Making it Count:
A feasibility study on collective indicators to monitor progress in the Agenda for Humanity
ALNAP is a global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve response to humanitarian crises.

www.alnap.org

The summary for Making it Count can be found at www.alnap.org/makingitcount-summary.

Authors
Alice Obrecht (lead), with Tim Harcourt-Powell and Amelie Sundberg

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Topic-specific inputs were provided by (in alphabetical order and by organisation):

**Peace and conflict:** Jason Franz (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research); Håvard Nygård (Peace Research Institute Oslo); Ralph Sundberg (Uppsala Conflict Data Program)

**International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and attacks on aid:** Clément Boutant-Willm and Tamara Kajtazović (Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)); Rudi Coninx (World Health Organisation (WHO)); Larissa Fast (then-Overseas Development Institute (ODI), now University of Manchester); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard (Individualisation of War Project, European University Institute); Maria Guevara, Jessica Ramirez Mendoza, Maciej Polkowski and Anne Quintin (ICRC); Andre Heller Pérache (Médecins Sans Frontières); Len Rubenstein (Johns Hopkins University); Abby Stoddard (Humanitarian Outcomes); Eva Svoboda (then-ODI, now ICRC); Rachel Thompson and Abdulkarim Ekzayez (Chatham House); Nathalie Weizmann (OCHA); Christina Wille (Insecurity Insight)

**Gender:** Elizabeth Cafferty, David Coffey and Ghita El Khyari (UN Women); Deborah Clifton and Fatima Sator (IASC); Isadora Quay (CARE International); Merrin Waterhouse (Independent)

**Localisation:** Chris Degnan and Luminita Tuchel (Development Initiatives); Josse Flint (Humanitarian Advisory Group); Josse Gillijns (IFRC); Paul Gunaratnam (Humanitarian Leadership Academy); Hibak Kalfan (Network for Empowered Aid Response); Anita Kattakuzhy (Oxfam Novib); Anne Street (CAFOD)

**Displacement:** Chris Degnan and Luminita Tuchel (Development Initiatives); Petra Nahmias and Kim Roberson (UNHCR); Rob Trigwell (IOM); Justin Ginnett, Luisa Meneghetti, Bina Desai, Avigail Shai and Christelle Cazabat (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, NRC)

**Disaster Risk Reduction:** Lucy Pearson (Global Network for Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Risk Reduction)
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Executive Summary

Over two years on from the World Humanitarian Summit, it is unclear how progress against the commitments made under the Agenda for Humanity will be judged. Monitoring progress in the Agenda for Humanity has faced several challenges, including the use of different measurement frameworks and an emphasis on activities and inputs over outcomes. This exploratory study examines whether it is feasible to look beyond inputs and activities and use shared indicators to track progress in achieving the outcomes of the Agenda for Humanity.

Shared indicators—measures that can be applied across multiple organisations or countries in order to understand changes in a particular area of interest—are one of many potential methods to monitor progress. Using shared indicators can support humanitarian actors to clearly define what they mean in their policy commitments and provide a common language for what success looks like. When paired with additional evidence on reform efforts, shared indicators can help decision-makers understand whether these efforts are working, and where they are failing to achieve positive change. However, data collection and use come with their own costs, and therefore it is necessary to understand whether the use of shared indicators is even feasible for the issues outlined in the Agenda for Humanity.

To assess the feasibility of using shared indicators to track progress in the Agenda for Humanity, ALNAP developed 71 indicators for 10 Transformations (two for each Core Responsibility). Each indicator was assessed using a framework adapted by ALNAP from the ranking system used for the SDG indicators.

This study finds that better collective monitoring is possible in several areas— if the sector takes steps to make this a priority.

There are different ways to set shared indicators, which have implications for the cost and feasibility of collecting and analysing the data. Because this will vary across topics, there may be stronger cases for monitoring certain parts of the Agenda for Humanity than others. Any monitoring exercise should begin with a clear understanding of who will be using the data, and to what end. Different methodologies will be suitable depending on whether data is intended to be used for accountability purposes or for informing course corrections. Regardless of the purpose, greater coordination and consortia work can support collective monitoring and the use of this data to reliably inform changes in policy and practice.

However, these efforts would need financial support: for several indicators, the data available for assessing progress is produced by a single organisation relying on medium-term grant funding. This not only places a great burden of responsibility onto these organisations, but can also threaten the stability of data pipelines, if an organisation faces financial difficulty or decides to cease its data collection.
This study identifies different types of collective monitoring, organised around:

**Three levels of disaggregation:**

- Tracking global trends (e.g. worldwide rates of poverty, violence, or displacement) using aggregated data;
- Country-by-country disaggregation, allowing comparisons or country-specific monitoring (e.g. poverty rates by country or a ranking of countries based on shared indicators);
- Disaggregation by actors (e.g. amount of funding directed by donors or agencies towards protection programming, or a ranking of organisations according to a set of shared indicators)

**Two types of approach:**

- Comprehensive, where data is collected for all places relevant to the indicator of interest;
- Sample-based, where data is collected on a sub-set of actors or countries and used as a proxy to understand broader trends

Regardless of the level of disaggregation or approach taken, if humanitarian actors have committed to making progress on the issues outlined in the Agenda for Humanity, data will be essential to understanding whether this is being achieved. Humanitarians cannot ‘reduce forced displacement by 50% by 2030’ without knowing how many people are currently displaced. It is not possible to ‘enhance the capacities of local and national actors for emergency response’ if there is no clear conception of what these capacities are, or how to tell if they are improving or declining. Truly assessing the progress made post-WHS will require the sector to look beyond intentions and actions to whether the Agenda for Humanity Transformations are actually taking place, particularly for people in crisis.

This study outlines six areas that could help facilitate a more collective picture of progress, if desired.

1. **Resourcing data collection and analysis for priority areas**

Better data comes at a cost. More resourcing for data collection and analysis is needed, but resources also need to be prioritised according to who will use this data and for what purpose. Data collection in the humanitarian sector relies primarily on the work of statistical/data divisions within UN agencies and on independent research organisations, who typically depend on grant funding to maintain high-quality datasets over time. Moderate and predictable increases in resources for a select group of high-priority indicators could support a more reliable pipeline of data.
2. **Getting more out of current data and research**
Alongside targeted resources, more can be done to maximise the value of existing data and research efforts, including: supporting and engaging with platforms for data sharing, greater harmonisation amongst organisations tracking similar or related data, and sharing and replication of in-depth primary data collection methodologies.

3. **Creating more opportunities for sector-wide collaboration and reflection on progress**
In order to facilitate the use of shared indicators for reflection and course correction, humanitarian actors may benefit from events and processes that go beyond data sharing to enable joint analysis and interpretation of data. While some post-WHS initiatives have their regular opportunities for meeting and reflecting on progress, there could be additional value in bringing different initiatives together around shared themes to further share and cross-fertilise learning based on their work to achieve change.

4. **Protecting the independence of humanitarian statistics**
For some parts of the Agenda for Humanity – particularly Core Responsibilities 1 (prevent and end conflict) and 2 (respect the rules of war) – it is important to retain an independent approach to data collection and analysis to ensure that figures are accurate and not influenced by political bias. This independence, like the operational independence of humanitarian agencies, is critical for developing a more robust and timely picture of trends, and should be considered in complement to broader efforts in the development data community to support National Statistics Offices.

5. **Clarifying baselines**
Across several areas of the Agenda for Humanity, data availability is improving year by year – the most significant examples being in relation to the numbers of attacks on aid workers and the amount of funding going to local and national NGOs. Yet, while improvements in data collection are welcome, rapid year-on-year changes in the dataset make it difficult to draw robust comparisons from one year to the next. Humanitarian actors could achieve appropriate baseline measures more effectively if they engage in sector-wide collaboration and backdate data to 2015 when joining reporting initiatives.

6. **Remembering that indicators are only one part of the picture**
Regardless of the orientation (global, country, actor) or approach (comprehensive vs sample), indicators help us understand trends but not their underlying causes or drivers. A broader range of research and evidence will always be needed to parse and analyse the contributing factors to these trends. Successfully achieving the aims of the Agenda for Humanity requires better knowledge of the underlying drivers for displacement, attacks on humanitarian missions, localised capacity for response and many other issues addressed in the five Core Responsibilities. It also requires evidence for what works best for seeing progress on these issues in different contexts.
“Data and joint analysis must become the bedrock of our action. Data and analysis are the starting point for moving from a supply-driven approach to one informed by the greatest risks and the needs of the most vulnerable.”

UN Secretary General's Report to the World Humanitarian Summit, 2016
Introduction

In Istanbul in May 2016, thousands of delegates gathered for the largest humanitarian policy event in history. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) aimed to articulate the ambitions of modern humanitarian action and raise these ambitions to the highest levels of international policy. Its key document, the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Humanity, set out five areas of work – or ‘Core Responsibilities’ – to reduce humanitarian suffering, improve the quality of support provided to those who need it and improve the efficiency of how international humanitarian assistance is provided. Hundreds of organisations, including over 60 Member States, submitted 3,780 commitments outlining how they would work to achieve these five Core Responsibilities (OCHA, 2016a: 5). In the two years since the Summit, a number of initiatives and reform processes have been launched to implement these commitments.

More than two years later, it is unclear how the success of these activities, or of the broader Agenda for Humanity, will be judged. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has taken important steps in collecting and analysing self-reported data from those who signed up to commitments at the WHS (OCHA, 2016b; OCHA, 2017). And significant investments in tracking progress have been made by signatories to the initiatives launched at the Summit, including the NGO-led Charter for Change (C4C) and the Grand Bargain – a specialised agreement across a group of donors, UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations (Derzsi-Horvath et al., 2017; Metcalfe-Hough and Poole, 2018).

Overall, however, monitoring progress in the Agenda for Humanity has faced several challenges, most importantly:

1. lack of consensus or clarity on what is being measured, which makes comparisons and aggregation across different agencies impossible
2. bias towards reporting on activities and inputs (e.g. funding, provision of goods and services) over outcomes and impact (i.e. changes in situations or people and their welfare)
3. bias towards subjective data (e.g. opinion surveys) over descriptive data (e.g. morbidity and mortality rates).

These limitations are the inheritances of a highly fragmented sector that has traditionally avoided more structured and collaborative approaches to tracking performance. In 2009, ALNAP conducted a major review of performance-management systems, inside and outside the humanitarian sector, resulting in the report Counting what counts: performance and effectiveness in the humanitarian system. At that time, humanitarian organisations invested in collective learning efforts only after significant failures, such as the 1997 Rwanda response (JEEAR, 1996) or the 2005 Tsunami response (TEC, 2006). Counting what counts asked whether there might be a better way for the humanitarian system to regularly assess its collective performance, and the answer to that question was the first State of the humanitarian system report in 2010.
The State of the humanitarian system report, along with other regular performance-monitoring initiatives, such as Development Initiatives’ Global humanitarian assistance report or the annual trends analyses produced by OCHA and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), provide an important service to the humanitarian community in enabling it to understand broad trends in its performance – from financing, to quality of aid delivery. These studies are used widely to influence policies and strategies across humanitarian donors, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, these reports provide general performance data and analysis and are not specifically tailored to monitoring progress on the Agenda for Humanity.

The 2009 ALNAP report noted that, while the international development and disaster risk reduction (DRR) sectors had the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Hyogo Framework for Action, ‘there [had been] no equivalent scale or unity of approach within the humanitarian sector’ (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2009: 2).

This potentially changed in 2014 with the launch of a consultation process for the WHS. It remains unclear whether the Agenda for Humanity achieved the same unity of vision and purpose as other international frameworks, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, or the MDGs. Two factors that hampered this were the status of the WHS process as ‘multi-stakeholder’ rather than an intergovernmental negotiation, and the departures taken from the outcomes of the stakeholder consultation process in the final Agenda for Humanity document.1 And certainly, the Agenda for Humanity was not a replacement for the DAC performance criteria, nor did it intend to be.2

Despite these limitations, the World Humanitarian Summit and its final outcome document presented humanitarians with a unique opportunity to create a collective narrative for the future of humanitarian action. But creating collective narratives are only powerful if they can be sustained through continuous monitoring and realignment of actions to achieve them. Given the resources invested by hundreds of humanitarian actors in realising the Agenda for Humanity, it is worthwhile understanding whether any progress is being achieved in the five core areas discussed at the Summit.

Unlike other post-2015 international frameworks, the Agenda for Humanity was not accompanied by a formal process to define and agree how progress against the commitments would be monitored and assessed. When it comes to tracking progress in the largest humanitarian policy process in history, ALNAP’s diagnosis from a decade ago still resonates today: ‘Most efforts [to monitor and report on performance within the humanitarian system] do not involve regular collection and analysis of data. Those that do are often fragmented in their approach,’ and ‘[t]here is often no connection between data collection and the use or application of those data for systematic reflection and learning’ (Ramalingam and Mitchell, 2009: 1–2).
Is this fragmentation unavoidable or is there a feasible alternative? Can a collective picture of progress against the Agenda for Humanity be achieved? This feasibility study sets out to answer these questions by exploring a specific monitoring approach used by other parts of the global policy system: collective indicators.

An alternative: collective indicators

Collective, or shared, indicators are measures that can be applied across multiple organisations or countries in order to understand changes in a particular area of interest. They are one of many potential methods to monitor progress and performance (see Box 1). The use of indicators to track aid performance was trialled throughout the second half of the 20th century by different agencies, including the OECD, before coming to prominence with the creation and implementation of the MDGs in the early 2000s (Cobb and Rixford, 1998). In the post-2015 international frameworks—particularly the SDGs and the Sendai Framework for DRR—indicators are used to manage implementation, monitor progress and provide accountability (Manning, 2009; IEAG, 2014).

There are good reasons both for and against the use of shared indicators to monitor progress, based particularly on experience in the development sector. Indicators can capture only one part of an issue—the part that is most easily quantifiable—and therefore offer a limited perspective on performance. They can reflect trends (such as decline in poverty rates) but do not on their own allow for an understanding of what is causing these trends—for example why or how poverty rates are declining. When shared indicators are used to track global trends,

BOX 1: APPROACHES TO TRACKING PERFORMANCE

A quantitative indicator-based approach is the dominant form of performance monitoring in other parts of the 2030 Agenda. But it is by no means the only method available. Monitoring methods must be selected with a view to their intended use: monitoring data can be used for managing or catalysing reform processes, for course corrections, or for research and accountability. Different monitoring methods will have advantages and disadvantages, depending on their use.

Other approaches to monitoring progress in the Agenda for Humanity could include more qualitative and process-focused methods, such as outcome harvesting, ethnographic research, and qualitative comparative analysis applied to case studies. Quantitative indicators can also be combined with one or more of these methods to produce a richer picture not only of which direction the needle is moving but of the dynamics and policy decisions that are contributing to this movement.

For an in-depth review of performance tracking approaches outside the humanitarian sector, see Ramalingam and Mitchell (2009).
they can mask important differences between countries. Collecting standardised data at country level also brings trade-offs for use; when managing change, governments often need indicators that are more tailored to their context.

On the positive side, indicators are potentially a powerful tool for accountability and advocacy, as they give a clear picture on whether desired outcomes are being achieved. One of the ways in which indicators support accountability is by forcing actors to define more clearly what they mean in their policy commitments and providing a common language for what success looks like. Collective monitoring allows for successful change, not necessarily through centralised control, but rather because it provides ‘a platform for creating a common picture of what is happening across the process, and for prompting discussion and learning between people engaged in different elements, or in different locations’ (Knox Clarke, 2017: 65). If well designed and applied, shared indicators can highlight gaps in global aid policies and inform policy change.

However, it is also clear that developing collective indicators requires significant resourcing. For example, the SDG indicator framework has been established through a wide multi-stakeholder consultation, resulting in 232 indicators and necessitating an estimated $7-8 billion-investment over the next 12 years to collect the necessary data (approximately $635 to 685 million per year) (Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, 2016).

Therefore, before examining whether collective indicators are desirable, it is important to assess whether they are feasible. To support this discussion, the ALNAP Secretariat has undertaken a feasibility study to understand what indicators could most likely be developed for monitoring the Agenda for Humanity and the practicality of using these indicators, given the current consensus and availability of data.

About this paper

Research questions

This paper seeks to answer the following question:

Is it feasible to use collective indicators to track progress in achieving the WHS Agenda for Humanity?

To answer this, the research team answered the following subsidiary questions:

1. What are some plausible and relevant collective indicators for each of the five Core Responsibilities?
2. What is the quality of the data and methodologies currently available to regularly and reliably measure these indicators?
3. For indicators where data for the baseline years (2015/2016) exist, what is the data telling us about progress?
These are questions that, in other sectors, have commanded the energies of entire organisations and multi-year processes and so it is important to be clear about the method and limitations of this paper.

