Haiti Earthquake 2010 - Evaluative resources

• Terms of reference

Objectives: The main objective of this exercise will be to use our experience in Haiti to help CARE identify shortcomings, recognize good practices, and improve upon CARE's humanitarian policy framework and how CARE International approaches emergency response at a global organizational level in a way that we can apply these lessons to
large-scale humanitarian crises we may face in the future.

Similar to the last organization-wide review undertaken for the 2004 tsunami, it is anticipated that the Haiti Earthquake Reflections Workshop will review:

1. Roles & relationships: Clarify roles and responsibilities, accountability, coordination, and management oversight.
2. How successful we were at getting the right people at the right time, including deployment modalities,staffing transitions, etc.
3. Programme design and absorptive capacity. Emergency preparedness planning, capacity assessments,strategic planning and transition from relief to development
4. Performance in core sectors (food security, shelter and/or WASH) and integration of cross-cutting issues(gender, DRR, etc.) given that CARE's response needs to be based not only on needs but also on itstechnical and absorptive capacity
5. How effectively was the transition managed between successive phases (e.g. relief to recovery)
6. Effectiveness of programme support, humanitarian accountability, fundraising, and media and communications – all of which influence the quality and timelines of an emergency response

Methodology: Workshop: 25 to 35 full-time participants with representation at a managerial and technical level from CARE Haiti, CARE International Members, various functional units of the Lead Member (CARE USA), and the CARE Emergency Response Working Group

Contact: Jock Baker, baker@careinternational.org, and Sarah Ralston, sralston@care.org

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Background: The disaster response environment in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake represented a complex healthcare challenge. This study was designed to identify challenges during the Haiti disaster response.

Methods: Qualitative and quantitative study of injured patients carried out six months after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti to review the surgical inputs of foreign medical teams.

Results: Study findings revealed a need during the response for improved medical records and data gathering for regulation, quality assurance, coordination and resource allocation; wider adherence to standard patient referral mechanisms and protocols linking surgical service provision with appropriate hospital and community based rehabilitation services; a greater recognition of the impact of non-amputation injury, and the need for patients to have a greater say in their management and to be the keepers of their medical records. Key first steps to improving the international response are a minimum dataset and uniform reporting.

Conclusion: This study showed that challenges for emergency medical response during the Haiti Earthquake involved issues of accountability, professional ethics, standards-of-care, unmet needs, patient agency and expected outcomes for patients in such settings:

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This review draws on desk research, interviews in Haiti and written and telephone communication with informants. It is not an evaluation of the effectiveness of the shelter response following the earthquake of January 2010 although it reflects the opinions of some informants on this issue. The review?s primary aim is to identify lessons and provide recommendations for the IFRC and the Shelter Cluster on coordination in future emergencies.

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2007, and based on the value chain development
framework, the Emergency Market Mapping and
Analysis (EMMA) toolkit was designed to help
staff to understand, work with and support critical
markets in sudden onset emergencies. Oxfam GB
(OGB) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
have now used this assessment tool in a number
of emergency responses. This case study looks at
the EMMA that was undertaken in Haiti following
the 2010 earthquake, and the emergency responses
implemented as a result of this, by both the IRC and
OGB.

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This evaluation reviewed the work of the Action of Churches Together Alliance from the 2010 Haiti earthquake to November 2011. The external evaluation team found the Alliance response to be a model of an integrated and holistic response based on clear principles of human dignity and respect within the framework of a long-term engagement.

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The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck the south of Haiti on January 12th 2010 triggered the largest humanitarian response since the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Hundreds of international agencies launched emergency responses, and local organisations, the Haitian diaspora, the private sector and many thousands of individuals also poured energy, money and time into finding ways to help.
The earthquake was unfortunately not the only serious emergency to strike Haiti in 2010. The outbreak of cholera in the town of St Marc on October 18th 2010 brought a new, highly infectious and deadly disease to a country with weak sanitation and health systems, and no knowledge or understanding of this illness. The response of communication actors from the first hours was essential to the survival of potentially thousands of people, whose ability to recognise symptoms and take prompt action was literally the difference between life and death.
This paper attempts to capture some of the communication work implemented by a whole range of partners, and to identify what was delivered from the perspectives of those affected by these two major but very different emergencies. The purpose of this exercise is to inform the continuing response in Haiti and to provide practical case studies and analysis of best practice models that may be useful elsewhere.

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Objectives and scope: 

The evaluation aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the activities implemented by the SHO organisations5 in 2010 and to assess their results. The individual organisations are either part of an international network organisation (e.g. Oxfam Novib) or channel all or some of their contributions to an international organisation. This is for instance the case for UNICEF Nederland, which channels its entire financial contribution to UNICEF Headquarters in New York. The Netherlands Red Cross has channelled some of its contribution through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and part through self-implementation. This implies that these two SHO organisations have been contributing to very large programmes implemented by these international organisations and their partners in the field. Other SHO organisations provide direct support either through self-implementation or in collaboration with national implementing counterparts. The evaluation has taken these different modalities into consideration.

The evaluation covers the programmes and projects implemented in the period 13 January - 31 December 2010. It includes all SHO organisations and their affiliates active in Haiti, and pays specific attention to those having the largest share of the expenditure in 2010. The evaluation covers all sectors receiving support.

The first year of SHO support to Haiti was mainly characterised by emergency relief.7 This is also reflected in the mix of activities implemented by the SHO organisations and their partners. The boundary between emergency relief and early recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation is not always clear. Where appropriate and feasible, the latter are already supported in the emergency phase. Consequently, the evaluation has also covered activities related to recovery and rehabilitation, such as education and health programmes (e.g. rebuilding or refurbishing schools or clinics and hospitals), livelihood programmes (e.g. food-for-work and cash-for-work programmes or the provision of small loans to families and small enterprises), and the establishment of sustainable housing (e.g. the provision of transitional or semi-permanent shelter). Finally, though the evaluation mainly focused on activities taking place in the hardest hit urban areas it also included a number of interventions located in rural or peri-urban areas to which earthquake victims had fled.

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Objectives: The primary objective of this evaluation is to assess the impact of beneficiary
communications activities, campaigns and messages in Haiti, whilst gaining a better
understanding of peoples’ information needs and the most effective channels to
use. The evaluation also aims to identify ways for the Red Cross to increase two-way
communication to increase accountability and engagement with beneficiaries.

This evaluation focuses on the beneficiary communications activities of the Haitian
Red Cross (HRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Socities (IFRC), looking specifically at activities through the eyes of the beneficiaries
to gage perceptions and impact of the Red Cross.

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This is a review of the deployment of a mass sanitation module by the British Red Cross to Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. The module is intended to provide sanitation facilities for up to 20,000 people; a self-contained team of trained delegates and pre-packed sets of standardised equipment can be deployed to work with host national society counterparts to mobilise volunteers from the community, providing rapid training for delivery of both hardware and software components of the module. The module is intended to provide safe disposal of excreta, solid waste, waste water, and medical waste; vector control; facilities for hand washing, bathing, and laundry; household water treatment; promotion of good hygiene practices; and advice on the management of dead bodies.

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Oxfam has been working in Haiti since 1978, with
both permanent programmes and humanitarian aid. In
response to the 2010 earthquake, Oxfam International
decided to focus on water and sanitation, shelter,
food security, livelihoods and the provision of Non-
Food items (NFIs) in the metropolitan area and some
affected areas outside Port au Prince. The voucher
programme was part of the second phase of the
response, with preparations beginning in late June
2010 and implementation taking place in September -
October.
The objective of the programme was to improve
health conditions in the area of Carrefour Feuilles
by facilitating access to hygiene kits for vulnerable
families. Beneficiaries were selected from an existing
canteen project which was providing daily hot meals
to displaced families. In order to deal with the massive
challenge and security risks of ‘classical’ in-kind
distributions in an urban context, Oxfam decided to
pilot a voucher programme for beneficiaries to access
hygiene items through local shops.

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This document was a result of interviews with the following 17 organizations in Haiti (UNDP, WFP, Oxfam, Save the Children, ALL Hands, Fosac, Mercy Corps, Christian Aid, Catholic Relief Services, American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Lutheran World Foundation, Fonkoze, Unibank, Voila, Digicel, and ACTED) in Feb 2011.These interviews were conducted over a two week period in Feb 2011 and constituted the first part of the fact-finding mission for the UNDP Lessons Learned in Cash Programming in Haiti. The second mission, which is by far the larger mission will spend 2 months in Haiti on the next phase of the fact finding, focusing on filling in gaps, and undertaking an understanding of the impact of cash programming, evaluation work and gaps in policy. This mission is expected to take place in Haiti in May and June 2011. The Final Report will be published later in 2011.

This study mainly looks for the root causes of those challenges which are faced by the humanitarian agencies during emergency response in Haiti and Chile. And try to focus those in detail with the support of secondary data. This paper took Haiti and Chile earthquake as a case study and tries to bring out the lessons which can be applicable for Dhaka or Chittagong for disaster management. And bring out the limitation of the legal framework and disaster management plan in urban areas by GOB with workable solutions.

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This report takes stock of the main achievements in responding to the immediate needs of children and those who care for them – but also highlights the serious gaps and challenges that still exist to ensuring the large numbers of survival and protection of children affected by the earthquake.

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Based principally on three cases studies (Pakistan, Haiti, and the Horn of Africa), the objective of this comparative study is to draw on lessons learnt for better coordination of cash transfer programmes (CTP) in future emergencies and to help build the CaLP’s advocacy strategy on cash coordination at global level. This study has been commissioned by the CaLP and conducted by Groupe URD.

