Conflict Sensitivity
Meta-Trends Analysis

This report was developed by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and World Vision International
Acknowledgments

We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Bill Lowrey, World Vision’s first Director of Peacebuilding. During his 10-year tenure, Bill ensured that several thousand World Vision staff were trained in Do No Harm. James Odong, who was responsible for Do No Harm during Bill’s leadership, started this line of inquiry in 2009 with Matthew Scott and Dilshan Annaraj. A former intern, Zakary Ostertag, was the first to collect all the field assessments and conduct the preliminary analysis from May to August 2011. All these efforts paved the way for a more robust research effort several years later.

Many World Vision and CDA staff made this research possible, including: Peter Woodrow, Diana Chigas, Kiely Barnard-Webster, Jasmine Walovitch, Mark Lorey and many of the other World Vision National Offices and the Peacebuilding/advocacy staff who provided their field assessment reports for this research. Special thanks to Dickens Thunde, National Director of World Vision Kenya, Hezron Masitsa (National Peacebuilding Coordinator), The ADP Manager and the staff of Kegonga-Ntimaru Area Development Programme for the case study. The authors thank all the community members and staff of non-governmental organisations who participated in interviews and focus group discussions. Their views helped shape this research.

A special thanks to Sarah Pickwick for the innumerous support in finalizing this product.

The publication of this analysis would not have been possible without support from World Vision UK through its Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA) with the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).

Nicole Goddard and Dilshan Annaraj

Authors

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Executive Summary

This paper attempts to address three key questions.

1. What general trends in conflict dynamics can be identified in the contexts in which World Vision works?
2. What general patterns can be identified in how World Vision programs interact with conflict contexts?

From WV staff interviews and surveys:

3. What general patterns can be identified in how World Vision staff apply conflict sensitivity in their work?

This paper is based on a review of data collected in Do No Harm (DNH)/Conflict Sensitivity (CS) and Integrating Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity (IPACS) reports compiled by World Vision International, representing programs in 12 countries, interviews with key World Vision (WV) staff in national offices and regional offices, surveys of World Vision Peacebuilding Officers, an in-depth review of the Kenya national office’s application of conflict sensitivity in its programming and consultations with WV staff and external organizations.

Key Findings:

There were two types of programmatic decisions that emerged as important in examining the conflict sensitivity impacts of World Vision’s programs: how goods, services, time, attention, jobs and other WV benefits were distributed, and which key actors WV engaged. Who receives benefits from a program or project is determined by criteria, most often not set at the field level. These criteria are meant to ensure that the resources brought into a community generate the maximum programmatic impact, by addressing the greatest need and directing aid toward the most vulnerable or poorest. However, when selection, hiring, or program participation criteria run parallel to lines of conflict in a context, it can deepen existing lines of division and contribute to tension. In WV programs, the effect of how resources were distributed led to increased tensions, perverse incentives, and negative perceptions of WV and its staff.

World Vision’s programs often identify key people in the communities in which they are implemented to work with, or work through to either gain entry to beneficiary communities or to help to implement projects. Involvement in an NGO project or program lends legitimacy to authorities, and so selecting the proper authorities in any context is vital. In WV’s programs, there were both positive and negative effects associated with authorities. Community groups and trusted and respected elders were identified as key connectors in many contexts. In those places, where WV was able to capitalize on those authorities, it generated positive impacts for communities. However, when groups or committees of decision makers were not seen to be legitimate, they could have quite a negative impact on intergroup dynamics.

When it comes to utilization of CS, World Vision staff identified some key areas that served as barriers to CS application or uptake, including the preponderance of tools for CS application, overall levels of staff capacity, and uncertainty about how CS fits in some programming areas. They also identified
some supports for CS, including the preponderance of tools available (this appears to be a personal preference—for some people it hinders uptake, for others it helps) and internal and external coordination and communication mechanisms.

Other key considerations for the depth of and commitment to application of CS were policies or requirements from headquarters and donors, and a lack of clarity about how CS fits in existing M&E plans and frameworks.

**Key Recommendations:**

Most recommendations included in this review attempt to address these final two challenges: managing remote support for CS and integrating CS into M&E.

1. **Revise the template for IPACS/DNH reports.**
   In order to be able to compare the CS data collected across national and regional offices both to those of other offices, as well as to other project data from the same office, reports should follow the same template, and staff should be provided with detailed instruction and/or facilitation for these reports. Currently a standard template exists, but is not widely used. This is especially important in the review of WV programs and the prioritizing or weighting of Dividers and Connectors.

2. **Update reports on a regular basis.**
   IPACS and DNH reports are a time consuming activity, but they could be updated on a regular basis to track both changes in the context as well as whether and how well WV programs are adapting to those changes.

3. **Make conflict sensitivity everyone’s responsibility.**
   Peacebuilding officers are a key support for CS within WV. However, they often note that overall, staff interest in and capacity for CS is low. If accountability for CS were spread among WV staff at all levels, this may increase application overall.

4. **Tailor World Vision tools to fragile contexts.**
   Some people noted that the emphasis on “conflict” in WV’s tools and approaches (and as CDA has heard from others, in the name “conflict sensitivity” itself) leads people to believe that these frameworks aren’t applicable in non-conflict contexts. Staff suggested that the language, or the approach could be tailored to reflect the realities of working in contexts without open conflict, but with high levels of fragility. WV is already testing a fragility application for its IPACs tool, and this approach can be watched carefully to determined how best to scale up this effort.

5. **Make explicit how World Vision tools work together.**
   World Vision has conflict analysis and program review tools examining contexts at multiple levels: macro/strategy level to micro/implementation level. It isn’t clear to staff how these various tools and approaches fit together and inform one another. This could be articulated to broaden staff understanding of what to expect from application of multiple tools over the lifecycle of a program.

All INGOs/NGOs face similar challenges and World Vision is keen to provide leadership in identifying them, sharing them (transparently) and providing a way forward.
1. Background

This paper is based on a review of data collected in Do No Harm (DNH)/Conflict Sensitivity (CS) and Integrating Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity (IPACS)\(^1\) reports compiled by World Vision International, representing programs in 12 countries, interviews with key World Vision (WV) staff in national offices and regional offices, surveys of 11 World Vision Peacebuilding Officers, an in-depth review of the Kenya national office’s application of conflict sensitivity in its programming, and the experiences and analyses of World Vision staff and colleagues collected in the course of two consultations. This document is part of a larger collaborative initiative by CDA and World Vision, to review the integration of conflict sensitivity throughout the policies and practices of INGOs, and in relation to donor policies.

The concepts and language of the Do No Harm Framework were used as a lens for analysis of all of the collected data. An overview of the DNH Framework is included in Annex 1.

1.1 Organizations Involved

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) is the home of the Do No Harm (DNH) Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Aid on Conflict. CDA has been working to improve the practice of actors with regard to conflict sensitivity for twenty years. While most donors have adopted Do No Harm (or its equivalent) as a broad principle, the main focus of these has been on NGOs and INGOs at the project implementation level. In recent years, CDA’s focus efforts has broadened to include government and intergovernmental actors and policy makers.

World Vision has supported the use of DNH among its staff since 2002. It has developed policies and resources to enable staff to build their capacities, reflect on their practice and learn from their experiences, with the aim of improving programming. WVI has also developed conflict sensitivity tools of its own, taking knowledge of conflict sensitivity and pushing it further. World Vision uses different tools for different levels of conflict sensitivity analysis. At the micro/meso level, WV uses DNH and Integrating Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity (IPACS) and at the macro level they use Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) and Good Enough Conflict Analysis for Rapid Response (GECARR). WVI has also collected and begun to analyze the reports of DNH field assessments performed by its staff in many of its country offices.\(^2\) This paper builds upon that report by incorporating data about the utilization of conflict sensitive approaches among WV staff. But a broader comparative evidence gathering and learning effort involving multiple organizations has not yet been done. WVUK contributed funding for this work from its Program Partnership Agreement funds from DfID.

\(^{1}\) A note on language: “Local Capacities for Peace” (LCP) was the original name of the Do No Harm Program at CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Within World Vision, DNH is still sometimes referred to as LCP. These two terms are used interchangeably in this document.

