ALNAP | Blogs

Let's hear it for the monolith

Fri, 12 Apr 2013 14:48:55 GMT

Posted on 12 April at 14:48 by Paul Knox Clarke.

As the humanitarian community worries about increasing fragmentation, perhaps it's time to think about the upside of a diverse and complex system, suggests Paul Knox Clarke.

Last week I took part in a consultation organised by OCHA on the topic of Humanitarian Effectiveness. We discussed what ‘effectiveness’ means in a humanitarian context: a fascinating discussion, but one which I couldn’t do justice to here. I would like, though, to pick up on one strand of the conversation – the relationship between uniformity and effectiveness.

It is very difficult to come up with a single criterion for measuring the effectiveness of humanitarian activities. Few would agree that effectiveness should be gauged purely by the degree to which we meet stated objectives: what if we had the wrong objectives in the first place? If they don’t take into account the real needs of the people, or of all the people requiring assistance? What if, in meeting these needs, we make people less resilient? This, of course, is why many evaluators use a broad set of several criteria, such as those produced by OECD DAC to judge if programmes have been successful, and why at ALNAP we use the OECD DAC criteria as the framework for the State of the Humanitarian System.

The really interesting thing, for me, about using these different criteria is that, in many circumstances, being successful in one may lead to being less successful in others. Programmes which strive to reach every last person in need may not be particularly efficient, for example. Programmes which aim to build longer term capacities, or reduce vulnerabilities, may lead to the allocation of resources to those who do not present immediate humanitarian needs. These tensions are inherent in our work, and while most humanitarians would agree that all of the OECD DAC criteria are important components of being effective, they would probably disagree on which criterion should be given highest priority.

It is unlikely that all of ALNAP’s members would agree on a single, overarching criterion, and unlikely that – if pushed to do so – we would agree on which criteria are more important than others. While we are all working in the same arena, with broadly similar goals, we are not all the same. The ‘formal’ humanitarian system is composed of many different organisations, with different priorities and approaches.

These differences can often be frustrating, and sometimes inefficient. A colleague at the OCHA workshop pointed out how common it is to talk about the “proliferation” and “fragmentation” of humanitarian actors, and to bemoan the lack of “common” definitions or approaches. Faced with messy complexity, we are tempted to rationalise, systematise and unify. There are good arguments for this. By consolidating, we become more efficient, as we reduce disagreements and overlaps. We also become more effective, by focussing our joint efforts on common objectives.

But wait a minute. If uniformity is so effective, why is it so rare in the social and natural worlds? Ecosystems, societies, and – at least today – most economic and political systems are anything but unitary. Instead, they are characterised by large numbers of diverse entities interacting with the environment, and with each other in a wide variety of different ways. They include mess, competition and overlap.

Why is this? I’m not an ecologist or an economist, but I suspect that it is because the benefits of diversity outweigh the (very considerable) costs. Variety allows a system to develop multiple approaches to the same problem, which increases the chances of finding effective solutions, and supports innovation and growth. A certain degree of overlap serves as an insurance policy: if one response is ineffective, another might (and in a similar vein, resilience in a system normally requires a degree of redundancy).

None of these systems are anarchic. Interactions are controlled by laws (human or natural) which provide a container inside which the system can work effectively. And they generally have systems to reward success and sanction failure. When we compare this to our system, we see common principles serving as the ‘laws’, but –arguably – a lack of rewards and sanctions: humanitarian actors seldom go out of business.

None of this is to say that we shouldn’t try to improve the system – and in some cases, this improvement will mean rationalisation. But it might also mean building the conditions for effective pluralistic action. We should be careful to see only the positive side of uniformity, and the negative side of diversity. As our colleague at the workshop said, it starts in the language we use – doesn’t ‘diversity’ sound more positive than ‘fragmentation’?

So – let’s hear it for the monolith… anybody?

Avoiding 'evidence wars' in humanitarian aid

Fri, 22 Mar 2013 16:24:17 GMT

Posted on 22 March at 16:24 by John Mitchell.

