

Disasters Emergency Committee

Disaster Risk Reduction

A review of DRR work by
DEC Member Agencies in
response to the
2004 Tsunami

Final Report

February 2010

Results Matter Consulting
All India Disaster Management Institute, and
Humanitarian Activities (UK)

RESULTS
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It is sincerely hoped that the lessons from this review will contribute to DEC members' future disaster response and work on disaster risk reduction.

Abhijit Bhattacharjee
On behalf of the review team

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Abbreviations

BOND	British Overseas NGO for Development
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Development
CSODR	Civil Society Organisation for Disaster Reduction
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness Programme of European Commission Humanitarian Office
DM	Disaster Management
DMC	Disaster Management Centre
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DS	Divisional secretariat
GPS	Global Positioning System
HAPI	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
NDMA	National Disaster Management Agency
NGO	Non Government Organisation
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
SHG	Self Help Group
SNEHA	Social Need Education and Human Awareness
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

Executive Summary

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) decided to mark the close of the Tsunami programme at the end of five years with a special report which examined whether its vision of a more long-lasting impact had been achieved in terms of the strengthening affected population's resilience to future environmental shocks and disasters in Tsunami-affected countries namely Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia. The purpose of this review was to inform future disaster responses by identifying lessons learnt.

This review focused on two key concepts: **disaster risk reduction (DRR)** and **building/strengthening community resilience**. The central question this review asked was: how had DEC members addressed these concepts and what had they achieved?

The review methodology was based on an adaptation of the international instrument known as Hyogo Framework for Action, and used some of the 'Characteristics' of a disaster-resilient community, developed by John Twigg for the DFID DRR Interagency Group¹. It focused on three countries – India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Overall Findings – Key Achievements of DEC members:

Reducing risks to future disasters has become a more prominent aspect of DEC members' recovery programming than it was, for example, after the Gujarat earthquake of 2001. The published policies and reports of DEC members reflect increasing recognition of DRR, mostly dating from 2005 onwards. Almost all DEC members have incorporated DRR activities in their longer-term recovery programmes and implementation.

This review indicates that DEC members have made a major contribution to rebuilding houses for the communities in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as well as in re-establishing livelihoods of the communities, including the most vulnerable. Considering the breadth of activities that contribute to DRR, DEC members have made important contributions to disaster risk reduction. Understanding of hazards and vulnerability is increasing among the local partners and some of the communities.

Rebuilding livelihoods is another area where there is general acknowledgement by the governments and communities of the role played by NGOs in general, and some of the DEC members in particular. Although the initial response by the humanitarian agencies in general led to a rush to supply boats and fishing equipments causing an over-supply of these in all Tsunami-hit areas, in the last two years or so, the approach adopted by many of the DEC members² has been more holistic. If the approach in the early relief phase was to provide and/or replace an asset or equipment or working capital for individuals without much

¹ Twigg, John. (2007). *Characteristics of a Disaster-resilient Community*, BOND DRR Group (p6).

² ActionAid, CARE, Help the Aged, Christian Aid (through its partner SWOAD in Ampara in Sri Lanka).

consideration of sustainability of such asset-replacements, now this has moved to linking all those engaged in a particular trade, particularly focusing on the most vulnerable communities, to deal with the value chain in the production and marketing processes. Some of the excellent examples included:

(i) the success elderly men and women's groups have had in India in changing the policies of financial institutions which traditionally did not consider elderly viable for providing loans (Help Age);

(ii) moving *dalit*³ women groups who were previously engaged in low-value fish-drying activities to higher-value crab cultivation and marketing, an activity supported by CARE in Tamil Nadu;

(iii) SNEHA's (ActionAid and Christian Aid partner) initiative in creating federations of women's self help groups (SHG) and setting up women-managed company. All of these are examples of lasting impact and made significant contribution to reducing vulnerability.

DEC members and their local partners have also been instrumental in ensuring a significant focus on addressing the needs of the most vulnerable communities like the elderly in all the three countries, women, and children and addressing social exclusion in highly hierarchical societies of Tamil Nadu (*Dalits* and *Irula* tribes, some of the communities in the lowest order of Indian caste hierarchy). The most striking change the review team came across was the case of the *Irula*⁴ tribe, where through the work of DEC members⁵ in particular, the community has been able to break through centuries-old oppression and exclusion in the past five years.

DEC members have worked with communities and local authorities in creating awareness about disaster preparedness, mitigation and early warning which are now widely understood in the Tsunami-hit areas of India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The community surveys revealed that in several communities, people are now being trained in various aspects of preparedness and response, and generally have a better understanding of mitigation and risk reduction. However, while in most cases specific aspects of community resilience have been addressed, there is no accepted standard for what should be achieved, or the means by which agencies can work together to achieve that standard. This is an area that may deserve attention in the forthcoming revision of Sphere Guidelines.

In specific terms, the following key achievements were noted during the review:

- At the community level, there has been significant progress towards putting in place grassroots institutions linked to the government at district level in all the countries, and great deal of emphasis is being put on DRR at community level by the

³ An Indian term for the 'oppressed' – refers to communities who are considered at the bottom rung of caste hierarchy.

⁴ The *Irula* community is an extremely marginalized one, living in the fringes of society being unable to fish in the open sea on account of their fear of the fishing community who consider the sea as their "property" not allowing access to anyone else. The *Irula* community, originally snake catchers are today largely dependent on agriculture wage labour and fishing in backwater- either through use of small crafts or through bare hands.

⁵ ActionAid partners and CARE

governments and NGOs. The DEC members have played a critical role in this process.

- There is greater awareness about disasters and communities have been trained in safer living insofar as these relate to their homes and immediate environment.
- The health and hygiene education which many DEC members played a significant role in have led to extensive change in sanitation practices with positive impact on public health issues, especially in areas with regular flooding.
- The country studies showed that while at the village/*panchayat* and sub-district level, DRR and disaster preparedness have received core attention, civil society including the DEC members need to play far greater role in advocating for DRR-related issues to figure prominently in the core agenda of the governments at meso- and macro (national in case of Sri Lanka, State/provincial level in India and Indonesia) levels. While progress has been made at the macro level on national policies and legislations, these still remain on paper.
- DEC members' livelihoods interventions in the latter stages of the Tsunami response have been highly effective when the livelihood activities were looked at in relation to the overall sector and with a deeper understanding of value chain, rather than when it took a traditional *income-generating approach* targeted at individual families without adequate attentions to value-chain analysis, as was done in the early phase of the Tsunami response.

Key Lessons:

1. Effective interventions on DRR have the potential to strengthen grassroots institutions at the local and district level as well as create strong interface between grassroots community organisations and local authorities, making local governance more inclusive and participatory.
2. While village level hazard maps and preparedness plans have been developed, unless these lead to practical action aimed at mitigation measures, people will lose interest in keeping these updated. Already in Sri Lanka, communities interviewed complained that they have identified local hazards which accentuate flooding, but there have been not enough resources made available by government or NGOs for taking corrective actions.
3. Interventions which are based on strong partnership and links with local organisations including private sector (banks/financial and insurance companies) were far more likely to succeed than one-off asset distributions.
4. Disaster preparedness has been mainly focused on preparedness for emergency response, and that too, with focus on Tsunami-like disasters. So far, with a few

exceptions, not enough attention and investment has gone into early warning, preventive and mitigation measures and recurring disasters like floods and droughts.

5. A great deal of training and capacity building activities are carried out by DEC members, but more systematic, collaborative, and public research and learning efforts are yet to emerge.

Strategic Issues for DEC and its members:

This review indicates that while DEC members are making serious efforts to take on board DRR approaches in their humanitarian programming, it presents a profound challenge to agencies' ways of thinking about vulnerability and disasters. DRR cuts across all sectors or themes and requires a long-term approach which often does not sit comfortably within agency structures and processes especially when focusing on delivery of timely emergency response. There is need for greater analysis and research to develop a practical understanding of how to integrate climate change in humanitarian programming.

Going into the future, the key challenge the DEC and its members need to recognise is that effective disaster risk reduction requires new ways of doing business. Conventional disaster response based on provision of relief assistance and competing for relief funds, separating organisation structure between emergencies and development may all still have their place in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. However if disaster risk reduction is to form a core agenda, collaborative work and joint actions at multiple levels, including working closely with governments will be essential. The DEC could set an example here by bringing together many of the biggest agencies and others could join in. The advantage for the members might be that they can leverage longer time-spans for disasters and better linkages into their ongoing development work. It need not be called a DEC process but maybe the DEC could be the forum to get it going. This is separate from general coordination of humanitarian response as is currently understood. This is about joint planning, strategic thinking and collaborative action.

Section One:

Introduction, Purpose, Scope and Methodology of the Review

1.1 Background to the Review:

Following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004, the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) raised an unprecedented amount of over £395.2 million for relief, recovery and reconstruction work by its thirteen member Agencies.

In June 2005 the DEC set out a Strategic Framework for the Tsunami Appeal⁶ which had its vision as follows: *“People affected by the Tsunami Earthquake, especially those most in need, will be helped to recover and to live in safer, more resilient communities that are better able to resist future disasters. Donors to the Appeal will know they have made a lasting difference”*.

The DEC Framework envisaged that the Appeal fund will *‘aim to put in place longer term permanent solutions and leave people above existing levels of poverty’* and specifically, *communities and families will have:*

- appropriate permanent housing
- support for children and other vulnerable groups
- enhanced economic opportunities
- early warning networks and preparedness training.

In delivering these, the Framework envisaged that the social infrastructure such as schools and clinics will be re-established, and local leadership and especially the bodies that represent the affected groups such as farmers’ and fisher folk associations will be supported and their capacity strengthened so that they can continue to manage their affairs over the long term and have their opinions heard by decision makers.

The Framework stated that the response will not only address the immediate needs of areas directly affected by the disaster but will also *‘reduce vulnerability to future disasters in zones bordering the Indian Ocean which are susceptible to natural disasters of this type.’*

1.2 Purpose, Scope and Objectives of the Review:

⁶ DEC (2005). *Strategic Framework, DEC Tsunami Earthquake Appeal*

The DEC decided to mark the close of the Tsunami programme at the end of five years with a special report which examined whether this vision of a more long-lasting impact had been achieved in terms of the impact of programmes on strengthening affected population's resilience to future environmental shocks⁷ and disasters. The purpose of this review was to inform future disaster responses by identifying lessons learnt.

The review covered member agencies' programmes in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, and concentrated on examining the impact on communities' and institutional capacity in relation to dealing with future disasters. Although house reconstruction was a major focus of work by many DEC agencies during the recovery and reconstruction phase of the Tsunami response, this review did not focus on housing as DEC has already conducted a study on this.

The review focussed on delivering the following objectives outlined in the terms of reference⁸:

- (i) Draw lessons - based on case studies and views and opinions of communities – for better preparedness, mitigation and disaster risk reduction in future.
- (ii) Examine the extent to which member agencies have strengthened communities and institutions to achieve the goal of 'building back better' in a sustainable way which further communities' resilience to future disasters.

1.3 The Review Framework and Methodology:

This review focused on two key concepts: **disaster risk reduction (DRR)** and **building/strengthening community resilience**. The central question this review asked was: what were the key elements of these two outcomes that the DEC members were leaving behind at the end of the five-year programme?

