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Evaluation of Sida's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

Synthesis Report

Sida

Foreword

Violent conflicts lead to immense suffering, constitute major obstacles to development and prevent people from escaping poverty. While poverty is generally decreasing on a global level, people living in poverty are increasingly concentrated to fragile countries affected by conflict. Today, there is a broad consensus within the international community on the need to invest in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to reach the Global Goals. As a response, Sida is increasingly focusing support to countries affected by conflict.

Support to peacebuilding is not new. Sida has been engaged in conflict and post-conflict countries since the agency was established. Often, the devastating effects of conflict, and in its aftermath, the prospects of supporting the development towards more peaceful inclusive societies, has been the very reason for Swedish engagement. In other contexts, support to peacebuilding has been more indirect through engagement in sectors and areas of support far beyond projects supporting conflict resolution and dialogue. Engagement in for example the health sector, institution building, decentralisation or livelihoods, has often had the purpose of contributing to sustainable peace or to implement peace agreements.

Effective support to peacebuilding implies learning from previous support, from what has worked well and what has worked less well. This evaluation is the first of its kind, taking a long-term perspective to capture general lessons learned and impact of Sida's approach to peacebuilding. The aim of the evaluation is to systematise experiences and learnings from Sida's support to peacebuilding from four different country contexts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. We hope that the findings of this evaluation can contribute to sharpen Sida's engagement for peacebuilding to support people's ability to escape poverty.

We wish to express our gratitude to the evaluation team and to the time and interest invested by all those who have participated in the evaluation. The evaluation process has served as a dynamic learning tool for Sida to compile the collected knowledge from staff at Sida, partners, experts and other stakeholders.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CDA	Collaborative for Development Action
CICIG	Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EU	European Union
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
GBV	Gender Based Violence
IAP	Integrated Area Project
ICMP	International Commission on Missing Persons
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRDP	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
JPLG	Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MIGEPROF	Ministry for Women's Promotion
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTFs	Multi Donor Trust Funds
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MSC	Most Significant Change

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PSGs	Peace and Statebuilding Goals
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
RBM	Results Based Management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
ToC	Theory of change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Preface

This report provides the overall findings of the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts since the early 1990s. It is a synthesis of findings from four country evaluations of Sida's peacebuilding support in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. The evaluation was commissioned by Sida and carried out by Tana Copenhagen between May 2018 and January 2019.

Members of the evaluation team were:

- Erik Bryld, Team Leader, lead author Somalia
- Julian Brett, evaluator, lead author Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Nadia Masri-Pedersen, evaluator, lead author Guatemala
- Cécile Collin, evaluator, lead author Rwanda.

Quality assurance of the report has been provided by André Kahlmeyer.

This report incorporates feedback from Sida, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Embassies in Sarajevo, Guatemala City, Kigali and Nairobi.

Executive Summary

This report presents a synthesis of the findings from the evaluation of Sida's support to peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict contexts commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. The report analyses and summarizes findings from four country evaluations of Sida's support to peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. This is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding-related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida.

The evaluation assesses Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding at the strategic level. The focus on the four countries was stipulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) and enables the evaluation to present and compare different contexts where Sida has engaged. The evaluation seeks to identify what has worked well and, conversely, what has worked less well. This includes an assessment of strategic decisions and prioritisation, especially those with a focus on peacebuilding and where peacebuilding has been an explicit part of the Swedish strategy. It also focuses on areas where peacebuilding was not a specific objective, but where the evaluation team has been able to identify peacebuilding effects.

The evaluation was also required to pay particular attention to four of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development – Development Assistance Committee's (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria, namely:

- Relevance of Sida's peacebuilding work vis-à-vis contextual and beneficiary needs, and Sida's policy priorities
- Effectiveness of Sida's peacebuilding work in terms of contributing to overall peacebuilding objectives, as well as Sida's ability to provide a conducive framework for its partners' peacebuilding work
- Impact of Sida's peacebuilding work, and
- Sustainability of Sida's peacebuilding work.

Across all four criteria, special emphasis has been given to results related to gender equality, women's empowerment and rights and inclusiveness of marginalised groups and ethnic minorities. For all four countries, the evaluation focused on aspects of marginalisation that are linked to peacebuilding, and where the issue has been reflected in literature and interviews. Marginalised groups have primarily been considered from the perspective of ethnicity or as a consequence of being a minority. This is because, in all four cases, ethnic factors form a major part of the root causes of conflict.

The evaluation team applied a 'timeline' theory-based **approach** to the evaluation assessing Swedish strategies and Sida's portfolios over time against conflict and

peace drivers, contextual developments and the international engagement in the countries concerned. The methodology was based on the premise that the evaluation is longitudinal, covering up to 25 years of engagement in peacebuilding in the targeted countries; and that it is strategic, focusing not on individual project results but rather on the overall approach taken by Sida and its influence on peacebuilding. However, while the evaluation is not an assessment of individual projects, the team also applied a Most Significant Change (MSC) approach in order to highlight selected individual projects that had an impact.

The longitudinal element means that the evaluation has, to a large extent, relied on documentation that is available and the experience and perceptions of those Sida staff and other experts who can recall reflections and decisions made across the long timeline of Sida's interventions. There were a number of challenges involved in this and which reflect **limitations** to the evaluation, including:

- *Attribution versus contribution*: in light of the fact that the evaluation focuses at the macro (and thus aggregate) level, the effects or changes produced are often the product of multiple inputs, including joint approaches with other like-minded development partners, or those engaged in similar theories of change, thereby making it difficult to attribute changes specifically to Sida. To mitigate this, the team focused on the contributions and likely effects of Sida's engagements rather than on direct attribution.

- *'Retroactive thinking'*: the four country case studies start from early 1990s and thus rely heavily on Sida staff and external stakeholders' recollections of events and actions from the past. Informants' recollections may have adapted and changed (unwittingly) over time, thus influencing the quality and/or accuracy of the information. To accommodate this limitation, the team triangulated or compared statements made with available secondary data.

- *Availability of older data*: the time passed since the early 1990s has influenced the amount of primary data available for older engagements. The team found it particularly difficult to obtain data prior to 2000, and to find individuals who were present and could recollect accurately what happened in this period. Consequently, the evidence base is stronger at the more recent end of the evaluation than for the first decade.

- *Quality and evaluability of data*: as already mentioned, the focus on the strategic or macro level means that the documentation available is less detailed than desirable, and this affects its evaluability. The team sought to mitigate this by undertaking assessments that extend from strategy to programme/project level.

With these limitations in mind, the evaluation has had a strong focus on validation and triangulation. The longitudinal nature of the evaluation means that the team drew heavily from Sida's documentation and Sida staff recollections of discussions and events. The team sought to triangulate this information with input from external experts and desk studies of non-Sida documentation. A panel of four independent experts was used to help facilitate this. The findings in the four country evaluations and in this synthesis report are contingent on either verbal confirmation by three or more independent sources or by one verbal source combined with an independent evaluation or assessment finding. In areas where the issues concern Sida and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) only, the team relied on at least three different sources for the information to qualify as a finding.

The evaluation progressed through a number of **evaluation phases**, with opportunities for interaction with Sida and external experts at each major point. Following an initial inception and mapping of documentation (that culminated in a brief inception report), the team undertook a desk-based analysis of the four countries resulting in a consolidated desk study report. This was discussed with Sida and the expert panel and formed the basis for the subsequent field work in the four countries. The field work and related interviews over telephone and Skype fed into an analysis phase and the production of four country evaluation reports and this synthesis report.

Validation and learning (utilisation) formed a key part of the evaluation, both to ensure that the findings are correct, and as a means of learning for the team as well as for Sida staff. In addition to written feedback from Sida, a number of validation mechanisms were included in the process. First and foremost, the team interacted with the evaluation steering committee and reference groups at Sida following the production of drafts of each specific output. At Sida level, this was complemented with debriefings at embassies as well as two specific workshop events: (1) the presentation of preliminary findings at Sida's Human Security Network workshop in October 2018, and (2) at a validation workshop at Sida in November 2018 during which the synthesis report was discussed.

As already mentioned, the team also made use of an independent expert panel (comprising two Swedish and two international experts with extensive experience of evaluation and peacebuilding). The expert panel provided valuable inputs to the methodology and desk report and gave reflections and feedback on findings and recommendations to ensure usability of the evaluation for Sida. The four experts were: Nicole Ball, Jannie Lilja, Emery Brusset, and Fredrik Uggla. All the evaluation outputs have also undergone an external quality assurance process undertaken by evaluation expert, André Kahlmeyer,

Underpinning the evaluation is the team's understanding of peacebuilding. The **concept of peacebuilding** is widely debated, and interviews at Sida also reveal differences within the organisation regarding its meaning. However, to enable the evaluation team to assess Sida's contribution over time, we adopted the following working

definition, that is, *to qualify as peacebuilding for this evaluation the intervention portfolio or project must have had an explicit or implicit influence on the drivers of peace and/or conflict.*

The team assessed the relevance and effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives at the time of their implementation, whether they resulted in a long-term peace impact, as well as the sustainability of results. This approach recognised that, while initiatives may have contributed to peacebuilding by increasing short to medium-term and/or local stability, they may not necessarily have resulted in long-term peace impact, which requires reducing the underlying root causes of conflict on a wider scale. As an example, Sida's support to the federalisation process in Somalia has contributed to short and medium-term stability and longer-term state formation, yet the process remains constrained in terms of ensuring representation of marginalised groups and, therefore, falls short in terms of addressing a key root cause of conflict. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the support to state level institutions has contributed to the implementation of the Dayton Accords and to short- and medium-term stability but it has not directly addressed the ethnic divisions of the country. The exceptions to this have mainly occurred at a local level (in mixed communities) where Sida (and other international actors) have tackled this core conflict driver.

The evaluation recognises that the four countries assessed have significant differences in terms of their level of conflict, the root causes of conflict, as well as the drivers of peace. In all of them, Sida has been supporting peacebuilding with different types, and intensity, of engagement over the course of the evaluation period and with differing financial envelopes. In some countries, Sida has been acting as a lead donor and been very active in the policy dialogue, while in others Sida's support has been aligned with other like-minded development partners. The case studies thus provide a good basis for understanding Sida's work in peacebuilding across different contexts and timelines.

Overview of key findings
The evaluation of Sida's peacebuilding approach and results shows that the agency stands out from other development partners. Although the characteristics of the approach are not unique individually, when combined, they give Sida a special niche in peacebuilding. Throughout the period of the evaluation, Sida's engagement in peacebuilding has been first and foremost value-based and something for which Sida has been recognised by other development partners, implementing partners, and recipient governments. This value-based approach is a core competence for Sida and has offered comparative advantage in its peacebuilding work, for which it has been acknowledged in the policy dialogue on rights and international commitments to peace agreements.

Sida's value-based approach has emerged in two ways: (i) in terms of commitment to the peacebuilding agenda from a perspective of equitable access to resources and rights, with a strong emphasis on rights, and in particular women's rights in policy

dialogue and in terms of partners chosen; and (ii) in how Sida has approached peace-building and engaged with the partner country and other development partners. The latter in particular concerns (a) providing a conducive framework for partners to operate in, (b) enabling the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral agencies to perform against their mandates, and (c) always committing Sida to provide support that is aligned with international treaties, conventions and goals. During the period evaluated, this has not changed significantly in any of the four countries, as illustrated by findings related to the evaluation questions, as summarised below.

Relevance: concerning the extent to which Sida's approach to peacebuilding in the four case study countries has been aligned with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and, more specifically, the countries' peace and security challenges. Overall, the evaluation finds that Sida's support has been relevant to the general context in terms of the development and statebuilding needs and beneficiaries addressed. However, the *alignment of the theories of change in the Swedish strategies and underlying Sida documentation to specific peacebuilding needs* has been weak because, with some exceptions, it has failed to sufficiently target the key root causes of conflict. Thus, while close to all projects have identified activities and outputs that were relevant to beneficiary needs at the time, including shorter to medium-term stability priorities, these have often not addressed root causes of conflict. The evaluation finds that this is because the strategies have not provided sufficient explanations for how Sida's engagements would address the root causes of conflict and thereby contribute to long-term peace. As a result, this reduced their potential peacebuilding relevance.

However, the evaluation finds that the above shortcomings have often been compensated by the activity of qualified staff and long-term partners with the capacity to identify and implement relevant peacebuilding work. On the other hand, this poses a quality risk should these staff or partners not be available, lack sufficient experience, or should they fail to be sufficiently innovative.

Overall, the *degree of alignment between the theories of change and women's and marginalised groups' rights and needs* is found to be high. Particularly when it comes to women's rights, Sida has moved from a focus on women as beneficiaries towards a focus on women's roles in peacebuilding. The attention to marginalised groups has varied; there has been an emphasis on indigenous people's rights in Guatemala but, while present, this has been less marked in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Somalia and in Rwanda, Sida took a conscious decision not to engage on the issue of ethnicity.

For all four countries, the evaluation finds that *the Swedish strategies as well as Sida's approach has been fully aligned with national peacebuilding plans, the international agenda, as well as with Swedish policies*.

Effectiveness: concerning the extent to which Sida's strategic approaches have contributed to intended peacebuilding outcomes. Overall, the evaluation finds that Sida's effectiveness in terms of addressing root causes of conflict has been limited in each of

the four countries given the lack of alignment between Sida portfolios and the conflict root causes. As noted above under relevance, drivers of conflict and peace have not been sufficiently highlighted in Swedish country (and regional) strategies and related documents in a manner that can guide and explain Sida's programming. However, in terms of *responding to peacebuilding opportunities*, the evaluation finds that Sida and its partners across all four countries have been effective in identifying and prioritising projects that, in one way or another, have contributed to peacebuilding at the local level, and that have contributed to short to medium-term stability. In other words, projects supported by Sida have contributed to a reduction in political violence, or the risk of it, and have contributed to institutional stability. However, because these gains have generally been short term, the impact on sustainable peace in terms of eliminating or reducing root causes of conflict has been limited. This is demonstrated by the fact that today the four countries still exhibit the same major drivers of conflict as they did in the 1990s.

The evaluation finds that *Sida has had a high degree of adaptability to the changing context*, and thus has been geared to operate in a peacebuilding context. This has been a consequence of Sida's overall approach to development, which has included long-term engagement with the same partners ensuring a high degree of predictability as well as flexibility in the funding provided. The evaluation also finds that there has been strong cooperation and alignment between Sida and the Swedish MFA. Similarly, Sida's perceived neutrality in most cases has made it a preferred partner, being relatively free from economic and security interests. And as a final point, Sida has shown itself to be a strong advocate for the use of the multilateral system; the evaluation has multiple examples of how Sida has strived to enhance the effectiveness of the same.

There are, however, risks around the current and past Sida approach, which merit attention in future Sida programming and implementation. First and foremost, the high reliance on the same partners and the limited use of independent information to inform portfolio decisions presents a risk for being caught in the same discourse and limits opportunities for engaging in new initiatives.

In terms of *ensuring conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm,* Sida has had the tools in place, but their application on the ground has not been always sufficient to ensure that partners have been fully attentive in their programming to conflict triggers and ethical considerations.

The degree to which Sida has been *effective in ensuring results related to women and marginalised groups* is generally positive. Sida has played a significant role among the international community and with partners in terms of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment in three out of the four countries. The effectiveness around ensuring the rights of marginalised groups has been more mixed, with Guatemala standing out as the best case.

Impact: concerning the overall effect of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct, indirect, intended and unintended, positive and negative results. Overall, in three of the four countries assessed, the level of political violence has reduced over time. And the evaluation team found that in all four countries, Sida has played an important role in supporting processes that have contributed to this change. Having said that, the evaluation also finds that none of these countries has seen a significant change in the root causes of conflict over the period evaluated. In many ways, the targeted countries are facing situations of negative peace, with lower levels of political violence but with the potential for renewed or exacerbated conflict still very much present. Below the macro level, progress has been identified in relation to peacebuilding and there have been pockets of contextual change towards peace to which Sida has contributed.

Furthermore, the evaluation finds that Sida has *contributed to the improvement of the situation for women* in a peacebuilding context. There are numerous examples of this at both institutional and local levels. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina Sida has contributed to the development of gender action plans as well as concrete peacebuilding initiatives involving women as actors at the local level. In Guatemala the extensive support to transitional justice contributed to women survivors gaining recognition. The impact in terms of ensuring inclusion of the most marginalised is, however, less evident (with the notable exception of Guatemala).

Sustainability: concerning the extent to which the results are maintained. The evaluation finds that, in all four countries, the long-term sustainability of Sida's support has varied over time. None of the countries has reached a sustainable and inclusive political settlement, which also provides for enhanced gender equality. Nonetheless, Sida has contributed to the present situation (which shows improvement in certain areas) in all four countries. In some cases, sustainability of this impact has been achieved in geographically delineated areas (e.g. Somaliland) or with specific sub-thematic areas (e.g. transitional justice). At the portfolio and project level, the evaluation finds that where there has been an institutional focus – be it through state or civil society – the interventions have been more likely to be sustainable.

Recommendations
The evaluation's conclusions lead to a number of recommendations, which are summed up below, and in more detail in the main report. The evaluation finds that Sida's value-based approach is a core competence and comparative advantage and should be continued in its peacebuilding work. However, to be meaningful in all contexts and to make a difference for long-term peacebuilding, there are a number of areas where Sida should consider further enhancing its approach. These are:

1) To be effective in its targeted peacebuilding work, it is recommended that Sida enhance its focus on drivers of peace and conflict and to link these specifically to the expected results of its peacebuilding work at country level. Theories of change should be made explicit and should explain how Sida will work with drivers of peace, and how it will target root causes of conflict. This

focus on drivers of peace and conflict and the related theory of change should be part of the full programming cycle. In order to promote a consistent approach, it would be worthwhile developing practical guidance on how peacebuilding can be introduced into overall theories of change. Further, it is recommended that Sida's quality assurance process be enhanced to include peacebuilding perspectives and ensure that drivers of peace and conflict are fully reflected in Sida's documentation.

2) With human rights as a core value and a specific focus on inclusiveness, it is recommended that the issue of marginalisation becomes a central part of Sida's peacebuilding work on a par with the focus on women's rights.

3) While Sida already has a strong profile in terms of ensuring the rights of women and their inclusion in peacebuilding processes in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the team recommends that Sida enhances this further.

4) To compensate for the heavy reliance on the same long-term partners for contextual and effectiveness related information, it is recommended that Sida consider introducing third-party monitoring and related mechanisms to assess and monitor the peace and conflict situation, the performance of its partners, as well as using it to inform decision-making on future support and strategy processes.

5) Sida should continue to apply the Sida 'classic' approach to peacebuilding, which includes an emphasis on flexibility, predictability and long-term partnerships, and the strong link and mutual support between the MFA and Sida. However, the approach should be updated and made explicit for a peacebuilding context. As part of this, Sida should consider the downside (of the generally positive) long-term partnerships versus identifying and engaging with new partners.

6) The emphasis on working with multilateral organisations, in particular the UN, and efforts to make them more effective and efficient should be continued. The process should be made more strategic in terms of providing guidance to Sida programme officers in the dialogue with the multilaterals. To identify how to best support this, it is recommended that Sida assess lessons learned from working with the UN and others (such as the World Bank) and mainstream these across the portfolio.

7) Finally, it is recommended that Sida further enhance the application of its focus on Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity in programming and in its assessment of, and dialogue with, implementing partners. This should reflect that conflict sensitivity also concerns positioning to take advantage of opportunities for peace.

1 Introduction

This report is a synthesis of an evaluation of Sida's support to peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict contexts commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. The evaluation is the first longitudinal assessment of peacebuilding related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and is focused on the support provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia from the early 1990s till today. The report analyses and summarises findings from the four country evaluations that are included as Annexes C to F.

The evaluation assesses Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding on the strategic level, presenting different contexts for Sida's engagement and identifying what has worked well and what has worked less well. This includes an assessment of strategic decisions and prioritisation, especially those with a focus on peacebuilding and where peacebuilding has been an overt a part of the Swedish strategy. It also focuses on areas where peacebuilding was not a specific objective, but where the evaluation team has been able to identify peacebuilding effects.

The evaluation was launched in May 2018 and comprised a desk phase in May-July 2018 documenting findings from available secondary data sources; a Stockholm interview phase in August 2018 where Sida and Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff were interviewed; a field level data collection phase in September and October 2018 with key informant interviews and focus group discussions in the four countries over a 5-12 day period; and a synthesis and validation phase in October and November 2018, which included learning and validation workshops with Sida staff. The key findings and recommendations of the evaluation were presented at a seminar in Stockholm on 24th January 2019.

To ensure the quality of the evaluation, provide inputs to sharpening the evidence and suggestions for the recommendations, as well as to allow for cross-donor reflections, the main outputs of the evaluation have been examined by an independent expert panel comprising:

- Nicole Ball, Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy
- Jannie Lilja, Associate Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
- Emery Brusset, Consultant, Managing Director, Social Terrain
- Fredrik Uggla, Independent Consultant and Professor at Stockholm University.

During the course of the evaluation, the evaluation team consulted around 150 stake-holders. We would like to thank all interviewees as well as Sida and MFA staff involved in Stockholm, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia (see also Annex B). The views expressed in this report are however the sole responsibility of Tana Copenhagen and the evaluation team.

The synthesis report is divided into a number of chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the methodology used to undertake the evaluation taking into consideration its strategic and longitudinal aspects. In Chapter 3, we discuss the concept of peacebuilding and how Sida has approached this in the past. We also provide a summary of how the term has been used for this evaluation. In Chapter 4, we present the findings in a synthesised manner against the four major evaluation criteria that are applied. In Chapter 5, we summarise and reflect on the major conclusions, and this is then followed by recommendations in Chapter 6.