As I returned to my seat after presenting the ALNAP meeting paper on evidence I wondered what would happen next? Two distinguished and eminent thinkers, Mary Anderson and Anthony Redmond, were about to give their reactions. Mary of course is known to us all as the architect of ‘do no harm’ and, as our Chair (Nan Buzard) pointed out, Anthony’s list of accomplishments was simply was too long to read out. Yes, this was going to be interesting.

Slowly I began to relax. As Mary and Anthony spoke, I looked across the room (populated by 152 of the humanitarian aid system’s sharpest thinkers from 52 countries) and saw a sea of nodding heads. In fact, nods of agreement from two different camps - those who championed the use of randomised control trials in humanitarian response, as well as those at the other end of the spectrum who championed local knowledge. And the unexpected thing was that both groups were nodding at both responses.

This was not what we had anticipated months earlier when the ALNAP Secretariat and Steering Committee began to plan the event. Evidence did seem like an idea whose time had well and truly come and other sectors were on fire with debate about who (and whose) evidence was gathered and used. But as we looked more closely at the debates, it became clear that talking about evidence could quickly slide into fighting about evidence. The blogosphere was full of posts and ripostes by those calling for higher evidence thresholds and others pushing hard for more contextualised knowledge. Fascinating, but polarised to the point of being alienating. Positions seemed entrenched. War had been declared.

In this light, the sight of nodding heads at our meeting was reassuring. Humanitarian practitioners and policy makers are on the whole a pragmatic lot and it looked like we were going to avoid the polarisation trap. And that was why it was so gratifying to be part of the numerous workshops, discussion panels and plenary sessions at the ALNAP meeting. Every argument put forward was valid, every idea thoughtful and thought-provoking.

Of course, it would not be a genuine meeting of minds (or very interesting) if everyone agreed completely with everyone else. There was much room for debate, but a real sense of purpose permeated the event: people were interested in it to make better decisions about what works and what doesn’t.

By the end of the three day meeting, there was a shifting towards the ‘third way’ of a mixed method approach – valuing and adapting elements of both the empirical data and contextual, personal knowledge.

I hope the participants return to their work with a renewed energy and greater feeling of balance about what makes ‘good’ evidence. And if you missed the meeting, or were there but missed out when choosing from the many sessions on offer, you can always view video clips, audio recordings presentations and meeting materials in our virtual space – it’s being updated constantly over the coming weeks. (Watch the videos and see if you agree with me about the nodding).

Why DFID is now funding innovation scale-up

Thu, 14 Mar 2013 10:25:47 GMT

Posted on 14 March at 10:25 by Nicola Murray.

The last month and half has been a whirlwind induction into the humanitarian sector. For those who I haven’t met yet, I’ve joined the Research and Evidence Division in DFID to work on humanitarian innovation and evidence. As generalist civil servant with a background in climate and environment policy, this has been a steep learning curve but one which has been absolutely fascinating.

What has been particularly striking so far is how DFID is taking up the challenge to be more innovative set out by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). We've set our plan of action in the (punchily named!) document Promoting innovation and evidence-based approaches to building resilience and responding to humanitarian crises: A DFID Strategy Paper. Don’t be put off by the title, as I think it really clearly articulates our assessment in DFID of the problem in terms of humanitarian innovation and evidence, and where we are going to sharply focus our energies. On the innovation side, it sets out that we want to promote and support humanitarian innovation, particularly ensuring that innovations make it to scale.

What do we mean by innovation? For us, an innovation is the creation and implementation of a new or improved process, product, service or method of delivery. It can occur through a series of novel incremental improvements or can involve a radical transformation. To put it crudely, successful innovations of all types have been shown to move through a number of key stages from recognition of the problem, to the invention of a solution or idea, the development of the innovation, implementation through pilot testing and sequent scaling; and (hopefully if you’ve got this far) diffusion of the innovation outside its original setting. This is not a straight forward linear process. There is much iteration and, perhaps stating the obvious, not all ideas make it to diffusion and scale-up. Underpinning each of these stages should also be a sound evidence base which supports the innovation throughout its development.