1.3.1 Defining the Concepts of DRR and Resilience

There is no universal definition of DRR but it is generally understood to mean the broad development and application of policies, strategies and practices to minimise vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout society (Twigg, 2007). Amongst the DEC members, there is no major difference in the definitions used by different members, although some remain more focused at community level while others have broadened out to a more 'systemic' approach. The aim of DRR is to build safer communities and increase resilience to a range of shocks, including natural hazards (such as floods, earthquakes and droughts), man-made hazards (such as fires and road accidents) and health epidemics⁹. DRR is an approach to programming that emphasises the importance of capacity building of at-risk communities through organisation and participation in disaster mitigation or prevention activities. In a DRR approach, at-risk communities (individuals, families, households) are actively engaged in the identification, analysis, reduction, monitoring and evaluation of disaster risks in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and enhance capacities' (BRCS).

⁷ DEC, 2009. Tsunami DRR Review Terms of Reference

⁸ Terms of Reference is attached as Annex 1 to this report

⁹ Source: British Red Cross Society, *Position paper – Disaster Preparedness and DRR*

¹⁰ Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief

DRR corresponds to Principle Eight of the Red Cross Code¹⁰ which requires that relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. The Red Cross Code has long been an accepted standard for DEC members and has previously been used in DEC evaluations (Gujarat 2001, Tsunami 2005 etc). Thus the focus on DRR in the current Review is not new but represents a specific focus within the broader scope of the Red Cross Code.

1.3.2 The Hyogo Framework for Action and its Components

As noted above, the Red Cross Code principle of reducing future vulnerability establishes a basic requirement that DRR should be integrated into disaster responses but does not set this out in any detail. The Sphere Standards provide little guidance on DRR. There is neither a Common Standard nor a Minimum Standard relating to DRR. The only overarching instrument that covers the range of issues that relate to DRR and community resilience is the international agreement which is known as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA¹¹). It was agreed with the DEC and members to use this as one of the reference points for this Review since the objectives of this international agreement reflect the concerns of DEC members in relation to DRR, which are:

- The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning;
- The development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards;
- The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programmes.

Under the HFA, activities in support of these objectives are divided into five thematic areas. The sub-categories under each theme have been adapted by John Twigg to better reflect UNISDR indicators¹² and make them more applicable to ‘resilient communities’¹³. Elements of this Table were used as reference point for this review:

Table 1: Hyogo Framework and Its Components

<i>Thematic area</i>	<i>Main components</i>
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¹¹ Discussed in more detail in Section 2.

¹² UNISDR. *A Framework to guide and monitor DRR*

¹³ Twigg, J (2006). *Hyogo and Other Indicator Frameworks: Convergence and Gaps*, Note to the DFID DRR Interagency Working Group

1. Governance	<input type="checkbox"/> Policy & planning <input type="checkbox"/> Legal & regulatory systems <input type="checkbox"/> Resources & capacities <input type="checkbox"/> Integration with development <input type="checkbox"/> Institutional mechanisms, capacities & structures <input type="checkbox"/> Political commitment <input type="checkbox"/> Accountability & participation
2. Risk assessment	<input type="checkbox"/> Hazards/risk data & analysis <input type="checkbox"/> Vulnerability & impact data/indicators <input type="checkbox"/> Early Warning systems <input type="checkbox"/> Scientific & technical innovation
3. Knowledge & education	<input type="checkbox"/> Information management & sharing <input type="checkbox"/> Education & training <input type="checkbox"/> Public awareness <input type="checkbox"/> Learning and research
4. Risk management & vulnerability reduction	<input type="checkbox"/> Environmental & natural resource management; climate change adaptation <input type="checkbox"/> Sustainable livelihoods <input type="checkbox"/> Social protection <input type="checkbox"/> Financial instruments <input type="checkbox"/> Structural & technical measures <input type="checkbox"/> Planning regimes
5. Disaster preparedness & response	<input type="checkbox"/> Organizational capacities & coordination <input type="checkbox"/> Preparedness & contingency planning <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency response mechanisms <input type="checkbox"/> Participation & voluntarism

Further expanding on the above components, John Twigg has also developed specific indicators or ‘characteristics of a disaster-resilient community’ (Twigg 2007). These are divided into two parts – those specifically relating to the community and those that relate to ‘an enabling environment’. These detailed indicators provided appropriate reference points in considering specific local activity and case studies for the review, but broadly the above Table was adequate for analysis.

1.3.3 Methodological approach

The overall methodology used for the review was based on a lessons-learning approach whereby data gathered was analysed with a view to generate lessons for DEC members in general, and draw conclusions in terms of the impact of members’ work on DRR and community resilience using elements of the HFA and John Twigg’s ‘Characteristics’ (Twigg, 2007). After an initial briefing and discussion with DEC staff and its members, the reviewers developed and presented an inception report which outlined the overall methodology, process and key questions in detail and this was used for further data gathering and analyses for the review which were carried out between early November and middle of December, 2009.

Flow Diagram outlining Key Steps in the Review:

As can be seen from the following diagram, the review process employed the following methods or steps to gather data:

- Key informant interviews in HQ
- Document review: DEC members' reports, policies, published papers related to DRR and Tsunami response
- Country visits – involving stakeholder interviews, and community surveys, apart from direct observations by the reviewers.




Figure 1: Flow diagram illustrating the Review process

Data Collection Process and Methods:

The review employed the following range of methods for gathering data and analysis:

- An initial briefing and scoping discussion with DEC and its members in London, and preliminary desk research;
- A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data provided by members and DEC;
- Country visits were made to the following locations which were selected in consultation with DEC and its members for high concentration of work of member agencies after the Tsunami, especially during the reconstruction and recovery phase:
 - India: Nagapattanam and Cuddalore districts
 - Sri Lanka: Ampara, and Batticaloa districts, with a short visit to Hambantota district
 - Indonesia: Banda Aceh and Bieurhen districts
- The country visits focused on intensive stakeholder interviews with DEC members' staff, partners, government officials, peer agencies and structured community surveys. Community surveys were conducted to elicit beneficiary/communities' feedback on their (including women, aged and other excluded) perspectives on the state of DRR and community resilience at village, district and state/national levels.

Community Survey and Stakeholder Interviews during country visits:

Of the thirteen DEC members, the following organisations participated in the primary data-gathering process conducted by the review team, and made their staff and partners available for interviews by the reviewers.

- India: ActionAid; CARE India and its partner, Sevalaya; Caritas India (partner of CAFOD); EFICOR and Discipleship Centre (partners of Tearfund); Helpage India (a partner of Help the Aged); SPEECH (a partner of Christian Aid).
- Sri Lanka: CARE; Help the Aged Sri Lanka; EHED Batticaloa (a partner of CAFOD); SWOAD (a partner of Christian Aid); World Concern (a partner of Tearfund); Islamic Relief and World Vision.
- Indonesia: Christian Aid; Help the Aged; Islamic Relief and World Vision.

A total of 68 stakeholders mainly comprising staff of DEC members and partners, government officials and local NGOs were interviewed in the three countries. A full list of key informants interviewed is given in Annex 2.

	Country staff (India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia)	HQ
<i>DEC member staff</i>	21	10

<i>DEC partner staff</i>	15	-
<i>Government officials</i>	11	-
<i>Others (UN, other NGOs)</i>	11	

The community surveys and discussion groups were held in 28 locations in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia in November and December 2009. The surveys gathered perspectives (including those of women, children and the elderly) on the state of DRR and community resilience at the village level. The questions that made up the community survey were taken from indicators put forth in John Twigg's *Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community*. The list of indicators was reduced to the most relevant 31 questions due to the availability of time for the Community Survey.

Community Survey Sample		
Country	Sample	Of which, % female
India	123	70=57%
Sri Lanka	121	73=60%
Indonesia	113	55=49%
Total	357	198=55%

The individual community surveys were backed up with field-level discussion groups and key stakeholder interviews. Structured field discussion groups with community members and leaders were held in twenty locations.

Field-level Structured Discussion Groups		
Country	Sample	Of which, % female
India	254	130=51%
Sri Lanka	310	214=69%
Indonesia	210	122=58%
Total	774	466=60%

To enhance uniformity in data collection across countries and assessment teams, tools were developed for community surveys and field discussions. A discussion guideline was created for the assessment teams to record responses during field discussion groups. The tools were derived from the *Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community* and organised around the (adapted) five priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action. The field-level tools were translated into local languages by national consultants in each country.

The community survey and stakeholder survey tools are annexed as Annex 3 with this report, with detailed explanation of sampling methods and administration of the survey instruments. The quantitative data gathered through the community surveys were statistically analysed by using standard SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science). The detailed findings of the survey are presented in Annex 5, and some of the key findings have been integrated in this report in sections 3-7.

1.3.4 Key Evaluation Questions

The broad questions the review addressed were as follows. These questions were adapted from the 'Characteristics of a disaster resilient community' and incorporated the key questions asked in the ToR for this review.

Governance

1. What contributions have members made to national/provincial level policy and planning on disaster preparedness, mitigation and DRR?
2. What institutions and systems relating to DRR have been created and/or strengthened at national/provincial/local levels?
3. How far have communities been able to assert their influence and rights in relation to national/provincial processes of DRR?
4. Have all groups within the community been represented in the above processes, especially women and children?

Risk Assessment, Disaster Preparedness and Response

1. Has the response contributed to better assessment of risks and hazards at community/local levels, and what role has been played by members and their partners in furthering this?
2. Are there now adequate early warning systems in place?
3. Has there been technical innovation in risk analysis?
4. What methods have been developed to engage communities in preparedness?
5. What capacities have been developed in the community? Do communities now have disaster preparedness plans? Have communities planned for disaster response? Has disaster preparedness included psychosocial issues?

Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction

6. How have members enabled communities to manage risk and reduce vulnerability?
7. What was done to ensure that the response reached all relevant groups and institutions? Were the most vulnerable communities identified and catered for?
8. How were vulnerability in relation to women addressed?
9. How are members taking on board the issues of climate change in their programming?

Knowledge and Education

1. What has been done to manage information and create public awareness of disasters, disaster mitigation and safer living?
2. To what extent has members' response contributed to learning and research about DRR?

Institutional Issues among the Members

3. Has DRR received adequate priority within Members' actions?
4. How did members incorporate responsibility for DRR into their structures?
5. Have members coordinated their support on DRR in the Tsunami areas?

1.4 Triangulation:

The team used the different data sources and various meetings throughout the process of the evaluation to triangulate information – checking and corroborating findings to ensure they were consistent. In particular:

- i) The country visit findings were all validated by key stakeholders of DEC member agencies in respective countries through an exit debriefing at the end of each country visit where the main findings were presented to the country team.
- ii) A 'Key Messages' Report summarising the preliminary findings and lessons from the country visits and community surveys was presented to DEC executives before the review team began drafting the main report. Although this report was not extensively commented by member agencies, it helped in acknowledging the limitations of the review.

1.5 Constraints:

The review process was hindered by several constraints, some of which were recognised during the design phase at the time of developing the inception report. However, subsequently during the field work for the review, the process faced more constraints which limited the availability of data and case stories that the review could draw upon. In specific terms, the following constraints affected the study:

1.5.1 Constraints identified at the design phase

(a) As this review was being undertaken at the end of five years of the Tsunami response, a few agencies which played crucial role at various stages of the Tsunami response had no direct links with partners or communities at the time of the review that could be leveraged to facilitate the review team visits in India and Aceh in particular. The review therefore relied on secondary information provided by these agencies to draw any evidence or data pertaining to the central purpose of this review.