2 Methodology

The methodology[1] for the evaluation has been designed based on the premise that the assessment is longitudinal, covering up to 25 years of engagement in peacebuilding, and that it is strategic, focusing not on the individual project results, but rather on the overall strategic approach taken by Sida in the given contexts in terms of its influence on peacebuilding. The longitudinal element means that - as described in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex A) – the evaluation relied to a large extent on the documentation that exists, and on the experience and perceptions of Sida staff and experts who could recall reflections and decisions made across the long timeline of Sida's interventions.

The evaluation focuses on four of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)'s evaluation criteria,[2] namely:

- *Relevance* of Sida's peacebuilding work vis-à-vis contextual and beneficiary needs and Sida's policy priorities
- *Effectiveness* of Sida's peacebuilding work in terms of contributing to overall peacebuilding, as well as Sida's ability to provide a conducive framework for partners' peacebuilding work
- *Impact* of Sida's peacebuilding work
- *Sustainability* of Sida's peacebuilding work.

Special emphasis has been given to the focus on and results related to gender equality, women's empowerment and inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups. We should note here that the focus of the evaluation is on peacebuilding. In terms of marginalisation, the team examined areas where the literature or interviewees pointed to conflict and peacebuilding influencing or being influenced by marginalisation. In each of the four countries evaluated, ethnic imbalances or factors form part of the root causes of conflict and represent a key driver of marginalisation. Thus, there is a focus on ethnic groups and minorities in the report.[3]

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[1] The evaluation is designed in accordance with OECD-DAC's quality standards and terminologies used are in accordance with the OECD-DAC Glossary. See
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/qualitystandardsfordevelopmentevaluation.htm

[2] The fifth OECD-DAC criterion of efficiency was not included by Sida in the ToR

[3] In contrast, in none of the countries did interviewees point specifically to People Living with Disabilities or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual or Intersex as specifically targeted by or influencing

The team used an expanded evaluation matrix to identify sub-questions and indicators against which the evaluation criteria have been assessed. For a full list of evaluation questions and indicators please see Annex I.

The team also needed to have a common conceptual understanding of peace-building in order to (a) provide a common benchmark against which to assess the relevance and effectiveness of Sida's portfolio and approach, and (b) frame the discussion with stakeholders and other sources for data collection. At the same time, we were conscious that the international and academic understanding of what is covered by peacebuilding varies and has varied over time. And that the team's conceptual understanding needed to relate closely to Sida's own understanding so as to enable an assessment of how Sida has responded to the peace and conflict context in the countries being evaluated. Therefore, we have used the following definition that:

> to qualify as peacebuilding for this evaluation *the intervention portfolio or project must have an explicit or implicit influence on the drivers of peace and/or conflict to be taken into consideration.*

From a methodological perspective, the team also worked to differentiate interventions which were relevant at the time and where Sida has been effective in providing peacebuilding contributions to short to medium-term stability (such as providing statebuilding interventions to enhance state legitimacy or strengthening service delivery to targeted populations), and then it sought to assess the long-term impact and sustainability of peace, which requires a positive change in terms of reducing the root causes of conflict.

The team developed and applied *a 'timeline' and theory-based approach* to the evaluation. As the evaluation covers multiple years, theories of change were identified for major strategy periods and/or periods of significant contextual relevance from a peacebuilding perspective in the country context. The theories of change were derived from Swedish strategies combined with an assessment of the portfolio based on documents and interviews. Using the timeline approach, the multiple theories of change were then mapped and assessed against: (i) the contextual events in the period; (ii) their explicit and implicit targeting of key conflict and peace drivers in the country; (iii) major international events; and (iv) engagements by other development partners

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peacebuilding or conflict. That does not mean that sub-section of marginalised groups do not face discrimination. As an example, homosexuality is punished with imprisonment in Somalia and is penalized in Rwanda.

in the period. *The timeline approach* thus provides an overview of Sida's ability to respond to the peacebuilding context in a relevant and effective manner.

While the evaluation does not look at all individual projects (the evaluation's terms of reference are strategic and not project oriented), the team nonetheless also applied a Most Significant Change (MSC)[4] methodology to identify individual projects that have made a significant difference and to assess and extract lessons learned and to document potential Sida contributions to results. These are described in the boxes in the individual country reports in Annexes C to F.

The evaluation is also novel in the sense that it is assessing change over a very long time-period, and operates largely at a macro-level, using a theory of change lens. This also means that there are a number of limitations, some of which were apparent at the outset, while others only emerged during the course of the evaluation:

- *Attribution versus contribution*: in light of the fact that the evaluation focuses at the macro (and thus aggregate) level, the effects or changes produced are often the product of multiple inputs, including joint approaches with other like-minded development partners, or those engaged in similar theories of change, thereby making it difficult to attribute changes specifically to Sida. To mitigate this, the team focused on the contributions and likely effects of Sida's engagements rather than on direct attribution. In practice, at the aggregate level, Sida's contribution to peacebuilding is assessed against overall peacebuilding trends, to which other donors have contributed as well. To focus on where Sida has been effective, and the reason for this, the Most Significant Change approach was applied to projects identified by Sida or other interviewees as having been effective. In these cases, the team used external evaluations to verify this effectiveness. Again, here, funding is usually from more than one source and thus the assessment relates to contribution only.

- *'Retroactive thinking'*: the country level evaluations start from the early 1990s and thus rely heavily upon the memories of Sida staff and external stakeholders concerning events and actions at that time. Informants' recollections may have adapted and changed (unwittingly) over time, thus influencing the quality and/or accuracy of the information. There is also a tendency among interviewees to present the period where they were involved in the given country as being of significant importance. To mitigate for this possible bias, the team triangulated statements with available secondary data, such as evaluations and progress reports, as well as by seeking confirmation from at least two other

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[4] During interviews and in desk studies, the team worked to identify projects that have made significant change in the four contexts. Not all projects were assessed, but it is rather based on the recommendations from Sida, resource persons and other development partners. The change has been assessed based on interviews and available evaluations and reviews.

independent sources/interviewees. All evidence presented is thus based on multiple sources of information.

- *Availability of older data*: time has influenced the amount of primary data collection for older engagements. In particular, the team found it difficult to obtain documentation prior to 2000 and to find individuals who were present and could recollect what happened in this period. Consequently, the evidence base is stronger at the end period of the evaluation than for the first decade. This also means that the findings are more detailed and with a higher level of triangulation in the latter part of the period evaluated. In the country reports, there are reflections on periods with very limited data and thus limited findings as well.

- *Quality and evaluability of data*: as already mentioned, the focus on the strategic or macro level means that documentation is sometimes less detailed than desirable, and this affects its evaluability. The team sought to mitigate this by undertaking a selection of assessments that extend from strategy to programme/project level. To the extent possible, this includes utilising existing evaluations that are available. However, the limited number of evaluations (and the fact that there are few thematic or country level evaluations of Sida support) means that there is a high level of reliance on data gathered through interviews with external sources. This data quality concern means that the team has only included findings that adhere to the strict triangulation requirements of the evaluation as outlined above and below.

The longitudinal nature of the evaluation means that the team relied heavily on Sida documentation and the recollection of Sida staff concerning discussions and events. The team sought to triangulate this information with the input from external experts and desk studies of non-Sida documentation. All findings in the country reports and the synthesis report are contingent on either verbal confirmation of the finding by three independent sources or by one verbal source combined with an independent evaluation (thus findings which only rely on Sida and partner statements are assessed to have an insufficient level of triangulation to merit inclusion in the report).

The team carried out key informant interviews with Sida and MFA staff, with a focus on key decision makers for the individual country programmes during the course of identification and implementation of a programme. This included Sida heads of cooperation as well as technical experts or desk officers with a specific mandate related to peacebuilding for the targeted country at the specific time.

Interviewees (both internal and external to Sida) were identified by the team based on the desk analysis as well as from inputs/recommendations from Sida in Stockholm and at country level. Key criteria for the persons interviewed were that they either (a) had a strong knowledge of the political and peacebuilding developments in the country (including experts with specific understanding of gender equality, women's inclu-

sion and marginalisation), and/or (b) were experts that had a strong link to and understanding of Sida's involvement in the given country over time.

Validation and learning (utilisation) were a key part of the evaluation to ensure that the findings are correct, but also as a means of learning for the team as well as for Sida staff. In addition to written feedback on the inception report, desk report, country reports and synthesis report, a number of other validation mechanisms were included in the process. First and foremost, the team interacted with the evaluation steering committee and reference groups following the production of drafts of each specific output. At Sida level this was complemented with debriefings at embassies as well as two specific workshop events: (1) the presentation of preliminary findings at the Sida Human Security Network workshop to around 60 Sida and MFA staff in October 2018 and (2) at a synthesis report workshop at Sida in November 2018 with emphasis on expanding the recommendations and making them relevant and actionable for Sida.

Finally, the team made use of the expertise provided by the four independent evaluation and peacebuilding experts mentioned above. The expert panel provided inputs to (a) the methodology and desk report to allow the team to apply these in the field research phase, and (b) reflections and feedback on findings and recommendations of the synthesis report. The inputs contributed to further sharpening the conclusions and recommendations for use by Sida. In addition, the evaluation has drawn from external quality assurance of all outputs from inception report to synthesis and country reports undertaken by evaluation expert André Kahlmeyer. Mr. Kahlmeyer's comments helped further sharpen the reports and ensured that the outputs met Tana and subsequently Sida standards.

3 Peacebuilding in an international and Sida Context

As noted above, evaluating Sida's peacebuilding approach(es) since the early 1990s requires an understanding and conceptualisation of what peacebuilding means and how it is used by the international community as well as by Sida.

The literature and policy documents that are available point to some confusion over terms, including the links between peacebuilding, statebuilding and conflict prevention, as is illustrated in the sections that follow.[5] This chapter therefore provides an overview of how the concept of peacebuilding has developed over the evaluation period and it locates Sida's understanding of the concept within this evolution. While reflecting Sida's role as a development agency (which in Sida's case means that less attention is paid to using hard security tools, e.g. military peacekeeping), we assess that Sida's understanding has been aligned with that of other key international actors.

3.1 THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON PEACEBUILDING

To understand Sida's approach to peacebuilding, we need to situate it within the international discussion and discourse. The first significant attention to peacebuilding internationally more or less coincides with the evaluation timeline, as the concept was introduced by the United Nations (UN) in the *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. This determined that peacebuilding was "*intended to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict*."[6] The UN focus on peacebuilding was further increased with the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery in 2001 and the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. This was complemented by an enhanced peacebuilding focus among academics during the same period. Together, these steps further strengthened the international focus on development aspects of peacebuilding.

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[5] See among others: Encouraging effective evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity: Towards DAC Guidance, OECD 2007

[6] UN (1992): An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.

In 2004, the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding[7] examined the peacebuilding efforts of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (UK) and highlighted *inter alia* the importance of locating peacebuilding activities (and their assessment or evaluation) within overall strategic frameworks at the country level as well as more generally. According to Utstein, "*peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the conditions, attitudes and behaviour that foster and sustain social and economic development that is peaceful, stable and prosperous. To this end, it uses a wide range of policy instruments. Some are activities undertaken as projects – discreet, chronologically limited activities, implemented by partner organisations; other policy instruments include diplomatic initiatives and military operations.*" To illustrate this complexity, Utstein referred to what it termed the *peacebuilding palette*, this being a mix of security, socio-economic, political, and reconciliation and justice factors or tools that can contribute to building peace. In assessing how the four countries actually performed, the study found that a significant proportion (over 55%) of the peacebuilding interventions assessed were not adequately linked to such strategic approaches and that the basis for assessing their impact was tenuous.[8] The Utstein study contributed to a broader strengthening of international aid effectiveness in conflict-affected and fragile states during the mid-2000s.

Subsequently, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) took a policy lead on conceptualising development assistance in fragile states and the related intervention modalities within the context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and also played a key role in promoting the same at OECD-DAC. As part of this, statebuilding also developed as a key complement to peacebuilding and was further cemented with the OECD-DAC's introduction of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007), as well as the broader aid effectiveness agenda promoted through the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2007), and the Busan Partnership Agreement and the New Deal in 2012. The latter introduced the mechanism of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to guide priorities at the country level. The first three of the goals, being particularly relevant here, are: (1) legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; (2) security: establish and strengthen people's security; and (3) justice: address injustices and increase people's access to justice. With these principles and goals, international donors committed themselves to enhance the focus on alignment and ownership in fragile and conflict-affected states and to engage in more result-oriented, coordinated and joint initiatives.

The further multilateralisation of peacebuilding efforts has become increasingly visible over the past two decades, in particular in Africa and South East Asia. And, in

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[7] Towards a strategic framework for peacebuilding: Getting their act together. Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Norwegian MFA

[8] Ibid

addition to the UN, the World Bank has become increasingly involved in peacebuilding related activities, notably via the establishment and management of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in fragile and conflict-affected states such as Afghanistan (2001), South Sudan (2005) and more recently in Somalia (2017). In parallel, individual bilateral development partners such as the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark have established specific stabilisation funds aimed at combining development assistance with capacity development activities implemented through non-Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) sources. The European Union (EU) established its Instrument for Stability, which in 2014 was transformed into the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Yet, after three decades of working explicitly on peacebuilding the concept remains 'ambiguous' with most development partners, as documented in the recent case study synthesis by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).[9]

3.1.1 SWEDISH GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AND SIDA POLICIES

Sweden[10] has been one of the most persistent advocates for peacebuilding since the concept was introduced in the early 1990s, which is also evidenced by the extensive number of peacebuilding related policies and tools published since then, culminating with the launch of a range of new policy and operational tools for peacebuilding in 2017 (see also Annex J). The Swedish Government's focus on peacebuilding is also evident at the international policy level with it advocating for key peace reform processes such as the inclusion of peace as a specific goal of the SDGs and resolutions backing the UN's agenda for sustaining peace (UN Security Council Resolution 2282) in 2016.[11]

Peacebuilding features as one of several sub-objectives under Sweden's overall objective of poverty alleviation and Swedish Government strategies have throughout the evaluation period focused on peace as a foundation for poverty alleviation. As a key implementing agency for the strategies, Sida has a long tradition of engaging in peacebuilding from a development perspective, which is also illustrated by the fact that Sida has had peace and security approaches in place since 1999,[12] as described in Table 3.1 below and in Annex J. These display a strong and consistent focus on conflict prevention. There is also an emphasis on influencing the actors involved in conflict and thus support to more direct peacebuilding interventions. Of the various strat-

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[9] ECDPM (2018): Supporting peacebuilding in times of change – a synthesis of 4 case studies, p 5.

[10] Note, that in the reports references to Sweden concerns the Swedish Government, in these cases often represented by the MFA, while references to Sida refer specifically to Sida as an agency of the Government.

[11] ECDPM (2018), p 24.

[12] Sida (1999): Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding

egies and policies, the 2005 policy is the broadest and includes more "peace dividend"[13] type activities such as road construction, although recognising also the need for such interventions to be explicitly targeted and linked to peacebuilding or conflict prevention.

The most recent global Swedish Government strategy is from 2017 - the Strategy for Sustainable Peace (*Strategi för Hållbar Fred*) – and is also relatively broad. This includes the objective "*to improve the prevention of armed conflict, effective conflict resolution, sustainable peace - and statebuilding and increased human security in fragile and conflict-affected states, with strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalised groups*." As such, the strategy aligns with its predecessors, although greater weight is placed on integrated approaches that take into account economically, socially and environmentally sustainable and gender equal solutions. The strategy also includes an objective on "*peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, including in forgotten and protracted conflicts.*"[14] This represents a departure from previous strategies but is firmly in line with the 2007 OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.

Table 3.1 – Overview of key Swedish Government strategies and Sida policies relating to peacebuilding

Swedish or Sida policy or strategy	Main objective and definitions
Strategi för Hållbar Fred 2017-2022 (***Strategy for Sustainable Peace***)	– Swedish Government Strategy – Objective(s): to improve the prevention of armed conflict, effective conflict resolution, sustainable peace- and statebuilding; increased human security. – National and local support during critical stages of prevention of armed conflict. Including in forgotten and protracted conflicts – Strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalised groups – Emphasis on UN and OECD-DAC alignment – Support should be long-term, yet fast/responsive, flexible and with a calculated risk, and rights based and perspective of poor people on development – Support must be economically, socially and environmentally sustainable and gender equal and considered in an integrated context.

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[13] The benefits of enhanced service delivery and less spending on defence following a peace agreement or similar arrangement

[14] Strategi Hållbar Fred 2017-2022, Swedish Government

Resultatstrategi för globala insatser för mänsklig säkerhet 2014-2017[15]	Result area 1: Human rights and freedom from violence. Focus on: - Conflict sensitivity and lapsing back into conflict - Gender Based violence (GBV) in conflict and post-conflict environments - Human security in conflict and post-conflict contexts Result area 2: Strong democracy and enhanced respect for human rights and freedom of expression. Focus on strong democratic processes and institutions and rule of law
Government Communication 2016/17:60 Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and humanitarian assistance	Key peacebuilding related points include: – Focus on statebuilding and to tackling the underlying causes of conflict and vulnerability. Including effective, responsible, open and inclusive institutions and for human rights – Strengthen capacity to withstand crises and handle conflict by peaceful means – Support to inclusive dialogues and mediation processes – Working in line with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – Contribute to strengthening the influence of women and girls and their meaningful participation in peace processes in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 – Work for transitional justice that incorporates the right to combat impunity
Government Communication 2013/14:131 Aid Policy Framework	Sub-objective 5: Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence. Focus on: - Reduced vulnerability to conflict and lapsing back into conflict - Greater human security in conflict and post-conflict situations - A reduction in gender-based violence *See details in the two sections above*
Peace and Security for Development 2010-2014	- Swedish Government policy - The policy defines peacebuilding as the process that endeavours to support the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability (including creating increased trust between the parties to a conflict; peace negotiations; implementation of peace agreements; participation of women and their influence in the peace process; creating reconciliation and actions that address the structural causes underlying the conflict) - Objectives: Promoting peace: influencing actors to support peacebuilding; capacity development to manage conflicts; involvement of women in peacebuilding process; Promoting security: security and justice sector reform; Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rein-

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[15] Before 2014 Sida's global interventions within the thematic area where guided by the strategy for global thematic strategic development interventions and prior to that the strategy for global development interventions, see https://www.regeringen.se/rapporter/2011/03/strategi-for-globala-amnesstrategiska-utvecklingsinsatser-2011-2014/ and
https://www.regeringen.se/rapporter/2007/12/strategi-for-globala-utvecklingsinsatser-2008-2010/

	tegration (DDR); arms control; demining; support to victims; awareness raising; Peace dividends: improvement in people's lives to ensure population support for peace (jobs, health, education etc.)
Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Co-operation 2005	Sida policy. Approaches include: – Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context – Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact – Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construction, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalised groups; trade; media; agriculture; Security Sector Reform). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict
Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 1999	Sida policy. Includes definitions: – Conflict management: aid financed projects implemented during armed conflict – Conflict prevention: activities aimed at preventing violence or escalation of violence – Peacebuilding: influencing parties involved in armed conflict
No Swedish Government or Sida global policy or strategy available pre-1999 relating to peacebuilding	

3.2 SIDA'S DEFINITION OF PEACEBUILDING

As noted above, the evaluation needed to relate to peacebuilding as it was defined and understood by Sida during the full period; that is from the early/mid-1990s onwards. During this period, various definitions have been used. In Sida's Issue Brief on Peacebuilding from June 2010, peacebuilding is described as involving "*(i) Capacity building that e.g. promotes women's participation in peace processes; (ii) Dialogue activities that will change attitudes and a continuous exchange of viewpoints as a process of negotiation and quest for common platform of thought and actions in a conflict situation and; (iii) Societal transformation i.e. transitional justice with a focus on justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of persuasive human rights abuses, armed conflict or a country in a fragile situation.*"[16]

Sida's current understanding of peacebuilding is explained in its concept document (January 2017) as "*initiatives [aiming] to contribute to a peaceful termination of a violent conflict and provide opportunities for sustained peace, through for example, mediation, dialogue and other types of confidence building activities.*"[17]

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[16] Sida Issue Brief on Peacebuilding, June 2010

[17] Defining key concepts, tools and operational responses, Sida, January 2017

These definitions are consistent with the OECD-DAC's definition provided in its guidance note on peacebuilding (2007) which is "*a broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations and which are explicitly guided and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of lasting and sustainable peace*."[18] And subsequently in the 2012 guidance, where OECD describes peacebuilding as concerning "*actions undertaken to reduce tensions and to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Beyond short-term actions, it includes the notion of long-term engagement. It consists of operational prevention, (i.e. immediate measures applicable in the face of crisis), and structural prevention, i.e. measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur.*"[19]

Sida's definition is also consistent with key parts of the Utstein definition presented earlier, although reflecting its status as a development agency, Sida's definitions are more development focused and do not include political and hard security aspects (i.e. military peacekeeping).

However, the degree to which Sida's definitions have been used in practice to form policy and guide programming is less clear and the use of a peacebuilding "marker" or indicator has varied considerably. The evaluation's assessment of portfolios and reporting (including on OpenAid) finds that often Sida has supported activities that are not clearly marked as peacebuilding but that can, nonetheless, be considered as having positive peacebuilding effects. This is partly a consequence of the fact that peacebuilding was only really introduced as a concept in Sida in 1999 and was only explicitly defined from 2010. But it also reflects that in some contexts the use of the word peacebuilding may be sensitive.

The current emphasis on being explicit is reflected in Sida's 2017 Statistical Handbook, which refers to "principal" and "significant" objectives, according to the degree to which peace and security features in the design and expected results of Sida's country engagements (see extract in table 3.2 below). As these reveal, both the principal and significant categories require a distinct peace and security focus. Where this is not the case, our findings in the chapters that follow suggest that important peacebuilding effects from Sida's engagements may be missed.

