

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of  
DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds  
March to December 2000  
Expanded Executive Summary

This evaluation is published in two volumes. This is an expanded executive summary and contains the full executive summary together with part of the introduction.

Volume one contains the main findings of the evaluation including the executive summary.

Volume two contains the appendices including the detailed beneficiary study and the summaries of the activities of the DEC agencies. Each agency summary looks at key issues relating to the performance of the agencies as well as presenting general data about their programme.

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Further details about this and other DEC evaluations can be found at the DEC website.

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
## Executive Summary

### *Introduction*

The floods that took place in Mozambique in the first quarter of 2000 were the worst in living memory. Both rural and urban communities were devastated as the floods took 700 lives and destroyed houses, crops, livestock, and livelihoods. The floods caused damages of over £500 million and affected the lives of two million people, including displacing or making homeless more than half a million. The floods also severely damaged or destroyed countless roads and bridges, four hospitals, forty-eight other health facilities, and five hundred schools in one of the poorest countries in the world.

In the UK the public gave generously to the Mozambique Floods Appeal launched by the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), which raised £31.5 million. Of the 14 DEC member agencies, all but three participated in the appeal<sup>A</sup>. The remaining eleven<sup>B</sup> shared £18.7 million of the money raised between them to fund the first nine months of their activities to December 2000 (Phase One).

Agencies share of Appeal Funds for Phase One




DEC agencies moved families to places of safety, provided or distributed food, water, sanitation, shelter, and basic household utensils to some of the hundreds of thousands of people taking refuge in the Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs)

<sup>A</sup> CARE did not participate in the appeal even though they had a large programme in Mozambique. The other two members, Children's Aid Direct and the Christian Children's Fund of Great Britain had no existing programmes in Mozambique.

<sup>B</sup> Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid, British Red Cross Society (BRCS), ActionAid, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), World Vision UK, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged, Medical Relief in Emergencies (MERLIN), and Tearfund.

on higher ground. When people left the TACs the DEC agencies followed them with assistance to rebuild their houses or re-establish their livelihoods. The agencies repaired roads, distributed household utensils, food, seeds, tools, and housing kits to help the population recover.

Agencies expenditure of Appeal Funds for Phase One



The humanitarian response, in which the DEC agencies played a significant part, was successful. After the initial loss of life in the floods themselves, there were relatively few deaths in the TACs<sup>A</sup>. Levels of malnutrition were also low.

As always, the DEC Secretariat commissioned an independent evaluation of the expenditure of funds raised by the appeal, both to report back to the UK public on the use of the funds and to learn lessons for future emergencies. This brief report has been drawn from the introduction and executive summary of the report<sup>B</sup>.

### *Overall Findings*

The evaluation team found that the DEC agencies did a good job in responding to the floods in Mozambique in 2000. All of the DEC agencies had something unique to offer and all contributed to an effective response. They achieved this good result despite numerous operational challenges, particularly of access. The DEC agencies used the resources entrusted to them by the UK public in a sensible way. They provided timely assistance that was largely appropriate to needs and to the local context and that had a real impact on the lives of those affected by the floods.

This impact will continue to be felt long beyond the life of individual programmes. Low mortality and morbidity was reported during the emergency period, and the DEC agencies also helped families return to their lands after the floods and rebuild their lives. While many people, agencies, and governments contributed to the success of the humanitarian operation that took place the DEC agencies and their partners

<sup>A</sup> The mortality rate in the camps was reportedly lower than the (admittedly high) background rate for Mozambique. (Source: Interview with Joe Hanlon)

<sup>B</sup> The full text of the report is available on the DEC website at <http://www.dec.org.uk>

played a particularly important role, carrying out a significant and very impressive amount of work.

### *Appropriateness*

Though DEC agencies had only limited involvement in the search and rescue activities that followed the floods, they were involved in a wide range of activities in the relief phase. These included food distribution and the provision of non-food-items, emergency shelter, water, sanitation, camp services and health services. The fast response by the DEC agencies meant that they were among the first to assist those affected. This relief assistance was particularly appropriate.

DEC agencies also had extensive programmes to help communities recover their livelihoods. These largely focused on agriculture but also included the renovation of schools, clinics, and other social infrastructure. DEC agencies were also active in efforts to reduce vulnerability to future disasters through programmes such as resettlement, and the promotion of the use of treated mosquito nets.

While interventions in all phases were generally appropriate, those that took place in the latter stages of the emergency response tended to be less appropriate than those at the beginning. The reasons for this are as follows:

- all of the agencies underestimated the resilience of the Mozambican population and their coping mechanisms
- beneficiary needs and capacities grew in their range and complexity with time, making the typical “one size fits all” solution of standard kits or packs less appropriate
- the need for beneficiary consultation became more important with time while the lack of this became more evident.

The evaluation team considers that, in the latter stages of the response, the greater use of cash, in direct distribution as grants or as part of kits, as well as in payment for work, would have allowed beneficiaries to respond better to their own needs.

The evaluation team found that despite this the interventions of the DEC agencies were generally appropriate. They were based on assessments and on knowledge of Mozambique and were professionally delivered. They were broadly appropriate to the context and culture. The assistance was timely and the DEC agencies were often the first to deliver assistance in many sectors.

