UNEG
United Nations Evaluation Group

The Humanitarian-Development Nexus – What do evaluations have to say?

Mapping and synthesis of evaluations

February 2018

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

World Health Organization

About the UNEG Humanitarian Evaluation Interest Group (HEIG)

The Humanitarian Evaluation Interest Group (HEIG) was established at the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Annual General meeting in 2015 under Strategic Objective 3 – *Evaluation informs UN system-wide initiatives and emerging demands* – in recognition that the specificities of humanitarian evaluation merited further and focused attention by UNEG, especially in its normative work.

The interest group was established in response to a perceived need within UNEG for a space that could bring together humanitarian evaluation practitioners within the UNEG network.

This HEIG is currently focusing on two areas of work: i) humanitarian principles – having commissioned a study looking at how humanitarian principles are reflected in evaluations and how this practice could be strengthened in the future; and ii) on the humanitarian-development nexus (the subject of this paper).

The HEIG is currently co-convened by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Evaluation Service and the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation. It includes representatives of the offices of evaluation of the following agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); International Organization for Migration (IOM); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); UNHCR; United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI); United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); UNWOMEN; WFP; World Health Organization (WHO); and Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) in an observer role.

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Executive summary

1.   This working paper presents the results of a study commissioned by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Humanitarian Evaluation Interest Group (HEIG)[1]. It offers an initial reflection on the extent to which the need – expressed in terms of commitment in the Agenda 2030 and the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), of delivering on collective outcomes and transcending the humanitarian-development divide – has been addressed in evaluative work. The assumption is that evaluations can contribute to a better understanding of the lessons and emerging issues through a cross-cutting analysis of policies and programming practices that may speak to the nexus.

2.   The paper attempts to address the following three main questions:

- To what extent and how have humanitarian and development evaluations considered the topic of the nexus? Can significant differences be observed in how evaluations have covered the topic of the nexus?

- Which type of evaluative evidence has been generated about the humanitarian-development nexus?

- Does a preliminary mapping and description of the evaluative evidence from the sample selected for the study point to significant gaps, good practices and lessons?

3.   In order to address these questions, the study reviewed a purposive sample of 123 evaluations (published in the 2010-2017 period), of which 97 focused on specific countries and 26 were of global scope. The mapping is exploratory in nature and tries to identify possible patterns across different evaluation commissioners, type of evaluations, scope and focus, as well as the specificities of nexus evidence and narratives in each of the countries covered as case studies. The report also highlights gaps and good or promising evaluation practices that contributed to a better understanding of the humanitarian-development interface.

4.   A lack of shared definitions of the nexus and its broad and evolving conceptual boundaries meant that the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of reports were discretionary, making it also too complex to carry out a statistically significant analysis. Evaluations selected include a host of issues expected to relate to the nexus, such as: agencies' policies, and analysis of programming and performance in relation to disaster risk reduction, resilience, engagement in fragile, crisis and conflict contexts; evolving delivery modalities and programming coherence; financing mechanisms and inter-agency coordination. As the findings were emerging, the study team conducted interviews with selected key informants to gather additional insights on the expectations and demands on the use of evaluative evidence around the nexus.

5.   The first set of findings relates to **how the evaluations covered the nexus**. The main finding in this domain is that nexus considerations are more explicitly addressed when evaluations: **i)** clearly address risk and risk convergence; **ii)** include dedicated context (and/or conflict) analysis; and **iii)** analyse agency positioning, spheres of influence and comparative advantages as part of the scope of the evaluation. The nexus is also more evident in those reports that reflect a broader understanding and

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application of evaluation criteria such as relevance, sustainability and effectiveness. Overall, the topic of the nexus appears to be covered more prominently in: humanitarian evaluations that focused on multiple, as opposed to single, interventions; strategic and thematic evaluations; and in those development evaluations that focused on a broader range of issues such as policy and institutional capacity, peacebuilding and stabilization.

6.   A second set of findings in the paper offers some insights into **how the nexus has been covered in evaluations across different sectors**. Examples and findings focus on food security, agriculture and livelihoods; nutrition; shelter; water and sanitation; health; education; public sector and infrastructure. A key theme identified is the importance for evaluations to analyse inter-sectoral linkages as starting point to cover broader nexus implications. Several evaluations highlight the difficulties of identifying and achieving development objectives and goals amid chronic risks, and emphasize programming challenges around the need to better adapt time frames and scope of interventions to address nexus considerations. When discussed in relation to the nexus, the notion of 'transition' is analysed in evaluations that look at efforts to move from humanitarian response towards recovery and development
– rather than efforts to invest on preparedness in development contexts. Moreover, in the evaluations reviewed, the nexus link with conflict and peace was addressed almost solely in evaluations covering conflict contexts or with a focus on peacebuilding. In these reports, the importance of conflict analysis was clearly recognized while do-no-harm and protection consideration were found to be less prominent in the evaluative analysis. Overall, among all the evaluations with focus on conflict, the majority included an analysis of the impact of conflict on both humanitarian and development programmes but rarely an analysis of the impact of programmes on conflict dynamics.

7.   The paper goes on to analyse issues of coordination, coherence with humanitarian principles and alignment with government policies. It notes that the majority of evaluations focused on alignment between aid and government policies and promoting aid effectiveness in conflict contexts, rather than on increasing coordination and synergies across the humanitarian and development interface. The mapping also suggests that the search for common outcomes anticipated the more recent calls for new ways of working. Additional findings focus on the need for greater synergies and, as feasible, alignment between humanitarian and development action both at the national and subnational levels, and highlight the challenge that the relationship with local government actors is often framed as a subcontracting one by international organizations.

8.   A number of evaluations reviewed touched on nexus-related issues when discussing how to break the cycle of repeated humanitarian interventions through a focus on graduation out of social protection measures, and a move towards resilience. There were only sparse reference to the nexus in the evaluations that focused on resilience, which is frequently described in overly linear terms, and as a de facto sector, competing for resources with humanitarian programming. In many reports, resilience and disaster risk reduction also appeared as being used interchangeably and with a stronger association with natural hazards.

9.   Analysis of financing issues and funding mechanisms in relation to the nexus received only mixed attention in the sample reviewed. The analysis focused on the challenges of ensuring greater coherence between short and long-term programming and funding mechanisms, with sparse references to the role of exit strategies. An emerging evaluative focus highlighted in the paper is the one multi-year planning and financing, and how its use should be maximized to strengthen humanitarian-development cooperation

10.   Enhanced capacity of national authorities and the role they could play in relation to the nexus receives considerable attention in evaluations, while capacities in civil society actors remain a

peripheral concern in the evaluations reviewed. Some evaluations note that capacity development continue to remain a secondary priority for humanitarian agencies and minimal attention is given to developing the capacities of national actors, particularly at regional and district level.

11.   The study found that only a small proportion of evaluations analyse the process and structural difficulties within and among agencies for linking development and humanitarian action. Rather, evaluations mostly focus on the relationship between aid, conflict and natural hazards, the humanitarian- and development-related needs of affected populations; and the roles of national and local governments, institutions and civil society.

12.   While few examples of good evaluation practices are identified, some of the reports did shed light on good programming practices on the nexus and these are illustrated through a series of country examples.

13.   Key informant interviews carried out for this mapping pointed towards a certain paradigm fatigue, and indicated that overall the nexus is not considered a central dimension when commissioning evaluations. Nevertheless, in few cases, interviewees shared examples of how including a nexus focus in the evaluations contributed to draw attention on the corporate and more strategic dimensions of agencies' contributions to WHS follow-up.

14.   From an evaluation-specific perspective, the main conclusion put forward in the paper is that a nexus lens may prove more useful if it is used as a scoping tool to identify and analyse areas for improved synergy and better ways of working across humanitarian and development interface, rather than as a new paradigm or framework. Looking forward, if the 'new way of working' towards 'common outcomes' becomes the unifying approach that it is intended to be, this will carry a new imperative to apply a nexus lens more broadly, in both humanitarian and development (and mixed-focus) evaluations. A nexus perspective in any given evaluative analysis is unlikely to be delivered by a single, new, unified approach and methodology. Rather, quality improvements in the evaluative analysis of the nexus can be made adjusting existing evaluation frameworks, guidance and toolkits already in use by different agencies, in different sectoral and programmatic domains.

1. Introduction

1.   The purpose of this paper is to provide United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) members, donors, governments and other stakeholders (e.g. evaluation networks) with a mapping and analysis of evidence from evaluations that have examined the humanitarian-development nexus, and a better understanding of how the nexus has been evaluated to date.

2.   Although development and humanitarian interventions often take place in the same countries and are supported by the same donors, humanitarian and development actors tend to have different objectives, work with different partners and use different approaches and methods. There is, however, an evolving discussion on the roles of humanitarian and development actors, and of a "new way of working"[2] to enable progress on the Agenda 2030[3] and the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS).

3.   A commitment to action was made at the WHS and signed by eight United Nations agencies' Principals[4] to transcend the humanitarian-development divide. The agreed aim was to meet people's immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability. The commitment was framed as a "humanitarian imperative to save lives", as well as a "development necessity" to ensure progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[5]

4.   The need to transcend the divide is not new, and many initiatives and approaches in the past have attempted to address it. The SDGs provide a common framework for both humanitarian and development actions, and seven of the 17 goals have explicit humanitarian targets.[6]

5.   In 2013, four of the ten highest recipient countries of humanitarian aid were also among the ten highest recipients of overseas development aid.[7] How was the humanitarian-development divide resolved in these countries? Were the challenges and effects relating to the humanitarian-development interface ever addressed in evaluative work?

6.   It is with these perspectives in mind that the UNEG Humanitarian Evaluation Interest Group (HEIG) commissioned a mapping and synthesis of the body of evaluative evidence generated by agencies working in countries confronted with this divide. The mapping is expected to bring an initial contribution to the evolving global and agency-specific conversations around the nexus by mapping and synthesising evidence from evaluations that have examined this topic.

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[2] WHS (2016) Transcending humanitarian-development divides – Changing people's Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need. Commitment to Action. World Humanitarian Summit: Istanbul, 23 May 2016. https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/key-documents

[3] UN General Assembly (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

[4] The commitment to action signed by the UN Secretary General and by the Principals of FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR UNICEF, OCHA, WFP and WHO. It was also endorsed by the World Bank and IOM.

[5] WHS (2016) ibid. page 1.

[6] Some of the Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. SDG 16) look at governance in the context of fragility, which is also relevant to the topic of this study.

[7] OECD Development Aid Committee data, 2013.

1.1 Structure of the paper

7.   This working paper has been conceived to provide some initial answers to three questions:

- Review Question 1: To what extent and how have humanitarian and development evaluations considered the topic of the nexus? Can significant differences be observed in how evaluations have covered the topic of the nexus?

- Review Question 2: Which type of evaluative evidence has been generated about the humanitarian-development nexus?

- Review Question 3: Does a preliminary mapping and description of the evaluative evidence from the sample selected for the study point to significant gaps, good practices and lessons?

8.   The findings emerging from the mapping are organized following the review questions. Section 2 looks at *HOW* evaluations have approached – more or less explicitly – the topic of the humanitarian-development nexus, and *WHAT* is discussed in relation to the nexus. The third question required more interpretation and is presented at the end of Section 2. Some suggestions for the UNEG-HEIG consideration when discussing how best to take forwards the nexus as topic for further analysis from an evaluation perspective are included in Section 3. Section 4 contains the Annexes.

1.2 Approach followed

9.   This mapping is exploratory in nature considering that some of the issues around definitions, conceptual boundaries and frameworks for analysing the topic of humanitarian-development nexus continue to be debated from various perspectives (policy, strategic, operational, programmatic and financing), particularly since the WHS. Considering the broad scope of nexus-related issues, this mapping and synthesis of evaluations aims to:

- understand the unique discourse and facets relating to the nexus in each country and how this is portrayed in evaluations reports;
- identify possible patterns across different evaluation commissioners, type of evaluations, and their scope and focus; and
- take note of possible good or promising evaluation practices that were seen as supporting an analysis of the humanitarian-development interface.

10.   A purposive sampling approach has been used to focus the mapping to select nine countries and within these countries a body of evaluations (from the past eight to ten years) for a total of 97 evaluations. The focus countries are Afghanistan (AF), Colombia (CO), Ethiopia (ET), Haiti (HA), Malawi (ML), Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Philippines (PH), Sierra Leone (SL) and South Sudan (SS).[8] In addition, 26 global, thematic, strategic evaluations, and corporate reviews were included in the analysis – which is thus based on a review of 123 evaluations.

11.   Rather than applying a specific definition of the nexus, the mapping was carried out using a more inductive approach through reviewing a broad range of evaluations covering a host of issues expected to relate to the nexus, for example in the analysis of:

- agencies' policies and performance relating to their interventions in fragile, crisis and conflict settings;

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[8] Shorthand abbreviations of the country names are used in the report to identify the quotes and excerpts from the evaluation reports reviewed for the mapping. The list of evaluations with reference code is available in Annex 1.