A relatively recent report commissioned by the Gates Foundation, highlighted three key market failures in the investment community’s ability to engage with development focused innovators, namely there isn’t an efficient intermediary so cost for searching out innovations are high. There is no “development innovation industry” structure providing a platform for innovators or a meeting place for the investment community. And whilst there has been an explosion in the number of development impact investors, there has been no corresponding growth in bankable innovations.

Innovations that do secure funding, be it public or private, have to battle what is often dubbed in innovation circles as the “two valleys of death”. Firstly, sparkly new innovations may be able to attract initial funds to generate knowledge and ideas, but struggle to find early-stage risk capital to advance to pilots and prototypes. Secondly, if they are able to progress to proof of concept they struggle to make the leap to commercialization through late-stage capital and cash-flow from sales. Developing a robust evidence base at both valleys can help bridge these challenges, by ensuring that the innovation is able to make a strong case of its value and potential impact.

The Humanitarian Innovation Fund has made great strides in trying to address some of these challenges for the humanitarian sector. It has already established itself as an important asset by providing financial support to would be innovators, enabling and encouraging diverse partnerships, and building a unique community of practice around innovation. If you haven’t recently checked out their website, I would really recommend a quick look at their case studies – everything for rapid evacuation wheelchairs to beneficiary feedback using SMS. We’re also working with the HIF on a new challenge fund for wash, sanitation and hygiene innovations – so watch this space.

However, the HIF only goes as far as proof of concept which leaves successful humanitarian innovations at risk of failing foul of the second valley.

To help address this, we have recently launched an exciting partnership with the USAID Development Innovation Venture team and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance to support humanitarian innovators to scale-up their ideas. In particular we will be looking for ideas which can articulate a robust case of how their intervention will address an identified humanitarian challenge. Applicants should also be able to present rigorously gathered evidence of effectiveness, cost-efficiency and impact from pilot-level testing in order to justify investment in their expansion. I’m really looking forward to seeing what interests this partnership produces, as it will only take one or two transformative innovations to really make an impact on millions of people’s lives.

Leadership - from lexicon to understanding

Mon, 04 Feb 2013 12:28:43 GMT

Posted on 4 February at 12:28 by Patricia McIlreavy.

Leadership is a concept that runs like an electric current through every evaluation, study and anecdotal criticism made about the humanitarian system and our ability to respond effectively. The word is charged with expectations. We qualify it, often negatively, demonstrating repeatedly how a strong aspiration can be weakened by the mere addition of an adjective. Poor. Ineffective. Controlling.

Glorified for its mystical promise of salvation, leadership is also a tawdry over-worn excuse for when something goes wrong. Yet we, the humanitarian community still seek answers for all our ills through chanting its mantra. Leadership. Leadership. Leadership.

For the past two years, I have been up-close and personal within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Working Group as we developed a “transformative agenda” to guide our action for an improved coordinated response in emergencies. We spoke at length of three main areas that needed attention - leadership, coordination and strategy; all the while knowing that for the latter two to occur, the first needs to be empowered, effective, competent, and humanitarian.

At times I truly wondered why anyone would take on the task of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The job has a thousand responsibilities, 10,000 critics and millions of people who depend on the creation of an enabling environment for collective action.

Yet no one person, however broad their shoulders, can take on this responsibility alone. The transformative agenda highlights that the leadership gap within a coordinated response does not lie solely with the Humanitarian Coordinator. The collective leadership of the Humanitarian Country Team is also central to a response’s success.

Unfortunately, a team does not become a team merely by assignation of a moniker. Everyone on a team has to have a common goal, shared values and an understanding of their role. Some of this can be dictated via guidance but other aspects of our success will rely on the will of the group, and, yes, the leadership of the individuals that comprise it.

How can a diverse and heterogeneous sector such as that of the NGO community be appropriately represented in this body? Will our voice be heard and welcomed? And if so, whose voice is it, and how do we ensure represents the wider NGO community?

Questions all well-deserving of answers. Not only for ourselves, but for the people we serve.

And to this end, we need your help.

InterAction is launching a series of studies in 2013 examining Perceptions, Expectations and Realities of NGO Coordination in Humanitarian Response. Our goal is to document the current role and quality of the NGO community's contributions within a coordinated response. All humanitarian actors need to understand better the operational implications of the transformative agenda.