\(^{2}\) Zakary “Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace: An internal review of 52 DNH/LCP Field Reports from 12 countries.”
1.2 Rationale for Meta-trends analysis

Conflict sensitivity has been incorporated into donor policies and guidance as an important practice that should inform the operations of all actors in conflict areas.\(^3\) Conflict sensitivity frameworks and methodologies are meant to be built into donor policies, applied at organizational headquarters in the design of organizational strategies, and used in the field to implement programs. It would appear, therefore, that there is vertical integration of conflict sensitivity as a concept—but is this true in practice?

Despite the widespread acceptance of conflict sensitivity, the challenge facing these actors is how to ensure its uptake among staff at all levels, how to monitor and evaluate its impacts on organizational practice, and how to communicate these impacts among the various actors operating at different levels. Donor policies often require and support conflict sensitivity in principle, but there is little guidance about how to support it as a practice. Headquarters-level policy makers have difficulty monitoring or evaluating its use among organizational staff or using conflict sensitivity at a high level to help in the setting of organizational priorities and policies, including systems of rewards and accountability. Organizations often fail to collect and analyze their conflict sensitivity analyses as sets of data for improving overall organizational practice or developing strategies at an organization or country level. Sometimes field-level project implementers have difficulties incorporating conflict sensitivity as a practice into their daily work and routinizing its use over the life of a project, especially in situations of urgency.

Currently, World Vision is updating its organizational strategy, including its partnering approach and engagement priorities, so a review of its conflict sensitivity commitments, how it addresses recurring dividers and connectors, and its staff’s perceptions of the utility of CS is coming at a particularly opportune moment. This report may help to inform how CS is taken forward within World Vision.

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\(^3\) See: OECD The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict; The Sphere Project "Protection Principle 1: Avoid exposing people to further harm as a result of your actions;" and, DFID "Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations. Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm."
2. Methodology

WVI collected a total of 54 field assessment reports from 12 country offices. These reports captured the context and program analyses performed by WV country office staff in these 12 countries. The field reports are largely based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews conducted by WV staff to review the impacts of a broad spectrum of development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and child-sponsorship programs. Many of the field assessment reports contained analysis of more than one WV project.

These reports were analyzed by CDA using NVIVO coding software to sort for context (dividers and connectors identified in each report), program analysis, program impacts on dividers and connectors and any options generated by the field office teams. A two-person coding team at CDA, comprised of DNH experts performed this work.

This report draws mainly on the raw data from the field assessment reports, but also references a series of key informant interviews with World Vision staff regarding the utilization of conflict sensitivity in country offices, a survey of WV Peacebuilding Officers conducted via SurveyMonkey, a case study on DNH/LCP utilization in WV Kenya performed by World Vision staff in 2015, CDA’s series of reflective case studies (2006-2011), and feedback from World Vision staff and other organizations (Mercy Corps, USAID, MSI, and Search for Common Ground) gathered in a series of consultations in June 2016.

![Table 1](image1.jpg)

2.1 Data constraints

The field assessment reports gathered for this analysis were spread geographically among 12 country offices. However, the balance of the data is skewed by the disproportionate number of reports from a small number of countries. Most country offices provided fewer than five reports however, Sri Lanka provided 20, and Uganda provided 8. Based on this spread of data, it may not be wise to draw conclusions on global trends of WV’s impacts. In order to address this imbalance, CDA has provided a breakdown of identified dividers and connectors by country (Annex 3 and 4).

Additionally, many of the reports are quite dated. These contexts and programs will look vastly different today than on the date of the report publication. For instance, of the 20 reports compiled for Sri Lanka, only four were drafted after the end of that country’s decades-long civil war. However, identified impacts on dividers and connectors over the years will still be useful information, because these findings could showcase important emergent trends.
Finally, the content of the reports also varies, in terms of level of analysis and the program information included (many projects were in a planning stage, thus there is limited information available about program details or impacts). Some reports are quite detailed, and contain very nuanced analyses, which link programmatic decisions to specific impacts on dividers and connectors. Some of the reports provided were only a context analysis, without specific review of dividers and connectors included, or with no programmatic data to analyze in light of those contextual factors. Not all reports contained a full DNH/LCP analysis, including a full program analysis, an analysis of impacts on dividers and connectors and the generation of programmatic options.

Many of the program analyses did not dive deeply into program details. For example, many made explicit and detailed lists of partners, but failed to analyze the makeup of WV staff in relation to the communities in the context. Or, when looking at the question of “when?” an intervention took place, simply stated the timeline of the program period, rather than examining constraining factors like time of day, time of year, entry/exit in relation to conflict context, etc. Lastly, few reports looked at decision making criteria when examining the program (the DNH program analysis question of “why?” is meant to help teams sort through the reasoning for detail decisions, like whom to hire, when to begin the work, etc. In most of the field reports the answer to this question was most often stated as the program goal—the reasoning for the program). Without this level of detail, it was often difficult to trace impacts back to program elements or details.

An explicit analysis of impacts on Dividers and Connectors (whether the program/project was making the dividers and connectors stronger or weaker) was the most frequently excluded section of analysis. In some reports, specific constraints to gathering the data for the field assessment were identified, including access to key actors, or multiple groups (for example, in one field visit report, only one of two groups in the context was able to offer their experience). These constraints will also affect the accuracy of the data included in the trends analysis.

CDA has included some process-related recommendations in Section 5 of this report to assist WV with addressing these data gaps going in future field reports.
3. Trends and Patterns in World Vision DNH Field Assessment Reports

As an early step in the meta-trends analysis, data was sorted for Dividing and Connecting factors. Full lists of identified Dividers and Connectors by country can be found in Annexes 2 and 3. In the coding (and often in the field assessment reports themselves), we utilized CDA’s five categories for Dividers and Connectors:

1. Systems and Institutions
2. Attitudes and Actions
3. Values and Interests (Shared-Connectors/Different-Dividers)
4. Experiences (Shared/Different)
5. Symbols and Occasions

These categories are useful for brainstorming during a DNH analysis, but also for disaggregating the Dividers and Connectors themselves, in order to better understand them. A single issue or theme may appear in multiple ways across these five categories. CDA has found that identifying the various ways an issue can connect or divide people can be useful for tracking impacts on those dividers or connectors. For example: the system of land distribution or ownership was often identified as a System/Institution divider, and the act of fighting over land is an Attitude/Action. Tracking these dividers separately may be useful for country teams to understand their impacts.

CDA coded all instances of Dividers and Connectors across the five Divider/Connector categories. The full tally of Dividers and Connectors identified at the country level are included in Annexes 3 and 4. Interestingly, World Vision teams identified similar numbers of dividers and connectors across the 54 field assessment reports. *It is important to note, however, that the frequency with which a certain theme is identified as connective or divisive does not have any bearing on the relative strength (connecting or dividing power) of that dynamic.* The field assessment reports did not assign any weight to identified dividers or connectors.

For the purpose of examining trends, however, CDA identified broader thematic categories. For instance, Actions having to do with land and Systems or Institutions for managing land would both fall under the heading of Resources (capturing land, water, and other natural resources).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Connectors</th>
<th>Dividers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Sudan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>521</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2*

---

*Anderson, Mary B. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War.*
3.1 Dividers

Throughout all the field assessment reports, four very clear thematic groupings of Dividers arose:

1. **Natural resources/Land/Water**
   These dividers had to do with access, distribution, ownership, and usership of resources. In different contexts these issues were communicated and disaggregated differently, however the social dynamics around control and use of resources were cited in nearly every context as a point of tension.

2. **Politics**
   These divisions had to do with political parties, the actions of politicians, or increasing tensions around elections to governing bodies at multiple levels. Often, in the scope of the report, national level political dynamics had great effects on local dynamics, but even competition for power at local levels and over committees and agencies was seen to be a source of tension.

3. **Religion**
   Religious identity was not cited as a divider in every context. However, in many contexts, religion, religious centers (churches, mosques, temples, etc.), or the expression of religious identity acts to divide groups.

4. **Ethnicity/Caste/Tribe**
   Ethnicity or other social identity (such as caste or tribe) was also frequently cited as a divider.

Not all of these dividers were present in every context (see Table 3), but on the whole, they were the most frequently-identified divisive issues globally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Sudan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>88</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3*

Additionally, alcoholism and drug abuse were identified as sources of tension in many contexts.
3.1.1 Considerations for World Vision Programming

Since World Vision has a clear Christian organizational identity, its interaction with the dividers relating to religion will need to be closely monitored. In many of the field assessments, religion-related dividers were given special attention by staff, and options generated to address these dividers often highlighted the unique challenge of a Christian organization operating in multi-religious contexts.