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Ordre du jour :

1. Présentation du Programme Coupons Fruits Frais (Fresh Food Vouchers, en anglais) par Julie MAYANS, Coordonnatrice de sécurité alimentaire à l’ACF.
2. Présentation par Emmet Murphy de l’ACDI/VOCA de l’approche « EMMA » d’Analyse et de Cartographie des Marchés en situation d’Urgence (Emergency Market Mapping Analysis, en anglais).
3. Autres questions d’intérêt.

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The purpose of this document is to share findings and recommendations from the RTE conducted in June 2010, as well as Catholic Relief Services (CRS) - Haiti program's discussion in August 2010 on how to move those recommendations forward. Annexes include additional extractions from the RTE report, including a timeline of the first months of the response, findings from CRS' Tsunami response based out of Aceh, and staff perspectives that were gathered during the consultant's findings workshop held in June.

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In 2010 DARA completed a total of 14 field missions to Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, the occupied Palestinian territories, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. These countries provided a representative sample of the diverse global crises faced in 2010 by the humanitarian community, including sudden-onset disasters, internal and regional conflicts, protracted crises and complex and forgotten emergencies. The reports from these crises highlight strong donor performance and areas which can inform the international community of where and how overall response can be improved. Recurrent in this years report are the themes of politicisation of aid and the need for greater protection of civilians. In 10 out of the 14 crisis analyzed this year, government and military interests have often taken priority over humanitarian needs such as protection, especially for women and children.

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Urban vulnerability and displacement: a review of current issues (pages S1–S22)

Sara Pantuliano, Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Eleanor Davey

Displacement in urban areas: new challenges, new partnerships (pages S23–S42)

Jeff Crisp, Tim Morris and Hilde Refstie

Protecting people in cities: the disturbing case of Haiti (pages S43–S63)

Elizabeth Ferris and Sara Ferro-Ribeiro

Shelter strategies, humanitarian praxis and critical urban theory in post-crisis reconstruction (pages S64–S86)

Lilianne Fan

Moving from the ‘why’ to the ‘how’: reflections on humanitarian response in urban settings (pages S87–S104)

Elena Lucchi

Aid in a city at war: the case of Mogadishu, Somalia (pages S105–S125)

François Grünewald

Jockeying for position in the humanitarian field: Iraqi refugees and faith-based organisations in Damascus (pages S126–S148)

Tahir Zaman

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Objectives: To explore and evaluate user understanding of the EMMA toolkit; to look at how practitioners perceive its strengths and weaknesses in order to gauge where EMMA sits within practice.

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Objectives: El principal objetivo de la evaluación es establecer recomendaciones y sacar conclusiones en torno a la gestión en su totalidad de la respuesta de emergencia ante el evento del terremoto del 12 de Enero de 2010 (comunicación, captación de fondos, el diseño de la intervención, su ejecución, el alcance de los objetivos y la medición de resultados.). Además se quiere valorar el vínculo entre la ayuda de emergencia la rehabilitación y desarrollo (LRRD por sus siglas en inglés) y su incorporación y aplicación en los procesos de rehabilitación iniciados tras la primera respuesta de emergencia. En referencia al LRRD se manejarán tres ejes partiendo de los imperativos humanitarios y las perspectivas de desarrollo que son: como se conjugan las iniciativas de la población afectada y de las instituciones públicas con las iniciativas de Solidaridad Internacional.

En relación a las razones estratégicas para la evaluación, se pretende mejorar la calidad de la intervención, incorporar los aprendizajes a la toma de decisiones, generar capacidades y, a través de la rendición de cuentas al equipo de Solidaridad Internacional, fomentar la cultura de la evaluación así como profundizar en la coherencia de la intervención en relación al contexto regional y la experiencia de intervención de Solidaridad Internacional en el área en este sector de intervención.

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Le présent rapport publie les résultats du programme d’Evaluation de l’Assistance Humanitaire en Haïti suite au séisme du 12 janvier 2010, dirigé conjointement par la Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy de l’Université de Tulane et par l’Université d’Etat d’Haïti. Le projet a bénéficié du soutien financier de la Fondation Bill & Melinda Gates.

Nous avons élaboré et mis en place un processus de recherche dynamique, qui a permis à notre équipe d’analystes d’examiner les thèmes de la résilience et de l’aide humanitaire sous l’impulsion de nos partenaires haïtiens, et dans le contexte d’un débat animé par des groupes de travail qui réunissaient des participants locaux issus des communautés affectées. Guidée par ces discussions, notre équipe d’analystes a pu développer un schéma de résilience qui conjugue 7 critères de résilience (niveau de ressources, endettement et crédit, comportements d’adaptation, capital humain, réseaux communautaires, protection/sécurité, ainsi que santé psycho-sociale).Nous avons eu recours à des données primaires recueillies au moyen de plusieurs enquêtes nationales auprès des ménages ainsi que d’observateurs essentiels parmi les communautés. Notre objectif était de mesurer les corrélations entre le séisme, la résilience préalable des Haïtiens, l’accès à l’aide humanitaire, et la résilience finale. Les critères de résilience ont été évalués au niveau des ménages mais aussi des individus.

Notre évaluation a démontré que l’aide humanitaire mise en oeuvre par les Haïtiens et la communauté internationale n’a pas eu d’effet bénéfique notable au regard des 7 critères de résilience : voire qu’elle a pu dans certains cas aller de pair avec des dynamiques négatives. De plus, notre analyse souligne l’impératif d’agir de concert avec les communautés affectées dès le départ, afin que les stratégies, les choix politiques, et leur mise en oeuvre sur le terrain reflètent une compréhension judicieuse des mécanismes de résilience et d’adaptation locaux. Ceux-ci doivent être intégrés au coeur de chaque étape de la planification humanitaire, dès l’irruption de la déstabilisation et jusqu’au terme du processus de relèvement.

Nous espérons que le schéma de mesure de la résilience que nous avons défini et utilisé dans le cadre de la présente étude pourra stimuler la poursuite des débats concernant la résilience haïtienne, voire qu’il permettra d’affiner les stratégies d’évaluation continue dans le cadre de la reconstruction d’Haïti. Cependant, cela ne pourra passer que par l’augmentation des ressources consacrées au développement des capacités du pays dans ce domaine, afin qu’Haïti soit en mesure de développer plus avant des méthodes et mesures d’évaluation (en particulier concernant le suivi des flux de ressources tout au long des chaînes de distribution, jusqu’aux destinataires parmi les organisations et populations haïtiennes). Seule une dynamique de ce type permettra de mieux comprendre les conditions de la résilience, et de produire les informations nécessaires au développement d’une planification guidée par les données du terrain. De fait, un des obstacles principaux rencontrés par notre équipe d’évaluation réside dans le fait que les flux de ressources restent trop opaques pour permettre une information et une analyse complètes – tandis que de nombreuses organisations humanitaires hésitent à promouvoir une meilleure transparence. Le renforcement des capacités dans ce domaine permettrait aux protagonistes haïtiens des secteurs public et privé de suivre, analyser, et surtout cibler et gérer plus efficacement les efforts humanitaires et de reconstruction, afin d’améliorer la résilience du pays.

Pour conclure, il est important de souligner que les observations de l’Evaluation de l’Assistance Humanitaire en Haïti reflètent les points de vue et les perceptions des Haïtiens eux-mêmes. Les recommandations que nous proposons dans les pages qui suivent ont pour objectif de suggérer au peuple et au gouvernement haïtien des pistes qui leur permettent de tisser des partenariats plus efficaces avec la communauté internationale, afin de travailler de concert vers des lendemains plus heureux – car plus résilients.

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General Objective

Meet the immediate needs of the population affected by the earthquake and support building reconstruction

Specific Objectives

1. To ensure access to safe drinking water and provide sanitation for 75,000 affected people.
2. To meet the immediate needs for food and nonfood products of the affected populations.
3. To promote and support breastfeeding amongst children under 12 months. 
4. To provide psycho-social support for people in distress and to enhance their coping mechanisms.

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Contact: Cathie Hurst, Manager, Caribbean Section, AusAID, Catherine.Hurst@ausaid.gov.au

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Purpose: This evaluation will examine OCHA’s response policies, structures and processes and their overall effectiveness in execution of OCHA’s core coordination functions. It is expected that the evaluation will contribute to organizational thinking about emergency response in OCHA and derive lessons for improving future humanitarian response operations. The conclusions and recommendations shall be discussed by the SMT. A management response matrix shall be prepared within three months of the finalization of the report.

Objectives: 1. Examine whether meaningful results were achieved and whether OCHA successfully identified and performed its core coordination functions; 2. Examine the timeliness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of OCHA’s response to Haiti earthquake and produce lessons for improving future OCHA operations; 3. Review performance of all processes and structures employed during OCHA Haiti response; 4. Examine the extent to which the operation represents an appropriate response from OCHA in view of its mandate and priorities as laid out in the Strategic Framework; 5. Assess adequacy and utilization of existing OCHA policies and procedures in guiding the emergency response.

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Objectives: The main objective of the Evaluation is to provide insight in the effects of the support provided by the SHO partners to Haiti during 2010 aiming to provide lessons for them and the SHO as a whole and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation also serves an accountability purpose by reporting how the funds provided by the Ministry and the general public in the Netherlands have been put to use and to what effect. In order to serve its accountability function for the Haitian stakeholders the final report will also be provided in French language.