The first of these studies explores the effectiveness of NGO representation within Humanitarian Country Teams. If you have worked within a crisis response, than we want to hear from YOU.

The survey can be found at http://www.research.net/s/NGOsandHCTs and will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

As NGOs are the key implementers in humanitarian response and are often closest to those affected by crises, our voice within strategic discussions, prioritization exercises and advocacy messaging is critical. Through this research, InterAction hopes to improve our own awareness of our role and the responsibility that comes with it.

Cash may be the 'new normal', but is its role really clear?

Tue, 15 Jan 2013 10:30:59 GMT

Posted on 15 January at 10:30 by Haley Bowcock.

The New Year sees a positive development in the growing acceptance of cash transfer programmes (CTPs) as an appropriate and effective tool to meet needs in emergencies: the Food Assistance Convention has come into force.

This welcome policy development will undoubtedly help to pave the way for more routine consideration of CTPs in emergencies, and likely at ever greater scales. But this in turn has got me thinking about some of the current barriers that may prevent this happening in practice. One constraint to the large-scale consideration or use of CTPs in emergencies – be they as a response to food insecurity or other immediate needs – is that the place of cash is not always clear in sector-based humanitarian coordination systems.

For instance, cash coordination tends to be reactive rather than strategic, and is usually sector-specific. There have now been many cash coordination groups set up in response to emergencies, including in Haiti, Pakistan Côte d’Ivoire and the Horn of Africa, to name a few. These groups are usually set up only once agencies have (separately) done response analysis and decided to implement CTPs. This means that opportunities for harmonised programming or for implementing multi-sector responses that incorporate CTP can be missed.

I’ve written previously in these pages on the coordination of CTPs in emergencies. A recent Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) comparative study (based on two reviews of cash coordination experiences from Haiti and the Horn of Africa, and experiences from other emergencies) proposed a new way to envisage cash coordination. Rather than seeing cash transfers as a single ‘entity’ that needs a distinct coordination structure (such as a ‘cash cluster’), cash coordination is instead broken down into a set of constituent tasks or functions, that needn’t all be coordinated in the same way. The functions of cash coordination range from the technical (e.g. a community of practice, the harmonisation of transfer rates, etc.) to the strategic (e.g. determining when it is appropriate to deploy cash transfers, mapping gaps and duplications etc.).

While all areas of cash coordination require strengthening to some extent, at the most recent CaLP global learning event based on the study and review findings, there was agreement amongst participants that the greatest gaps lie in strategic coordination. Most major emergencies are coordinated through the cluster approach, and there is little appetite for adding another coordination structure to the mix. Strengthening the capacity of the cluster system to take on various functions of cash coordination was identified as a priority.
Within this, integrating cash within all of the sectoral clusters – their trainings, guidance, assessment and decision-making tools, and so on – is key for making the consideration of cash more explicit within their work. Cash can play a powerful role as a multi-sector and multi-purpose tool that flexibly addresses a range of needs. There is of course a risk that aligning the use of cash too closely with a sector-based coordination system may constrain its more innovative applications. However, integrating cash coordination into existing clusters is a pragmatic first step in the short- to-medium-term.

External developments such as the coming into force of the Food Assistance Convention suggest that cash is on the way to becoming a ‘new normal’ in emergency response, and so likely to increase the need for effective coordination of CTP. What, then, do you see as the priority areas to address for improved cash coordination in emergencies? Where do you see it sitting in humanitarian coordination systems? One thing is for sure: given the ability of CTP to cross sectors and meet multiple needs, any cash coordination at cluster level should be complemented by additional cross-sectoral coordination. Clear consensus is yet to emerge on the structure, responsibilities and placement of this inter-sectoral group, or how it would be reflected at global level. What are your thoughts on the long-term arrangements for this?

[Photo caption: Tess Williams/Oxfam]

The Trouble with Aid

Fri, 14 Dec 2012 11:54:59 GMT

Posted on 14 December at 11:54 by John Mitchell.

