in it. Furthermore, both OFDA and OCHA have incorporated REA\textsuperscript{100} into emergency training and its concepts have been integrated into the 2004 Sphere guidelines.

CARE generally makes little use of the REA tool and it was not employed in this response. A REA of both Hurricanes Ivan and Jeanne in Haiti, Grenada and the Dominican Republic was available\textsuperscript{101} but it contained little information relevant to CARE’s design of an environmentally sound response. There was knowledge of the REA methodology in the CAMI team\textsuperscript{102} and environment is covered in their report but this is more in terms of environmental effects rather than the possible environmental impact of CARE’s ongoing, planned or potential response and mitigation measures.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations
6a. CARE Haiti

CARE has a long-term core development programme of the quality for which it is internationally respected and, in Gonaives for example, it is associated with the inherent risk of becoming the \textit{de facto} local government there. For CARE to expand into a large-scale Disaster Preparedness and Response capability at a national level would increase this risk multi-fold (\textit{viz}. the incapacity of GoH to respond to September’s disaster at any level) and negate the very essence of development.

CARE’s strength in Gonaives in September 2004 was its local knowledge, contacts, pre-existing protocols with local government institutions and the fact that it held humanitarian response commodities in store, albeit largely destined for its development work. Furthermore, while the effects of Jeanne were largely unavoidable, the effects of ‘normal’ floods can be mitigated against if proper human behaviour and physical structures can be developed.

Nevertheless, disaster is a frequent certainty in Haiti as illustrated by its incidence (in parenthesis) over the 20\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{103}:
- Drought (7);
- flood (25);
- cyclone (16);
- earthquake (1);
- civil disorder;
- military strife;
- and international embargo (1);

and CARE cannot ignore its responsibilities according to its mandate and moral obligations.\textsuperscript{104}

The Team therefore recommends a three-point strategy based upon:

i) prevention/mitigation through development;

ii) preparedness through development; and

iii) response through development partners.

i) Prevention/mitigation through development implies working with local government and communities to change human behaviour and to develop physical structures with which to help avoid the consequences of ‘normal’ extreme conditions. For flood, this involves propaganda towards the maintenance of rivers and drainage structures and against the practice of rubbish disposal in them\textsuperscript{105} in addition to continuation of CARE’s ongoing canal upgrading and river-bank protection projects.

\textsuperscript{100}Considerable REA resources from this project and other sources are available at: http://www.benfieldhrc.org/SiteRoot/disaster_studies/rea/rea_index.htm
\textsuperscript{101}Compiled by the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit in October 2004.
\textsuperscript{102}Still to verify.
\textsuperscript{103}Source: Plan National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres. MICT, DPC, Haiti 2001
\textsuperscript{104}\textit{Viz}. the strong lobbying of CARE staff and CARE International members to intervene in with no CARE presence in other parts of Haiti with no CARE presence during the flooding in Mapu and Fond Verrette earlier in 2004.
\textsuperscript{105}A pre-condition of improved disposal behaviour is the availability of a rubbish collection capacity. This is a dangerous area for a donor or NGO to enter as it is difficult to develop a reliable exit strategy in the face of weak government. Development of community partnerships, capacity building and links with government are recommended but the problems are not to be under-estimated.
On the water-sheds above agricultural and inhabited areas, re-afforestation, soil conservation and gulley control measures need to be put in place while inappropriate environmental behaviour should be corrected through agricultural extension.

For drought, agricultural extension should work towards the adoption of appropriate resistant crops, short season improved varieties, reduction of post-harvest losses\textsuperscript{106}, irrigation\textsuperscript{107}, agro-pastoralism, agro-forestry and the development of off-farm employment. Bulletins already produced by CARE are impressive and present potential for increased market, disease and meteorological intelligence.