(b) As this review took a lessons learning approach, it is neither an exhaustive study of all the work agencies have done post-tsunami, nor did it attempt to examine members' work randomly. The review team relied on members to guide it in selection of case studies and examples of good practices in DRR and community resilience. The review team acknowledges this limitation, although it does not think that this in any way undermined the central purpose of this review which was to draw lessons and examine the impact in terms of strengthening communities' capacity for disaster response and mitigation.

(c) Further, as the community survey method was designed for assessing communities' perceptions of the overall achievements in relation to risk reduction and resilience, attributing findings and outcomes to individual agencies was not always possible with this approach. Many organisations intervened in the areas covered by the field mission and community members surveyed were not able to distinguish DEC agencies from others, although whenever there were verifiable references to individual members, the review team was able to attribute some of the outcomes to either individual members or to collective DEC response.

(d) This review, being a multi-agency exercise involving thirteen different organisations, gravitated towards drawing general conclusions which apply to DEC members as a collective. It is quite possible that different agencies are at different levels of development of their institutional capacity and knowledge on disaster risk reduction and related issues

emerging from HFA. Some of the lessons that came out of this review may have already been taken on board by some agencies, while there may be others who are just beginning to integrate learning from Tsunami in their programme.

1.5.2 Constraints during the field work stage

(e) Several member agencies which did have ongoing programmes and/or partners in some or all of the three countries visited, did not participate during the field work. Although requests were made to these agencies, their staff and/or partners were not available to meet the reviewers in any of the three countries. For these agencies, the reviewers have solely relied on the reports and documents made available to the team. It needs to be noted that given that nearly half of the DEC members did not participate in the primary data-gathering process, the richness of primary data and case stories studied by the review team was limited.

(f) Finally, in a sound analysis, findings would depend on differences of outcomes in a treatment group—those who received DEC support—from a control group, an identical group who received no DEC support. However, in this case, no valid control group could be found for the community survey. Communities in the affected areas differ in numerous demographic, economic and recovery dimensions and weren't able to clearly identify the agencies which provided them support. This was further compounded by the fact that several agencies (and /or their partners) did not take part at any stage of the field work in any of the three countries meant that the reviewers had no way of being guided on whether or not a particular community could be taken as a control group.

1.6 The Report Format:

The report is set out in nine sections, with the next section (2) providing a background to the evolution of the concept of DRR in humanitarian programming, as well as an overview of DRR in the DEC members' policies and priorities. Section 3 presents an overview of key achievements of DEC members in reducing disaster risks and *building-back-better*. The sections 4-7 present detailed findings on various aspects of DRR using the questions set out in section 1.3.4. Section 8 draws out from the preceding sections and the documents researched by the reviewers institutional issues which DEC members are confronted with as they try to direct organisational energies into DRR. Finally in section 9, the review outlines – based on lessons from this review – opportunities and challenges for DEC as a collective of like-minded organisations in taking on board risk reduction and climate change issues in their programming.

Section Two:


Evolution of the Concept of DRR and its Integration in Humanitarian Programming

This section presents a brief overview of evolving concept of DRR and its inter-linkages with poverty and vulnerability, and how the DEC members are taking these issues on board in their own policies and humanitarian programming.

2.1 Poverty, Vulnerability and DRR:

Hazards such as floods, earthquakes and even the massive Tsunami of 2004 are inevitable events but their impact on poor people and poorer countries is generally much greater than on richer people and countries. The vulnerability of poor people is greatly increased by unsafe conditions and underlying problems that make response and recovery difficult. Poor people may experience even ordinary hazards as disasters because of the effect and incidence of poverty. The rationale for DRR is neatly expressed in the widely used 'Disaster Crunch Model' shown below:

Disaster crunch model



(Source: Tearfund (2007) *Disaster Management Team Good Practice Guidelines –Disaster Risk Reduction*)

This understanding of linkage between poverty, vulnerability and disasters has led to a view that aid should not only focus on disaster response but should also address the whole pattern of poverty that increases disaster risk. The Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) approach has been steadily moving up the agenda of aid agencies. The important point is that DRR is not just a few activities at the end of a disaster response. It is a different approach to disasters reflecting awareness that poor people experience disasters as a constant threat in their daily lives. Poverty increases vulnerability, and vulnerability increases the impact of hazards. In effect a DRR approach integrates disaster response and development. As a Christian Aid document¹⁴ states: "Disaster risk reduction (DRR) should thus be regarded as part of long-term sustainable development work and should be a core element of development programme planning. DRR contributes to sustainable development by preventing or decreasing the frequency of shocks occurring, or by increasing the capital resource base of a community so that the impact of the shock is less and/or recovery is more rapid."

From the perspective of International Non-Government Organisations, such as DEC members, the focus of DRR is generally on communities, although it is recognised that communities need support from outside, especially their governments. Most of the Tsunami-affected countries are characterised by strong national governments, capable of playing a major role in DRR and disaster response. In order to increase 'community resilience' it was necessary to work both within the community and on the relationship between the community and the outside world.

The main challenge with the notion of DRR is that it is open-ended. It moves outwards from disaster to all other issues. This reflects the reality of the lives of poor people – vulnerability arises from many different sources including infrastructure, livelihood and social relations. This presents a difficulty for aid agencies because DRR does not easily fit the labels of convenience that are normally applied in aid planning – response, recovery, rehabilitation, development etc., all of which can be part of DRR. This also leads to difficulty in agencies

¹⁴ Christian Aid – TEA DRR Sustainability Review - Case Studies

assigning responsibility within their organisations as DRR does not neatly fit the conventional structural and departmental boundaries within organisations.

2.2 Evolution of the concept of DRR on global humanitarian agenda:

Persistent work to achieve a more strategic international approach to disasters, focused around the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)¹⁵, and culminated in January 2005, just after the Tsunami Disaster, in the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Hyogo, Japan. This led to adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) by practically all the world's governments¹⁶ and a period of substantial funding of DRR by donors. Several DEC Members benefited from DFID's willingness to fund 5-year programmes to introduce and integrate DRR into their planning¹⁷. Funding from the European Commission (DIPECHO) has also helped to kick-start an interest in DRR. This was given further impetus by increasing concern about climate change and the series of major natural disasters that occurred in quick succession after the Tsunami Disaster.

A recent survey initiated by civil society organisations (CSODR)¹⁸ concludes that there has been considerable progress since Hyogo in formulating national policies. Many of the governments, especially in Asia and the Pacific, have introduced legislation and allocated resources for disaster response and DRR. But the survey shows that this tends to be a top-down process and is 'not generating widespread systemic changes in local practices'. This view is supported by the most recent official review of progress since Hyogo which also notes that community participation in DRR is 'scattered' and inconsistent across the region.¹⁹ Governments have not energised local officials and communities to put DRR into practice.

2.3 DEC Appeal and DRR:

Reducing risks to future disasters has become a more prominent aspect of DEC members' recovery programming than it was after the Gujarat earthquake. Many DEC members have recognised DRR as an important aspect of long-term recovery support although it still remains a relatively new area. Several DEC members have begun institutionalising specific aspects of DRR in their responses and support the same in their key partners. Almost all DEC members have incorporated DRR activities in their longer-term recovery programmes and implementation. Many DRR projects were designed or evaluated around—or at least mention—DRR priority areas of the HFA.

At the time of the Tsunami, several members had already developed policies on DRR, and others were developing them. Tearfund was particularly prominent in the UK on discussions about the issue and attracted funding from DFID that helped other agencies to develop approaches to DRR. For example, ActionAid now considers DRR as an essential aspect of

¹⁵ This succeeded the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in the 90s, which set the ball rolling for DRR.

¹⁶ Summary of the Framework is set out as Annex 6.

¹⁷ ActionAid, British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Tearfund

¹⁸ Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (2009) *"Clouds but little rain...." Views from the Frontline*

¹⁹ Pacific Disaster Risk Management Partnership Network (2009) *Regional Synthesis Report on HFA Implementation* www.preventionweb.net

its core objective of 'human security'. ActionAid and CARE regard DRR as the 'right' of a community in relation to government and other actors. They also recognise that within the community specific groups may need to assert 'rights' in order to reduce their vulnerability.

The basic notion of DRR therefore is nothing new to the DEC or its members. However, as previous DEC evaluations found, this objective received less attention than others (notably Gujarat 2001). This was not necessarily because DEC members did not recognise the need for reducing vulnerability but because they felt under pressure from the public to use funds quickly. In the case of previous DEC Appeals, the media had criticised the members for holding onto funds long after the disaster. There was constant pressure to show that funds were spent rapidly and not used to finance longer-term development work. This made the DEC introduce a time-limit for spending. This was generally set at nine months (although it changed over time) and was sometimes extended by approval of the Trustees. DEC members came to focus on quick spending of appeal funds in disaster response rather than the longer-term thinking and planning needed for reducing vulnerability. Arguably the DEC time-limits have had a systemic impact on the way members responded to disasters, strengthening arguments for speed and scale, rather than long-term impact.

Arising from the humanitarian imperative to provide relief and assistance rapidly, there is a dominant view among DEC members which emphasize the need for life-saving disaster relief above other considerations. It was reflected in the Sphere Standards which had become a dominant influence on disaster responses, focusing on high quality but short-term responses, with less emphasis on future vulnerability, risk reduction and other 'developmental' aspects of the response.

The public response to DEC Appeals have varied considerably and in some cases the scale of the response dictated the period of spending. This had happened in the case of Kosovo but the response to the Tsunami Appeal was on an even greater scale. It was quickly apparent that the members could not possibly spend this unprecedented amount of money within the normal time-span. A period of five years was therefore set for spending the Tsunami Appeal funds, with the last year particularly focused on reducing future vulnerability, or DRR. In justifying a longer 'period of spend', the DEC set itself a more ambitious goal than in previous disasters. The intention was to leave people better off than they had been before the disaster – or as it came to be known, to '*build back better*'. And in furtherance of this, the DEC set out its ambitious Strategic Framework for the Tsunami Appeal mentioned in section 1 above.