I sat down to watch Riccardo Pollack’s BBC 4 documentary ‘The Trouble with Aid’ knowing that it was going to raise vitally important issues about aid neutrality. This is good news and it is healthy that such issues are brought to the attention of the public and also that the humanitarian community is seen to be held accountable by the media.

The film’s hypothesis was simple: aid agencies offer simplistic solutions to complicated problems and that aid workers are politically naive, are quickly out of their depth in difficult situations and end up feeling disillusioned, let down, angry and/or guilty. Cue several key shots accompanied by emotive music; an ex-SCF worker walking across a meadow, collar up; a well-known figure from MSF in existential pose in a French café; a lingering head shot of an ex-Oxfam nutritionist reflecting on being let down by his organisation after Cambodia; an ex-Care Country Director standing like a statue and staring into the distance; and another ex-MSF field worker alone on a landscape. The point is clear – aid has not delivered the solutions it promised and, in the face of defeat, agencies would be well advised to pack their bags and go home.

'The Trouble with Aid' is ‘good TV’ and it successfully tells a powerful and emotive story but what is unfortunate, and a sadly missed opportunity, is that the film does not follow the most basic steps that all good journalists are expected to use – attempting also to disprove, or at least test, their own hypothesis that aid sometimes does more harm than good. As a matter of good practice I would have thought that the programme should have done three things.

First, it should have considered many other contexts, including natural disasters, which might suggest aid does more good than harm. Second, it should have used the enormous amount of data that exists (especially the State of the Humanitarian System Report which was offered to the programme) rather than solely relying on a very small group of contributors, none of whom legitimately represent affected populations. And thirdly, it should have seriously considered counterfactuals or alternatives: what if there had been no support to Cambodia or Ethiopia, or the Rwanda camps? This approach would have resulted in a more accurate picture and would not have detracted from a compelling story. There even may have been room for a shot of one or two aid workers enjoying a celebratory beer in the pub after a job well done!

In the panel discussion afterwards the journalist Ian Birrell said that he wished that the media could be more effective in holding the aid community to account. But in the light of this programme I can’t help feeling that we should ask another equally important question. Who holds journalists and film-makers to account for presenting a one-sided picture? Should there not be some mutual accountability here?

Helping people is always complicated - in families, welfare and in war (Poverty Matters Blog by Hugo Slim in The Guardian)

The Debating Chamber - “The Trouble With Aid” shows the trouble with documentaries (AlertNet blog by Hugo Slim)

A two-way ticket to Helsinki: evaluation luggage, maps and souvenirs

Mon, 05 Nov 2012 10:20:53 GMT

Posted on 5 November at 10:20 by Francesca Bonino.

In early October I attended the 10th EES Biennial Conference in Helsinki. I’d like to share a personal reflection and unpack a little of the ‘humanitarian evaluation luggage’ I brought back with me.

Unexpectedly, I came back to my ALNAP humanitarian evaluation researcher desk with a more optimistic take on how Evaluating Humanitarian Action (EHA) is seemingly starting to peek through the branches of the larger aid evaluation tree. Perhaps – if you can bear another arboreal metaphor – I could say that EHA is starting to enjoy a bit of sun exposure!

Why do I think this is the case?

EHA is on the evaluation map

EHA was featured in the conference programme – and not only as a side event – but as one of the pre-conference evaluation training opportunities offered. One of the positive spill overs of putting EHA ‘on offer’ at such large events is that it attracts interest from a different group of evaluation practitioners. Riccardo Polastro, for example, delivered a one-day session on EHA for an audience that included evaluators sitting in ministerial offices; public health evaluators; policy and advocacy officers new to EHA; M&E officers that have recently rotated positions from development to humanitarian evaluation portfolios in large multi-mandate NGOs.

I personally find the lateral thinking and questions coming from such gathering of diverse backgrounds very stimulating. I wish there were more opportunities within the ALNAP evaluators’ community to get input from other evaluation disciplines to share emerging reflections (e.g. around indicators and process use in evaluation).