The high incidence of this divider across contexts points to just how vital a conflict sensitivity analysis and programmatic response is. If this divider exists in a context and World Visions interactions with it are not analyzed and programs are not adapted to take it into account, unintentional negative impacts may occur.

3.2 Connectors

Connectors tended to be spread over a greater number of themes than dividers in the field assessment reports. While similar numbers of connectors were identified on the whole, they did not fall as starkly into trending categories as the dividers did. The connectors captured in these themes were identified less frequently than the dividers (see Table 4):

1. Economic Activities and Community Projects
   People tended to come together around markets, economic opportunities, shared or interdependent livelihoods, and community development activities.

2. Local groups and committees
   These groups, where they existed, were seen as particularly capable of organizing community members toward a shared goal. Often these groups managed commercial or social activities.

3. Occasions and Events
   Holidays, religious celebrations, and social occasions of all kinds were identified in nearly all contexts as connectors.

4. Value for and investment in children and schools
   In many contexts schools, playgrounds, the safety of children and hopes for children’s futures came up in multiple ways as connectors.

5. Elders and Local leaders

In the Kenya Case study, these Divider trends largely held. Among Dividers identified, those highlighted below fall into the categories above:

- Cattle rustling and revenge attacks
- FGM and other negative culture practises
- Corruption
- Clan and tribal issues linked to party politics
- Wider violence and illegal armed groups
- Issues of religion tensions, especially between Christians and Muslims
- Tensions between civil society and the government which is resulting in shrinking space for civil society (particularly NGOs and INGOs)
- Land and resource allocation across the country due to scarcity
- Illiteracy
- Manipulation of youth
- IDPs
- Party politics
Very importantly, leadership that was cited as connecting was almost always local or traditional leadership (contrasting the national level political dynamics that were often identified as divisive). The role of elders, especially in dispute resolution, was also identified as connective in many contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic Activities</th>
<th>Local Groups</th>
<th>Occasions/Events</th>
<th>Children/Schools</th>
<th>Elders/Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>West Africa</td>
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Likewise, Connectors identified in the Kenya case study also align with those identified in the field assessments:

Traditional family set up; use of **sport and activities that engage young people**, **shared markets** and other public services e.g. **schools**, health clinics; church based activities including regular worship and inter-faith/inter-denomination events; **cultural ceremonies and community events**; **sharing of resources**; positive leadership roles.

The recurrence of these trends from field assessments to current case study may indicate that these trends are still holding today.

### 3.2.1 Considerations for World Vision Programming

Further, more detailed analysis may be useful for World Vision in examining the connector of children, schools, and education. It may be useful to know when individuals go from being identified as “children” to being identified as “youth.” Youth, and particularly, youth unemployment, or manipulation by political leaders is often cited as a divider. Understanding the **contextual specifics** of the child/youth divide will be important for program design.

Working with, or focusing on, children in any context may help to build on that connector, but how it is done will also always matter.
Second, World Vision has a special emphasis on engagement with religious leaders. The distinction in the field reports was quite clear. Leadership in and of itself was not the factor that defined whether something was divisive or connective, but rather how leadership is used was the important element. Leaders—including religious leaders—who manipulate power, do not serve or adequately represent their constituencies, or engage in partisanship, political maneuvering, or other manipulations can just as easily be divisive as politicians. The trust people place in leadership comes with conditions, which is why they most often cited traditional leaders and elders, along with, in some contexts, religious leaders, as connectors. It is very important that WV staff fully analyze leadership and the use of power in each context in order to determine whether it is connective or divisive.

3.3 Impacts on Dividers and Connectors

While program details were not always explicitly analyzed in the Program sections of reports, as noted above, they do start to emerge when staff analyze the impacts of programs on conflict dynamics. In many cases, staff note that targeting or selection criteria are the source of particular impacts, or that staff and/or volunteers held ethnic or religious biases. This data is important to make explicit in CS analysis, as it helps move toward options generation and program adaptation. In cases where criteria are problematic in a particular context, staff may feel disempowered to act or adjust the program, as selection criteria are usually not set at the field level. However, if the specific conflict-blind program details are made clear in an early analysis, other options, apart from adjusting the criteria, may be identifiable.

3.3.1 Distribution Effects

The most commonly identified pattern of impact in the field assessment reports (and, evidence shows, the most easily identifiable in CS analysis) is the pattern of how goods, services and attention are distributed among different communities. Who receives benefits from a program or project is determined by criteria, most often not set at the field level. These criteria are meant to ensure that the resources brought into a community generate the maximum programmatic impact, by addressing the greatest need and directing aid toward the most vulnerable or poor.

However, when selection or program participation criteria run parallel to lines of conflict in a context, it can deepen existing lines of division and contribute to tension. In Kenya, one project noted:

“The criteria of targeting those most affected by the conflict resulted in a situation where those mostly assisted were from a certain ethnic group that was already perceive by others to have benefited, for a long time, from unfair control of an access to political power and economic opportunities. This outcome was met with complaints from the other ethnic group that were affected by the conflict and did not help to calm tensions between them, but rather enhanced them.”

In other cases, criteria can create perverse incentives, that can potentially undermine the aims of the project or program. In Zambia:

“Nutrition groups bring only mothers that have children who are malnourished. This has the potential to segregate [women] and increase jealousy with mothers who are not
members of these groups and encourage non-beneficiary mothers to deliberately not care for their children so that they can be enrolled for the nutrition project."

Distribution effects are created by more than just criteria for project participation. In some cases where, when and how projects are implemented can inadvertently exclude participants from a project. In Uganda, one project was implemented during peak labor season for farmers. The WV Area Development Program (ADP) noted that organizing community meetings during rainy season took people away from farm activities, and increased conflicts within families. On the positive side, a project in Ethiopia saw that because they located water points closer to villages, children were no longer spending large amounts of time traveling to fetch water, which reduced their risk of abduction, which had been a major source of tension in the community.

Another key issue with regard to distribution effects is access to jobs within World Vision. Where, how (and for how long) these are advertised, and the criteria for hiring came up in many contexts as having an impact on who was ultimately hired. In Somalia:

"The people in Waajid are less educated and most times do not qualify for technical positions. The Jiron sub-clan, the majority in Waajid, see themselves as discriminated against, which therefore deepens the rift between them and other clans."

In Uganda:

"The short duration for job advertisement by World Vision tended to feed into unequal access to formal employment as a tension in the area (i.e. by limiting access of the local people to better paid positions in the organizations)."

In Kenya:

"WV staff explained how they used the concept of 'DNH' in community level staff recruitment. To guard against tensions and ensure diversity staff would be equally recruited from both clans. However, it was unclear if staff were also taking into account religious diversity. At national level ensuring diversity seemed more challenging although interviewees did see the importance of getting this right."

3.3.2 Legitimization Effects

World Vision’s programs often identify key people in the communities in which they are implemented to work with, or work through to either gain entry to beneficiary communities or to help to implement projects. Involvement in an NGO project or program lends legitimacy to authorities, and so selecting the proper authorities in any context is vital. In WV’s programs, there were both positive and negative effects associated with authorities.

Community groups and trusted and respected elders were identified as key connectors in many contexts. In those places, where WV was able to capitalize on those authorities, it generated positive impacts for communities. However, when groups or committees of decision makers were not seen to be legitimate, they could have quite a negative impact on intergroup dynamics.
In Zambia:

“The selection of the committee members and the involvement of the village leadership have led to allegations of nepotism, segregation, and favoritism. More vulnerable community members have been left out of the project as a result of the composition of the committees, which are favoring less vulnerable members."

In Lebanon, individuals who had been involved in one ADP’s program and gained visibility and legitimacy through that involvement went on to become trusted community leaders:

“Responsible people in the villages have a long history with WV. They were partners from the beginning of the ADP. Some of them were volunteers and now they are members in the municipal council and still working with the ADP.”

**Distribution effects** often overlap, positively and negatively, with **legitimization effects**. Local officials, community groups, and other authorities are often key people in program implementation—they can open or close doors for WV staff, as well as amplify the impacts of the program. When authorities are trusted, and act in fair, respectful, accountable and transparent ways—the same DNH Behavior Patterns that apply to staff—the impact of engaging them can be quite positive, and build positive relationships within the community, as well as building trust between communities and WV. When these authorities engage in nepotism, favoritism, bribery, and other forms of bias, their actions not only disintegrate relationships between favored and non-favored groups, but they erode trust between WV and the communities it is attempting to serve.

