5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OPTIONS FOR IHA

5.1. Conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above. These conclusions lead to the suggestions for action by IHA presented in Item 5.2.

5.1.1. Special Characteristics of AMM Countries

The emergency situation in the AMM countries has characteristics that present special problems and challenges for IHA planning and funding:

i. The emergency is a man-made disaster which has become chronic in nature, requiring a multi-year response. In Malawi and Mozambique, at least, the need for emergency assistance is likely to persist for some time.

ii. The ability of CIDA to rapidly assess emergency needs and to monitor funding progress in AMM is reduced by Canadian government staff limitations. There is no permanent CIDA staff person in Angola, the staff position in Malawi is to be eliminated and staffing in Mozambique is minimal.

iii. While the CIDA-Harare office is frequently consulted on IHA funding decisions, Harare staff visits to assess progress of IHA funding are infrequent.

Given these characteristics, more systematic monitoring of the situation as it evolves in the AMM countries, and of the use of IHA funds, is necessary.

5.1.2. Humanitarian Assistance, Rehabilitation and Development

A transition from emergency assistance to development is desirable in AMM countries as soon as conditions permit. The IHA mandate restricts it from funding development per se, and criteria for funding rehabilitation or reconstruction (R&R) are vague. Two studies commissioned by IHA (Goss Gilroy, 1987 and Brem 1991) have encouraged the Division to get actively involved in R&R. As described above, a number of IHA-funded projects in AMM have been for activities that are typically rehabilitation (seeds and tools, road reconstruction, etc.). An internal IHA planning document suggested in April 1990 that "seeds and tools are seen as the best emergency items which can be provided to famine victims or war-displaced, after food and water."

(End p 25)

Reduced overall funding for IHA in 1992/93 is resulting in a re-ordering of funding priorities, with the result that proposals for R&R are generally not being approved. This
abrupt change in practice is confusing for organizations such as Canadian NGOs that have received funding for such requests in the recent past. Furthermore, it is possible that international organizations will continue to use IHA funding for some R&R activities embedded in their larger annual programmes, whereas specific requests from Canadian NGOs for R&R funding are rejected. Several options for action are suggested in Item 5.2.2 to assist IHA in implementing this change.

5.1.3. Refugees Versus Internally Displaced Persons

Differential treatment of refugees and internally displaced persons is understandable in the case of UNHCR, which has a specific mandate to assist refugees. The IHA mandate appears, on paper at least, to favour work with refugees as well. There is a sovereignty issue involved in assisting internally displaced persons which IHA and its funding recipients must respect, but there is no humanitarian basis for discriminating against the internally displaced. IHA is to be commended for assisting persons in both types of situations.

5.1.4 Funding for International Organizations Versus Canadian NGOs

Calculations from Appendix D show that UNICEF and UNHCR together received 40% of recent IHA funding for AMM in the three most recent years and that UN organizations plus ICRC and IFRCS received 62%. There is a perception among some Canadian NGO staff that IHA provides funding to large multinational organizations much more readily than it does to Canadian NGOs, and requires much less detailed planning and reporting from them.

While Canadian NGOs have not been neglected by IHA (they received CDN(Dollars)10.0M or 38.2 percent of total IHA funding for ANN in the last three years and 52 percent of funding for Mozambique), the observation of differential treatment appears valid. International organizations frequently submit minimal planning statements with their appeal documents and in many cases are given IHA funding with few strings attached. Canadian NGOs, higher IHA management input for grants to NGOs and has resulted in questions of funding fairness.

Canadian NGOs represent an important partner in emergency assistance delivery in the AMM countries and past IHA funding has recognised this capacity. Suggestions for further strengthening the relationship between IHA and Canadian NGOs are given in Item 5.2.4.

(End p 26)

5.1.5. The Drought in Southern Africa

The impact of natural disasters such as drought, and the cost of mitigating them, is magnified in AHM countries where emergencies caused by war have already disrupted the lives of millions of persons. In these cases victims of the chronic emergency and those suffering the effects of drought are frequently the same people. For that reason, the
desire of some funding organizations to specifically target drought victims for support is not very realistic in a country like Mozambique.

The logistics of food delivery will be a major limiting factor in Southern Africa in 1992/93 and a breakdown in the delivery mechanism will probably result in starvation for certain groups. Special emergency funding will be necessary to ensure delivery and distribution of essential supplies.

5.1.6. Future IHA Funding in the AMM Countries

Emergency needs in the AMM countries continue at a high level. The situation will be especially severe as long as the present drought lasts. Future funding in each case should depend on assessment of the emergency needs in each country and the possibility that external funding will effectively reach those in need. The evolution of the peace process in Angola and Nosambique, and the duration of the present drought in the region, will directly influence the volume and nature of necessary assistance. Suggestions for IHA funding in the AMM countries is given in Item 5.2.6.