I got talking to a number of development evaluators in Helsinki who didn’t have regular contact and exchanges with the evaluation/M&E office covering the humanitarian aid portfolio within their organisation, and vice versa. This was especially the case in large multi-mandate/multi-context INGOs, but also within donor agencies.

Be it real or perceived, this ‘insularity’ between development and humanitarian evaluation teams is to the detriment of intra-organisational peer-level learning. Evaluators housed under the same ‘organisational roof’ may be exposed to very different evaluation cultures and subjected to different stakeholders’ expectations and assumptions toward evaluation.

Real Time Evaluation (RTE) is a larger dot on the map

The concepts, key features and evolving practice in RTE is the one topic area that received, for me, a surprisingly high level of attention in the main conference programme. Amidst strands of conference showcasing ‘more sophisticated’ evaluation approaches and applications, there was a sizeable interest in getting more exposure to RTEs practice from different angles – including the humanitarian one. Ted Kliest, familiar to evaluators in the ALNAP network, chaired a few sessions that ranged from donor perspectives on RTEs in humanitarian action (MFA Germany) to real-time approaches to gather and use data from crisis-affected populations in disaster settings (experience of the Ushaidi Haiti project).

To some ‘evaluation purists’ humanitarian RTEs could appear as leaning markedly towards a more ‘rough-and-ready’ approach to conducting evaluation in often data-poor and operationally fluid contexts. Yet the attitude in Helsinki was an openness to delve deeper into RTE practices, to strengthen different elements and potential applications of RTEs (not only by operational humanitarian agencies, but also by donors and NDMAs for instance).

Causal inference in evaluation

One other piece of ‘evaluation luggage’ that I think the EHA community will more and more start picking up is about the evolving discussion about causal inferences in impact evaluation. In addition to the high profile counterfactual evaluation frameworks (hinging on the application of experimental/quasi-experimental designs), Elliott Stern, in this recent DFID-commission paper, gives an overview on other types of causal inferences beyond counterfactual. He identifies and groups them under the headings of: regularity frameworks; multiple causation; and generative causation. (See report pp.16-17).

What I took away from the reactions to this work, is that it seems that more efforts and more ‘armaments’ are being put in place to start levelling the ground between causal and explanatory approaches to unpack the causation challenge. One interesting footnote about Stern’s work: among the different excerpts of DfID’s evaluation work he analysed, the humanitarian relief and response to the Haiti earthquake (see pp. 57-59) was featured in addition to the evaluation data set extracted from other programmes looking at longer-term interventions.

Evaluation souveneirs

And finally, here are two evaluation-related ‘souvenirs’ I’ve brought back from the conference for you:

A report by Isabelle Vogel (2012) reviewing the use of theory of change in international development and how ‘theory of change thinking’ can help “clarify what is going on ‘behind the arrows” (p.20) of the renowned ‘logframe’ approach. Although the focus is explicitly on development interventions, the report features different examples where different theories of change were used in programmes operating in fragile contexts.
BetterEvaluation - a very well structured and user-friendly portal. Although the international collaboration that supports this initiative brings together more expertise from the development evaluation field, there are a number of resources - including evaluation methods and tools options that EHA evaluators – at all levels of seniority! – may find interesting.

I am sure some evaluators in the ALNAP Network went last week to Minneapolis to the 26th AEA Annual Conference. I would love to hear about what they brought back in their humanitarian evaluation luggage! Any souvenirs to share with the EHA community?

The trust factor: humanitarian networks in uncertain times

Thu, 10 Jan 2013 16:13:21 GMT

Posted on 10 January at 16:13 by Kim Scriven.

Last month I was immersed in the world of humanitarian networks, Bangladeshi-style. I’m interested in how national NGOs use networks to boost their capacities and improve preparation for, and response to, crises. Unpicking aspiration from action is always going to be tricky, and not just in the vibrant and diverse community of NGOs across Bangladesh.

In Dhaka, networks fulfil a range of functions – from jointly advocating for change in national level disaster management policy, to sharing good practice and mobilising resources. This hasn’t always been an easy process: there are a number of instances of short-term successes failing to lead to sustainable networks in the longer term.