### 3.3.3 Substitution Effects

Substitution effects occur when existing systems, structures or authorities in a community are overwhelmed or undermined (or, on the positive side, supported and strengthened) because of their involvement with an organization’s programs. How an organization engages, builds relationships with, and works through groups and communities will most often determine if it is displacing an existing structure, or reinforcing it.

In Ethiopia:

“Before project inception, the existing water committee that was nominated by community members played a vital role in linking the community with other communities, the government, and World Vision. They not only explained the problem of the community to government and World Vision, but they also mobilized the community members to contribute ten percent of the project cost in cash, the local materials and the labor...The project worked closely with this committee and by doing so strengthened it further. This contributed to ownership of the project by community members.”

“The community contributed to and participated in constructing other school blocks—activities that brought community members to work together. Contracting an external contractor may have undermined this, since it denied full community participation, as the contractor was responsible for the whole process. This process as well is likely to implicitly
disempower the community where they might see themselves as incapable of doing quality work."

Bringing in external resources can also free up money (at a family, community or governmental level) to contribute to tensions. At a governmental level, this can mean more money flowing to militias or armies to continue fighting. At a community level, more support for destructive groups. At a family level, as was observed in one ADP in Uganda, it can also increase violence:

"By paying school fees for registered children, the ADP tends to substitute family resources which are then used for drinking resulting in domestic violence."

### 3.3.4 Market Effects

Bringing in external goods, services, job opportunities and other resources can have powerful effects on local markets for products, rents, and skills. External inputs can distort prices, making it difficult for local people to sustain their livelihoods. Alternatively, it can also balance and support local markets.

In Zambia:

"The project was designed to provide crop and livestock diversification to improve livelihoods. This approach accommodates those who have access to farm land (considered the rich) as well as those who do not have access to farm land (the poor). The people who do not have land receive goats and chickens from the project. This eases the tension between perceived have and have nots."

In Sri Lanka:

"The tsunami aid programs have generally had a detrimental market effect in skewing the prices of basic commodities—especially building materials—and labour. This particularly affects the poor and those on marginal incomes. A fairly well-off farmer complained about not being able to get farm labor as village women were off working on tsunami projects!"

In Somalia:

"Limited effort to share information about the procedures relating to the purchase of seeds and farming equipment. There are a few complaints and tensions created especially as a result of purchasing seeds from Nairobi. There is sometimes a feeling that the seeds can be purchased locally and the local business people would like to tender to supply the seeds."

### 3.3.5 Theft

Theft of goods, especially common in humanitarian response (food and cash distributions) can increase tensions and feelings of insecurity. However, theft can also be reduced through careful attention to program details.

In Kenya:
“Uncontrolled movements in and out of IDP camps presented unintended beneficiaries an opportunity to access humanitarian assistance and often increased unhealthy competition over limited services, food, and non-food items. Inter-ethnic tensions were sometimes intensified given that most unintended beneficiaries were from ethnic groups that perpetrated violence against those who fled to camps.”

In Uganda:

“Increasing the number of food distribution points and bringing them closer to the beneficiaries has greatly reduced the time taken to collect food due to the long distances covered. This has greatly minimized food theft on [beneficiaries’] way back and security risks involved while traveling back from the food distribution points.”
4. Conflict Sensitivity Utilization Across WV Country Offices

The second piece of this review is an understanding of how conflict sensitivity is utilized in WV offices today. WV collected survey data from Peacebuilding Officers (PBOs), collected case evidence of one ADP’s application of CS in Kenya (Annex 2) as well as individual interviews with key personnel in order to collect experiences of how they interpret CS, how they analyze its application in WV, and what recommendations they have to improve CS practice within their offices and within the organization as a whole.

A key question of the PBO survey was an assessment of National Office application of CS. PBOs were asked to rate the application of conflict sensitivity in their National Offices (NOs) on a scale from 1-5 based on their own assessment of the important factors for CS integration; all respondents ranked their office as either a 2 or a 3 (below average or average). Each of them responded that there was room for improvement in CS application. They offered suggestions for increasing CS application, including more systematic approaches, increasing staff capacity (hiring more staff to support CS/Peacebuilding), training/sensitizing leadership, integrating CS into NO strategies, developing indicators for CS, integrating CS into WV’s partnership approach, developing a budget line for CS in project budgets, and developing guidance for incorporating CS into Development Program Approaches (DPA) and Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DME) processes. In the course of surveys and KIIIs, the patterns below began to emerge:

4.1 Barriers and Supports to Using CS

There were several specifically identified barriers for implementing CS in various operational contexts. Some of these were contextual, others were operational.

4.1.1 Barrier and Support: A large number of tools

There was not consensus among respondents as to whether the range of conflict/context analysis tools that WV uses was a support for CS application, or a barrier to it. Some people said that there was a lack of clarity about which tools did what, or how to apply different tools in different contexts. One person said that “people know the names of the tools, but not necessarily which one does what.” Several people noted that GECARR was good for informing strategic directions, but it needed to be supplemented by additional analyses once a strategy was developed and programs were being planned. Some people also pointed out that other CS approaches and guidance had been helpful to them. Specifically, someone cited the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium’s How-to Guide5 as a particularly useful reference document.

Staff acknowledged that, while the existing tools for CS and conflict analysis were helpful, it would be useful to consider how CS was (or could be) integrated into technical approaches and programs, such as the Learning through Evaluation, Application, and Planning (LEAP) tools for DME.

5 Conflict Sensitivity Consortium “How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity.”
4.1.2 Potential Barrier: CS in different program areas

In recent engagements, CDA has seen a shift in how aid workers interpret the applicability of CS to their work. While much of the initial research and collaborative learning to develop the evidence pool for the DNH Program took place with humanitarian actors, currently, humanitarians report that CS runs seemingly contradictory to humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. There has been some push-back, which seems to stem from a misinterpretation of CS. These arguments were not made by WV staff, however. Specifically, in the Syria Response, one person noted that in, “WV generally there is a need for more focus on CS in responses versus development contexts.” It was also pointed out that although there is a commitment and understanding that CS should be applied in humanitarian contexts, in reality “it hasn’t been institutionalized the past few years. As a result, it is sporadic, according to the context. Sometimes there is nothing as there is no time, capacity or know-how within the response.”

Building on this, another staff member said that there was, “no time to think in humanitarian contexts. This means lots of “burning bridges” at the initial stages of the response and then it becomes difficult to deliver in later stages.” The need to respond and deliver goods or services swiftly in the face of a humanitarian crisis creates an added pressure on humanitarian agencies. Context analysis and program strategies and planning are most often deferred. However, in the interim period, community trust can be lost, which can affect the program later on. Another staff person said, “Needs assessments are not the same as DNH, there is little understanding of the added benefits of DNH.” This statement would seem to indicate that many staff members are focused on addressing needs, but not the downstream impacts of how programs are implemented.

That CS and humanitarian response have seemingly competing priorities may be a challenge for field staff. In the Kenya case study, this was raised as an issue:

Staff at the local level were concerned that an emphasis on conflict sensitivity in choosing beneficiaries and project locations was sometimes at odds with responding according to greatest humanitarian need and ensuring cost effectiveness. However, they didn’t see any way to resolve this tension.

This may be an area where further guidance or support, or simply a clear directive, from management could offer clarity to implementing staff.

4.1.3 Support: Coordination and Communication

Several people noted that formal and informal mechanisms for coordination and communication bolster CS application in WV. Small groups that exchange information about context and program often provide a venue for discussing CS and increasing implementation of DNH within a program. In other cases, formal coordination mechanisms meant to ensure lack of duplication of aid often provided platforms to discuss CS issues like impacts on local markets, distribution effects, and criteria for participation in programming.

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4.1.4 Barrier: Staff Capacity

Many interviewees indicated that staff capacity for CS overall was low. Several people noted that capacity was “on a downward trend” or that there were few people driving CS at the national level. One person said, “it has gotten to the stage where it just isn’t done, neither CS nor context analysis, except by security or policy folks. Hence, staff don’t know how to do assessments and there is no one held accountable for not doing DNH or CS.” Many people saw this as a structural and management concern. The focus of training, they said, was on developing awareness among staff, but not among managers, who could keep staff accountable for its application. While there seems to be widespread awareness of what CS is, only a small number of staff members are responsible for CS within national or regional offices. One peacebuilding officer said, “Those offices that have peacebuilding core staff are few and when there are PBOs in an office they have other responsibilities, which reduces their focus and how much attention they can put on CS.”