5.2. Suggested IHA Response

5.2.1. IHA Monitoring of the Emergency in the AMM Countries

While the Harare office should continue to be consulted on IHA funding matters, the chronic nature of the emergency in AMM countries requires that the CIDA-IHA officer visit the region at least every two years. In addition, consultants (Canadian or local) should be contracted to undertake special situation reviews during years when the officer cannot visit the region.

5.2.2. IHA Funding Criteria and Priorities

Given changes in priorities for IHA funding in 1992/93, in which fewer reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are likely to be funded than was the case in recent years, the following suggested action by IHA is proposed:

(End p 27)

i. Prepare written orientation regarding the criteria and priorities for IHA funding in 1992/93, along with a periodic update whenever practice or policy changes significantly.

ii. Apply criteria and priorities uniformly for all IHA funding recipients, whether international organizations or Canadian NGOs.

iii. Follow through on plans for an informational seminar for NGOs in 1992 to: a. explain IHA funding criteria and priorities; b. offer a forum for frank discussion between IHA and the NGO community interested in emergency assistance delivery.
iv. Give special consideration to funding R&R activities in Angola in 1992/93, where the country is in transition from emergency to a more normal situation. This will reinforce the transition to peace in the short term and help avoid a relapse to emergency conditions.

v. Reconsider the decision for 1992/93 funding that seeds and tools constitute reconstruction and not emergency assistance. Provision of these inputs is essential assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as for victims of drought. IHA should also take a leading role in encouraging the CIDA Food Aid Centre to create a seed supply component in its programme.

vi. Require that development criteria be utilized by recipient organizations in implementing IHA-funded assistance, to train local people and provide them with opportunities to actively participate in decision-making. If taken seriously by organizations such as UNHCR and IFRCs in Malawi, for instance, this approach would prepare the ground for future reconstruction and development in Mozambique.

vii. Liaise with the CIDA Southern Africa programme staff in Harare, as well as the NGO Division and the Food Aid Centre in CIDA-Hull, to ensure continuity of concern through the deployment of CIDA development funding for situations in transition from emergency to development. Given the regional nature of the Mozambican refugee question, CIDA-Harare could provide leadership in the region on this question as part of its new regional strategy.

IHA has both an opportunity and the responsibility to keep other CIDA divisions informed of progress in emergency situations and of the estimated need for rehabilitation and development support once the emergency ends. It is widely acknowledged that victims of a disaster may be worse off once initial emergency assistance is withdrawn.

5.2.3. Refugees Vs Internally Displaced Persons

IHA is encouraged to continue to interpret its mandate broadly in support of refugees and internally displaced persons alike. Support for displaced persons and destitute people in Angola and Mozambique will be an essential component in making a harmonious repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries possible.

(End p 28)

In situations where international financial support is strong for one population group (eg. refugees in Malawi), but less strong for another with similar needs (eg. internally displaced persons in Mozambique), IHA should consider preferentially funding the group that is likely to receive less support. A decision of this type is possible in chronic situations where donor funding patterns have been established.

5.2.4. Funding for International Organisations Versus Canadian NGOs

The attempt by IHA to create some balance between funding for international vs Canadian NGOs and to recognize the special delivery capacity of the latter in certain
circumstances is positive.

Suggestions for maintaining this funding balance and for strengthening the capacity of Canadian NGOs to respond to the emergency in Southern Africa include:

i. Make the criteria of funding for Canadian NGOs explicit. Criteria for funding could include specialized emergency skills, emergency assistance delivery record, presence of capable local partners in the emergency region, use of a developmental approach in emergency assistance delivery and the ability to raise alternative funding for part of the funding requirements.

ii. Suggest to NGOs that they provide IHA information on other sources of funding for proposed activities, thus clarifying the level of responsibility and risk that IHA is assuming.

iii. Encourage Canadian NGOs to specialize in specific aspects of emergency support and provide funding to assist in developing this capability, thus increasing the usefulness and credibility of Canadian NGOs in emergency situations. Specialization in seeds and tools selection, packaging and delivery, for instance, represents a key area of needed expertise in AMM countries.

iv. Encourage Canadian NGOs to assess the institutional capacity of partner NGOs in AMM countries, help strengthen this capacity where necessary and dimension funding requests to IHA in accordance with the delivery capacity of these partners.

v. Encourage Canadian NGOs to forge working relationships with other NGOs working in emergency situations that demand a high degree of coordination. The massive repatriation of refugees to Mozambique is one case in point.