Table 3.2 - Sida's classification of peace and security 2017

Classification	Description and Criteria
Principal objective	The main objective of the project/programme is to advance peace and security. This objective is fundamental and explicitly reflected in its design and

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[18] Peacebuilding overview, OECD Issues Brief, 2005

[19] Evaluating peacebuilding activities in settings of conflict and fragility, OECD 2012

	expected results. The project/programme would not have been undertaken without this peace and security objective.
Significant objective	At least one objective for advancing peace and security is explicit and/or an integrated conflict perspective is explicitly reflected in the documentation. Peace and Security is an important and deliberate objective, but not the principal reason for undertaking the project/programme.
Not targeted	The project/programme has been screened against the criteria above but has been found not to fulfil them.

4 Findings

In the following sections, we present a synthesis of the findings from the four country evaluations and the headquarters level interviews. The findings are presented in accordance with the four OECD-DAC criteria specified for the evaluation (relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability) and are presented against the evaluation matrix (see Annex I). For a more detailed analysis divided into periods and geography, please see the individual country evaluations in Annexes C to F.

4.1 RELEVANCE

As is evident form the policy analysis above and confirmed in interviews with Sida staff, **the definition of peacebuilding varies in Sida** and with the MFA, and the relevance of peacebuilding as assessed by the individual staff members and embassies varies along with the definition. For example, interviews related to Sida's work in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed a general perception that almost everything Sida is engaged in there relates in one way or another to peacebuilding as the support seeks to contribute to implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Similarly, in Guatemala, as the support is - and has been – fully aligned with the peace agreement, most support is categorised by interviewees as peacebuilding even though some of the development interventions have limited direct influence on the drivers of peace and conflict. In Rwanda, development partners have needed to consider how they articulate peacebuilding. In Somalia, the definitions used by most interviewees are closely aligned with the definitions provided in Chapter 3 above.[20] The evaluation team finds that the substantial variations in the definitions eventually permeate the design of strategies and project designs where - as evidenced below – the link between programmes/projects and peacebuilding varies considerably. For the evaluation, we have used the definition outlined in Chapter 2 that **an intervention must have an explicit or implicit influence on the drivers of peace and/or conflict** to be taken into consideration.

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[20] Based on assessment of Swedish strategies and interviews with Sida staff in the field and at headquarters

4.1.1 THEORY OF CHANGE ALIGNMENT TO PEACEBUILD-ING CONTEXT

Across all four countries and across all periods assessed from the early 1990s to 2018, **the majority of Swedish regional and/or country level strategies, as well as the underlying Sida documents, that have had an explicit or an implicit peacebuilding element are assessed by the team to be relevant to the context at the time, in terms of the peacebuilding contribution to short to medium-term stability**. The team worked to identify theories of change for all strategy periods for all four countries. As the theories of change were rarely explicit in the strategies, we have worked with the implicit understandings drawing from the strategies and sector priorities.[21]

The level of strategy focus on peacebuilding has varied considerably over time and by country. In Rwanda, the strategies have been less explicit about peacebuilding goals. Similarly, the Bosnia and Herzegovina strategies have not referred specifically to peacebuilding, yet peace (and statebuilding) has been regarded as an overarching and long-standing objective of the support.[22] At the other end of the spectrum, all of Guatemala's strategies have related to peacebuilding explicitly and in particular the last strategy is very peacebuilding-oriented from objective to output level. The two Somalia strategies have referred to peacebuilding directly but with varying degrees of emphasis.

While the strategies and underlying documentation are assessed to have been generally relevant to peacebuilding needs at the time, **there are very few cases of strategies directly reflecting on and developing a theory of change around the drivers of peace and conflict in the four countries**; therefore the expected causality around the Sida support vis-à-vis explicit peacebuilding effects is often weak. The team identified, and verified through interviews with resource persons, key drivers of conflict and peace in all four countries (which have remained largely the same over the period evaluated) (see the peace and conflict chapters in the country reports in Annexes C-F). The team mapped these against the Swedish strategies and against the underlying Sida documentation. The missing causality is most evident at the strategy level where there are very few cases in the four countries where root causes are made explicit.[23] In particular, sensitive issues around ethnicity and corruption and party politics are either not cited or where they are, the link to the Swedish priorities is not clear.

The evaluation finds that there are differences in the quality of the strategies from a peacebuilding perspective. Interviewees confirmed that around 2001-2003 some

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[21] Statement based on team's assessment of country strategies for all periods as evidenced in text below

[22] All strategies for Bosnia and Herzegovina (and regional)

[23] Primarily the Guatemala 2001-2005 and 2008-2012 strategy and the Somalia 2003-2005 strategy

countries were subject to a Sida task force advising on strategy development and peacebuilding.[24] This is likely to have contributed to the enhanced quality of several of the strategies, including the Somalia strategy 2003-2005, the Rwanda strategy from 2004, and the Guatemala strategy from 2008, which all stand out in terms of being the most comprehensive strategies for the four countries assessed by the team. They (in particular Somalia and Guatemala) include the identification of a number of conflict drivers as well as the inclusion of elements of a theory of change and/or a clear causality chain in the description of the Swedish assistance.

Overall, the limited use of a theory of change approach (or causality explanation) is also an issue in the latest strategy format. In length and content, it provides limited specific guidance to Sida and the embassies (except for overall sector prioritisation), which in turn gives considerable room for Sida to make the choices on partners and aid modalities based on its country and poverty analysis. This format has, as explained above, often limited reflection of the drivers of peace and conflict at country level and guidance for how Sida should address this in its programming.[25] As one interviewee stated, *often you can simply change the country name on the cover and the strategy will then be equally applicable for any other fragile country.*

Based on the individual strategy assessments as described in the country reports, we have summarised the Swedish strategy relevance in terms of addressing root causes of conflict in table 4.1 below. We have assessed relevance of the individual strategies looking at the context analysis of the strategies, the relevance of the (implicit) theory of change and the relevance of the sector and interventions identified.

Table 4.1 Overview of strategy reference and theory of change around conflict and peace drivers

Swedish Government strategies		Criteria: reference to conflict/peace drivers in:	Somalia	Rwanda	Bosnia	Guatemala
2015-2020	**2014-2020**	1. Context analysis				
		2. Overall theory of change				

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[24] Interviews with Sida staff.

[25] Note that the lack of a proper theory of change linked to conflict and peace drivers is a general criticism of much of the peacebuilding work of other like-minded development partners as well. As an example, the evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (2014) found that conflict analysis were not undertaken on a systematic basis nor were there an explicit theory of change in the support. Similarly, the evaluation of the EU Instrument for Stability-Crisis Response Component 2007-2013 (2016) that there was an absence of systematic conflict analysis and a related absence of a systematic formulation of theories of change.

(Guat, Rwan.)	(BiH)	3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	grey	yellow	yellow	orange
2013-2017 (Som)	**2010-2014 (BiH, Rwan.)**	1. Context analysis	orange	green	orange	grey
		2. Overall theory of change	red	orange	red	grey
		3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	yellow	yellow	red	grey
2006-2013 (BiH)	**2008-2012 (Guat)**	1. Context Analysis	grey	grey	orange	green
		2. Overall theory of change	grey	grey	red	yellow
		3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	grey	grey	red	green
2003-2005 (Som, BiH, Rwan)	**2001-2005 (Guat)**	1. Context analysis	green	orange	orange	green
		2. Overall theory of change	green	orange	red	yellow
		3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	yellow	orange	red	red
2000-2002 (BiH)	**1997-2001 (Guat)**	1. Context Analysis	grey	grey	orange	red
		2. Overall theory of change	grey	grey	red	red
		3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	grey	grey	red	red

Legend:

Conflict and peace drivers well integrated in strategy document (or clearly aligned with background analysis of drivers)	green
Conflict and peace drivers included in part of the document	yellow
Conflict and peace drivers mentioned but not prioritization nor substantiated based on this	orange
Conflict and peace drivers not included in strategy	red
No strategy for this period	grey

The difference in relevance and utility of the Swedish strategies, to a large extent, also relates to the strategy development process and strategy design requirements. Based on strategy guidelines, assessments and interviews, the evaluation team finds that there has been a steady progression on the requirements around the strategy development process (see strategy process overview in Annex K). From the late 1990s, the embassies engaged with the Swedish MFA and Sida Headquarters on the scope and content of the strategies, including through providing background analysis (although this practice appears to have varied).

The team found that in some cases there were significant strategy gaps. Somalia, for example, only has strategies for 2003-2005 (which however was extended for following years) and again from 2013 onwards. In Guatemala two strategies were extended for three years each, thus covering seven-year periods. In Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Rwanda, the team has not been able to identify any strategies prior to 2000. These strategy gaps, combined with the often very broad and open nature of the strategies, provided a lot of programming flexibility for the embassies and individual programme officers for these periods.

The overall process around identifying appropriate approaches and programmes to support has improved over time. With the introduction of a more Results-Based Management (RBM)-focused approach by Sida in 2006, additional steering or direction was provided to the operationalisation of country and regional strategies. In principle, following this, all embassies needed to develop operational plans ('verksamhetsplaner') to guide the strategy implementation.[26] This, combined with annual plans and follow-up, provided much more guidance than before for the individual programme officer at the embassies, since there was solid documentation available to guide the dialogue processes with partners and prioritise activities. This furthermore underscores the importance of the quality of all these documents. From an RBM perspective, annual reports were also developed (though some countries like Guatemala and Bosnia and Herzegovina have had these throughout), where lessons learned were described and fed into the next year's operational plan. This was then further refined with a traffic light reporting system initiated in 2015 as well as the introduction of a new universal strategy format.

As with the strategies, however, Sida's documentation has rarely included an explicit theory of change and the reporting has often fallen short of providing solid evidence to back the assessment of progress. Thus, while the current planning and reporting scheme is a significant improvement in terms of RBM and strategic direction and is more comprehensive than what the team has seen with many other development partners, the quality of the plans and reporting differs across countries and time. In some cases, such as in Guatemala from 2008 and onwards as well as in the underlying Sida documentation supporting the 2013-2017 Swedish Strategy for Somalia, Sida's *verksamhetsplans* and *resultatförslag* and analysis undertaken by Sida covers conflict drivers which the embassy can rely on. The team received verbal confirmation that the same has been the case in Rwanda, where this document, however, is confidential and not accessible. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only one of the strategies (2003) has been accompanied by a set of context analyses, including a conflict analysis, and the latter focused mostly at the political economy level.

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[26] The operational plans have not been made available for all countries.

Interviews with Sida staff and the assessment of Sida guidelines made available to the team shows that, throughout the period evaluated, Sida's operational plans and related documentation have not been subject to a quality assurance process from a peacebuilding perspective. Embassies could request inputs to overall strategies, plans as well as specific projects from the headquarters-based peace and security advisors and the Human Security Helpdesk. In the case of Guatemala, the Helpdesk was used several times in the early 2010s, but from the documentation made available and interviews with field level staff, there is otherwise limited documentation or explicit reference to the use of these resources for any of the other countries.

The evaluation finds that the planning basis for the embassies has been enhanced through the use of data from evaluations. It is not always evident to the team how evaluations are selected or prioritised, but for all four countries there are some evaluations available for individual interventions and also evidence from interviews with implementing partners that these have been used in programming. It is also clear from interviews that Sida has been effective in using the evaluations in its dialogue with partners to enhance their performance. It is, however, less evident how these evaluations have been used to inform the overall strategy level.

Interviews also indicated that the extent to which an embassy focused on conflict in the underlying documentation depended upon the embassy's ability to, and interest in, undertaking background analysis and/or requesting peacebuilding related research inputs from outside or headquarters level experts.[27] In short, the relative absence of such documentation means that there is limited written evidence on how embassies have responded to conflict and peace drivers.

Interviews with Sida staff and partners show that **the limited written documentation on drivers of peace and conflict has often been compensated for by the long-standing relationships with key partners who have in-depth experience of the conflict as well as Sida staff with extensive field experience in the regions concerned.**

In all four countries, Sida has engaged with partners working on peacebuilding for decades. In Somalia this includes the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and Interpeace, which have received assistance since the early 90s. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, several Sweden-based international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been extensively utilised, including Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme Centre, Swedish Helsinki Committee/Civil Rights Defenders, amongst others. In Rwanda, long-standing partners have included Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace

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[27] Interviews with Sida staff show different degrees of understanding and prioritisation of conflict (though generally a high level of conflict understanding), but also interviews with implementing partners reveal a significant difference in how (if) conflict is addressed in the policy dialogue depending on which programme officer is in charge.

(IRDP)/Interpeace. In Guatemala, they have included Diakonia, Oxfam Ibis, Forum Syd, Save the Children, Plan Sweden and UN agencies amongst others.

In terms of staffing, the team encountered Sida staff members in all four countries who have either (i) undertaken several postings at the embassies over a 10-15 year period, (ii) stayed in the region working on regional aspects (often with a peacebuilding angle), (iii) worked with the targeted country at headquarters before being posted at the embassy, or (iv) – in a not insignificant number of cases – joined Sida having worked in the country for NGOs, such as Kvinna till Kvinna, Interpeace, and LPI.

According to interviewees, **this local level capacity is important when the strategies are so broad and helps to ensure relevance**. When overall objectives were approved and turned into an 'instruction' from the MFA to the embassies, the embassies were largely free to design and prioritise projects and programmes for the given country. Even in countries such as Somalia, where the *de jure* responsibility still rested with Stockholm until the mid-2000s, the decisions on what to fund were largely made at embassy level. So, while strategies have not always been able to link cause and effect, Sida staff have identified interventions which were relevant to short to medium-term peacebuilding, and in some instances, such as the Somaliland democratisation process, the Guatemala transitional justice process, or the Rwanda dialogue processes, these have also been relevant in terms of longer-term conflict reduction.

4.1.2 CONTEXTUAL RELEVANCE OF PORTFOLIOS

The team finds that irrespective of the lack of strategies or the limited guidance from existing strategies, the majority of portfolios and individual projects assessed across all periods were relevant from a short to medium-term peacebuilding perspective. To assess the relevance of the actual portfolios, the team relied on a combination of strategies and actual portfolios as presented in annual reports, evaluations, OpenAid or from individual project documents.

Overall, the team finds that the portfolios identified by Sida have been broadly relevant to peacebuilding at the time of identification (see example in Box 4.1 below). There are very few deviations between the Swedish strategy and the Sida portfolios, primarily because the strategies and, in many cases, the portfolios, have been so broad. The portfolios for all four countries have seen some progression over time but with a high degree of consistency in terms of implementing partners. This has been especially the case with (particularly Swedish) NGOs, which in some instances have received funding throughout the period.

Box 4.1 example of relevant Sida intervention in Guatemala

Support to Truth Commissions
Sida supported two truth commissions' reports: 1) an official commission established by the Peace Accords, Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), and 2) one established by the Archbishop of Guatemala's Office for Human Rights (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del

Arzobispado de Guatemala, or ODHAG).

Apart from being relevant for the time, it later proved to be even more relevant when the information gathered for the reports of the truth commissions (in addition to the support to the National Police Archives) provided the basis for the legal cases that were later presented in court, among them, the Genocide case against ex-president Rios Montt and the Sepur Zarco sexual violence case. The reports also documented corruption mechanisms, which later became part of the rationale for establishing the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG). Finally, they were also incipient in documenting and condemning gender-based violence and sexual violence against women during the war.[28]

As a summary of the portfolios' relevance and in accordance with the timeline approach of the evaluation, in the table below, we have tried to capture the main thrust of the portfolios' trend and relevance over time (table 4.2 – for full details, see the country reports in Annexes C-F).

Table 4.2 Sida portfolio relevance overview

Country	Conflict drivers	Peacebuilding portfolio development	Relevance
Somalia	1) Clannism as a spoiler and mediator 2) Access to and security around land tenure 3) Horizontal inequalities 4) The state as a spoiler as well as an enabler 5) Economic interests of the business sector in peace as well as conflict 6) Women's role in peacebuilding	1) 1990-early 2000s: Mostly NGOs working on local level mediation 2) 2002-2010: Support to Somaliland democratisation process and initiation of support to central level institution building 3) 2010-2018: Support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) formation process. Still local level UN and NGO	1) Relevant to the high level of conflict across Somalia and the limited availability of institutions for statebuilding engagement 2) Relevant to the stabilisation and long-term statebuilding needs and progress in Somaliland. Also relevant to attempt to support first state formation processes as basis for peacebuilding 3) Relevant as FGS is first semi-legitimate structure for peacebuilding. Also, still conflict in most areas in south-central, so is relevant to stay en-

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[28] Interviews and Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (2017) *Norway's contribution to peacebuilding in Guatemala 1996-2016*

		support	gaged with local level mediation and bottom-up state formation
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1) Perceptions of identity and lack of trust between ethnicities 2) Separated curricula between entities 3) Identity and form of the state 4) Unemployment, esp. youth 5) Corruption 6) Civil society as enabler and mediator 7) International community and EU association as enabler	1) 1995-1999: Support to reconstruction – in particular housing – and economic reform but also community level reconciliation 2) 2000-2010: Support to a very wide range of sectors, but including democratic governance and human rights (focus on local governance, justice, gender, human rights, civil society, transitional justice) 3) 2011-2018: Continued focus on reform and EU accession with continued grassroots level work	1) Support in line with Dayton agreement and relevant grassroots level interventions 2) Relevant to the context and international commitment at the time with elements of more direct peacebuilding work, especially transitional justice and civil society activity 3) Relevant as EU accession provides a foundation for statebuilding and human rights compliance Also continued ethnic tension at local level means there is continued need for grassroots work
Guatemala	1) Discrimination based on ethnicity 2) Limited political will to reform 3) Weak state and political system 4) Corruption and impunity 5) Access to land and land reform 6) Civil society as advocate and enabler	1) 1990-2001: from multilateral support towards specific interventions targeting peacebuilding, humanitarian, democratic development and poverty reduction 2) 2001-2015: aligned with peace agreement but focus on democratic and socio-economic development 3) 2015-2018: enhanced	1) Relevant peacebuilding focus combined with more humanitarian funding 2) Very broad portfolio with relevance to context and aligned with peace agreement but less peacebuilding oriented 3) Relevant as need for

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		focus on human se-curity, rights, gender in parallel with pov-erty reduction efforts	enhanced focus on rights holder per-spective
Rwanda	1) Ethnic identity and political rep-resentation 2) Migration and regional dimen-sion of conflict 3) Demographic pressure 4) Strong govern-ance 5) Transitional justice as an en-abler 6) Human rights deficits	1) Early 1990s-2002: Humanitarian sup-port only 2) 2002-2010: Focus on development cooper-ation as a way of also ensuring inclusion 3) 2010-2018: devel-opment combined with enhanced hu-man rights perspec-tive. No major re-gional intervention	1) No direct peacebuild-ing relevance 2) Short-term relevance, but limited attention to long-term inclu-sion and critical thinking 3) Support to civil soci-ety very relevant in light of repressive regime (though fund-ing limited). Region-al dimension of con-flict missing

Thus, for all four countries, the evaluation finds that the portfolios have been relevant across most of the time periods from a short to medium-term peacebuilding perspec-tive. **However, in terms of the probability of long-term peacebuilding impact and thus relevance from a long-term peacebuilding perspective, elements addressing conflict drivers have been less evident** (see details of mapping against conflict and peace drivers in section 4.1.1 above).

As with the Swedish strategies, there are few examples during the evaluation period of portfolios directly targeting drivers of peace and root causes of conflict – and thus relevance from a long-term and sustainable peace perspective. In Somalia, interviews and annual reports do not reveal any engagements specifically targeting clan bias, marginalisation or land rights. In Guatemala, it has been particularly challenging to engage the private sector in peacebuilding efforts, although they are identified as drivers of the conflict. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic divide has been targeted indirectly (though there is also a good example of Sweden working with others to try and change the constitution (albeit unsuccessfully) and there are examples at local level where interaction across ethnicities has been prioritised). At institutional level, Sida has tended to operate within the confines of the Dayton Accord, which has for-malised the ethnically based administrative divisions of the country. In Rwanda the issue around ethnicity remains extremely sensitive and, throughout, Sweden has de-cided not to address it directly, with the exception of the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP)/Interpeace dialogue project. In that sense there is align-ment between the broad peacebuilding perspectives of the strategies and the underly-ing documents, which has ensured relevant short- to medium-term peacebuilding en-

gagements. Yet there has been limited willingness to target the more sensitive key peace and conflict drivers directly.[29]

4.1.3 WOMEN AND MARGINALISED GROUPS IN STRATE-GIES AND APPROACH

For all of the four countries, there has been a progressive strengthening in the way that women are targeted by Sida's assistance, which is also aligned with the overall trends within Sida and the international community. In the first Swedish strategies, women are, in most cases, identified as vulnerable beneficiaries where assistance should improve their access to services from an overall poverty reduction perspective. Over the period of the evaluation, this has changed to increasing the focus on women's role in peacebuilding processes and as part of the political settlements for the four countries.

In Somalia, the change in the latter strategy includes specific indicators on women's participation in the political processes at central and local level. However, for Somalia as well as for Rwanda, there has been very limited attention to women in the portfolios of the first two decades of Swedish support. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, gender equality and women's empowerment has been part of all the strategies and through projects implemented by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (such as Kvinna till Kvinna and Olof Palme Centre and others). This has developed into a focus on women as key role players in decision-making processes (although where the country is still under-performing). In Guatemala, women have been prioritised from the early years as beneficiaries and also as decision-makers.