- agencies' policies and performance relating to their disaster risk and resilience programming;
- how humanitarian assistance has evolved in different contexts in relation to changing aid objectives and delivery modalities;
- external and internal coherence of policies and programmes; and
- inter-agency coordination and financing mechanisms.

12.   As the findings from the mapping were emerging, ten key informant interviews were conducted with evaluation commissioners, evaluation managers and advisers to better understand the expectations with and demands for evaluative evidence around the nexus. The interviews were also used to nuance and put in context the initial findings and patterns emerging from the mapping. Before delving on the findings of the mapping, below is an overview of the characteristics of the 123 evaluative reports considered in the analysis. More details on the methodology are provided in Annex 2.

1.3 Key characteristics of the sample

13.   In terms of overall focus, the 123 evaluations considered in the mapping were relatively evenly distributed among development-specific, humanitarian-specific and a combined scope – for example focusing on internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugee return, livelihood, recovery and disaster risk reduction (DRR). In terms of main risk considerations, of the 123 evaluation reports, 49 focus on conflict, 34 on natural hazards and 40 reports have a more combined focus.

14.   About half of the evaluations make more explicit reference to the nexus – particularly in the analysis of programmes with 'overlapping' humanitarian and development-related objectives - for example, in relation to livelihood recovery; basic service provision intended to deliver a 'peace dividend'; community-level peace and reconciliation activities; peacebuilding and human security initiatives; IDPs and refugees return.

15.   Overall, the sample features an even division between evaluations of specific programmes and interventions, versus country and strategy evaluations whereas in terms of evaluation commissioning offices the sample has strong weighting towards the United Nations (58 reports as 48 percent of the total 123 in the sample). The remaining 64 reports are evaluations commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC); international non-governmental organizations (NGOs); Red Cross/Red Crescent movement; the European Community/European Union; bilateral and multilateral donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

1.4 Limitations

16.   The lack of a shared definition of the nexus and its broad and evolving conceptual boundaries[9] complicated the task of setting stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria for the evaluations sample. It was also not possible to draw a statistically valid sample of reports for the analysis. As such, this mapping does not provide a substitute for a meta-evaluation or a systematic review.

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9 As exemplified for instance in a recent mapping produced in 2017 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus with a focus on protracted contexts.https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/humanitarian-development_nexus_mapping_2017.pdf

17.   Most evaluations in the sample have been issued before May 2016 and so the mapping does not capture the most recent evolution of the policy discourse at single and inter-agency level in relation to the nexus. The content analysis of evaluations reviewed also had to take into account that the very term 'nexus' has been coined rather recently – arguably in the run-up to the WHS – and the evaluation reports up until 2015 make only sparse use of this term.[10] Moreover, indicating a possible bias in the findings, the search for evaluations reports to be included in the analysis did not return significant hits for evaluations commissioned by the affected countries themselves and available in the public domain.

18.   Finally, with concern to the strength of analysis and quality of evidence presented in each evaluation report, the research team did not carry out any evaluation quality assessment of the reports but relied of the fact that most evaluation commissioning offices included in the sample have their own quality assurance (QA) mechanisms and carry out QA reviews before publishing evaluation reports. Some actions taken to address those limitations included:

- ensuring sufficient diversity in the type of evaluations and evaluation commissioners considered – including evaluations commissioned by donor offices and IFIs;
- improving the relevance of evaluations included in the final sample iteratively, using the UNEG-HEIG group to probe and refine the list of evaluations;
- making use of key informant interviews to understand the emerging findings from the mapping;
- using the opportunity of the UNEG 2017 Annual General Meeting to share and gather feedback on some of the initial insights from the mapping.

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[10]Due to resourcing constraints, the analysis does not include a full evaluation quality assurance review for each report in the sample and relied more on the fact that most evaluation commissioning offices included in the sample have developed their own quality assurance (QA) mechanisms and carry out QA reviews before publishing evaluation reports.

2. Findings

2.1 How have evaluations covered the nexus?

19.   Nexus-related considerations become more evident when looking at the way in which evaluations:

- present and give the rationale for the scope of analysis;
- discuss agencies' positioning and their different spheres of influence and comparative advantage vis-à-vis other actors and in relation to specific policy or operational issue;
- make a more 'progressive' use of evaluation criteria – particularly effectiveness, relevance and sustainability;
- include more comprehensive context (and as relevant) conflict analysis;
- include an analysis of risks that also looks at risk convergence.

20.   The remainder of this section discusses in more details each of these issues.

Entry points for analysis and scoping issues around the nexus

21.   Regardless of the development or humanitarian programmatic entry point, when evaluations explore nexus-related themes they make use of the conventional Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria, particularly relevance, sustainability and – to a lesser extent – connectedness. Other criteria relating to capacity development and alignment are also considered in the evaluations reviewed.

22.   Overall, evaluations that focus on **single humanitarian projects pay the least attention to development**. These evaluations are more likely to focus on effectiveness of specific interventions, concentrating on emergency response and immediate survival. By contrast, humanitarian evaluations focusing on broader programmes commonly address questions of whether and how the interventions considered recovery, exit strategies, resilience capacities and the role of the state even in core humanitarian programming. **Humanitarian evaluations that look at multiple initiatives and protracted crises tend to also cover development issues, especially factors impinging on sustainability.**

23.   Evaluations taking a development entry point are **likely to be concerned with a somewhat broader range of nexus-related issues,** such as institutional and community-level capacity development, alignment with government policies, the nexus between development and DRR (which is increasingly being shifted from humanitarian to development portfolios), peacebuilding and stabilization. The nexus with humanitarian assistance *per se* is given somewhat less attention.

24.   Evaluations of single humanitarian interventions commissioned by NGOs are the least likely to address nexus-related issues. Nexus issues are given more prominence in strategic/thematic evaluations and some evaluations of country programmes commissioned by the United Nations, particularly those agencies that have mandates and capabilities to work across the nexus. FAO, for example, stresses how its country offices are developing new networks to mount more comprehensive resilience efforts

(CR#4). These efforts, however, were often constrained by the overall context, and some evaluations note that the potential has not yet been fully realized (CR#7, SS#6).

25.   Overall, the extent of focus on nexus-related issues seems to relate more to the scope of the evaluation than the mandate of the agency as exemplified in a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) evaluation in South Sudan:

> *"At individual UN agency level, the line between development and humanitarian work is often very blurred, with most individual agencies able to continue work within the areas of their mandates in both situations. However, as a UN collective it cannot be 'business as usual' because UNDAF loses its relevance as a tool for joint planning and coordination when the overarching focus shifts toward emergency relief. UNDAF should therefore promote a recovery context through a conflict-sensitive and resilience-building approach" (SS#6: p.25).*

Analysis of agencies' positioning

26.   The issue of agencies' positioning emerged from the mapping as one of the entry points leading to some analysis of the nexus. **For example, questions around nexus are asked (more or less directly) when evaluations analyse agencies' positioning** in global and country-specific contexts or positioning *vis-à-vis* a specific policy or programming issue. When exploring these issues, evaluations frequently look at priority-setting and programming relevance, which in turn often lead to **critical reflections on agencies' spheres of influence** and on **appropriateness of aid modalities** in contexts where a mix of initiatives by different actors are required.

27.   In contexts undergoing a rapid shift both from conflict to development and vice versa, considerations relating to agencies' mandate, operational capabilities, inter-agency coordination and funding become more focused on identifying where different agencies can claim comparative advantages. Some evaluations in the Sierra Leone cohort, for example, emphasize the challenges of shifting from development to humanitarian response (SL#1, SL#4, SL#6) and regularly frame the issues in terms of resilience.

28.   In most of the evaluations reviewed, the need to view the nexus as a 'two-way street' is rarely apparent, as the analysis and scope of evaluations are usually framed in relatively linear terms. Some evaluations analyse the implications of shifting funding priorities and explore whether the humanitarian and development 'arms' within the same organization provide a strategic added value from both perspectives in the changing aid landscape.

29.   For example, Danida's review of humanitarian funding (CR#2) emphasises how climate change adaptation and DRR were shifted to development modalities (and therefore considered outside the scope of a more 'humanitarian-focused' evaluation). An evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) cited interviewees' concerns that inclusion of DRR as one of the area to be funded through the CERF could "dilute the principle purpose of the fund" (PH#2: p.25). By contrast, FAO's corporate evaluations (CR#4, CR#5) seem to infer that a narrow focus on humanitarian interventions (such as including seed and tool distributions) would have a negative effect in terms of relevance of programming and could also result in a decline in funding. Evaluations recommend a push for the organization to better integrate development and humanitarian programming under a resilience framework, ensure appropriate coverage and flexibility in implementation modalities as well as evaluate how to proceed with a shift of focus to resilience.

> **Box 1: Evaluative evidence for 'repositioning' within FAO**
>
> FAO's evaluation of its resilience work has looked at the challenges of increasing resilience efforts while relying on the (relatively large but potentially shrinking) voluntary contributions for humanitarian response. As resilience focuses on the importance of long-term commitments to addressing risk, all aspects of resource management should necessarily be long-term. This is expected to enable FAO to consolidate its approach through more holistic planning and programming.

30.   With regard to positioning, in the sample reviewed many summative and more retrospective evaluations tend to highlight long-standing issues of the comparative advantage (or challenges) of agencies' positioning along the humanitarian-development interface (CR#4). In contrast, formative and more forward-looking evaluations seem to move away from a narrow technical focus in their analysis and attempt to identify and study what might be more relevant and suitable interventions in the future giving the changing landscape of aid in crisis contexts. (CR#6, CR#10).

Role of context analysis

31.   Overall, the mapping suggests that nexus-related analyses are most prominent when evaluations include significant contextual information and analysis. **To a large extent, it appears to be the context more than the programmatic entry point that directs the content and orientation of evaluations towards the nexus.**

32.   Across the sample analysed, one of the findings emerging most clearly is the recurrent call for greater attention to context analysis to inform programming that are sensitive to nexus-related concerns and challenges. This is illustrated for instance in the prominence of this issue in Afghanistan, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Colombia and South Sudan cohorts where evaluations are concerned with programming in complex and large-scale protracted crisis contexts (e.g. AF#1, AF#3, AF#8, AF#5, SS#1, SS#4, SS#6, SS#8, PT#3, PT#8, PT#13, PT#16, CO#2, CO#6). As discussed in the following section, this also signals the need for further analysis of the nature of crisis qualifiers and of the extent to which different types of risks converge in a given context.

33.   In the OPT evaluations reviewed for example, the extremely protracted nature of the crisis and the dismal prospects for positive change have led to a considerable degree of critical reflection across the nexus from different perspectives and from different agencies and donors involved. In the OPT evaluations cohort, the role of embassies is also described as important for ensuring up-to-date contextual knowledge to inform decisions on rapidly shifting nexus-related needs and conditions particularly around addressing endemic conflict, violence and exclusion (e.g. PT#3, PT#16).

Analysis of risk convergence

34.   The evaluations reviewed suggest that there is no significant difference in the *level* of attention to nexus-related issues in countries faced by different types of crises. The **variations relate to how risks are addressed and the extent to which the convergence of risks is acknowledged and reflected in the evaluative analyses**. The mapping also shows that evaluative evidence on risk convergence was strongest in relation to the nexus between conflict, political dysfunction and economic growth/stagnation.

35.   In many evaluations, the challenge of analysing and recommending programme approaches for addressing multiple and converging risks is also often seen as beyond the scope of a given evaluation – and possibly beyond the contextual knowledge of the evaluation teams, considering the complex system within which most interventions take place.

36.   The need for applying a multiple-risk perspective when analysing the nexus has been strongly emphasised for example in a recent evaluation of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (CR#6), and other evaluations largely endorse this view. However, for the most, evaluations still tend to focus on either natural hazard or conflict and crisis qualifiers, with relatively few examples of evaluations that take an integrated approach across this divide and offer a broader perspective on the humanitarian–peace and conflict–and-development nexus. Among the countries included in the mapping, the Colombia evaluation cohort stands out for taking a more encompassing perspective on the nexus (see Box 2).

Box 2: Broad perspectives on the nexus from the Colombia evaluations cohort

The evaluations in the Colombia cohort took a broader perspective on the nexus than in the other country cohorts, including more explicit attention to longer term issues and deeper contextual analyses of risk convergence (CO#2; CO#5; CO#7). This means more attention to difficult questions about the appropriateness of prevailing aid modalities, including considerations of aid effectiveness (CO#2). Also related to a strong focus on risk dynamics, the Colombia cohort paid more attention to the role of local government and civil society, and framed these analyses in recognition of a fuller role as actors (rather than just implementers and service contractors). Other issues that speak to the nexus emerged more prominently in the Colombia evaluations cohort:

Peacebuilding and linkages with livelihoods and markets (CO#2, CO#6) – there was recognition that peacebuilding will rely on the emergence of employment opportunities and that jobs and businesses will only be sustainable if they reflect territorial competitiveness in different areas. Evaluations assessed the extent to which interventions are relevant in terms of linking these dots.