### *Impact*

The work of the DEC agencies had a real and noticeable impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. The evaluation team found evidence of the positive impact of the DEC agencies everywhere that they travelled. The efforts of the DEC agencies covered all phases of the operation, the whole of the affected area, and most sectors of activity, with a correspondingly broad impact.

### *Efficiency*

The DEC agencies used the resources entrusted to them by the UK public in a responsible way. The most glaring inefficiency was not anything done by the DEC agencies, but was donor governments' use of military resources instead of

commercial alternatives. Some of the most efficient interventions by DEC agencies were actions taken to mobilise resources of other agencies.

Some DEC agencies implemented their programmes using their own staff while others either funded partners or used a combination of both. The evaluation team found that no one approach was inherently more efficient. While the extensive use of expatriate staff was very efficient in the initial stages, it became less so with time compared with the recruitment and training of local staff. The most efficient responses took place where agencies were able to build on pre-existing programmes or on their investment in disaster preparedness.

Short time limits on expenditure meant that some interventions were less efficient than they could have been. This was not helped by the slow financial reporting systems of several DEC agencies that did not make for efficient resource control in an emergency situation. It was impossible to compare unit costs between agencies, but indirect measures suggested that some interventions were less efficient than they could have been.

Where health and safety was concerned there were many examples of both good and poor practice by DEC agencies. Poor health and safety practices not only posed a risk to the lives and welfare of agency staff, but also posed the risk of costly accidents or responses to them.

Many DEC agencies have special internal mechanisms for the rapid and effective management of their emergency response. While there are unique factors in each agency, the sharing of information about these mechanisms would allow each of the DEC agencies an opportunity to improve their own emergency management mechanism.

### *Coverage*

The DEC appeal was limited to Mozambique rather than the wider Southern African Region. This was appropriate as Mozambique was the worst affected country and a focused appeal probably generated more funds than a broader one would have done.

As a group, DEC agencies and their partners worked throughout the whole country and assisted beneficiaries in the places that were hardest to reach. Overall, partly because of the involvement of agencies that were not as professional as those of the DEC, those beneficiaries who were more accessible received significantly more assistance. The evaluation team found no evidence that aid was allocated or directed within Mozambique based on political affiliation.

Despite the inclusion of vulnerable individuals in target criteria, delivery to them was more by chance than by specific targeting. Some vulnerable groups were put at a disadvantage by aid programmes that did not take their particular needs into account. Such failings were not always noticed because of the lack of monitoring data categorised by gender, age, or vulnerability.

### *Connectedness*

The DEC agencies were generally familiar with the long-term context in Mozambique and took this into account in their programmes. The biggest problems were with the sustainability of the permanent infrastructure that they built.

## *Coherence*

Government co-ordination was strong in Maputo and poor outside the capital in the initial stages. This improved in the recovery phase as the activities fell under the aegis of particular ministries, rather than with the newly formed and inexperienced National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC - Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades). There were ongoing co-ordination problems in the resettlement of people affected by the floods as this did not fall neatly under any one ministry.

Mozambique is a developing country with a complex set of rules that is administered by an under-resourced and sometimes poorly educated bureaucracy. This bureaucracy sometimes caused delays and increased costs for DEC agencies. Programmes also suffered from bureaucracy within the DEC agencies themselves.

## *Appeal management*

Co-ordination among DEC agencies was very good, and the establishment of a DEC agency group was extremely positive. However, setting up this effective mechanism for co-ordination between the DEC agencies demanded management resources at the same time that they were putting all their efforts into organising their own response. The delegation of authority by the DEC to the DEC agency group in Maputo for the allocation of 'surplus' appeal funds was very positive in that it enabled the agencies in Mozambique to react very quickly to the 2001 floods.

The agencies saw the DEC appeal process as a valuable mechanism, not just in terms of providing funds, but both in raising awareness in the UK of the emergency in Mozambique and providing a channel for their donations. Members of the DEC found that they were brought together in-country in a positive way enhancing their mutual lesson learning and co-operation.

Although agency monitoring and reporting was generally of a high standard there were some exceptions. There was a broad consensus among agencies that DEC reporting requirements and rules needed clarifying at the outset, particularly as many of the field staff involved came into contact with the DEC for the first time.

## *Standards*

Although all of the DEC agencies subscribe to the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief* one of the agencies had systems in place to monitor their compliance. With a very few exceptions, DEC agencies did not promote the code or monitor their own compliance. The evaluation team found that compliance with the principles of the code was not always satisfactory. The lack of support given by DEC agencies to beneficiaries settling away from the resettlement sites indicated by the government, although in line with government policy, may have breached the principle that all beneficiaries are entitled to assistance in proportion to their needs.

DEC agencies promoted the Sphere standards<sup>A</sup> and measured their work against them. There were some deviations from the numerical indicators in the Sphere

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<sup>A</sup> The Sphere project was set-up establish minimum standards for the provision of services to beneficiaries in emergencies. These standards cover disaster assistance in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health services.

standards and in some cases agencies decided to adhere to national standards instead. The evaluation team found that these deviations were generally appropriate.

### *Conclusion*

While there was room for improvement, the evaluation team found that the DEC agency response was generally appropriate, efficient, effective, and coherent. The agencies between them achieved a good and effective coverage of those affected by the disaster. Through the DEC agencies, the UK public's generosity has had a significant impact on relieving suffering among flood-affected communities.