The attention to marginalised groups varies in spite of the significant contextual relevance in all four countries. In Guatemala, Sida has had a strong focus on indigenous people's rights from the first strategy process. The approach has been all-encompassing from a rights-based perspective covering economic, social, cultural as well as political rights. In Somalia, on the other hand, there is close to no reflection on the needs and rights of minority clans and ethnic groups, though there is reference to internally displaced in the documentation. In Rwanda, the issue cannot be expressed openly in the strategy documents. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the constitution only confers political power to the three main ethnicities *de jure*, thereby side-lining minority ethnicities like Roma. To counter this, Sida has included some elements of support to ethnic minorities in its programmes (especially Roma), though this has been limited, and more broadly, has sought to ensure that all ethnicities are treated equally and have access to services. Also, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida

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[29] Based on assessment of Sida annual reports and interviews with Sida and MFA staff. See details from the country reports in Annexes C-F.

has supported inclusion of minority groups (such as LGBTI) through the Sarajevo Open Centre.

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Overall, effectiveness in terms of addressing root causes of conflict has been limited because Sida has rarely addressed these issues directly, except at the local level. The team finds that this is partly explained by the political settlements emanating from the various peace accords or statebuilding agendas and Sida's support to the latter:

- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Accord provided a formalisation of the ethnic division of the country and thus cemented the post-war status quo allowing the country to be governed according to ethnicity, often with separate administrations, education curricula, etc. This process handed power to the ethno-political elites in the two entities, who have had little interest in changing the status quo. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there has not been a truth and reconciliation process and the ethnic divisions remain unresolved.

- In Guatemala, the peace agreement and the truth and reconciliation process *de facto* allowed for many of the war crimes to remain unaddressed (except for crimes against humanity and genocide), and also cemented the existing land rights situation facing indigenous people. The peace agreement – while an important step in ending years of violence – *de facto* formalised the existing power structures favouring the urban elite.

- In Rwanda, to preserve stability and promote a poverty alleviation agenda, the international community has supported the Government since the genocide and, while this has resulted in stability and economic growth, shortcomings in the democratic space have undermined democratic development and human rights in the country.

- In Somalia, the formation of first the Transitional National Government (TNG), then the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and finally the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been based on the 4.5 clan agenda. The state formation process is thus, by default, favouring dominant clans leaving little room for minority clans and ethnic groups to have the opportunity to access resources and hold public office.

Arguably, all four countries (and in particular the first three) are in a situation where they are closer to what Galtung (1967) would describe as 'negative peace'. All four countries are at a stage – or moving towards a stage – of predictable stability, but

where the underlying root causes of conflict (e.g. access to resources) and *de facto* structural violence (based on ethnicity) are still very much present.[30]

The effectiveness of Sida's peacebuilding work should be seen in light of the limitations provided by these political settlements. As a development partner, Sida has had the choice of following suit with other like-minded development partners and working within this political settlement and hoping to change it slowly over time (as seen below this has been the Sida approach in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda), or going against the stream and addressing the root causes more directly (as Sida has done to some extent in Guatemala).

4.2.1 EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE CONTEXT

In all four countries, the evaluation finds that Sida identified and prioritised projects that, in many cases, provided a positive contribution to peacebuilding. While these portfolio decisions might not always have had a long-term and/or broad impact, they were relevant and, in several cases, effective at the time (see also findings under the impact section below for examples). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sweden worked with like-minded development partners in efforts to amend the constitution to reduce political obstructionism, and also sought to set up a truth and reconciliation commission. Neither of these initiatives, which would have directly addressed root causes of conflict on a broad scale, came to a successful conclusion.[31] In other cases, Sida's support has been much more successful; for instance, in relation to missing persons and support at local level to women's groups across ethnic boundaries. But these effects were, by and large, more localised. In Guatemala, Sweden was one of the first development partners to support the development of truth and reconciliation reports and the establishment of the anti-impunity commission (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG)).[32] In Rwanda, Sweden engaged in a pilot on cross-border trade for peace, which was relevant in light of the regional dimension of the conflict, and it has also engaged in transitional justice.[33] And in Somalia, Sweden (in terms of Sida funding relevant programmes, and the Swedish MFA in the policy dialogue process) has played an important role with other like-minded development partners in supporting democratisation in Somaliland and the establishment of the Federal Member States in the southern and central part of country.[34]

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[30] Galtung (1967): Theories of Peace – A Synthetic Approach to Peace Building

[31] Interviews with Sida staff, resource persons, development partners and implementing partners in Bosnia and Hercegovina

[32] Interviews with Sida staff, development partners in Guatemala as well as Sida documentation.

[33] Interviews with Sida staff and resource persons and Sida documentation and evaluations of IRDP / Interpeace

[34] Interviews with Sida and MFA staff, development partners and resource persons

From an effectiveness perspective, there is evidence to suggest that identification and support to these initiatives was in large part a consequence of knowledgeable and responsive staff at the embassies. Particularly in the first decade evaluated, it was left largely to individual programme officers to decide on whether a project was relevant and potentially effective and, therefore, whether it should be supported. But even more recently, programme officers have played a significant role in identifying the projects to be supported.[35] This is in part a consequence of the very broad and flexible strategies (as outlined in the section above), as well as what the evaluation team assess - based on interviews - is a culture within Sida of relying on programme officers for detailed prioritisation. Over the three decades, however, this substantial degree of flexibility and freedom to prioritise has become increasingly targeted with organisational plans (*verksamhetsplaner*) gaining precedence as an overall guide (see relevance section above).

Analyses of annual reports from the four countries show that **Sida has chosen to work with many of the same partners for long periods of time and, in interviews, programme officers expressed their high of reliance on partner information for making this prioritisation** (box 4.2 provides an example of one of the long-term partnerships)**.** Therefore, when prioritised projects have been relevant and, in many cases effective in delivering against plans, this has been, to a large extent, a consequence of the quality of the staff on the ground and/or the quality of the long-term partners to Sida. Currently, the individual grants go through an internal appraisal process, and there is thus an element of quality assurance; although the degree to which peacebuilding features in the quality assurance process is unclear.

Box 4.2 Interpeace in Somalia – a case of a long-term partnership

Interpeace
From the early 2000s until today, Interpeace has been working on the democratisation process in Somaliland (and Puntland). From capacity development of the electoral commissions to voter registration, election logistics as well as capacity development to civil society and awareness raising initiatives (in addition, through other programmes also with contributions from Sida, Interpeace works on local level reconciliation).

Given the political challenges around Somaliland's claim of independence, the UN has not been in a position to support the election process in the region. Instead Interpeace stepped in and provided a platform for joint donor financing and policy dialogue. Enabled by strong donor funding and a development approach building on a long-term relationship with in particular the Somaliland election commission, interviewees report that Interpeace has played a lead role in supporting the institutionalisation and implementation of three parliamentary and presidential elections in Somaliland with peaceful transition of power between parties.

While the elections have always seen significant delays and attempts of political influence,

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[35] Interviews with Sida and MFA staff

they have all been eventually categorised as free and fair by international and local level observers. In this way the elections form a key part of a long-term peace process for Somaliland.

Sources: no evaluation reports of Interpeace work on elections have been made available to the team and the box information is therefore based on interviews with Sida, Interpeace staff, other development partners and resource persons as well as Interpeace and Sida's own reporting.

Looking at the portfolios over time, their level of engagement in what Sida refers to as principal and significant peacebuilding (as described above) varies and there is no uniform pattern to Sida's prioritisation of the peacebuilding approach used (i.e. bilateral vs. multilateral, principal vs. significant). Instead, there is evidence to suggest that **Sida has been good at following the current trends in the countries supported and it has aligned with the context**. As an example, in Somalia Sida moved away from prioritising grassroots level peacebuilding activities at a time when the country was marred by instability and where there was no real formal or informal political settlement to rally around, to engaging in statebuilding activities around the FGS and the FMS formation once the situation allowed this.[36] In Rwanda and Guatemala, over time, Sida has moved from broader statebuilding work to a closer engagement with civil society, as the appetite to engage closely with the two governments has been reduced in both countries with limited results of the past.[37] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, also following Sida's policies and international trends, there has been a move from working with civil society as service providers towards more advocacy type of engagements, while maintaining a focus on supporting the development of a stronger unified state through strategic state level functions, such as justice.[38]

The evaluation also looked more specifically at the synergies and cooperation between Sida and the political side of Sweden's country engagement as represented by the MFA. Overall, we found an **effective cooperation between Sida and the MFA in all countries in most periods**. The team asked external actors such as development partners and implementing partners for their assessment of continuity and alignment of messages of Sida and the MFA, and there was a perception of a solid and united stance on key political issues related to peacebuilding and statebuilding. The team also assessed MFA-Sida alignment and cooperation as expressed in the documentation and by staff of both institutions. Again, in most cases, there was agreement about the degree of alignment. There were also multiple examples of where Sida had provided funding to back the policy dialogue undertaken by the MFA

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[36] According to OpenAid for Sida in Somalia, the support to civil society has remained relatively stable throughout the last 15 years, while the substantial increase in funding has been more targeted multilateral support to statebuilding processes

[37] Interviews with Sida staff as well as OpenAid

[38] Ibid

in terms of supporting peace processes (in Somalia and Rwanda) and peace agreements (in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Guatemala). The only major difference expressed by some interviewees was the often long-term development perspective of engagement by Sida, compared to the more short to medium-term political actions and analysis of the MFA. Despite this, the team did not identify any cases where this difference in perspective negatively affected Sida's peacebuilding work.

4.2.2 A SIDA APPROACH ENABLING PARTNERS TO BE ADAPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE

To a large extent, Sida's approach to peacebuilding in the countries evaluated has provided a strong framework for enabling partners to be effective. A number of features stand out in terms of Sida enabling national and international partners to perform peacebuilding work. While these are general features for Sida's overall development assistance, they are also of particular relevance in a peacebuilding context. The following points were confirmed by almost all the implementing partners interviewed[39] and were present throughout the period being evaluated:

1) **Long-term engagement and predictability of funding.** Sida has engaged with the same partners for long periods of time. For some, such as Diakonia in Guatemala, LPI in Somalia, and Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme Centre, and Swedish Helsinki Committee/Civil Rights Defenders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida has been supporting the organisation for all or much of the period of the evaluation. According to the interviewees, this long-term commitment has allowed partners to have a more strategic approach to their peacebuilding work aiming at long-term outcomes rather than short-term outputs. In Somalia, this approach has been in stark contrast to other like-minded development partners who in the 1990s and 2000s often worked through one-year funding cycles, which provided less stability of funding. Some interviewees pointed to the importance of relationships and trust-building when working directly on mediation and peacebuilding and that long-term funding provided the stability needed to ensure this.

There is, however, also a potential negative side to engagement with the same partners over long periods. Interviews with Sida staff showed less interest in identifying new partners compared to using the same long-term partners as key informants. While non-Sida interviewees confirmed the relevance of the bulk of the partners supported, there is still a high path-dependency in working with the same partners, and analysis of Sida reports also shows a high degree of referencing of partner reports in the Sida reporting. The long-term partnerships thus also risk reasserting the same

[39] For list of partners interviewed, see list of persons met in Annex B

thinking and findings on the one hand and provide less room for engaging new partners (strategic versatility) on the other.

2) **Flexibility.** Almost all the partners interviewed stressed the importance of the high level of flexibility provided with the funding from Sida compared to most other development partners. The flexibility was expressed in terms of: (a) Sida listening to implementing partners and allowing them to design their interventions based on their contextual understanding and lessons learned from past phases (it should be noted that in some cases referred to by the interviewees, Sida imposed elements of design to the programmes, but that the partners found that these had been less successful); and (b) realigning projects as the context changed and new opportunities emerged. Implementing partners explained how, during a project implementation process, they could approach Sida and request approval of project changes to address new opportunities not identified at the design stage (i.e. adaptability). As one partner put it, "*Sida has a strong ability to jump in and out of funding as per the need, crisis and as opportunity emerges, and Sida is more responsive than other donors. Other donors are very destination focused and not understanding the process." Sida does.* However, it is also clear from the interviews that some implementing partners found that the flexibility lessened with the increasing focus on RBM, which made it difficult to change result frameworks during implementation and thus limited the degree of flexibility. Others pointed to the fact that the relationship with the individual programme officer at the embassy was key in terms of approval of flexibility and that this had changed during the course of the period evaluated as the officers changed.

3) **Linking diplomacy and development**. With a few exceptions, interviewees from Sida as well as those from outside Sida, confirmed that Sweden in general *speaks with one voice* and that there has been consistency between Sida's operations and the MFA's policy dialogue. In several cases the joint approach went beyond the formalised dialogue, but there is also strong evidence of Sida supporting MFA peacebuilding policy dialogue processes, such as supporting the implementation of the peace accords in Guatemala, and the support to the establishment of Federal Member States in Somalia. Partners agreed that the joint approach has meant that there were consistent messages from the Swedish Government and that this provided the partners as well as the partner counterparts with a clear understanding of Swedish priorities.

4) **Neutrality**. Neutrality was highlighted as a key comparative advantage of Sida by implementing partners in three out of the four countries. In these countries, implementing partners interviewed assessed that Sida's funding was less tied to political agendas and security concerns. This meant that these

partners would not be tainted by the funding provided and it thus allowed them to engage more freely with the parties in the conflicts.[40] The exception to this was in Guatemala, where Sweden has remained committed to a value-based agenda. Thus, for Sida this was a conscious choice, which carried also reputational risks.

While the overall framework for supporting partners is, in many ways, conducive for peacebuilding, a number of issues were also raised by interviewees that point to opportunities for Sida to further enhance the facilitation of peacebuilding work.[41] These include:

1) **Need for more attention to the application of conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm**. The Sida "classic" development approach (i.e. Sida's modalities applied in any context irrespective of level of fragility) application also means that there has been less attention to the issue of conflict sensitivity throughout the period evaluated. While Sida has developed conflict sensitivity tools and also engaged the NGO/think tank CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in Do No Harm training in the early 2000s, the evidence of conflict sensitivity is less evident in the written documentation. Interviews with partners illustrate that this was not a major area of discussion in the dialogue or in the project appraisal process (though risk assessment and Do No Harm do feature as a topic in the appraisal and some of the NGO partners, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, revealed knowledge of Do No Harm). In light of the focus on women and inclusiveness in the evaluation, the team sought evidence from interviewees of Do No Harm and conflict sensitive approaches including attention to marginalised groups as well as women exposed to the risk of Gender Based Violence (GBV). Only a few interviews with implementing partners revealed that Sida had brought up these issues in the partner dialogue process.

2) **Need for additional Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**. The evaluation has found evidence of many good traits in terms of M&E within Sida's peacebuilding work, such as mid-term reviews, annual reports as well as partner reporting and evaluations. But this was less so when it concerned systematic monitoring.[42] While M&E has improved over the evaluation period with greater focus on internal reporting against indicators, interviews with Sida staff indicate that Sida has not yet embraced the path undertaken by other

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[40] This is confirmed by the ECDPM (2018) report on peacebuilding, which states that Sweden is a small, non-aligned European country with a strong identity as a peaceful actor…(which) creates space for a value-based approach to peace policy, p 16.

[41] While the enabling elements above were raised by close to all partners, the issues presented below were only raised by some of the partners interviewed.

[42] Assessment of Sida annual reports, strategy reports as well as evidence of mid-term reviews and evaluations (see list of references in Annex H)

partners in applying third party monitoring and seeking inputs to M&E be-
yond the partnership base. Assessment of Sida documentation and interviews
with staff shows that the need for such mechanisms is particularly relevant in
contexts such as Somalia where Sida has less access for security reasons.

For all four countries, the team found that the annual reports, while having improved
over the years in their depth, have been often more of a subjective internal assessment
than an evidence-based overview.[43] As an example, in Somalia the latest reports show
significant progress in terms of women's role in decision-making processes and the
ability of central level institutions to deliver services in accordance with human rights
principles. In Guatemala, evaluations and reviews in the early 2000s pointed to poor
monitoring of Sida's own partners (in particular the UN), which again affects Sida's
own reporting. This in effect means that there is a risk of Sida missing out on non-
partner information to inform decision-making and thus a risk of a one-sided assess-
ment of the peacebuilding situation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida has mitigated
this risk through relatively extensive use of independent programme evaluations to
provide in-depth analysis and documentation (see also text on evaluations under Rel-
evance). Although it should be noted that only one of the examples seen by the team
refers directly to peacebuilding.[44]

This is further compounded by the weak or implicit theories of change implying that
there is an incomplete basis for follow-up or assessment of whether the assumptions
underlying the expected causality link of Swedish assistance to the country can be
confirmed.

4.2.3 WOMEN AND MARGINALISED GROUPS

In all four countries, strategies and interviews with key external stakeholders show
that **Sida has played a significant role among the international community and
with partners in terms of promoting gender equality and women's empower-
ment**, in particular in the last ten years.

Comparing the responses from interviews in the four countries, Guatemala stands out
as the country where the role of women, not only as beneficiaries but also as enablers
and actors in the peacebuilding processes, is most explicit in terms of Sida's priorities
and effectiveness on the ground. Sida's engagement in this area includes women's

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[43] Very few of the report refer to independent research, studies or evaluations for the assessment but
either have no source referral or refer to partner reports only. Again, pointing to the need for seeking
information beyond partners' reporting

[44] Returning home – An evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sida Evaluation 05/18, July 2005

rights, access to political power as well as economic and land related rights (see Box 4.3 below as an example).[45]

Box 4.3 Support to gender institutions in Guatemala

Supporting gender institutions in Guatemala

Sida has prioritised many projects aiming at on one hand strengthening the integration of gender in institutions (e.g. in the planning entity SEGEPLAN or at Ministry of Health with gender focal points) and on the other hand strengthening specific gender institutions such as the Presidential Women's Secretary (SEPREM), which was supported from 2001.

The support to SEPREM involved mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the National Decentralisation Policy and Poverty Reduction Strategy, updating the 15-year National Policy of Promotion and Development of Guatemalan Women and the promotion, support and follow-up on participation of women in local development councils. According to Sida's 2007 Country Report and the project Completion MEMO, increased participation of women's organisations has been noted in development councils and SEPREM's strategic role in this work was recognised by the government. The Country Report further mention that previous Sida financed SEPREM personnel were being financed by the government who increased the budget allocation to SEPREM in the period 2004-2007 (no evidence of the sustainability of this).

According to the 2017 Country Report, SEPREM implemented a strategy for expanding the attention to violence against women by gathering 298 municipal women's offices, 119 municipal planning offices and 66 financial administration offices in order to effectively plan for financial allocation to prevention of violence.

The Completion MEMO mentioned that the weaknesses of SEPREM were the low budget assigned by the Government of Guatemala, the low level of dialogue between SEPREM and women organisations, and insufficient capacity in terms of public policies management.

Amongst the other countries, Sida has had a strong focus on gender at a grassroots level in Rwanda through targeting women in rural areas and also from an empowerment perspective by supporting the state gender machinery, including the Ministry for the Promotion of Women.[46] A similar trend is also seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Sida is recognised by the parties interviewed as a lead in promoting women's rights. For these countries, the activities funded as well as the rhetoric around this has moved from seeing women as a vulnerable target group in need of assistance, towards an empowerment approach more aligned with UN Resolution 1325 during the different periods evaluated.[47]

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[45] Sida annual reports and project document of partners

[46] Sida reporting as well as interviews with Sida staff, resource persons and implementing partners

[47] Evidenced in interviews as well as in the results framework and indicators of Sida and Sida's implementing partners

From an effectiveness perspective, Sida's work with women in Somalia is less impressive than in the other countries. While there are a few important exceptions, such as women's increased representation in the latest parliament, women's role has featured less prominently in the projects supported and partners on the ground did not identify this as a major priority for Sida.[48] Examples of gender specific projects are presented in the table below (table 4.3).

Table 4.3 examples of gender specific projects in the four countries

Country	Year	Project Name	Description
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Whole period	Support through Swedish framework NGOs, including Kvinna till Kvinna (KtK) and Olof Palme Centre (OPC)	KtK and OPC have engaged with women's groups from different communities, where local women's groups have been empowered to cross boundaries, identify common issues, and increase awareness about their rights. This has had a peacebuilding effect through breaking down barriers and dispelling myths
Guatemala	1999	Defensoria de la Mujer Indigena (DEMI)	A specific Ombudsman mechanism for defending and promoting the full exercise of the rights of indigenous women
Rwanda	Ongoing	Gender Machinery	Inclusive of the Gender Monitoring Office, under the Prime Minister and which is a structure dedicated to Gender Mainstreaming and MIGEPROF, the Ministry for Women's Promotion
Somalia	2012-2014	Support to UN Women	Enabling UN-Women's presence and promotion of women in peacebuilding processes in Somalia

The team finds that Sida has had mixed levels of effectiveness in terms of reaching out to the excluded and marginalised. In Somalia, there has been close to no mention of the exclusive nature of the clan system and the existing discrimination of ethnic groups[49] or minority clans at any point in time. Nor is there any evidence of a dialogue on this with the implementing partners (a trait which is not only identified with Sida, but for most other development partners).[50] In Rwanda, the sensitivities around certain conflict drivers have made it a challenge to address the issue directly.[51]

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[48] Assessment of project documents and annual reports and interviews with partners with emphasis on Sida's prioritisation of women's rights and inclusion in the policy dialogue process

[49] This is also evidence by the fact that that there is no reference to Bantus or the existence of a non-ethnic Somali group in the country

[50] Assessment of strategies, annual sports as well as interviews with implementing partners and development partners

[51] Interviews with implementing and development partners as well as assessment of Sida documentation

In Guatemala, on the other hand, interviewees confirm that Sida's consistent and long-term support to civil society has strengthened the capacity of indigenous organisations to enhance their organisational capacities. According to evaluation reports and interviewees, this process has strengthened their ability to exercise their rights and engage in dialogue processes and has contributed to enhanced access to justice for the indigenous populations. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida's partners have worked specifically with ethnic minorities in the respective entities to ensure that they are included in decision-making and receiving equal benefits, for example through local governance. The flagship project on returnees (the Integrated Area Projects) also included provision for support to the Roma Action Plan in relation to housing.