For earthquake, the encouragement of appropriate building techniques is recommended. For civil disorder and military strife, ‘peace by presence’ (of foreign subjects) is not a completely naïve concept.\textsuperscript{108}

The thinking behind the above recommendations is based upon the fact that CARE is not the Government of Haiti, it cannot do everything and, if it tried to do so, would fail. CARE’s strength is its history in Haiti, its knowledge of the country, its contacts there and, most of all, its capacity to see clearly what is going on there amidst (even at the best of times) a sea of disorder. CARE’s comparative advantage lies in its acting as a catalyst for better prevention and mitigation, not in trying to do the job itself. The interventions suggested above should then represent beacons of excellence for replication around the country. This is good development.

ii) Preparedness through development. Equally, it must be accepted that, even in the poorest of countries, preparedness remains primarily with government through police, emergency and social services and, finally, the military. While accepting that these are far from ideal in Haiti, at least the problem is understood and the positive turn-around of this negative statement should form the basis of a solutions strategy. CARE interventions (but now fully integrated with the aforesaid institutions) should again catalyse and constitute role models for replication.

There is a strong element of ‘Early warning’ in preparedness and, while any local response institution must be vigilant in its risk monitoring (particularly during the hurricane season), there is a role for CARE’s regional sub-institutions to play and this linkage with broader regional preparedness is referred to in 6c below.

The region (to include the United States in this instance) is availed of highly sophisticated disaster monitoring mechanisms whose information is at the disposal of any concerned institution and one of CARE Haiti’s priorities should be to equip itself with the necessary hard- and soft-ware to access this in order to maintain its well-developed ‘knowledge of the country’ referred to above. This should include, not only hurricane monitoring, but also developing meteorological conditions which lead to crop failure/destruction. At the same time, CARE Haiti needs to be availed of well qualified staff who can correctly interpret the data so obtained.

This strategy, therefore, implies forming partnerships with existing institutions and catalysing the creation of currently non-existent ones. Historically, disaster was institutionally regarded as an impediment to development (or exploitation) until the late twentieth century when response took on its own identity with, for example, the eventual creation of ECHO and OFDA. The debate now, however, is turning full circle in regarding preparedness as an implicit component of development\textsuperscript{109}.

\textsuperscript{106} Including improved storage techniques.
\textsuperscript{107} The potential for low-cost Israeli techniques is great in areas such as the Gonaives basin.
\textsuperscript{108} Note the verbal communication USAID’s Michael Kerst who considered that CARE’s presence in Gonaives ‘kept the lid’ on civil disturbance in Gonaive, albeit with the palliative of humanitarian aid and the protection of MINUSTAH.
\textsuperscript{109} The capacity of a country to accept this of course depends upon the level of its development but, while Haiti is poor and a little disorganised, it is certainly not under-developed, being availed of an educated and diligent population.
To take a lead here, CARE Haiti will have to improve its own expertise through training by CARE’s own network\(^{110}\) and through hired-in specialists. Training courses should be open, not only to its existing and potential partners, but also to other government departments, International and local NGOs, International Organisations, Red Cross and community groups. The scale of this intervention should not be under-estimated nor the problem of funding/maintaining equipment ignored – it is a long-term development programme which requires ongoing re-training and practice.

CARE’s statement, in its Revised Strategic Direction 2 Strategic Objective #2 of its intention to “become organisationally prepared to respond to most likely emergencies in Haiti”\(^{111}\), raises key questions:

a) **what is the foreseen budget ceiling?** Every intervention has limited donor funding.

b) **which type of disaster (see above) can CARE address?** Is it realistic for CARE to establish a life-boat, marine pollution or fire service?

c) **what is the assumed time-frame?** Every intervention should have a beginning and an end - ie an exit strategy. Financial sustainability has to be assured.

The Team considers that CARE should choose those areas in which it can realistically intervene and then do so with excellence.

CARE should probably limit itself to the areas of drought, flood and cyclone, sectors in which it already works; the similarities with the effects of earthquake would also justify the latter’s inclusion. Even within these limits, a very substantial expansion of work is required in terms of both project components and expertise:

- **Drought** related expansion implies agricultural intelligence (including market and weather), improvement of the monthly bulletin, a capacity to issue interim bulletins at times of impending disaster and wider involvement in public service radio;

- **Flood/cyclone** intervention demands again a first rate communications/public announcement service with the added creation of a personnel network on the ground with capacity to warn, mobilise people for their own safety and manage response;

- **Earthquake** requires the none-fire components of a traditional fire service along with the capacities described in **Flood/cyclone** above.