CS is largely seen as a tool for program implementation, however, very few people saw links being made to program-level decision making when discussing CS application. The emphasis of training and CS application in many contexts appears to be on doing, rather than using, analysis. Several staff expressed a lack of clarity about how to use CS analysis.

A practical example from the Kenya case study:

Local level staff interviewed had a good knowledge of DNH but no formal training. Senior individuals had bought into and understood DNH concepts, had then insisted on assessments, cascaded them to other staff, and integrated them into the ADP work. This highlights the key role that DNH ‘champions’ can play. However, as DNH is not compulsory across WV Kenya this makes further integration a challenge as new staff come on board but there is not a parallel increase in DNH capacity building. An institutionalisation of DNH would also bring in wider accountability structures that negate relying solely on individuals. WV field staff were keen to increase the number of DNH ‘champions’ through formal training and awareness raising as well as refresh their own knowledge.

4.2 Management and Funding

A great deal of focus of the key informant interviews was on management at the national and regional levels, both in terms of human resource management and organizational structure and where CS “fits” in the organization. In CDA’s DNH Reflective Case Studies, a clear lesson was that staff prioritize what they are held accountable for, by managers and by donors. Additionally, CS, along with other cross-cutting themes, tend to get variable donor support over time, which means that accountability for CS application ebbs and flows.

Most interviewees indicated that there was not reliable management support for CS application, or accountability for its use. Without ongoing accountability for CS application, it becomes largely personality-driven: those who find it useful apply it, those who don’t - don’t. While this can mean that some offices will experience higher levels of CS application, and therefore implement programs that are more conflict sensitive overall. For example, one person noted, “There’s a good trend in the East Africa Regional Office, when a new regional leader came, to everyone’s surprise his vision was peace,
opportunity and protection for every child. So that is the regional vision. With him declaring that, national offices and even regional offices have been forced to align to that vision to achieve it. So that is definitely trickling into national office strategies and operations. So, the fact that we have an overarching vision, so people will give you an ear and start recognizing that there is something we need to be doing. The environment at the policy level has become more enabling because of this vision." Unfortunately, personality driven agendas are unreliable, because they are dependent on a few dedicated individuals, rather than broader systemic institutional support.

The primary vector for CS application and practice within WV seems to be its Peacebuilding Officers (PBOs). However as one person pointed out, PBOs can be “triple-hatted, responsible for gender, protection and CS.” Though, this is not always the case—sometimes PBOs have more responsibilities, sometimes CS is folded into other functions or roles—it is clear that very few people across WV are solely tasked with thinking and advising on conflict sensitivity. If PBOs are asked to mainstream and/or lead in all of these areas, they will inevitably set priorities, which will shift over time. Additionally, storing an office’s capacity for any methodology, lens, or tool in a handful of people is not a sustainable means of integrating it into the overall approach of the staff—as staff leave WV, or move from office to office, they take crucial capacities with them.

Management and funding structures can have real impacts on how staff perceive organizational priorities and how those priorities are translated into programmatic choices. The Kenya case gives a good example of the concerns of staff about management decisions and how those may have impacts for WV beneficiaries in their ADP:

*In addition, several WV staff raised concerns around new program models that were being brought in to raise effectiveness and efficiency. For example, a program model called LEAP3 will apparently draw WV Kenya’s 55 ADPs into 22 clusters. The concern was that consolidation could mean additional workloads for some people and thus inadvertently have a detrimental impact on conflict sensitivity as people focus on more things with fewer resources and so it gets de-prioritised. There were also concerns that consolidating different geographic areas into one could present issues due to the high diversity of groups and needs.*

Many people spoke about the influence of donors on CS application. Donors have a tremendous influence on how programs are rolled out at the field level. “Funding is crucial for CS to happen,” one person said. While donor pressure seems to be a key condition for CS application, especially in contexts where it is not internally driven by the organization or by management, CS can still slip through the cracks. Another person said, “donors talk a lot about CS, but they don’t follow up and they’re not specific. They don’t have tools to monitor CS among their partners; they’re limited to checklists.” This sentiment was echoed by others. In many contexts, within and outside WV, people indicate that CS can become a “tick box,” especially when it comes to donor accountability. Because most donor organizations don’t require that monitoring or evaluation mechanisms meaningfully integrate CS, organizations are left to self-report that they are applying it as an approach in programming. One WV staff member made this plain, “Donors have a lack of information about what is going on in the field. They have a lack of clarity about who and how we engage and a lack of understanding about how those actors engage each other.” Another said, “Funding (for CS) generally
is not there. There is a lot of rhetoric from donors and it’s included in guidelines but they don’t really focus on it when they’re assessing applicants.”

4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Throughout the aid industry, among donors and NGOs, understanding how to monitor and evaluate CS is proving a challenge. It is difficult for an organization to develop accountability mechanisms for CS without meaningful means of monitoring and evaluating its application. Monitoring and Evaluating CS requires a two-pronged approach. An organization must monitor both impacts on the conflict context, as well as staff utilization of tools and frameworks. Many WV staff indicated that CS should be more integrated into WV’s monitoring mechanisms. This would help non-technical (peacebuilding) staff, more fully understand how to integrate CS into strategy and programming, and be more accountable for its use. One person suggested that WV should provide, “more clarity on how CS is integrated into technical approaches and technical programs, specifically, LEAP (Learning through Evaluation, Accountability and Planning) tools.”

World Vision’s field assessment reports for IPACS and DNH serve as a good baseline for M&E going forward, and these must be supplemented with regular context updates, follow-up for programmatic options generated. While this may be being done at a project or program level, without a systematic M&E approach, there is no way to track this data in an ongoing way. However, as many people pointed out, in interviews and in consultations, the existence of a report or a CS analysis does not necessarily indicate that a project was implemented in a conflict sensitive manner. One person said, “At the program level, it is taken as a given that people are considering the context, but there is no proactive checking and giving of support.” Without ongoing monitoring of CS application and program impacts on conflict, it will be difficult for WV to tailor its capacity building approaches to specific needs in specific contexts, and understand its impacts in a meaningful way.

4.4 Tool Application and Uptake in an Organizational System

An organization, like any context, is a complex system, whose factors have dynamic relationships. Using a systems map, it becomes possible to see where and how there may be leverage for influencing the dynamics in the system. Many people speak about mainstreaming conflict sensitivity within an organization, as if it is a process that can be completed. Mainstreaming needs constant attention, support and funding over time to maintain levels of understanding and application among staff—to keep it on the agenda, and keep it a priority. Rather than thinking about mainstreaming, it may be more useful to think about saturation. A sponge, saturated with water will dry out over time, unless more water is added. Another WV staffer likened the need for full CS integration to “putting DNH in our bloodstream, it needs to be part of everything we do, and how we operate.” Others pointed out that currently, among WV leadership, there is an openness to CS that has not been there before. Generating wider ownership for CS across staff will be a big cultural shift, which will require resources and attention, but a moment for such a shift may be emerging. The uptake and application of any approach, tool or methodology cannot be explained by a single factor, or even a preponderance of factors. However, seeing the system as a whole, how factors interact, and the causal relationships among them can generate a better understanding. On the next page there is a
diagram of the system explained by WV staff about how and why CS is taken up, or not, within World Vision.

Generally speaking, the left side of this diagram depicts the organizational structures and processes into which most energy and funding for CS is generally inserted. Training, tool development, headquarters support (in the form of staffing, polices, and guidance) are the primary approaches to the integration of a new concept or tool in any organization. Largely unaddressed in the case of CS, are the factors on the right: M&E and Accountability.
5. Broader issues and Recommendations

Based on the field assessment reports, the Kenya case study, survey data and key informant interviews, a number of broad issues emerged regarding World Vision’s interaction with conflict contexts. These can serve as the basis for internal reflection among World Vision staff, management and policy makers. While these issues are generated from WV data, they are not unique to WV, its staff, or its identity.

5.1 Broader issues

The issues raised in this section should serve as entry points for discussion, strategy, and planning among staff, management and headquarters. All of these challenges represent areas in which there are no hard-and-fast answers, no right or wrong. These decisions need to be made deliberately, and with an understanding of what the impacts of each choice will be in the immediate, medium and longer term.