2.3.1 DRR Policies and Member's Approach to DRR

The published policies and reports of DEC Members reflect increasing recognition of DRR, mostly dating from 2005 onwards. Those that have published policy and practice papers explicitly on DRR include, ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, Concern, Merlin, Tearfund and Oxfam (see Annex 4: Key Documents). Many of these documents reflect a trend among aid agencies towards greater accountability to local communities which has become a major concern of aid agencies, leading to joint action such as the Humanitarian Accountability Project International (HAPI). Christian Aid, for example, made a commitment to DRR, stating that- '*the main output of DRR work is always the same – a community that understands the dangers it faces, and is taking steps to protect itself and improve its well-being*²⁰.' Oxfam conducted extensive research into attitudes of communities affected by the Tsunami and found that '*disaster-affected communities want a chance to*

²⁰ Christian Aid (undated) *Frequently asked questions on Disaster Risk Reduction* p1

*guide their own relief and rehabilitation. Too often, the research revealed, the knowledge, capacity and priorities of communities were overlooked.*²¹

In 'Rethinking Disasters' Oxfam International puts forward a systemic approach to DRR, not only as a component of disaster response but also as an essential aspect of development : *"Our experience shows that successful disaster risk reduction policies, integrated into development work, save lives and money, making vulnerable communities more resilient and protecting development gains"*.²²

Several DEC members have adopted a rights-based approach in their humanitarian programming. ActionAid and CARE focus on ways in which communities can assert their 'rights' in relation to government and other actors. ActionAid conducted a study of HFA implementation in Tsunami-affected communities of India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand²³, involving 44 partner organisations and nearly 3,000 tsunami-affected people. The study concluded that *'The current policy and programming efforts for disaster risk reduction in the four countries are comprehensive and conform to the HFA priorities. However, there is much that must be done to translate the laws and policies into practice.'*

ActionAid (along with CARE and Christian Aid) also puts emphasis on including the 'last' in communities – the people who are normally excluded from consultations. ActionAid has conducted a global study of its efforts to identify the most vulnerable people and address *'people's exclusion from participation in planning and decision-making processes'*. The study found that *'information about the policies and plans have not been disseminated'*²⁴. This applies not only to specific social groups excluded by caste and religion but also, as a general rule, women in the Tsunami response for example.²⁵

DEC members have conducted detailed evaluations and reviews of their interventions. Some members have also taken the opportunity to reflect more widely on the Tsunami experience. The picture emerging from these studies is that although specific aspects of DRR have been addressed, there has not been a systematic process of reducing disaster risk. Studies consistently show that DRR implementation is patchy and piecemeal. ActionAid, for example, finds that in most communities disaster risk had not been reduced and people feel that - *'The intervention of agencies tends to be ad hoc in addressing their core issues in DRR..... Almost three years after the tsunami consultations with poor people suggest that their pre-existing poverty and in turn their vulnerabilities, are largely unchanged. Poor people's ownership of coastal land and access to the sea is being threatened; poor and excluded people's livelihoods have not been 'built back better' or diversified; and women are not safe from violence against them.'*(Action Aid, undated)

Similarly, a study commissioned by Oxfam in Tamil Nadu (India)²⁶ found that *'awareness of disasters and need for preparedness had increased considerably amongst village communities in the post-tsunami period'*, but progress had been greater at national level

²¹ Oxfam International (2009) *Collaboration in crises: lessons in community participation from the Oxfam International tsunami research program*. P2

²² Oxfam International (2008) *Rethinking disasters –why death and destruction is not nature's fault but human failure*, Oxfam www.oxfam.org.uk

²³ ActionAid (2009) *Disaster Risk Reduction in the post-tsunami context*,

²⁴ ActionAid (undated) *Rebuilding Lives – a reflection on the experiences of disaster-affected poor people* pp26-27

²⁵ ActionAid (2006) *Tsunami Response – A Human Rights Assessment*

²⁶ Building and Enabling Disaster Resilience of Coastal Communities (BEDROC) *Building Local Capacities for Disaster Response and Risk Reduction* www.bedroc.in. Funded by Oxfam, the study was not particularly focused on areas where Oxfam worked.

than at community level where *'community involvement in, ownership of and access to the systems being put in place are at less than desirable levels.'* In other words, governments had taken action and people were generally more aware, but the link between the two had not been established.

Studies by DEC members indicate that DRR at the community level is a far more complex issue and demands more sustained attention than advocacy at national level. Indeed the challenge may be more to work with national governments around agreed objectives rather than focus on changing government views. The problem for governments, as the Hyogo Framework review stated²⁷, was to translate legislation into action at District and local levels.

This would require long-term involvement even beyond those envisaged in the Tsunami Appeal. Possibly DEC Members have found it difficult to come to terms with the unlimited scope and scale of DRR. It was adopted as an ideal but agencies have found it difficult to develop policies and structures that provide them with realistic objectives in relation to DRR. Some reports, for example Christian Aid's Tsunami Evaluation²⁸, question whether DRR should be attempted at all in situations where the agency has only a very limited involvement. A British Red Cross report²⁹ on Tsunami response questions whether DRR should be included in short-term responses - *'The overall poor performance of disaster management and disaster risk reduction interventions in these programmes.... questions the appropriateness of this type of activity in a short term recovery intervention where immediate community priorities lie elsewhere.'*

Without a clear policy direction coming from management, staff within the agencies have been left struggling with difficult issues in relation to DRR. The British Red Cross report asks: *'Within British Red Cross recovery responses, where did DRR best sit? In both Indonesia and the Maldives, DRR was constantly overshadowed by construction and livelihood priorities. The experience from the Maldives suggests DRR should maintain a distinct profile and authority and not be subsumed within a livelihoods intervention. Indonesia initially followed this separation; then DRR was absorbed into livelihoods.'* (BRCS, 2009)

This was echoed in the findings of a recent evaluation of the Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), commissioned through the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and focusing on the later stages of the response.³⁰ The concepts of LRRD and DRR are closely related and both require an integrated approach. The evaluation found that agency activities were largely piecemeal and poorly coordinated around long-term results. The most significant successes were attributable to *'multi-sector integrated approaches, where gender empowerment, infrastructure and community mobilisation had been combined with good information to the population, psycho-social support and economic opportunities.'* But such integrated approaches were very rare. Like other TEC evaluations, the report indicates that the impact of the response would have been much greater if agencies had coordinated more closely together and established objectives for reducing disaster risk in relation to each and every community.

Lessons/Conclusions:

²⁷ Pacific Disaster Risk Management Partnership Network (2009) *Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2007-2009*

²⁸ Christian Aid (2008)

²⁹ BRCS (2009)

³⁰ Brusset et al (2009). *A ripple in development? Long Term Perspectives on the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004*. This was the second of two studies.

- The secondary data scanned for this review from agency reports and related documents indicate that while humanitarian agencies, including DEC members, are making serious efforts to take on board DRR approaches in their humanitarian programming, it presents a profound challenge to agencies' ways of thinking about vulnerability and disasters.
- DRR cuts across all sectors or themes and requires a long-term approach which often does not sit comfortably within agency structures and processes especially when focusing on delivery of timely emergency response.

Section 3:

Findings - Overall Achievements of DEC Members in DRR

This brief section summarises the key achievements of DEC members in terms of their impact on risk reduction at the level of communities in the Tsunami areas of India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

As mentioned in the previous section, DEC's strategic framework for Tsunami response sought to, while addressing the immediate needs of areas directly affected by the disaster, *reduce vulnerability to future disasters.*

This review indicates that DEC members have made a major contribution to rebuilding houses for the communities in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as well as in re-establishing livelihoods of the communities, including the most vulnerable. Considering the breadth of activities that contribute to DRR, including health and hygiene, water/sanitation, disaster planning, and advocacy, through the longer-term and development-oriented recovery programmes, DEC members have made important contributions to disaster risk reduction. Understanding of hazards and vulnerability is improving among the local partners and some of the communities. Recovering communities are well aware of disaster recovery and risk reduction concepts and many community members were able to explain hazards affecting their communities, give examples of training received or preparedness exercises conducted.

Houses provided by EHED, a CAFOD partner in Ampara and Batticaloa districts of Sri Lanka, CARE in Ampara, and EFICOR (a Tearfund partner in Tamil Nadu) for example were cited specifically by communities and local government officials as examples of excellent housing provided by DEC members and their partners. Overall in all communities where community surveys were conducted in the three countries, houses were universally acknowledged as being stronger and better quality than the houses people were living in pre-Tsunami. However, in several locations in India and Sri Lanka, siting of the new houses in low lying land provided by the governments have meant that although houses are stronger and better quality, they regularly face hazards like water logging and flooding, leading to unsanitary living conditions. This review did not examine all issues around housing in-depth as DEC had already conducted a separate review on this.

Rebuilding livelihoods is another area where there is general acknowledgement by the governments and communities of the role played by NGOs in general, and some of the DEC members in particular. Livelihoods systems have an important bearing on people's vulnerability and ability to cope with disasters. Although the initial response by the humanitarian agencies in general led to a rush to supply boats and fishing equipments causing an over-supply of these in all Tsunami-hit areas, in the last two years or so, the approach adopted by many of the DEC members³¹ has been more holistic. If the approach in the early relief phase was to provide and/or replace an asset or equipment or working capital for individuals without much consideration of sustainability of such asset-replacements, now this has moved to linking all those engaged in a particular trade, particularly focusing on the most vulnerable communities, to deal with the value chain in the production and marketing processes. Some of the excellent examples of this were seen (i) in the success elderly men and women's groups have had in India in changing the policies of financial institutions which traditionally did not consider elderly viable for providing loans; (ii) in moving *dalit* women groups who were previously engaged in low-value fish-drying activities to higher-value crab cultivation and marketing, an activity supported by CARE in Tamil Nadu; and (iii) in SNEHA's (ActionAid and Christian Aid partner) initiative in creating federations of women's self help groups (SHG) and setting up women-managed company. All of these are examples of lasting impact and made significant contribution to reducing vulnerability.

Box 1: SNEHA's Work on Women's Empowerment

One of the best examples of increasing women's access to market was seen in the work of a partner of ActionAid and Christian Aid, SNEHA in Tamil Nadu. Social Need Education and Human Awareness (SNEHA) in India was already operating in the Tsunami-affected area before the Tsunami. It has formed more women's groups in villages since the disaster. In some villages the women were provided with vending vessels, and, within groups, individuals were provided seed capital to start vending. There is internal lending within the group with an interest rate of two percent per month as opposed to 10 percent with informal lenders. In one bigger village a fish-drying yard was constructed at an investment of 0.4 million rupees. The fish yard has resulted in a 20-30 percent increase in price realisation as the fish dries fast and there is an improvement in quality as it is no longer dried in mud/sand. Now SNEHA is promoting a producers' company, with the members of the federation which will be an enterprise of women involved in fish processing. The strength of this intervention is that it builds on the current competence and activities of the members by trying to address certain aspects of the value chain which are local – drying and/or transport of dry fish.

DEC members and their local partners have also been instrumental in ensuring a significant focus on addressing the needs of the most vulnerable communities like the elderly in all the three countries, women, and children and addressing social exclusion in highly hierarchical societies of Tamil Nadu (*Dalits* and *Irula* tribes, some of the communities in the lowest order of Indian caste hierarchy). The most phenomenal change the review team came across was

³¹ ActionAid, CARE, Help the Aged, Christian Aid (through its partner SWOAD in Ampara in Sri Lanka).

the case of the *Irula* tribe, where through the work of DEC members³² in particular, the community has been able to break through centuries-old oppression and exclusion in the past five years.

DEC members have also worked with communities and local authorities in creating awareness about disaster preparedness, mitigation and early warning which are now widely understood in the Tsunami-hit areas of India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The community surveys revealed that in several communities, people are now being trained in various aspects of preparedness and response, and generally have a better understanding of mitigation and risk reduction. Where communities can afford, they are already investing in making their houses stronger and safer, without waiting for NGOs or governments. Communities are also actively seeking to manage disaster risks to their livelihoods and houses through micro-insurance schemes in Tamil Nadu³³.