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Objectives: 

a. To assess the extent to which the programme met its objectives as set out in the Phase 1 and Phase 2.1 proposals with particular emphasis on the appropriateness, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention.

b. To learn lessons from the experience in order to improve HelpAge’s future emergency interventions and humanitarian assistance for older people more generally.
 

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Objectives:

• To assess the delivery of rehabilitation services for people with disabilities in emergency contexts
• To assess how disability was mainstreamed through partnerships (by whom, with whom and how?)
• To formulate recommendations to CBM and its partner organisations in terms of provision of adequate disability inclusive response to disasters

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Haiti will feature as one of the key case studies in the evaluation of SDC's worldwide humanitarian operations.
Dates: Field visit to Haiti and Dominican Republic 22nd Aug - 5th Sept.
Contact: Claude de Ville de Goyet, Particip GmbH, claudedevilledegoyet@gmail.com
 

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The executive summary and Merlin's management response to an Evaluation of our response to both the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and 2010-11 Cholera outbreak. This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the DECs evaluation policy.

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General Objective

To prevent mortality among the earthquake affected population.

Specific Objectives and Activities

To provide psychological and/or nutritional support to young children, as well as pregnant and lactating women and people in distress.

Results:

Breastfeeding and adequate feeding practices for children less than one year old are promoted and supported.

Activities: 

• Coordination with partners and advocacy for breastfeeding promotion, as well as adequate use of infant formula with respect to the “International Code on the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes”
• Installation of “baby friendly tents” providing support to breastfeeding mothers and infants feeding (using RUIF for infants who cannot be breastfed), and psychological support for children and caretakers.
• Sensitization about breastfeeding and psychosocial issues in the “baby friendly tents”, and at gathering points of earthquake affected people (sensitization of key persons, diffusion of radio messages)

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ACF-IN promotes and uses Evaluation as a tool to enhance operational performance as well as a way to increase ACF-IN accountability towards beneficiaries, partners and donors.
The evaluation conducted must always comply with donor requirements and / or ACF evaluation policies.

Objective of the Evaluation
To evaluate the ACF’s emergency response to the cholera outbreak. The evaluation will be on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the response including:

• Programs designs and implementation
• Human resources mobilisation (expatriate and national) and adjustment of the HR organization of the mission to the emergency
• Funding mobilisation (including the way the co funding of the project has been designed)
   

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The Haiti Emergency Relief and Response Fund (ERRF) was activated in 2008 (with start-up funding by Sweden) with the goal of enabling the international community to better support local authorities by providing rapid and flexible funding to meet unforeseen needs in the event of natural disasters. It received approximately $85.2 million from more than 40 donors beginning August 2008. The evaluation found that against a background of overwhelming constraints, the main strengths of the Haiti ERRF include flexibility, proximity, approachability, alignment inside the cluster architecture (fostering coordination), visibility for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and ability to leverage $163 million in additional funds (indicating that approved projects were worth more than three times their weight). The evaluation found ERRF weaknesses to be bound more by the design of the mechanism than its manifestation in Haiti. They include internal contradictions such as the simultaneous emphasis on lifesaving and recovery/development and a design for field-based efforts outside the CAP, but subject to 50 per cent redirection by exceptional decisions made at a higher level. Other weaknesses are weak support to government and national NGOs and inadequate monitoring and communication.

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The purpose of this external evaluation is to assess the performance and whenever possible the outcome and impact of the activities carried out by IOM, with a main focus on funding received from Sida, in order to identify lessons learnt and good practices for IOM’s implementation of projects and management. The evaluation was planned to take place during the implementation in order to provide IOM Haiti programme managers with useful inputs that could be used as suggestions before the end of the project itself and for the implementation of other projects.

The evaluation specific objectives are:

• To assess the projects through evaluation criteria (relevance of the intervention to the humanitarian situation, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. A particular attention will be paid to the coverage, coherence, connectedness, coordination among other subjects) with a particular focus on the results (Results-Based Evaluation) and in particular to identify the lessons learnt and related recommendations based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of results in terms of the changes occurred in the lives of beneficiaries and the degree to which the level of previous living condition have improved.
• To identify best practices that could be applied on a wider scale in the activities implementation, taking into account the particular profile and vulnerability of the target beneficiaries.

The evaluation should also serve as accountability purposes towards the donor, in particular towards the Sida-IOM agreement’, and partners and providing transparent information between programmes and IOM units allowing improvement in the planning and management of current and future projects.

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About Build Change:

? US 501(c)3 international non-profit social enterprise with
programs in Indonesia, China and Haiti
? Founded in 2004 by Elizabeth Hausler, bricklayer and Ph.D.
earthquake engineer from University of California, Berkeley
? Goals: Design earthquake resistant houses; train builders,
homeowners, government officials and engineers to build them;
change construction practice permanently
? Mission: Greatly reduce deaths, injuries, economic losses from
housing collapses due to earthquakes in developing countries
? Impacts: 73,000 people living in houses improved by Build
Change, over 12,000 people trained; no damage to minimum
standard houses in 2009 earthquake; governments adopting Build
Change model

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This report intends to share with the general public, the people of Haiti, and our supporters a detailed breakdown of how the funds donated to MSF for the earthquake emergency relief effort have been used to meet the needs of the Haitian people in the year since the earthquake hit. It attempts to outline the choices made by MSF in deploying its operations, the challenges we faced, the lessons we learned, and our plans and perspectives for the
future.
The report is broken into three sections. The first covers MSF’s operations in Haiti from January 12, 2010 to October 31, 2010 in three phases: the emergency (January 12 through April 30); the post-emergency (May 1 through October 21); and the cholera emergency (October 22 through the present). The second section provides a breakdown of the financial resources spent by MSF in the first year of the emergency. The final section discusses
the current challenges and MSF’s future plans.

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Purpose: In addition to joint fundraising, the Humanitarian Coalition members made a commitment to working together to improve program delivery and accountability standards. A significant effort has been given to the development of joint programming standards, a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and comprehensive financial accountability protocols. As a part of this commitment the Humanitarian Coalition is organizing its first Real Time Review (RTR). Implementing a joint RTR in the first phase of a response requires a very flexible approach from the RTR team in order to fit in with the demands and challenges facing the members’ team/s, partners and the affected population.

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The agricultural cluster strategy in the aftermath of the earthquake is a living document, prepared, shared and discussed by the cluster member Organizations in order to guide in a participatory manner the work of the cluster.

The cluster’s primary aim is, in coordination with the Government, to support the food production and job creation of the people of Haiti after the 12th January earthquake that devastated Port au Prince, Jacmel, Leougane and the rural areas in the surroundings and between these cities.

With strong interconnections between the rural and urban areas, the earthquake’s destruction in important urban centres has rapidly transmitted in a radial manner to rural areas. The earthquake effects could be classified into two different broad categories:

• Direct effects through the destruction of houses, death of relatives, destruction of job places

• Indirect or spill over effects.

The normalization of the Haitians’ life, will largely depend to a large extend on the ability to restore destroyed livelihoods, food production and income opportunities.
 

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This quick guide for humanitarian policy makers and practitioners distils key findings and emerging lessons from a selection of available evaluations on the response to Haiti’s earthquake in January 2010 which killed 220,000 people. Much went well. Haitians themselves responded immediately with life-saving initiatives and moved to areas of relative safety and security where assistance was, or could be made, available. There was a phenomenal response from a wide range of actors in the international community. Many lives were saved and livelihoods restored. Not all, however, went well. Old mistakes were repeated and new ones made.

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An evaluation carried out as part of the committment to the DEC. The benchmakrs used were the DEC priorities for accountability, Oxfam's own standards and principles and international standards such as Sphere.

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Objectives:

The objectives of the DRLA/UEH Humanitarian Aid Evaluation are to:

• Evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of humanitarian interventions on human security and community resilience.
• Develop recommendations for improving human security and resilience outcomes in catastrophic disasters.
• Develop the capacity of Haitian academic institutions to execute and disseminate evaluations of humanitarian interventions and their effects on community resilience.
• Disseminate findings among the international humanitarian community.

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This report of the Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation of the 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th was undertaken by Tulane University’s Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy in partnership with the State University of Haiti (UEH) and funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

The research process was dynamic, allowing the evaluation team to explore the theme of resilience and humanitarian assistance led by and between Haitians in stakeholder workshops in impacted communities. Guided by these discussions, the evaluation team developed a resilience framework based upon 7 dimensions of resilience (wealth, debt and credit, coping behaviors, human capital, community networks, protection and security, and psychosocial) and used primary data collected through a national household and community key informant surveys, to measure the relationship between the earthquake, Haitian resilience, and exposure to humanitarian assistance and resilience outcomes. Resilience outcomes were measured at the household and individual levels.

This evaluation found that humanitarian assistance provided by the national and international community did not make a detectable contribution as defined by the 7 dimensions of resilience and in some instances, may have been associated with undesirable outcomes. Furthermore, this evaluation demonstrates the importance of engaging the impacted community from the on-set of the disaster to lead strategy, policy, and implementation based upon a thorough understanding of resilience and coping mechanisms that should be integrated into humanitarian programming starting at the beginning and continuing through the recovery process.