5.1.1 Identity

Every organization brings its identity, be it nationality or affiliation, into the contexts in which it works. World Vision, by virtue of its Christian identity may face additional challenges, especially when working in multi-religious contexts. While this may serve as a challenge in initiating programming or entering a new context, at a program-implementation level, this seems to be a barrier easily overcome. In field assessment reports, staff often identified religion and religious identity as a potential barrier between WV and communities, but many reports indicated that they were able to address this through communication with key people and transparency about programs.

In all contexts, but especially those where religious identity is a key Divider among communities, WV should pay close attention to how religion is or may become instrumentalized as conflict dynamics shift. A trust carefully built between communities and the organization may be broken down by external forces, rhetoric, or political manipulation. This can be linked not only to local conflict dynamics, but to national, regional or international dynamics as well.

In each operational context, identity and trust-building will manifest differently. WV staff should continue at a program level to analyze who are the key people to work with in the community, and how to engage both beneficiary and non-beneficiary populations for transparency about their mission and approaches. At a national and regional level, WV staff should engage in serious conversations about organizational identity as related to operational decisions (e.g. selecting partner organizations).

Finally, World Vision staff are its primary face within a community. How communities perceive those staff, both their behavior and their identity can serve either to promote or hinder positive relationships. WV should engage in analysis of who staff are, how they are hired, promoted, and retained, and what their relationships are like with communities as a key part of their conflict sensitivity

7 As included in World Vision International’s “Programme Accountability Framework.”
analyses. Currently, the field assessment reports contain no meaningful analysis of “Who?” WV staff are, and therefore how they relate to and are perceived by communities. Similar to the transparency applied to its organizational identity and its approaches, WV can apply a similar approach to its staffing.

5.1.2 Access vs. Impact

Another recurring issue in the reports and interviews was the seeming conflict between the desire for programs to have the greatest impact on populations with the greatest need, and the ability to access those populations. This issue arises mainly in humanitarian contexts—due to the pressures to spend, to meet goals quickly, and to address the greatest needs of the most people—but it is also a challenge for development actors. Again, this issue is not unique to World Vision. In many contexts, it also carries with it the technical and technological challenges of communication with staff and partners, the ability to monitor programming remotely, and risk management for national and international staff.

5.1.3 Timeliness vs. Quality of Response

In the humanitarian sector, it is vitally important for organizations and programs to respond quickly and effectively to life-threatening emergencies. However, too often, more emphasis is placed on speed and less on effectiveness. Context analysis, adapting programs, and communicating effectively with communities takes time and energy, and there are fewer incentives for these skills in emergency contexts. However, as several staff pointed out, if time is not taken at the outset to focus on quality and effectiveness, this can affect the impact of programming in the medium- to long-term. Given its identity as a multi-mandate organization, perhaps there is a way to utilize data gathered and analysis done in other programmatic areas.

5.1.4 Conflict Sensitivity Analysis vs. Application of Conflict Sensitivity

One person said, “When we do IPACS or when we do DNH, to what extent is it being used to shape decisions about a project? It is unclear, you have reports but are they using them for the purpose they are meant to serve?” Many people at different levels supported this statement. The existence of a conflict sensitivity analysis, even one that identifies options for program adjustments, does not necessarily indicate that the program took up those options, or took a conflict sensitive approach to
program implementation. In order to understand if a CS approach was actually taken, and what the impacts of CS were in the context, CS must be fully integrated into M&E systems.

5.2 Recommendations

The recommendations presented below are based on suggestions from WV staff and CDA’s experience working with NGOs and INGOs on CS integration and utilization. These recommendations focus on the technical or process-related challenges of CS application, utilization, and monitoring.

*Revise the template/instructions for DNH/IPACS reports:*

Many of the CS assessment reports (DNH reports, especially) were missing vital CS information, such as the criteria for decision-making, and a thorough analysis of program details. Explicit instructions for program analysis, particularly would be useful to staff, and/or a revised field assessment template. CDA has developed the Critical Details chart, which is a useful way of sorting program analysis with step-by-step guidance for sorting details and understanding criteria and process decisions, as well as patterns of impact (Resource Transfer and Implicit Ethical Message patterns). Templates like this might help staff be more deliberate about program analysis, especially on disaggregating the “Who?” questions of CS, and making the case to management when a specific policy or program element (especially those for which implementing staff have little decision-making control) may be conflict insensitive and need to be addressed.

Additionally, if field assessment reports will be further utilized after their completion, it would be helpful for D/C analyses to include a prioritization of Dividers and Connectors in the context. This can help focus analysis and tracking going forward and help staff prioritize options generation. The meta-trends analysis included in this document could not assess whether the most frequently identified D/C were especially important in their individual contexts. A high-level view such as this could be better informed by understanding if and how WV is interacting with especially strong, divisive or dangerous dividing factors in various ways, and if and how WV is supporting or undermining powerful connecting forces.

*Update Field Assessment Reports on a regular basis:*

Each field assessment report provides a snapshot of the context and program in a particular moment (planning, during implementation, etc.) however, in order to be make these reports more a more useful programming tool, staff should update these regularly. Key considerations for this would be to determine if programmatic options determined in a first (or subsequent) report had their intended effects, what new D/C emerged, changes in relative strength of D/C over time, and the impact of external events (elections, natural disasters, etc) on D/C. All of these would provide useful information for developing more adaptable and flexible programs. A WV staff member also said that it would be useful to have documentation of how analysis has turned into action. This will be useful for Monitoring purposes, and for formative and summative evaluations of programs.

*Move from “fire-fighter” approach to “safety” mentality:*

Conflict sensitivity can suffer from “resource person” syndrome within organizations. Often, if CS is identified as related to peace or peacebuilding work, it becomes siloed in peacebuilding or conflict
mitigation programs, and de-emphasized in humanitarian and other program types. When key personnel or departments are responsible for the integration of CS in programming, they may find themselves responding to challenges and helping their colleagues address negative impacts (fighting fires), rather than helping to develop longer term strategies for operating in conflict contexts. On a build site, the safety of the site is everyone’s responsibility. Every worker should be paying attention to his or her own safety and looking out for the safety of others. Conflict sensitivity can be approached in the same way. WV can generate meaningful accountability mechanisms for staff application of CS linked to monitoring and evaluation data, and it can change the perspective of CS as a ‘program tool’ only to an operational approach that applies to strategies, processes, and programs.

Tailor some of the guidance on DNH or IPACS to fragile contexts:

One staff member requested that WV adapt some of the language of its tools and approaches to CS for fragile contexts, which are not necessarily conflict-affected. CDA has seen that staff and management are much more likely to apply CS in contexts of active conflict, but de-emphasize its importance in contexts without ongoing or violent conflict. While CS is intrinsically linked to program quality, the language of “conflict sensitivity” still leads it to be confined to peacebuilding activities and programs in many organizations or to be considered unnecessary for relatively peaceful contexts. The struggle of how to discuss CS as linked to program effectiveness overall is not specific to World Vision. There may be some internal language, framing, or guidance that can help with uptake of CS in fragile contexts.

Outline how WV tools fit together GECARR, MSTC, DNH, IPACS:

The preponderance of existing tools for CS, both inside and outside WV has a tendency to lead to confusion about how these approaches fit together and what the benefits of one tool are over another. WV could generate some guidance, or add to its existing approaches, an explicit discussion of how its various tools supplement one another, what the added value of each is, and in which contexts some may be more or less beneficial than others. This can help clear up some confusion and may assist in generating a broader contextual picture overall.

Integrate CS into Accountability Mechanisms:

In order to move from a “fire fighting” approach to a “safety” approach, as outlined above, all staff members need to be informed about, and most importantly, accountable for CS impacts. Integrating CS into training and onboarding for staff is not sufficient to ensure uptake, or the ‘transfusion of CS into WV’s bloodstream.’ CS can be built into individual review processes, as well as project and program review processes.
Annex 1: Do No Harm, A Tool for Conflict Sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity in is the ability of an organization to:

1. Understand the context in which it is working, especially the dynamics of relationships between and among groups in that context.

2. Understand how the details of its interventions interact with that context. This includes not only the outcomes of the interventions, but also:
   a. Details of its programs (beneficiary/participant selection, sites and timings of programs, etc.)
   b. Details of its operations (hiring, procurement, security, etc.)
   c. Specifics of its policies (criteria-setting for both programs and operations).

3. Act upon this understanding to minimize the negative impacts of its interventions on the context and maximize positive impacts.