What this paper is not

This is not a report of the activities that have been undertaken and reported on by signatories to the WHS. These efforts are being captured and analysed annually through the OCHA Agenda for Humanity reporting process. Instead, this paper attempts to focus on the external changes in the world we would expect to see if these activities were effective and successful, and identifies the organisations and existing sources that could provide regular monitoring data on those changes.

This is not a primary research study on the outcomes of the WHS. This paper aims to identify what primary data and secondary data analysis are already being produced annually or semi-annually by another organisation and to understand what existing data can tell us about progress against the WHS commitment areas. The ALNAP team did not engage in primary research on outcomes and also refrained from collating raw data in cases where raw data was available. This is because the primary aim of the study is to assess the feasibility of collective monitoring, based on existing investments and efforts to produce the kind of analysis that would be useful for regular monitoring.

This is not comprehensive across the Agenda for Humanity. The Agenda for Humanity is structured by five Core Responsibilities, each of which has a list of between four and seven key ‘Transformations’. Due to time and resources, this study only focuses on two Transformations per Core Responsibility. The ALNAP team selected the Transformations according to which two had received the highest number of commitments from WHS stakeholders as of September 2016. This means this report covers only 10 of the total 27 Transformations.

This paper does not set targets and goals. There is an important distinction between targets, or goals, and indicators: indicators ‘establish one or more parameters against which progress can be measured’ while ‘targets typically set desired achievements against such indicators to be met by some date, thus giving them an explicit incentivising purpose’ (Manning, 2009: 17). The relevance of targets for humanitarian action is not examined here. Instead, we focus on ways to measure changes in the issues addressed by the five Core Responsibilities.

Method

Identifying the indicators

ALNAP selected 10 of the 27 Transformations in the Agenda for Humanity to be used in this study by reviewing the number of commitments aligned under each Transformation in the first post-WHS report, Commitments to Action. An initial set of indicators was drafted internally by
ALNAP, then further refined and developed through desk research on current monitoring initiatives and phone conversations with topic experts and those actively monitoring indicators for performance in humanitarian action.

To develop the indicators, the ALNAP research team asked:

1. If this Transformation were to be achieved, how would we know? Specifically: what quantifiable outcome would we expect to see?
2. Can this quantifiable outcome be measured meaningfully as a standardised statistic (e.g. number (#) of people, percentage (%) of countries, etc.) to track collective progress?

The second question was used to rule out indicators that are only feasibly collected on an agency-by-agency basis, such as programme-level performance. While efforts are underway to gain a more collective picture of the performance of an entire response on thematic areas other than the DAC criteria, the humanitarian system currently lacks the ability to integrate programme data across multiple organisations in a single country or response to understand how it is performing.

Assessing the indicators

Each of the 232 indicators proposed for monitoring the SDGs has been ranked (Table 1), through a process led by United Nations Statistics Division (UNSTATS). The purpose of the ranking is to understand where data exists to support monitoring, and where there are key gaps that need addressing immediately.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td>Indicator is conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology and standards are available, and data are regularly produced by countries for at least 50% of countries and of the population in every region where the indicator is relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2</td>
<td>Indicator is conceptually clear, has an internationally established methodology and standards are available, but data are not regularly produced by countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 3</td>
<td>No internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the indicator, but methodology/standards are being (or will be) developed or tested.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/tier-classification
ALNAP sought to develop a similar ranking system and, as the status of data and methodologies is different in the humanitarian system, adapted this approach – establishing five tiers instead of three to reflect the wider range of quality that we see in humanitarian efforts to monitor performance (Table 2). In order to be considered as a suggested source for an indicator, a dataset had to be publicly available.

### TABLE 2: ALNAP TIER CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR AGENDA FOR HUMANITY PROGRESS MARKERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier I</td>
<td>Indicator is conceptually clear, is based on a rigorous, internationally established methodology and is sourced by a dataset that is comprehensive (covering all or most countries in which humanitarian assistance and protection is delivered), transparent (publicly available) and current (regularly updated).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IIa</td>
<td>Rigorous, internationally established methodologies and standards are available, with active attempts to collect data, and there is sector-wide consensus on which methodology to use, but data is either not regularly updated, or is only partially available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IIb</td>
<td>Rigorous, internationally established methodologies and standards are available, with active attempts to collect data, but data is partial or not regularly updated, and there is no sector-wide consensus on which methodology to use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>No internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the indicator, but methodology/standards are being (or will be) developed or tested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IV</td>
<td>No internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the indicator, and no concerted effort is underway to develop or test such methods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key modifications and their rationale are as follows:

- Humanitarian operations do not occur in all countries worldwide; therefore, the Tier I description was amended to apply to only ‘countries in which humanitarian assistance and protection is delivered.’
- The SDG system defines the bottom ranking as methodologies currently in the process of development; in the humanitarian system this floor is even lower, as there are gaps in methodology that are not being addressed by any actor or initiative. A further tier (Tier 4) was therefore added, ranking below the SDG Tier 3.
- Upon review of current initiatives, the ALNAP team decided there was a substantial difference between initiatives where the main challenge was lack of data and initiatives where the main challenge was lack of agreement on how to measure the indicator. These two challenges have very different implications for next steps and for the ability to measure baselines. We therefore split Tier 2 into two levels to reflect these two separate challenges, ranking indicators on which there was general agreement higher than those for which consensus was still being sought.
Assessing progress
Progress was assessed where data was available by comparing the ‘baseline’ year of 2015 to data from 2017. All assessments of progress were contextualised within the known limitations of the data and methodology.

Expert review
After compiling the draft report in January 2018, ALNAP convened an Advisory Group of sector experts on data and performance monitoring as well as small groups of topic experts around each of the seven themes addressed by the Transformations:

1. Peace and conflict prevention
2. IHL and attacks on aid workers
3. Displacement
4. Gender
5. Locally-led humanitarian action
6. Finance
7. Risk reduction

ALNAP also presented on the indicators and received feedback at the International Humanitarian Studies Association Conference in The Hague. The team revised the indicators in October, based on peer review inputs.

Finally, it should be noted that a system-wide conversation to come up with indicators would probably produce a different paper – and potentially different, or more, indicators than what we have here.
Report structure

The remainder of this report is structured according to the five Core Responsibilities in the Agenda for Humanity.

**TABLE 3: THE SAMPLE OF TRANSFORMATIONS FOR EACH CORE RESPONSIBILITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Core responsibility 1: Prevent and end conflict</td>
<td>1B Act early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1C Stay engaged and invest in stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Core Responsibility 2: Respect rules of war</td>
<td>2B Ensure full access to and promotion of the humanitarian and medical mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2D Take concrete steps to improve compliance and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Core Responsibility 3: Leave no one behind</td>
<td>3A Reduce and address displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3D Empower and protect women and girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Core Responsibility 4: Working differently to end need</td>
<td>4A Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4B Anticipate, do not wait for crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Core Responsibility 5: Invest in humanity</td>
<td>5A Invest in local capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5E Diversify the resource base and increase cost efficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each chapter follows the same structure, providing a brief introduction to the two Transformations and an overview of relevant initiatives and challenges with monitoring progress in these areas. Potential indicators for tracking progress are presented, and the limitations outlined. Where it is possible to assess progress, a brief statement on this is made. This paper’s conclusion provides an assessment of the feasibility of using an indicator-based approach to monitor progress on the Agenda for Humanity.
Endnotes

1. Whereas intergovernmental negotiations are highly formalised, led by Member State negotiations, and can create convoluted pathways for civil society and other non-state actors to influence what is agreed, the WHS multi-stakeholder process created significant space for influence over content for non-state actors, from Red Cross/Crescent societies to NGOs both international and national, to youth groups and religious organisations. However, in its final stages of preparation, rather than rely on the Global Synthesis Report as the founding document for the Summit, UN OCHA in consultation with the Office of the Secretary-General, were selective on the issues and themes that were eventually reflected in the Agenda for Humanity. This made it more difficult to generate and maintain buy-in across a wide range of Member States and humanitarian agencies.

2. The World Humanitarian Summit also featured several high level roundtables around themes not addressed in the five Core Responsibilities—this included accountability to affected populations, innovation and urbanisation. Due to time constraints, the ALNAP Secretariat focused only on the Core Responsibilities in the Agenda for Humanity to develop indicators for progress monitoring.

3. In support of the 2018 State of the Humanitarian System Report, ALNAP explored other methodologies for understanding whether the policy commitments at the WHS led to field-level changes. As part of this work, a method based on outcome harvesting was piloted in Ethiopia and Lebanon.

4. All indicators marked as ‘Tier 3’ are currently undergoing a formal process to develop a methodology for measurement, convened by UNSTATS and led by a group of topic experts. Plans for these processes were made publicly available in March 2017 and will be regularly updated.
Core responsibility 1: Prevent and end conflict

Transformations within Core Responsibility 1

1B Act early to address tensions and de-escalate violence before situations deteriorate
1C Invest in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, and stay politically and financially engaged for the long-haul

Background

Understanding the transformations

The first Core Responsibility of the Agenda for Humanity addresses conflict and its role in increasing the global demand for humanitarian assistance. Commitments under this Core Responsibility centred on early warning systems (EWS), capacity strengthening and stronger international leadership and collective mechanisms to prevent, reduce and end conflict. This Core Responsibility received the fewest number of commitments at the WHS and also the lowest number of reports in the first year of self-reporting. This may reflect the view that, while preventing and ending conflict is critical to reducing the humanitarian caseload, the responsibilities for this rest largely outside the humanitarian system, in the hands of governments and other political actors. The first-year progress report by the OCHA on the WHS noted that:

A reluctance to engage in this area may be evidence of Member States’ sensitivity to conflict prevention efforts that “internationalize” an internal problem. It could also reflect that conflict prevention and resolution efforts are often conducted through ‘quiet diplomacy’ and may not be publicly reported.

(2017: 24)

The two transformations that received the greatest number of commitments under this Core Responsibility at the WHS were 1B – ‘Act early to address tensions and de-escalate violence before situations deteriorate’, which concerns early warning and response systems, and ‘Invest in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, and stay politically and financially engaged for the long-haul’, which covers commitments for financial investments in fragile contexts to support resilience and stability and address the root causes of conflict (Table 4) (OCHA, 2016b).
TRANSFORMATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformations addressed in this chapter</th>
<th>Number of commitments made that aligned with this</th>
<th>Reports on progress submitted in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B Act early to address tensions and de-escalate violence before situations deteriorate</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C Invest in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, and stay politically and financially engaged for the long-haul</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (OCHA, 2016: 13)

Monitoring conflict and peace

Transformation 1B concerns the prevention and mitigation of conflict. ALNAP explored three sets of indicators for tracking this. The first set (1B.1 and 1B.2) track the systems for early warning and prevention themselves – that is, to what degree they are set up and how they are being used. The second set (1B.3 and 1B.4) track rates of conflict itself and the final set (1B.5–1B.8) track the effects of conflict in terms of displaced populations and deaths.

Transformation 1C focuses on shifting to longer-term support for countries affected by chronic or cyclical conflict to promote peace. A core challenge in finding relevant indicators to track progress in 1C lies in defining ‘fragility’ in a manner that reliably tracks whether a society is becoming less prone to violence and conflict. Peer reviewers noted the difficulty in using a definition of fragility specific enough to enable causal attribution of efforts to address fragility with clear outcomes.

This Core Responsibility highlights both the opportunities and the difficulties in working across the 2030 Agenda to use similar indicators and data collection methods to monitor progress. The WHS Core Responsibility 1 links to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, to:

*Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.*

While much has been made of the alignment between the WHS and the SDGs, the task of monitoring collective progress across the development, peacebuilding and humanitarian communities reveals several gaps in how these different aid sectors approach the issue of conflict and peace. SDG 16 calls for promoting peaceful societies, yet only one of the indicators being used to monitor SDG 16 directly addresses the issue of conflict (16.2.1). There are several independent organisations that have been tracking conflict events and deaths of civilians in conflict over the past decades. The process to monitor indicator 16.1 on conflict-related deaths, however, will not draw from these sources. As the SDG indicator
framework is centred around the role of national statistics offices, data on conflict-related deaths is expected to be collected by governments themselves. This includes governments collecting data from conflicts within their borders to which they are an active party – posing serious questions regarding bias and the politicisation of this data. While data in the humanitarian sector has arguably suffered due to its reliance on separate independent organisations collecting data in silo, there are trade-offs with using a more harmonised approach to data collection when this relies on state bodies. Therefore, to some degree, the independent organisational approach used in the humanitarian sector may end up serving as a useful complement (or counterweight) to the state-led data collection processes for the 2030 Agenda.

Core Responsibility 1: Indicators with rankings – at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Potential/Actual source</th>
<th>Positive or negative progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B Act early to address tensions and de-escalate violence before situations deteriorate</td>
<td>1B.1. # of people per 100,000 covered by early warning and response system for 1) sub-national conflict; 2) cross-border conflict</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.2. % of countries that have adopted response strategies for preventing &amp; mitigating conflict</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.3. # of countries in high-intensity conflict</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>HIIK</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.4. # of wars (defined by 1,000+ battle-related deaths)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.5. # of intense conflicts worldwide (e.g. conflicts covering &gt;50% of a country’s geographical area)</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.6. # of people displaced by conflict</td>
<td>Iib</td>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.7. Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population by sex, age and cause</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Praia Group/OHCHR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.8. Fatalities in conflict and violence, global</td>
<td>Ila</td>
<td>UCDP/PRIO</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B.9. # of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons</td>
<td>Ila</td>
<td>AOAV</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C Invest in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, and stay politically and financially engaged for the long-haul</td>
<td>1C.1. # of countries decreasing significantly in fragility/conflict or increasing in peacefulness</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>World Bank; OECD; Fund for Peace; Global Conflict Risk Index; Institute for Economics &amp; Peace</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1C.2. ODA funding to peace and stabilisation, with spend on military or counter-terrorism excluded (for top 20 countries receiving humanitarian assistance only)</td>
<td>Ila</td>
<td>Development Initiatives</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: FFP = Foundation for Peace; GCRI = Global Conflict Risk Index; HIIK = Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research; IDMC = Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; ODA = Official Development Assistance; OHCHR = Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; PRIO = Peace Research Institute Oslo; UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Assessment and discussion

**Indicator 1B.1 Number of people per 100,000 covered by early warning and response systems for (a) sub-national conflict; (b) cross-border conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>SDG overlap</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B.1</td>
<td>SDG 16</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

**Discussion**

EWS for conflict has evolved significantly over the past two decades, with three ‘waves’ (Figure 1). As the nature of conflict has evolved from wars between nation states into more sub-national and cross-border conflicts featuring non-traditional or non-state armed actors, EWS have had to adapt from a country-based model to one that counts individual conflicts. Using a country-based indicator (number of countries with an EWS) is generally considered to be less relevant for understanding coverage of early warning capacity than a population-based indicator (percentage of population covered by a conflict early warning system), although not all peer reviewers were in agreement on this. An indicator that tracks EWS system per 100,000 population is recommended, while recognising the limitations of a population-based approach when considering cross-border movements and refugee populations.

There is reasonably good information available on the existence of early warning mechanisms for conflict. However, no actor is currently providing this information on an annual basis. In 2015, Saferworld produced a list of countries in conflict that were covered by an early warning mechanism (Nyheim, 2015). In the same report, Saferworld outlines several gaps in understanding the true coverage of current early warning mechanisms and questions the value of focusing on EWS for conflict prevention.
One issue raised in this report is the difficulty posed by the wide variety in scope of existing early warning mechanisms. Current understanding of early warning coverage is still ‘patchy’, as different mechanisms choose to limit their risk monitoring to particular themes or areas. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Early Warning System for conflict – a regional mechanism – focuses on only trans-/cross-border conflict risks and does not address internal conflict within its member states. Meanwhile, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for Horn of Africa (CEWARN) focuses on pastoralist-related conflicts (Nyheim, 2015: 15). One way to address this patchiness is to use a country-based indicator and a conflict-/population-based indicator in complement to one another. However, this could also pose challenges in terms of double-counting.

To address this, we recommend that a population-based indicator assess coverage per 100,000 people for two potential scopes: interstate conflict and intrastate conflict.1 Individuals in West Africa would fall under the former due to the ECOWAS system but would not be counted under the intrastate conflict EWS indicator, unless there was a second EWS for their particular country or sub-national area.