4.2.4 ALIGNMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND JOINT PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS

The evaluation finds that Sida has prioritised the international agenda and joint efforts in its peacebuilding work. In all four countries, Sida has been seen by international development partners as a strong advocate for international and joint engagement – preferably UN (and EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Interviewees stressed how Sida has aligned with the international agreements and joint efforts such as the New Deal, the peace accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Guatemala, and the trust fund arrangements of the multilateral system in the countries supported. Interviewees pointed to Sida's policy dialogue in the promotion of the international system and, in some countries, interviewees even pointed to Sida staying true to the international agreements "*to the extent of being 'naïve*." However, from a peacebuilding perspective, this is one of Sida's characteristics most frequently echoed by partners in all countries.

In addition to aligning with the international policy framework, **Sida has also prioritised working with and through the multilateral system** to varying degrees across the time period evaluated and in the four countries.[52] In particular the UN has played a prominent role in Sida's portfolio in certain of the countries (e.g. Guatemala and Somalia). While in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and especially the European Union (EU) should be included in this assessment. While movement towards enhanced multilateral engagement has been a trend among a number of other development partners also (as a consequence of lean-processes and resource

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[52] Interviews with Sida staff and assessment of annual reports

management), interviewees noted that for Sida it has been also based more explicitly on values. Risk-sharing and resource pooling were also arguments mentioned by some Sida staff members.

According to interviewees, Sida's prioritisation of the UN has not been the same as leaving it to the UN to implement on its own. Among several development partners and the UN itself, there was a perception of Sida engaging resourcefully at steering committee meetings to ensure quality of process and making the UN work and giving credit to the UN mandate as a peacebuilding institution. As one interviewee stated, "*Sweden engages to make multilateralism work*."[53] While this is a clear commitment expressed by several interviewees, there is - as per the documentation made available and interviews with Sida staff - currently limited guidance as to what has worked and what has worked less well in making the multilateral system effective by Sida and at what point Sida should possibly have withdrawn its assistance.

4.3 IMPACT

Attributing changes to the peacebuilding context specifically to Sida's engagement in any of the four countries is not realistic due to the large number of other factors involved. However, **elements of contribution to peacebuilding can be identified in all four countries** taking into account the Sida footprint in terms of resources allocated and projects prioritised over the years. As already noted, **none of the countries has seen a significant change in conflict and peace drivers over the period and the root causes of conflict remain the same in of the countries**. However, there has been progress in terms of elements of peacebuilding, such as institutional reform and reduction in the level of political violence. And the evaluation team has found that in all four countries, Sida has played an important role in supporting processes that have contributed to this change. Thus, there are elements of peacebuilding to which Sida has contributed.

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the country evaluation in Annex C finds that conflict drivers remain (ethno-nationalism in particular) and continue to constrain the country's peaceful development and recovery from the 1992-1995 conflict. Yet, there are a number of results to which Sida has contributed. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Sida's support to refugee and IDP returns (which started as humanitarian support) contributed to a substantial number of returns (including minority returns). Sida's support to local governance, justice and law enforcement, gender and human rights, culture, and transitional justice has also had positive results over the evaluation period according to evaluation reports and interviews with non-Sida interviewees. In the area

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[53] This is also reflected in the ECDPM (2018) report on peacebuilding, which states that Sweden has a strong tradition of support to multilateralism and collective security and a belief that adherence to international norms benefit both national and global security, p 17

of transitional justice, the support provided with other like-minded donors to the International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP) has enabled that organisation to develop innovative methods to identify around two thirds of missing persons from the conflict, providing important evidence to war crimes trials and serving to help counteract the propagation of myths surrounding the war.[54] Evaluations show that the support to local governance has contributed to increasing linkages between municipalities and citizens.[55] In the formal justice area, interviewees noted that it has contributed to increasing the efficiency of the judiciary and reducing the backlog of administrative cases. Through providing funding, it has also helped maintain the State Court in relation to anti-corruption and war crimes cases.

The support to gender equality has contributed to strengthening the institutional basis for promoting gender equality, women's empowerment and action against Gender Based Violence through government action plans on gender and UN Security Council Resolution 1325. According to documentation and interviews, this has been substantially backed up through partnerships with civil society that are increasingly advocacy focused. The support provided indirectly through Swedish framework organisations to Bosnian civil society has, in the cases highlighted in the country evaluation in Annex C, also had positive effects on inter-ethnic interaction and understanding at grassroots level.[56]

While the international support has been an important factor in preserving these results so far, there are concerns about growing revisionism. In this respect, it is unfortunate that the momentum generated here could not extend to agreement on a truth and reconciliation commission. Interviews with local stakeholders in Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly suggest a continued need for transitional justice and awareness-raising within the two entities. Likewise, it is unfortunate that Sida (and other actors') efforts in 2006 to address the limitations in the constitution did not succeed. As many interviewees highlighted during the field work, the nationalist rhetoric surrounding the October 2018 elections indicates that these constraints are not about to go away. In the face of this, interviewees noted that Sida's support to democracy and human rights in the country has been and continues to be important.

Guatemala is still a country affected by conflict, with very little progress in discrimination, violence, poverty, corruption and the State's ability to function effectively and assume its responsibility towards its citizens and implement the Peace Agreement signed in 1996. The country evaluation in Annex D finds that many of the root causes

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[54] www.ICMP.int and interview, Sarajevo, October 2018

[55] Mid-Term Evaluation of the Governance Accountability Project in Bosnia-Herzegovina – GAP2, USAID, May 2010. GAP was implemented jointly with Sida

[56] Interviews with Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme International Centre and NGO Vive Zene, October 2018

and structural reforms have still not been addressed - most importantly the much-needed tax reform, land reform and the sensitive issue of indigenous people's rights - leaving the peace process stagnated.

Looking at the last 30-year period, it is possible to establish some links between Sida's support and broader changes in Guatemalan society. In the 1990s, Sida's support was highly relevant and contributed to the peace negotiations and peace process overall, including the return of refugees and IDPs and the reintegration and demobilisation of the guerrilla forces. According to non-Sida interviewees and annual reports, Sida provided timely support to relevant actors, who were able to contribute to the peace process, such as the UN and civil society actors. Sida's engagements in this period supported the political dialogue conducted by the MFA staff along-side other international actors in the 'grupos de amigos'.

There are examples of Sida-funded programmes contributing to improved legislative framework and improved electoral processes and participation. There is also evidence to suggest that several state institutions have been strengthened. As evident in the country evaluation report in Annex D, there has been increased interaction and dialogue between the State and civil society, although some people interviewed mentioned that more should have been done to foster dialogue across sectors. [57]

In the area of access to justice, there have been numerous advances both in terms of the strengthened justice system and in transitional justice. Sida's support has contributed to increased access to justice among citizens, particularly marginalised people and survivors of the war. Guatemala has seen convictions of people who committed crimes during the armed conflict, such as the genocide conviction against ex-president Rios Montt, to which Sida's support contributed in various ways (including through evidence in court processes (truth commission reports and recovery of historical archives) support to Civil Society Organsiations (CSOs) representing victims and witnesses, the Human Rights Ombudsperson (PDH), Attorney General etc.).[58]

According to country studies and interviewees, the women's and indigenous rights movement is stronger and more vibrant than it was in the 1990s, where they had suffered years of repression. Sida has supported and funded civil society extensively throughout this period, both through the UN as well as through Swedish and international NGOs. This is regarded by non-Sida interviewees as having contributed positively to civil society's organisation and ability to advocate – particularly amongst the women's rights movement and the indigenous organisations.

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[57] Sida reporting and interviews with Sida staff and partners.

[58] Ibid

In **Rwanda**, the country evaluation in Annex E finds that the root causes of conflict remain largely unresolved, but that Sida has made a difference in specific areas, notably in relation to civil society capacity; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); police reform; and gender equality. Examples include the support to reconciliation where Sida funded the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) and Interpeace to set up grassroots mechanisms with a multi-ethnic audience. An evaluation of this in 2008 highlighted its choice of activities, participants and strategies that contributed to its influence.[59] Subsequently, a further evaluation of the same engagement highlighted its promotion of a culture of debate and openness to critical thinking through the promotion of peace education and the possibility to discuss and raise taboos or express personal feelings on the situation.[60] Sida also contributed to statebuilding through the support to institutions and to government programmes in key sectors where there has been strong ownership. An example is the tripartite support (with South Africa) to the Rwandan National Police, which was also an innovative use of South-South cooperation. According to the 2010 external review, this contributed to modernising policing and introducing new thinking.[61]

In terms of gender mainstreaming, which has also had significant government buy-in, Sida supported institutions dedicated to gender promotion and mainstreaming through UN Women. This included the Gender Monitoring Office under the Prime Minister, a structure dedicated to gender mainstreaming; the National Women's Council; and MIGEPROF, the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. Rwanda's performance in this area is world-leading and well known when it comes to political representation of women, including 61% parliamentarians, 50% in the Cabinet. The promotion of gender also forms a part of the overall dynamic of non-discrimination. However, despite the existence of this strong institutional and normative framework in favour of women and visible progress at the national level, the situation of women at grassroots and the implementation of this national framework remains a challenge.

According to interviewees, a lot of the results are due to the strong leadership and political will of the government. This highlights the importance of the political economy for the success of international assistance interventions, including peacebuilding. The results in particular at the community level on dialogue and peace education, also point to the significance of addressing social drivers to conflict and the sense of identity, in order to complement poverty reduction approaches and deal with the conflict driver of access to resources.

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[59] IRDP / INTERPEACE Peacebuilding Dialogue & Research Programme: External Evaluation, Serge Rwamasirabo and Sue Williams April 2008

[60] External Evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme, Guus Meijer & Dr. Théogène Bangwanubusa, October 2011

[61] 2010, Programme for Democratic Policing between the Rwanda National Police, the Swedish National Police Board and the South African Police Service, Sida reviewed, Birgit Lindsnaes, Piet van Reenen.

In **Somalia**, the country evaluation in Annex F finds that the root causes of conflict related to land, clannism, and horizontal inequalities remain. Sida is currently the fifth largest provider of development assistance and Sida has been an important contributor to peacebuilding activities in the country, in particular since 2003. For the general trends around statebuilding in Somalia, it is difficult to assess the extent of Sida's specific influence as most of this support is provided through multilateral institutions. Sida's engagement in newer initiatives which have a more direct effect on peacebuilding in Somalia such as the Somalia Stabilisation Fund (SSF) may hold the potential for longer term peacebuilding impact as they address several of the conflict drivers at local level. But it is too early to assess their longer-term effect.

The areas where the support has contributed most significantly to peacebuilding have been in Somaliland and in Puntland.[62] Today, both of these regions are fairly stable, and in particular Somaliland has been largely free of political violence and held several rounds of elections, which have included transfers of power between opposing parties. Sida has been supporting this democratisation process since the beginning and the institution building around it. Also, local level conflict remains less prevalent in the two regions. And while attribution is a challenge, Sida has been supporting local level mediation in both countries since the early 90s and there thus may have been a contribution.

The impact of Sida's work vis-à-vis women's empowerment and gender equality has been more limited, partly due to the difficult context but also because Sida's priorities have varied over time. Similarly, the absence (by Sida and most other development partners) of prioritisation and dialogue in terms of promoting the most marginalised sections of the Somali society, the minority clans and ethnic groups, has meant that the existing repressive political economy around these groups remains as it was 25 years ago (in spite of these groups comprising anywhere between 15 and 25% of the population). [63]

However, Sida's more recent approach to not only supporting the national statebuilding process of the FGS but also to staying engaged at FMS and local government level shows an understanding of the complexity of the Somalia conflict and the need to ensure a spread of development across geographical and political areas, minimising the risk for enhanced conflict between the centre and the periphery of the country.

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[62] Based on Somalia country studies, interviews with resource persons, Sida staff, development partners and evaluation reports

[63] Some interviewees pointed to the need to focus on stability rather than engaging too verbally on the issue of women's rights and in particular marginalisation

The evaluation finds, however, that there have also been some missed opportunities where Sida's support might have made a difference. These are mostly areas that would have required a considerably higher level of risk-taking; for example, confronting the political status quo in one way or the other. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina,** interviewees mentioned that the education sector remains fragmented along ethnic lines and the three separate curricula continue to promote divergent historical narratives, which underpin the status quo and thus fuel continued tensions with the new generations. While there is awareness of this need, development partners have not succeeded in breaking the political grip on the sector. There is no evidence from the documentation or from Sida interviewees that Sida actively considered joining this important, yet difficult, intervention area with a direct link to a key conflict driver.

In **Guatemala** the lack of successfully involving the private sector stands out. In all periods evaluated, the non-involvement of the private sector means that a key partner in the peacebuilding efforts has been excluded. However, Sida has in all periods worked actively at trying to engage this stakeholder, but without any long-term effect. In this case, Sida has been aware of the opportunity but has decided not to engage.

In **Rwanda**, the regional dimension is key to conflict drivers, both there and in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While this dimension is reflected in some of the documentation, the strategic approach has not addressed it in any significant way and there are only a few projects focused on it. Similarly, Sweden has not utilised its position to actively address the sensitive issue of ethnic marginalisation.

In **Somalia**, the constitution process and the state formation processes (2003, 2008 and 2011 and again now in 2018) have needed to address marginalisation more explicitly and in the support and policy dialogue favour a more balanced political settlement, which would move towards the end of the discrimination against marginalised groups in Somalia. An even more daring opportunity would have been, as several pointed out, a move towards engaging in dialogue with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2004-2006, which over a few years managed to create stability and predictability in southern and central Somalia building on a conservative but still not radicalised Islam (which then came about later with al-Shabaab).

4.3.1 PROJECTS WHERE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE WAS IDENTIFIED

Parts of these peacebuilding achievements have been supported by projects funded through Sida in the last 25 years providing the link between the (often implicit) theories of change underpinning Sida's support and the results on the ground. In the country reports, a number of projects are presented which provide for significant change and a sample of these are presented below (table 4.5). These are all projects where Sida has had a strong partner, which has identified a peacebuilding opportunity (often

through long-term engagements) drawing upon Sida's comparative advantages out-lined in the effectiveness chapter above.

Table 4.5 Examples of projects with significant change

Country	Significant Change
Somalia: LPI's peace-building work, 1990s-ongoing	The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) is the longest development partner to Sida in Somalia and has received funding throughout the evaluation period. LPI has been working in Somalia since 1993 primarily on local level peacebuilding and mediation with a strong focus on Somaliland and Punt-land in the first ten years and then expanded to also include the southern and central parts of Somalia as well as more work related to policy development and dialogue (though Sida's funding in the past has mostly focused on the first area). Interviewees across the board confirmed that LPI has played an important role in local level mediation and peacebuilding and addressing capacities at local level in conflict transformation. The main concerns of the support relate to the long-term sustainability of the support and the possible (currently limited) feedback into the national level reconciliation. This is largely confirmed by the evaluation reports of the LPI programme, to which the team has had access. For example, Paffenholtz in (2000) p 59 found that LPI's peacebuilding work 1990-2000 was inclusive and addressed peacebuilding across communities and was also able to involve women in the process already from the activities of the early 1990s. But also that the link to track peacebuilding was less clear. A 2005 evaluation report (G. Tamm et al p 1) found that "*in Somalia the likely impact is considerable, directly through LPI's pioneering role of strengthening civil society and its focus on women, indirectly through promoting local-level peace consciousness through extensive skill-training. But both programmes (particularly Somalia) lacked a strategy of linking to wider supra-local peace efforts*". A 2015 evaluation report (LPI-CRM Final report p 13) found that "*throughout this evaluation, participants noted a decrease in the frequency and intensity of conflicts, as well as the voluntary returning of stolen property and unprecedented freedom of movement over clan boundaries: participants also discussed improved relations between clans that have spread to more informal engagement, like trade.*" A 2016 mid-term review of LPI's regional programme found that for Somalia (Sipu p vii) "*the achievement of results under Strategic Priority 1 (ed.: capacity development of conflict transformation CSOs) is perceived to be relatively high. The capacity of partners in addressing conflict transformation strategies and organisational matters has been strengthened. There are also a number of reported achievements from partners' engagement in local level conflict transformation. It is the understanding of the evaluation team that there is a need to further strengthen the focus on long-term solutions to these conflicts that move beyond agreements on compensation for recent and historic crimes (killings).*" A 2017 evaluation

	report (Hikman & Rogers p 5) found that *"the project introduced dialogue and demonstrated that it is a viable alternate option giving pause to the default practice of immediate and sometimes deadly retaliation. Alone, these demonstrations of viable, peaceful alternatives may not be sufficient to leverage the cultural changes needed to transform Somali cultural drivers of violence."* The evaluation found the project to be situationally responsive but not addressing the root causes of conflict.[64]
Guatemala: PAJUST, 2010-2014	Through a range of programmes implemented primarily by the UN, Sida has supported the justice sector (joint-funding with other donors) with the aim of improving coordination and interaction between the justice system and civil society. The combination of these projects - and the long-term approach - has led to important results in the area of transitional justice.
	Sida has funded *Programa de Alianzas con la Sociedad Civil* (PASOC) I and II between 2000-2007 - through UNDP – aiming at increasing civil society participation in the justice sector. PASOC is a continuation of a UNDP/MINUGUA programme (1998-2003). In 2004, Sida initiated funding to PAJ (*Programa Aceso a Justicia*), which ran until 2008 (managed by the Soros Foundation). According to a 2008 evaluation of PAJ it is clear that effectiveness has been hampered by weak state institutional capacity and limited political willingness.
	Sida commenced support to PAJUST I (2010-2014) and PAJUST II in 2015-2018, aiming to support both state and CSOs capacity within four key transitional justice areas: i) Truth ii) Justice iii) Reparation and iv) No Repetition. PAJUST promoted the recovery of the historical and political memory of the country; the location of clandestine cemeteries, missing persons and information for the clarification of human rights violations; the strengthening of system of justice and the eradication of impunity (link to CICIG and General Attorney). CSOs have played a fundamental role, empowering victims to claim their rights and providing them with legal and psychosocial support. Overall, support to key processes has been relatively well coordinated, but there has been scope for providing a more capacity enhancing support to CSOs working with transitional justice. Examples of important outputs achieved (through combined programmes) are:
	• The State has developed public policies aimed at guaranteeing Transitional Justice. • Digitalisation of 16 million documents from the National Police Historical Archives. Support to strengthen databases and testimonies and support efforts of the working group advocating law reform regarding missing persons – all of which served as important information in transitional justice cases. • In 2017 civil society organisations have been able to continue important forensic work including DNA matching and inhumations and

[64] In addition to references in box, the sources are interviews with Sida and LPI staff and desk review of LPI documents and non-public evaluations of LPI's work received from LPI as well as public reviews (see list of references in Annex H)

	the Police Archive maintains the provision of data to the Attorney General's Office used for investigations in the process to achieve justice and truth. • Oxfam's Indigenous Fund supported families displaced by the conflict and in 2017 they achieved measures of both individual and collective reparation, among the measures of individual reparation 806 families were benefitted with 83 873 quetzals each • Support to civil society to drive legal cases and as of 2013, support for Bufete Juridico de Derechos Humanos, the law firm dealing with most of the legal proceedings concerning human rights crimes during the internal armed conflict, including the historical trial against Ríos Montt. Montt was convicted for Genocide, as the first ever ex-president to be convicted by a national court. Examples of important results achieved (impact): • Ríos Montt, a former de facto president, was sentenced to 80 years in prison for genocide and crimes against humanity as responsible for the military massacre and abuse in the Ixil region during the period March 1982 to August 1983. While the ruling was subject to a lot of pressure, the trial and the ruling were important achievements for restoring victims' and relatives' dignity and recovery of historical memory. • The trial process in the Sepur Zarco case, alleged sex slavery and sexual violence against 15 women from the Mayan Kekchi ethnic group on a 1982-1983 military base, is a breakthrough for the conduct of sexual violence during the internal armed conflict. The trial process was prepared for several years by the prosecutor's office together with an association of civil society organisations using, inter alia, the Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1960. The convictions against a former military and former military commissioner fell in February 2016. Progress being made today is the result of decades of work with empowering victims and building up prosecuting capacity.[65]
Bosnia and Herzegovina: ICMP, 2005-2018	ICMP's efforts have led to the location and identification of over 70% of the 31,500 people declared as missing, including nearly 7,000 of the 8,000 men and boys who disappeared in the Srebrenica genocide. It has helped promote accountability and transparency for crimes against humanity and other war crimes, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or the role of person in the conflict. In 2005, ICMP supported the domestic anchoring of this work through the establishment of the Missing Person Institute (MPI) in Sarajevo in 2005, the establishment of a registry, and the 2004 BiH law on missing persons (which was the first of its kind). Families of missing have been a driving force (through provision of DNA samples). Together with Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina has since signed the *Declaration on the Role of the State in Addressing the Issue of Persons Missing as a Consequence of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Abuses.*

[65] Interviews and a range of documents including country reports and programme evaluations.