Human rights and discrimination (CO#1, CO#4) – the humanitarian crisis in Colombia is about failures to protect human rights, and this has strong gender and ethnic dimensions that need to frame the response. The evaluations highlight these core aspects of relevance and connectedness.

Linkages to climate change and natural resource management (CO#4, CO#3) – there is a convergence of risks related to pressures on natural resources and the growing effects of climate change. The sample also links these concerns to ethnic and cultural dimensions.

Linkages between natural hazards and conflict (CO#8, CO#1, CO#4, CO#3) – these different sets of risks need to be addressed together in order to ensure relevance and connectedness, particularly to recognize and support the appropriate paths to resilience.

Use of relevance and effectiveness criteria

37.   In the sample reviewed, overall, **relevance** emerged as the evaluation criterion where strategic questions around the nexus tend to be addressed most explicitly – particularly when evaluations ask whether agencies are 'doing the right thing' in light of changes in the nature of conflict, different types of risks and vulnerability, and how broadly the analysis should be scoped to answer those questions:

> *"Reintegration as a goal leads to a fundamental question: how does one determine*
> *when a returnee has been reincorporated into society? Which types of reintegration*

– economic, social, or cultural – are then most salient? […] Should returnees be compared to a nationwide benchmark, or local standards? Should they be disaggregated by their original levels of wealth and societal capital in considering their local "equivalents"? Further complicating the notions of return and reintegration is that of sustainability. This introduces a longitudinal element into consideration: are the activities sufficient to enable returnees' "reintegrated" status to continue?" (AF#6: p.74-75).

38.   When examining relevance, an inter-agency evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti questioned both relevance and effectiveness of compartmentalized coordination in a context where humanitarian response and development needs are so intertwined (HA#1).

39.   The mapping shows that a more narrow application of other commonly-used OECD-DAC criteria, such as **effectiveness** can constrain nexus-related analysis. In some evaluations, a narrow focus on effectiveness in achieving project outputs can result in analysis ignoring the linkages between intended humanitarian and development outcomes, and the synergies between different sectoral outcomes and humanitarian and development-oriented delivery modalities. For example, in the Sierra Leone cohort, some evaluations focus narrowly on operational effectiveness and do not consider implications for pre-emergency preparedness and post-emergency institutional development (SL#3, SL#5). In the Philippines Haiyan evaluations, the focus on humanitarian effectiveness is described as diverting attention to examine other relevant investments, for example in DRR (PH#2, PH#6).

40.   In some countries, evaluations were used to explore the concern that in order to fill gaps in humanitarian needs, some United Nations actors decreased their focus on development priorities. While pursuing an effective response, some projects neglected the underlying drivers of risk and vulnerability. In Malawi, this concern was raised with regard to the United Nations system, as noted in the following quote:

> *"Currently, much of the work of the UN addresses symptoms rather than the underlying causes of major issues. As a result, the UNCT largely acts as "a provider of last resort" for basic services. This serves clear and urgent humanitarian needs but perpetuates dependency. A root cause analysis should yield a clear set of insights on what is needed to affect lasting change for the better in key areas." (ML#1: p.51).*

2.2 What do evaluations analyse in relation to the nexus?

This section gives an overview on the main themes relating to the nexus as they emerged from the mapping of both country-specific and global/corporate evaluations and reviews.

Sectoral differences in evaluations

41.   In the sample reviewed, nexus-specific analysis is most often included in evaluations focusing on **food security, agriculture and livelihoods**. Possibly, this has to do with the focus of several World Food Programme (WFP) evaluations of its Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) as well as the ones of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). With the emergence of **cash** as an increasingly dominant modality during the period under analysis, many agencies have merged food security and livelihoods into one sector. However, the mapping also revealed that other evaluations also provided a different perspective to the nexus:

- The World Bank focused heavily on jobs (and economic growth) and devoted less attention to food, nutrition and agriculture as sectors central to the nexus.

- European Union-commissioned evaluations paid considerable attention to the need to focus on employment as a core aspect of peacebuilding in Colombia (CO#2), while noting that their relief and rehabilitation activities have failed to link to development due partly to a lack of attention to the 'territorial competitiveness' needed to sustain livelihood advances.

- In Haiti, evaluations have questioned the appropriateness of continuing humanitarian cash for work and livelihoods support, the impact of continuing humanitarian assistance on the urban economy and the slow progress towards restoration of markets and sustainable urban livelihoods.

- By contrast, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories such support to urban coping is largely accepted as a long-term strategy due to the absence of alternative modalities. The trade-off between focusing livelihood programming on households with strong income earning potential versus targeting the most vulnerable was rarely analysed.

42. **Nutrition** receives passing attention in a number of evaluations, but with too insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions on this issue. Some evaluations with specific and narrow focus on nutrition interventions were excluded from the sample as they had little or no focus on the nexus. An exception was an evaluation in Malawi that found difficulties in harmonizing emergency response to acute malnutrition with overall health system support. This was partly due to donors and the government treating this programme to deal with *acute* malnutrition as being outside of national structures (despite the recurrent need for addressing acute malnutrition).

43. **Shelter** and other related basic services (including water and sanitation, education and to some extent livelihoods) are primarily addressed in evaluations concerned with refugee and IDP returns, which is an area of programming that falls within the nexus zone (AF#7, AF#6, HA#1, HA#2). There are few examples of evaluations of basic services which note that humanitarian efforts often bypass government structures too weak to respond. In some cases this results in limited alignment (AF#5) and reduced effects due to poor planning and site selection (AF#10). Some evaluations noted that failures to include strategic directions and find a niche in permanent shelter hamper long-term solutions to refugee reintegration (AF#6). Some in-depth evaluations stress how essential contextual knowledge is for shelter planning that relates to livelihood opportunities and other key factors (AF#6, AF#7). Some evaluations also underscore the challenge of short funding cycles, and that operational agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) may not have the capacity to coordinate with development actors during response (AF#5, p.77).

44. A nexus perspective in evaluations of **water and sanitation** interventions was most apparent in analyses of sustainability and capacity deficits (AF#15; ET#4). Evaluations in the Haiti and Sierra Leone samples paid the closest attention to water, sanitation and health as sectors, owing to the challenges posed by endemic cholera. Resourcing and capacity gaps were discussed in relation to the discontinuation of humanitarian water supplies to camp-based populations; shortcomings in water and sanitation infrastructure; and health services in urban areas in the case of Haiti (HA#1, HA#2). The importance of basic water, sanitation and health services in the response to the Ebola crisis and its aftermath in Sierra Leone has been emphasised as an example of a 'health crisis' that requires an integrated response (e.g., SL#2, SL#3).

45. **Health** was the primary focus in the Sierra Leone evaluations cohort due to the Ebola crisis. Nexus concerns were related to: bilateral donors' and agencies' levels of preparedness and emergency

capabilities before the crisis; connectedness and time frames for sequencing humanitarian and development interventions; health and humanitarian organizations' recognition of the crisis as both a public health and humanitarian crisis, and implementation of joined-up emergency health and humanitarian responses that the crisis demanded (SL#1, SL#2, SL#4, SL#6, SL#7). An interim assessment panel report on the World Health Organization's (WHO's) response, for example, observed that although "it is well understood that WHO leads the United Nations' Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Global Health Cluster in major humanitarian crises", it is nonetheless "unclear […] how a public health emergency fits into the wider humanitarian system and at what point an outbreak becomes a humanitarian emergency". The Panel "was surprised that many donors, governments, the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations understand only one or the other system" (SL#7, p.23). Some attention within Sierra Leone evaluations cohort was also paid to exit strategies and sustainability looking at readiness and preparedness of national health systems, and the extent to which programming has contributed to this.

46. In the other country contexts included in this mapping, nexus perspective around health was sometimes framed in evaluations as a transition from fragmented NGO-led humanitarian service provision – with often inconsistent standards and procedures – to one whereby the state, in particular local government, takes a leading role to ensure sustainability (SS#4). Even amid the disintegration of such fledgling structures in South Sudan, one evaluation stressed the importance of these longer term objectives (SS#3). Whereas most evaluations describe a nexus focused on the handover of responsibilities to government service providers, one evaluation (SS#4) draws attention to the costs that recurrent crises can generate.

47. In both humanitarian and development evaluations, **education** is often presented as important in relation to longer term impacts and priorities, so it is often approached somewhat indirectly as a nexus issue. The World Bank (CR#11, CR#12) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (CR#10) have recently reflected upon and redefined their roles in the education sector. By contrast, one evaluation was critical of how, in South Sudan, education was de-prioritized in relation to "life-saving activities", thereby ignoring its importance for psychosocial support and other objectives that "contribute to mitigating some of the key drivers of humanitarian need" (SS#5: p.8-9).

48. A key theme that emerged in the evaluations of the Ebola response is the importance of recognizing and establishing paramount **inter-sectoral linkages** to ensure a more holistic (and thereby developmental) approach to an operation that was labelled a 'health emergency' (SL#1, SL#6). In general, this and other Sierra Leone evaluations (e.g. SL#4, SL#6) stressed how the failure to link the emergency health response with other existing development programmes undermined programme effectiveness, and how funding gaps for wider cross-sector recovery efforts led to poor results. An evaluation of Oxfam's humanitarian response (SL#6) found weak linkages among the emergency response, prior development programming and planning for transition post-crisis, noting:

> *"[There is] very little, if any, reference to what Oxfam was doing before the crisis, especially in urban WASH, and there is no real consideration of the response activities against the development programmes. It would be useful to review the appropriateness of the responses, the robustness of the development programmes and the impact of the crisis on strategies and ways of working."*

49. Another report describes Oxfam's uncertainty regarding if and how to build on its development focus in other sectors to respond to an emergency that was, at least initially, felt to be a narrow sectoral concern: "Oxfam struggled in the initial stages to see its own relevance in what was considered a public

health emergency" (SL#6: p.20). This was despite objectives in their country programme to maintain emergency preparedness and contribute to resilience and lead responsibilities for urban water and sanitation.

50.   With regard to the **public sector**, evaluations by the World Bank included in the sample pay particular attention to the intended and unintended effects of programming on public financial management and the civil service in fragile states. These concerns were strikingly absent in the large majority of evaluations commissioned by other agencies.

51.   The Asian Development Bank (CR#13) looked critically at the extent to which their pre-existing 'hard' **infrastructure** focus had adapted to reflect the more complex societal factors that generate disaster risk, and whether the level of attention was proportionate to the very high levels of vulnerability to hydro-meteorological risk in Asia. The report states: "The objectives were often limited [...] and focused on infrastructure rehabilitation with more limited attention for connecting the dots with livelihood restoration and improving disaster resilience" (CR#13: p. vii). By contrast, the weak capacities of the state to maintain basic infrastructural investments in South Sudan was noted in one evaluation as a major source of "frustration" (SS#2: p.60), which was implicitly described as contributing to the drivers of conflict.

Programming issues

52.   Two main programming issues that relate more closely to the nexus emerge from the mapping: around **scope and time horizons for needs assessment and planning**; and around **identification of programme objectives**.

53.   With regard to the first, scope and time frame issues are often brought up when evaluations highlight the constraining boundaries of **narrow application of logical frameworks** tools – particularly when the effort is ensuring adequate scope and coverage for a given intervention. Some reports also stress the importance of **adapting the scope of needs assessment** to a broader range of needs and responses when a nexus perspective is applied – particularly for **multi-year planning**, as discussed in a recent evaluation by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

> *"Current HRP [Humanitarian Response Plan] planning has a strong focus on prioritisation of the most immediate assessed needs. However, multi-year planning requires an underpinning analysis which differentiates root causes from short-term needs and so a different needs assessment process is required, one that specifically considers needs in phases: short-, medium- and long-term or something more specific according to context. This requires change and will be a challenge while collective needs assessment processes are still relatively new." (CR#14: p.9)*

54.   With regard to programme objectives, several evaluations highlight the **difficulties of identifying and achieving development objectives and goals amid chronic risks**. Many also discuss limitations linked to donor-driven funding and programmes time frames – as discussed for instance in most corporate evaluations in the sample, in some evaluations in Colombia (CO#6, CO#2) and in most of the Afghanistan and South Sudan cohorts.

55.   When evaluations analyse how the emphasis and focus of programming shifts back and forth across the nexus, as for example in protracted situations, the mapping underscores a general call for **more realistic objective setting** considering agencies' actual sphere of influence and areas of greatest

competence (AF#6, AF#10, OPT#13), and commitments and resources needed to sustain long-term capacity development efforts to support national actors (e.g. AF#5, SS#4).

56.   The mapping also identified inconsistent messages. On the one hand, some evaluations offer recommendations for more narrow and realistic programming focus, while also suggesting that agencies do more in areas where needs are great – even when past operational performance and effectiveness have been poor. Such inconsistencies are particularly notable in the findings and recommendations around protecting, restoring and promoting livelihoods (AF#6).