This indicator is currently set at Tier IV, as desk-based research did not identify any agency currently producing and monitoring data in this format on a regular basis. While such information would greatly support an understanding of early warning coverage, it is also important to note that early warning coverage is insufficient for assessing or monitoring Member State actions to prevent and mitigate conflict. For this reason, an indicator assessing the response side of early warning and prevention is also needed.

---

**FIGURE 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Generation Systems</th>
<th>Second Generation Systems</th>
<th>Third Generation Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First generation systems are centralised in structure and focused on prediction and providing analysis to inform decision-making.</td>
<td>Second generation systems will be closer to the regions they cover, have field monitors, focus on prediction and analysis, but also make proposals for response.</td>
<td>Third generation systems are localised in structure; the monitor and responder are often the same person, and the focus is on using information as a response. These systems aim to prevent violence in specific localities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+</strong> Stronger institutional ownership of information and analysis.</td>
<td><strong>+</strong> Quality of information improves because of field networks.</td>
<td><strong>+</strong> Stronger ability to capture real time information on sub-national conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>–</strong> Limited integration into response decision-making.</td>
<td><strong>–</strong> Response options may not reflect response capacities; response mechanisms are slow.</td>
<td><strong>–</strong> Geographical coverage is limited; cross-border conflict systems may remain unaddressed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Graphic reproduced from (Safer World 2015: 17-19).
Indicator 1B.2 Percentage of countries that have adopted response strategies for preventing and mitigating conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B.2</td>
<td>Percentage of countries that have adopted response strategies for preventing and mitigating conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations
There is currently very little evidence relating to early action and prevention for conflict, including:
- whether, and how, EWS are effective at establishing a link between warning and response
- the impact of early response options and strategies on a conflict
- the ways in which response decisions are made and how these can be made more effective (Nyheim, 2015: 17-19).

There are a number of problems with attempting to track the success of specific instances of conflict prevention and mitigation, the most significant of which is that it is unclear what might have happened had the conflict-prevention actions not been taken. As such, efforts to improve the evidence base on the effectiveness of early response to conflict have recommended focusing on broader response strategies, rather than on the development of specific response options. In line with this, the suggested indicator tracks the percentage of countries that have adopted response strategies for preventing and mitigating conflict.

With further work, this indicator could be adapted, from tracking the presence of response strategies to tracking features of conflict response mechanisms that are proven to be effective at reducing or preventing conflict.
Indicators 1B.3-1B.5  Number of countries in high intensity conflict; Number of wars; Number of intense conflicts worldwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B.3</td>
<td>Number of countries in high intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B.4</td>
<td>Number of wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B.5</td>
<td>Number of intense conflicts worldwide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

The numbers of countries in a state of high-intensity conflict has declined since 2016, from 43 to 36. This, complemented by the decrease in conflict-related deaths, ‘lends support to the claim that conflict deaths are in decline and that the world is increasingly peaceful. This trend holds even more strongly when controlling for increases in world population’ (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). However, the number of conflicts worldwide has risen: from 153 in 2015 to 164 in 2017. This is due to the rise of non-state conflict, which reached a peak of 82 active conflicts in 2017 (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). Indicators 1B.4 and 1B.5 concern the intensity of conflict; wars under the UCDP definition (conflicts with a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths) increased from 11 to 12, then dropped to 10 in 2017, showing no clear trend. While there is no current reliable measure of worldwide conflict intensity, research suggests that conflicts are becoming more concentrated in fewer countries. Also, although fewer people are dying due to conflict (see 1B.7 and 1B.8 herein) the nature of conflict has become potentially more dynamic, with a greater number of non-state actors involved, which has implications for humanitarian delivery.

Method and limitations

Conflict is extremely difficult to define and measure. Thankfully, there are several initiatives that have been developing rigorous methodologies to monitor and understand the rate of conflict over the past two decades.

In the desk-based review, ALNAP reviewed the methodologies and reports of four main sources for tracking conflict worldwide:

1.  The Index for Risk Management (INFORM) system
2.  Heidelberg International institute for Conflict Research (HIIK) Conflict barometer, which feeds into both the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) and INFORM
3.  Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, which is used for the GCRI up to 2015
4.  Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
The Armed Conflict Database (IISS) was not used as it requires a subscription to access data. Databases and methodologies used to assess conflict risk were reviewed separately for indicator IC.1.

The UCDP/PRIO database and the HIIK barometer are the primary sources for mapping current and ongoing conflicts worldwide. A major difference between the two is in what they measure as the indicators of conflict. The UCDP/PRIO database tracks quantitative incidents of violence, such as battle-related deaths, one-sided violence against civilians by military, and non-state conflict. It defines armed conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ (Human Security Report Project, n.d.; Uppsala University, 2018). The HIIK focuses on what it calls the ‘processes of conflict’: the interactions between parties of conflict. The HIIK therefore looks at both non-violent and various levels of violent conflict, including war and uses a set of indicators related to (1) the means of conflict and (2) the consequences of conflict, to assess conflict severity. The HIIK barometer can provide a useful ranking and overall score for countries on their level of conflict – for instance, ECHO’s INFORM database uses a modified version of the HIIK rankings for its conflict indicator. However, the HIIK may also be quite broad, as it includes a significant amount of organised criminal violence as political conflict.

Similarly, in peer reviewers of this report, suggested ACLED as a potential data source for tracking rates of violence – particularly violence against civilians (ACLED, 2018). While ACLED is a useful and widely-cited source for figures on generalised violence, its data is not currently collated on an annual basis to give a global picture of trends on violence (whereas both UCDP and HIIK produce annual summaries). Due to the methods used by ACLED to generate its data on violent events (primarily through media reports) and its comparative lack of verification processes compared to UCDP data (Eck, 2012), ACLED’s data is susceptible to increasing due to increase in media reporting and availability of information rather than an actual increase in violence.

Originally, ALNAP proposed an indicator (1B.5) to track the overall number of conflicts worldwide per year. In peer review of this chapter, topic experts questioned the relevance and usefulness of monitoring the number of conflicts worldwide in order to understand progress on this Core Responsibility. The war in Syria, for example, would be counted as a single conflict along with a small insurgency in north-east India, despite the Syrian war being far more intense and having greater implications for humanitarian need. Instead, experts suggested that tracking conflict severity or intensity would be more useful. The problem is that no organisation is currently carrying out this type of analysis, and there would be several definitional questions that would need answering in order to do so. One suggestion is to focus on geographical coverage of a conflict within a country as a proxy for its intensity.
While recent studies have used geospatial data to analyse trends in conflict (Höglund et al., 2016; Fjelde et al. 2017), there is currently no annual report that uses georeferenced data to analyse year-on-year changes in the severity of conflict worldwide.

A reverse way to understand trends in conflict is to look at rates of peace or peacefulness. The Global Peace Index produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace is one potential source for this kind of indicator, which is discussed under 1C.1 in the discussion of fragility measures.
Indicator 1B.6  Number of people displaced by conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B.6</td>
<td>Number of people displaced by conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
There has been a slight but steady drop in the number of people displaced by conflict from 2015 to 2017.

Method and limitations
See the ‘Method and limitations’ section under Core Responsibility 3, Indicator 3A.3.
Indicators 1B.7 and 1B.8  Number of conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause; Number of fatalities in conflict and violence (global)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B.7</td>
<td>SDG 16, indicator 16.1.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III Led by OHCHR N/A N/A N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B.8</td>
<td>SDG 16 UCDP/PRIO 119,085 104,892 90,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

The number of deaths due to two-party conflict and one-sided violence is declining, part of a continuing decades-long trend (Human Security Report Project, n.d.).

Method and limitations

Currently, the best available data on conflict-related deaths is provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. UCDP uses a specific definitions and classification system which looks at three forms of what the UCDP calls ‘organised violence’: conflict, consisting of two sub-categories of state and non-state conflict; and one-sided violence (where a state or non-state actor uses armed force against civilians resulting in at least 25 deaths per year) and where no party to conflict is a state or government.

UCDP reports total deaths in all three forms of violence on an annual basis in the Journal of Peace Research. These are not disaggregated between combatants and civilians, and while the raw data is disaggregated, there is currently no regular source that provides annual figures of civilian deaths across these three areas. Another conflict monitoring agency, ACLED, provides statistics on violence against civilians. However, this violence does not all lead to deaths and includes a much wider range of events, including bank robberies.

While UCDP/PRIO datasets are regarded by some as the ‘gold standard’ for this kind of data, this indicator is ranked as Tier IIa instead of I because the figures are widely acknowledged to be a minimum estimate of battle deaths. UCDP compiles its statistics based on individual incident reports, drawn from media and on the ground reporting from NGOs, and offers a conservative estimate of deaths. This means it is likely underestimating the total number of battle- and one-sided-violence-related deaths (Human Security Report Project, n.d.).
In the SDG indicator framework, one of the indicators being used to track progress on Goal 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies) is conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, disaggregated by sex, age and cause. The Praia Group, led by Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), is leading efforts to combine existing datasets and data collection efforts around a single methodology (United Nations, 2018).

It remains to be seen whether it is possible to disaggregate conflict-related deaths by cause. For instance, the SDG indicator process is particularly focused on understanding whether the cause is based on sex discrimination, an aim that expert peer reviewers suggested would be impossible to track accurately. A further challenge arises from distinguishing conflict related deaths from criminal violence, an issue that will be addressed in conjunction with the main institutions responsible for tracking the health impacts of crime, the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This is particularly relevant to humanitarian policy, as urban conflict has been an overlooked context for humanitarian need owing to the tendency to classify urban violence as ‘crime’ instead of conflict.

To date, the work on SDG indicator 16.1 is not well connected to the existing efforts to collect data by UCDP/PRIO. One potential reason for this is definitions: the UCDP definition of conflict reflects a wide consensus in social science and is precise to aid measurement. However, it is not derived from, or perfectly aligned with, definitions of warfare in international law. Definitions of conflict may need to be aligned with international law in order to be used to track Member State actions under the SDGs.

The disconnect between the two data collection processes also raises an important question on how global statistics on humanitarian issues are best collected. The SDG indicator framework operates on the understanding that the primary data collectors will be national statistics offices. The methodology and data collected through the work of the Praia Group will therefore rely on data collection by governments and not an independent organisation such as the UCDP or PRIO (or ACLED for that matter). While there are advantages to collecting data through government bodies, there are also clear disadvantages when governments are a party to the conflict themselves as this may affect the accuracy of the data. There is therefore good reason to maintain two separate indicators – one that tracks official government statistical data on conflict-related deaths through the SDGs and one that is provided and verified by an independent, non-state actor.
### Indicator 1B.9 Number of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1B.9</td>
<td>Number of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>AOAV</td>
<td>33,307</td>
<td>32,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Assessing progress

The number of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons appears to have peaked in 2015 at 33,307, with steady declines since. However, these declines are not enough to return to pre-2012 figures. In the introduction to AOAV’s 2016 Explosive Violence Monitor report, they note that:

> For the first year since AOAV began the recording, there was a decrease in the number of civilian deaths and injuries compared to the previous year. Despite this, the number of civilian deaths and injuries recorded in 2016 remained 48% higher than that recorded in 2011, the year our EVMP began (AOAV, 2017).

#### Method and limitations

In addition to deaths of civilians and combatants in conflict, organisations are collecting related mortality and event data that could be of relevance to understanding progress on Transformation 1B. One potential indicator could be the number of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapons, tracked by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). AOAV collects data on explosive violence incidents using English-language media reports. While AOAV relies on secondary data from media reports and other sources for its figures, in each of its reports, AOAV provides a lengthy methodology, stipulating the conditions required for recording certain information, and the definitions employed. As well as many of the problems highlighted with collecting secondary data in Chapter 2, AOAV also identifies other issues with their own data, including: only English-language media reports are used, the lack of a mechanism to follow up and verify reports, and geographical variations in reporting.

Ideally, this indicator would measure civilian casualties in conflict more broadly. However, as AOAV relies on media reports, there is no examination of whether the injuries recorded turn into deaths. The AOAV figures would therefore not give the full global picture of civilians killed or injured in conflict. It is for this reason that UCDP/PRIO figures were used instead for 1B.6.

Despite these limitations, and because this indicator provides a proxy for understanding the impacts of warfare and state violence on civilians, it is still useful in assessing the extent to which severe violence and conflict are being successfully averted by states and third parties.
Indicator 1C.1 Number of countries decreasing significantly in fragility/conflict risk or increasing in peacefulness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1C.1</td>
<td>Number of countries decreasing significantly in fragility/conflict risk or increasing in peacefulness</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>World Bank; OECD; Fund for Peace; Global Conflict Risk Index; Institute for Economics and Peace</td>
<td>N/A N/A N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
As there is further need to identify the most appropriate source of data for this indicator, no progress is assessed at present.

Method and limitations
Violence and conflict are more prevalent in societies characterised as ‘fragile.’ Therefore, potentially one way to support societies to be more peaceful and inclusive is to address their fragility, and progress on these efforts could be monitored by tracking rates of fragility or risk of conflict.

Fragility, however, is a complex concept that is difficult to measure. For this indicator, ALNAP compared five approaches to conflict risk and fragility:

1. Fund for Peace Fragile States Index
2. World Bank Fragile Situations List
3. OECD States of Fragility Series
4. Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI), which feeds into the INFORM system
5. Global Peace Index, produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

The Fund for Peace offers a regular country-based assessment of fragility, using a set of 12 indicators, referred to collectively as the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which have been used to assess fragility for two decades (FFP, 2017a; 2016). These indicators include measures of socioeconomic conditions, political freedom, human rights, and migration. Data is collected by individual monitors at field level and country rankings are carried out annually (FFP, 2016).

The World Bank produces one of the most widely used and cited fragility classifications. Their list is based on their Country Policy and Institution Assessment scores, which rate countries based on four factors: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public-sector management and institutions. A situation is rated as fragile if it presents either (a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace building mission during the past three years’ (World Bank, 2016b).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has tracked funding flows to fragile contexts for many years and produces a regular report on fragility that is backdated by two years (e.g. the 2018 report covers data from 2016). The OECD uses a broader definition of fragility than the World Bank and draws on the Fragile States Index as well as World Bank data for its list. Rather than focus purely on formal governance structures, the OECD definition ‘links fragility with a combination of risks and coping capacities rather than focusing primarily on weak governance’ (OECD, 2016).

The GCRI and Global Peace Index are different from the aforementioned classifications as they do not offer a measure of fragility, but instead aim to calculate risk of future conflict (GCRI) or peacefulness (GPI).

The GCRI looks at both the probability that conflict will occur, and the intensity of such conflict, using logistic and linear regression models that have been ‘trained’ using historical data on conflict from the past 20 years. Weights for the GCRI indicators are based on their significance in predicting conflicts, using the historical data. These indicators cover many similar areas as the Fund for Peace, such as socioeconomic status, social cohesion and regime type; however, the source for these are different, with many coming from the World Bank (GCRI, n.d.).

The Global Peace Index is produced annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2016; 2017; 2018). Scores for each country are developed from a composite index of 23 indicators weighted and combined into one overall score. While some indicators draw on quantitative data sources such as the UCDP/PRIQO battle-related deaths dataset, others are scores assigned by country-specific experts from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Scores are reviewed by an advisory panel before finalisation (IEP, 2017: 114-115).

ALNAP was unable to determine which of the aforementioned sources, or combination thereof, would serve as a suitable source for tracking rates of fragility over time.

**FIGURE 2: FIVE-YEAR TRENDS ON FRAGILITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Africa</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Kiribati</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Congo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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</table>
A first challenge is that the two most commonly cited sources – World Bank and OECD – monitor trends related to fragility but do not track the severity or rate of fragility. Only the Fragile States Index currently analyses the data for increases and decreases. However, they do so over 5- or 10-year periods rather than from year to year (Figure 2).

Analysing trends in increasing or decreasing fragility is useful, but it is important to ensure in the first instance that the kind of fragility tracked by the Fragile States Index is that which is most relevant to understanding how peaceful and inclusive societies are becoming. A review of the effectiveness of donor practices in fragile states undertaken by the Brookings Institution found that changing the fragile state classification system led to very different statistical results (Chandy et al., 2016). The World Bank, OECD and Fragile States Index include different measures and therefore end up tracking different issues:

*Competing fragile state classifications should not be viewed as imperfect proxies of the same underlying characteristics; they are more likely measures of different characteristics entirely (Chandy et al, 2016: 15).*

This is further illustrated in the differences across countries listed as fragile for 2016 in the GCRI, OECD, World Bank and Fragile States Index (see Table 4). The light red boxes indicate those countries that are featured across all four lists; there are only 11 that overlap (less than 50%).