The framework for measuring resilience defined and used in this evaluation can serve as a catalyst for future discussions related to Haitian resilience and to support and refine the monitoring and evaluation strategy for Haiti’s recovery. However, more resources are needed to strengthen Haitian capacity to further develop evaluation methods and metrics (particularly metrics that track resources through the value chains to Haitian end user organizations and beneficiaries) that will allow for a deeper understanding of resilience and provide evidence to support data driven programming. A major constraint of the evaluation was the inability of the evaluation team to capture fully and analyze resource flows and a reluctance of many aid organizations to assist in this effort. Strengthening capacity in this regard will allow Haitian public and private institutions to more easily track, analyze, and ultimately target and manage humanitarian and recovery assistance to promote resilient outcomes.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the findings in the Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation reflect the views and perceptions of Haitians themselves and that the recommendations provided in this evaluation, serve to guide the people of Haiti, and their government, to more effectively partner with the international community to work towards a brighter and more resilient future.

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The second edition of the Observatory Newsletter includes a number of contributions. The first article explores the question of internal migration and institutional weaknesses which exacerbated the effects of the earthquake of January 12 2010. It develops the idea that the disaster was not only natural but was also caused by the absence of planning over several decades, both in rural and urban areas.

The second article deals with the issue of rural housing reconstruction in terms of the choice between an emergency response which does not take cultural specificities into account and a more personalised response which is better adapted to rural ways of life.

The third article briefly presents the micro-zoning studies which have been launched since the earthquake.mThese aim to map risks in terms of geological factors.The fourth article focuses on the lessons from cash transfer programmes implemented after the earthquake. The urban response led to the large-scale development of cash transfer programmes and new operational methods. The article refers to several reports published in recent months on this subject. Lastly, the fifth article refers to a collective study of the medical response in the first three months after the earthquake coordinated by the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO).

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• Executive summary

The International Housing Coalition’s (IHC) Haiti Shelter Sector Assessment (HSSA) reviews the progress and obstacles facing the recovery of the shelter sector after Haiti’s devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. The HSSA is based on the prevailing shelter conditions one year after the earthquake. The principal objective of the HSSA is to provide USAID with a broad perspective on support to the shelter recovery process. Recovery from such a devastating earthquake will take many years. Therefore, the Assessment takes a medium to long-term perspective on the process. The assessment identifies critical Haitian shelter sector issues, analyzes their current context and recommends appropriate actions to be taken or facilitated by USAID through its assistance program. The following Executive Summary of the HSSA provides a brief background on Haiti, USAID’s shelter program in Haiti, as well as the five priority recommendations the IHC believes are critical to moving shelter and livelihood reconstruction forward. The Executive Summary then presents the full set of recommendations of the IHC.

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Haiti exhibited a dramatic escalation in criminal violence with Haitians reporting declining confidence in police institutions during the last six months (August 2011 to February 2012). For the first time since 2007, the incidence of violent crime and victimization has shown a consistent increase, and confidence in public institutions appears to be dropping quickly. Random household surveys conducted on a monthly basis between August 2011 and February 2012 indicate that violent crime is increasingly common, particularly over the past few months in the densely packed ‘popular’ zones of Haiti’s largest urban centers.

This assessment is based on a longitudinal survey using random sampling methods. Specifically, households in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, St. Marc, Jacmel and Leogane were randomly selected and surveyed about their experiences with criminality and faith in public institutions. The survey sought to measure their exposure to insecurity and opinions regarding future safety. Collectively, these surveys demonstrate an increasing dissatisfaction with the government of Haiti after five years of growing confidence as well as fears that political uncertainty and turmoil will increase crime.

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• Terms of reference
• Management response

Objectives:
To assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Haiti (accountability);
to determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Haiti, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

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On 12 January 2010 at 4.50 pm local time (the middle of the night in Europe), the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault awoke. The earth began to shake, thick white dust rose above Port-au-Prince while a terrifying noise echoed out. Complete silence followed only to be broken by the screaming and crying of hundreds of thousands of Haitians.

When the news reached us at Groupe URD we were in the process of sending the six
country reports of the Cluster II evaluation. We had written the Haiti country report
for this evaluation in late 2009. In the end, we could not send it - no one was left on the
Haitian side to receive it. Since then, we have been constantly mobilized. On 13 January
we posted advice for actors and our assessment of the context on our site. Since then,
we have been to Haiti to conduct eight evaluation and organizational support processes
and several research projects. We have tried to share lessons at every opportunity via
numerous articles and participation in conferences.

A great deal is at stake: since 2003 and the Bam earthquake in Iran, no year has passed without a major disaster (tsunami, earthquake, flood, cyclone, etc.) erasing fragile advances in development and calling into question certain paradigms of humanitarian action. There are no two ways about it: we need to learn quicker, improve institutions, revise work methods and do all we can to avoid repeating the mistakes that have been made in Haiti. We owe as much to the dead and to the living.

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Objectives: The evaluation assesses the operational effectiveness and the main outcomes of the cluster approach, as well as its interactions with other pillars of humanitarian reform. It
offers recommendations for different stakeholders to better achieve the intended goals of the cluster approach. As the primary objective of the evaluation is to encourage learning, it aims to identify factors that hinder or support the cluster approach in achieving these goals.

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Objectives: L’évaluation analyse l’efficacité opérationnelle et les principaux résultats de l’approche Cluster aussi bien que ses interactions avec les autres piliers de la réforme humanitaire. Le rapport propose des recommandations aux différentes parties prenantes pour qu’elles atteignent mieux les objectifs escomptés de l’approche Cluster. Comme le
premier objectif de cette évaluation est d’encourager l’apprentissage, ce document vise à identifier les facteurs qui gênent ou soutiennent l’approche Cluster dans l’atteinte de ces objectifs.

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• Terms of reference
• Key findings

Ushahidi Haiti Project is interested in assessing the effectiveness of the mobilization of the Ushahidi technology platform following the recent earthquake in Haiti, in particular during the initial disaster response phase. The deployment was based out of and managed by students from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a graduate school of international affairs based at Tufts University. The evaluation will look at how widely the Ushahidi Haiti platform was used by different organisations, how effectively it was implemented, and how it was communicated to people on the ground. Furthermore, the evaluation will address the appropriateness of Ushahidi Haiti Project’s work; does this form of deployment addresses the real needs of the situation and add value to the response? The evaluation will take place in Boston and Haiti.
 

The time period being evaluated is January 12 through January 26, the immediate emergency response period. Evaluation Goal: To understand the effect that the Ushahidi Haiti deployment had in the humanitarian crisis response effort in Haiti from January 12 to January 26, 2010 in order to inform future actors that may consider utilizing the crisis mapping platform. Evaluation objectives: This evaluation will have three objectives: 1) effectiveness, 2) efficiency, and 3) relevance. These objectives are defined in the OECD DAC evaluation terminology.

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The aim of this review was to examine three broad areas of action primarily related to relief and recovery assistance to the Haitian Government and people: (1) internal U.S. Government
coordination; (2) partner coordination; and (3) response effectiveness. The timeframe of the report is from the date of the event, 12 January, through 30 June 2010. All data collected and analyzed correspond to this timeframe. The report draws on more than one hundred and fifty interviews and several hundred documents to identify lessons learned in the first six months of the response. Many of these lessons are shortcomings and need changes in the system, but many are successes. If the report focuses on the shortcomings, it is to learn from mistakes and make the management of catastrophes a little easier in the future than it was this time around.

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The INSARAG Haiti Earthquake After Action Review Meeting was held in Geneva,
Switzerland on 02-03 June 2010 with more than 110 participants from 36 countries and 12
organizations. The meeting was hosted by the Government of Switzerland and co-organized
by OCHA’s Field Coordination Support Section, in its capacity as the INSARAG Secretariat.
The meeting was chaired by Ambassador Toni Frisch, Chairman of INSARAG. Keynote
presentations were given by Ms. Marie Alta Jean-Baptiste, Director of Civil Protection,
Government of Haiti, Mr. Rudolf Müller, Chief, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA Geneva,
Mr. Rene Carrillo, USAID-ODFA Regional Advisor on behalf of the Chairman of the
INSARAG Americas Regional Group, and Mr. Jesper Lund, Officer-in-Charge of the Field
Coordination Support Section of OCHA Geneva. The list of participants (Annex G) and the
agenda of the meeting are attached (Annex F).