Transition

57.   Transition is another theme discussed in relation to the nexus that emerged from the mapping. The bulk of analysis focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of early steps in transitioning from emergency response to development, rather than distilling broader lessons for preparing for the next crisis.

58.   A common limitation for exploring the nexus in evaluations that discuss transition is that the analysis tends to focus on lessons from operations undertaken during, or shortly after the emergency itself. The analysis often fails to **i)** frame lessons taking into account the broader context and sequence of events before the emergency; **ii)** account for outcomes – particularly in relation to capacity development; and **iii)** examine whether investments in DRR brought about outcomes that actually contributed to reducing future risks.

59.   When evaluations discuss transition, greater focus goes to examining relevance of and connectedness with resilience and recovery initiatives than actual linkages and interface between humanitarian and development programming *per se*. Overall, evaluations from both humanitarian and development perspectives are increasingly concerned with whether programmes (on either sides) are contributing to **more relevant ways to *overlap* relief**, rehabilitation and development responses, especially in protracted crises, **rather than** being concerned with the **direct *linking* of relief, rehabilitation and development programmes**.

The nexus with peace and conflict

60.   A few evaluations recognize that conflict analysis is a precondition to identify and implement appropriate operational strategies (CR#11, AF#1, AF#5, AF#8, SS#4, SS#6, SS#8). Evaluations of specific peacebuilding interventions, or with a peacebuilding focus not only include more consistently a conflict analysis component, but they are the only examples were the links between conflict and development are analysed in depth (see for example AF#2, PH#1, PH#3 and the Colombia cohort).

61.   The evaluations sample shows a mixed degree of awareness of and attention to 'do no harm' and protection-related concerns, as well as the risk of seeing conflict aggravated by programming. One evaluation explicitly notes that when conflict factors are described, this is in relation to the impact of the conflict on the programme and not the other way around (AF#5).

62.   Inconsistent attention given to the risks of aggravating conflicts can be seen as indicating a gap in the nexus with peacebuilding as highlighted in an evaluation in the South Sudan sample:

> *"Although UNDAF addressed conflict and peace-building, it lacked robust risk*
> *assessment. The UN lacked effective conflict analysis and risk monitoring and was*

unprepared to adequately respond to the outbreak of political conflict in December 2013, which was deep rooted in the cracks that existed in the body politic of South Sudan." (SS#6: p.3).

Coordination, coherence with Humanitarian Principles and alignment with Governments policies

63.   In those evaluations taking a broader view on the nexus, coordination and coherence issues are often framed in relation to the government. **Instead of emphasising the need for greater aid coordination, the emphasis was often on assessing whether aid has, at a minimum, been aligned with government policies**.

64.   Many evaluations, including some from the humanitarian cohort, go further by asking whether programming has contributed to the capacity of states, and sometimes other local institutions, to lead coherent and coordinated response (e.g. AF#5, AF#7, AF#9, H#1, SS#4, SS#2). One corporate evaluation highlighted how agency support to disaster recovery did lack a strategic focus and was not used effectively to strengthen national ownership and capacity (CR#7, p.30). Overall, the mapping suggests that the search for 'common outcomes' anticipated the more recent calls for 'new ways of working'.

65.   When evaluation discussions about coordination touch on the nexus, the arguments are not frequently framed as a challenge for international agencies, but rather as part of the broader challenges of promoting aid effectiveness in conflict-affected states. A European Community-commissioned evaluation specifically reflects on this aspect: "[The] *European Community experience of country strategy planning and project programming in Colombia during the evaluation period shows that, in a context of armed conflict, it is not easy to take into account and promote Aid Effectiveness. Despite the EC's willingness to provide effective aid, the context has been a hindrance*" (CO#2: p.76).

66.   **Coordination efforts tend to be described as a point of entry to achieve alignment and greater synergy with government policies**. However, this is also acknowledged as highly problematic from a humanitarian principle perspective. The following is an excellent summary of the challenges in coordination and alignment across the nexus in the context of the Haiyan response:

> *"Transition includes change in (a) the nature of affected people's needs (emergency to early recovery); (b) the type of programme approaches to meet changing needs (humanitarian to recovery to development); and (c) structures and systems for coordination of assistance. [...] Lack of familiarity with the capacities of a middle-income country, differences between the international and national planning timeframes, and different views on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, all contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. The transition to recovery was complicated by the fact that sectors and regions recovered at different paces, and by uncertainty regarding the government's capacity and timetable to begin large-scale recovery programmes. Furthermore, underlying this is a conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The culmination was the Government's announcement in July of the end of the humanitarian phase and closure of humanitarian clusters." (PH#5: p.7).*

67.   A broad strategic/thematic evaluation presents clearly the complex implications of humanitarian principles for such alignment:

> *"**One constraint to closer cooperation is that, for development actors, a government lead is appropriate**, but the requisite government structures do not always exist, do not map onto humanitarian planning structures, or are undermined by a lack of political will or capacity. **For humanitarian actors, adherence to the humanitarian principles** of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence **is of paramount importance**, which can result in hesitance to working closely with a Government. This can result in collapsed frameworks and a re-assertion of 'binary' aid logic." (CR#14: p.10-11- emphasis in the original text).*

68.   Particularly in Afghanistan, evaluations take a critical stance on alignment due to concerns about how to maintain humanitarian principles when working along the interface between humanitarian response and political/military engagements (AF#1, AF#2, AF#8, AF#10). One of the evaluations reviewed (AF#8) takes up the ambiguities of both cooperating with other United Nations agencies while also operating in a political landscape where neutrality requires a degree of distance from state-building aims.

69.   Some evaluations draw attention to where **high volumes of aid in relation to state revenues constitute an obstacle to genuine alignment** (most Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Sudan and Afghanistan evaluations sampled). For example, "WFP's alignment with national priorities, in so far as they are articulated, has been strong, though in the intensely donor-driven environment of Afghanistan policy tends to be driven by what is funded" (AF#8: p.50).

70.   Despite the declining legitimacy of the South Sudan government, until as late as 2013 there were evaluations that promoted alignment with the government: "Funding mechanisms need to work towards fulfilling Government aspirations for control" (SS#4). An ubiquitous theme across the overall South Sudan cohort, and also across the Haiti sample, relates to the very significant limitations on international aid actors' ability to transfer ownership of humanitarian and development efforts to national and local authorities due to severe lack of capacity and other institutional governance problems in the countries concerned (e.g. SS#2, HA#1, HA#5).

71.   Even in contexts where the prospects of alignment with strengthening nationally-led programmes were seen as comparatively good, evaluations note that there are many institutional factors that complicate implementation, notably lack of capacity, stability, policy coherence and consistency within state structures (AF#5, AF#8, PT#3, PT#16). **Alignment needs to occur at both national and subnational levels.** In the case of South Sudan, one evaluation describes how collaboration with local government has been an effective way to manage the return to humanitarian response:

> *"BSF has shown that services can be delivered on the ground, often in very challenging circumstances. These have been delivered largely through a 'relief' modality, using a mix of NNGOs or INGOs with large contingents of local staff, working in collaboration with embryonic local government at county and state level." (SS#4: p.15).*

72.   The work of local government actors in humanitarian response is occasionally mentioned in relation to their participation in joint relief and recovery assessments; however, these observations tend to accept this as largely a sub-contracting relationship rather than one of coordination and alignment. These roles attract more critical attention in the near future, as evaluations begin on the progress in achieving localization goals from the WHS and the Grand Bargain.

73. Evaluations pay very little attention to the potential **role of the humanitarian clusters** in facilitating a more integrated approach to nexus challenges *within specific sectors*. The clusters are primarily a humanitarian function, mostly directed at day-to-day coordination which misses the opportunity of including strategic coherence with development. For example:

> *"Although cluster coordination focuses on "humanitarian" and the local aid coordination structure on "developmental" issues, clusters fail to connect to or integrate into a more comprehensive aid coordination approach…" (PT#8: p.34).*

74. A strategic/thematic evaluation reflects further on this point, adding that:

> *"[Al]though cluster coordination remains at the centre of the organisational structure of humanitarian assistance, it was not designed with longer term and resilience approaches in mind.* **The way in which clusters currently function can work against a more coherent approach that links shorter and longer term activities.**" (CR#14: p.9).*

Resilience and graduation issues

75. A nexus perspective emerges particularly in the Ethiopia and Malawi cohorts in relation to the **need to focus on 'graduation' out of social protection measures** (ET#8, ET#18). Discussions around graduation issues are framed in some cases as "breaking the cycle" of repeated humanitarian interventions (ML#2), and in others emphasise the need to bring a stronger resilience perspective – particularly at the intervention design stage:

> *"The Country Office could link Purchase 4 Progress to a new resilience theory of change so that Food- or Cash-for-Assets beneficiaries, with improved productive capacity and new financial acumen, are exposed to market opportunities at these locations within current and future Food-Assistance-for-Assets districts." (ML#2: p. xvii).*

76. The evaluations reviewed include very few detailed discussions on the implications for the most destitute or marginalized people for whom such paths to 'resilience' may not be an option. One exception is an evaluation of Irish Aid programming in Malawi (ML#4) which makes explicit reference to the application of vulnerability analyses. The dismal prospects for 'graduation' in the Occupied Palestinian Territories may be a reason that there is little discussion of resilience there. As one evaluation put it "There was little synergy between the relief and resilience pillars, not least because the latter was so weakly developed and the prospects for recovery were so massively constrained" (PT#13).

77. A few evaluations highlighted factors of market risk and how better analyses are needed of these factors in order to ensure the effectiveness of livelihood-related programming (AF#3, SS#7). One example framed this as a lack of development thinking:

> *"The European Community has approached the productive challenges from a peace-building point of view, adopting a socio-economic (employment/income) and actor-oriented strategy, thus helping victims of the armed conflict transit from humanitarian aid to rehabilitation; but it has left out sectoral and territorial competitiveness, that is the development dimension" (CO#3: p.75).*

78. A recent OCHA evaluation (CR#14) shows how a multi-year perspective can become a vehicle for focusing more on risk and crisis-modifiers:

> *"Although few of the case study multi-year plans contained elements which constituted a risk-management framework, things do seem to be improving in terms of risk-modelling, particularly in respect of the resilience platforms. These generally had a crisis modifier or internal risk facility as a way to adapt the programme style to protect longer-term investment in the event of short-term shocks" (CR#14: p.10).*

Resilience and disaster risk reduction

79.   The evaluations reviewed mostly report how weakly empirical data on natural hazards were linked to vulnerability analysis. This, in turn, affected the robustness of the analysis needed for example to assess effectiveness of DRR programming.

80.   Some evaluations made recommendations for anchoring programming in natural hazard mapping (PH#4, CR#4, CR#7), but they put forward little evidence on whether the interventions undertaken on the basis of such mapping actually reduced risks. This can be read as indicating reliance on standard narratives about the importance of DRR, at the expense of more critical and empirical risk analyses. One evaluative good practice example highlights how a focus on risk requires a profoundly different perspective:

> *"Many of those consulted felt that a shift of perspective from 'crisis response' to 'risk management' was needed, but had only partly been achieved. Some new initiatives, including new forms of risk financing (including weather-based insurance), were helping to point in this direction. Meanwhile some more immediate steps could be taken, including the routine adoption of 'crisis modifiers' in all development programs in drought-prone areas to allow for quicker and smoother adaptation to extreme circumstances. A more general shift was felt by many to be required away from the use of outcome indicators such as nutritional data towards the use of predictive (risk) indicators as a basis for early intervention. The necessary complement to this was an agreed policy framework for early (preventive) intervention and specific funds to enable such interventions" (ET#4: p.7).*

81.   Capacity strengthening for resilience – within affected populations; states and institutions; and aid actors – is a common goal discussed in relation to the nexus, and it is framed differently in many evaluations in the sample. Resilience in Malawi and the Philippines cohorts tends to refer to state capacities. In South Sudan (and to a lesser extent in the Sierra Leone sample) resilience is sometimes framed as humanitarian surge capacity boost needed to save lives and provide services where state capacity has collapsed. One South Sudan evaluation describes how, even before the renewed conflict, capacity development objectives had become completely overshadowed by service delivery targets due to the magnitude of needs and the limited absorptive capacity (and ownership) of the state (SS#4). Resilience is also sometimes defined as having varied connotations in relation to different types of capacity in humanitarian as opposed to transformative or development efforts:

> *"Resilience, as defined for humanitarian contexts, includes individual and communities' ability to predict, withstand, and recover from conflict and climatic-based shocks. This is distinct from resilience programming that attempts to make the links between recovery and development" (SS#5: p. iv).*

82.   Resilience is sometimes effectively used as a more acceptable alternative to the term 'early recovery'. Malawi is the cohort where the word 'resilience' is most apparent in this regard, even if the concept of resilience has become rather muddled with Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), for example:

> *"The UNDAF was designed at what proved to be the end of a series of good harvest years. Since then there have been a succession of poor harvests and humanitarian crises (floods and droughts). The work of the UN has therefore rightly shifted to a more humanitarian role, refocusing from planned work building long-term resilience [...] In this changed context, the UN should integrate the humanitarian and development agendas, and the UNDAF should better link relief, recovery and resilience work, linking food security with early recovery and resilience building as well as social protection"* (ML#1: p. 51).