Understanding fragility and its relationship to peaceful societies is important, and an indicator that tracks rates of fragility could be useful for understanding progress in delivering effective long-term support to peaceful and inclusive societies. However, significant further work would be needed to compare and test different fragility classifications for their ability to meaningfully track Transformation 1C.
Indicators 1C.2 Official development assistance funding to peace and stabilisation (in USD), with spend on military excluded [for top-20 countries receiving humanitarian aid only]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1C.2</td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong> ODA funding to peace and stabilisation (in USD), with spend on military or counter-terrorism excluded [for top-20 countries receiving humanitarian assistance only]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**
There are no clear trends to assess progress: the percentage of total assistance has declined since 2015 by 0.6%.

**Method and limitations**
Understanding the amount of funding for peace and stabilisation efforts should be straightforward, but unfortunately reporting mechanisms and donor reporting practices make these figures difficult to compile. The closest source possible for an indicator on spend on peace and stabilisation is the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (Development Initiatives, 2016; 2017; 2018). However, this report only provides this data for the top-20 countries receiving humanitarian assistance. The reason for this limitation is that this data must be compiled manually by researchers, through cross-references to multiple databases. The OECD tags ODA funds for peace, conflict and security; while the data is available for organisations to use and analyse, the OECD does not provide overall figures in an annual report. There are also questions as to whether an independent organisation can use OECD data directly without having to make modifications to reach an accurate figure for non-military spending on peace and on conflict prevention. A revision to the ODA casebook in 2017 has broadened this category to allow for a wider range of activities, including donor country military and counter-terrorism efforts (Saferworld, 2016).
Endnotes

1. Although using a population-based indicator comes with its own challenges. As pointed out by a peer reviewer, ‘Moving from country-based to population-based measurement appears reasonable but might encounter data problems in border areas due to cross-border movement, refugee populations, and limited information of central governments over peripheral areas.’

2. While it draws on the HIIK and GCRI for its rankings, we did not recommend INFORM as a source for the indicators because of how it modifies the inputs from HIIK and from UCDP/PRIO. INFORM takes the HIIK barometer scores, but applies a weight to these depending on whether the conflict is ‘sub-national’ or ‘national’: sub-national conflicts are assigned a lower weight by INFORM, due to their assumption that: ‘In INFORM we consider conflicts over National Power to have a graver impact on population, supplies, and long-term development than those over subnational items. First of all, they constrain the overall national production and supply lines and are mostly fought with heavier weapons and more personnel and turns more people into refugees than conflicts over e.g. secession. Second, wars over government usually affect large parts of national territory and oftentimes have the tendency of involving foreign powers’ (2015: 37). For humanitarian purposes, it is not clear that these assumptions hold: one of the most significant conflict crises in 2017 occurred in the Kasai province of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which would classify as sub-national, but which has had significant implications for IDP caseload.
Core Responsibility 2: Respect rules of war

Transformations within Core Responsibility 2

2B  Ensure full access to and protection of the humanitarian and medical missions
2D  Take concrete steps to improve compliance and accountability

Background

Understanding the transformations

Stating that ‘even wars have limits’, Core Responsibility 2 encourages WHS stakeholders to ‘respect the rules of war’. To this end, the Agenda for Humanity calls for ‘strengthened compliance with international law’. However, monitoring respect for the rules of war or compliance with international law is a difficult exercise: no overarching system for this currently exists and data is highly sensitive and difficult to verify. Transformation 2C (not covered by this feasibility study) recognises this data problem, calling for a ‘dedicated “watchdog” to track, collect data and report on trends of violations of and gaps in compliance with international humanitarian law’.

Transformation 2B – to ensure full access to and protection of the humanitarian and medical missions – commits stakeholders to ‘meet the essential needs of people’ (through respecting humanitarian principles and ensuring access) and ‘respect and protect the humanitarian and medical missions’ (by ensuring that actors fulfil obligations to respect and protect aid and health workers, and their patients). More than 180 commitments were made against this Transformation.

Transformation 2D – to take concrete steps to improve compliance and accountability – concerns compliance with and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). The Agenda for Humanity states that, to achieve transformation 2D, stakeholders should ‘ensure respect through spheres of influence’ (using leverage to encourage compliance, and complying with the Arms Trade Treaty), ‘reinforce’ the global justice system (embedding IHL in national legislation, investigate and prosecute violations, and support the International Criminal Court, ICC), use the Security Council (encourage it to act on serious violations, to support timely and decisive action, and withhold vetoes on such matters), and to ‘eradicate sexual and gender-based violence and treat survivors with dignity’ (through national legislation and prosecution, and provision of support to survivors).
While the belief in the need for better data is shared across experts and peer reviewers, the significant challenges in collecting relevant and meaningful data are also apparent. Through peer review and discussion with experts, there were several recurrent concerns around the ability to collect and use data to track progress on the issues covered by 2B and 2D. Core Responsibility 2 is potentially the section of the Agenda for Humanity that is most difficult to monitor or track reliably. Yet Core Responsibility 2 also offers some of the strongest examples of humanitarian organisations collaborating and investing in robust methodologies to strengthen the empirical evidence on issues that significantly affect humanitarian performance. Such efforts have increased in the past two years, and there is good reason to believe that the evidence base for 2B and 2D will see improvements over the medium term.

**TRANSFORMATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS CHAPTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformations addressed in this chapter</th>
<th>Number of commitments made that aligned with this</th>
<th>Reports on progress submitted in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2B Ensure full access to and protection of the humanitarian and medical missions</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D Take concrete steps to improve compliance and accountability</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (OCHA, 2016: 13)*

**On tracking access to, and protection of, humanitarian aid and medical missions**

For this study, ALNAP considered approaches to measuring the protection of humanitarian and medical missions by means of tracking number of attacks. For access, ALNAP considered recent efforts to better systematically collect data on people in crises’ access to healthcare.

**Tracking attacks on aid and health workers**

Attacks against aid workers, particularly those engaged in the healthcare sector, has seen a significant amount of discussion in recent years from the ‘Not A Target’ campaign (UNDP, 2017), to the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2286, which calls for an end to attacks on health facilities and workers. But the increased attention and reporting has ‘yet to translate into effective protection of health care on the ground’ (Taylor, 2018).

There are several approaches to monitoring attacks against humanitarian and medical missions, but no global, standardised method is regularly employed to collect data.

Two of the most prominent initiatives collecting and disseminating this kind of data, the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD) and Insecurity Insight, draw on reports submitted to them by operational agencies as well as secondary sources, such as media reports, or social media activity. Insecurity Insight releases monthly bulletins (Aid Security Monthly Newsbriefs) and
can provide bespoke annual statistics upon request; AWSD publicly releases annual figures on attacks. Many organisations collect data from their own operations (such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and ICRC) but this is privately held and not publicly available. Others (such as the Syria American Medical Society, SAMS) (SAMS, 2017) collect primary data and make it accessible, but (similarly to the privately held data) it tends to cover only a limited geographical area – for example within a single country or areas where the organisation operates.

There have been several recent efforts to strengthen the quality of data on attacks on healthcare in crises specifically. The Safeguarding Healthcare in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) is a group of medical non-governmental organisations and academic institutes working to improve the security and safety of healthcare workers in conflict settings. The aims of the coalition include ‘working with national and global organizations to strengthen the documentation of such attacks and increase accountability for violators.’ (SHCC, 2015). As part of the coalition’s work, several organisations have compared their data on documented attacks to understand how different reporting mechanisms can be better triangulated to produce a more accurate understanding of the rate of attack on medical staff and missions in conflict settings.

The WHO has also launched a new Surveillance System for Attacks on Healthcare (SSA). The SSA takes information from a range of sources, and assigns a level of confidence (rumour, possible, probable, confirmed) based on this. One major benefit of this system, is that it draws on the WHO’s pre-existing presence to obtain a more global reach. It also covers a very broad range of incidents, from the commonly measured violence against healthcare workers, to ‘militarisation of a civilian health care facility’, ‘removal of health care assets’, and ‘psychological violence/intimidation’. It also takes a very broad approach to the individuals captured by its monitoring – ‘healthcare personnel’ capturing both primary and auxiliary workers, as opposed to only those affiliated with a humanitarian organisation or only healthcare providers. At this point, however, it will have limited usefulness as it has only recently been made public and the data recorded currently only covers 2018 and is globally incomplete.

Overall, tracking attacks on aid workers is held back by several challenges related to the collection and analysis of data. We outline three main sets of challenges associated with defining measurements, accessing data, and analysis.

Understanding what we’re measuring

An initial challenge is the issue of definitions. If initiatives and organisations use different definitions of key terms such as ‘humanitarian assistance’ or ‘humanitarian worker,’ it is difficult to compare or aggregate data. During peer review, sector experts felt that greater consensus has been achieved around core definitions in recent years, with many accepting the same definition of ‘aid worker’ when it comes to internationals. However, it can still be
difficult to apply this classification to national-level aid workers, as there are many national first responders who are difficult to identify formally as aid workers.

A further challenge lies in classifying a violent event as an ‘attack.’ ‘Attack’ implies intention, which can be extremely difficult to verify from secondary sources. This is particularly hard to assess for national staff, who bear a much higher risk of injury or death. For example, if a national NGO staff member is killed in her home from a bomb or while attempting to evacuate her own family members from an area, this may be considered a civilian casualty of conflict rather than an ‘attack on aid.’ With limited information on the motive, context and situation surrounding a death, it can be difficult to determine whether it counts specifically as an attack.

The most significant challenge in using attacks on aid workers as a proxy indicator to monitor the respect and protection of humanitarian missions is the difficulty in framing the number of attacks as a ratio to the total population of aid workers. The number of total attacks on aid workers is not a good indication of whether respect and security for aid missions is improving or declining, as increases or decreases in staffing numbers can skew the number of attacks (that is, if the overall population of aid workers increases, this means there is greater potential for attacks to occur). Instead, a proportional figure based on the ratio of attacks to total number of aid workers would be more relevant. Unfortunately, understanding the size of the aid worker population is challenging. AWSD creates an estimate for this figure by dividing agencies into ‘similarly sized tiers’ and using averages of these tiers to ‘extrapolate missing data’ (Stoddard et al, 2016). Other initiatives instead explicitly prefer to focus not on mapping this global phenomenon but trying to understand the causal factors that lead to attacks in particular contexts.

Accessing the data that exists

The data associated with attacks on humanitarian aid workers is highly sensitive; in remote areas where only one or two agencies are operating, this data can easily be traced to specific agencies and potentially put their staff at further risk of attack. While there are several organisations that work to collect this data, they do not all make this information publicly available, which impedes the use of this data for routine and public monitoring. Several peer reviewers stressed the need for better agreements on data sharing, and more transparent coding of incidents, in order to create a more comprehensive data set.

Understanding the data that exists

It can be difficult to interpret and extrapolate policy-relevant trends. Similar trends in the data could be caused by an increase in either security or insecurity, making it unclear whether the safety of aid workers has actually improved. A decline in attacks could be due to an improvement in security conditions, or a result of denial of access to humanitarian
actors or the withdrawal of humanitarian personnel from an area because of unacceptable levels of insecurity. Many peer reviewers noted that reporting systems for attacks have been improving in recent years, meaning that a rise in attacks could potentially reflect the strengthening of reporting systems rather than an actual increase. Also, any increase in the global trend over time must be considered in relation to the size of the humanitarian workforce – are increases only absolute, or also relative to the broader humanitarian ‘population’?

Tracking outcomes

Partly because of the difficulties in collecting data on attacks, and partly due to the perceived failure of this data to motivate policy changes in protecting humanitarian workers and IHL, attention in recent years has shifted from the number of attacks on aid and healthcare workers to the implications these attacks have for affected populations’ access to assistance.

Most studies of access have been one-off pieces of in-depth research, rather than a regular monitoring of a standard set of indicators (SAVE, 2016). OCHA and Humanitarian Outcomes are currently working on ways to more routinely monitor humanitarian access but it will be years before data is regularly available.

Measuring incidents of denial or prevention of humanitarian access is also difficult – an issue discussed further herein, as it pertains to tracking compliance with IHL. The SHCC, which includes the WHO, are attempting to improve understanding of access by focusing on coverage of healthcare services to people in crisis and their ability to access medical assistance.

On tracking compliance with International Humanitarian Law

As per Transformation 2C, an overarching monitoring system (or ‘watchdog’) for violations of IHL does not exist. In its absence, there are several initiatives that track compliance and violation with reference to particular areas of IHL.

ICRC databases

The ICRC supports three databases related to IHL (ICRC, n.d.a). The ‘Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries’ database tracks state ratification of the treaties and agreements that comprise IHL. The ‘Customary IHL’ database tracks practice of the 161 rules of customary IHL (‘rules that come from “a general practice accepted as law” and that exist independent of treaty law’ (ICRC, 2010). The ‘National Implementation’ database collects information on national implementation measures for IHL, such as law and case law regarding a range of topics covered by IHL, such as fundamental guarantees and chemical and biological weapons. The ICRC notes that, while all three databases are comprehensive (seeking worldwide coverage) and updated regularly, they are not fully exhaustive of all treaties, acts of implementation or practices of customary law.
In an effort to change the narrative around IHL, the ICRC created a new database in 2018, ‘IHL In Action’ (ICRC, 2018), which tracks positive cases of IHL compliance. The database takes a more in-depth case-based approach and does not aspire to be globally representative or to capture all cases of compliance.

**UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism**

There are initiatives within the United Nations system which focus on monitoring specific areas that overlap with IHL. One example is the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) (United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, n.d.) for grave violations against children in conflict. The MRM feeds into annual reports on children and armed conflict, and violations can lead to the creation of action plans to bring actors in line with the law. However, the six violations that count as ‘grave violations’ against children in conflict do not all qualify as IHL violations.

**Databases tracking violence or death caused by violence**

There are several entities that track violence against civilians and civilian deaths in conflict. These include:

- **UCDP datasets**, which track deaths of combatants and civilians in conflict and one-sided violence
- **AOAV**, which publishes annual reports on death and injury caused by ‘explosive violence’; and
- **ACLED**, which tracks organised violence globally, including organised crime

The early draft of this report proposed an indicator that tracked violence against civilians and civilian deaths for Transformation 2D. However, this was removed after peer review as topic experts emphasised that violence and death of civilians would not be an adequate proxy indicator for tracking incidents of IHL or compliance with IHL. This is because certain civilian deaths and violence against civilians is permissible within the boundaries of IHL and tracking a quantitative figure would not be meaningful for understanding whether IHL is being respected. Instead, figures on deaths in conflict are addressed as a proxy for tracking the effects of conflict under Core Responsibility 1.

**The challenge of compliance**

International agreements on IHL require states to replicate it in their national law and prosecute cases. The ICRC databases can be used to track this – albeit imperfectly, given that they are not exhaustive. Incorporation into national law and practice, however, does not completely cover compliance. To understand progress in achieving compliance and accountability in IHL, it would be necessary to have some way of understanding the proportion of cases prosecuted to the total number of violations, a figure that is yet unavailable and may be impossible to accurately measure.

The indicators ALNAP proposed for Transformation 2D were the most challenged indicators in the peer review process for this study. As a result, most of the original indicators were either removed or changed significantly. Questions were raised as to whether it would be realistically possible to collect data that is relevant to tracking compliance and accountability for IHL.
The value of monitoring

While Core Responsibility 2 covers topics that face great challenges in measurement, it is also the area in the Agenda for Humanity that potentially features the greatest amount of groundwork by organisations and inter-agency coalitions to improve data collection and analysis. This is in recognition of the view that having a general picture of respect for IHL, access conditions and safety for aid workers is important for guiding future reforms and decision-making in humanitarian organisations.

While peer reviewers expressed a range of concerns with the indicators proposed by the ALNAP team, overwhelmingly it was felt that better approaches to monitoring are valuable and potentially integral to seeing future progress on these issues. There was also a high degree of positivity regarding increase in high quality data leading to greater representativeness of the figures, and the potential for further improvement from evolving multi-agency collaborations.

The core question is which indicators would capture the appropriate balance between relevance and what is feasible to collect accurately. With Transformation 2D in particular, a wrong indicator could be incredibly detrimental to achieving greater compliance and accountability with IHL.