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As the humanitarian coordination body of the United Nations, the
mandate of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is to
ensure efficient and coordinated response to emergencies. This mandate
requires coordination amongst all the humanitarian actors, especially at
the very first phase of an emergency. As one of OCHA’s primary partners
in the critical life-saving phase of emergency response, the International
Search and Rescue Advisory Group was once again at the forefront of the
international rescue and relief operations following the devastating earthquake
which struck Haiti on 12 January 2010. OCHA - as the provider
of the INSARAG Secretariat and custodian of many of the international
community’s first response tools, such as the Global Disaster Alert and
Coordination System (GDACS), the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination
Centre and the United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination
(UNDAC) team - worked around the clock to facilitate information sharing
amongst all responders. OCHA immediately deployed a team of UNDAC
members – many travelling to the disaster site with international urban
search and rescue (USAR) teams - to support operational coordination of
USAR teams on the ground throughout the rescue phase and to jumpstart
OCHA’s humanitarian coordination activities of the international humanitarian
response.
The INSARAG network grew out of lessons learned from earthquake
response. The 1988 Armenia Earthquake was the trigger for its creation.
International urban search and rescue teams rushed to assist the country
in its rescue efforts, but there was no communication, no system of
coordination. Teams worked wherever they found a need, rather than
be directed to where there were priority requirements for the kinds of
technical expertise and equipment they possessed. Recognising that this
was not an effective way to respond, INSARAG was created in 1991, to
set up a system of operational coordination, to foster minimum standards,
to work to common methodology and guidelines. The work of
INSARAG and its methodology was endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 57/150 of 2002 on “Strengthening the Effectiveness
and Coordination of International Urban Search and Rescue Assistance”.
First on the ground, USAR teams work hand-in-hand with local response
teams, bringing additional expertise and technology to assist where
needed, where local resources may be lacking. In addition to search and
rescue support, INSARAG USAR teams provide medical support and are
often providers of the first assessments, the first information to come
out of a disaster site, the first indication of needs and priorities.
This information is shared with the international community, through
the Virtual OSOCC and on the ground, to assist planning and targeting
of international humanitarian relief efforts.
When the rescue phase draws to a close, INSARAG teams move to
recovery activities, helping extract bodies for burial – so important to
families and loved ones – rubble removal, structural evaluations, always in
support of local teams, always in coordination with other response efforts.
INSARAG has always collectively evaluated its response, recognising the
importance of sharing experience to bring improvements to the INSARAG
Guidelines and methodology. Thus, the Haiti Earthquake After-Action
Review Meeting took place in Switzerland on 02-03 June 2010, hosted by
the Swiss Government. This publication is an example of how INSARAG
methodology is taken forward as a living process, summarizing the many
recommendations to come out of the USAR community’s experiences in
Haiti with the aim of enhancing the quality of collapsed structure disaster
response.

• Terms of reference

The IA RTE will be multi-phased and provide snapshots of current situations, including real-time feedback and learning to the UN Country Team (UNCT) and to the IASC locally. The main objective of the IA RTE is to assess the response at multiple phases to inform management decision making in the field, and enable both field and headquarters staff to undertake corrective actions in real time as the response evolves. Actions taken during the first weeks and months after a disaster have a major impact on the recovery process that follows. Accordingly, the first IA RTE team will be deployed during the initial phase. A subsequent mission will allow for reflection on uptake of lessons learned and further reflect upon the direction of the response. The results of the IA RTE in Haiti are envisaged to support the ongoing operational planning of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which will be the most immediate user of the IA RTE process and its recommendations. In the transition to recovery phase of the IA RTE, primary users include those involved in the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) and recovery framework (RF) development processes, senior management and support functions within agencies involved in the response, donors, and others.

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The Inter-Agency Standing Committee held a real-time evaluation (RTE) of the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake that included three phases, the first of which was implemented between April and May 2010. The three-week country mission included workshops with key stakeholders, in-depth data analysis, and debriefings in Port-au-Prince. The process of gathering information and recording local people’s perceptions was carried out as rigorously as possible on the basis of a typology of different sites and zones via semi-structured face-to-face interviews and focus groups. The fieldwork was followed by a series of debriefings and additional data collection exercises in New York, Geneva, and London.

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This report summarises the second phase of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the response to the Earthquake, twenty months after the disaster event. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th 2010 had a drastic effect on the country’s human and institutional public and the private sector capacity. An estimated 230,000 people lost their lives; 300,000 more were injured and over 1 million were left homeless. The devastating humanitarian situation was compounded by Haiti’s underlying vulnerabilities and high level of chronic poverty. In response, the international community mounted a massive humanitarian relief effort and fifty-five donors pledged a total of $4.59 billion in grants for 2010 and 2011 towards the rebuilding of the country.

Given the scale of the disaster and subsequent hum anitarian response, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) launched a multiphase exercise to inform decision makers at national and headquarters levels, to draw lessons and allow corrections to be made where necessary. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is intended to be the most immediate user of the feedback and recommendations of the evaluation.

The first phase of the Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation, completed in May 2010, covered the initial response. The second phase was initially foreseen to take place in October 20103 and focus in a forward-looking manner on inter-agency coordination problems or operational challenges during the transition phase. The process was postponed, due to the October 2010 cholera outbreak and the delays in starting the transition phase.

This second phase sought to:

• Analyze and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordination between different actors involved;
• Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with longer-term and/or governmentestablished mechanisms; and
• Analyse the extent to which the findings and recommendations from the first phase of the Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation have informed the evolving humanitarian response in Haiti.

The evaluation found that the key achievements of the response have been: mainstreaming of disaster preparedness; an effective response in camps, with populations largely free of cholera; recent progress on the rate of rubble removal; implementation of integrated neighbourhood-based approaches; and progress in improving water and sanitation in the longer term. The main shortcomings include: durable solutions; livelihoods; accommodation; communication; and provision of continued support to address remaining needs. The evaluation has also identified many areas where data collection, needs analysis, consultation and communication, inter-agency action, and action with government need to be strengthened so that gains made are not lost as agencies phase out. The response in Haiti has been more expensive than in other recent emergencies (e.g., Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and has far exceeded initial estimates, with projects reported as exceeding projected costs by 2.5 to 3 times. Transition is on the agenda but needs a vision, a strategy, a plan, and leadership. There is a need for defining and understanding new roles and clarifying responsibilities in the move towards transition and development. Note that the data one cover page of the report is incorrectly given as January 2011 rather than January 2012, although the final file data is March 2012.

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Summary and links for Crisis Mapping Haiti

• Terms of reference

Objective of the Evaluation

The objective of the evaluation is to draw “lessons-learned” and recommendations regarding the relevance of the “double-sided” approach used in the urban context that is Port-au- Prince, after the January 12th earthquake.

This approach consists of:

• First, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) for families with children from 6 to 59 months and/or lactating and pregnant women
• Secondly, Fresh Food Vouchers distributions to the general population where eligible BSF families are located.

The evaluation will contribute to the technical and methodological capitalisation for this type of intervention. The evaluation should as well look at program definition and implementation and propose specific and concrete recommendations, both as a response to the emergency and to the longer term needs facing the affected population.

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Objectives: The purpose of this joint evaluation is to provide to participating organizations a measure of the effect of their post earthquake’s emergency intervention in Haiti within the first 7 months and to draw clear recommendations for longer term programming for the coming 5 years.

Specific Objectives
a) To provide an assessment of the relevance and timeliness of the humanitarian response to the earthquake so far using the DAC criteria of:

• Relevance /appropriateness
• Connectedness
• Coherence
• Coverage

b) To draw out key lessons to inform agencies recovery plans, with consideration given to implementation according to benchmarks and targets in each agency’s accountability framework

• Commitment to agreed humanitarian principles, standards and behaviours in addition to performance in each organization core sectors and in cross-cutting issues (protection, gender equality, local context, participation of primary stakeholders).
• How far have agencies built on local capacity?
• Accountability to beneficiaries: to what extent the affected population has been involved in all stages

c) To determine to what extent agencies are building on lessons learnt from similar humanitarian responses, specifically previous earthquake responses.

d) To determine to what extent synergies, cooperation and integration have occurred.

e) What are the negative impacts of the early response, especially for the longer term (such as increased concentration of power, authority and economic resources or focusing on sites instead of communities). Is the “do no harm” approach applied?

f) Advocacy: to what extent the organizations used their network to promote key priorities of the affected population at the highest level.

g) To highlight any unmet needs or unnecessary overlap that should be addressed further during the response.

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Objectives: 

Focus: 

Criteria: 

Comments: 

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Ce rapport a pour objectif d'analyser quelques spécificités du contexte urbain de Port-au-Prince ainsi que certains des grands enjeux de la reconstruction qui s'amorce en Haïti, presque deux ans après le tremblement de terre du 12 janvier 2010.

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Ce rapport a pour objectif d’analyser quelques spécificités du contexte urbain de Port-au-Prince ainsi que certains des grands enjeux de la reconstruction qui s’amorce en Haïti, presque deux ans après le tremblement de terre du 12 janvier 2010, afin de permettre à Solidarités International de mieux définir les cadres de son action en contexte urbain.

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This handbook documents Catholic Relief Service’s experience in planning
and implementing its urban transitional shelter response in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
The following pages highlight challenges, successes and key aspects that could
be useful in future responses to urban disasters. This publication is a result of
site visits, studies of internal and external documentation and interviews with
beneficiaries and community members during the 2010–2012 post-earthquake
period. CRS is currently planning for permanent reconstruction programs in
Haiti and is scheduled to pilot such a program in May 2012.

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La société haïtienne se trouve actuellement dans la phase critique de sa crise
chronique de développement. Elle est fortement prise dans une trappe de sous-développement.
N’était-ce la contribution financière des émigrants haïtiens et des organisations non
gouvernementales, elle se serait déjà effondrée. Cette situation découle en grande partie du
décalage démo-économique qui s’est creusé au fil du temps. Quant à ce décalage, il est lié, dans un premier temps, à l’enclenchement tardif de la transition démographique, et, dans un second temps, à la stagnation de celle-ci. Ces deux phénomènes s’expliquent eux-mêmes par des facteurs institutionnels à la fois civils (structuration familiale et mode de production) et
politiques (absence de politiques publiques d’éducation et de population). Cet article, suivant
une approche institutionnelle prenant en compte les processus sociaux parallèles, vise à
procéder à l’intelligibilité des interactions dysfonctionnelles entre les institutions de base de la
société haïtienne, et ce afin de déterminer leur impact sur le processus de transition
démographique et par surcroit sur la dynamique de sous-développement de ce pays.