Initial training expertise will require inputs external to CARE Haiti (see 6b and c below).

### iii) Response through development partners

CARE staff has proven that they can work in a professional manner (even under their own duress) to support and coordinate local, national and even international authorities. To do this more effectively, CARE Haiti needs to avail itself of a more comprehensive modern communications system (to include a WAN\(^{112}\) and satellite and radio communications). Rather than taking on the unsustainable task of an emergency facility, CARE

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\(^{110}\) See Points 6b and c below.

\(^{111}\) 2.1 Develop rapid response capability for most likely emergencies

Incorporate risk management/emergency preparedness into program structure and into each project/sector(flesh out the structure)

Develop contingency plan

Identify and tailor appropriate and relevant risk assessment tools/processes and train staff in use PT and Emerg. Mangr Qtr 4 FY05-ongoing

**2.2.** Incorporate lessons learned and external evaluation recommendations into CO preparedness and response planning

Conduct internal and external evaluation

Develop action plan to implement the recommendations

M&E Evaluate the implementation of recommendations SMT - Task F. & Emerg. Manager Qtr 3 & 4

2.3 Identify and tailor appropriate and relevant risk assessment tools/processes and train staff in use (PT) and Emerg.

Manager Qtr 4 FY05 and FY06

\(^{112}\) Wider Area (intranet) Network – already in the process of establishment by CARE Haiti
should instead support its response partners with ‘state of the art’ disaster intelligence, communications and ‘on-the-spot’ disaster management consultation with those partners.

There is an understandable reticence, here, about CARE’s ‘coming to the table empty-handed’ and, since the organisation normally holds, in store, commodities such as programme food aid and equipment associated with its development programmes, it is not unreasonable to make contingency plans for their release during disaster. This implies either:
- a one-time donor investment in pre-positioned stocks to be drawn down at the time of disaster and replenished using incoming funds/commodities destined for that current disaster and rotated (for stock renewal) through development programme usage\(^{113}\); or
- pre-signed agreement with the donors of development programme commodities for their immediate release upon verbal agreement\(^{114}\).

Connectedness & Coherence  CARE, with its local knowledge and unquestionable contribution to relief and development, should expand its network of local civil society partners, its community group capacity building efforts (strengthening advocacy capacity towards greater government involvement in addressing their needs), its capacity building with local government (strengthening advocacy capacity toward greater resource allocation from central government, and improving responsiveness to local needs), and efforts to bring civil society/communities and government in closer dialogue.\(^{115}\) Such efforts would contribute to addressing root causes, and would complement the organisation’s investment in long-term development programming to help mitigate against disasters.\(^{116}\)

If CARE Haiti chooses to venture down this route in the pursuit of greater responsiveness, accountability and two-way relationships between citizens and government, a good starting point would be to seek greater participation and relationships of accountability to communities within the framework of its own programmes.

Coordination  If the CO is to develop an emergency contingency plan, it should include an emergency response structure with clear responsibilities, lines of communication and relationship with existing CO structures. Measures will have to be put in place to ensure that CARE does not have to take the lead (of other institutions) by default while the excellent spirit with which CARE Haiti pursued coordination of other bodies should, of course, be maintained.

Efficiency  As part of emergency preparedness, mechanisms to facilitate faster turn-round time for pre-contract, or contract amendment approvals would be beneficial. A Letter of Intent format for signature between donor, CO and perhaps Lead Member might facilitate this process.

CARE Haiti needs to ensure that the system of NFI management is well established at the Gonaives office to include manuals, training and perhaps punitive measures for failure to use approved systems. Structured, formal administrative and procurement emergency procedures could be developed as part of CARE’s emergency preparedness effort. Finance and accounting measures, such as proper use of

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\(^{113}\) This is practised most effectively by the Iranian Red Crescent albeit experiencing some difficulties with external donors. It is a system which should interest WFP through their PRROs.