Overall these are significant achievements. In the following sections, the review has examined overall progress and the contributions made by DEC members and their partners in relation to the key questions of the evaluation (outlined in section 1 earlier) in the Tsunami areas of India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Lesson/Conclusion:

- DEC members' livelihoods interventions in the latter stages of the Tsunami response have been highly effective when the livelihood activities were looked at in relation to the overall sector and with a deeper understanding of value chain, rather than when it took a traditional *income-generating approach* targeted at individual families without adequate attentions to value-chain analysis, as was done in the early phase of the Tsunami response.

Section 4:

³² ActionAid partners and CARE

³³ Facilitated by CARE and SNEHA jointly with private insurance companies.

Findings - Policies and Community Voices in DRR and Disaster Management

This section addresses the following questions/issues: (a) members' contributions to national/provincial level policy and institutions on disaster preparedness, mitigation and DRR; (b) community voice on national/provincial processes on DRR; (c) inclusion of vulnerable in community and government processes on DRR.

The official review of progress since Hyogo concludes that community participation in Disaster Risk Reduction is scattered and inconsistent across the Asia Pacific region.³⁴ A recent survey concluded that there has been progress since Hyogo in formulating national policies but this is *'not generating widespread systemic changes in local practices'*³⁵. This is confirmed in studies conducted by DEC Members. The ActionAid study mentioned earlier highlighted the gap that remains in *translating the laws and policies into practice* (ActionAid, 2009), and the need to complement high-level advocacy needed with activities at all levels.³⁶

4.1 Disaster Management Policies and Institutions:

The Tsunami provided governments in all three countries an impetus to expand their risk management approach and systems. Governments have variously responded with new national disaster management systems, housing projects, and evacuated coastal zones. These significant achievements were accomplished by national stakeholders, and DEC members and partner national NGOs have contributed to the movement towards formal disaster management legislation in all three countries.

Each country has established a lead agency for disaster management. Legislations in the form of Disaster Management Act was passed in 2005 in India and Sri Lanka. In July 2005 the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) was set up in Sri Lanka, which is managed by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (MDMHR). India and Sri Lanka also have institutional frameworks to link the national to provincial to district to local levels. For example, in India the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMA) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) have been created. Likewise in Sri Lanka, the National DMC is linked to District Disaster Management Centres headed by District Level DM Coordinators.

Indonesia also has new legislation and new institutions, although they are still not fully operational. Guidelines are still being developed and roles and responsibilities still need to be clearly defined. However, there is a clear willingness to improve and build appropriate

³⁴ Pacific Disaster Risk Management Partnership Network (2009) *Regional Synthesis Report on HFA Implementation* www.preventionweb.net

³⁵ Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (2009) *"Clouds but little rain...." Views from the Frontline*

³⁶ ActionAid (2006) *Tsunami Response – A Human Rights Assessment*

disaster management systems, which will take time. There is a shift from focusing only on response to include preparedness, a dimension reflected in the new laws and guidelines³⁷.

4.2 Role played by Civil Society & DEC members:

DEC members and partner national NGOs have contributed to the development of formal disaster management legislation in Indonesia. After considerable advocacy from national organisations and support from international organisations, including DEC members, UNDP, and others, legislation was enacted in 2007 that defines government responsibilities at different levels relating to disaster management. In India, civil society organisations working on disaster risk reduction have initiated an alliance which aims to promote the development of a National Platform through mainstreaming DRR in development and influencing policies through community-driven practices and partnerships by engaging with policy makers, practitioners, academics and community representatives. In Indonesia, communities pointed out that DEC members focused on community DRR plans, while the government and World Bank were working on district and regional DRR plans, and often these two efforts did not match and integrate.

In Sri Lanka, almost all the community groups interviewed had been exposed to the structure of the Government Disaster Management Units and had been mobilised and organised into Disaster Management Committees at the local /village levels. Training on disaster management had been given by the Division Secretariats (D.S.), and by DEC member organisations³⁸. Divisional offices have recognised these as viable partners in disaster response at village level. Overall there has been good linkage between the government, NGOs and the community. In India, similar linkages have been established between the village communities through the *panchayats*³⁹ or village committees set up by NGOs⁴⁰. In partnership with the district administration, NGOs⁴¹ in Tamil Nadu have trained *panchayat* task force on disaster preparedness which was able to play an active role in responding to Nisha cyclone in 2008.

There are examples of good practices in Tamil Nadu where the community has gained conceptual clarity on DRR and become politically active in addressing issues affecting the community at larger level. The village *panchayat* in the Akkaraipettai community is actively taking measures for disaster recovery, through the support of government agencies and NGOs. This is a good example where partnering with local organisation working with the community even before disaster could build back the community better.

55% of respondents in the community survey in the three countries stated that communities had now better capacity to lobby external agencies and government on DRR plans & priorities.

Box 2: CARE's Work in Tamil Nadu with Village Committees on Disaster Risk Reduction

³⁷ LRRD 2 Evaluation

³⁸ For example, EHED (a partner of CAFOD), World Vision, CARE Sri Lanka, Help the Aged Sri Lanka and SWOAD

³⁹ *Panchayats* are elected bodies at the village level which are mandated by the laws in India as institutions of local self-governance at grassroots level.

⁴⁰ Sevalaya, Pondicherry Multipurpose Social Service Society (CAFOD partner)

⁴¹ SNEHA

In coordination with the district administration and UNDP, CARE partnered with local NGO Sevalaya in Nagapattanam district from 2007 on community based disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities. This included Training of Trainers which incorporated vulnerability analysis, community preparedness in pre-, during and post-disaster phases, the role of *panchayat*/village level disaster management committees, etc. Village institutions like SHGs, *panchayats*, children in schools and youth clubs were also sensitised on disaster preparedness related issues. Disaster management committees were set up in villages, with specific responsibilities assigned for early warning, shelter management, rescue and evacuation, damage assessment, relief and coordination, waste, carcass disposal, first aid etc. Similar activities were carried out in Cuddalore and Kanyakumari districts.

Similar processes are happening in Prakasam district of Andhra Pradesh which was also Tsunami-affected. Disaster preparedness is increasingly becoming one of the key agendas in the village level meetings. Community institutions are now managing disaster response activities, coordinating with multiple stakeholders and leveraging good assistance from government programmes and other agencies for infrastructure development like levelling of low lying areas, renovation of cyclone shelters, and approach road from village to sea shore and culvert work, casuarina plantation as shelterbelt.

In Sri Lanka, discussions on DRR take place in monthly meetings of community groups. 20 of the 23 community groups interviewed in Sri Lanka felt that they have the capacity to negotiate with or challenge authorities regarding DP and DRR issues either through their own community-based groups or together with the Rural Development Societies, Women Rural Development Societies, and the *Grama Sevaka*⁴². In Aceh, several civil society organisations are now emerging and these have a vital role to play in DRR efforts but, with donors leaving, DRR will require new sources of financing and these do not appear to be coming from national governments.

However, although several districts in all the three countries have produced disaster management/contingency plans, communities generally did not have much of an involvement in or awareness of these plans. Some of the plans seen by the review teams appeared to focus on creating structures for response, rather than on developing a comprehensive plan for mitigation and DRR. The understanding of disaster risk reduction policies and planning is low at the community level. In India, since there are regular meetings at the district collectorate⁴³ for elected *panchayat*, there is some awareness about the elements of disaster management policies among the *panchayat* leaders, but the communities tended to associate the DRR policy with the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ)/buffer zone notification and the regulation of activities on the coast.

An interesting offshoot of the community level DRR work in Sri Lanka in particular has been a greater openness of the grassroots level government functionaries (Grama Niladhari, divisional secretary, etc) toward the concept of consultation with communities in general and the village DMCs in particular. Although there is little perceptible change in the functioning of the government institutions at the district and national levels, lower down the bureaucratic machinery, communities find the officials more accessible and engaging in community-level DRR initiatives. A similar phenomenon was also observed in Cuddalore district of Tamil Nadu where through joint efforts by NGOs and local government officials, it became possible to give the *Irula* families a new identity (see Box 3 in section 4.3).

4.3 Addressing Issues of Exclusion:

⁴² Village level worker of the district administration.

⁴³ Office of the senior-most government official in a district.

DEC members in all the three countries have recognised instances of exclusion in DRR work and have reached out to marginalised groups of women and minorities, and developed several initiatives that promote risk reduction among these groups. In some cases, different vulnerable groups, including women, school children and the aged were specifically targeted by DEC Members and partners.⁴⁴ In DEC member programmes, women took leadership roles in self-help groups, lending groups and as community facilitators; number of women in communities where DEC members worked had skills in planning, management and budgeting that were useful to DRR projects. In some instances, partners prepared illustrations of what to do during any disaster for those who could not read.

A significant progress in the entire Tsunami response has been the inclusion of the elderly in all Tsunami response plans by most DEC members and positive acknowledgement by most agencies that the elderly and the disabled members of the community have to be included in plans for emergency evacuation. One DEC member specifically targeted the aged with disaster management support, including an English language resource book for community DRR with Older People's Associations. Two members also collaborated on tools for addressing older people's needs in the Aceh recovery context.

In all the villages visited in Sri Lanka, women were members of the community-based organisations set up or facilitated by DEC Members. Women were members of the sub-committees of the local Disaster Management Committees. The strongest participation of women in Group interviews was seen in one village of Ampara (where SWOAD is active) in Sri Lanka where approximately 50 women were interviewed during the course of a day by the review team. They said categorically that their lives were better since the Tsunami with the assistance and guidance given by a range of NGOs, and that the government assistance and response to their needs was also better. Access to livelihoods had increased and many women now had their own means of earning income.

There were several examples of DRR with emphasis on children. One DEC partner has raised awareness of DRR through local schools. In Sri Lanka, community Disaster Management Committees were most often made up of younger members, mostly between the ages 17 and 30.

Tsunami has also brought about some profound transformation in the social structures in some of the communities in Tamil Nadu, thanks to the work of local and international NGOs on issues of social exclusion following the Tsunami. A local organisation, Bharathi Trust (partner of ActionAid) has played a crucial role in championing the rights of the *Irulas* over the years. Kalaingar Nagar is a settlement of 165 houses constructed as part of the Tsunami reconstruction for the *Irula* community.

Box 3: Partnership between local NGOs and DEC member

Post-Tsunami, one of the DEC organisations in India prioritised the problems of the *Irulas* who, though not directly affected by the Tsunami, had lost their small boats and nets which they used for fishing in the backwater. Additionally, the tidal action had altered the salinity levels of the backwater resulting in non availability of shrimp affecting their livelihoods drastically.

Efforts by various organisations prior to the Tsunami had resulted in the government allotting some land to some of the community members but no houses had been constructed either by the government or by the community itself (which obviously did not have the own resources for construction). The 105 families in Kalaingar Nagar despite being allotted land, continued living on the land in their huts or in scattered settlements elsewhere.

⁴⁴ For example, in Lambaro Neujid in Indonesia.

The DEC member⁴⁵ decided to build houses for this community and 60 other *Irula* families who had not yet obtained land from the government. While the DEC member did not have sufficient resources to buy land for building houses for all the 165 *Irula* families, the local partner NGO⁴⁶, CREED used alternative donor support to procure land for additional 60 houses next to the site where the original 105 families had been given land – ensuring that both the sites were close enough separated only by a road. The completed houses were handed over in 2006.