83.   However, the above evaluation also recommends separating humanitarian and development activities, and another evaluation in Malawi describes the need to shift back to a humanitarian response as an obstacle to (rather than a part of) resilience efforts. "The PRRO was severely disrupted by the sudden onset emergency of the January 2015 flood and the prolonged dry spell and delayed rains later in the same year. Both events increased the relief caseload, deflecting Country Office and donor resources to the emergency response and away from funded recovery and resilience activity." (ML#2: p.35). **This example suggests a tendency to describe resilience as a de facto sector, competing for resources with humanitarian efforts,** wherein volatility is a hindrance to resilience programming rather than a justification for this new 'sector'.

84.   The implications of the varying conceptualizations of resilience for multi-year planning are touched on in another evaluation that found:

> *"The concept of resilience can challenge the construction and conceptualisation of relief and development as a bifurcated system and has specific implications for humanitarian planning.... **However, the term 'resilience' was not consistently applied across the case-study countries, nor understood in the same way in each country**. It is seen by some as an overarching term that subsumes relief and development interventions. For others, it is seen from a purely humanitarian perspective, as a contextually appropriate style of humanitarian intervention"* (CR#14: p.9).

85.   The mapping found that when evaluations uncritically accept resilience as a sector or as being subsumed under either development or humanitarian efforts exclusively, opportunities are lost to analyse the extent to which resilience has been applied as a conceptual framework (e.g. for reforming links among a range of programming modalities and sectors in response to chronic and transient risks and vulnerabilities).

86.   Even where resilience is given considerable attention, it is sometimes difficult to isolate the evaluative evidence amid the broader discussion of resilience-related concerns. **The linearity associated with resilience in many evaluations is directly at odds with how resilience is framed in the academic discourse (i.e. calls for resilience should embrace an acknowledgement that volatility cannot always be managed, and that emergency interventions may be needed to respond to inevitably recurrent risks).** The South Sudan cohort could be viewed as a 'reality check' on such assumptions about linearity, as earlier evaluations that framed resilience as a one-way process later recognized that resilience has to work both ways.

87.   DRR emerged as a significant component in the analysis of resilience programming in the evaluations reviewed. **In some evaluations, DRR and resilience were used almost interchangeably.** One implication of this is that the evaluations tend to note and encourage that DRR is shifting from a primarily 'humanitarian' modality to development. **DRR is overwhelmingly associated with reducing risks from natural hazards (rather than conflict); likewise, resilience is often categorized as natural hazard-related** (CR#7), though there are exceptions.

88.   One evaluation suggested that **including DRR in programming may be a way to access longer term support from climate change adaptation funds,** by highlighting where policy commitments bring the two together (PH#6). By contrast, one evaluation noted the difficulties of attracting donor support, despite explicit links to climate change agendas, which has left some DRR plans unimplemented (ML#2). However, as noted elsewhere in this review, there is little detailed analysis in the evaluations of whether DRR investments led to disaster risks being reduced. In the sample, DRR tends to be presented as a 'good thing', which should be included in programming as 'good practice'. One evaluation that attempts to delve deeper into these outcomes while exploring the links with conflict dynamics states:

> *"The project has fostered institutional participation (Public, Private and Community) and consolidation of municipal and departmental systems for risk management, creating spaces and technical platforms, which have generated a cultural change and thematic engagement that, as a result, evidence institutional strengthening in capacity and number of members for risk management" (CO#1: p.9).*

Financing issues

89.   Analysis of financing issues and funding mechanisms in relation to the nexus receive mixed attention in the sample. Overall, the mapping did not find any explicit recommendations on adjusting funding windows to reflect more 'uncertain' nexus time frames in protracted crises.

90.   Constraints relating to humanitarian financing modalities being integrated with longer term development financing mechanisms are a relatively minor point of analysis in some evaluations (AF#5, AF#15). In some reports the issue appears to be largely accepted 'as a given', almost a contextual factor rather than an issue to be more proactively addressed.

91.   Looking at IFIs evaluations and corporate reviews in the sample, the mapping highlighted that despite an emphasis on flexibility in the use of aid instruments, some evaluations downplay or overlook humanitarian action, as the range of instruments considered does not consistently include humanitarian ones (CR#11, CR#12, CR#13). In these reports, an analysis of the nexus is largely absent even when criteria such as sustainability, coherence and alignment – that could be expected to encourage nexus-related questions to be asked – are used to analyse country and programme strategies.

92.   Several country-level evaluations commissioned by bilateral donors draw broad conclusions regarding **weaknesses in aid architecture** (AF#1, AF#5, OPT#3, OPT#16, HA#2, PH#6) and discuss possible options to address the poor coherence between short- and long-term programming and funding mechanisms, with some occasional reference to the role of exit strategies.

93.   Some evaluations discuss in more details the poor integration of humanitarian and development funding mechanisms (HA#1, HA#2), highlighting how these long-standing concerns have yet to be addressed. More specifically, one Philippines evaluation (PH#2) raised concerns about limitations of CERF due to the inability to fund DRR initiatives, a point that is made somewhat more indirectly elsewhere in the sample. On a more positive note, a Sierra Leone evaluation (SL#1) noted how flexible use of a range of funding instruments made it possible to maintain programming amid erratic commitments.

94.   A recent OCHA evaluation (CR#14) reviewed financing issues in relation to multi-year planning. Given the current spotlight on reforming funding mechanisms in the Grand Bargain[11] and WHS commitments, it could be assumed that evaluations in the future will sharpen their focus to analyse how different funding modalities can be used to strengthen humanitarian development cooperation – such as, for example, in the context of forced displacement.[12]

Capacity development

95.   Enhanced capacity of national authorities received considerable attention by evaluations as a vehicle for more effective responses to complex nexus-related challenges. Capacity development extending to civil society received considerably less attention (again, highly notable given recent commitments to localization), but one positive example states:

> *"The European Community strategy in Colombia has contributed to generating the conditions for peace in the conflict zones, mainly with the construction of a social network in the territories thanks to the strengthening of civil society organizations, networks and the promotion of alliances between public and private institutions in the territory. It has also contributed to the generation of spaces for dialogue between the different actors present in the territory"* (CO#2: p.79).

96.   The evaluations also identified some evidence regarding failures by key United Nations actors to ensure an appropriate focus on capacity development (CR#7). Some evaluations noted that **capacity development is a secondary priority for humanitarian agencies**, which can lead to limited results and a gap between high-level goals and de facto programming scope and ambitions (AF#7), particularly when local partners are engaged through service delivery contracting modalities (AF#6). **This also seems to have major implications for localization goals**.

97.   Evaluations in the sample often described investments in capacity as being an inherently 'good thing' and pay little or no attention to measuring the outcomes of this support. For example, only few evaluations highlighted agencies' weaknesses in establishing benchmarks and indicators to measure capacity development and associated outcomes (ET#8).

98.   Even though references to capacity development were abundant in discussions of the nexus in much of the sample, there were notable gaps. One multi-initiative evaluation of the Ebola response in Sierra Leone briefly mentions that capacity and sustainability were given little attention in reporting due to this being an 'emergency' operation (SL#5). Considering the need for a legacy to respond to these risks in the future, this can be seen as a striking omission.

99.   There was minimal **attention given to developing the capacities of subnational government.** One evaluation found this appropriate in the recovery stage, but also noted challenges with ensuring

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11   See Report to the Secretary-General of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (December 2015) https://reliefweb.int/report/world/high-level-panel-humanitarian-financing-report-secretary-general-too-important-fail

12   See for instance UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme – Standing Committee 69th meeting (June 2017) Strengthening humanitarian-development cooperation in forced displacement situations. http://www.unhcr.org/593918295c.pdf and Work Bank Group IDA 18 http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/replenishments/ida18-overview

adequate timing and absorptive capacities of local actors and institutions (PH#5) and with ensuring institutional memory at subnational levels (CO#1:12).[13]

100. **Certain programming areas were framed as being about capacity development, most notably DRR** (AF#10, PH#2, CO#1, HA#4). Other evaluations were critical of how emergencies diverted support away from capacity development – with DRR sometimes highlighted as the most glaring example – and towards direct service provision (South Sudan and Malawi cohorts in general). These tendencies were generally described as 'failures' in the linear pathways envisaged for the nexus.

To contrast those more linear views, some evaluations put forward the recommendation to refocus programming approaches along multiple axes: i) strengthening *absorptive capacity* (the ability to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses through preventative measures); ii) *adaptive capacity* (making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions), and iii) *transformative capacity* (the governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms). (ET#8: p.44).

2.3 Gaps and potential for good evaluation practice

Different facets of the nexus are currently overlooked

101. In the sample reviewed, most evaluations related to peacebuilding, human security and climate risk included minimal reference to the humanitarian-development nexus. For example, even when conflict is acknowledged as an important contextual factor, evaluations do not seem to systematically include a conflict dimension in the analysis of programme outcomes and impacts. Similarly, from the mapping it also emerged that limited attention is given to the implications of programming in relation to protecting the environment.

Two-way transitions: from and to development and humanitarian interventions

102. Another gap noted in the evaluations reviewed is that of using evidence to learn not only about how to increase capacities to 'bounce back' after a crisis, but also learn about how agencies manage the transition from development to emergency response. This issue could be mitigated through a better understanding of development-to-relief transitions, a topic which is largely ignored in conventional LRRD frames of reference. Some tentative efforts considered these aspects in relation to country office

'preparedness' and subsequent 'surge capacity' (particularly in the Sierra Leone evaluations cohort). Rather than conducting a deeper analysis of the transition, however, too many evaluations described the competition for resources and mandate issues that arise when development programming is slowed down and resources are shifted. Protracted situations such as the one in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and the recognition that linear progress is unlikely to emerge for the foreseeable future, presents a unique challenge for nexus-related analysis.

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[13]"El proyecto presenta una gran vulnerabilidad frente a la pérdida de memoria procesal de cada uno de las actividades, métodos, metodologías, desarrollo de productos, redes de participantes, mecanismos de trabajo interinstitucional, acciones de sistematización a nivel departamental y regional." (CO#1:12)

Collective outcomes from 'new ways of working'

103.   In recent years, there have been efforts to use 'resilience' as the new paradigm to 'link the dots' across the nexus and to acknowledge non-linearity. The evaluations reviewed largely indicated that this has not happened. The term 'resilience' has frequently been 'captured' and turned into a somewhat specialized 'sector', apparently located somewhere in the nexus between DRR and early recovery.

104.   The mapping found that it may be difficult to use resilience as a rallying point for taking a more holistic approach to understanding the nexus. Rather, it is suggested that the current spotlight to more 'modest aims' of trying to measure collective outcomes and efforts to find new (or better) ways of working shows promise. Key informant interviews have reinforced this view that systemic changes underway are enabling a range of actors to collaborate in new and diverse ways across the nexus in different country contexts. The value of the concept of the nexus may therefore well be in using evaluations for learning from these polycentric processes (with an emphasis on what is happening within individual countries).

Beyond 'good things'

105.   Many of the evaluations reviewed drew attention to what are often framed as 'inherently good' activities such as DRR, capacity development and gender programming that are also recognized as important in the analysis of the nexus. However, the depth of analyses of the outcomes relating to those domains and programming areas remains weak. In turn, this creates a danger of evaluations being (mis-)used to simply 'tick the good practice box'. In order to understand the dynamics of the nexus, greater attention should be given to understanding whether, in a given context, disaster risks are actually being reduced, whether new capacities are being brought to bear on the critical challenges of the nexus and whether programmes are really addressing the gendered nature of the crises at hand.

Assessing whether anyone is being 'left behind' across the nexus

106.   The evaluations reviewed generally included little empirical analysis of inclusion and exclusion in programming across nexus transitions (both in and out of crises). Questions were rarely asked regarding who may 'graduate' from social protection programming and how gender, ethnicity, disability or other forms of discrimination and exclusion are addressed when programming is adapted to shifting crises and development opportunities. If evaluations are to be used to measure how nexus-related efforts contribute (or perhaps obstruct) achievement of the aims of Agenda 2030, a greater focus on measuring inclusion is needed.

> **Box 3: The neglected household perspective in the analysis of the nexus**
>
> The evaluations reviewed paid little attention to the perspectives of affected people on their own 'household nexus' that can be understood as bringing together different support mechanisms, whether humanitarian or developmental in source and modality.
>
> Some evaluations highlight instances of failing to integrate project activities with household and community strategies (AF#14, AF#6). Moreover, some evaluations noted that consultations with 'community leaders' are not equivalent to consulting with vulnerable individuals to gain their perspectives (AF#7). Nonetheless, most evaluations reviewed pay little attention to this dimension. Where the perspectives of affected populations were analysed, it often related to the gap between expectations of a shift to recovery and actual aid priorities.