Looking at networks across different contexts and sharing the factors critical to their success or failure is an exciting prospect. ALNAP has long suggested that a networks perspective could be important in getting the most out of the increasing number of initiatives and inter-agency structures increasingly present in the humanitarian system.

Back in Bangladesh, the pace of change seems furious. National NGOs are thinking and speaking more and more in terms of collective action; the UN is working with the government on national-level coordination structures; INGOs, through consortiums driven by donor funding and under the auspices of the ECB Project, are stepping up their collaboration efforts. Within this broad range of collaborative endeavours, those tasked with responding to disasters see positive improvements as well as specific instances of collaboration, like the recent work on joint emergency needs assessments led by ECB and ACAPS.

But despite the plethora of networks and other collaborations, their success is neither straightforward nor a given (and how you measure that success is another matter in itself). I was pleased, then, to see ECB’s publication, What We Know About Collaboration, which shares the experiences from a range of ECB country consortia, including Bangladesh. There are no quick fixes, and the ten identified factors for success cover area including:

ensuring effective leadership
the need for clear aims and objectives
the importance of defined roles and responsibilities
the ‘alignment’ of different parts of an organisation behind a collaborative effort.

One of the issues that cuts across many of the lessons in the ECB guide, and which was immediately apparent from looking at the range of networks and collaborations present in Bangladesh, is the fundamental importance of establishing and maintaining trust. ECB have even produced guidance on building trust in diverse teams.

Koppenjan and Klijn, in their work on managing uncertainty in networks, have noted that trust ‘develops slowly and disappears quickly’, but that when present trust can be an important force for action in situations of substantial uncertainty. This observation seems to transfer well into humanitarian settings (typified by uncertainty), where the trust developed through collaborations on an ongoing basis can be essential for triggering collaborative efforts during emergency response. The importance of trust in supplementing formal modes of control has also been noted in research into the role of network governance in crisis response (which may be of interest to anyone in this ALNAP discussion forum).

The Bangladesh experience seems also to show that where homogenous actors are brought together as a community it is easier to establish trust. Convening diverse groups of actors, even when they are already operating in the same environment, is a far harder task.
This may have important implications for NGO networks – particularly in cases such as Bangladesh, where there is great diversity between organisations working on a range of similar and related issues. And as a wider range of actors become involved in humanitarian response, this issue is likely to grow in importance, and test the ability of existing collaborative structures to manage diversity and build trust.

We will be publishing our full findings from Bangladesh soon, along with reports from the Philippines and Afghanistan, which will explore a range of examples emerging from the research telling us new things about how networks function.

In the meantime, I would love to hear from you – via the comment box below or email – if you have any examples of building trust when convening diverse groups within networks, whether it was a success, a failure or a mix of both (as most things usually are!).

Whose needs did we meet? Disaggregating humanitarian data

Mon, 08 Oct 2012 11:27:48 GMT

Posted on 8 October at 11:27 by Kate Burns.

Whose needs are being met in humanitarian action? Should be simple to answer, but in reality we just don’t know. Why don’t we know? The short answer: humanitarian actors are primarily output-focused people. How many latrines were built? Shelters constructed? Patients seen at a health clinic? These are our main success indicators. While we collectively move to try and measure the impact of our humanitarian action, we must also answer the question: whose needs did we meet? This requires the collection, analysis and use of sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) so we can say whose needs were met, and who fell through the cracks.

I am constantly mystified by an absolute unwillingness to collect SADD. “It’s too hard,” people say. It makes me upset but also angry because without the collection of SADD we cannot know the impact of our efforts in meeting the needs of the people affected by crises. A recent study – Sex and age matter by the Feinstein International Center and Tufts University – supported by OCHA and CARE, gives several powerful examples of how gathering this data early can make a real difference (Mazurana et al, 2011).

The collection and analysis of SADD is key to gender analyses and gender-sensitive humanitarian programming and, therefore, to measuring the effectiveness of humanitarian response. A lack of SADD makes it more difficult to understand people’s differentiated needs and hampers the ability of aid workers to monitor the impact of assistance. If, for example, a health centre simply reports seeing 10,000 clients a month, humanitarian responders cannot tell whether there are more women than men accessing its services, or whether there are issues to be resolved around men’s or women’s access to health care. Similarly, if a school simply says it has 20,000 students, it will be unclear whether there are more boys than girls attending that school, or if more girls than boys are dropping out and at what stage. That makes it much more difficult to address emerging gaps and to tailor services to address them.