	Also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICMP has supported the role of Family Associations, although a 2012 evaluation showed that the effect of these was uneven and there was some distrust of CSOs as "lead organisations" in relation to funding. ICMP has supported connectivity between the associations across different ethnic backgrounds and has sought to involve young people. Despite its inclusion in the 2004 law, the issue of compensation arrangements for victims' families remains unimplemented.[66]
	ICMP has helped to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional capacity to address the issue of missing persons in a non-discriminatory manner, crafting legislation to safeguard the rights of families, introducing systematic forensic methods, including the use of DNA, upholding rule of law-based processes that have ensured the provision of evidence to domestic courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and facilitating the active engagement of the families of the missing.[67]
Rwanda: IRDP/ Interpeace 2008-2018	Since 2001 Sweden has supported Interpeace for community dialogue initiatives. Interpeace used to work with IRDP until 2013 when, because of management and political issues, it was replaced by Never Again.
	The launch of the interventions was based on the specific challenges faced in the Rwandese society, while support was shifting from NGOs to donor governments. With the initiation of Gacaca, some people fled the country, others decided to eliminate the witnesses and the genocide survivors, and some decided to revenge and killed the suspected genocidaire. At that time dialogue was impossible on 1994 events. IRDP was created with the general aim of reducing the mistrust between members of the same society. The IRDP programme was also created to provide more space for other categories of people to give their thoughts on human rights and justice in Rwanda and to help the society break the violent silence. The IRDP programme sought to facilitate dialogue between people from different political backgrounds.
	The 2008 evaluation concluded that: *"The IRDP/ Interpeace programme has made a significant and strategic contribution to the possibility of building peace in Rwanda. It has selected activities, participants, and strategies which have real influence, and a combined impact greater than any one of its elements. This positive assessment is supported by those interviewed, virtually without exception.*
	IRDP / Interpeace has established itself as an interlocutor, described in terms such as credible, neutral, objective, and accepted. It has been particularly adept at identifying important issues which were controversial or

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[66] www.ICMP.int and Interview, Sarajevo, October 2018

[67] www.ICMP.int

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taboo, yet which needed to be discussed in order for Rwanda to progress in the direction of peace-building, and at engaging those at elite and decision-making levels in dialogue. It has dared to open difficult themes, and has managed to inform and include the full range of actors, from the base to the high political levels."[68]

This was further emphasized by the 2011 evaluation, which concludes "*that the IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Programme continues to be of great strategic relevance for the prospects of peacebuilding in Rwanda. It has succeeded in bringing into the open a number of highly sensitive and controversial issues, yet of crucial importance for the future of peace in the country; in the process, it has engaged a broad range of people in growing numbers, from youth in schools and universities and ordinary "people on the hills" to local authorities and the main decision-makers at national level. In particular, it has uniquely succeeded in bringing groups of the Rwandan diaspora around the world into this on-going and ever widening dialogue."[69]*

4.3.2 IMPACT FOR WOMEN AND MARGINALISED GROUPS

As is also evident from the section above, there are a number of examples of where **Sida has contributed to gender equality and women's empowerment in a peacebuilding context**. This includes the enhanced number of female voters registered in Guatemala, women's enhanced role in public service management positions in Rwanda, the gender action plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the number of women members of parliament in Somalia. Many, but not all projects, have mainstreamed gender.

From a broader peacebuilding perspective, **the impact of Sida's (and Sweden's) assistance has been particularly strong in the policy and partner dialogue processes around gender equality** and women's role in peacebuilding, as is evident from the findings in Guatemala and Bosnia and Herzegovina over the time-period covered (see Box 4.4 on Bosnia below). These findings are backed by interviews with development partners in all four countries who stated that Sweden has brought the issue of women as beneficiaries as well as key stakeholders in peacebuilding processes into the dialogue with governments and development partners. Similarly, as also reflected further above, Sida has been seen by the implementing partners interviewed (more so in Guatemala and Bosnia and Herzegovina, less in Somalia) as a strong advocate for women's rights in project design and implementation. The impact of this has varied and it is also evident that change has often been a collective effort.

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[68] IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Dialogue & Research Programme: External Evaluation, Serge Rwamasirabo and Sue Williams April 2008

[69] External Evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme, Guus Meijer & Dr. Théogène Bangwanubusa, October 2011

Box 4.4 Sida's work on women and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Sida, women and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The impact of Sida's support to gender equality and women's empowerment has been good at output level but wider effects have remained challenged by the country's patriarchal system. Nonetheless, Sida and its NGO partners have helped develop the Gender Action Plan and the 1325 Action Plan, both anchored in the State Gender Agency. Kvinna till Kvinna and others have actively engaged with women's groups from different communities and the effects of this at local level are reported to be positive. Local women's groups have been empowered to cross boundaries. This has had a peacebuilding effect through breaking down barriers and dispelling myths. There is increased attention to gender-based violence (GBV), partly via Kvinna till Kvinna, partly through the local NGOs (the Atlantic Initiative's gender and justice project is an example), and partly via UNDP, which also works with changing male attitudes. Given the high rates of GBV in BiH and the persistence of patriarchal values, these interventions are relevant. The recent *Women in Change* initiative is an example of a more direct and informed advocacy on key peacebuilding and justice issues (including 1325 implementation) that still need to be addressed.

The impact on the inclusion of marginalised groups is less evident. While Sida has brought the issue into the lamplight (in at least three of the countries) and has brought it to international and government fora in two of the countries, it is only really in Guatemala that there is strong evidence of Sida's efforts having had an impact for these groups. The issue was also not automatically brought up in interviews but recognised as a need when flagged by the team to Sida and MFA staff.

4.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The degree of sustainability of Sida's interventions in the four countries has varied according to the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the portfolios concerned. Projects that have made a difference, like the Interpeace intervention in Somaliland and the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) project in Guatemala have contributed to a process that continues to be on-going and has been institutionalised to the extent that there is a high probability of continued impact beyond the Sida support.

However, the evaluation finds that the peacebuilding approaches taken have often focused more on immediate stability issues, such as mediation efforts at local level or reconstruction efforts which are not necessarily always anchored in an institutional approach but have a more humanitarian character. Nonetheless, Sida's move towards more statebuilding oriented efforts in most of the countries examined does by default take a more institutional approach which can bring with it a higher degree of potential for longer-term sustainability. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the move to further statebuilding and to fund NGOs for advocacy and demand-side activities and leave service delivery to the state apparatus is an example of an enhanced focus on sustainability.

Across all four countries, the funding to NGOs engaged in peacebuilding activities has fallen short of ensuring long-term sustainability of the NGO operations from a financial perspective. This emphasises the need for ensuring that results are sustainable before funding ceases. Examples of this are the inclusion of an education manual in the national curricula developed by the Aegis Trust Peace Education in Rwanda and the increased voter participation promoted by TSE in Guatemala. However, again for all four countries – and in particular for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia – there has been low capacity among civil society operators at the outset and thus building this capacity has been in itself a contribution to the sustainability of the peacebuilding process.

While the principal of statebuilding (focusing on state formation and institutional processes) is expected to provide a sustainable framework in a post-conflict context, the evaluation finds that the results are often not fully sustainable. For example, in Guatemala, the sought-after inclusion and change in the civil service has not materialised. In Somalia, the FGS is only operational as a consequence of funding from development partners with no immediate expectation of significant revenue generation in the near future.

Finally, the fact that the majority of root causes of conflict remain in the four countries assessed provides an unstable foundation for their future peace and stability (and still to be achieved in Somalia). In effect, this means that **the <u>overall</u> results in terms of national level peacebuilding will not be sustainable until the root causes of conflict are adequately addressed.**

5 Conclusions

In the following sections, we present the evaluation conclusions in accordance with the key questions outlined in the evaluation matrix, followed by an overall summative observation regarding Sida's peacebuilding work.

Relevance: the extent to which the approaches in the case studies were aligned with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the peace and security challenges

Sub-questions developed by the team were:
- *Theory of Change alignment with peacebuilding needs in the four countries?*
- *Theory of Change alignment with needs of women rights and inclusion needs?*
- *Alignment with national peacebuilding plans?*
- *Alignment between portfolio and Swedish strategy and policy objectives?*

The evaluation finds a significant variance in the definition of peacebuilding among Sida staff and in the policies and guidelines relating to peace and security over the period evaluated. The variation leads to different perceptions of what is peacebuilding, which impacts the strategy and portfolio development process.

The evaluation finds that the *alignment of the theory of change embedded in Swedish strategies and underlying Sida documentation and approach the peacebuilding needs in the four countries* has been mixed. The Swedish strategies and underlying Sida documentation have been (by and large) all relevant to the context, but the strategies have often not been explicit regarding the root causes of conflict and how the (explicit or implicit) theory of change would address these and thereby contribute to sustainable peace. Sweden has gone through at least five different peacebuilding strategy periods at the global level and multiple strategies (four in Bosnia and Herzegovina, four in Guatemala, three in Rwanda and two in Somalia) during the course of the evaluation period at country level. In some cases, peace has only been included at the overall objective level and with no direct reference to the peacebuilding contribution of the areas targeted by Sida (as with most of the Bosnia and Herzegovina country strategies). In other cases, peacebuilding – or at least the peace agreement – has explicitly permeated the strategies for the country concerned (Guatemala is a good example of this).

The Swedish Government has also used several strategy formats during the period covered by the evaluation and the team finds that the quality of these has varied. In the early 2000s, most of the country strategies included fairly solid analysis and lessons learned and a theory of change, which reflected some of the root causes of conflict. In contrast, the latest Swedish strategy format provides limited room for actually

describing the causalities and effects of Sweden's support to the given country and limited guidance beyond a sector prioritisation. This, however, is compensated for by an increase in the use of internal Sida analyses, which provide a more in-depth assessment of lessons learned and an integrated conflict perspective. Sida is thus becoming increasingly more focused on documenting lessons learned and providing guidance internally to embassies on peacebuilding work. This is also more evident in the annual and strategy period reports, which include references to peacebuilding and results assessment.

The evaluation finds that the limited written documentation on drivers of peace and conflict to guide the work of Sida has often been compensated by the availability of qualified staff and long-term partners, with the capacity to identify and implement relevant peacebuilding work. This however, can be seen to pose a risk when there is staff turnover or if partners fail to produce effective results, which underlines the relevance of having a quality assurance process in place that includes a focus on drivers of peace and conflict. Staff and partners have also contributed to ensuring that the portfolios were relevant to the context and needs even if they were not directly addressing conflict drivers.

The *degree of theory of change alignment with women's and marginalised group's rights and needs* was overall found to be high with some differences across the four countries. In particular, regarding women's rights, Sida has moved from a focus on women as beneficiaries towards a focus on women's role in peacebuilding aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 1325. However, the evaluation finds that the attention to marginalised groups has varied; there has been a high emphasis on indigenous people's rights in Guatemala yet also a conscious decision not to engage in the issue of marginalisation and ethnicity in Somalia and Rwanda. This appears to be counter to Sida's otherwise value-based approach to development.

For all four countries, *the evaluation finds that Swedish strategies as well as Sida's approach have been fully aligned with national peacebuilding plans, the international agenda as well as Swedish policies*.

Effectiveness: the extent to which the approaches taken have contributed to intended peacebuilding outcomes
Sub-questions developed by the team were:
- *Sida's ability to respond to emerging peacebuilding opportunities?*
- *Adaptability of Sida's approaches in changing contexts?*
- *Lessons learned for approaches that have worked well/less well?*
- *Theory of change for inclusion of women and marginalised groups and link to results in this area?*
- *Degree to which women and marginalised groups are included in theories of change?*
- *Degree of conflict sensitivity?*
- *Coherence with joint peacebuilding efforts?*

Overall, the evaluation finds that effectiveness in terms of engagements systematically and explicitly addressing root causes of conflict has been limited in all four of the countries assessed. This is partly a consequence of the limited focus on drivers of peace and conflict in strategies and underlying documents and partly because projects have not directly tackled these issues.

However, in terms of *responding to peacebuilding opportunities*, the evaluation has found that Sida has identified and prioritised projects that in one way or the other contribute to short to medium-term peacebuilding. The limited strategic guidance on peacebuilding – in particular in the first two decades evaluated – also means that Sida's programme officers had (and to a large extent still have) considerable scope to identify interventions to be supported. Sida has relied heavily on the same partners over time, which has contributed to peacebuilding effectiveness and alignment with contextual developments due to the focus, knowledge and experience of the partners concerned.

The evaluation finds that *Sida has had a high degree of adaptability to the changing context*, and there is evidence to show that Sida has been effective when its 'classic' development approach has been applied, which includes the long-term engagement with the same partners ensuring a high degree of predictability as well as flexibility in the funding provided. The evaluation also finds that there has been a strong cooperation and alignment in messaging between Sida and the Swedish MFA and this has made it easier for partners to position themselves and cooperate with Sida. Similarly, Sida's neutrality in most cases has made it a preferred partner, free from economic and security interests, while Sida's values remain clear. And as a final point, Sida has been a strong advocate for the use of the multilateral system, and the evaluation provides examples of how Sida has strived to enhance the effectiveness of the same. This is also aligned with the significant *coherence* between Sida's peacebuilding efforts and joint donor approaches to peacebuilding in all four countries.

The evaluation, however, also highlights risks around the current and past Sida approach, which merit attention in future Sida programming and implementation. First and foremost, the high reliance on the same partners and the limited use of independent information (e.g. from third party monitoring) to inform portfolio decisions provides a risk for being caught in the same discourse around what is effective and what is not effective and limits opportunities for engaging in new initiatives and approaches with new partners. There has thus been a risk of Sida only learning from the same partners.

In terms of *ensuring conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm,* Sida has had the tools in place, but their application on the ground has, with some exceptions, been insufficient to ensure that partners have been sufficiently attentive in the programming to conflict triggers and potential unintended consequences of the support.

Overall, the degree to which Sida has been *effective in ensuring results related to women and marginalised groups and inclusion of the same in theories of change* is positive. Sida has played a significant role among the international community and with partners in terms of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment in three out of the four countries, and they have often been *part of the theories of change*. The effectiveness around ensuring the rights of marginalised groups, however, has been more mixed, which again is a reflection of the limited attention to the issue at the strategy, theory of change and portfolio levels in two of the countries. Guatemala stands out as the only country where this issue has received particular attention as is evident as part of the theory of change.

Impact: the overall impact of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct, indirect, intended and unintended, negative and positive results
Sub-questions developed by the team were:
* *Alignment between Sida theories of change and peacebuilding developments in the country targeted?*
* *Confluence between Sida theory of change and long-term peacebuilding changes?*
* *Results related to improvements in situation of women and marginalised groups?*
* *The validity of the theory of change assumptions over time?*
* *Reference to Sida peacebuilding in external evaluations?[70]*

Overall, none of the countries evaluated has seen a significant change in the root causes of conflict over the period evaluated. So, at the macro level, there has been *poor alignment between Sida's peacebuilding theories of change and the portfolios and the developments in the targeted countries*. In many ways, the targeted countries have been (and still are) facing situations that can be described as negative peace with lower levels of political violence but with the potential for renewed or exacerbated conflict still present. Sida has not by itself been in a position to change the root causes of conflict and this situation cannot therefore be attributed to Sida alone. However, with a few exceptions, Sida (and most other development partners) has not proactively engaged in these often politically sensitive areas. Sida has refrained from articulating and designing interventions explicitly around the root causes of conflict in most of the countries in most of the period evaluated.[71] Thus, Sida has indirectly, and unintentionally contributed to the status quo in this respect.

The evaluation identifies, however, areas where there has been *progress in terms of elements of peacebuilding and also pockets of contextual change towards peace*, to which Sida has contributed. There are examples of projects that have contributed to

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[70] This question is responded through throughout the evaluation findings sections with specific reference in text or footnotes.

[71] And with no explicit theories of change, there are also no explicit assumptions to be assessed.

significant change either contextually or within their sub-sector. In Somalia, LPI has played an important role in local level mediation and peacebuilding and addressing capacities at local level in conflict transformation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICMP has helped promote accountability and transparency for crimes against humanity and other war crimes, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or the role of person in the conflict. In Rwanda, IRDP/Interpeace proved adept at identifying important issues, which were controversial or taboo, yet which needed to be discussed in order for Rwanda to progress on peacebuilding. In Guatemala, the support to PAJUST promoted transitional justice, including historical and political memory, the location of clandestine cemeteries, missing persons, and information for the clarification of human rights violations.

The evaluation finds that Sida has *contributed to the improvement of the situation for women* in a peacebuilding context. However, in terms of overall impact, the indicators remain bleak in most of the countries evaluated. Nonetheless, there are projects targeting women's role in peacebuilding funded by Sida that have made a difference in the specific area targeted. The impact in terms of ensuring inclusion of the most marginalised is less evident in the evaluation (with the exception of Guatemala).

Sustainability: the extent to which the results have been sustainable
Sub-questions developed by the team were:
  * *Has change remained over time?*
  * *Sustainability in improvement of women's and marginalised rights?*

The evaluation finds that the long-term sustainability of Sida's support has varied over time in all four countries. None of the countries has reached a sustainable and inclusive political settlement, which also provides for enhanced gender equality. Nonetheless, Sida has contributed to the present situation in each country and there is some sustainability of this impact in geographically delineated areas (e.g. Somaliland) or with specific sub-thematic areas. Examples of the latter include identifying missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributing to transparency and accountability, improving citizen-state dialogue in Rwanda, transitional justice in Guatemala resulting in prosecution of war criminals. Arguably Sida's value-based peacebuilding approach, which includes a strong element of trust, inclusion and listening to its implementing partners, has in these cases provided a strong platform for achieving the set goals.

At the portfolio and project level, the evaluation finds that where there has been an institutional focus – be it through state or civil society – the interventions are more likely to be sustainable.

In terms of sustainability of the results relating to women and marginalised groups, the mixed performance overall reflected in the sections above also means that overall the results are limited. Yet, where Sida has made a difference (for example in terms

of indigenous rights in Guatemala and women's role in statebuilding processes in Rwanda) the results remain and thus indicate sustainability.

Summative conclusion

Combining the findings above, the evaluation of Sida's peacebuilding approach and results shows that Sida has stood out among development partners because of a number of distinctive characteristics in its peacebuilding work. These characteristics are not unique individually, yet combined, they have given Sida a special niche in peacebuilding. Aligned with Sida's overall development policies throughout the period of the evaluation, Sida's engagement in peacebuilding has been first and foremost value-based. This has been most visible in Guatemala, which is also the country with the most direct peacebuilding engagement where long-term policy dialogue efforts have built upon Swedish values. It has, however, also been a key feature in the other three countries, and an aspect for which Sida has been recognised by other development partners, implementing partners, and recipient governments alike. Sida's value-based approach has thus been a core competence and comparative advantage in its peacebuilding work. Sida has also stood out and been recognised for bringing to the policy dialogue issues of rights and the international commitments to peace agreements.

Sida's value-based approach comes out in two ways: (i) in terms of commitment to the peacebuilding agenda from a perspective of equitable access to resources and rights with a strong emphasis on women's rights in the policy dialogue and in terms of partners chosen, and (ii) in how Sida approaches peacebuilding and engages with the partner country and other development partners. The latter in particular concerns (a) providing a conducive framework for partners to operate in, (b) enabling the UN and other multilateral agencies to perform against their mandates, and (c) always committing Sida to provide support aligned with international treaties, conventions and goals. This has not changed significantly in any of the four countries in the last 20-25 years.

The commitment to peacebuilding is driven by a focus on human rights (and a rights-based approach) and – at strategy level – a commitment to seeking to ensure inclusive peace settlements and their implementation. Similarly, Sida has had a strong focus on gender equality and women's empowerment in peacebuilding, as in development more generally. Sida has been a strong advocate for ensuring the rights of marginalised groups and minorities in global strategies, although the level of practical commitment to this has varied in the four countries. However, in all of them, this commitment to values has also been complemented by a strong grassroots focus, often through (Swedish) NGOs and their local partners.

The value-based approach is also evident in how Sida has approached peacebuilding through its strong commitment to the international peacebuilding agenda, peace agreements, and the multilateral system that supports them. At a strategic level, Swedish assistance refers to international agendas such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, MDGs and SDGs, and at the country level it is evident in the commit-

ment to the agreements reached such as the New Deal Compact in Somalia, Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the peace agreement in Guatemala. It has also meant that a commitment to the multilateral system - in particular the UN – and rallying behind the multilaterals' lead role in particular in state-building processes in the four targeted countries.

Sida's limited results (in common with all other development partners) in terms of addressing root causes of conflict are, however, also an issue which should merit further reflection at Sida. Sida's niche in terms of its strong value-based approach and focus on human rights has been demonstrated throughout this evaluation. Sida has had a unique position as a defender of these rights. Where the root causes have not been directly and explicitly addressed, Sida should consider taking this process further in its implementation on the ground in the future

6 Recommendations

Sida's value-based approach is a core competence and comparative advantage in its peacebuilding work and should continue to be a core element in the future. However, to be meaningful in all contexts and make a difference for longer-term peacebuilding, there are a number of areas where Sida should consider further enhancing its approach:

1) To be effective in its peacebuilding work, the evaluation team recommends that Sida enhances its focus on drivers of peace and conflict and link these specifically to the expected results of its peacebuilding work. Theories of change should be made explicit and explain how Sida will work with drivers of peace and target root causes of conflict. Likewise, the assumptions and preconditions for change results should also be made clear so that they can be monitored, and adjustments made should this be necessary. This focus on drivers of peace and conflict and the theory of change around this should be part of the full programming cycle in terms of:

   a. Background analysis which informs Sida (and the MFA) of drivers of peace and conflict, which is expected to include conflict and political-economy analyses
   b. Sida inputs to the Swedish country and regional strategy processes
   c. Design of underlying Sida documentation guiding strategy implementation
   d. Referencing and reflection on progress in addressing root causes of conflict and supporting drivers of peace in country and strategic level reports
   e. Ensuring that drivers of peace and addressing root causes of conflict is a core element in the selection of partners and the dialogue with these
   f. Ensuring that these issues are part of Sida's dialogue with all partners as well as in Sida's inputs to the MFA policy dialogue processes
   g. Ensuring that drivers of peace and conflict and the theory of change around this become a core element in mid-term reviews and in evaluations.

   In order to promote a consistent approach to this, it would be worthwhile considering the development of practical guidance (with examples) of how peacebuilding can be introduced into theory of change. It is furthermore recommended that the quality assurance process be enhanced to ensure proper inclusion of drivers of peace and conflict in Sida's contributions and documentation, in particular vis-à-vis Sida's inputs to strategy development.