Evaluations that reviewed how programming addressed protracted crises were more likely to cover the nexus in relation to links between development interventions and household level capacities to manage risks and shocks. However, even here attention to the perspectives of affected people on 'their own nexus' concerns and expectations was limited.

107.   One of the most recent evaluations in the sample – issued by OCHA in 2017 on multi-year planning – makes explicit reference to the Agenda 2030 core tenet of **leave no one behind**: "The concepts of "leaving no one behind" and "reaching those furthest behind first" provide a basis for shared outcomes for humanitarian and development actors" (CR#14: p.12). However, evaluations generally provide limited empirical guidance in achieving this, and very few present sufficient disaggregated primary data to draw conclusions regarding exclusion and potential discrimination.

108.   Relatively few evaluations present strong evidence whether highly vulnerable populations are 'left behind' when programming shifts from relief to recovery. One positive example is an inter-agency real time evaluation of the humanitarian response 20 months after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which reports that: "*Transitioning from relief and phasing out humanitarian response has [...] been difficult in a context where humanitarian priorities are not sufficiently taken up by other actors. The main concern is that the most vulnerable will not be covered in the recovery and reconstruction plans*" (HA#1: p.36).

Opening the black box of 'political economy'

109.   An issue raised repeatedly in the evaluation sample was the weakness in institutional capacities for conflict and political economy analysis. This was especially the case for evaluations in which organizations' sectoral units at headquarter and country offices had a technical focus, and did not clearly define i) whether actors were 'doing the right thing' in relation to crisis qualifiers; and ii) what falls within the sphere of influence of single aid interventions. Some evaluations found that political economy factors have profound implications for understanding the "operational landscape" (AF#8: p.16) and how aid is framed. For example, the failures of the international community to recognize the danger signs in South Sudan were also indicative of an extreme misjudgement of how politics would change the operational landscape. While recognizing the importance of the political economy is laudable, one key informant interviewed noted that the evaluation community has a responsibility to take these analyses a step further by being more specific about what political economy factors are important, where they should be (or have failed to be) applied to decision-making and how these gaps might be filled.

110.   Addressing the gap in political economy analysis as part of a broader evaluative analysis may suggest the need for stronger links with think tanks and other research institutions producing such analyses. Part of the evaluative gap between recognizing the need to learn about context and developing recommendations for what to do about it, may also lie in insufficient guidance about what aspects of the political economy need to be better understood to inform strategy and programme design. For example, one interviewee noted that the role of remittances is now broadly recognized as central to coping and recovery, but evaluations are largely silent about what needs to be learned about remittances to inform programming. This is not to suggest that evaluators should shoulder the primary task of undertaking these analyses, but rather that evaluations should go further in proposing how to better draw on research to fill these knowledge gaps.

Breaking down 'organizational silos'

111.   A more 'inward-looking' perspective of the nexus is offered in several UN-commissioned evaluations when they analyse and put forward recommendations to address some of the dysfunctions related to internal linkages between humanitarian and development divisions and units (e.g. CR#5, NE#6, CR#6) In the same vein, the strategic/thematic evaluations in the sample frequently touch on nexus-related issues particularly in the recommendations around 'breaking down organizational silos' internally (CR#4, CR#2, CR#6).

2.4   Demand for evaluative evidence around the nexus

112.   Key informants interviewed for this study suggested that the nexus is (still) not a central dimension of what their colleagues (in operational and policy roles) expected to see assessed in evaluations. Interviewees stressed the importance of being aware of the (often siloed) perspectives of different evaluations audiences within their organizations, and that this often constraints the opportunities of 'looking outside the box'.

113.   The level of awareness about the WHS and follow-up initiatives was found variable among the interviewees. From the interviews, it also emerged that the extent to which different evaluation offices have carried out an analysis of the implications of Agenda 2030 tended to reflect what their individual departments can do, rather than the strategic roles of their organization.

114.   Nevertheless, some interviewees noted that they saw some points of leverage where evaluations can encourage individual stakeholders to 'look outside the box'. In many organizations, senior management is more aware of nexus-related concerns and may have insights into what could drive the internal reforms needed to improve the humanitarian development interface. Furthermore, rapidly intensifying pressure for greater efficiencies may encourage a further boost for 'new ways of working'. As one evaluation commissioner interviewed noted, their evaluative conclusions regarding the nexus may have influenced their board to bring several units together, partly due to a combined recognition of the integrated nature of the issues, and partly as a way to cut costs.

2.5   Emerging good practices for programming and for evaluation

115.   The evaluations reviewed revealed few examples of possible good evaluation practices in relation to the nexus. The mapping also revealed some possible good practices in relation to programming. A more in-depth analysis of programming aspects is beyond the scope of this exercise. However, the following Box has been included to highlight how varied are the metrics of what is considered relevant and appropriate in nexus-related terms in different country contexts.

Box 4: Country examples of nexus-relevant programming
In **Ethiopia**, the nexus discourse is portrayed in evaluations that pay particular attention to the role of national safety nets and whether and how these could be expanded as a tool to address both acute and chronic vulnerability.

In **Malawi**, and to some extent in the South Sudan evaluations sample, shifts of resources to humanitarian efforts are often described as undermining the likelihood that promising development outputs will reach outcomes at significant scale (ML#5), and the scope of the evaluations reflect these 'trade-offs' rather than synergies.

In **Afghanistan**, the nexus challenge tends to be framed in evaluations as one of ensuring that interventions recognize the chronic nature of fragility, conflict and economic decline.

The most recent **South Sudan** evaluations in the sample draw attention to transitioning and reverting from development to humanitarian activities (including in contexts where there has been a reversal of development efforts back into humanitarian assistance). One evaluation describes this as follows: "Programme design cannot presume that society is making a one-way transition from a "relief" environment to a "development" environment. It needs to be able to adapt to setbacks such as renewed insecurity." (SS#4: p. ii)

The **OPT** evaluations cohort describes a challenging context in which there is recognition that the scope of programming needs to transcend standard 'good practice' in order to mitigate the negative effects of what is likely to be a deteriorating situation.

116.   In its future discussions on how to take forward the results of this mapping, the UNEG-HEIG group may consider exploring further some of the examples of emerging good practices relating to the nexus captured through this exercise as they are briefly outlined below:

- Some evaluations included critical reviews of the 'labels' used to categorize affected populations (e.g. returnees, vulnerable groups, 'graduates' from social protection programmes, community leaders) and the extent to which these labels reflect how individuals and communities engage with and benefit from different types of programming across the nexus.
- A few evaluations analysed the extent to which development agencies were prepared for a subsequent crisis and were able to act also taking into consideration humanitarian imperatives. Overall, the mapping shows that a more constructive focus on preparedness can be a first step towards a more comprehensive scope in relation to 'two-way transitions' from and to development and humanitarian response and assistance.
- Some evaluations took a useful broader perspective in reviewing whether the programme is 'doing the right thing' in relation to the overall landscape of risk – rather than taking a more narrow view on risks.
- Few evaluations examined the outcomes of investments in capacity development; more good practices were found in the evaluative analysis of outcomes relating to peacebuilding than DRR.
- Some evaluations made efforts to disaggregate the factors affecting different needs, opportunities and risks in relation to gender, ethnicity, other drivers of diversity, and how they relate to financial and market integration. This will be of vital importance including for the analysis of progress towards 'leaving no one behind'.
- Some evaluations applied a critical lens to judge what 'resilience' means for households facing a range of different risks, and what this implies for different types of programmes.
- Some evaluations have begun to apply a 'localization' lens in relation to the roles of subnational government authorities and civil society, and thereby transcend a past tendency to merely assess their performance as service providers.

3. LOOKING FORWARD

117.   This study found that only a small proportion of evaluations analysed the process and structural bottlenecks within and among aid agencies for linking development and humanitarian initiatives. In the sample reviewed, the focus was primarily on a broader range of issues regarding i) how aid relates to conflict, natural hazard risks and vulnerabilities; ii) affected populations' interconnected humanitarian, recovery and development-related needs in crisis-affected situations; and iii) the roles of national and local governmental and civil society institutions.

118.   Evaluative evidence on institutional relations emphasised relations between aid and states (rather than just among aid agencies) and the extent to which the positioning of aid reflects the political economy of conflict and fragility. Furthermore, the mapping highlighted a greater recognition of how chronic and recurrent crisis drive the need for 'better linking development with relief'. This is not to suggest that the 'old LRRD' issues have been solved, but rather that these are now being viewed as one piece of a larger puzzle. The old LRRD problems were sometimes portrayed as a frustrating diversion from the core issues, as one evaluation illustrated:

> *"Whether a context is humanitarian or development will determine what types of agencies operate and the budget lines they are funded from, and what the overarching strategy looks like. Switzerland is no more or less immune to such battles than others. […] This is a time consuming and distracting debate, underpinned by sensitive questions about which agencies lead and what types of approaches should be used. Common shared analysis […] must also be the starting point for Switzerland - and a mechanism for achieving this is needed to make this a practical reality" (CR#6: p.33).*

119.   Interviews with key informants found significant 'paradigm fatigue', suggesting that the value of the nexus will be missed if the concept is forced into elaborate conceptual frameworks. Overall, the **findings from the mapping suggest that the nexus may prove most useful if it is viewed as a scoping tool to identify and analyse areas for improved synergy and a more effective way of working for development and humanitarian interventions**.

120.   Looking forward, evaluations can contribute to an evidence-informed understanding of these varied nexus dynamics and some final observations for further analysis and discussion can be put forward:

- Many evaluations are no longer narrowly focused on the interface between humanitarian and development. This can be seen as a welcome development that opens up space for a broader analysis on collective outcomes – including together with national and local actors.

- In designing and framing evaluations, the value of the nexus appears to be primarily as a **scoping tool** to alert evaluators of the need to connect sectoral and thematic areas – beyond a narrow humanitarian-development view – to include for instance DRR, stabilization, peacebuilding, human rights, justice and perhaps even resilience. Context-specific political economy analysis has emerged as one possible tool for evaluators to explore such connection.

- The main set of nexus relations described in the evaluations reviewed is the one between aid actors and their engagements with national-level government institutions – the relation is especially challenged by crises. A greater focus on using evaluations to better understand how

aid agencies relate to local government and civil society will be particularly important to understand operational effectiveness, coverage and outcomes, as well as prospects for achieving inclusive and sustainable improvements in service delivery and socio-economic inclusion more generally.

- From the sample of evaluations reviewed, it appears that some of the underlying components of resilience thinking – most notably the need to factor in risk and vulnerability, and not assume linear paths to development – can bring an essential contribution for understanding nexus-related processes.

- There is an emerging movement towards more 'political economy analysis' in fragile and conflict-affected states. While acknowledging that there are limits to the extent to which evaluators alone can redress the gap in political economy analysis, evaluations can do more to look into the 'black box' of political economies. For example, they could engage more expertise from local think tanks to undertake these analyses.

- In some contexts where the situation is deteriorating, the nexus focus may be on how different modalities and activities together contribute to stabilization and slowing vicious cycles, rather than expecting the emergence of 'development' *per se*. Evaluations can be a way to better understand how agencies manage shifts that may include less linear change pathways, and more modest aims.

121. Finally, one can consider that if the 'new way of working' towards 'common outcomes' becomes the unifying approach that it is intended to be, this will carry with it a new imperative to apply a nexus lens more broadly, in both humanitarian and development (and mixed-focus) evaluations. A nexus perspective in any given evaluative analysis is unlikely to be delivered by a single, new, unified approach and methodology. Rather, quality improvements in the evaluative analysis of the nexus can be made adjusting existing evaluation frameworks, guidance and toolkits already in use by different agencies, in different sectoral and programmatic domains.