At the same time, peer reviewers highlighted the need for better qualitative research to accompany quantitative measures, which could help understand what motivates attacks on aid and health workers for example, or what approaches are most effective at incentivising respect for IHL. They also suggested collecting more refined data that allows for categorisation of particular weapons used, or perpetrators, to understand the nature of violence faced by aid and health workers. Therefore, any attempt to better quantify and standardise global measurements in Core Responsibility 2 should be accompanied by similar investments in qualitative tools for understanding causal influences on aid security and compliance.
# Core Responsibility 2: indicators with rankings – at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Potential/Actual source</th>
<th>Positive or negative progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2B Ensure full access to and protection of the humanitarian and medical mission</td>
<td>2B.1. # of international aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD)</td>
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<td>2B.2. # of international aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks</td>
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<td>AWSD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B.3. # of national aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>AWSD</td>
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<td>2B.4. # of national aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks</td>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>AWSD</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td>2B.5. # of healthcare providers and auxiliary staff killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
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<td>WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B.6. # of patients killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
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<td>WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care</td>
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<td>2B.7. Healthcare facilities affected by violent attacks</td>
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<td>2B.8. Healthcare transports affected by violent attack</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B.9. Healthcare warehouse/storage affected by violent attack</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B.10. Verified cases of humanitarian access incidents globally</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Annual Report of the SG for Children &amp; Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B.11. # of countries with humanitarian access concerns</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Annual Report of the SG on the protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D Take concrete steps to improve compliance and accountability</td>
<td>2D.1. # of countries that have ratified/acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.2. # of UN Member States who have implemented x% of IHL topics</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>ICRC National Implementation of IHL Database</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.3. # of UN Member States with x% coverage of customary IHL in their legal frameworks and military manuals</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>ICRC Customary IHL Database</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.4. # of state parties providing ‘adequate’ financial resources to the ICC</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>ICC Financial Statements</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.5. Proportion of IHL violations prosecuted to total number of documented IHL violations worldwide</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.6. # of states exercising universal jurisdiction on war crimes</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.7. # of countries that have taken concrete steps to create effective investigation mechanisms for attacks by their military forces</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D.8. # of countries that have established effective accountability mechanism for attacks by its forces on healthcare</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: UNODA = UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Assessment and discussion

Indicators 2B.1-2B.4  Attacks on aid workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.1</td>
<td>Number of international aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000 international aid workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.2</td>
<td>Number of international aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.3</td>
<td>Number of national aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000 national aid workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.4</td>
<td>Number of national aid workers killed or injured in violent attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It would be possible to assess progress in this area if there were more data available for 2B.1 and 2B.3. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, figures were not publicly available for 2015 or 2017. In lieu of this, we have included indicators 2B.2 and 2B.4, which are the gross total figures for aid workers killed or injured. As we will discuss, it is not possible to extrapolate a trend from these numbers, as they do not account for the potential inflationary/deflationary effect of fluctuations in the overall size of the aid worker population. The increase in number of national aid workers being killed or injured, for example, may be due to the disproportionate rise of national aid workers when compared to nationals.

Method and limitations

Two main sources of data on attacks on aid workers are the Aid in Danger database managed by Insecurity Insights, and the AWSD managed by Humanitarian Outcomes. Both use similar methods, combining confidential reports from agencies with media analysis.

The data for the AWSD is collected from public sources (through ‘systematic media filtering’) and direct information from aid organisations and operational security entities. Incidents reported in the AWSD are verified with the relevant agencies on an annual basis (AWSD, n.d.). The AWSD draws on a specific definition of ‘aid workers’ as the employees and associated personnel of not-for-profit aid agencies (both national and international) that provide material and technical assistance in humanitarian relief contexts. Peer reviewers viewed this definition as generally endorsed in the sector. The definition of ‘major incidents’ for the AWSD is: killings, kidnappings and attacks that result in serious injury.
The peer review process raised questions as to whether a composite indicator drawn from multiple sources might work better than relying on one source, such as the AWSD as suggested above. As part of the SHCC, Insecurity Insights and WHO cross-checked their lists of events and found that there was only an overlap of 11%, reflecting that any individual data collection system only captures a sub-set of the total number of attacks on aid and different systems will pick up different events.

It may indeed be the case that triangulating from multiple data sources will provide an overall more accurate picture of how many attacks are occurring against aid and medical missions. However, at present there is no clear way forward for reaching a triangulated figure. The primary rationale behind suggesting AWSD as a database is that it is the only source of data at present that meets all three criteria noted in the Tier I ranking definition of: (1) being global in scope (several other sources are limited to a particular sub-set of countries); (2) using a rigorous method; and (3) regularly reporting annual figures.

While the AWSD can provide an understanding of the security of those associated with the formal humanitarian system, those beyond that might not be captured. According to one expert, the health sector was different from others in emergency contexts because, due to potentially large numbers of indigenous health workers, humanitarian organisations don’t necessarily do most of the work. Unless associated with a non-profit organisation, these individuals would not be counted by the AWSD. For this reason, indicators 2B.1 and 2B.2 look only at the protection of humanitarian workers. This means it can only function as a partial indicator for Core Responsibility 2B, which calls for ‘protection of the humanitarian and medical missions’.

Finally, peer review suggested other potential relevant indicators pertaining to security incidents involving aid workers, including:

- proportion of all aid workers reportedly killed by explosive weapons
- proportion of all aid workers reportedly killed by firearms
- proportion of aid workers reportedly killed by state actors
- proportion of aid workers reportedly killed by non state actors

Due to time constraints, ALNAP was unable to fully investigate these options; however Insecurity Insights can provide aggregated statistics for the first two (deaths of aid workers by explosive weapons and by firearms) upon request.
**Indicators 2B.5-2B.9** Attacks on health care and health care access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.5</td>
<td>Number of health care providers and auxiliary staff killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.6</td>
<td>Number of patients killed or injured in violent attacks (per 100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.7</td>
<td>Health care facilities affected by violent attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.8</td>
<td>Health care transports affected by violent attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.9</td>
<td>Health care warehouse/storage affected by violent attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is currently not possible to assess progress against this indicator, due to the lack of a baseline, and data for 2016 and 2017. There are also a number of caveats with using the data that currently exist for this indicator, as incident reporting methods are not consistent across all countries, meaning that data that currently exists is skewed towards countries where data collection and verification practices are much stronger (not necessarily the countries where the highest number of attacks are occurring). Also, more clarity is needed on how some of the core terms, such as health care facility, or warehouse/storage, are defined.

**Method and limitations**

Indicators 2B.3–2B.7 would draw their data from the WHO’s SSA. This database is publicly available (WHO, 2017) but currently only hosts data for 2018 and only displays data for five countries.

All indicators using the WHO SSA as a data source have been ranked at Tier III. This is largely for the fact that the project is still in the early stages of implementation and it is hard to judge exactly how the data will look in its final public iteration. The SSA cannot currently serve as a source for this indicator, even for a 2018-set baseline, given the gaps in its data. Also, it is not clear that the WHO SSA will compare the data collected to any other statistics, such as health personnel population size, to strengthen the potential for drawing inferences from it. While our indicator calls for the number per 100,000, it is not clear that this will be obtained from the WHO SSA data. However, it is an active project that is underway, with expectations that data comprehensiveness will improve over time.
Peer reviewers cautioned that the data collection process was still in development and, while promising, would require further work before the SSA could be used as a reliable source for this indicator. If the SSA were to be used as the source for this indicator, further clarification would be needed on how SSA verifies its reported incidents and on how it applies its four-tiered ranking system of ‘rumour, possible, probable, or confirmed’ for each event.

Some peer reviewers felt that the work done by the SHCC could serve as a better source of data, since it collates data from across multiple organisations including the WHO and therefore the SSA. However, the SHCC does not currently produce regular sets of statistics on attacks on healthcare as part of its work. If it was to do so in the future, and if its data collection were more comprehensive and verified than the SSA, using the Coalition’s collective data in lieu of the SSA would be recommended.
Indicator 2B.10  Verified cases of humanitarian access incidents globally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Temporal data</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B.10</td>
<td>Verified cases of humanitarian access incidents globally</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Annual Report of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 2016; 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress


Method and limitations

As stressed by several peer reviewers, humanitarian access incidents do not necessarily qualify as cases of denial of access to humanitarian actors or assistance. However, monitoring access incidents can give insight into the on-the-ground conditions for access, regardless of whether impediments to aid are intentional or unintentional.

OCHA tracks humanitarian access incidents and for certain responses provides a map indicating the severity of access constraints across a country (OCHA, n.d.). OCHA does not currently collate this data globally on a regular basis, though this may change in the coming years.

Given the absence of annual reported figures from OCHA, the ALNAP team reviewed the Annual Report of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, which provides a number of verified and non-verified cases of ‘humanitarian access’ incidents. To be included in our indicator, events must be marked specifically as incidents of ‘humanitarian access’ and must be marked as ‘verified’.

The data collection, verification and definitions employed by the Children and Armed Conflict report are not transparent. This makes it difficult to assess the quality and completeness of the data (even without an overarching definition of ‘access’). There are incidents reported that appear to be access constraints (such as access to healthcare in the Occupied Palestinian Territories) but are not referred to as either ‘access’ or ‘humanitarian’ and are therefore not counted.

The reports also vary in how they report the data on impediments to access. While there are many explicit references to data being verified, there are few clear statements of non-verification. Often, access incidents are referred to as ‘recorded’ or ‘documented’, but it is not clear whether these are verified or might be in future.
Finally, the only countries examined are those on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council. This likely includes most of the contemporary humanitarian crises. It has not been possible to find these figures recorded elsewhere other than these reports. For these reasons, we have ranked this indicator as Tier IV. Ideally, improvements in measuring this indicator may be seen in OCHA’s work on how it reports its access data in the future.
Indicator 2B.11 Number of countries with humanitarian access concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2B.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries with humanitarian access concerns</td>
<td>Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

Between 2015 and 2017, the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (United Nations Security-General, 2016b; 2017b) has recorded an increasing number of countries with humanitarian access concerns.

Method and limitations

The limitations of this method are similar to those identified for 2B.9. There is a similar lack of clarity around the sources, definition, and validation of data. The data itself is not presented numerically and only appears as references in text (such as, ‘There were access concerns in country X’). The number of individual countries were counted by ALNAP researchers to reach the figures in the preceding table.

The 2016 report notes that it only covers ‘broad trends and patterns of harm to civilians in armed conflict’ and that this is derived from ‘information provided by United Nations actors and humanitarian organizations operating around the world’. Rather than a systematic data collection effort, it appears that the collection of this data is passive. Indeed, the report notes ‘The examples discussed herein are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive’. This casts further doubt on this source of data’s viability. For these reasons, we have ranked this indicator as Tier IV.

Peer reviewers suggested using ACAPS’ Humanitarian Access Overview instead as a potential data source; while considered methodologically superior by some peer reviewers to the SG report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Humanitarian Access Overview is selective in the number of countries it surveys and is produced on a more routine basis and does not provide annual figures.
**Indicators 2D.1-2D.3** Number of countries that have ratified/acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty; Number of Member States who have implemented x% of IHL topics; Number of Member States with x% coverage of Customary IHL in their legal frameworks and military manuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>#</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indicator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.1</td>
<td>Number of countries that have ratified/acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.2</td>
<td>Number of Member States who have implemented x% of IHL topics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.3</td>
<td>Number of Member States with x% coverage of Customary IHL in their legal frameworks and military manuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

Between 2015 and 2017, the number of states that have ratified/acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty has slightly increased.

It is not currently possible to assess progress on 2D.2 or 2D.3, due to the lack of any actor collating this data from the existing databases on an annual basis.

**Method and limitations**

Ratification of IHL treaties is a first step towards compliance; implementation of IHL into national legislation and practice is a further step. As stressed by peer reviewers for this chapter, ratification and implementation are not the same as compliance. However, they are arguably an important part of ensuring worldwide compliance with IHL.

In terms of ratification, one approach may be to track the ratification of specific parts of IHL. As an example of this, ALNAP looked at the processes in place to track ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, the most recently established treaty within the IHL cannon. The United National Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) records the dates of ratification and accession for the Arms Trade Treaty (UNODA, n.d.a). For our purposes, countries’ ratification/accession dates were segmented by year (the first bracket including all dates prior to 2015) and then the number of countries were aggregated in a running total in each subsequent year.

The data provided by UNODA is supplied in a PDF rather than a database format, and it is unclear whether it is collected whenever a state ratifies/accedes, on an annual basis or within
another time frame. Our method of aggregating states by their ratification/accession dates should prevent this from being a problem but it means that dates may change until the end of a given calendar year. As noted, there are more general issues here, including one key point: signing a treaty doesn’t equal compliance with it. This measure of the Arms Trade Treaty ratification/accession was included in our indicators because the explicit reference to it in the WHS Agenda for Humanity text. But this measure won’t necessarily give a clear picture of the impact of WHS: any trend seen may reflect the normal pattern of ratification/accession to an international treaty. If a more effective way to measure compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty becomes available, this will be considered. The Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Project (ATT-BAP, 2014) may provide such a measure but at this point its usefulness is unclear.

The ICRC National Implementation of IHL database holds a record of actions taken by Member States to implement IHL in their legal and administrative frameworks; the ‘Customary IHL’ database tracks practice of the 161 rules of customary IHL (‘rules that come from “a general practice accepted as law” and that exist independent of treaty law’ (ICRC, 2010; n.d.b.). While comprehensive, the ICRC notes that its databases are not exhaustive (ICRC, n.d.c) and the ICRC has not proposed that any actor use its databases for the purpose of routine monitoring.

Still, the ICRC databases offer the strongest repository of information on how states are implementing IHL, and therefore were deemed appropriate to consider as a potential source for global monitoring on 2D. There are different options for developing an indicator to track rates of implementation of IHL, using the ICRC databases. One is to establish a threshold at which a state could have been said to have ‘fully incorporated’ IHL into their national legislation, and then calculate the number of states that meet this threshold, based on the information provided in the National Implementation of IHL and Customary IHL databases. However, there are at least three challenges with this approach:

1. The database offers no public statistics or database export on the number of states that have implemented a law on a particular area of IHL, or on the percentage of IHL topics or customary IHL rules that a state has implemented legislation or practices. This means that this would have to be manually gathered.

2. The ICRC National Implementation database tracks international treaties that comprise IHL but not regional or bilateral treaties that cover some states’ IHL obligations, such as the Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced People in Africa.

3. As previously indicated, to make this measure effective, a threshold of ‘full implementation’ would have to be established. However, no immediate candidate is forthcoming and there are significant variations in the number of references to IHL in national law, which would likely require some form of weighting (for example do 3 references to Criminal Repression in Afghan law carry the same weight as 32 in the United Kingdom?).
**Indicator 2D.4 Number of state parties providing ‘adequate’ financial resources to the International Criminal Court**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2D.4</td>
<td>Number of state parties providing ‘adequate’ financial resources to the International Criminal Court*</td>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>ICC financial statements</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the number shown here is the total number of state parties minus the number of states with outstanding contributions; source: (ICC, n.d.)

**Assessing progress**

The increase of one additional state providing ‘adequate’ resources shown between 2015 and 2016 actually reflects the joining of another state party, not of a state party with outstanding contributions clearing their contribution – the number of states with outstanding contributions was the same in 2015 and 2016.

**Method and limitations**

The data for this indicator is drawn from the ICC’s financial statements, under the ‘Status of contributions’ tables. The number of countries with an amount to their name in the ‘total outstanding’ column was subtracted from the total number of state parties in the table. Therefore, this number reflects the number of states that have fulfilled their full financial contribution.

In the detailed description for Transformation 2B, the text calls for stakeholders to ‘provide adequate political, technical and financial cooperation and support to the International Criminal Court’. In light of this, the indicator suggested makes sense. However, it is unclear what ‘adequate’ might mean and whether this should reflect a country’s full contribution. To strengthen this indicator, this would need to be agreed with experts on the ground.
Indicators 2D.5-2D.8 Indicators to assess state efforts towards compliance with IHL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2D.5</td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of IHL violations prosecuted to total number of documented IHL violations worldwide</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.6</td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of states exercising universal jurisdiction on war crimes</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.7</td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries that have taken concrete steps to create effective investigation mechanisms for attacks by their military forces</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D.8</td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of countries that have established effective accountability mechanism for attacks by its forces on healthcare</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress due to lack of available data and questions on feasibility of measurement.

Method and limitations

An overarching message from the peer reviewers for this chapter was that none of the ALNAP indicators directly addressed the core matters of Transformation 2D, namely the issues of compliance and accountability for violations of IHL. Peer reviewers suggested several indicators that could more relevantly track this, including those related to the enforcement of Security Council Resolution 2286: ALNAP has included all four suggestions here. A brief review of existing efforts to collect and track data related to the above set of indicators found no existing entity that is regularly monitoring countries’ compliance with IHL on a global scale with any regularity.
Endnotes

1. Particular thanks to Christina Wille (Insecurity Insight) for raising this point.

2. The 2012 World Health Assembly tasked the WHO with developing a methodology for reliable collection of data on attacks against healthcare. A method was developed and, in 2015, trialled with the Turkey hub of the health cluster.