5.2.5. Support for Drought Victims

Support for drought victims in Mozambique must be closely integrated with regular support efforts for the internally displaced, but this system may prove inadequate. The ICRC is probably the only organization capable of delivering food and other life-saving support for populations living in regions of open conflict, but the establishment of 'safe corridors' to permit the movement of emergency supplies on the ground would greatly reduce cost. NGOs should be discouraged from shipping small quantities of food and non-food support in 1992/93 in order to avoid creating even greater congestion in the ports of Southern Africa. They should rather be encouraged to cooperate with other organizations in the delivery of emergency support.

5.2.6. Future IHA Priorities in the AMM Countries

The emergency situation is multi-year or chronic in the AMM countries. While there is reason for hope that the Angolan situation will normalize after years of war, that in
Malawi and Mozambique offers no immediate hope of resolution. The following are suggestions for priority funding or action by IHA:

**At a Regional Level**

i. Assuming that the peace process in Angola continues as planned, IHA should focus more emergency assistance in Mozambique. Countries such as the **UK** may be willing to support refugees in Malawi up to and during the refugee repatriation process.

ii. Encourage the UNHCR to make a careful assessment of the capabilities of NGO organizations to effectively assume responsibility for Mozambican refugees once they have returned to that country, as the present repatriation plans propose.

iii. Assess coordination mechanisms and activities set up to assist victims of drought during 1992/93 with a view to using these for delivering emergency assistance, especially to returnees and internally displaced in Mozambique.

**Angola**

i. A peace process is under way, but escalating violence continues to be a distinct possibility until after the elections. ii. Support for the demobilization process is essential, and is probably best channelled through **UNICEF**.

ii. Support for the demobilisation process is essential, and is probably best channelled through UNICEF

(End p 30)

iii. Support for a UNHCR appeal to assist returning refugees from Zaire is valid, but without simultaneous road de-mining and emergency bridge placement refugees may be unable to return to their final destination.

iv. Fortunately the drought does not appear serious in Angola this year, but basic inputs (eg seeds and tools) for displaced persons returning home will be necessary.

v. Logistical support for the government emergency unit is only justified if emergency needs escalate.

**Malawi**

i. Support for refugees is necessary and will be somewhat more expensive in 1992/93 due to the drought. Specialized organizations (UNHCR, IFRCS) are best equipped to meet these needs. Funding by other donors, such as the UK, may permit IHA to hold or reduce funding levels over the next two years.
ii. Emergency relief for the local population, especially in southern Malawi near the refugee camps, is essential due to drought and severe food shortages. Logistical support for relief distribution initiatives already under way is a higher priority than encouraging parallel ones.

iii. Refugee repatriation continues to be a possibility, but it is doubtful that significant repatriation will occur this year.

iv. IHA should monitor planning and follow-up of the York University Refugee Conference, in conjunction with other CIDA divisions funding the event, and designate a person to attend on its behalf.

Mozambique

i. The emergency situation will worsen this year due to severe drought in the southern regions, and war and banditry throughout the country. This is the second year of drought in some provinces and it can not be assumed that this will be the last.

ii. Procurement and delivery of food and other relief commodities will overshadow all other activities in southern Mozambique. Funding logistical support for the delivery of relief items is critical.

iii. Delivery of essential inputs such as seeds (CARE, World Vision) may be quite relevant in northern provinces in 1992/93. Regions affected by the drought will urgently require seeds when the drought ends.

(End p 31)

iii. It is strongly suggested that CIDA consider extending funding for the LSU-Nampula, providing CARE-Canada presents a request that is in harmony with the CARE-International plan at the national level and that provides for a phase-out in a similar timeframe. If the emergency situation deteriorates, provision for phase-out will have to be reviewed.

iv. ICRC will have a key role in providing famine relief in RENAMO controlled areas and may require additional funding. The organization should be supported in its attempt to establish ‘safe corridors’ for ground transportation of relief supplies.

Indicative Planning Figures for IHA Funding. Given the continuing need for emergency assistance in AMM countries, it is suggested that IHA earmark indicative funding volumes for support to the man-made disasters in these countries. Suggested levels of funding are based on the IHA 3-year funding history, combined with an estimate of the probable evolution of the emergency. Unpredictable natural disasters such as drought is not included in this calculation.
(TABLE 5.1: INDICATIVE PLANNING FIGURES FOR AMM COUNTRIES, NOT INCLUDED IN THIS REPRINT)

(Footnote 5: Assumed the peace continues as presently planned)

(Footnote 6: Assumes no repatriation during 1992/93, but 100,000 assisted returnees in both subsequent years. No allowance is made for support for drought victims in any of the years.)

(Footnote 7: Assumes cease fire in early 1993, with improved access to displaced persons and returning refugees.)