4. Annexes

Annex 1. List of evaluations and reports reviewed

1.1. Sample of country-specific evaluations

AFGHANISTAN

CODE	EVALUATION / REPORT
AF#1	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). (2015). *Summative Evaluation of Canada's Afghanistan Development Program* (Synthesis Report). Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD).
AF#2	Bennett, J. (2015). *A Case Study on Peace and Development in Finland's Country Programme in Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report). Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
AF#3	Samuel Hall Consulting. (2014b). *Humanitarian Assistance through Mobile Cash Transfer in Northern Afghanistan: An Evaluation of a DFID Pilot Project in Faryab, Jawzjan, and Samangan* (Final Report). DFID.
AF#4	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2012). *Evaluation of Danish development support to Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
AF#5	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. (2012). *Evaluation of Danish development support to Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
AF#6	Samuel Hall Consulting. (2014a). *Evaluating IOM's Return and Reintegration Activities for Returnees and Other Displaced Populations - Afghanistan* (Full Report). International Organization for Migration (IOM).
AF#7	Maastricht University, & Samuel Hall Consulting. (2013). *Evaluation of the UNHCR Shelter Assistance Programme*. UNHCR.
AF#8	IOD PARC. (2012). *Afghanistan: An evaluation of WFP's portfolio (2010-2012)* (Country Portfolio Evaluation No. OE/2012/015). WFP.
tokens AF#9	Coombs, D., Soekarjo, D., Moossavi, N., Bokhari, S., Hakimi, A., & Horst, N. (2016). *Afghanistan PRRO 200447 Assistance to Address Food Insecurity and Under-nutrition: An Operation Evaluation* (Evaluation Report No. OEV/2015/011). WFP.
AF#10	UNDP. (2013). *Assessment of Development Results: Afghanistan* (Evaluation of UNDP Contribution). UNDP.
AF#11	Emmott, S., & Jawhary, A. M. (2014). *Evaluation of the National Area-based Development Programme (NABDP) in Afghanistan* (Final Report). UNDP.
AF#12	Bhattacharjee, A., Postgate, D., & Andersen, H. (2013). *Evaluation of CPD Outcome 6: Diversified Livelihoods, Private Sector Development and Public-Private Partnership* (Final Report). UNDP.
AF#13	Baker, J., Buswell, M., Kohistani, M., & Kamraan, A. S. (2013). *Review of the DDG Humanitarian Mine Action Support to the National Strategy through Clearance and Enhanced Quality Project in Afghanistan (Oct. 2010 – Sep. 2013)* (Final Report). Sida.
AF#14	Collin, C., & Cosgrave, J. (2011). *5-year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund Country Study Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report).
AF#15	House, S. (2011). *Final Independent Evaluation of the humanitarian support to vulnerable households in the most water and sanitation scarce and cold regions of Afghanistan* (Evaluation Report). Action Against Hunger, ACF International.

COLOMBIA

CODE	EVALUATION
CO#1	Barcenas Sandoval, J. (2013). Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Institucionales para la Gestión Integral de Riesgos en el Caribe Colombiano (Evaluation Report No. DCI-ENV/2010/250-772). UNDP.
CO#2	Development Researchers Network. (2012). Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's co-operation with Colombia (Final Report). European Commission.
CO#3	Jantzi, T., Zapata, P., Garrido, G., & Byler, C. (2010). Asistencia Alimentaria a Personas en Situación de Desplazamiento y a otros grupos con altos índices de inseguridad alimentaria afectados por la violencia en Colombia – OPSR 10588.0 (Operation evaluation). WFP.
CO#4	Rodríguez Puentes, A. L., & Gaviria Serna, M. (2013). Las Comunidades Indígenas y Afrocolobinanas del Choco Promueven su Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (Final Project Evaluation). UNDP, F-ODM.
CO#5	Caballero Reinoso, C. (2014). Evaluación Final al Programa País del PNUD para Colombia 2008-2014 -CPD por sus siglas en inglés, y al Plan de Acción del Programa de País para Colombia 2008- 2012 (Final Evaluation Report). UNDP.
CO#6	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). (2013). Colombia Country Program Evaluation 2006-2011 (Synthesis Report). Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD).
CO#7	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, & Gobierno de Colombia. (2014). Revisión Intermedia - Marco Asociación País Colombia-España 2011-2014 (Final Report). Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (España).
CO#8	Samper, J. (2014). Evaluacion Externa: United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) Colombia 2008-2014. UNDP.

ETHIOPIA

CODE	EVALUATION
ET#1	UNDP. (2015). Assessment of Development Results: Ethiopia. UNDP.
ET#2	CARE Ethiopia, & UNOCHA. (2012). CARE Ethiopia / UNOCHA Emergency Nutritional Support Project Evaluation (Synthesis Report). CARE, UNOCHA.
ET#3	Silva Villanueva, P., & Bekele, T. (2014). Disaster Risk Management and Livelihood Recovery programme of UNDP Ethiopia (2010-2016) (Independent Mid-Term Evaluation Report). UNDP.
ET#4	Darcy, J., Asmara, E., Banda, T., & Clifton, D. (2012). Disasters Emergency Committee - East Africa Crisis Appeal Ethiopia Real-Time Evaluation Report (Evaluation Report). DEC - Disasters Emergency Committee, Humanitarian Coalition.
ET#5	IFAD. (2016). Ethiopia Country Programme Evaluation (2016) (No. 4144–ET). IFAD.
ET#6	MASKAD Consultancy & Business PLC, & Dilalu Consulting Service. (2015). Ethiopia Food Security & Resilience Evaluation (Final Report). GOAL Ethiopia.
ET#7	World Food Programme, & Tango International. (2015). Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200700 (2015-2018) Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees: An evaluation of WFP's current operation and transition period (Evaluation Report No. OEV/2015/032). WFP.
ET#8	Fox, K., & Mueller, M. (2014). Ethiopia PRRO 200290 Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity (2012-2013): An Operation Evaluation (No. OE/2013/015). WFP.
ET#9	Holzaepfel, E., & Jacobsen, K. (2015). Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOS/PRM Livelihoods Programs in Ethiopia and Burundi (Evaluation Report). US Department of State.
ET#10	Hennion, M., Christensen, P., Metz, M., Ranz, T., Bultosa, G., Jacobson, M., & Amine, M. (2012). Evaluation of the Commission of the European Union's co-operation with Ethiopia Country Level Evaluation (Final Report). European Commission.

CODE	EVALUATION
ET#11	Ambroso, G., Swamy Meier-Ewert, G., Parker, J., & Richardson, L. (n.d.). Evaluation of UNHCR's Response to the L3 South Sudan Refugee Crisis In Uganda and Ethiopia (Evaluation Report No. PDES/2016/01). UNHCR.
ET#12	Stenbäck, T., Fleming, D., & Mussa, M. (2014). Evaluation: A Case Study on Peace and Development in Finland's Country Programme in Ethiopia. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
ET#13	Woldemariam Gole, T., & Bekele, M. (2013). Final Evaluation Report of African Adaptation Programme: Supporting Climate Resilient Sustainable Development in Ethiopia (Final Evaluation). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UNDP.
ET#14	Damiba, E. A. (2013). Final Evaluation: National Nutrition Programme. MDG Achievement Fund.
ET#15	Sida, L., Gray, B., & Asmare, E. (2012). IASC Real Time Evaluation (IASC RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis - Ethiopia (Real Time Evaluation Report). IASC.
ET#16	Robertson, T., O'Loughlin, B., & Hoogendoorn, A. (2010). Mid-Term Evaluation of the Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 10665.0 (2008-2010): An Operation Evaluation (Mid-term Evaluation Report No. OE/2010/009). WFP.
ET#17	Berhane, G. (2013). Evaluation of Ethiopia's food security program. IFPRI.

HAITI

CODE	EVALUATION
HA#1	Hidalgo, S., & Théodate, M. P. (2012). Inter–agency real–time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti: 20 months after. IASC.
HA#2	Grünewald, F., Kauffmann, D., Boyer, B., & Patinet, J. (2010). Real-time evaluation of DG ECHO's response to the Haiti crisis and review. European Commission, Groupe URD.
HA#3	CARE, & Save the Children. (2011). An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response (Joint Evaluation Report). CARE, Save the Children.
HA#4	Baptiste, M. F. (2013). Mid term evaluation report of the disaster risk management programme (Mid-term Evaluation Report). International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
HA#5	Boyer, B., & Baunard, E. (2015). Evaluation du Programme d'Appui à la Reconstruction du Logement et des Quartiers. ONU Habitat.
HA#6	NORAD. (2014). Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake. NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).
HA#7	The QED Group. (2013). Final Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Haiti Recovery Initiative. USAID.
HA#8	British Red Cross, & Group URD. (2013). Urban livelihoods recovery: Lessons from Port-au-Prince, Haiti. British Red Cross.

MALAWI

CODE	EVALUATION
ML#1	Olver, R. (2015). United Nationals Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Malawi 2012-2016 (Evaluation Report). Joint UN.
ML#2	Lewins, R., Msiska, F., Bahr Caballero, K., & Prout, J. (2016). Malawi PRRO 200692 Responding To Humanitarian Needs And Strengthening Resilience: A mid-term Operation Evaluation (Operation evaluation No. OEV/2015/027). WFP.
ML#3	Downen, J., Richardson, L., Chima, J., & Vallet, M. (2014). Malawi Country Programme 200287 (2012-2016): A mid-term Operation Evaluation (Measuring results, sharing lessons No. OE/2014/06). WFP.
ML#4	Irish Aid. (2015). Irish Aid Malawi CSP, 2010-2014 (Evaluation Report). Irish Aid.
ML#5	Chiwara, R. M. (2016). End of term Evaluation for UNDP Malawi Country Programme (2012 – 2016) (Evaluation Report). UNDP.

CODE	
ML#6	Clifton, J., Menard, S., Queiroz da Souza, A., Chanje, D., & Amine, M. (2011). Country Level Evaluation - Republic of Malawi (Final Report). European Commission; Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO) & Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI).
ML#7	UNDP. (2011). Assessment of Development Results: Malawi. UNDP.
ML#8	Kouam, E. (2016). 2016 Malawi: Evaluation of Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) in Malawi. UNICEF.

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

CODE	EVALUATION
PT#1	The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). (2013). DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA. DFID.
PT#2	Kassahun, Y. A. (2012). End of project evaluation of the Emergency relief and reinforcement of essential healthcare services in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Final Report No. D2.1/LVdB/19601/1-NH/2011/06). Oxfam.
PT#3	ECORYS. (2015). Evaluation of the Danish engagement in Palestine (Evaluation Report). DANIDA - Danish International Development Assistance.
PT#4	Ferretti, S. (2010). Evaluation of the Gaza emergency response. ActionAid.
PT#5	Shah, R. (2014). Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council's Palestine Education Programme 2010-2014. Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).
PT#6	Lallement, D., & Wright, K. (2014). Evaluation of UNDP's Community Resilience and Development Programme (CRDP) (Final Evaluation Report). UNDP.
PT#7	Rajab, K. (2013). Final Evaluation of the MDG-F Joint Programme for Culture and Development. (Final Evaluation Report). UN Women.
PT#8	Krüger, S., & Steets, J. (2010). IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, Country Study - Occupied: 2nd Phase Palestinian territory. IASC.
PT#9	Marrar, S., Lake, T., Esaied, S., Turjman, M., Herceg, C., Quintero, R., & Karakra, A. (2013). Mid-Term Independent Evaluation of the project for livelihood support to the most vulnerable communities in the Southern West Bank with an emphasis on Traditional Herders through components of Food Security, Water, and Sanitation (Mid-Term External Evaluation). Action Against Hunger, ACF International.
PT#10	Dammers, C., Jones, A., & Silkin, T. (2010). Occupied Palestinian territory PRRO 10387.1: September 2007 and August 2009: An Operation Evaluation (Operation evaluation No. OE/2010/014). WFP.
PT#11	Gallagher, E. (2009). Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP/PAPP Mid-Term Strategic Framework 2008 - 2011. UNDP.
PT#12	English, K., & Baltzer, M. (2011). Reducing Food Insecurity through Fresh Food Assistance and Agricultural Inputs to Vulnerable Households in the Gaza Strip (Project Evaluation Report). CARE, European Commission.
PT#13	Turner, S., Bhatia, R., Madi, A., Silkin, T., Tavakoli, H., & Driscoll, Z. (2016). State of Palestine: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011-2015) (Evaluation Report No. OEV/2015/014). WFP.
PT#14	Freij, N., Sandouka, R., Sandouka, M., Scheuermann, P., al Wehaidy, R., & al Wehaidy, R. (2012). UNFPA Country Programme Evaluation Occupied Palestinian Territory 2011-2012 (Evaluation Report). UNFPA.
PT#15	UN Women. (2012). United Nations Trust Fund on Human Security (UNTFHS) Joint Programme Mid-Term Evaluation Assignment Evaluation Report (Evaluation Report). UN Women.
PT#16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. (2016). How to Break the Vicious Cycle. Evaluation of Dutch Development Cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014 (Evaluation Report). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

PHILIPPINES

CODE	EVALUATION
PH#1	Curry, S., Byron, G., Kubota, A., & Carou Jones, V. (2009). Assessment of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to the Philippines. UNDP.
PH#2	Collin, C., Cosgrave, J., & Lachica, R. C. (2011). 5-year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund Country Study: Philippines. UN OCHA.
PH#3	Eguia, R. (2012). Early Recovery and Rehabilitation for Central Mindanao (Terminal Evaluation). UNDP.
PH#4	Duncalf, J., Walters, T., & Modin, N. (2014). Philippines PRRO 200296 Support for Returnees and Other Conflict Affected Households in Central Minanao, and National Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Response: An Operation Evaluation. WFP.
PH#5	Valid International. (2014). IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response. IASC
PH#6	ICAI. (2014). DFID's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. DFID.
PH#7	Darcy, J., Leonardi, E., Robitaille, P., Monzanal, M., & Gandin, J. (2014). Real-time Evaluation of UNICEF's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Real Time Evaluation Report). UNICEF.