Today the 165 *Irula* families not only are proud owners of houses which they have never lived in before, and no longer live in the fringes of the society. Through the work of DEC members and local partners⁴⁷, many of the *Irulas* are now boat owners as well as engage in activities like crab farming, tailoring etc. Previously they used to work as labourers on traditional fishermen's boats or as daily labourers on farms etc. Their title to land, houses and access to independent livelihoods activities have meant that the caste villages in the neighborhood now look to *Irulas* with awe and grudgingly accept the transformation that has been taking place in the centuries old social structure.

Lessons/Conclusions:

- At the community level, there has been significant progress in putting in place grassroots institutions linked to the government at district level in all the countries, and great deal of emphasis is being put on DRR at community level by the governments and NGOs. The DEC members have played a critical role in this process.
- The country studies showed that while at the village/*panchayat* and sub-district level, DRR and disaster preparedness have received core attention, civil society including the DEC members need to play far greater role in advocating for DRR-related issues to figure prominently in the core agenda of the governments at meso- and macro (national in case of Sri Lanka, State/provincial level in India and Indonesia) levels. While progress has been made at the macro level on national policies and legislations, these still remain on paper.
- Effective interventions on DRR have the potential to strengthen grassroots institutions at the local and district level as well as create strong interface between grassroots community organisations and local authorities, making local governance more inclusive and participatory.

Section 5:

Findings - Risk Assessment, Disaster Preparedness and Response

⁴⁵ CARE

⁴⁶ CREED

⁴⁷ Bharathi Trust and CARE amongst others

This section examines the following key issues/questions: (a) Has the response contributed to better assessment of risks and hazards at community/local levels? (b) Are there now adequate early warning systems in place? (c) What capacities have been developed to engage communities in disaster preparedness and response?

5.1 Risk Assessment - Understanding of Risks & Hazards:

At the community level, especially in the coastal areas hit by the Tsunami, there is now greater awareness among rural and fishing communities of disaster risks and hazards. In all the countries, community groups stated that they had received awareness and training on risk assessment from NGOs. The communities have participated in carrying out risk assessments.

Hazard maps have been drawn up in almost all villages visited by the review team. In Sri Lanka, NGOs⁴⁸ have worked with communities in preparing village hazard maps and village level disaster management plans. The Disaster Management Committees at the community level were trained and tasked with liaising with the *Grama Sevaka* and other local government officials.

In all the countries, the longer term and development-oriented recovery programmes of DEC members have made important contributions in disaster risk reduction initiatives. Understanding of hazards and vulnerability is becoming widespread among the local partners and some of the communities. A strong majority of respondents⁴⁹ to the community survey across three countries indicated that their community has the skills and ability to carry out risk assessments. Recovering communities are well aware of disaster recovery and risk reduction concepts and many community members were able to explain hazards affecting their communities, give examples of training received or preparedness exercises conducted. Respondents in discussion groups in Indonesia reported that they have learned to do risk assessments from DEC members. These groups were able to explain village profiling and village planning as part of this process. However, at the government levels in the districts and Divisions in Sri Lanka, most of the focus still remains on Tsunami-type of disaster, with emphasis on emergency response capacity, search and rescue, evacuation, etc. While these are critically important, government officials appear to take recurring disasters like annual floods in districts like Batticaloa and Ampara as inevitable.

An important lesson that emerged from the review is that while village level hazard maps have been developed, unless these lead to practical action aimed at mitigation measures, people will lose interest in keeping these updated. Already in Sri Lanka, communities interviewed complained that they have identified local hazards which accentuate flooding, but there have been not enough resources made available by government or NGOs for taking corrective actions.

62% of respondents in the community survey strongly expressed the view that they now have skills and capacity to carry out community hazard and risk assessments, maintained through support and training.

⁴⁸ Sri Lanka Red Cross, Help the Aged, World Vision, SWOAD and EHED in Sri Lanka were cited frequently.

⁴⁹ 75% responded "strongly agree" or "agree" to the question if communities had skills to carry out risk assessments.

5.2 Early Warning Systems:

In all the three countries, the governments have been investing in developing early warning systems, mainly focusing on Tsunamis, Cyclones and tidal waves in the coastal areas. In Sri Lanka and India, the communities visited were well informed about the early warning system in the form of information centres in every village equipped with sirens, loudspeakers operated from tempos, mosques or churches. In India, dedicated internet access and telephone lines have also been provided in some of the villages for providing early warning so that every community has access to information from the district collectorate, fire stations, police stations and *panchayat*. In Indonesia, community discussion groups report using (traditional) *bedug* (big drum covered by goat skin) and *kentongan* (sticks) and electronic loudspeakers. In one community, since the Tsunami, there has been a designated messenger responsible for informing all. In Tanali village of Aceh, one DEC member supported a community early warning system that informed residents to prepare belongings for an oncoming flood.

The government is setting up early warning towers in coastal villages of Sri Lanka, and communities in Navalady in Batticaloa, and Sainthamaruthu and Periyaneelavne in Ampara, were aware of the three different types of alarms that would sound from these towers to indicate whether the disaster was a Cyclone or a Tsunami. In Tamil Nadu, early warning systems were reported to exist in all locations visited by the review team, and in some instances these were facilitated by DEC members. In both India and Sri Lanka, mock drills have been conducted by the district administration and there are clearly marked evacuation routes in most of the villages.

However, relatively fewer efforts are so far invested in forecasting events and issuing warnings as well as taking precautionary measures in response to warnings. Avoiding impending disaster threats has remained second priority to putting in place resources, plans, and mechanisms to ensure that those who are affected receive adequate assistance. In many cases excellent participatory plans are made and at local level community response mechanisms are put in place but plans often remain without resources and mechanisms to link community efforts with the government efforts are rare. Though up to 18 communities out of 28 surveyed were aware of the warning systems and the role they were expected to play, only 8 communities in the three countries said that they had the resources and tools and the equipments to carry out an effective response as per the plan.

5.3 Disaster Preparedness and Response:

DEC members have made efforts to expand disaster preparedness at local levels and enhance the response capacities of communities by organising and strengthening capacity to undertake timely and effective rescue, relief, and assistance. In some villages, community level preparedness mechanisms were strengthened establishing linkages with local public disaster management committees. Community preparedness plans have been created in many communities by, or with support of, DEC members, other NGOs and government agencies in all the three countries. 78 per cent of respondents to the community survey in Indonesia indicated that a community disaster preparedness plan exists for their community. But in communities where plans were made, only 37% indicated that the plans were tested regularly. There is also a question of how well the aspects of the preparedness plans were known to community leaders. In one community in Indonesia, the discussion group reported that they had a village preparedness plan but the village leader recently changed and nobody knew where the plan was. In most of the villages visited in India and Sri Lanka too,

village level preparedness and contingency plans exist, although their awareness among the community members may be limited.

Several DEC members in all the three countries made efforts to help communities make disaster preparedness plans. Often these plans were matched with modest amount of resources to operationalise the plans. In Indonesia the plans could have been better resourced with the money from the multi donor trust fund if effective and early coordination between the DEC members and the fund was established. Large amounts of DEC resources have gone into providing preparedness trainings and workshops, and outreach efforts and practical tips like how to move an injured child and where to lead an orphaned child is known to most communities. Very few communities out of the 28 surveyed (less than 6), had gone back to the preparedness plans and thought about what needed to be changed and updated, though in several communities the plan was used for flood response at least once.

Almost all discussion groups mentioned that one or more NGOs — DEC members, partners, or other NGOs — were doing DRR work in their community. In Aceh, communities reported receiving training on DRR, health, and other areas from DEC members and partners. Discussion groups reported information campaigns for DRR conducted by specific DEC members and their partners. These campaigns included pamphlets, meetings and community simulations. In Cut Mamplam, illustrations were prepared for those who could not read on what to do during any disaster.

In other communities visited, committees were formed for community disaster preparedness in the initial phase but these were not always active since there was no follow up at the local level, although there is capacity within the community to provide emergency services because of the trainings given to them. The training on first aid and emergency medical assistance has helped many communities in accessing these services from the trained members for dealing with cases of minor injuries and wounds – a highly valued resource considering that emergency ambulance services are non-existent in many of the areas.

In villages like MGR Nagar, Pazhayar and MGR Thittu in India there is no noticeable activity on disaster preparedness other than recruiting and the formation of committees. PRA was conducted for the community members in the initial phase. Later neither the *panchayats* nor the organisation had followed up with the community. Some community members reported participating in emergency drills (hosted by partners of DEC members) but this was usually limited to those who were part of trainings. Discussion groups reported that there were not enough trained community volunteers for effective response.

An evaluation of DRR activities in Trincomalee found that although communities had gone through the whole series of initial training, drawing up disaster assessment and management plans, they were least prepared to handle an emergency. Emergency telephone numbers were available in their files but not stored in their personal mobile phones, equipment given to the teams for use during an emergency was not located in places that were easily accessible. Equipments were handed over to the DMC president but the key to the store room was kept somewhere else. (source: MDF South Asia, TRRP 2 DRR Implemented by World Concern Sri Lanka. Evaluation Report)

In India the DEC members have responded to the ongoing government efforts to set up preparedness mechanism, and have also advocated inclusion of the minorities and various tribes in the process. Institutional framework for response in the east coast of Sri Lanka is still in its early stages. In Aceh the UN is developing a comprehensive response mechanism and there is south-to-south knowledge links that are being developed by UNDP and TDMRC of the local government that DEC members have joined through their partners. In one community in Indonesia, the preparedness plan was made environment-sensitive by taking care of possible toxic waste and two DEC member partners were trying to integrate disaster response with climate adaptation measures by including relocation sites in the plan itself.

Lessons/Conclusions:

- While village level hazard maps and preparedness plans have been developed, unless these lead to practical action aimed at mitigation measures, people will lose interest in keeping these updated. Already in Sri Lanka, communities interviewed complained that they have identified local hazards which accentuate flooding, but there have been not enough resources made available by government or NGOs for taking corrective actions.
- Disaster preparedness has been mainly focused on preparedness for emergency response, and that too, with focus on Tsunami-like disasters. So far, with a few exceptions, not enough attention and investment has gone into early warning, preventive and mitigation measures and recurring disasters like floods and droughts.

Section Six:

Findings - Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction

In this section, the following key issues/questions have been examined: (a) How have members enabled communities in managing risk and reduce vulnerability? (b) How was vulnerability in relation to women addressed? (c) How are members taking on board the issues of climate change in programming?

6.1 Reducing Vulnerability through Community Interventions:

Vulnerability assessment is recognised as an essential step to preparedness, and the difference between risk and vulnerability is well recognised by the local communities and local authorities. In all the 28 locations surveyed in the three countries, half of the individuals interviewed at community level referred to some form of vulnerability assessment.

Vulnerability to disasters is directly linked to poverty and resources people have access to. These in turn determine and are influenced by the nature of livelihood activities a family engages in, and hence the livelihoods systems have a direct bearing on communities' ability to deal with and recover from disasters. DEC members and partners have implemented a very wide range of community DRR activities. Some members promoted activities like tree

and bamboo planting along river banks⁵⁰ in Aceh, safe house construction, training communities and local officials on disaster management concepts, evacuation planning, media communication of DRR concepts and advocacy. In India, the green belt casuarina plantation covering 100 acres under cash-for-work programme⁵¹, apart from serving as a bio-shield, the intervention will also augment livelihoods, reduce the fuel wood collection burden of women and contribute to the community fund of the village. The work of repairing shallow ponds, organising micro-irrigation, desalinating land used for vegetable growing and supporting better ways of vegetable growing has also yielded good livelihood stabilisation results in Prakasam district of Andhra Pradesh.