2) With human rights as a core value and with a specific focus on inclusiveness, it is recommended that the issue of marginalisation – and in the context of peacebuilding, in particular marginalisation around ethnicity - becomes a core part of Sida's peacebuilding work on a par with the focus on women's rights (see recommendation 3 below). In contexts like Somalia and Rwanda, where no other development partner has the same rights-based niche as Sida, Sida can make a difference in furthering this agenda. In practice, this means that Sida should ensure that marginalisation becomes a specific issue to be included in the full programming cycle, from strategy inputs to project identification and policy dialogue, and that targets and indicators are developed around this. This also requires a stronger focus on the role of marginalised groups in terms of drivers of peace and conflict (see further below).

3) While Sida has a strong profile already in terms of ensuring the rights of women and their inclusion in peacebuilding processes aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the team recommends that Sida enhances its scope further. As with marginalisation, this means ensuring that women's rights are part of the full programming cycle and that there are indicators and targets developed particularly for women's rights and inclusion in peacebuilding processes. Sida has very strong experience with this (in, for example, Guatemala and Colombia), which can be documented and fed into future Sida programming in other countries.

4) To compensate for the heavy reliance on the same long-term partners for contextual and effectiveness related information, Sida should consider introducing third party monitoring and related mechanisms to assess and monitor the peace and conflict situation and performance of Sida partners and use it to inform decision-making on future support and strategy processes.

5) Continue to apply the Sida 'classic' approach to peacebuilding, which includes an emphasis on flexibility, predictability and long-term partnerships, and the strong link and mutual support between the Swedish MFA and Sida. However, this approach should be updated and made explicit for a peacebuilding context. In this process, Sida should consider the downside (of the generally positive) long-term partnerships versus identifying and engaging with new partners. For the approach to be effective it should be complemented by additional information flows as recommended in (4) above

6) The emphasis on working with multilateral organisations, in particular the UN, and efforts to make these more effective and efficient should be continued. However, the team suggests the process is made more strategic in terms of providing guidance to Sida programme officers in the dialogue with multilateral agencies vis-à-vis: (a) advice and demands for a strong results based management approach of the UN+, (b) reasonable administrative costs and overheads when working in fragile and conflict-affected areas, (c) cross-

UN/multilateral cooperation such as One-UN engagements. Furthermore, Sida should also be clearer in terms of identifying 'red lines' for engaging with the UN, i.e. when it becomes too costly or if the direction of the multilateral is compromising Sida's value-based approach to peacebuilding. To identify how to best support this process, it is recommended that Sida assesses lessons learned from working with the UN and mainstream these across the portfolio so that it can continue as a strong advocate and facilitator for effective UN engagements

7) Consider enhancing the application of Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity in programming and in the assessment of, and dialogue with, implementing partners. Sida already has tools in place for this, however, the team recommends that the application of these is promoted through dialogue and capacity development provided to programme officers at the embassy level as well as through quality assurance by Sida's thematic advisors. This should also reflect that conflict sensitivity concerns not only avoiding doing harm but also positioning to take advantage of opportunities for peace.

7   Annexes

ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Sida's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Information about Sida

Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, is a government authority. Our goal is to contribute to enabling poor people to improve their living conditions.

As other Swedish government agencies, Sida works independently within the framework established by the Swedish Government and Parliament. They decide on the financial limits, the countries with which Sweden (and thus, Sida) will cooperate, and the focus and content of that cooperation.

For additional information, please visit Sida's website, www.sida.se

1.2 Information about the responsible unit at Sida

The evaluation is commissioned by the Peace and Human Security Unit located within the Department for Asia, Middle East and Humanitarian Assistance. The Unit is responsible for the implementation of the strategy *Sustaining Peace 2017-2022*, and provides method and thematic support to Sida and to Swedish Embassies on a wide range of topics, including among others, peace and human security, conflict prevention, conflict sensitivity, children and youth and women, peace and security.

2. THE ASSIGNMENT

2.1 Evaluation object and scope

The object of the evaluation is Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding on the strategic level in four countries in different post- conflict and conflict situations where Sida has a considerable engagement. The four countries are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. The evaluation is not expected to evaluate individual contributions. Timewise, the evaluation will cover the periods during which Sida has been engaged in each country, i.e. all past and current Swedish cooperation strategies.

The scope of the evaluation shall be further elaborated by the evaluator in the inception report. Current Swedish development cooperation strategies are available at www.gov.se. For further information about Sida's engagement in conflict resolution, peace and security in the four focus countries as well as Sida evaluations, please visit Sida's website, www.sida.se.

Sida has worked in conflict and post-conflict countries ever since the agency was established. Often, a conflict or post-conflict situation has been determinant for the Swedish engagement and development cooperation with a country. Sometimes, peacebuilding has been an explicit part of the theory of change in Swedish development cooperation strategies. Several Swedish country and regional strategies have explicit objectives related to peacebuilding or human security. In other cases, a broad development engagement in conflict-affected contexts is based on the assumption that poverty reduction and development is conducive for a more peaceful and democratic development, but without any explicit development objectives related to peacebuilding. In many countries where the end of a conflict has been the initial motive for engagement, motives for continued engagement have shifted over the years. Sida's engagement for peace goes far beyond projects supporting conflict resolution and dialogue. In several contexts, the reason for engagement in for example the health sector, for decentralisation or for livelihoods, has been to contribute to sustainable peace or to implement peace agreements.

More concretely, Sida's broad support to the fundamentals of peacebuilding has, to mention a few examples, been directed towards the implementation of peace agreements and addressing root causes of conflict in Central America and the Western Balkans; transitional justice and reconciliation in Liberia, South Africa, Central America and Rwanda; dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in diverse contexts, such as Somalia, Myanmar and Colombia; and strengthening of state institutions that are key for sustained peace in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Liberia.

In 2016, Sida's support for the sector Conflict Prevention, Peace and Security amounted to 733 MSEK, 3.9 % of Sida's total disbursements. 7% of Sida's total disbursements the same year, were targeting interventions having Peace and Security as one of its principal objectives, and 51% to interventions having Peace and Security as a significant objective.

Over the years, Sida has commissioned several evaluations regarding peacebuilding related to certain countries and sub-topics, however, there has in recent years not been any effort to make a more comprehensive evaluation of Sida's approach regarding peacebuilding in conflict and post- conflict contexts. An "Assessment of Lessons learned from Sida support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding" carried out in 2000, focused on five specific projects targeting conflict resolution and thus forms a limited evidence base. Evaluations of the overall impact related to peace on country-level include the "Inquiry of Swedish engagement in Afghanistan" (2017) and a study of the cooperation with El Salvador in support of the peace and democratisation pro-

cess (2004). Furthermore, several evaluations have been carried out of specific cooperation partners working with conflict management and peacebuilding. Now, Sida has a need to systematise its experiences and lessons learned from peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict contexts with a focus on the broader choices and priorities that have been made at country and global portfolio level, not at least how support within different sectors have added up to contribute to peacebuilding at large.

2.2 Evaluation purpose: Intended use and intended users

The purpose or intended use of the evaluation is to systematise lessons learned from peacebuilding practice. The evaluation will serve as an input to the process of conceptualising and developing Sida's approaches to peacebuilding. These approaches will in turn influence strategic planning and design of future Sida support in contexts affected by conflict. Moreover, the evaluation is expected to contribute to increased understanding of peacebuilding as a concept and practice within Sida and Swedish Embassies with international development cooperation programs.

The primary intended users are policy specialists and program officers in Sida's network for human security. Secondary intended users are managers responsible for strategies with peacebuilding components and Sida's management group. Other stakeholders are the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and partner organisations to Sida.

The evaluation is to be designed, conducted and reported to meet the needs of the intended users and tenderers shall elaborate on how this will be ensured during the evaluation process in the tender.

2.3 Evaluation objectives and questions

The specific objective of the evaluation is to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts. Drawing on the experiences of Sida staff, relevant documentation and validations by experts, the evaluation shall systematise lessons learned from what has worked well and less well. Lessons learned in terms of experiences and results as well as challenges shall be structured around the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria on relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, i.e**:**

Relevance

- To which extent have the approaches in the case studies conformed to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the peace and security challenges in the specific context?

Effectiveness

- To which extent have the approaches taken contributed to intended outcomes?

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Impact

- What has been the overall impact of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct or indirect, intended and unintended, negative and positive results?

Sustainability

- To what extent have results been sustainable?

  Furthermore, the evaluation will answer the following question:

- To what extent have women's rights and inclusiveness of excluded groups and minorities been considered in Sida's peacebuilding approaches?

The answers to the questions shall primarily be based on experiences and perceptions of informants at Sida, secondary sources such as relevant documentation and validations by experts and other informants. It is not expected that the evaluators shall elaborate on advanced methodologies for assessing impact.

Questions are expected to be further developed in the tender by the tenderer and further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation.

2.4 Methodology and methods for data collection and analysis

The evaluation will be based on four country case studies with the following principal elements:

a) Individual and/or group interviews with Sida staff who work or have worked with peacebuilding in the four countries. These interviews will provide information about how objectives and assumptions in the development cooperation strategies have been translated into approaches to peacebuilding in strategic planning of development portfolios. The evaluators are expected to elaborate and discuss the Theories of Change underpinning Sida's peacebuilding approaches for each country case.

b) A desk study summarizing and systematizing learning, conclusions and recommendations from relevant documentation including evaluations, research on peacebuilding etc. in combination with expert panels and other innovative methods.

c) Field visits could be proposed if deemed relevant for the proposed evaluation method. If field visits are proposed, all costs for these visits shall be included in Appendix 4 Price Appendix as a part of the total price for the assignment.

The tenderer is encouraged to elaborate the methodological approach in the tender and include suggestions on methods for data collection. The methodology, methods and evaluation questions should be further elaborated and explained in the inception report.

The evaluation will be carried out with a participatory approach since it aims to mobilise knowledge and shared understanding within Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of what have been examples of strengths and shortcomings of the Swedish engagement for peacebuilding in different conflict and post-conflict countries.

Sida's approach to evaluation is utilization-focused which means that the evaluator should facilitate the entire evaluation process with careful consideration of how everything that is done will affect use of the evaluation. It is therefore expected that the tenderer, in their tender, presents i) how intended users are to participate in and contribute to the evaluation process and ii) methods for data collection that create space for reflection, discussion and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

Evaluators should take into consideration appropriate measures for collecting data in cases where sensitive or confidential issues are addressed, and avoid presenting information that may be harmful to some stakeholder groups.

2.5 Organisation of evaluation management

This evaluation is commissioned by Sida's Peace and Human Security Unit at the Department for Asia, Middle East and Humanitarian Assistance.

A contact person from Sida will be provided for the evaluation team. If more significant problems or issues arise, the evaluators will inform the contact person to discuss solutions.

A Steering Committee and a Reference Group have been established for the evaluation. Decisions during the evaluation process will be taken by the contact person, in consultation with the Steering Committee. The Reference Group is composed by primary and secondary users of the evaluation as well as other stakeholders and representatives from the Swedish Embassies in the four countries.

2.6 Evaluation quality

All Sida's evaluations shall conform to OECD/DAC's Quality Standards for Development Evaluation. The evaluators shall use the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation. For this evaluation, it is recommended that reference is made to OECD/DAC Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results. The evaluators shall specify how quality assurance will be handled by them during the evaluation process.

2.7 Time schedule and deliverables

It is expected that a time and work plan (including number of working hours/days per team member) is presented in the tender and further detailed in the inception report. The evaluation shall be carried out between January and September/October 2018. The timing of any field visits, surveys and interviews need to be settled by the evalua-

tor in dialogue with Sida during the inception phase.

The table below lists key deliverables for the evaluation process.

Deliverables	Participants	Deadlines
1. Start-up meeting at Sida HQ in Stockholm	The Steering Committee	January 2018
2. Draft inception report		19 February 2018
3. Inception meeting at Sida HQ in Stockholm	The Steering Committee and the Reference Group	5 March 2018
4. Comments from intended users to evaluators	The Steering Committee and the Reference Group	12 March 2018
5. Final inception report		19 March 2018
6. Debriefing workshop at Sida HQ in Stockholm	The Steering Committee and the Reference Group.	May 2018
7. Draft evaluation report		1 June 2018
8. Comments from intended users to evaluators	The Steering Committee and the Reference Group.	15 June 2018
9. Final evaluation report		29 June 2018
10. Evaluation brief		29 June 2018
11. Seminar in Stockholm	Sida, Swedish Embassies, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Webcasted	September/October 2018

The inception report will form the basis for the continued evaluation process and shall be approved by Sida before the evaluation proceeds to implementation. The inception report should be written in English and cover evaluability issues and interpretations of evaluation questions, present the methodology, methods for data collection and analysis as well as the full evaluation design. A specific time and work plan for the remainder of the evaluation should be presented which also cater for the need to create space for reflection and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

The final report shall be written in English and be professionally proof read. The final report should have clear structure and follow the report format in the Sida Evaluation Report Template. The approach/methodology and methods used shall be clearly described and explained in detail and a clear distinction between the two shall be made. All limitations shall be made explicit and the consequences of these limitations discussed. Findings shall flow logically from the data, showing a clear line of evidence to support the conclusions. Conclusions should be substantiated by findings

and analysis. Recommendations and lessons learned should flow logically from conclusions. Recommendations should be specific, directed to relevant stakeholders and categorised as a short- term, medium-term and long-term. Sida is particularly interested in the gathering of lessons learned and drawing more general conclusions on what have been successful and less successful engagements of Sida within the area of peacebuilding. The report should be no more than 35 pages excluding annexes. The evaluator shall adhere to the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation.

The evaluator shall, upon approval of the final report, insert the report into the **Sida Evaluation Report Template** and submit it to Sitrus (in pdf- format) for publication and release in the Sida publication data base. The order is placed by sending the approved report to sida@sitrus.com, with a copy to the Sida contact person as well as Sida's evaluation team (evaluation@sida.se). Write "**Sida evaluations**" in the email subject field and include the name of the consulting company as well as the full evaluation title in the email. For invoicing purposes, the evaluator needs to include the invoice reference "ZZ610601S," type of allocation "sakanslag" and type of order "digital publicering/publikationsdatabas".

Sida mainly foresees to disseminate the findings of the evaluation within Sida and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and will be expecting the evaluator to participate actively in a seminar organised for this purpose after approval of the final report.

Sida will communicate the findings of the evaluation externally. The evaluators are expected to produce an evaluation brief suitable for this purpose.

2.8 Profile of the Supplier and requirements for personnel

It is envisaged that the Assignment is carried out by a team consisting of one team leader and 2-3 senior team members and it is recommended that junior team members are used where appropriate. It is important that the competencies of the individual team members are complimentary. In the workplan, as referred to under section 2.7, details are to be provided on the role and responsibilities that will be carried out by the different team members.

All personnel proposed must have very good knowledge in spoken and written English (at least level 2 of Sida's Language Definition, Appendix 8). One team member must have knowledge of reading Swedish (at least level 2) and one team member must have knowledge of Spanish (at least level 2).

All personnel in the evaluation team must be independent from the evaluation object and evaluated activities, and have no stake in the outcome of the evaluation. Consultants and actors who have been involved directly with the implementation of Swedish development cooperation in the four case countries, including members of the Helpdesk for on Human Security and Humanitarian Assistance, are disqualified from submitting a bid.

2.8.1 Person principally responsible for the implementation of the evaluation (team leader)

The tenderer must propose a *team leader* with:

I. Academic education, at least Master's degree or equivalent. ⌊SEP⌋
II. At least 3 assignments as team leader for complex evaluations (complex meaning evaluations of large programmes with many stakeholders and/or in unpredictable contexts) within an international development cooperation context. ⌊SEP⌋

The tender must include:

a) A description in the form of a Curriculum Vitae for the team leader. The CV must contain a full description of the person's theoretical qualifications and professional work experience of relevance for this assignment according to the template enclosed in Appendix 6. ⌊SEP⌋

b) One written specification of previously performed assignments by the proposed person. The specifications must contain information according to the Appendix 5 "Reference in writing" and relate to projects performed and concluded within the past three years. ⌊SEP⌋

2.8.2 Other team members

Tenderers must assign *senior team members* with:

Academic education, at least Bachelor's degree of equivalent.

At least 5 assignments in the area relevant to the person's role in the Assignment within an international development cooperation context.

Any *junior team members* assigned must have the following competencies:

I. An academic education, at least Bachelor's degree or equivalent. ⌊SEP⌋
II. At least one year working experience in the area relevant to the person's role within the Assignment. ⌊SEP⌋

The tender must include:

A description in the form of a Curriculum Vitae for all senior and junior team members. The CV must contain a full description of the person's theoretical qualifications and professional work experience of relevance for this assignment according to the template enclosed in Appendix 6.

One written specification of previously performed assignments by the proposed person. The specifications must contain information according to the Appendix 5 "Reference in writing and relate to projects performed and concluded within the past three

years.

Budget and other resources

The maximum budget amount available for the evaluation is SEK 3 000 000, including fees and reimbursable costs. A detailed budget (based on an estimate of time required per part of the assignment indicated in section 2.7) including expenses, shall be submitted to Sida as part of the tender response for the assignment.

As outlined under section 2.7, four different trips to Stockholm will be carried out.

Participants invited to the inception meeting, workshops and seminar are expected to carry out their own costs.

The contact person at Sida is Åsa Wallton, Lead Policy Specialist, Peace and Security. The contact person should be consulted if any problems arise during the evaluation process.

The contact person will provide relevant Sida documentation and contact details to intended users.

The evaluator will be required to arrange the logistics (preparing visits, booking interviews, workshops etc) including any necessary security arrangements.

Members of Sida's Chief Evaluator team and the contact person should be given the possibility to participate as observers in evaluation activities deemed suitable by the evaluators.

3 EVALUATION CRITERIA

The proposed tender will be evaluated to a total of 100 points divided into the following evaluation criteria:

- Method and organisation of the Assignment: (40p)

  o Clear description and justification of proposed methodology and methods for data collection that is appropriate for answering the evaluation questions. (15 p)
  o Clear description on how a utilisation-focused approach will be ensured. (5 p)
  o A clear outline of how quality assurance will be handled during the evaluation process. (5 p)
  o A clear and feasible time, workplan and budget. (15 p)

  Skills, knowledge and experience: (60 p)

  o Technical competencies: Evaluation and monitoring approaches and methods. (20p)

- o Process oriented competencies: utilisation-focused evaluation and facilitating participatory processes within international development cooperation. (10 p)
- o Experiences from evaluating peacebuilding (including women, peace and security) in conflict and post- conflict countries. (20p)
- o Specific knowledge of and experiences from peacebuilding (including women, peace and security) from all four case countries. (10p)

ANNEX B: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Marie Bergström	Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Johan Norqvist	Swedish Embassy, Programme Officer, Sida	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Nedim Bukvic	Swedish Embassy, Sida	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mario Vignjevic	Swedish Embassy, Sida	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Emil Johansson	Swedish Embassy, MFA	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Pelle Persson	Former Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Marie Jusnes	Sida HQ, former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Staffan Herrström	Ambassador, previously Sida HQ with responsibility for BiH	Via e-mail
Per Iwansson	Former Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Peter Swartling	Former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Skype
Bo Elding	Former Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Anders Hedlund	Former Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Jonathan Francis	Sida HQ, former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Joakim Molander	Former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Erik Illes	Former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Sweden
Elisabet Tomasi-nec	EU Delegation, Sarajevo (former Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in	Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Sarajevo)	
Julien Berhoud	EU Delegation, Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Haris Lokvanic	SDC	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Nejra Neimarlija	KULT (Youth NGO)	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Biljana Potparic Lipa	USAID Justice programme	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Majda Halilovic	NGO Atlantic Initiative	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Edina Becirevic	NGO Atlantic Initiative	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Samira Krehic	International Commission for Missing Persons - ICMP	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ana Bilic	Higher Judicial and Prosecutorial Council - HJPC	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Edin Telalagiv	UNDP	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slobodan Tadic	UNDP	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Jasna Kilalic	USAID	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mirjana Popovic	USAID	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Andreja Sporer	Office of the High Representative	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mirna Buljugic	BIRN (media NGO)	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Samra Filipovica	Head of Gender Agency, Ministry of Human Rights & Refugees	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kika Babic	Gender Agency, Ministry of Human Rights & Refugees	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Eva Zillén	Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm	Skype
Bojana Mumin	Kvinna till Kvinna, Sarajevo	Skype
Christina Bergman	Olof Palme International Centre, Stockholm	Skype
Mima Dahic	NGO Vive Zene	Skype

Guatemala

Ana Maria Mendez	Country Director, Oxfam	Guatemala
Anders Kompass	Swedish Ambassador to Guatemala, since 2017	Guatemala
Beatrice Bussi	Chief of joint cooperation, EU	Guatemala
Björn Holmberg	Head of Development Cooperation 2006-2008, Swedish Embassy, Guatemala	Sweden
Blanca de Hernandez	FAMDEGUA	Guatemala
Christina Elich	UNDP Programme officer	Guatemala
Claudia Samayoa	UDEFEGUA	Guatemala
Delfina Mux Cana	Oxfam Ibis Indigenous Fund (Support mechanism for indigenous peoples)	Guatemala
Edelberto Torres Rivas	FLACSO/UNDP	Guatemala
Edgar Perez Archila	Bufete Jurídico de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala (BDH)	Guatemala
Eivor Halkjaer	Swedish Ambassador to Guatemala, 2004-2006	Sweden
Elisabeth Lewin	Director of Latin America Department 1994-1997, Sida	Sweden
Ewa Nunes Sörenson	Head of Development Cooperation 2009-2012, Swedish Embassy, Guatemala	Sweden
Ewa Werner Dahlin	Head of Development Cooperation 1998-2000, Ambassador 2006-2010, Sida	Sweden
Fanny Bengs	Programme Officer Human Rights/Democracy, Swedish Embassy in Guatemala (Sida)	Guatemala
Fredy Peccerelli	Director of FAFG - Foundation of Forensic Anthropology of Guatemala	Guatemala
Göran Holmqvist	Programme Officer in the 90s, Head of Department for Latin America 2000-2006 , Sida	Sweden
Hans Magnusson	Head of Development Cooperation 2000-2006 and 2012-2016, Sida	Sweden
Hans Peter Dejgaard	Regional coordinator for IBIS 1989-1992.	Denmark
Hector Rosada	Peace negotiator on part of the Government of Guatemala.	Guatemala
Helen Mack	Fundacion Myrna Mack	Guatemala