SIERRA LEONE

CODE	EVALUATION
SL#1	Konterra. (2017). An evaluation of WFP's L3 Response to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) crisis in West Africa (2014–2015) (Evaluation Report). WFP.
SL#2	UNICEF. (2016). Evaluation of UNICEFs Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa 2014-15. UNICEF.
SL#3	Medicins Sans Frontieres. (2016). MSF OCB Ebola Review. Medicins Sans Frontieres.
SL#4	Platt, A., & Kerley, L. (2016). External evaluation of Plan International UK's response to the Ebola virus outbreak in Sierra Leone. PLAN International.
SL#5	Aid Works. (2016). Evaluation of the DFID Ebola Emergency Response Fund (DEERF) in Sierra Leone. DFID.
SL#6	Fearon, C. (2017). Humanitarian Quality Assurance – Sierra Leone: Evaluation of Oxfam's humanitarian response to the West Africa Ebola crisis (Effectiveness Review Series). Oxfam.
SL#7	World Health Organization (2015). Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. WHO.

SOUTH SUDAN

CODE	EVALUATION
SS#1	Barnes, S., Comninos, S., Awuol, C., & Achuoth, P. D. (2015). South Sudan Recovery Fund Round 3: UN Joint Stabilization Programmes. UNDP.
SS#2	The World Bank. (2013). Independent evaluation of the World Bank administered multi-donor trust fund in Sudan: final evaluation report (No. 78524) (pp. 1–108). The World Bank.
SS#3	Singleton, G., Cammack, T., Horstman, R., & Hayombe, P. (2015). Health Pooled Fund: South Sudan (Mid-Term Review Report). UK Aid.
SS#4	Johnson, R., Ockelford, J., & Powert, T. (2013). Learning from BSF: Lessons from the Basic ServicesFund, South Sudan, 2006 to 2012. DFID.
SS#5	Konterra. (2015). Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund: South Sudan (Country Report: South Sudan). UN OCHA.
SS#6	Chiwara, R. M., & Deng Ajang, P. (2015). Evaluation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for South Sudan: UNDAF (2012-2016) (Evaluation Report). UN.
SS#7	Scanteam. (2011). Southern Sudan: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation (Outcome Evaluation). UNDP.

CODE	EVALUATION / REPORT
SS#8	Byamugisha, C., Ternström, B., & Ternström, I. (2013). Evaluation of five Humanitarian Programs of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP Case Country Report - South Sudan (Case Country Report). NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation).
UNHCR's SS#9	Ambroso, G., Swamy Meier-Ewert, G., Parker, J., & Richardson, L. (2015). Evaluation of **SS#9** UNHCR's Response to the L3 South Sudan Refugee Crisis In Uganda and Ethiopia (Evaluation Report No. PDES/2016/01). UNHCR.
SS#10	O'Hagan, P. (2013). Impact Evaluation Report of the South Sudan Education Cluster. South Sudan Education Cluster.
SS#11	Featherstone, A. (2012). Evaluation of Oxfam's South Sudan Humanitarian Response - Using Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool (Evaluation Report). Oxfam.

1.2. Sample of corporate, thematic evaluations and non-evaluative reviews

CORPORATE REVIEWS

CODE	EVALUATION / REPORT
CR#1	Mokoro, DAI (Development Alternatives INC), & GeoTest. (2017). Draft Evaluation Report on External Financing Instruments - 11th European Development Fund (EDF) (Main report). European Commission.
CR#2	Mowjee, T., Fleming, D., & Toft, E. (2015). Evaluation of the strategy for Danish humanitarian action 2010-2015 (No. 978-87-90656-32–4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
CR#3	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. (2015). Policy Review of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance, 2009-2014 (Policy Review). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
CR#4	FAO. (2016). Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5: Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises (Thematic Evaluations). FAO.
CR#5	FAO. (2014). Evaluation of FAO's contribution to crisis-related transition: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (Final Report).
CR#6	Sida, L., Ramalingam, B., Frej, B., Mountain, R., & de Weijer, F. (2012). Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC.
CR#7	UNDP. (2010). Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery (Reducing Vulnerabilities). UNDP.
CR#8	UNDP. (2016). Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Mine Action. UNDP.
CR#9	UNDP. (2013). Evaluation of UNDP support to conflict affected countries in the context of UN Peace Operations (Peacebuilding). UNDP.
CR#10	Diaz Varela, A. (2016). Evaluation of UNESCO's Role in Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises (Final Report No. IOS/EVS/PI/157.REV 2). UNESCO.
CR#11	World Bank Group. (2014). World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: An Independent Evaluation. World Bank.
CR#12	World Bank Group. (2016). World Bank Group Engagement in Situations of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence. World Bank.
CR#13	Asian Development Bank. (2012). Special Evaluation Study on ADB's Response to Natural Disasters and Disaster Risks (Special Evaluation Study No. SES: REG 2012-12). ADB Independent Evaluation Department.
CR#14	UN OCHA. (2017). Evaluation of Multi-year Planning. UN OCHA

NON-EVALUATIVE REPORTS and OTHER STUDIES

CODE	EVALUATION / REPORT
NE#1	UN Malawi. (2017). The Real-Time Monitor. UN Malawi.
NE#2	Global Humanitarian Assistance. (2015). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015. Global Humanitarian Assistance.
NE#3	European Parliament. (2012). Linking relief, rehabilitation and development: Towards more effective aid (Policy Briefing No. DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_74).
NE#4	Inter-Agency. (2016). Better Humanitarian-Development Cooperation for Sustainable Results on the Ground. OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and the World Bank.
NE#5	UNDP. (2016). The UNDP's take on the humanitarian-development nexus and #WHS16.
NE#6	UNICEF. (2016). UNICEF study on linking development and humanitarian programming (Final Report). UNICEF.
NE#7	Mosel, I., & Levine, S. (2014). Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development How LRRD can become a practically useful concept for assistance in difficult places (Commissioned Report). HPG, ODI, BMZ.
NE#8	UNDP. (2016). UN70: Rethinking the humanitarian development nexus: How can the UN achieve a better integration of long-term aid and humanitarian assistance?
NE#9	European Commission. (2014). Resilience Marker General Guidance. European Commission.
NE#10	European Commission. (2015). EU Resilience Compendium - Saving lives and livelihoods. European Commission.
NE#11	Otto, R. (2013). Linking Relief and Development: More than old solutions for old problems? Netherlands MFA.
NE#12	Hinds, R. (2015). Relationship between humanitarian and development aid. Helpdesk Research.

Annex 2. Approach and methodology

2.1 Sample selection and countries of focus

1.   A purposive sampling approach has been used to focus the mapping to select nine countries and within these countries a body of evaluations (from the past eight to ten years) for a total of 97 evaluations. In addition, 26 global, corporate reviews and thematic and strategic evaluations were included in the analysis.

2.   A purposive sampling approach has been used to focus the mapping to select nine countries and within these countries a body of evaluations (from the past eight to ten years) for a total of 97 evaluations. In addition, 26 global, corporate reviews and thematic and strategic evaluations were included in the analysis

3.   The focus countries are Afghanistan (AF), Colombia (CO), Ethiopia (ET), Haiti (HA), Malawi (ML), Occupied Palestinian Territories (PT), Philippines (PH), Sierra Leone (SL) and South Sudan (SS). [14] They were selected purposely, based on the following criteria:

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[14] Shorthand abbreviations of the country names are used in the report to identify the quotes and excerpts from the evaluation reports reviewed for the mapping.

- most have received substantial levels of both humanitarian and development financing (with Afghanistan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and the Palestinian Territories among the ten highest aid recipients globally);

- given the high level of attention (and funding) received through both humanitarian and development instruments there was an expectation that evaluations would analyse and speak to issues relating to the humanitarian-development interface. This expectation was probed and tested during the analysis;

- some countries (notably Malawi) were included to ensure a focus not only on high profile situations, but also to 'forgotten crisis'.

4.   In addition, the nine countries were selected to represent different operational and crisis contexts, with a wide mix of geographic, socio-economic and political situations, state capacity and drivers of risks and crisis. Specifically:

- four countries included in the sample have experienced very high levels of chronic conflict and associated displacement (South Sudan, Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Colombia);

- four countries face major recurrent crises related to natural hazards (Ethiopia, Malawi, Haiti and the Philippines). In the Philippines, major risks associated with natural hazards are combined with conflict-related risks; Ethiopia faces additional risks associated with mass refugee influx; in Haiti the risks due to natural hazards combine with risks associated with extreme state fragility and chronic instability;

- one country has been affected by major epidemics, in combination with extreme state fragility (Sierra Leone).[15]

5.   The nine country-specific evaluation cohorts (for a total of 97 evaluations) have been complemented by 26 thematic and strategic evaluations with a global scope.[16] These were selected in order to understand whether and how performance has been assessed around nexus-related issues (complete list of reports reviewed available in Annex 1).

2.2 Database and web-searches

6.   The review team used key word searches of relevant websites and online evaluation repositories including UNEG, ALNAP, DAC Evaluation Resource Centre and individual agency websites. Reports were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- Date of publication: inclusion of reports published since 2010; inclusion of reports published prior to 2010 only if judged to be of particular relevance and importance; exclusion of reports older than ten years since publication.

- UN-commissioned evaluations and evaluations commissioned by other actors (e.g., non-governmental organizations, bilateral donors, International Financial Institutions).

- Reports with titles that indicated likely or potential attention to the nexus according to focus, context, sector and/or theme (e.g. recovery, risk reduction, partnership, human security, capacity- and institution-building/development).

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[15] The Sierra Leone cohort includes some sub regional evaluations of the Ebola response.

[16] Twelve non-evaluative reports and studies have also been reviewed to bring some additional perspectives to the analysis.

- Exclusion of evaluations for which the full reports were not available (either online or from the UNEG-HEIG members).

7. Each report included in the initial purposive sample – averaging around 20-25 reports per country cohort – was screened for relevance and potential inclusion in the final core sample using a combination of contents analysis, keyword searches and rapid scanning of ToRs, executive summaries and most relevant sections. From this initial selection, a final core sample for close review was selected for each country/global cohort based on an assessment of the relative quality and relevance of each report (including direct or indirect attention to nexus-related issues within the report) and also seeking an appropriate balance of types and focus of reports across each core sample in terms of type of commissioner and sector, theme and/or contextual coverage.

8. Supplementary Google searches and two rounds of consultations with UNEG-HEIG members were used to complement and refine the initial search for evaluations. A sample of 123 evaluations (listed in Annex 1) was included in the final sample for close review and analysis.

9. As the findings were emerging, ten key informant interviews were conducted with evaluation commissioners, evaluator managers and advisers to better understand the expectations and demand for evaluative evidence around the nexus. These interviews were also used to understand and put in context the initial findings and patterns emerging from the evaluation mapping.

2.3 Characteristics of the evaluations sampled

10. As shown in Diagram 1, the total 123 evaluations reviewed were relatively evenly divided among development, humanitarian and combined foci (the latter including a small number of evaluations focused on disaster risk reduction, recovery and internally displaced people/refugee return). The development cohort was slightly smaller, reflecting perhaps the difficulties in identifying development evaluations more explicitly relevant to the topic.

DIAGRAM 1: MAIN PROGRAMME TYPE

- Development 28%
- Humanitarian 33%
- Integrated 39%

Total number of reports (n=123)

11. About half of the evaluations had a direct focus on the nexus. There was also a relatively even division between evaluations of specific programmes versus country/strategy evaluations in the sample. The distribution of risk foci was relatively even as well, with 40 percent focused on conflict, 32 percent on combined risks and 28 percent on natural hazards.

12. There was a strong weighting towards United Nations evaluations. There are relatively few 'non-UN multilateral' evaluations, a category that includes the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, International Financial Institutions and the European Community.

DIAGRAM 2 COMMISSIONER TYPE

Legend:
- UN
- International NGO
- Donors
- Academia / Think Tanks
- Government
- Non-UN & International Financial Institutions

Pie chart values: 48%, 15%, 25%, 1%, 1%, 10%

Total number of reports (n=123)

13.   A notable gap in the sample is that there were hardly any evaluations identified commissioned by the governments of the affected countries. In addition, key information that would have aided analyses was missing from many evaluations. Most notably, it has not been possible to rigorously map the initial intentions in evaluation design, as only 66 percent of the sample had evaluation ToRs publicly available.

Annex 3. List of interviewees

Name	Affiliation
Tomoo Ueda	Asian Development Bank
Nanna Hvidt	Danida
Sophia Swithern	Development Initiatives
Christina Bennett	Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Simon Lawry-White	*Independent evaluation consultant*
Pia Hussein	OCHA
Rachel Scott	OECD/DAC Secretariat
Vivien Walden	Oxfam (formerly)
Sara Sekkenes	UNDP
Caroline Heider	World Bank – Independent Evaluation Group