\(^{114}\) This is what did actually happen with WFP and USAID in September 2004.

\(^{115}\) Eg in participatory planning, communications and negotiation, understanding rights and responsibilities. CARE is increasingly involved in this type of governance work in countries quite different from Haiti but from which models could be learned (eg participatory budgeting and expenditure monitoring activities in Peru (with USAID funding); engaging civil society and government on forest policy in the Democratic Republic of Congo; or the National Agricultural Advisory and Development Service (NAADS) Action Research Initiative in Uganda (latter two funded by CARE Canada’s Civil Society Engagement Fund). See also project examples in Zambia and Honduras referenced in footnote 118 below.

\(^{116}\) Eg the presence of active citizen participation mechanisms could have helped the CO to identify more appropriate needs at the outset of the crisis.
Fund Code allocation procedures, should be considered as part of refresher training for managers and finance staff.

As recommended by the January Review, a database of emergency-relevant staff skills should be developed to assure fuller and better use of CARE Haiti’s personnel in future emergencies. In the event of emergency, the availability of appropriate staff should be determined and responsibilities clarified and shared.

While the CO’s response was relatively efficient under difficult circumstances, greater preparedness is needed. Staff skills, procedures, and some level of contingency planning needs to be developed to include provision for external human resource inputs whose roles need to be well defined and communicated.

**Gender**

Without a CO strategy\(^{117}\) to ensure that gender is understood and addressed at the programme level, *ad hoc* treatment of gender will continue to be basis for both all its emergency and development programming. For emergency programming, resources do exist, however, to support the integration of gender into assessment, design, implementation and monitoring of emergency programmes.\(^{118}\) The CO should ensure that these are available for future reference and should build the capacity of one or more gender specialists within the CO. This should be complemented by efforts to broaden and deepen knowledge and buy-in across the CO, and rendering the pursuit of gendered objectives an across-the-board approach. Evolution of a CARE Haiti gender policy, strategy and/or guidelines would be beneficial not only from a programming perspective but could also address the need to promote gender equality within the CO.

**Environment**

The CFW project’s work in mobilizing and building capacity of clean-up brigades may offer a model from which to learn and upon which to build additional initiatives to address waste management at a local level. A gap remains in terms of the ability and will of one of the CFW project’s government partners, the TPTC, to gather and dispose of debris collected by communities - addressing this gap is critical to the sustainability of such initiatives, otherwise communities will quickly lose motivation. Programming in the environment sector always poses a challenge given the “public good” nature of benefits, and of harms. CARE Haiti should look to the CARE network for examples of environment/waste management programming and innovations involving partnerships of local communities, NGOs, and the public and private sectors.\(^{119}\)

As CARE Haiti builds staff skills relevant to emergency response\(^{120}\), one or more environment specialists should be identified and their skills developed in REA methods.

**6b. CARE International and LACRMU**

It is tempting to recommend an enhanced role for both CEG and/or LACRMU in future responses in order to alleviate some of the burden on the CO. The CEG or Region could, for example, act as the intermediary between the CO and CI members in the communication of early assessment findings and facilitation of the matching of CI funding,

\(^{117}\) Whether a CO-specific policy and strategy or a tailoring of CARE USA’s policy.

\(^{118}\) Examples are available on the CI Emergency section of CARE’s Livelink: *Inter-Agency Workshop on Integration of Gender into Needs Assessment and Planning of Humanitarian Assistance - Summary guidelines and checklist for integrating gender analysis and assessment* (no author or date); InterAction Commission on the Advancement of Women (1998) *Weaving Gender in Disaster and Refugee Assistance*.