DEC support has contributed towards integration of DRR with conflict reduction in Aceh. Reintegration of ex-combatants has been a key issue in maintaining peace in Aceh⁵². DEC members have supported local networks that have provided vocational skills to ex-combatants and developed a conflict-related early warning mechanism. In Indonesia, DRR initiatives have emerged out of humanitarian response and long-term recovery work, as opposed to development efforts. Local partners suggest that DRR will have to be more closely integrated with development, humanitarian needs, climate risk and conflict risk.

One DEC member has been very successful in forming self help groups (SHG) at village levels and district levels in all the three countries. In India, self help groups for elders have reached out to over 7,800 elder members in older persons' Associations in Tamil Nadu and Kerala which were hit by the Tsunami⁵³. Assisted partly through DEC funds, these SHGs have their own revolving funds which are used by members to borrow either for investments in micro-enterprises or in times of crisis. To ensure that village institutions took ownership of these, these groups were linked to other village committees/*panchayats* comprising people from the villages like the school teachers, *panchayat* members, retired officials, youth and women groups etc.

Communities have experimented with several forms of community financing for recovery and preparedness. In Sri Lanka, many agencies did help set up savings groups⁵⁴, and helped to establish a growing culture of savings and credit, and in some instances introduced these savings groups to formal micro-credit institutions and lending institutions such as banks. However the scale of such provisions is relatively small compared to the need, and discussion groups in all countries indicated limited access to microfinance among communities.

In Indonesia, participants in most discussion groups reported that no community funds were available for community emergency savings. Two communities reported that they collect common funds for social purposes and building common facilities. In Cut Mamplam (Indonesia), a school collects money weekly that can be used for public emergencies and each class has a common fund for social purposes.

Some of the agencies have worked specifically on addressing issues of vulnerability of women. House ownership is an issue that affects women, particularly single women in the region. In all the countries, several members worked on getting land and houses provided after Tsunami registered in joint names of husband and wife. In India, the women were

⁵⁰ For example in Flores and Belu.

⁵¹ ECHO-funded CARE programme

⁵² Oxfam International. 2008, December. *Tsunami Fund: End of Program Report*.

⁵³ Helpage India (2007), *Footprints in Coastal India: A Model for Sustainable Social Protection of Elders through Self Help*.

⁵⁴ Help the Aged with elderly, CARE in several districts, Action Aid and the Christian Aid-OfFER partnership in the Eastern Province, with high female participation.

aware of the joint registration of the land. The positive outcome of owning the house was the protection it offered to them by way of being able to retain the asset if their husbands remarried.

6.2 Innovations in Risk Reduction:

An important innovation in risk reduction has been the introduction of low-cost micro insurance in order to address deeper issues around vulnerability and risks faced by communities living in coastal areas through recurring cycle of cyclones and floods, apart from diseases and illnesses leading to disability and loss of earnings. Working in partnership with private insurance providers in Tamil Nadu, NGOs⁵⁵ developed customised products that covered the risks articulated by the community. The products were priced very nominally so that most of the vulnerable communities could take advantage of this. Communities are linked up with reduced premium insurance and the community has gained in recent floods with more than 3000 clients claim in Cuddalore district alone. SHGs were major vehicles for taking forward this message. During the cyclone NISHA in 2008, 13,000 families received claims for damages to houses and household assets to the tune of Rs 40 million in Cuddalore and Nagapattanam districts alone.

In Sri Lanka, a DEC member has encouraged cattle insurance among villagers who were provided cattle as part of livelihoods response. Likewise, small shop owners have been encouraged to register their shops with government authorities as this would entitle them to compensation in case of fire or floods. A similar development is taking place in India. In the past, many small fishers did not see any significant benefit in registering themselves with the Fishermen Cooperatives, apart from the 1,200 rupees⁵⁶ given to them during the lean fishing season every year. As a result many of them were reluctant to register themselves. However, since the Tsunami the number of people showing interest in registering with these cooperatives has increased after they saw that the government compensation was given only to those who were registered with the cooperatives.

The most notable achievements in livelihoods have been made when the interventions have led to diversification of livelihoods, rather than merely focusing on re-creating what existed before Tsunami through asset replacements. A diversified portfolio of livelihoods enables families and communities to better withstand the impact and incidence of disasters. Several members⁵⁷ have particularly focused on this. The programming has been based on a total livelihoods approach, with interventions along the value chain, including tapping existing bank and government funding to improve input availability, product quality and marketing, as was seen in the case of fish processing and crab farming mentioned earlier.

6.3 Climate change in humanitarian programming:

Climate change is becoming a critically important issue in relation to DRR. It provides impetus for action but it remains difficult to distinguish general hazards from those associated with climate change. At DEC members' and partners' meetings in all the three countries, the issue of climate risk and DRR overlap was brought up⁵⁸. More work on how

⁵⁵ SNEHA and CARE

⁵⁶ Indian Rupees. £1=INR 75

⁵⁷ SWOAD (Christian Aid partner) and CARE in Sri Lanka, CARE and SNEHA in Tamil Nadu, etc.

⁵⁸ For example, at the debriefing meeting in India with ActionAid and partners.

this overlap and how it can be addressed at community level, institutional/DEC member level or at project level in future is needed.

Discussion group members reported that there was little training or work on longer term development practices such as land use, agriculture and water management. Demand for safer agriculture training was voiced in South India and Sri Lanka.

As was noted in several studies and evaluations, following the Tsunami, the overall impact of humanitarian agencies remained limited in the fishing industry, although a bulk of investment went into this sector. As an ActionAid Study⁵⁹ noted, the major problems faced by

the small-scale fishers in the pre-tsunami period (declining fish catches, weakening access rights to the sea and land, changing trade context, marginalisation of women and the poor, over-capitalisation and increased cost of operations) were not addressed in post-Tsunami livelihood support programmes and some of the issues may even have been exacerbated by these programmes. Fishers' capacity to cope with future disasters remains as poor as it had been previously.

Fishers in India and Sri Lanka commented on the large increase in the number of boats, compared to pre-Tsunami period, which had resulted in increased fishing in the inshore waters. Further, the new fiberglass boats and engines were very new to the local communities and the capacity of the fishers to undertake maintenance and repairs is very low. The cost of fishing operations went up as a result of motorisation and increased engine horsepower that required large quantity of fuel to run, compounded by huge increases in fuel costs in the past two years. With capital investment being confined to one-off support (and most funding agencies having already gone), and the credit from the private sector being a major drain on incomes, many fishers faced problems in sustaining fishing activities.

It is now widely acknowledged that in the rush to replace the assets (boats and nets) destroyed, humanitarian agencies took a simplistic approach to asset replacement, without adequate consideration being paid to understanding the entire fishing industry sector. An important lesson that emerged from this costly mistake was that livelihoods interventions cannot simply look at individual families⁶⁰ without understanding how the entire sector worked, something a few of the DEC members did take on board in the programming in the latter stages.

For humanitarian agencies, Tsunami brought to the fore the limitations of conventional approach to vulnerability analysis based on social and economic factors, and incidence of previous disasters. Integrating long term effects of climate change in understanding vulnerability and risk reduction remains a challenge.

Lessons/Conclusions:

- Interventions which are based on strong partnership and links with local organisations including private sector (banks/financial and insurance companies) were far more likely to succeed than one-off asset distributions.
 - Greater analysis and research is needed to develop a practical understanding of how to integrate climate change in humanitarian programming.
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⁵⁹ ActionAid (2007) *Fisheries Based Livelihoods in the post-Tsunami Context, Peoples Report, India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand*

⁶⁰ What conventionally is known as income-generating activity

Section 7:

Findings - Knowledge and Education

Issues/Questions examined in this section: (a) what was done to manage information and create public awareness of disasters, disaster mitigation and safer living? (b) to what extent has members' response contributed to learning and research about DRR?

7.1 Community Awareness on DRR and Disaster Management:

The community surveys in all the three countries indicated that communities were generally aware of the need for DRR and safer living conditions than they were pre-Tsunami, and people generally attribute this to the work of NGOs in the post-Tsunami period. In Sri Lanka and India in particular, the extensive work done by humanitarian organisations in hygiene promotion and sanitation has led to extensive change in sanitation practices which, in flood-prone districts like Batticaloa and Ampara, have made considerable improvements in water-borne diseases, according to local health officials interviewed by the reviewers.

Generally in all the three countries, communities were aware of the need for disaster preparedness and mitigation, although respondents were at times unclear as to the difference between disaster preparedness and DRR, especially where the communities were located away from the sea⁶¹. There is consensus among community members in the range of risks faced, but this has not been fully translated into consensus on actions to be taken in management of these threats. The 3-country combined survey indicates that 42% of respondents do not believe that funds or other resources were available at the community level for facilitating disaster risk reduction measures.⁶² In Sri Lanka, public awareness on disasters has been created and increased through some of the NGOs and government agencies⁶³. Communities interviewed in India and Sri Lanka pointed out that they were often unclear on how to formulate DRR goals and activities. However, communities in all three countries felt that they could be more involved in planning DRR results (and not only activities) including identifying outcomes, measuring outputs and developing targets for DRR projects.

DEC members and partners are reported by discussion groups to have provided training to community members or students on many topics including search and rescue, DRR, First Aid, Health and Nutrition, and Village Development Planning and Advocacy. DEC members have used a range of methods to reach communities at household, local and district levels and created awareness about DRR. Community level dialogue, networking, exhibitions and

⁶¹ Ottamawadi in Batticaloa and Vijaya Pura and Central Camp in Ampara

⁶² Community Survey question #3, combining "strongly disagree" and "disagree" responses.

⁶³ EHED, SWOAD, NECCDEP (North East Coastal Community Development Project), by the Disaster Management Committees as well as by the Medical Officer of Health (MOH), Public Health Inspectors, the Samurdhi programme and through exhibitions in schools.

learning have contributed to effective DRR at the local level in Indonesia (in 3 communities), in Sri Lanka (in 2 communities) and in India (in 4 communities).

It was noted during the field visits in India and Sri Lanka that while individual NGOs (including DEC members) had been investing significantly in training and community awareness and creating a cadre of volunteers for DRR and disaster response, the scope for collaboration among the various institutions even in the same geographical area was not being leveraged. There seemed to be little coordination between members to coordinate and link up the Disaster Management Committees that they had facilitated setting up within or between two districts. Most members of the local level DMCs that were interviewed said they

34% of respondents to the community survey indicated that householders and builders were not trained in safe construction techniques. This view was even stronger among community survey respondents in India (59%).

had no such links.

7.2 Learning and Research on DRR:

7.2.1 Introduction of new techniques and safety measures:

Following the Tsunami, though many families got newly constructed houses, not everyone has been trained in safe construction and retrofitting techniques. Although the governments in Sri Lanka and India reinforced the building codes post-Tsunami, their implementation has been patchy as there are no enforcement mechanisms except when it came to government buildings.