Jocke Nyberg	Independent expert, NCG	Sweden
José Flores	FAMDEGUA - Relatives of Detained Persons Disappeared from Guatemala	Guatemala
Juana-Maria Campo-seco	National Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Guatemala (Sida)	Guatemala
Kristina Salomons-son	Desk Officer, September 2010 through August 2014, Sida	Sweden
Luz Mendez	UNAMG - The National Union of Guatemalan Women	Guatemala
Martin Hessel	Head of Development Cooperation (since 2016), Swedish Embassy in Guatemala (Sida)	Guatemala
Michel Andrade	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Guatemala (Sida)	Guatemala
Mikael Fruhling	Swedish Ambassador to Guatemala 2010-2014.	Sweden
Morten Bisgaard	Senior Governance Advisor, Oxfam - IBIS	Denmark
Nery Rondenas	Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala (ODHAG)	Guatemala
Outi Karppinnen	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Guatemala (Sida)	Guatemala
Patricia Ardon	Independent expert	Guatemala
Raquel Zeleya	Formerly with SEPAZ, First Secretary of Peace	Guatemala
Sandino Asturias	General Coordinator, Centro de Estudios de Guatemala (CEG)	Guatemala
Sotero Sincal	Country Director, Diakonia	Guatemala
Staffan Wrigstad	Ambassador 1994 to 2000 & Head of Latin America Department 1992-1994, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Sweden
Susanna Navarro	Director, Estudios Comunitarios y Acción Psicosocial (ECAP)	Guatemala
Veronica Melander	Programme Officer Human Rights/Democracy 2011-2016, Sida	Sweden
Wendy Maldonado	Coordinator, Bufete Jurídico de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala (BDH)	Guatemala
Åsa Wallton	Programme Officer 2007-2009, Head of Development Cooperation 2009, Sida	Sweden

Rwanda

Jenny Ohlsson	Ambassador, Swedish Embassy	Rwanda
Sara Haglund	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy	Rwanda
Clément Kirenga	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy	Rwanda
Théobald Mashinga	Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy	Rwanda
Brice Mukashema	Programme Administrator	Rwanda
Mikael Boström	Former Head of Dev Coop, Sida	Sweden
Kikki Nordin	Former Head of Dev Coop, Sida	Sweden
Sandra Diesel	Former Programme Officer, Sida	Sweden
Joakim Molander	Former Head of Dev Coop, Sida	Sweden
Hanna Doller	Former BBE Peace and Security, Sida	Sweden
Malin Eriksson	Former BBE Peace and Security, Sida	Sweden
Betty Mutesi	International Alert, Country Manager	Rwanda
Jonathan Lea-Howarth	Projects Coordinator, RCN	Rwanda
Hugo Moudiki Jombwe	Country Director, RCN	Rwanda
	National Commission on DDR	Rwanda
Rose Rwabuhihi	Gender Monitoring Office, Chief Gender Commission	Rwanda
Nadine Umutoni Gatsinki,	Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, Permanent Secretary	Rwanda
Alain van den Brande	Cooperation Officer, EU Delegation	Rwanda
Thibaut Moyer	Head of Economics and Governance, EU Delegation	Rwanda
Christophe Cardon	First Secretary, Belgian Embassy	Rwanda
Harold Vandermeulen	Cooperation Manager, Belgian Embassy	Rwanda
Laurent Deniau	French Embassy	Rwanda
NN	DFID	Rwanda
John Callan	US Embassy, Political Officer	Rwanda
Michel Muhirwa	GIZ, Refugee Component Leader	Rwanda
Mahamoud Zinelab-	Republic of Sudan, Director for Planning and	

din   Coordination

Somalia

Abdo Ainte	Minister of Planning, FGS	Somalia
Abdullahi Shirwa	Director, Peaceline	Somalia
Anne-Maria Madsen	Somalia Counsellor, Embassy of Nairobi, Denmark	Kenya
Charlotte Booth	Director, LPI	Kenya
Emma Bjerten	Somalia focal point, SIPRI	Kenya
Erik Petterson	Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Eva Atanassova	Democratisation Lead, EU Somalia	Somalia
Fulgenzio Garrido Fuiz	Programme Lead, EU Somalia	Somalia
Halima Ibrahim	Director, NIEC	Somalia
Iman Icar	Depty Maur Mogadishu, BRA	Somalia
Ivanoe Fugali	Community Development Lead, DRC	Somalia
Janni Anderson	Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Jenny Svanberg	Director, LPI	Kenya
Jens, Peter Dyrbak	Governance Lead, DFID	Kenya
Jerry McCann	Director of Interpeace Somalia, Interpeace	Kenya
Jody Henderson	Director, LPI	Kenya
Johan Svensson	Somalia peace and reconciliation advisor (former LPI and interpeace) Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Judith Gardner	Rift Valley Institute, Resource person	Kenya
Katharina Zinn	Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Ken Menkhaus	Lecturer, Resource Person	Kenya
Kristina Normann	Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Mads Frilander	Head of DDG, DRC	Kenya

Marika Fahlen	Special Envoy, Horn of Africa, Swedish MFA	Sweden
Mathias Krüger	Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Michael Lindvall	Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Michele Cesari	Director, LPI	Kenya
Nina Berg	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Denmark, Nairobi	Kenya
Ole Thonke	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Denmark, Nairobi	Kenya
Paul Simkin	Overall Programme Officer, JPLG	Kenya
Per H Karlsson	Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya
Simon Nziolkha	Director for Somalia, DRC	Kenya
Stephen Ndichu	Director, Diakonia	Kenya
Tariq Chaudry	Director of Political Affairs, UNISOM	Kenya
Urban Sjöström	Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi	Kenya

ANNEX C: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COUNTRY REPORT

Please see separate report

ANNEX D: GUATEMALA COUNTRY REPORT

Please see separate report

ANNEX E: RWANDA COUNTRY REPORT

Please see separate report

ANNEX F: SOMALIA COUNTRY REPORT

Please see separate report

7 ANNEXES

ANNEX G: MODALITY DEFINITION

Modality classification to be used in Sida PB evaluation	
Definition: Aid modalities or aid instruments are the methods used to finance development (and in this case peacebuilding) activities, See SADEV 2007: 4	
Modality	**Example**
General budget support	Direct budget support to the state budget without earmarkings
Sector budget support	Direct budget support earmarked to specific sector
Multilateral support	Funding through UN, WB or similar
Joint EU	Funding through or with EU as lead donor
MDTF	Funding through a multi-donor trust fund
Pooled fund	Funding through a specific programme or NGO through a joint donor financing mechanism (also labelled basket arrangements)
Project support	Bilateral project to specific project
NGO support	Bilateral support to specific NGO

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ANNEX H: LIST OF REFERENCES

General Swedish Government

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ANNEX I: EVALUATION MATRIX

DAC criteria	Overall evaluation question	Sub-questions/assessments	Indicators
Relevance	To what extent have the approaches in the case studies aligned to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the peace and security challenges in the specific context?	- Degree of Sida ToC alignment with peace-building needs over time as identified through desk research and interviews. i.e. the extent to which Sida's approach and assumptions underlying this approach corresponded with the contextual needs at the given time of the interventions - Degree of country intervention ToC alignment vis-à-vis women's rights and inclusion needs at the given time (Women's role and focus in Sida objectives, approach and assumptions) - Degree of alignment with beneficiary national peacebuilding plans (national, regional and/or international, incl. peace agreements) at the given time - Degree of Sida ToC alignment with Sida/Swedish objectives as specified in the global, regional and country strategies at the particular time of assessment as well as alignment with Sida's commitments to international policies and treaties	- Timeline showing relevance in Sida portfolio and ToCs (explicit/implicit) vs. contextual changes - Timeline showing relevance in Sida portfolio and ToCs and actions vs international community response - Existence and adequacy of the conflict / situation analyses (by Sida or other stakeholders). Consistency of those analyses with the strategy and with the programming. - Drivers of peace and conflict identifiable in Sida policy, country or backgrounds/underlying documents linked to portfolio and ToC - Women and marginalised groups clearly identifiable in portfolio and ToCs, strategies and operational plans or similar (as beneficiary as well as active involvement in decision-making) - Checklist alignment of Sida/Swedish country strategies and operational plans with recipient country national plans. - Checklist: alignment between

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DAC criteria	Overall evaluation question	Sub-questions/assessments	Indicators
			Sida/Swedish country strategy/plan and Sida global policies. - Coherence of the intervention logic / theory of change, including between the inputs and expected results. - Checklist: alignment with international policies and agreements (e.g. UNSCR 1325)
Effectiveness	To what extent have the approaches taken contributed to intended outcomes?	- Sida ability to effectively respond to emerging peacebuilding opportunities - Degree of adaptability of Sida approach/ToC with changing context in targeted country - What are lessons learned and results identified in relevant Sida and external evaluations - Degree of alignment between Sida ToC focus on women's needs and inclusion on the peacebuilding processes and immediate peacebuilding results in the targeted country* - Degree of conflict sensitivity (Do No Harm) aspects in the Sida ToC - Degree to which inclusion of women and marginalised groups are identified in ToC as beneficiaries and participants; effects of such identification and targeting; particular approaches that have worked well/not worked	- Examples of where Sida has responded to a contextual/international peacebuilding response opportunity (e.g. peace agreement process; launch of government; mediation initiative etc.). Response as portfolio and individual engagement outside strategy - Sida's comparative advantage and added value identified and maximized compare with other donors. Role of Sweden in the coordination mechanisms, existence of duplication, complementarity, synergies with other stakeholders. - Evidence of Sida alignment/support to/from Swedish Government/diplomatic peacebuilding activities/dialogue - Evidence of Sida changing/learning

DAC criteria	Overall evaluation question	Sub-questions/assessments	Indicators
		- Degree to which Sida support has been coherent and aligned with joint efforts to enhance effectiveness	approach according to contextual changes (adaptability), including evidence of addressing opportunities for enhancing the role of women in the peace process - Evidence of application of conflict sensitive approach, DNH - Systems and processes in place to monitor and evaluate results, performance of the interventions, as well as change in risk and conflict situation to inform adaptive programming - Evidence of risk willingness and management - Existence of unintended and negative effects. - Degree of use of principal vs. significant peacebuilding (i.e. explicit reference to peacebuilding) - Degree of use of direct projects vs multilateral joint interventions
Impact	What has been the overall impact of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct or indirect, intended and unintended, nega-	- Degree of alignment between Sida ToC actions and immediate peacebuilding results in the targeted country* (i.e. if Sida's approach has been found to be relevant, is it then possible to also identify positive changes in the peace context in target country?) - Identification of con-	- Alignment of changes identified by Most Significant Change with areas prioritised by Sida. i.e. to identify projects where Sida did contribute to making a difference (examples). Including projects where women and marginalised groups situation was im-

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DAC criteria	Overall evaluation question	Sub-questions/assessments	Indicators
	tive and positive results?	fluence between Sida ToC and long-term changes in country peacebuilding context and/or key country level outputs like peace agreements.* This includes assessment of Sida footprint in terms of ToC prioritisation and funding and overall development in the peace pattern over time - As above: results related to improvements in the situation and involvement of women and marginalised groups (meeting their needs as well as their degree of lasting involvement in decision-making processes)* - Assessment of validity of Sida ToC assumptions over time - Any specific reference to Sida peacebuilding approach and peacebuilding development in evaluations or from external (non-Sida) sources	proved as part of the peace process - Changes in global conflict and peacebuilding indicators over time vs. Sida support areas where feasible – also gender related - Overall changes to peace situation in country vs. Sida level and type of support (level of funding, type of funding etc.). - Evolution of the conflict and peace drivers.
Sustainability	To what extent have results been sustainable?	- If links established under Relevance, Effectiveness and possibly Impact, has this change then remained - Degree of institutionalisation of Sida ToC support in terms of e.g. lasting policy frameworks (which are implemented) or settlements implemented - Degree of sustainability of possible improvements in situation of women and/or marginalised groups linked to	- Sustainability of peace achieved over time (institutionalization of the drivers, ownership of the population and institutions over the mechanisms, existence of self-replicating dynamics to identify and adjust to the evolution of conflict drivers and to integrate peace drivers, increase of the local capacities, relays by other do-

DAC criteria	Overall evaluation question	Sub-questions/assessments	Indicators
		Sida ToC	nors or stakeholders) - Sustainability (actual, prospect) of Most Significant Change results - Sustainability of peace related institutional support - Continued improved role of women and marginalised groups

ANNEX J: OVERVIEW SWEDISH GLOBAL POLICY GUIDANCE

Sida policy, tool or note	Key Recommendations/Instructions/Purpose and intended use
Global Thematic Analysis on Peace and Security (2018)	• Identifying the themes important in the achievement of Sida's peace and security mission in 2018 • Description of current global trends and observations re: threats, conflict, violence, security, peace and challenges to development cooperation going forward
Building and Assessing institutional capacity to integrate conflict sensitivity (tool) (2017)	• A list of guiding questions intended to help guide the process of strengthening Sida's capacity and management processes for integrating a conflict perspective (Categorised into: Institutional capacity, Management processes, Operational Practices and Results) • Checklist can also be used to assess the suitability/capacity of partners to implement and plan programmes in a conflict sensitive manner • *Source of inspiration* for ToR
Peace and conflict toolbox – defining key concepts (tool) 2017	• Purpose: facilitate understanding and absorption of guidance from other tools • Description of key concepts and analytical models and tools that are used by Sida (Peace (positive and negative), Conflict, Direct and Structural violence, Fragility, The Conflict Cycle (submerged and riding tensions, violent conflict, post conflict)) • Analytical models and tools (context and multi dimensional poverty analyses, conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis) • Approaches and Responses (Integrated conflict perspective, conflict prevention) • Women, peace and security
Sida's approach to an Integrated conflict perspective (tool) 2017	• For Sida Staff and partners providing guidance on when and how to integrate this perspective at different levels (strategic, portfolio, project/programme) When to apply • Not just in situations of direct violent conflict but in reaction to submerged tensions or rising tensions How to Apply • Distinction between working in (implementing developing during conflict) and on conflict (peace and security initia-

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	tives) Working in conflict recommendations • Risk awareness • Conflict sensitivity Working on conflict recommendations (*in addition*) • Promote peace and security
Conflict sensitivity in programme management (tool) 2017	• Purpose: Conflict sensitivity at a programme management level and how to integrate the conflict perspective in designing interventions and monitoring activities • The *what* and *how* of conflict sensitivity • Understand the context: through undertaking a conflict analysis • Understand interaction between your intervention and the context: link analysis to programme • Identify, assess, mitigate, manage and monitor risks – take opportunities to support positive change in society: keep conflict sensitivity in focus throughout all stages of the programme (planning, implementing, evaluating) • Tool provides guiding questions for how to assess conflict sensitivity of partners and programmes and the continued monitoring of results • Also contains the do no harm approach key lessons
Conflict Prevention: Opportunities and challenges in implementing key policy commitments and priorities **Thematic overview document (2017)**	*Thematic Overview:* • Rationale for investing in conflict prevention • Identify opportunities and challenges in supporting conflict prevention • What is conflict prevention (descriptive) • What how and who and when of conflict prevention • Key challenges in conflict prevention
A human rights approach to peace building 2015	• Purpose of the brief: how to apply a human rights based approach to peace building and how to do so in a conflict sensitive way • Definition and comparison of HRBA in peacebuilding and application of HRBA in conflict sensitivity • Similarities and differences between actors, core principals, relation to conflict, approach, timeline, methodology, interdependence, conflicting interdependence and enforcing interdependence in HRBA vs Peace and Human Security • Description of how to apply conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding when working *in* conflict vs when working *on* conflict • Main recommendation: staff should combine tools for HRBA analysis and peace & conflict analysis when as-

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	sessing, supporting and evaluating development cooperation contributions (and possible steps to do so)
Gender tool box: women peace and security brief (2015)	• Gendered dimensions to peace and security • Brief: giving an overview of the women, peace and security agenda and how it is positioned within Sida's development cooperation agenda • Description of the pillars of the women, peace and security agenda (participation, protection, prevention, relief/recover) • Outlines international policy commitments to women in peace and security • Discussion that they do integrate gender equality into programs relevant for peace and security but no specific discussion on how
Peace and Security for Development 2010-2014 (Swedish Government Policy)	Objectives of policy for this strategy period: • Promote peace • Promote security • Peace dividends
Manual for Conflict analysis (2006)	• How to conduct conflict analysis at the strategic, sector and project levels • Guidance on Strategic Conflict Analysis, which may serve as a guideline for drafting a Terms of Reference for a consultancy assignment. • Analytical framework: discusses possible struggles and problems, which could cause instability which arise through mechanisms that drive violent conflict and war. Framework also contains goals, opportunities and a list of example means to achieve. Ideas for appropriate responses to different types of conflict problems
Lets Talk! Human rights meet peace and security (2006)	• Aim of the report: enhance knowledge and discussion about the relationship between human rights and peace and security • Intended use: form the base for further work on how development cooperation may develop human rights promoting and conflict sensitive practices • Description of the way forward in the merging of human rights and peace and security practices
Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation 2005	• Approaches: • Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context • Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact • Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construc-

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	tion, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalised groups; trade; media; agriculture; SSR). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict
Promoting Peace and Security 2005	Main purpose of the document is to identify thematic global trends and observations relevant for fulfilling Sida's mission to reduce poverty
Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 1999 (Sida policy)	• Defines Conflict management and prevention Long and short term measures to reduce risk of violent conflict • Objectives: • Promote a culture of prevention • Identify structural risk factors • Develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation • Strengthen the international institutional framework and its preventive instruments • Strengthen Sweden's capacity for international conflict prevention activities in different policy areas (foreign policy and security, trade, migration and development assistance) • Enhancing respect for human rights and international law • Strengthen measures to protect civilian populations • Integrate conflict prevention with development co-operation work and develop a common perspective • Prevention language • Conflict analysis should be a natural part of the preparatory process

ANNEX K: SWEDEN'S STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OVER THE YEARS

Overview of Strategy development cycle, guidelines and reporting

1990-2005
This period is characterized by a lot of 'flexibility' for the embassies to decide what to support, although the degree of decentralization varied (e.g. for Somalia, decisions taken in Stockholm).

- Government (Regeringskanseliet, Utriksdepartementet - UD) "instruction" provides the overall objective at country/regional level and guides the agency's activities. Priorities within the "instruction" developed through consultations between MFA and Sida prior to release.
- The Instruction is complemented by an annual "Letter of Appropriation" and, in the case of Sida, usually a "cooperation strategy" issued at Government level
- 'Sida at work' manual – administrative manual (1990s)
- Analytical papers produced by Sida/embassies inform government decisions on strategies
- Annual reporting. These tend to be quite descriptive but include overview of country development trends and reporting within the main thematic intervention areas, although not specifically against objectives.
- Basic activity data input into "Open Aid" from 1998 onwards. But often without objectives.
- Sida produces thematic policies/guidance, e.g. Promoting peace and security through development (2005).

2006-2014
From 2006, there is a progressive shift to more results-based management: Government steers development cooperation through strategies (global, regional, country), generally 3-7 years duration with priorities (results areas - RAs).

- Global strategy: Peace and Security for Development (Swedish Government, 2010)
- Embassies make annual operational plans (verksamhetsplan - VP).
- Sida staff make a separate Country Operational Plan that is attached to the VP and is the basis for Sida to delegate resources to the Embassy to implement development assistance on behalf of Sida. The name and the format of these plans has varied and also between departments.
- Sida continues to produce thematic guidance, e.g. conflict analysis manual (2006), Issue Brief – Peacebuilding (2010).

- From 2013, Sida changes the strategy report format into 'traffic light' system and increasingly reporting through an M&E framework at result area level with baseline and indicators. This is connected to the Operationalisation Plan.
- Specific analytical questions feed into one-pagers (e.g. that can help develop a ToC for the RAs) and underpin the Operationalisation Plan at Embassy level (2013 onwards).
- Annual reporting on results
- Mid-term reviews (MTRs) of the country strategies are conducted internally by Sida.

2014-2018

Main elements from the previous period are continued: Regional/country strategies, VPs, Operationalisation Plans, annual reporting.

- Global Strategy – Sustainable Peace (2018), Swedish Government
- The latest guidelines are from 2017.[72] These are a Government directive for strategy development clearly outlining the process for strategy development, highlighting strategic/cross cutting priorities (e.g. including gender and conflict perspectives) and involving agencies in the process (e.g. through consultation and background analysis)
- MTRs now called In-depth Reviews.
- Sida produces updated guidance and tools, e.g. conflict sensitivity in programme management (2017)

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[72] Riktlinjer för strategier inom svensk utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärt bistånd, Regeringskansliet, 21 December 2017

Evaluation of Sida's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts
– Synthesis Report

This report presents a synthesis of the findings from the evaluation of Sida's support to peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict contexts since the early 1990s. It has been commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. The evaluation assesses Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding at the strategic level and seeks to identify what has worked well and what has worked less well. To do so, it draws from four country evaluations of Sida's support to peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. The evaluation finds that Sida's support has been relevant to the general context in the four countries. While Sida has played an important role in supporting processes that have contributed to positive change and has managed to identify and utilise opportunities to support peacebuilding, underlying conflict factors remain and continue to undermine sustainable peace. The alignment of Swedish strategies and underlying Sida documentation to specific peacebuilding needs has been weak because, with some exceptions, it has failed to target sufficiently the key root causes of conflict. The report includes recommendations to strengthen Sida's peacebuilding engagement.