3. Without this, it is impossible to infer whether a number is increasing as a result of increased attacks against health personnel, or whether there are just more crises worldwide, and thus more health personnel deployed in emergencies.


5. The numbers within the ‘Basic Facts’ box are hyperlinked to reports offering more detail.
Background

Understanding the transformations

‘Leave no one behind’ was the predominant theme of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and reflected a commitment to see rights, opportunities and benefits more equally distributed across all demographic groups. Leave no one behind urges Member States and international agencies to avoid focusing on ‘low hanging fruit,’ or easy wins, and find solutions for the most vulnerable and marginalised segments of the world population who had been left out by the development gains of the previous 15 years.

Within the humanitarian system, leaving no one behind centred on improving assistance and protection for certain groups of people who are often overlooked in targeting and in response design. This included internally displaced people (IDPs) and commonly overlooked demographic groups who may not receive sufficient or relevant assistance – namely women and girls, older people and people with disabilities.

**TRANSFORMATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS CHAPTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformations addressed in this chapter</th>
<th>Number of commitments made that aligned with this</th>
<th>Reports on progress submitted in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A Reduce and address displacement.</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D Empower women and girls to fully and equally participate in decision-making at all levels, meet their specific needs, protect them against gender-based violence, and increase their access to humanitarian funding.</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (OCHA, 2016: 13)
Displacement: good collective monitoring is within reach, but political will has lagged behind

Displacement and migration were high-profile policy issues at the WHS. The Agenda for Humanity called for states to address the root causes of forced displacement and for a 50% reduction of global displacement by 2030. Many of those who attended the WHS were already looking ahead to the UN Summit on Refugees and Migration, convened by the United States in September 2016. The outcome of that Summit, The New York Declaration on Refugees and Migration, led to the launch of two separate intergovernmental processes to reform international policy on migration and refugees: the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), to be agreed in December 2018, and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), in final drafting stage in late 2018.

Initially, it seemed that the Compacts could lead to intergovernmental commitments and a monitoring process that would cover the displacement issues raised at the WHS. Many of the actors that made commitments on displacement at the WHS referred to their engagement in the GCM and GCR processes in their self-reporting to the online Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation (PACT), as indications of how they were moving forward on these commitments. However, as noted by OCHA in the first-year progress report on the WHS, neither the GCM nor the GCR address internal displacement (OCHA, 2017). Between migrants and refugees, the issue of forced internal displacement has largely dropped from the global reform processes. The processes underway to establish indicators for the GCM and GCR do not include outcomes that would be relevant for assessing progress on reducing internal displacement or addressing the needs of IDPs. As such, there are still gaps in the systems in place to track global progress on addressing internal displacement.

In identifying indicators that would be useful for understanding progress made on Transformation 3A, ALNAP looked at two main types: indicators that tell us whether displacement is increasing or decreasing; and indicators that tell us the comparative quality of care being provided to those who are forcibly displaced.

Displacement data is difficult to collect and verify given the increasingly mixed flows of populations moving multiple times through the same places for different reasons (EU and UN, 2018a). Few countries and international organisations have strong enough statistical capacities to track these movements well. There are presently two main agencies that collate this data to provide global annual figures: UNHCR's Population Statistics and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). Both draw on country-based data collection processes, which incorporate data collected by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other partners, including the multi-agency Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), created in 2016.
It is important to be aware of the variation in displacement figures reported by the two agencies. UNHCR’s Population Statistics cover all refugees worldwide and IDPs in the countries where UNHCR is operational. This means that the UNHCR data on displacement is a subset. In most cases UNHCR relies on its own data but where UNHCR is not responsible for registering displaced persons it relies on figures from host governments. The estimations made by UNHCR do not always align with host governments, who may dispute how many of its citizens are internally displaced. The IDMC figures therefore tend to be higher than UNHCR’s. IDMC relies on partners to collect displacement data and has discussed at length the limitations and challenges in reliably aggregating this data across multiple sources in its annual Global Report on Internal Displacement (IDMC and NRC, 2016; 2017; 2018: Methodology Annexes).

Humanitarian actors recognise different types of displacement statuses, all of which are relevant to tracking global trends in displacement (OCHA, 2004; UNHCR, 1951). ‘IDP’ refers to ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border’ (UNHCR, 1998). Unlike refugees, IDPs remain legally under the protection of their own government and are not protected by international law. A refugee has had to flee their country because of persecution, war or violence, has received legal recognition of this status and is therefore entitled to legal protection, other assistance and social rights from the countries who have signed the 1951 Geneva Convention (UNHCR, 1951). An asylum seeker is someone who had to flee their country and whose request for sanctuary in another country has yet to be processed.

Despite providing a useful framework, these categorisations can present problems for tracking stateless and undocumented persons. ‘A stateless person is someone who is not a citizen of any country,’ and therefore does not have a legal bond with any government. To date, UNHCR has treated figures on stateless persons as an exclusive group, but with the growing phenomenon of stateless asylum seekers and refugees (such as the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh) this categorisation risks double counting. In turn, official statistics on forced displacement are not able to count those who have crossed borders illegally and remain undocumented (Francis 2015; UNHCR 2016).

To understand whether displacement is increasing or decreasing, ALNAP explored two indicators: annual new caseload (so, the number of new displacements per year) and overall total number of displaced people – including people who have been displaced for more than a year. When moving from annual new caseloads to ongoing totals, the methodological challenges become even greater. Data can become quickly outdated, and thus inaccurate, particularly for disaster-related displacements where there is rarely any medium- or long-term follow up on the situation of those initially displaced by a rapid onset disaster.
Second, current data collection methods are not well adapted to tracking successful returns, repeated displacements as well as secondary and additional displacements of people within and across the borders of their country. Systematic data on births and deaths of displaced populations is also not captured. All these flows and processes impact the total figure of displaced people (IDMC and NRC, 2017; UNHCR 2018).

Organisations such as IDMC argue that to achieve progress on displacement, new indicators and data will be needed that go beyond descriptive statistics on increases or decreases in IDPs and instead help illuminate the underlying drivers and risks related to displacement (IDMC and NRC, 2018). To see significant reductions in displacement: ‘countries will need to monitor progress against a much wider set of issues, including governance arrangements; local, national, regional and global policies, programmes and investments; development and humanitarian indicators that determine risk and countries’ capacity to support IDPs; and more complex displacement metrics, including duration and severity’ (NRC/IDMC, 2018a: 68).

To understand the different quality of care received by displaced people, ALNAP looked at recent work to define and measure durable solutions for both refugees and IDPs, as well as mortality and morbidity data. Data on quality of care and outcomes for displaced people is similarly challenging to capture in a manner that would support collective monitoring the identification of trends.

One potential new development that may address these challenges is the work of the international Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS). Mandated by the UN Statistical Commission (UNSC), EGRIS was established in 2016 to develop a set of international recommendations on refugee and internal displacement statistics, both released in March 2018 (EU and UN, 2018a; 2018b). EGRIS is working to support the use of refugee- and displacement-specific indicators within the broader monitoring process for the SDGs and to help improve the capacity of national statistics to ‘better understand the phenomenon of forced displacement, to analyse its impacts, and to measure changes over time’ (EU and UN, 2018a: 13). This new work on statistics reflects the realisation that making progress on the SDGs and other commitments is only possible with good data, relevant indicators and robust monitoring processes.

**Gender: the lack of strong collective monitoring systems for programming is a barrier to tracking progress globally**

While gender equality was not originally a focus of the consultations for the WHS, it became a significant theme at the Summit itself, after a gender advisor was hired to create a strategy and mobilised Member States, civil society and other UN stakeholders. Over 500 commitments were submitted on gender empowerment and equality across all five core responsibilities. Yet, as noted in the first-year progress report, these commitments vary widely in both topic and in level of concreteness – from specific targets for humanitarian staffing to broad statements of support for sexual and reproductive rights (OCHA, 2017).
Commitments made by Member States tended towards high-level policy commitments to gender equality, funding for women’s organisations or support to sexual and reproductive rights, while implementing agencies committed to programmatic changes that can only be measured by the agency themselves – for example, commitments to increasing ‘gender-responsive programming.’ Others committed to the ‘meaningful participation’ of women and girls in decision-making and leadership across ‘humanitarian, prevention, response, protection and recovery’ activities.¹

A key challenge to tracking progress on gender issues in humanitarian action comes down to trying to articulate shared definitions and clear outcomes. What do positive outcomes for women and girls in humanitarian crises look like? What does it mean to ensure that crisis assistance and protection are not influenced by harmful gender norms and instead potentially help move gender imbalances in a positive direction?

There are four key layers to the commitments made on gender at the WHS, namely decision-making, meeting needs, protection from gender-based violence and access to humanitarian funding. Considering these commitments along with existing and ongoing work to define and measure gender-responsive programming, ALNAP’s desk-based review suggests three broader areas for tracking progress on gender under the Agenda for Humanity.

**Equality.** In terms of gender equality, we suggest focusing on resources and participation rather than on equality in terms of amount of aid received by women and girls compared to that received by men and boys. Equal aid does not mean that needs are being met equally – this is a matter of equity, addressed in the next paragraph. A good area to look at in terms of equality is in the participation of women in the activities of peacebuilding and humanitarian response, for example by leading women’s organisations or participating in conflict resolution (3D.1). An indicator that helps us track indirectly women’s leadership, at the level of outputs rather than outcomes, is how much funding is going towards women’s organisations (3D.2).

**Equity.** A central concern of gender-responsive programming is that women and girls have different needs from men and boys, which can be ignored or underserved in crisis even when everyone is given the same support, and therefore results in aid that is inequitable. The same water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services provided to a woman and a man leads to an inequitable response if the woman has menstrual hygiene needs, which the man does not have and are therefore unserved. Here, the humanitarian system may want to understand how responsive it is being to these specific needs, using the Gender with Age Marker (GAM) (3D.4, 3D.5). It may also want to track the percentage of humanitarian funding dedicated to a specific area of needs for women and girls, gender-based and sexual violence (GBSV) prevention (3D.6).
Outcomes. The GAM suggests understanding outcomes for women and girls in their own terms, based on the degree to which women and girls feel their needs are being addressed by humanitarian aid. This suggests the following outcome indicator:

**Satisfaction with humanitarian assistance and protection.** Responses by women and girls to survey questions regarding relevance, quality, timeliness, and quantity of humanitarian assistance (Indicator 3D.7).

Beyond this, the humanitarian sector could also track more specific outcomes related to women and girls’ well-being. Identification of these warrants wider discussion but could involve sector-specific outcomes. Based on existing suggested indicators and alignment with the SDG indicators related to gender, three outcome indicators might be:

- **Comparative mortality and morbidity rates for women and girls; men and boys.** While there are many factors that contribute to mortality and morbidity rates in a crisis, understanding whether there is a pattern of higher mortality and morbidity rates for women and girls could help crystallise the impacts of gender blindness in humanitarian programming (3D.8).

- **Reproductive and sexual health care coverage.** Generally, the SDG indicators track gender equality as it plays out in social services and political structures in a state, and therefore are not relevant to understanding how well humanitarian response is addressing gender equality issues. However, there are two exceptions to this: one being the indicator on coverage for reproductive and sexual healthcare, which, if adapted to the humanitarian system, could provide a more cohesive understanding of women and girls’ access to these services and the degree to which they are or are not disrupted in a crisis (3D.9).

- **Safety from gender-based and/or sexual violence.** The SDG indicator framework also includes indicators to track gender-based violence. We discuss the modifications needed to track this meaningfully for humanitarian crises (3D.10, 3D.11).

Looking across the 2030 Agenda, there are several related initiatives that have been underway since before the WHS and which may provide some useful monitoring data – for example, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls (GEEWG) in Humanitarian Action endorsed in 2017 and the IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap).

In 2015, the UN Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council on Women and Peace and Security. One of the key initiatives issuing from this report was the creation of the Women’s Peace & Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) (formerly the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action). The WPHF is a global pooled funding mechanism that aims to re-energize and stimulate a significant shift
in the financing of the women’s participation, leadership and empowerment in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and humanitarian response. Several of the outcomes that WPHF plans to monitor in its monitoring, evaluation and learning plan may be of relevance to humanitarians, although the WPHF’s focus is across the ‘nexus’ rather than strictly on the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian response.

In 2017, the IASC endorsed an Accountability Framework to bolster the performance of IASC Bodies, Members and Standing Invitees in relation to the GEEWG (IASC, 2017a: 1). The Framework outlines the principles and standards that IASC-affiliated organisations should abide by to integrate gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls into humanitarian action. It also sets out reporting and information management mechanisms to help IASC members hold themselves accountable to their commitments under the policy. Several indicators included in the framework are potentially relevant for monitoring the WHS commitments on gender responsiveness. For example, the peer review group suggested that this study could adopt the Framework’s indicator looking at the percentage of humanitarian needs overviews (HNOs) that are based on gender analysis and the use of sex, age and gender disaggregated data, with the idea that this demonstrates whether humanitarian strategic responses are geared to address the specific humanitarian needs of women, girls, men and boys (IASC, 2017b: 14).

In the end, this is the only indicator from the GEEWG that is included in this study, for two reasons. First, it is unclear from IASC documents how comprehensive or routine the data collection will be for the GEEWG indicators. The Accountability Framework notes that ‘there are limited organizational control mechanisms that can be used to monitor the implementation of the Gender Policy’ and that a monitoring role will be undertaken by the IASC Gender Desk. However, there have been no public reports from the Gender Desk since the end of 2017 on the proposed indicators. Second, several of the indicators are qualitative and would need to be quantified (perhaps by relating them to the GAM), in order to compare progress over time.

Of the three initiatives discussed here, perhaps the most directly relevant initiative for shared indicators on gender-responsive programming in humanitarian action is the GenCap Project’s GAM. In 2007, the IASC, in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and (OCHA), established the GenCap to strengthen the capacity of humanitarian actors to ensure gender equal programming. One of GenCap’s projects is the GAM tool, which is used to classify humanitarian projects on a scale of 0–2 based on the degree to which they take gender-related issues into account in programming and design programming to meet the specific needs of women and girls.

Since its launch, uptake of the gender marker has been mixed. It was not used widely by humanitarian agencies and there were also significant issues with consistency in how the marker was applied to projects. In a 2015 review, GenCap advisors collected a random sample
of 844 projects from the 2014/15 humanitarian appeals. The advisors coded these projects independently, then compared them to the codes that had been self-applied by agencies to the projects in the appeals. The review found that 40% of the projects had been miscoded. GenCap’s coding also found that 22% of projects were gender blind (did not take gender differences into account in programme design) and only 35% achieved the higher ranking of ‘showing significant potential for mainstreaming gender’ (GenCap, 2015: 9-10).

In 2017, GenCap worked with ECHO, Care International and Oxfam to revise the gender marker and include an age component, leading to the launch of a new GAM in June 2018.

The revised GAM captures ‘the extent to which essential programming actions address gender- and age-related differences in humanitarian response’ (GenCap, 2018a) and enables the assessment of:

1. the proportion of projects/programmes where activities and benefits are relevant to needs
2. whether there are outstanding gaps or unintended consequences as well as steps planned/taken to address
3. how the affected population is engaged and with whom
4. whether projects are contributing to the prevention of GBSV through either mainstreaming or remedial actions (Merrin Waterhouse, private communication, 2018).

Aside from the inclusion of age, there are three important differences between the previous gender marker and the revised GAM that will potentially make it easier to achieve a collective picture of how humanitarian agencies are meeting their commitments to gender-responsive programming and gender equality.

To assess the benefits or outcomes of gender-responsive programming, the GAM focuses on three characteristics: distinctness, satisfaction and addressing unintended harms (see Figure 3). To achieve a high rating a project must show that ‘There are distinct benefits for women/girls and/or men/boys in different age groups as a result of activities adapted to different needs or barriers’, that women and girls are satisfied with the aid received, and that any problems or negative effects are being mitigated in ways that distinctly address the concerns of women and girls (GenCap, 2018b).
Within this framework, the revised GAM assesses projects with 12 indicators. Four of these are considered key indicators on project design that are used to ‘rate’ the project (GenCap, 2018a). Each of these four has two supporting indicators that are measured during project monitoring. A number of the 12 GAM indicators have been pulled out as potential data sources to inform indicators for this study. In some cases, they would be used only for triangulation because GAM reporting is currently conducted at the project level while the unit of measurement for some of the indicators put forward here is at the individual level.

OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) reporting will explicitly include the GAM and therefore lead to a higher use of the GAM in the reporting of funded projects. Second, the GAM rating will no longer be based on an agency assigning its own score but will instead be assigned based on answers to a set of questions on the FTS online reporting form. While agencies are still responsible for answering these questions themselves (and are providing answers that are not independently verified), this is a step towards improving consistent use of the GAM. Third, the new GAM looks at both programme design and programme monitoring as distinct components of gender-responsive programming, providing the ability to review whether projects continue to do what is required to remain gender responsive after the initial design stage.

It is important to note that although reporting on the GAM will be a mandatory component of the FTS by the first quarter of 2019, humanitarian appeals through the FTS account for just under 55% of all humanitarian funding (Development Initiatives, 2018). As such, the GAM code would not be comprehensive for the entirety of humanitarian assistance and protection. Moreover, given that the GAM is new, it remains to be seen how its use by stakeholders will play out in practice. That said, during the peer review process for this study no other viable sources were identified that could provide a more complete picture on gender-responsive programming.
### Core Responsibility 3: indicators with rankings – at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Potential/Actual source</th>
<th>Positive or negative progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A Reduce and address displacement</td>
<td>3A.1. # of new internally displaced people (IDPs) due to conflict</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.2. # of new IDPs due to disaster</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.3. # of total IDPs: conflict</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.4. # of total IDPs: disaster</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.5. # of new asylum seekers and refugees</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.6. Total # of asylum seekers and refugees</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.7. # of refugees achieving durable solutions: resettlement</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.8. # of refugees achieving durable solutions: integration</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3A.9. Mortality and morbidity rates of displaced; compared with refugees; compared with non-displaced people targeted by humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | 3D Empower women and girls to fully and equally participate in decision-making at all levels, meet their specific needs, protect them against gender-based violence, and increase their access to humanitarian funding | 3D.1. Proportion of early warning indicators that are gender specific | III | Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund; UN ISDR | N/A |
| | 3D.2. % of women and girls who report being able to participate in programme design and use complaints mechanisms | IIa | ALNAP; GTS; IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project | N/A |
| | 3D.3. % of humanitarian funding going to women's organisations | IV | None | N/A |
| | 3D.4. % of HNO based on solid gender analysis, sex and age-disaggregated data, which identifies gender inequalities that lead to different power, vulnerabilities, capacities, voice and participation of women, girls, men and boys | III | IASC Gender Desk | N/A |
| | 3D.5. % of humanitarian funding going to projects rated at least 3 on all indicators on the GAM in the monitoring phase | IIb | FTS; IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project | N/A |
| | 3D.6. % of humanitarian projects in HRPs rated at least 3 on the GAM in the monitoring phase | IIb | FTS; IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project | N/A |
| | 3D.7. % of humanitarian funding going to gender-based and sexual violence prevention (GBSV) | IIb | FTS; IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project | N/A |
| | 3D.8. % of women and girl aid recipients who report that humanitarian aid is relevant to their needs | IIb | ALNAP; GTS; IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project | N/A |
| | 3D.9. Mortality & morbidity rates of women/girls compared to men/boys | IV | CRED | N/A |
| | 3D.10. % of population covered by sexual and reproductive health and rights services in countries receiving humanitarian assistance | IV | None | N/A |
| | 3D.11. Proportion of women and girls receiving humanitarian assistance aged 15 years+ subjected to sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the previous 12 months | III | UNSTATS; OECD | N/A |
| | 3D.12. Proportion of women and girls receiving humanitarian assistance aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by an intimate partner in the previous 12 months | III | UNSTATS; OECD | N/A |

Notes: HRP = humanitarian response plan
Assessment and discussion

**Indicator 3A.1 and 3A.2 New internal displacements due to conflict and disaster**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of new internal displacements due to conflict</td>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of new internal displacements due to disaster</td>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ila</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

When looking at total number of all new internal displacements, regardless of cause, there has been a gradual increase every year since 2015. However, when new internal displacements are disaggregated according to cause, there are no clear trends. New displacements from conflict dropped slightly from 2015 to 2016 yet nearly doubled in 2017. Displacement from disaster rose by more than 20% – from 19.2 million to 24.2 million in 2016 – only to fall to 18.8 million in 2017. Drops in conflict-driven displacement were compensated for by a rise in disaster-driven displacement in 2016, and then in the reverse the following year. Future work in the sector is looking beyond aggregate figures of displacements and displaced people to better monitor and understand the **duration** and **severity** of displacement.

**Method and limitations**

A general caveat for both conflict- and disaster-caused displacement figures is that current monitoring is poor at tracking the displacement patterns of individuals, and therefore risks ‘double-counting’:

> It should be noted that ‘new displacement’ is somewhat misleading in that data may capture the same people being displaced more than once during the year. Given that we are unable to track individual IDPs, it is often not possible to determine the extent to which this is the case for the numbers reported. The current lack of disaggregated data on IDPs who fail to achieve durable solutions, and on cross-border returns to displacement, also means that such inflows are taken as incidents of new displacement.’

(NRC/IDMC, 2017: 4)

As a result, the suggested language in the indicator is ‘new displacements’ rather than ‘number of new internally displaced people’, reflecting that the data tracks the number of **instances** of displacement, rather than **individuals** displaced.

Peer reviewers noted that it can be difficult to identify a single cause for displacement, which further explains the variation in figures reported by different agencies. For example,
in 2017 UNHCR reported larger numbers than IDMC of displacement in Somalia, as it was difficult to untangle whether people had been displaced due to conflict or drought. UNHCR included both groups as they faced the same protection risks, while IDMC counted only those displaced by conflict, as IDMC only began counting displacements caused by slow-onset disasters (e.g. drought) in 2018. Despite the difficulties in distinguishing between the two types of displacement, it was felt by peer reviewers to be important to disaggregate based on cause of displacement because prevention and drivers of these types of displacement are different and as such have different policy implications.

Given the discrepancies in numbers reported for certain countries, peer reviewers suggested it might be more appropriate to use one source for some countries and a different source for others. More routine tracking mechanisms, such as IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) could be used to supplement or calibrate these figures. While this may be the ideal approach, in the absence of a clear method for selecting sources per-country, we have proposed IDMC’s GRID as a source for internal displacement and UNHCR’s Global Trends report as the source for figures on refugees, asylum seekers and durable solutions.

IDMC uses two related methodologies to estimate the number of new displacements caused by conflict and those caused by disasters.

**FIGURE 4: ANNUAL RATES OF DISPLACEMENT DUE TO CONFLICT AND DISASTERS (2008-2017)**

[Graph showing annual rates of displacement due to conflict and disasters (2008-2017)]


*Note: The box indicates the years included in this study, with 2015 as the baseline.*

New displacement figures for conflict and violence are collected on a country-by-country basis, with IDMC using situation monitoring and other reports from partners such as UNHCR, IOM’s DTM, and others. Reports tend to come in monthly or quarterly, and in different formats, which IDMC must reconcile to arrive at an aggregate total. While these reports are not sufficiently detailed, IDMC notes that in recent years significant improvements have been made, allowing for stronger comparisons across countries (NRC/IDMC, 2017: 94).
Disaster-related displacement are calculated based on specific events, then aggregated by country, to produce an estimate of the number of people displaced by disasters during the course of the year. Again, IDMC relies on reporting from partners, namely crisis-affected governments, the UN, IFRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, NGOs and international media outlets. Importantly, IDMC’s method has to date excluded slow-onset disasters, such as droughts, from its scope of disaster ‘events’, which can limit the relevance of its figures for humanitarian disaster displacement monitoring. Also, the figures used from government are official evacuation statistics, which can in some cases over-estimate, and in others under-estimate, the population affected by a weather event.

In the past two years, IDMC has made some revisions to its methodology, including the tracking of displacements caused by slow-onset disaster, and changes to how IDMC counts the ‘end’ of a displacement. IDMC also notes the increasingly enhanced capacity to identify incidents of displacement, including in hard to reach areas, due to new tools and technologies including natural language processing (NLP) and satellite imagery analysis, among others. IDMC has also harmonised its methods to record incidents of conflict-related displacement and disaster-related displacement and now bases most of its estimates on the detection of specific incidents of displacement.

FIGURE 5: IDMC’S DISPLACEMENT DATA MODEL

Source: NRC/IDMC 2018b
These changes, in particular the rise in the quality of available data on displacement, will potentially increase the accuracy of annual displacement figures. But they also pose challenges for comparing displacement data year-on-year, as a rise in displacement numbers could be due to improvements in data collection.

During the peer review process for this paper, it was suggested that it would be useful to look at indicators that could track the duration and severity of displacement. UNHCR regularly tracks duration of displacement, and IDMC is developing a displacement severity index. As these methodologies are still evolving, duration and severity are important considerations for future monitoring but were not included as indicators in this study.
Indicators 3A.3 and 3A.4 Global total of displaced people due to conflict and disaster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A.3: # of total IDPS, conflict</td>
<td>IDMC GRID 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A.4: # of total IDPS, disaster</td>
<td>IDMC GRID 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

The total number of people displaced by conflict fell slightly from 40.8 million in 2015 to 40.3 million in 2016. In 2017, IDMC cited a figure of 40.0 million, which it said covered the total of all people displaced, whether by conflict or disaster. It is not clear why the category was expanded to include both conflict- and disaster-related displacements – particularly when IDMC notes the ongoing methodological challenges that prevent a total figure from being produced on rolling disaster-related displacement.

Method and limitations

IDMC uses a multi-component model to calculate total displacement numbers (Figure 5), which relies on regular and accurate data on returns, settlements, and integration, as well as failed returns, settlements and integration. Often, however, there is little or no data for IDMC to use in their model due to lack of detail in situation reporting they receive from partners.

Disasters are a particularly difficult area for generating total numbers of displacement, as these numbers are often not updated beyond one year after a disaster event. For example, it is unknown exactly how many people are still displaced from the Haiti earthquake eight years on, or from Typhoon Haiyan after five years. Due to these limitations, IDMC does not produce a total figure for disaster displacement. However, we have rated this indicator Tier III as IDMC is working on an improved methodology for calculating total figures for disaster-related displacement.

Given the amount of attention placed on disaster displacement by the Sendai Framework and Paris Climate Agreement, it is possible that data collection and regular updating will improve in coming years. There are also promising, concrete developments in this area. Along with IDMC’s efforts, and new efforts by UNHCR and the World Bank to improve statistics on displacement in complex emergencies, the UNSC has established an expert group and called for a technical report on official statistics for IDPs and refugees to be prepared in time for its 49th session in 2018. (IDMC and NRC, 2017: 69).
Indicators 3A.5 and 3A.6 Number of new asylum seekers and new refugees; and total number of asylum seekers and refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A.5 # of new asylum seekers and new refugees</td>
<td>UNHCR Global Trends Report 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
<td>3.8 mn</td>
<td>3.4 mn</td>
<td>4.4 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A.6 Total # of asylum seekers and refugees</td>
<td>UNHCR Population Statistics database; UNHCR Global Trends Report 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
<td>24.5 mn</td>
<td>25.3 mn</td>
<td>28.5 mn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

There is no overall progress on reducing the number of asylum seekers and refugees worldwide either by addressing the causes of refugee migration and asylum seeking, or by achieving durable solutions for existing refugees. There was drop in the number of new asylum seekers and new refugees in 2016 – but the total number of asylum seekers and refugees was still larger than in 2015. Moreover, new caseload rose sharply by 1 million in 2017.

Method and limitations

UNHCR maintains an ongoing web portal, the Population Statistics database, with updated annual figures on refugees, IDPs, stateless people and returnees (http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview). This is based on operational data gathered by UNHCR across its country offices worldwide and verified with Member States. UNHCR also publishes an annual summary and analysis of the trends in cross-border and internal displacement, the Global Trends Report.

The indicator covers both refugees and ‘asylum seekers’; excluding persons who have had to flee their origin countries but are still in the process of applying for refugee status would risk underrepresenting the true scale of displacement in any given year. For example, in 2015 more people were new applicants for asylum (2.0 million) than new refugees (1.8 million) (UNHCR, 2016). Total numbers are harder to arrive at, as they involve updates based on births and death. However, given the status of refugees and asylum seekers within international law and their more formal engagement with international agencies, births and deaths are easier to track for these populations than for IDPs.

Finally, it should be noted that we suggest indicators at the level of global aggregates, not country-level. Disaggregating refugee and asylum seeker figures according to country raises the question of which country should be the unit for analysis: the country of origin, or the country in which refugee status is being sought.
Indicators 3A.7 and 3A.8 Number of refugees placed in durable solutions: resettlement; and integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A.7</td>
<td>107,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Global Trends Report 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Global Trends Report 2016; 2017; 2018</td>
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</table>

Assessing progress
The number of refugees continues to grow steadily and there have been no sustainable shifts in how Member States approach resettlement or other options within the durable solutions framework.

Method and limitations
‘Durable solutions’ are positive permanent or long-term outcomes for refugees and IDPs. A durable solution is achieved when a person of concern ‘no longer [has] any displacement-related assistance and protection needs and [is] able to enjoy their human rights without discrimination deriving from displacement’ (IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons).

There are three main pathways to durable solutions currently pursued by UNHCR and its partners: (1) voluntary return to the country or area of origin; (2) integration into the host country or community; and (3) resettlement to a third country location.

Significant challenges lie in tracking progress on durable solutions.

Resettlement of refugees to a third country is currently the easiest solution of the three to track and repatriation to country of origin is the most difficult. As UNHCR notes, voluntary return to the country of origin can be difficult to assess, as it involves understanding the extent to which a refugee’s decision to return is an authentic choice. ‘Unfortunately, the contexts in which such returns took place in 2017 were often complex, with many refugees returning under adverse circumstances to situations in which sustainable reintegration could not be assured’ (UNHCR, 2018: 28).

Similarly, integration into a host country is challenging to accurately monitor because ‘Local integration is a complex and gradual process comprising separate but equally important legal, economic, social, and cultural dimensions ... [therefore] measuring and quantifying the degree and nature of local integration is challenging given its complexity’ (UNHCR, 2018: 30).
Citing these complexities, UNHCR has to date used official statistics on naturalisation of refugees in order to track integration into a host society (although these are not without their own caveats (UNHCR, 2018: 30-31).

Tracking durable solutions for IDPs is even harder as it is not clear when their formally recognised displaced status stops. Durable solutions for IDPs could see them either return voluntarily, safely and in dignity to their habitual place of residence or resettle elsewhere in the country under the same conditions. Although the IASC has presented a framework and guidance on what durable solutions mean and how to achieve them, key stakeholders in each country need to come together to set context-specific criteria to help determine whether a durable solution has been indeed been achieved (IASC, n.d.). Unlike the legal clarity provided by the process of naturalisation for refugees, different countries approach the legal recognition of durable solutions for IDPs differently. For example, in Colombia IDPs never lose their displaced status, while in Georgia the government has undertaken initiatives to move away from status-based assistance for IDPs to needs-based assistance for those most vulnerable (World Bank, 2016a).

As part of the research process ALNAP considered indicators from the Durable Solutions Library, which was launched online in summer 2018 (IASC, n.d.). The Library is the outcome of a multi-stakeholder process coordinated by Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPs) to conceive a set of jointly agreed indicators for governments and international agencies to use in tracking the achievement of durable solutions. The library is comprehensive and covers three broad areas: the first two cover demographic data and IDPs’ perspectives on their own status; the third covers a wider set of indicators corresponding eight criteria for durable solutions. Each criterion has several sub-themes, with multiple indicators listed for each sub-theme.

While all indicators are potentially useful and relevant for understanding progress on durable solutions, attempting to regularly measure all of them would require significantly more resource than is currently available. Moreover, there is currently no clear case for selecting one set, or one individual indicator, over others, without further consultation and consensus. Also, the indicators appear more suitable for operational programme monitoring than global composite measurement. For these reasons, we have not attempted to select from the Durable Solutions Library indicators in this feasibility study, while noting that it is an area in which significant progress is being made to clarify and agree common frameworks for tracking durable solutions at the programme level.

Peer reviewers recommended the work of the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS) for looking at future measures of durable solutions that are being developed through multi-agency consensus.
In March 2018, EGRIS recommended a set of indicators to measure refugee integration, along seven dimensions (EU and UN, 2018: 84):

1. Legal indicators
2. Civil-political indicators
3. Demographic and migration indicators
4. Education indicators
5. Economic indicators
6. Social inclusion indicators
7. Health indicators
Indicator 3A.9 Mortality and morbidity rates of displaced; compared with refugees; and compared with non-displaced people targeted by humanitarian assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A.9</td>
<td>Mortality and morbidity rates of displaced; compared with refugees; and compared with non-displaced people targeted by humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress as no actor is currently collating and analysing this data on an annual basis.