CDA’s Do No Harm framework is one tool for the application of conflict sensitivity. It was developed through a Collaborative Learning Project (CLP), through the Do No Harm Program. This CLP convened thousands of aid workers, donors, academics and communities to understand how assistance given in contexts of conflict interacts with those conflicts. Ultimately, the project distilled six core lessons from the myriad experiences of aid workers in vastly differing contexts:

1. When an organization enters a context, it becomes a part of that context.
2. All contexts can be categorized by both Dividers and Connectors.
3. Every intervention will have an impact on both Dividers and Connectors.
4. The source of an intervention’s impacts are its Actions (the resources it brings to the context and how those resources are delivered) and the Behaviors of its staff (the implicit messages sent through organization-community interactions).
5. The details of an intervention matter. These details add up to broader impacts on Dividers and Connectors.
6. There are always Options to improve an intervention’s impacts.

These lessons form the backbone of the Do No Harm Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Aid on Conflict.

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8 For more information on CDA’s Collaborative Learning Methodology: [http://cdacollaborative.org/](http://cdacollaborative.org/)
The Do No Harm Framework (above) is meant to help practitioners consider the broader impacts of their programs, outside of meeting their stated goals, on the relationships among people in the contexts where they operate.

**Dividers and Connectors**

Dividers are those sources of tension, mistrust, or suspicion in a community. They are the factors that pull people apart and prevent reconciliation or peace. Connectors are the sources of cohesion and trust in a community. They reinforce normalcy in contexts of conflict, and they are the local capacities people have for peace in their own societies.

Dividers and Connectors can be sorted into categories, to help brainstorming and disaggregation for the analysis process. The main categories used in DNH workshops are:

- **Systems and Institutions**: What are the structures in society—both formal and informal—that promote, prolong, or enable division or connection among people?
- **Attitudes and Actions**: What are the things that people say and do (including media messages, stereotyping, rallies, peace marches, etc.) that divide or connect people?
- **Values and Interests**: What shared (connector) or different (divider) values do people express in society? What common or different interest do they have in the use of resources, prolonging violence, or maintaining peace?
- **Experiences**: What shared experiences unite people (historical or recent)? What different experiences divide people?
- **Symbols and Occasions**: What symbols or occasions (holidays, festivals, etc.) remind people of their similarities? Of their differences?

**Understanding the Aid Program**

One key step in applying DNH is interrogating the details of the intervention. These details include:

1. **Who?** (staff, beneficiaries, PO, and authorities)
2. **What?** (the resources the organization brings to the context—inputs and outcomes)
3. **Where?** (macro, meso, and micro level locations of program elements and activities)
4. **When?** (startup, exit strategies, times of year, month, week, day)
5. **Why?** (criteria for decision making, also important to ask, “why not?” Cuts across all other program details)
6. How? (methodologies and other considerations. Cuts across all other program details)

The DNH Program Analysis is not just a run-through of these six questions, but an in-depth examination of the many decisions that go into the development of an aid intervention. Participants are encouraged to examine why and how decisions are made, who benefits (or benefits most) and who is excluded.

**Patterns of Impact**

There are two sets of patterns that determine the impact of an intervention on Dividers and Connectors: Patterns of Action/Resource Transfers (what and organization does, the resources it brings into a context, how it brings those resources) and Patterns of BehaviorImplicit Ethical Messages (how staff interact with communities and the messages communicated through those behaviors).

**Patterns of Action/Resource Transfers**

- Theft: Are resources likely to be stolen? Does the intervention make local communities more vulnerable to theft?
- Market Effects: Will the resources brought into the context affect local prices such that local people are priced out of their own markets, or that they are unable to make a living due to deflation?
- Distribution Effects: Are resources distributed along the lines of existing divisions in society? Are they perceived to be distributed along those lines?
- Legitimization Effects: Are certain authorities or actors legitimized because of their involvement with the intervention? Are certain behaviors rewarded and thus encouraged?
- Substitution Effects: Are existing systems and structures ignored, overwhelmed or undermined by the intervention? Is the organization taking on roles that should be played by authorities or government?

**Patterns of BehaviorImplicit Ethical Messages**

- Respect: Who is consulted? Who decides? How are disputes settled? Do staff listen?
- Accountability: Do staff respond to grievances and feedback? Are problems and mistakes fixed promptly?
- Fairness: Are local definitions of “fair” considered in the design and implementation of the intervention?

**Options Generation**

Once an organization observes changes in the context of conflict, or observes that there are potential impacts on D/C via identified patterns of impact, the details of programs or program plans can be adjusted to address those changes and patterns. These Options should also be checked against any potential impacts on other D/C identified. Often, only small adjustments are needed to the program details in order to address impacts on Dividers and Connectors. Examples of these can be found in the DNH Trainer’s Manual.
Annex 2: Kenya Case Study

DNH Meta-Trends, Kenya Case Study

**Background**

This case study is a brief review of conflict sensitivity application and impact within World Vision (WV) Kenya (both positive and negative), highlighting some noticeable trends. The purpose is to highlight key contextual and programmatic trends and impact, enabling future comparison with other WV offices and better evaluation of WV overarching conflict sensitivity policies, procedures and practises.

It draws on the inputs of WV staff, as well as the perceptions and experiences of WV beneficiaries in south-west Kenya and other INGOs working in the country. The case study forms part of a one year collaborative research project between WV and Collaborative for Development Action, CDA (the founders of ‘Do No harm’, DNH). This research is an in-depth examination of the integration of DNH/conflict sensitivity within WV looking vertically from donor, to support office (SO), regional office (RO) to national office/response level and also horizontally across sectors and departments. The research is being done through a desk based reviews of ‘DNH’ reports, surveys, interviews with key staff and in-depth case studies (of which this is the first).

**Methodology**

Data collection in Kenya was done over three days in November 2015, through a combination of focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs). It was done in two locations; in Nairobi with the WV regional office, donors, WV Kenya staff and other NGOs; and in WV Area Development Programme (ADP) Kegonga-Ntimaru (Kuria district, Migori county, south western Kenya) with WV field staff and programme beneficiaries. The data was then triangulated into key findings and analysis. World Vision international (WVI), World Vision UK (WVUK) and WV Kenya staff conducted the interviews.

WV staff conducted a total of 9 focus group discussions (60 people) and 9 key informant interviews in Kegonga-Ntimaru (total of 69 people). Questions included identifying connectors and dividers, and programmatic questions around WV impact, contextual understanding, community involvement and participation, feedback mechanisms, communication and suggested improvements. Groups interviewed included men, women, children (primary and secondary), young people, pastors, reformed warriors, peace committees, local government, elders and non-WV groups. In Nairobi 10 key informant interviews were conducted, making a total of 79 people spoken to overall.

**Limitations:** Due to time restrictions, WV staff visited only one ADP to collect data (despite WV Kenya having 55 ADPs). Kegonga-Ntimaru ADP was selected due to its active use of ‘DNH’ and a Peacebuilding Project that has worked to enhance inter-ethnic conflict prevention/mitigation and reconciliation. However, it still remains unclear if Kegonga-Ntimaru ADP demonstrates common practise amongst WV Kenya work or is a notable positive exception. The findings will be compared to other ADPs by WV Kenya staff in due course.
Key Findings

**Contextual trends:** The exercise of identifying connectors and dividers enabled WV interviewers to gauge the capacity of WV Kenya staff and their understanding of the context, and also identify some trends. For many staff interviewed these questions prompted a new and stronger acknowledgement of the importance of contextual understanding, including identification of trends, and the need to review this regularly as individuals and organisations, in order to better understand the situation. Many had not received formal DNH training but had a basic understanding in order to complete the exercise.

A summary of contextual issues identified by, and between, various groups through this exercise includes:

- **Connectors:** traditional family set up; use of sport and activities that engage young people; shared markets and other public services e.g. schools, health clinics; church based activities including regular worship and inter-faith/inter-denomination events; cultural ceremonies and community events; sharing of resources; positive leadership roles.

- **Dividers:** cattle rustling and revenge attacks; FGM and other negative culture practises; corruption; clan and tribal issues, linked to party politics, wider violence and illegal armed groups; issues of religion tensions, especially between Christians and Muslims; tensions between civil society and the government which is resulting in shrinking space for civil society (particularly NGOs and INGOs); land and resource allocation across the country due to scarcity; illiteracy; manipulation of youth; IDPs; party politics.