\(^{119}\) For instance, CARE Zambia has emphasized programming in urban areas to address a myriad of issues from water supply to waste management. The approach of projects such as PROSPECT (Programme of Support for Poverty Elimination and Community Transformation) or the C3 Challenge Fund is to work with both the demand and supply sides: the communities that require better access to resources, and the supply side of local government and private service providers. COs in Latin and Central America (eg Honduras) are also experienced in governance programming in urban areas, bringing communities and government together and promoting participatory models of planning and delivery (For more information on the latter refer to Schnell, C.E (2002) *Strengthening Local Governance to Enhance the Impact and Sustainability of Food Security Interventions: Case Studies from Honduras and Peru Title II Programmes.*)

\(^{120}\) As suggested in the Lessons Learned/After Action Review workshop (page 10).
available HR resources and the CO’s needs and CEG, in concert with LACRMU, should be able to facilitate the rapid deployment of an emergency response team to assist with early assessment and response.\textsuperscript{121}

Such a recommendation, however, needs to be accompanied by three caveats:
- there is knowledge, if not specifically of emergency response, in the country and, as such, there is a risk that adding a layer between a CO and a CI member will slow down information exchange.
- The complement of emergency response personnel, full-time or on stand-by within CI (or LACRMU) is limited. If Jeanne had occurred in January, CEG members would have been torn between Tsunami demands and the (relatively) small-scale, localized Haitian crisis.
- CARE Haiti’s strength lay in the presence of its office/warehouse/commodity stocks in Gonaives as well as in its partnerships with government, communities and donors. Any external response team would need to involve CARE Haiti staff members to ensure inclusion of these strengths.

Future CAMI deployments need to ensure its own capabilities. Since CAMI currently focuses on mitigation and not response, the sub-institution needs to question whether it will take on a response role in the future and thus question whether it should undertake deployments at all in the case of forthcoming emergencies. Equally, a review of LACRMU emergency preparedness and response within the region is now timely.

6c. Implications for linking with broader regional preparedness

As discussed in 6a. above, there is a preparedness role for CARE’s regional sub-institutions and this primarily in the close monitoring of the vast sources of current disaster information in the region,\textsuperscript{122} the analysis of risks and the clear and timely communication to the CO of oncoming threats.

On the face of it, this is a task for CAMI. However, there are certain factors which have to be taken into consideration:

i) CAMI is a young and developing sub-institution which proved (in the Jeanne operation) to be unsuited and ill-equipped for the task asked of it;
ii) Haiti may be considered to suffer from being in a permanent disaster condition;
iii) Haiti stands alone in terms of having excessively more serious levels of structural poverty than the rest of the Latin America and the Caribbean region;
iv) Haiti stands alone in terms of the fact that it is the only vulnerable Creole and French speaking nation in the region; and
v) Haiti is, in fact, a better regional fit with the countries of CARE’s SWARMU.\textsuperscript{123}

If CARE is, therefore, to evolve a regional emergency strategy, measures would need to be taken to assure relevance for CARE Haiti. However, the possibility of establishing Haiti as a ‘stand-alone’ case (with its own CAMI) should be very seriously considered even though this would undoubtedly be an expensive undertaking. CARE Haiti has expressed a preference to make closer links with existing local initiatives such as those of the state and DPC as well as with UNDP contingency planning, training and materials supplies rather than trying to integrate with CAMI.

The advantages of Haiti taking on a ‘stand-alone’ status would be:

a) Haiti would benefit from a focus on its peculiar problems which it really needs;
b) In solving its problems successfully, it could provide a model for other difficult countries;
c) It could eventually provide a source of expertise for other difficult countries and notably those in the SWARMU region.

\textsuperscript{121} This was achieved with CAMI, which provided a team despite the fact that no mechanism actually existed for rapid deployment of CAMI staff although the actual contribution of CAMI was not significant - see Section 5.d (Efficiency).

\textsuperscript{122} Which can be placed at their disposal largely by the United States.

\textsuperscript{123} This is not to intimate that SWARMU should take-over the role of CAMI \textit{vis-à-vis} Haiti.
Such a course of action would not necessarily exclude the other regional players and other national CARE offices who still have inputs to offer in terms of expertise and material inputs but this must imply the development of an emergency contingency plan\textsuperscript{124} requiring their prior consultation with CARE Haiti and establishment of clear coordination responsibility under CARE Haiti.

\textsuperscript{124}To include UN security forces if their long-term presence is anticipated.