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Objectives: Une brève analyse de l'évolution du contexte doit permettre d'informer SwS sur les facteurs potentiellement les plus influents sur le déroulement des projets.
Une analyse transversale des projets fait le suivi et l’appréciation des processus de gestion mis en place dans ces projets pour atteindre leurs résultats. Elle permet de faire ressortir les forces et faiblesses des différentes approches, les difficultés communes et les solutions à reproduire afin de créer des synergies et favoriser l'apprentissage découlant de la mise en commun des expériences.
Une analyse par projet permet de cibler les forces et faiblesses d'un projet et d'assurer un meilleur suivi de la mise en oeuvre afin d'émettre des recommandations précises.

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This report captures three important observations:

1. Traditional humanitarian organizations were often open to the new technologies, but remain nervous about the implications of information and powersharing through crowdsourcing and other new media platforms.

2. Joint humanitarian communities demonstrated that there were many beneficial ways to use digital media in the crisis setting, particularly texting functions.

3. Although much of the attention has been paid to new media technologies, radio was the most effective tool for serving the needs of the public. The first media priority in Haiti was to restore radio service (as it was in the tsunami and other recent crises).

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The objectives of this evaluation of urban case studies are to:

a. review, the tools, practices capacities and methodologies employed by
humanitarian agencies in responding to humanitarian crises and emergencies;

b. develop a robust evidence base to support the strategy formulated for
meeting humanitarian challenges;

c. enhance IASC’s understanding of challenges and gaps encountered in
the humanitarian response.

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Purpose: To evaluate Concern’s response programme in the first six months following the January 12th earthquake with particular emphasis on appropriateness, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions carried out.

Objectives focus on: 1. The process; 2. The quality, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the response; 3. The level of connectedness and coherence of the response.; 4. Relevance of Concern’s systems to cope with a major sudden onset emergency –HR, Finance, Procurement and Logistics systems.; 5. The extent to which ‘lessons’ or recommendations from previous emergencies were incorporated into this response; 6. Identify lessons to be learned to inform the future emergency responses of Concern.

Methodology: Participatory process: 1. Review of relevant secondary data – e.g. proposals, donor reports, and case studies; 2. Meet and/or interview key staff in Concern’s head office and US office; 3. Use of appropriate tools and interview/focus groups discussions. 4. Visit the areas where the emergency responses were implemented, using appropriate tools to interview programme participants and other key stakeholders, including partners and project staff - the views of non- beneficiaries should also be included; 5. Debriefing and / or presentation to key staff on key findings and recommendations; 6. Produce and solicit feedback on the draft report from relevant Concern staff in Dublin and Haiti; 7. Production of the final report from the analysis.

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• Terms of reference

The MSF response to Cholera in Haiti was of extraordinary scope and happened under extremely difficult circumstances: Cholera re-appeared for the first time after 100 years and spread rapidly given the poor humanitarian situation in the country. While all MSF sections were involved in the response, this evaluation covers the intervention of the Operational Centre Geneva (OCG) between October 2010 and February 2011. The intervention is judged very successful: Innovative approaches were applied for the management of Cholera in pregnant women, for decentralised care in remote rural areas and for the treatment of excreta in treatment facilities. Social mobilisation was the key for rapid intervention and scale up. MSF had an important technical lead role in the nation-wide Cholera response. One of the main recommendations is on the need for MSF to move beyond its mainly curative response to more effectively prevent the spread of an epidemic.

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Objectives: 

Focus: 

Criteria: 

Comments: 

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Based on research conducted in Port-au-Prince in late 2010 and early 2011—and
interviews with 128 women and girls living in 15 displacements camps in 7 of the 12
earthquake-affected communes—this report looks at women’s and girls’ access to
reproductive and maternal care in post-earthquake Haiti. It examines the impact that food
insecurity has on reproductive and maternal health; the reliance on transactional sex that
some women and girls have developed in order to survive; and their vulnerability to, and
the consequences of, gender-based violence (GBV). It also considers Haiti’s human rights
obligations, and the need for mutual accountability between the government and donor
states and non-state actors in the country.
The report finds, 18 months after the earthquake, the voices of women affected by the
earthquake have been excluded from the reconstruction process—even though women are
integral to the country’s economy. Moreover, initial optimism felt by international aid agencies and donors that access to maternal health would improve in areas affected by
the disaster has not been realized for all women and girls. This is despite an outpouring of
international support and of new, free services run by international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that promised to remove the geographic and economic barriers that
had historically prevented women and girls from accessing health care.
For the women and girls interviewed by Human Rights Watch in the camps, their enjoyment
human rights, such as the rights to life and health, remains poor (not withstanding
benefits accruing from the presence of free care and experts on the ground), and most of
them lack basic information that would allow them to access available services. Indeed, as
is widely recognized, Human Rights Watch found evidence of three types of delay that
contribute to pregnancy-related mortality: delay in deciding to seek appropriate medical
care; delay in reaching an obstetric facility; and delay in receiving adequate care when
reaching a facility. For the women and girls we interviewed, these delays occurred because
women and girls did not recognize signs of early labor or were unfamiliar with a new
neighborhood; because the places where they previously received care had been
destroyed in the earthquake; because of distance, security concerns, or transportation
costs; and because of inadequate care at facilities.

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Objectives: The main purpose of this review is for the MFA to learn from and further develop the humanitarian assistance based on the concrete and operational experiences with the support to Haiti. The aim of the review is two-fold:
1. To document the first phase response of MFA to the earthquake disaster in Haiti.
2. To assess the response in light of previous Norwegian experiences with response to
large natural disasters as documented in reviews and evaluations.

Around 20% of older people living in temporary camps in Haiti are going hungry, according to a survey conducted by HelpAge International.

One year on from the earthquake, data shows that out of over 11,000 older people we interviewed, 2,330 eat only one meal or less a day.

Food aid distributions to camps for internally displaced people stopped in April 2010, at the request of the Haitian government.

Months later, reasonably priced food is extremely difficult to find. This situation looks set to get worse as global food prices hit record highs last week.

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The global urban population is now larger than the rural population. While rural areas in general remain worse off than urban areas, the number of people in urban poverty is growing fast, and urban dwellers are vulnerable to significant disasters. Development and humanitarian agencies are therefore increasingly exploring how they can work better in urban areas, where they have traditionally had comparatively little experience.

This report sets out findings from three assessments of Oxfam’s urban emergency food security and livelihoods programmes in Nairobi (Kenya), Port-au-Prince (Haiti) and Gaza. The purpose of the assessments was to explore the following areas:
• Appropriateness
• Timeliness
• Targeting
• Impact
• Accountability
• Partners’ experience

The three programmes differed substantially and responded to very different types of vulnerability:
• The Nairobi Urban Social Protection Programme (NUSPP), which included cash transfers, cash for work, skills training and business grants, and advocacy to the government for scale-up. The assessment is based on primary fieldwork.
• Oxfam’s Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods (EFSL) response to the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, which included cash for work, food and cash grants, training and in kind transfers. This assessment is based on Levron 2011.
• The Gaza Food Security and Livelihoods Programme (GFSL), which included cash for work, a voucher programme, training and support to income generation. This assessment is based on Levron 2011.

The methodology for each study was based on a review of documents and semi-structured interviews and group discussions with programme officers, other stakeholders, and participants in the programmes.

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Disaster struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 in the form of a 7.0 earthquake which left some 223,000 people dead, 300,000 injured, and 2 million homeless. This 60-second earthquake, occurring in Léogâne, near the capital city, Port-au-Prince, had a particularly devastating impact on the Haitian government, with nearly 30 percent of its civil servants killed, all but one government ministry building destroyed, and basic infrastructure wiped out.1 The United Nations (UN) experienced its greatest loss of life on a single day ever, when 102 staff members died (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) 2011). By any standards, it was a mega-disaster.
The international community mobilized rapidly and massively to assist Haiti. UN and other international agencies deployed staff quickly, thousands of NGOs rushed to the scene, donor governments and military forces sent personnel and some $3 billion was pledged in relief and recovery efforts. Indeed almost two-thirds of all international funds mobilized for natural disaster response in 2010 went to Haiti (Ferris & Petz 2011). Clusters, the international mechanism for coordinating humanitarian response, were set up, international staff arrived by the hundreds in Port-au-Prince, programs were established and aid poured in.
It was a monumental effort and there have been many efforts to evaluate the international humanitarian response to the Haitian earthquake. Indeed, as of February 2011 ALNAP counted 45 evaluations of response to the earthquake (ALNAP 2011). In summarizing the results of these evaluations, ALNAP identified several commonly-identified shortcomings:
• a ceaseless flow of often-inexperienced small NGOs and in-kind donations;
• a limited understanding of the context, particularly the urban setting;
• by-passing of local authorities and civil society groups;
• insufficient communication with affected populations;
• lack of attention to how assistance could better support coping strategies; and
• weak humanitarian leadership structures, including a weak relationship with military.

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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems of the Haiti earthquake response operation, focusing on both relief and early recovery concerns.

Contact: Josse Gillijns, josse.gillijns@ifrc.org
 

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• Terms of reference

This evaluation of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO)’s operations and strategy in Haiti is in keeping with Articles 7 and 18 of Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid and Article 27 of the Financial Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002.