**Context analysis:** Communities complemented WV for its contextual knowledge. They felt this was demonstrated through WV seeking their active participation (in project design and implementation), regular monitoring visits and ability to feedback. However, neither WV staff nor communities mentioned systematic context analysis that would provide a more in-depth understanding, or regular follow up context monitoring. In Nairobi some interviewees felt WV didn’t fully understand the context, especially when it came to issues of tribalism/clan and their affiliations to various groups, their government relationships, and ways of partnering etc. The assumption for this divergence of viewpoints is that potentially Kegonga-Ntimaru ADP has done exceptionally well in contrast to other ADPs.

**Programmatic trends**

**Staffing (recruitment and capacity):** In Kegonga-Ntimaru WV staff explained how they used the concept of ‘DNH’ in community level staff recruitment. To guard against tensions and ensure diversity staff would be equally recruited from both clans. However, it was unclear if staff were also taking into account religious diversity. At national level ensuring diversity seemed more challenging although interviewees did see the importance of getting this right. Although some have queried if these methods of recruitment were simply common sense rather than intentional application of ‘do no harm’ or how you distinguish, the overall outcome has been a continuation of WV work and presence in the area.
Local level staff interviewed had a good knowledge of DNH but no formal training. Senior individuals had bought into and understood DNH concepts, had then insisted on assessments, cascaded them to other staff, and integrated them into the ADP work. This highlights the key role that DNH ‘champions’ can play. However, as DNH is not compulsory across WV Kenya this makes further integration a challenge as new staff come on board but there is not a parallel increase in DNH capacity building. An institutionalisation of DNH would also bring in wider accountability structures that negate relying solely on individuals. WV field staff were keen to increase the number of DNH ‘champions’ through formal training and awareness raising as well as refresh their own knowledge. However beyond being keen to get ‘training’, they were unable to articulate the added value this would bring to their work (e.g. needing further tools, concern about missing certain things etc.).

It shows training alone will not always ensure take up and added value to ADP activities if there is no accountability from the national WV HQ level to integrate it. The limited awareness and capacity regarding DNH at the WV HQ level has also no doubt had an impact on field level DNH implementation.

**Partnerships:** Communities in Kegonga-Ntimaru felt WV Kenya had a number of good partnerships, including with the government and churches. However, these partnerships were often around activities rather than aiming to improve WV Kenya’s understanding of the context. Partnerships were strong at the local level, whilst at the national level there appeared to be more challenges. Interviewees questioned whether WV adequately partnered with fellow NGOs/INGOs, with a tendency to ‘go it alone’ which created tensions between the INGO community and WV. They questioned ‘who’ WV partnered with and how these decisions were made. WV’s faith identity was sometimes seen as a weakness due to potential bias to work more with churches rather than exploring alternative partners like the private sector.

**Targeting:** WV staff gave several examples of DNH integration, including using the concepts in recruitment, targeting, community participation, and project location selection. Some at the community level protested at WV beneficiary selection (especially children under the sponsorship programme, see point below on ‘approaches’), claiming it wasn’t always done on the basis of vulnerability but geographic positioning. WV’s response to this was that this wasn’t possible to work in some of these areas on account of additional costs such as transport, overheads, staff security etc. Youth were flagged by some as a neglected group at both the macro and micro level although youth groups interviewed were very appreciative of WV projects. It highlighted once again the need for good contextual understanding of key groups and vulnerabilities in relation to minimising tensions and promoting peace.

**Inter-faith relationships:** Linkages with faith leaders were commended at the local level, across Christian denominations and between faiths. Communities and fellow INGOs felt this was a strong aspect of WV’s work with possible entry points for promoting further DNH. However sometimes these relationships (both with individual leaders and organisations) did not extend up to national level.

**WV approaches:** Although communities highlighted World Vision’s development, community based and peacebuilding projects as a connector they also mentioned WV Kenya’s sponsorship approach
several times at the ADP level as a source of tension. Communities queried why their children were or were not marked as ‘registered children’ and the benefits that they perceived should come from that (e.g. extra services), in relation with what was being asked of them (e.g. writing letters, photo shoots etc). Whilst WV staff were clear about the rationale for the model of selecting a certain number of children as ‘registered children’, to promote the work in communities and communicate with sponsors, this wasn’t so clear to those interviewed. This highlights the importance of clear communication as a means of ‘doing no harm’. It was difficult to ascertain whether interviewees had already raised such issues previously and had had appropriate engagement with WV to resolve them and yet were raising again.

In addition, several WV staff raised concerns around new programme models that were being brought in to raise effectiveness and efficiency. For example, a programme model called LEAP3 will apparently draw WV Kenya’s 55 ADPs into 22 clusters. The concern was that consolidation could mean additional workloads for some people and thus inadvertently have a detrimental impact on conflict sensitivity as people focus on more things with fewer resources and so it gets de-prioritised. There were also concerns that consolidating different geographic areas into one could present issues due to the high diversity of groups and needs.

Other issues:

- **Trade off**: Staff at the local level were concerned that an emphasis on conflict sensitivity in choosing beneficiaries and project locations was sometimes at odds with responding according to greatest humanitarian need and ensuring cost effectiveness. However, they didn’t see any way to resolve this tension.

- **Dependency**: There were concerns that WV’s work in a community can create dependency and that this presents a conflict sensitivity issue when it comes to exiting. Field staff highlighted the need for a parallel track of work that creates a mindset of self-sufficiency as part of DNH. However, there is little funding available for such work.

- **The impact of peace building work**: In Kegonga-Ntimaru WV staff were aware of connectors and dividers and this may have benefitted from the intentionality of the parallel peace building project in the ADP. Staff understood that DNH and peace building were separate but compatible.

- **Feedback mechanisms**: In general communities felt feedback and listening mechanisms were good, reducing tensions. However, a few raised concerns about their feedback not going back to WV. It was unclear whether these were one off incidents, a result of individuals causing delays, or more systematic issues. In some cases, beneficiaries complained about the lack of direct contact with WV which they had when projects began. WV explained that this way of working was not practical as projects progressed and grew in size. At the national level interviewees felt WV feedback mechanisms were weak but this was at odds with what was seen to be working well in Kegonga-Ntimaru and could be an issue of misperception and miscommunication.

- **Contracts**: a few staff raised concerns around contracting out work and how conflict sensitivity could be maintained if third parties were undertaking all of the work outside of WV structures.
Conclusions and Recommendations

In order to progress the integration of conflict sensitivity within WV Kenya, this case study makes the following recommendations (which reinforce similar recommendations made in a WV Kenya Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity Assessment in November 2013):

1. **Institutionalise DNH:** DNH assessments should be compulsory for all WV Kenya ADPs with an appropriate budget allocation. This should be accompanied by DNH training for both HQ and field level staff, which includes an explanation of why conflict sensitivity is important as well as tools for deeper context analysis and ongoing context monitoring. There should be increased accountability through reporting mechanisms on conflict sensitivity, at field level and from field to HQ level. These measures will increase ownership and buy in across a wider number of staff so the burden does not fall on just a few individuals and is not lost when there are transitions. DNH should then be integrated into all aspects of programming including recruitment, targeting, partnerships as well as design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

2. **Develop or review partner strategy:** In light of possible misperceptions WV Kenya should review its partner strategy (if it has one) or if it does not have one, institute a process to develop it. This strategy should cover both field and HQ, clearly explaining the selection process for partners, activities undertaken and standards adhere to, the mechanisms for review, and the communication strategy to explain this to external audiences. This should also cover what is expected when working with contractors.

3. **Improve communication and listening:** WV Kenya should ensure its communication approach at both field and HQ level is reviewed on a regular basis in order to correct any arising misperceptions or miscommunications around issues such as targeting, WV approaches, partners, etc. It should also regularly evaluate and test its feedback mechanisms to ensure they are working and easy to use.

4. **Increase interfaith work:** this area has an increasing “positive impact” mainly in the field level in Kenya and should be built upon and expanded where possible, at all levels.

5. **Programme where possible according to key connectors and dividers:** Communities in Kegonga-Ntimaru (rural) identified cattle rustling and violence as the key divider and churches, sport and markets as key connectors. At the Nairobi level (urban) the main dividers identified were tribal/clan and political issues. These should be given primary consideration when deciding further programming, especially within peacebuilding activities.
Annex 3: Resources

General Conflict Sensitivity Resources


CDA Resources


World Vision Resources


Ostertag, Zakary. “Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace: An internal review of 52 DNH/LCP Field Reports from 12 countries.” 2011.