Many communities observed that better and stronger quality houses have been built since the Tsunami. However, this has almost always been when NGOs or richer households have invested money in planning and hiring qualified engineers and who have used local labour to construct these houses. It was pointed out that the issue was not whether the local house builders have the skills or have been trained through such processes, but that better houses have been constructed only where there have been enough funds for such quality constructions. In most cases where money was not available, householders and house builders continue to build houses that are not '*built back better*'.

In Sainthamaruthu in Ampara district of Sri Lanka, which has a high density population, houses are built in extremely close proximity to each other. Here Tsunami has had a very clear impact on the materials used in house construction by the community. Most houses are now being built using concrete reinforced pillars etc. The house construction is mainly through private funds.

There is also a growing awareness of safer living and health and safety issues especially in the coastal areas. In some communities like the fishermen of Tamil Nadu, use of high tech equipments like global positioning system (GPS) and mobile phones (and for those who can afford it, echo sounders) was already in use from the moment it became available (well before the tsunami), because fishermen saw the need for safety measures, as well as because this equipment helps them to reduce the time spent on looking for shoals of fish. A key factor determining whether or not fishermen use GPS and other equipment seems to be the type of boat. On wooden *catamarans*, fishermen do not take GPS with them because there is no place where it can be kept safe and dry. One study⁶⁴ by a DEC member partner

⁶⁴ Signs of Transformation - Evaluation report of Discipleship Centre's post-tsunami development projects and housing project in MGR Nagar (funded by Tearfund UK), Timmo Gaasbeek et al, November 2008

found that fishermen seem well aware of sea safety issues. If there is equipment that they don't take with them, this is for practical reasons more than for lack of awareness.

Lessons/Conclusions:

- There is greater awareness about disasters and communities have been trained in safer living insofar as these relate to their homes and immediate environment.
 - The health and hygiene education which many DEC members played a significant role in have led to extensive change in sanitation practices with positive impact on public health issues, especially in areas with regular flooding.
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Section 8:

Institutional Issues for DEC Members

Questions/Issues addressed: (a) Has DRR received adequate priority within Members' actions? How did Members incorporate responsibility for DRR into their structures? (b) Have Members coordinated their support on DRR in the Tsunami areas?

The Tsunami response presents an important opportunity to assess how aid agencies addressed DRR in 'optimal' conditions. DEC members recognise that DRR cannot be limited to any one type of disaster. Studies by the members showed that although Tsunamis were not common (certainly not on such a scale) communities faced many other disaster risks. Some of these were entirely local, such as house fires, and would not attract outside support. Consequently the goal should be that communities were 'resilient' to such disasters without outside help.

Some agencies, not necessarily DEC members, have taken DRR to apply only to the particular type of disaster they are addressing. This meant that in the case of Tsunami they worked to prepare communities for another Tsunami but not for other disasters. This reflects a misunderstanding of DRR, which is about disaster risk in general. Even some of the DEC members may not have moved on from the perception, as in previous disasters, that the objective was to 'prevent the same thing happening again' whereas DRR implies a willingness to reduce *all* disaster risk. As a World Vision spokesperson remarked- *'The multi-hazard approach is vital at the community level. The kind of work we do in the communities*

would relate to whatever localised hazards there are.⁶⁵ Some agencies and staff seem to have been clearer about this than others. Even now there is some uncertainty whether the Tsunami focus on DRR was an exception (because of ample funds) and normally DEC members will focus only on specific disasters.

8.1 Need for a comprehensive approach:

Addressing the issue of 'community resilience' requires working in a holistic way across a range of issues and sectors. It is understandable that humanitarian agencies including DEC members concentrate on the areas they are best at or on issues that are already closest to their agenda. So one agency may decide to work on advocacy for inclusion of groups that face discrimination, or another may focus on the need to include the perspectives of children in relation to DRR, and yet another may choose to focus its work on psycho-social issues. All of these are vitally important for the community affected by disasters. But this also runs the danger that the interventions miss the totality of DRR and the inter-dependence and inter-linkages of various components. DRR demands a comprehensive approach that, to implement on any scale, requires the input of many different agencies. Instead the project documents show DEC members celebrating success in relation to specific inputs such as livelihoods or early warning. This makes a contribution to an aspect of community resilience but it does not amount to a comprehensive approach which would achieve the kind of sustainable vision set out by the DEC.

One can find a situation where if a specialised agency which focuses on elderly or psychosocial care isn't working in a particular village or community, these issues may be not picked up for targeted interventions. The problem is that the implementation of DRR becomes patchy because specialist inputs are only available where the specialist agencies happen to be working. Children will be consulted and involved in some areas but not in others. This lack of overall vision is a fundamental weakness in the overall approach to DRR, not just of the DEC members, but of humanitarian agencies in general.

8.2 DRR remains an aspiration:

Christian Aid's argues that *the main output of DRR work is a community that understands the dangers it faces, and is taking steps to protect itself and improve its well-being*⁶⁶. In 'Rethinking Disasters' Oxfam International emphasises *that successful disaster risk reduction policies, integrated into development work, save lives and money, making vulnerable communities more resilient and protecting development gains*.⁶⁷

The DRR policy papers of several DEC members reflect a similar aspiration, although whether or not this has been internalised in practice remains a question. The practices on the ground still amounted to only an 'add on' to vulnerability reduction activities often taking place at the end of a disaster interventions. Several DEC members have appointed staff specialising in DRR and there is a working group through BOND which has been developing good practice case studies.⁶⁸ The evidences from documents as well as our field studies suggest that DRR is an aspiration rather than a reality among DEC members and that DRR specialists are lobbying for an idea that is still developing. The British Red Cross notes

⁶⁵ Debs Harris, resilience project manager for World Vision in Asia Pacific quoted on Alertnet

⁶⁶ Christian Aid (undated) *Frequently asked questions on Disaster Risk Reduction* p1

⁶⁷ Oxfam International (2008)

⁶⁸ Moss, S (2008) *Local voices, global choices: for successful disaster risk reduction*, BOND

candidly that in its Tsunami response, the DRR component suffered from staffing constraints and a relatively late start for most activities. As a result, the programme duration has been too short to build sustainable disaster preparedness capacity within fragmented, traumatised communities (BRCS, 2009).

DRR presents profound challenges in terms of organisational structure based on separate specialisations including the deep division between disaster response and development. Without a strong lead from management and intensive systematic work to train staff and alter mindsets, DRR may still be viewed as a separate activity that takes place towards the end of a disaster response, rather than as an integrated concept of long-term disaster management. This may be a reflection of the way DRR has entered the consciousness of the members – as a separate activity that has been externally funded and as an exceptional ‘luxury’ in the case of the Tsunami Appeal.

DRR specialists within the agencies express concern over this issue. The policy papers they are drafting reflect a desire to initiate a debate about the underlying concepts, to ‘mainstream’ DRR and treat it as a ‘cross-cutting issue’ rather than a project. CAFOD’s draft framework for DRR, for example, emphasises the need to ‘develop a shared understanding of DRR with CAFOD and with partners’ and to ‘integrate DRR into Programme Cycle Management’.⁶⁹ This is clearly a huge task, requiring a strong push from management to give priority to the issue.

8.3 DRR is about Partnership and Mutual Learning:

DRR is multi-faceted and requires a multi-sectoral approach to addressing local issues. DRR starts with most local and real risk—say drinking water—faced by the community and evolve into wider range of risks including those such as conflict. No single agency, no matter how resourceful, has the capacity, resources and competence to address all the core issues that affect communities’ vulnerability to disasters. This is where partnership becomes crucial.

This review has seen good international and community-level partnerships for risk reduction. DEC Members have increasingly facilitated recovery support through local partners and have developed partnerships with civil society organisations and with governments for reducing disaster risks. However, joint work between DEC members remains an exception. Although DEC is not a strategic body for coordination of members’ response, given that DEC puts out joint appeals on behalf of all the members, one would expect certain level of cooperation and collaboration among the agencies on the ground. Lack of engagement of several DEC members during the field work for this review in any of the three countries has meant that opportunities have been missed for enriching the data and lessons for this review for inter-agency learning.

A number of training and capacity building activities are carried out by DEC members but more systematic, collaborative, and public research and learning efforts are still to emerge. Some member projects have included valuable research and documentation related to DRR, but much valuable information remains unavailable to outside agencies or the public. DRR presents a profound challenge in relation to relief agencies and development organisations working together to maximise DRR inputs to communities, recognising that no agency can achieve objectives of disaster risk reduction on its own.

Lessons/Conclusions:

⁶⁹ CAFOD (undated) *CAFOD Disaster Risk Reduction Framework - draft*

- A great deal of training and capacity building activities are carried out by DEC Members, but more systematic, collaborative, and public research and learning efforts are yet to emerge.
- Joint actions at multiple levels are more effective over single-agency actions, however technically sound and well thought out. DEC members need to strengthen their commitment to working collaboratively amongst themselves and learning from each other⁷⁰.

Section 9:

Key Lessons and Challenges: Disaster Risk Reduction in the Future

As discussed in preceding sections, there has been significant progress on putting in place grassroots institutions linked to the government at district level in all the countries, and great deal of emphasis is being put on DRR at community level by the governments and NGOs. The DEC members have played a critical role in this process. There is greater awareness about disasters and communities have been trained in safer living in many communities.

These are significant achievements. There are also valuable lessons that are emerging from the work done in the three countries following the Tsunami, and some agencies ahead of others in taking these forward in their work in different countries. Some of the key lessons to emerge from this review are as follows:

- Effective interventions on DRR have the potential to strengthen grassroots institutions at the local and district level as well as create strong interface between grassroots community organisations and local authorities, making local governance more inclusive and participatory.

⁷⁰ This was also strongly articulated in an evaluation of DEC response to Tsunami conducted in 2005. See *Independent Evaluation of the DEC Tsunami Crisis Response*, Final Report, November 2005

- While village level hazard maps and preparedness plans have been developed, unless these lead to practical action aimed at mitigation measures, people will lose interest in keeping these updated.
- Interventions which are based on strong partnership and links with local organisations including private sector (banks/financial and insurance companies) were far more likely to succeed than one-off asset distributions.
- Disaster preparedness has been mainly focused on preparedness for emergency response, and that too, with focus on Tsunami-like disasters. So far, with a few exceptions, not enough attention and investment has gone into early warning, preventive and mitigation measures and recurring disasters like floods and droughts.

DEC members are making serious efforts to take on board DRR approaches in their humanitarian programming. DRR also presents a profound challenge to agencies' ways of thinking about vulnerability and disasters. DRR cuts across all sectors or themes and requires a long-term approach which often does not sit comfortably within agency structures and processes especially when focusing on delivery needed to develop a practical understanding of how to integrate climate change in humanitarian programming.

Going into the future, the key challenge the DEC and its members need to recognise is that effective disaster risk reduction requires new ways of doing business. Conventional disaster response based on provision of relief assistance and competing for relief funds, separating organisation structure between emergencies and development may all still have their place in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. However if disaster risk reduction is to form a core agenda, collaborative work and joint actions at multiple levels, including working closely with governments will be essential. The DEC could set an example here by bringing together many of the biggest agencies and others could join in. The advantage for the members might be that they can leverage longer time-spans for disasters and better linkages into their ongoing development work. It need not be called a DEC process but maybe the DEC could be the forum to get it going. This is separate from general coordination of humanitarian response as is currently understood. This is about joint planning, strategic thinking and collaborative action.