Without SADD, humanitarian organisations will be unclear about the effectiveness and, accordingly, the appropriateness of their assistance. In DRC, in 2011, for example, data on malnourished children was initially not broken down by girls and boys. A Gender Adviser urged a closer look. The new analysis showed that more boys than girls were malnourished, but more girls than boys were coming to supplemental feeding centres. Aid agencies working in the nutrition sector were surprised at this finding and plan to revise their plans accordingly. To design gender-sensitive projects and to deliver humanitarian relief effectively, aid workers need to understand how needs differ by sex and age and more emphasis will be required to build skills and hold actors accountable on not only generating such data but using it to inform programming approaches and measuring their failures and successes.

Examples abound on the lack of data disaggregated by sex and age. I recently read the latest ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System Report and was drawn to page 48. Initially excited to see data from aid recipients regarding their opinions on the services provided and the degree to which they were consulted. The results are bleak – in many cases more than 60% of people affected by the crisis were not consulted. But the data is not disaggregated be sex so we have no idea if both men and women were asked these questions.

My gut tells me that if this data were disaggregated that we would see a very different picture. Women are usually not included in assessments of needs and therefore their opinions are not registered. It would be great to hear from people on the ground about their challenges in collecting and using sex and age disaggregated data and examples of when they did use it - how that changed the way they delivered services.

It is our responsibility to meet everyone’s needs. The only way to be sure is to collect, analyse and use sex and age disaggregated data – if not we are left in the dark about the effectiveness and impact of our efforts.

The 'c' word: the state of coordination for emergency cash-based programming

Wed, 18 Jul 2012 15:44:46 GMT

Posted on 18 July at 15:44 by Haley Bowcock.

This week I’ve been reading ALNAP’s State of the Humanitarian System (SOHS) report. Of the many areas highlighted in the report that are showing progress, requiring attention, or indeed, both, one particularly occupied my attention: coordination.

For sure, better coordination makes for better emergency programming overall, and it is great to see elements of the reform process beginning to bear fruit in this regard. But one response modality that has proven difficult to find a happy home for in formal coordination mechanisms is cash-based programming.

Cash is being recognised and used more and more, as understanding grows of benefits that it can bring in terms of flexibility, support for local markets, choice and dignity for beneficiaries... all of which can contribute to programme effectiveness and efficiency. Indeed, as one respondent in the SOHS report puts it, less time is spent: ‘agonising over whether or not cash is appropriate as an emergency intervention and more time just getting on with it’.
There is also the tantalising possibility that cash unsettles the way we ‘do’ aid (Erik Johnson speaks on this in Humanitarian Exchange 54), since it does not necessarily conform to the neat sectoral boundaries we have drawn to organise assistance. Cash has certainly brought the importance of better market assessment and response analysis to the fore, which of course has implications for better programming in general.

Cash may no longer be ‘new kid on the block’, but we aren’t yet routinely considering or using it at scale. A recent article by Breanna Ridsdel for the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) sets out what we need to get better at for this to happen, including market assessment and response analysis, preparedness, and of course, coordination.

In this vein, CaLP has recently released some work on coordination, which tries to tease out how to make predictable, functional coordination happen. The old refrain of there being no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach certainly applies, though the study does suggest a model to guide the process. The model urges flexibility to needs and contexts, such as existing levels of cash experience, type and phase of the crisis, and the pre-existence of coordination mechanisms. It suggests technical (‘how-to’) discussions be kept separate from more strategic coordination; this latter part is what needs better integration into existing sector-based coordination mechanisms. And of course, sufficient, predictable resources – both people and financial – are a must.

As the use of cash grows as a way to meet needs during emergencies, it is important that we get cash coordination right – this model provides a useful starting point for us to find our way there.

Photo credit: Jane Beesley/Oxfam