DG ECHO has been running programmes in Haiti for more than fifteen years. These programmes have concerned issues related to disaster preparedness (DIPECHO programmes), the response to natural disasters and the humanitarian consequences of political and economic turmoil (different types of emergency decisions). On the basis of an analysis of the humanitarian situation carried out in 2007, an ad hoc decision was made in 2008 which allowed programmes in the sector of Maternal and Child Health to be funded, complementing the funding of projects in connection with decisions made on the Food Aid budget line. In 2009, to respond to the high levels of malnutrition following the hurricanes of 2008, DG ECHO opened an office in Port-au-Prince and established a Global Plan. In the hours following the earthquake of 12 January 2010, DG ECHO rapidly mobilized funds both through the European Civil Protection mechanism and by making funds available to its partners via primary emergency, emergency and ad hoc funding decisions. These efforts continued in response to the cholera crisis from October 2010. At the end of 2010 and during the first weeks of 2011, DG ECHO clarified its objectives for 2011 as well as its coordination strategy with other European instruments and the Member States.

The evaluation covered all these arrangements and actions at both strategic and operational levels in order to help DG ECHO and its partners to be as accountable as possible and draw as many lessons as possible from this series of operations.

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In keeping with EU regulations and in view of the substantial amount of funding which has been mobilised for Haiti since 2008, an operational and strategic evaluation was carried out from November 2010 to April 2011. This evaluation included a field visit from 28 January to 28 February, which was carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of four experts and covered the work of the DIPECHO programme, the Global Plan and the response to both the earthquake of 12
January and the cholera crisis. It was part of a broader prospective process between
January and May 2011 which produced a note on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), an in-depth literature review and a series of visual presentations in video format.

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Tearfund conducted an RTE for their phase 2 response in Haiti (the first 6 months). The prime purpose of the evaluation was to learn from the second phase of the response, which started in mid-February following the one-month emergency response phase, and to identify lessons both for the remainder of Phase 2 (until July 30 2010) and for Phase 3, which is envisaged as the recovery and reconstruction.

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Objectives: 

To review, in as factual and neutral a way as possible, the national and international actors and bodies involved in the response to the crisis.

2. To evaluate the level of coherence between needs and the emergency relief provided.
The evaluation included critical analysis of the relevance of the emergency relief delivered by civilian and military actors in relation to the needs of the affected population and the specific constraints of this operational context. The conclusions of this analysis will guide future decisions with regard to preparation and planning of French actors’ response to crises at the national level and in relation to multilateral issues.

3. To speak to beneficiaries and to try to understand how they perceive the response, how
they judge the quality of the aid provided and the aid agencies, and how they perceive the future.

4. To analyse the response in terms of defence and security and identify lessons learned and know-how needed via the activities of the MINUSTAH, the US military deployment and  overlapping external military interventions.

The evaluation focuses on the following points:

- the constraints involved in the response;
- the initial situation and needs assessment;
- the sequence of events involved in the response to the earthquake;
- the impact of international relief on security.

These highlight improvements which need to be made to the inter-ministerial mechanism which is currently being put in place and recommendations are made for way of improving the way the response to crises is planned by the state.

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Oxfam’s portfolio of urban disaster risk reduction projects in the Caribbean region are at the forefront of current practice. They offer an opportunity to review outputs, practice and lessons learned for Oxfam and the wider DRR community. This report aims to take that opportunity. Specifically it presents a review of DRR work in four urban contexts:

• Inner-city settlements in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic (Intermón Oxfam
projects 2007-currrent) with The European Commission
• Peri-urban settlements around Georgetown, Guyana (Oxfam projects 2006-2009) with The
European Commission
• The municipality of Cap-Haitien, Haiti (Oxfam projects between 2003 and 2009) with The
European Commission
• Metropolitan region of Port au Prince, Haiti (Oxfam projects from 2006-current) with
Government of Haiti/World Bank.

This summary provides an overview of key findings. The structure presents comments on the methodology used in the review, outcomes, interaction with local government and populations at risk, gender equity, challenges and opportunities for disaster risk reduction specific to urban contexts and an assessment of the sustainability of project outcomes. Finally lessons learned relevant to urban disaster risk reduction more generally are put forward

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Following the earthquake of January 2010 which hit the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince and neighbouring cities, humanitarian organisations chose to implement Cash Transfer Programmes (CTPs), Cash-For-Work (CFW) programmes, and direct cash transfer programmes and coupon distributions as the markets in Port-au-Prince had the potential to meet the needs of those affected by the disaster. Humanitarian coordination was rapidly put in place through the cluster approach. Certain NGOs, including members of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), organised an ad hoc coordination mechanism for CTPs.
This study, which was commissioned by the CaLP, aims to review and document the coordination of cash transfer programmes implemented from the emergency phase in Haiti. It is part of a wider review of CTP coordination in emergency situations which includes 3 case studies (Pakistan, Haiti and the Horn of Africa). The earthquake in Haiti is an example of a large-scale natural disaster in an urban environment where there is little knowledge about CTPs in the country prior to the crisis.

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This report documents the impact of Haiti’s 2010 earthquake on farmers, and highlights chronic problems in the agricultural sector that could impede recovery. This document reports on a comprehensive seed system security assessment (SSSA) in Haiti, undertaken in May-June 2010. The work, the first ever SSSA in Haiti or the wide region, assessed the impact of the January 2010 earthquake on households and agricultural livelihoods, examining possible changes in assets, land holdings, labour availability, income generation activities, crop profiles and seed use. The work analysed acute seed security issues, particularly farmers’ strategies for obtaining seeds, and the impacts of past emergency seed aid. More chronic seed security problems were also analysed, including the effectiveness of markets (which provide 80% of seed in Haiti), the transformation of agricultural products, and access to modern varieties.

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Summary
1. The objectives of this evaluation of urban case studies are to:
a. review, the tools, practices capacities and methodologies employed by humanitarian
agencies in responding to humanitarian crises and emergencies;
b. develop a robust evidence base to support the strategy formulated for meeting
humanitarian challenges;
c. enhance IASC’s understanding of challenges and gaps encountered in the humanitarian
response.
2. Following recommendations of the IASC Task Force on MHCUA, Nairobi, Eldoret and Manila
and Port au Prince were adopted as representative case studies. They reflect recent and different
types of sudden onset emergencies and disasters (urban violence, severe flooding and hurricanes,
earthquakes) impacting densely populated urban areas. They also illustrate different national and
local government and NGO capacities and partnerships. All the cities experience on-going chronic
conditions because of rapid urbanization, high population densities, deepening poverty and, in the
Kenyan cities, the in-migration of refugees and IDPs.
3. Field visits were conducted in Nairobi, Eldoret and Manila where interviews were held with
stakeholders from the UN system, international humanitarian NGOs donors, national and local
authorities, local civil society representatives and the affected populations. Reviews of existing
reports including evaluations, lessons learned and related documentation were also undertaken. A
desk review was conducted for Haiti.
4. Four institutional and organizational themes and six sectoral issues are highlighted and for each
topic the review: outlines key challenges and gaps experienced by humanitarian agencies;
highlights practices, approaches and tools; provides transferable recommendations to IASC
partners for improving delivery of humanitarian response and preparedness.

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The Sendai tsunami, floods in Bangkok, earthquake
in Christchurch: three different disasters of 2011
– all in densely populated areas. With the rate of
massive growth now taking place in cities and urban
centers around the world, the likelihood of another
natural disaster hitting the urban poor is only rising.

Report includes a case study of Haiti.

Now that we are in the transition phase, it seems essential to identify and share lessons and good practices from the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake, and notably concerning cash transfer programmes which were central to the urban response. These lessons should be applied both to the new national programmes which are being implemented in Haiti, particularly the initiatives for the most vulnerable people and social protection programmes, and also to the contingency and response plans which are being developed to deal with the risk of new disasters.

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On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7 earthquake
struck Haiti about 10 miles southwest of the capital
Port-au-Prince. It killed approximately 230,000
people, injured 300,000 more and destroyed
great swaths of the city and surrounding areas.
In the aftermath, nearly 600,000 people left
Port-au-Prince to live with friends and relatives in
unaffected rural areas. An estimated 250,000 of
these displaced Haitians have since returned to the
capital because they were unable to secure work in
rural areas.1
Haiti is one of the most disaster-prone countries
in the world. It suffers a major catastrophe every
three years. It is one of the world’s most vulnerable
islands to hurricanes, flash flooding, and landslides.
Haiti was still recovering from the 2008 hurricane
season—one of the worst in Caribbean history
(four hurricanes in 30 days)—when the earthquake
struck. The earthquake was the worst disaster in
the Caribbean in 200 years. In just 30 seconds,
Haiti lost 20 percent of its civil servants. The
scale and magnitude of the disaster crippled the
ability of the already weak Haitian government to
meet the basic needs of its people. While Haiti
was still reeling from the earthquake, an outbreak
of cholera in October 2010 quickly spread from
rural areas to towns and cities.2 Recovery and
reconstruction were further undermined by
political and civil unrest following highly contested
presidential and parliamentary elections held on
November 28, 2010. As a result, a year after the
earthquake, nearly 1.3 million people in Portau-
Prince are still displaced and remain living in
crowded spontaneous settlements and tent cities.
Unemployment remains high, buildings are in ruins,
most rubble has yet to be removed and children are
unable to attend school.
Prior to the earthquake, Port-au-Prince was home
to approximately 3 million people, even though the
city was designed to accommodate only 200,000.
The combination of a dearth of jobs in rural areas
and lack of investment in the agricultural sector had
pushed people to migrate into the city, leading to
overcrowded living conditions in Port-au-Prince.
Social and economic inequities also predated
the quake. Before the earthquake, Haiti’s
unemployment rates were as high as 80 percent;
nearly 54 percent of the population lived on less
than $1 per day.3 Required school fees prevented
many children from attending school; only an
estimated 55 percent of children went to school
before the earthquake.4
The earthquake exacerbated all of these problems.
People marginalized by Haitian society, including
children, women, the elderly, and persons with
disabilities, found themselves acutely vulnerable.
Today, far too many Haitians, especially women
and children, are engaged in a daily struggle for
access to basic necessities such as clean water,
economic opportunities, education and protection
from violence.
At the time of the earthquake, the International
Rescue Committee (IRC) did not have programs
in Haiti although the IRC had worked with Haitian
asylum-seekers in the United States. Within hours
of the earthquake, the IRC sent its emergency
response team—including doctors, water and sanitation experts, coordinators and logisticians—to
Haiti to assess the critical needs of survivors and
mount an effective response. In the days and weeks
that followed, the IRC established emergency
operations in Haiti and moved to address the urgent
need for clean water, sanitation and health care, as
well the special needs of women and girls.
Today, the IRC is continuing its work with the
displaced and poor of Port-au-Prince and
surrounding communities. The IRC is preparing to
open a second office in Petit Goave—southwest of
Port-au-Prince—to focus on tracing and reuniting
people who are still separated from their families a
year after the earthquake
The IRC strives to ensure that the most vulnerable
earthquake victims—including the elderly,
persons with disabilities, women and separated or
unaccompanied children—have access to services
and that their views and needs shape the rebuilding
process. Much of this work is done with local
groups and organizations. Moreover, the majority of
IRC staff members in Haiti are Haitian.
This report lists some of the outstanding problems
affecting Haiti and describes how the IRC is
responding. Personal testimonies from IRC field
staff and the people they serve illustrate the
immense challenges they face.

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Haiti is routinely characterised as an archetypical fragile state. In spite of considerable donor
investment in security promotion, real and perceived safety have proven frustratingly elusive.
In the years before the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, the country’s capital, Portau-
Prince, was also the site of considerable experimentation to promote security and stability.
This paper reviews the discourse, practice and outcomes associated with three parallel stabilisation
initiatives undertaken in Haiti between 2007 and 2009. Although they shared many similar
objectives, the paper describes how these separate interventions mobilised very different approaches.
The specific focus is on United States, United Nations and combined Brazilian, Canadian and
Norwegian stabilisation efforts and their implications for humanitarian actors, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières. The paper concludes
with some reflections on the implications of stabilisation before and after the country’s most
recent natural disaster.

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On 12th of January 2010, an earthquake measuring 7 on
the Richter scale struck Haiti. Approximately 3.5 million
people lived in areas directly affected by the earthquake.
An estimated 220,000 people died during and immediately
after the earthquake and a further 1.5 million people were
displaced. The earthquake dramatically increased the levels
of unemployment, with productive assets lost or damaged
and infrastructure shattered. The earthquake resulted in a
significant increase in household food insecurity and loss of
livelihoods.
As a result of the earthquake, poverty levels were estimated
to have risen by 30-50% in Port au Prince (PaP) and by
80% in the commune of Carrefour. Across the city, people
struggled to afford to eat, as food became less affordable
and less accessible. Early assessments have indicated
that people resorted to a range of coping strategies, from
reducing the number of meals and borrowing money, to
selling assets and engaging in sex work.

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This Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis looked at the opportunities for earthquakeaffected
populations to gain employment in the construction sector. Prior to the earthquake,
construction had been identified as an area of potential job growth and a priority sector for the
government, however there was a mismatch between skills available in the labor market and
jobs available. Professional, skilled, and semi-skilled workers were all in demand, but this
demand was often filled by foreigners, in particular workers from the Dominican Republic. Now,
as a result of the destruction, labor opportunities in the construction sector are anticipated to
increase ten-fold.
Previously, formal training for the construction sector was provided through universities (of
which four are recognized as providing a high quality education), numerous technical schools,
and a few NGO training centers. However, about 40-50% of workers were trained through
apprenticeships and on the job training, for periods up to two years. Quality of education varied
widely across formal training options, with some estimates indicating that students were learning
only 60-70% of the skills needed. Professionalism and other non-technical competencies, such as
project management, were also regularly noted as being in high demand, but difficult to find.
With all four of the universities known for training engineers and many technical schools
destroyed in the earthquake the options for quickly training professional, skilled, and semi-skilled
workers are severely limited. A rough estimate indicates that 100,000 people will need to be
trained to ensure Haitians have access to new jobs in the construction sector. Universities,
training centers, and informal training mechanisms must be immediately supported to “build
back better” if Haitians are to benefit from the increased employment opportunities in their
country.
Access to heavy equipment, availability of construction credit at the household and business
level, and clarity on government policies will play a large role in how quickly the reconstruction
efforts can truly start and employment benefits be gained. Humanitarian efforts now are
focused on transitional shelters that can be built by three people in one day. However, this
shelter is only designed to last 3-4 years. The trauma of the earthquake has created a window of
opportunity to change building practices and preferences, as people have direct experience of
the importance of appropriate construction practices and good quality construction materials.
Yet the opportunity for change is small compared to the size of the task ahead. Initial damage
estimates indicate that it could take up to 10 years to rebuild to previous levels, before
considering future growth.
Another barrier to employment is the fact that most employment is found through personal
contacts. This means it can be difficult for individuals to get their first position and gain job
experience, lack of job experience then limits job opportunities. One recommendation is to
create a placement agency that can vet potential candidates and verify certifications for
companies and individual engineers wanting to putt together teams.
The recently passed minimum wage does not seem to be an issue for the construction sector, as
market rates for nearly all positions are well above the minimum wage.

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On January 12, 2010 a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit the island of Haiti, approximately 25 km (16
miles) west of Port au Prince. Haitian government estimated that up to 230,000 died country-wide in
the quake, and another 300,000 were injured. Additionally, emergency needs assessments have
confirmed that shelter is among the major needs and priorities for affected populations. 180,000 to
3000,000 households (900,000 to 1.5million persons) are estimated to have become IDPs as a result
of housing destruction. Further assessments is required to determine the number of homes actually
destroyed, but in the meantime, this study will use 180,000 – 300,000 as the number of families
without adequate housing in metropolitan Port au Prince.
Based on a small sample of households surveyed, we estimate that 80 to 90 % of these families lack
the ability to procure the necessary CGI for roofing due to the loss of assets, capital, and work
opportunities. As a consequence, 1.4 to 2.7 million CGI sheets will be needed to assist these
households in securing adequate transitional shelter.
As a consequence, the capacity of the CGI market chain to provide for this massively increased need is
a critical issue for the reconstruction process. This will focus on two questions regarding the CGI
market system: 1.) Does the local market system have the capacity to meet the demand for CGI in
greater Port au Prince?; and 2.) How do beneficiaries prefer to receive shelter assistance (in-kind
materials, unconditional grants, etc.)
The CGI market chain is built around 4 categories of major actors for whom the EQ has had very
heterogeneous impacts:
• The importers: they are broken into regular importers, wholesalers who also import when the
demand is great enough, and opportunistic importers who respond to ad hoc demand for major
construction projects.
• The Middle-Wholesalers: they are supplied by the importers – wholesalers and opportunistic
importers - partly on the basis of informal credit.
• The Retailers: Local hardware stores that are supplied by middle-wholesalers and rely largely on
informal credit and smaller share of formal credit.
• Consumers: they procure mainly from the retailers who operate as neighbourhood shops serving
the local area.

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• Terms of reference

The terms of reference required this report to undertake a context analysis (see
Appendix Three); provide a commentary on the effectiveness of Disasters
Emergency Committee (DEC) agencies’ response to the Haiti earthquake and how
this differed from rural responses; and to address five questions concerning: using
and building social and human capital; balancing short term and long term needs;
assumptions made; tools and instruments used; and addressing preparedness and
resilience.
Throughout the study the guiding question has been, ‘what can international non
governmental organisations (NGOs) learn from Haiti for the next urban disaster?’
To address this, the study team worked together for two weeks in Haiti in
December 2010, with a plan to undertake the following activities:
• visits to affected communities, including camps and focus group discussions
with earthquake affected communities
• meetings with all DEC member agencies, either through direct meetings in
members’ offices or, because of the security situation, through telephone
interviews
• meetings with key informants, from UN agencies, government ministries, non-
DEC international NGOs and from Haitian civil society.

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Large-scale urban WASH programming requires different approaches to those normally employed in Oxfam emergency response activities. This paper examines the lessons learned from the WASH response to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The paper also gives practical case studies of some of the success and failures from the WASH activities, undertaken in a very high-density urban/peri-urban context.

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Decisions being made right from the start through to the postdisaster
reconstruction and rehabilitation effort need to conform to
international standards and principles.

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This report emerges from Ian Davis’s visit to Haiti in November 2011, to examine progress
with reconstruction approximately twenty-two months after the earthquake. His visit only
lasted three weeks, but his reflections relate to almost 40 years of work, as an architect,
academic and consultant examining, researching and writing about post-disaster sheltering and
housing in about 30 different recovery situations. During his visit he was able to visit various
sites and interview a spectrum of informants that included NGO, UN and Government officials
as well as earthquake survivors, consultants, private sector representatives and academics. Ian
Davis’s findings are totally independent viewpoints since he was not employed by any agency
operating in Haiti.

This is a summary of a longer, fully illustrated report with relevant historical examples. This can
be downloaded from www.onuhabitat.org/haiti

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