Method and limitations

The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology for Disasters (CRED) maintains the most reliable databases on crisis mortality and morbidity statistics. CRED has an ongoing database, Emergency Database or (EM-DAT), which reports deaths from disasters. Until 2015, CRED also managed a public database on deaths in complex/conflict-driven emergencies, the Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT). Due to a funding shortage, CE-DAT is no longer publicly accessible and is not being comprehensively updated on an annual basis. If this issue is addressed in the future, CE-DAT could produce relevant data for Indicator 3A.9.

A study produced by CRED researchers in 2016 looked at the excess mortality rates for IDPs, residents and refugees over a 12-year period from 1998 to 2012. IDPs were found to be dying at a significantly higher excess mortality rate than refugees (Heudtlass et al., 2016). The study was useful for illustrating tangible differences in health outcomes for IDPs compared with other demographics receiving humanitarian assistance. However, it was produced as a single academic study and has not been repeated since.

UNHCR also maintains a database on mortality and morbidity statistics where it is operational in camp settings, but this is not comprehensive for other areas of a response and is not publicly available.
Indicator 3D.1 Proportion of early warning indicators that are gender sensitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Indicator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.1 Proportion of early warning indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that are gender sensitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPHF, ISDR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (baseline)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress, as baseline data is currently being collected.

Method and limitations
The Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund is currently planning to track indicator 3D.1 as part of its monitoring framework. Data is expected to be reported at country level and provided by UNDP. At the time of writing, no baseline had yet been established.

FIGURE 6: OUTCOME 2 ON EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT MEDIATION FOR WPHF

### Indicators 3D.2 and 3D.3

Percentage of women and girls who report being able to participate in programme design and use complaints mechanisms; percentage of humanitarian funding going to women-led humanitarian organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D.2 % of women and girls who report being able to participate in programme design and use complaints mechanisms</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>ALNAP; Ground Truth Solutions; GAM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>23% (SOHS 2015)</td>
<td>37% (SOHS 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.3 % of humanitarian funding going to women-led humanitarian organisations</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress as no actor is currently collating and analysing this data on an annual basis.

### Method and limitations

Both these indicators reflect an attempt to meaningfully track improvements in the participation of women and girls in humanitarian action. Trying to define and understand women’s participation and leadership in a response is difficult, and peer reviewers highlighted the importance of distinguishing between the participation of women as aid workers and the participation of women as crisis-affected people. 3D.1 looks at the participation of affected populations and programme beneficiaries and 3D.2 looks at support for women-led humanitarian actors in a response.

3D.1 was added based on peer review inputs, which suggested that the emphasis on participations should be placed in understanding how crisis-affected women participate in decisions that affect them. The ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System (SOHS) report is currently the only source that has tracked the participation of women and girls using gender disaggregated data and with a view to producing a collective picture of participation across multiple humanitarian responses. In recent years, Ground Truth Solutions has carried out increasing numbers of surveys of crisis affected people and is now providing this data through its Human Voice Index, which could be used for annual review. The GAM also tracks participation and therefore GenCap could provide monitoring data on this in the future.

Turning to women’s participation as aid workers and leaders of humanitarian organisations, an initial challenge with understanding support to women’s organisations is defining what this means – i.e. is a ‘woman’s’ organisation defined by mandate or staff composition? Ideally progress would aim to see more organisations mandated for women led by women.
To address this, the peer review group suggested that another potential proxy for this indicator would be to measure the proportion of humanitarian staff who are women but could not identify an appropriate source of such data. Although the FTS system could be adapted to include self-reporting on the percentage of funded staff that are women, currently it does not fulfil this purpose. The research organisation Humanitarian Outcomes tracks humanitarian staff numbers worldwide but does not currently disaggregate by gender. And while some donors require that a certain percentage of funding goes to female staff, there is currently no mechanism to extract and collate this information across donors.

Acknowledging these caveats, ALNAP suggests an indicator to track funding to women-led humanitarian organisations. While Development Initiatives’ global humanitarian assistance (GHA) report and OCHA’s FTS provide breakdowns of funding going to different types of local and national actors, neither disaggregate this according to whether organisations are led by women or focused on services to women. The OECD data portal reports funding on gender equality separately from funding for humanitarian crises, rather than allowing for these to be examined together (i.e. it does not allow the tracking of funding for gender equality/gender issues as a sub-set of humanitarian funding).

The Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund was established precisely to increase and leverage funding for women’s leadership roles in peacebuilding and humanitarian work, including funding directly to women’s equality organisations. Several reports produced in the process of setting up the WPHF provide useful figures on the state of funding to women’s organisations. For example, one report notes that, based on OECD data, ‘in 2012-13, only USD 130 million of aid went to women’s equality organizations and institutions—a tiny amount of the USD 31.8 billion of total aid to fragile states and economies over the same period, and representing just one per cent of gender equality focused aid to fragile states and economies’ (UN Women, 2015).

However insightful, these figures are provided as one-off statistics and not collected regularly for monitoring purposes. The WPHF’s financial monitoring of the grants it disburses may provide a partial indicator of whether funding to women’s organisations is on the rise. However, more work would be needed to understand how representative the WPHF’s grants programme can be for wider practice on support to women-led organisations.
Indicators 3D.2 and 3D.3 Percentage of women and girls who report being able to participate in programme design and use complaints mechanisms; percentage of humanitarian funding going to women-led humanitarian organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.4</td>
<td>% of HNOs based on solid gender analysis and sex and age disaggregated data, which identifies gender inequalities that lead to different power, vulnerabilities, capacities, voice and participation of women, girls, men and boys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.5</td>
<td>% of humanitarian funding going to projects rated at least ‘3’ on all indicators on the GAM in the monitoring phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.6</td>
<td>% of humanitarian projects in HRPs rated at least ‘3’ on all indicators on the GAM in the monitoring phase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress, as there is no actor currently collating and analysing this data on an annual basis.

Method and limitations

Many WHS commitments refer to supporting more ‘gender responsive’ or ‘gender equality’ programming, without defining clearly what this means. Until recently, it has been difficult to track gender responsiveness collectively, as the previous gender marker was applied inconsistently and sparingly.

As mentioned in the ‘Background’ section of this chapter, the IASC Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls (GEEWG) in Humanitarian Action is accompanied by an accountability framework with suggested indicators for tracking progress. The GEEWG sets a target of 100% of HNOs being based on solid gender analysis and sex and age disaggregated data by 2019. Regardless of whether the target is met, tracking this figure could be relevant for understanding to what degree needs assessments used by the formal humanitarian system enable gender responsive programme design through appropriate gender analysis and disaggregation.

Other indicators suggested by the GEEWG are also relevant, but less precise and therefore harder to monitor. To be precise and to capture the work of organisations other than those agencies reporting to the IASC, a set of indicators framed around the GAM may be more feasible.
The new GAM was launched in 2018 and at the time of writing was being piloted in 15 countries. These indicators are therefore rated as Tier IIb but have some way to go before they reach Tier I.

At the same time, increased high-level political support for gender responsivity in crisis – such as the Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique and its two commitments to advancing equality in education and ending sexual and gender-based violence – may lead to greater use of the GAM for accountability purposes, and therefore to greater incentives to apply the GAM across projects and track ratings (G7, 2018). This could enable a baseline to be set as early as the beginning of 2019.

There does not, however, seem to be any actor, including GenCap, who is planning to regularly track the GAM and provide annual global reports on this. OCHA’s FTS has been redesigned to incorporate the GAM and link with its database but the interface required to search, review and extract gender marker data will not be operational until January 2019.

There is a further question as to how to use the GAM in a global indicator to track overall progress on gender-responsive humanitarian programming. Projects submitted on FTS will be coded according to the GAM but this code is based on only 4 of the 12 indicators, at the project design phase. Therefore, looking at the score for all 12 GAM indicators in the monitoring phase may be a more relevant way to track progress. ALNAP suggests an indicator to track how many projects achieve the minimum rating of 3 to be considered gender-responsive on all 12 GAM indicators. Peer review also highlighted that the GAM aims to measure the improvement of projects from one year to another, suggesting that another useful indicator could be to look at the percentage of projects that have improved. This suggestion was not included because the WHS commitments are looking at improvements across the sector as a whole, which can be measured by comparing the originally proposed indicator results over a few years.
**Indicator 3D.7** Percentage of humanitarian funding going to gender-based and sexual violence prevention and response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D.7</td>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of humanitarian funding going to GBSV prevention and response</td>
<td>IIb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: (FTS)</th>
<th>Total humanitarian spend (FTS only)</th>
<th>Total allocated to GBSV prevention (FTS)</th>
<th>% GBSV to total humanitarian spend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>20.1 billion</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>0.0096%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>22.9 billion</td>
<td>6.0 million</td>
<td>0.0262%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>20.6 billion</td>
<td>11.2 million</td>
<td>0.0546%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures from 2015 to 2017 show slight improvements, with a rise in funding to GBSV prevention rising at a slightly faster pace than the rise in total humanitarian spend. However, the overall percentage of GBSV within the broader humanitarian spend remains very small – at 0.05% in 2017. This is all the more surprising given the rise of conflict-driven crises, which tend to be accompanied by heightened sexual violence.

**Method and limitations**

GBSV is a designated sector in OCHA’s FTS, which makes it possible to track all projects listed as addressing GBSV needs within the FTS (although it provides only a partial picture of all humanitarian action). However, to assess progress, ALNAP had to pull the figures directly from FTS, as there is no actor currently collating and analysing this data annually. Soon, with the introduction of the GAM to the FTS in 2019, organisations using the system will need to report on GAM indicator ‘E: Protection from GBV’, which could also be included as a source here. For now, this is technically outside the scope of the WHS markers project, which aimed to collect and report only the data that is already being collated and produced annually by other organisations. As such, we have ranked this indicator as Tier IIb.
Indicator 3D.8 Percentage of women and girl aid recipients who report that humanitarian aid is relevant to their needs; of good quality; timely; of sufficient quantity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D.8</td>
<td>% of women and girl aid recipients who report that humanitarian aid is relevant to their needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IIb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
Data exists, but not all of it is currently disaggregated according to gender; nor is all of it reported annually.

Method and limitations
Since the first major survey of crisis-affected people was carried out for the 2012 SOHS report, surveys of affected populations have become more common and are increasingly used by aid agencies to understand their performance. Such surveys could feasibly be used to track what percentage of women and girls report satisfaction with the relevance, quality, timeliness and quantity of support they receive, with relevance being potentially the most important factor. The SOHS report provides figures on aid recipient satisfaction; the 2018 edition will, for the first time, publish these figures in a disaggregated format based on gender.

Ground Truth Solutions also regularly carries out surveys of crisis-affected people, including on an annual basis to support Grand Bargain monitoring. However, none of this data is currently disaggregated by gender. Disaggregating survey data by gender is fairly straightforward and therefore it could be possible to achieve a regular annual review of what women and girls think of the aid they receive. However, there is no current noted plan by any actor to do this. In 2018, Ground Truth is launching its Human Voice Index, a compilation of all data it has collected across multiple projects and contexts. If disaggregated according to gender, this could potentially serve as a more regular review of the satisfaction levels of women and girls in humanitarian assistance.

The GAM indicators ‘J: Benefits’ and ‘K: Satisfaction’ could be used to triangulate this indicator, but the data is self-reported by organisations at the project level and therefore cannot be disaggregated to the individual level to match the unit of measurement for this indicator.
Indicator 3D.9 Mortality and morbidity rates of women/girls compared to men/boys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D.9</td>
<td>Mortality and morbidity rates of women/girls compared to men/boys</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress, as there is no actor currently collating and analysing this data on an annual basis.

Method and limitations
As mentioned under 3A.10, no actor is currently reporting annual mortality and morbidity statistics for humanitarian crises, although the data exists for natural hazard-related disasters on EM-DAT. Ideally, this data could be disaggregated by gender and used to understand if there are differential health outcomes for women and girls in comparison to men and boys, similar to the analysis carried out by CRED researchers on comparative excess mortality rates for IDPs and non-IDPs in 2015.

If this were done, a critical clarification would be needed on whether to track the mortality and morbidity rates of women and girls on its own, or to compare this to similar rates for men and boys. If a comparative approach is taken, then this would need to take account of the cause of death—e.g. a greater number of men may die in crisis due to violence or conflict, while experiencing the same rates of mortality as women on particular diseases. Peer reviewers emphasised that this indicator would need further refinement and clarification on cause of death in order to be useful.
Indicator 3D.10 Percentage of population covered by sexual and reproductive health and rights services in countries receiving humanitarian assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.10</td>
<td>% of crisis-affected populations covered by sexual and reproductive health and rights services in countries receiving humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress, as there is no actor currently collating and analysing this data on an annual basis.

Method and limitations
Until recently, sexual and reproductive health services (SRHS) were overlooked by many humanitarian agencies as an element of humanitarian response (Robinson and Obrecht, 2015; WHO, 2016). SRHS is not listed as a sector, nor is it used as a marker in the HRPs or in the FTS. While some statistics on SRH coverage in humanitarian settings would be feasible with better reporting, at present it is not possible to assess this on an annual basis and there is no organisation attempting to do so. In the development sector, access to sexual and reproductive healthcare (SRHC) has been an indicator used to track the Millennium Development Goals and now SDGs. Two major sources for data on access to SRHC are UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) – large population surveys that are carried out periodically rather than annually and do not have consistent data sets for all countries in which humanitarian actors operate. For example, the MICS is currently being developed for the first time for South Sudan; other countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan have had multiple rounds of the survey carried out every five to six years. These can be used to track long-term trends on access to reproductive care, but tend to focus on national health services and are not finely tuned enough to offer a regular review of whether humanitarian agencies have increased access to SRHC for women and girls in crisis.
Indicators 3D.11 and 3D.12 For all countries receiving humanitarian assistance, proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the previous 12 months; For all women and girls receiving humanitarian assistance, proportion of these aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by an intimate partner in the previous 12 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D.11</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>UNSTATS; OECD; GAM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D.12</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>UNSTATS; OECD; GAM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress; however, this is a planned indicator for SDG 5 and data is expected.

Method and limitations
There are several data sets that track different indicators relating to violence against women. Primarily, these focus on tracking women's attitudes to violence (whether it is seen as appropriate) or tracking incidents of violence perpetrated specifically by an intimate partner. SDG 5 sets out the following target and indicators:

**Target:** Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation

**Indicators:**

5.2.1 Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence and by age.

5.2.2 Proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by age and place of occurrence.
While domestic violence also exists amongst crisis-affected communities, another critical measure for gender-based violence in humanitarian settings is violence perpetrated by non-intimate partners. Data is available for SDG indicator 5.2.1 through the OECD and other sites. However, we propose waiting until data for 5.2.2 is available and using both indicators for all sub-populations of women and girls who also report being humanitarian aid recipients or who reside in sub-national areas covered by humanitarian response. It was noted during peer review process data collection for these two indicators will be difficult to collect and verify. Moreover, the age limitation of both indicators to populations aged 15 years and older runs the risk of undermining the exposure of violence against girls as well.

**Endnotes**

1. As noted in the first-year synthesis report for the WHS commitments, many of the activities reported in 2017 related to processes or initiatives that predated the WHS. Most actions pertain to operational, policy, training and advocacy, with 9%-36% referring to financial contributions, depending on the sub-theme (see OCHA 2016b: 48).

2. Based on the information obtained from partners and using additional contextual evidence and secondary documentation, IDMC and its data collection partners will make a subjective assessment of the severity of displacement across different caseloads of IDPs.
Core Responsibility 4: Working differently to end need

Transformations within Core Responsibility 4

4A Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems
4B Anticipate, do not wait, for crises

Background

Understanding the transformations

The fourth Core Responsibility of the Agenda for Humanity seeks to shift from ‘delivering aid’ to more sustainable approaches to addressing humanitarian needs. It covers the reinforcement of local aid systems, improving preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR) and transcending barriers within the international aid system (the development–peacebuilding–humanitarian ‘nexus’). This Core Responsibility received the highest number of commitments at the WHS and has had the clearest influence in policy since; while the nexus later received significant attention, at the Summit it was 4A (focusing on the role of national and local actors in humanitarian response) and 4B (better crisis prevention and risk mitigation) that received the most support.

Enhancing the power and role of local and national actors in humanitarian response was a major theme of the entire Summit, commanding significant high-level attention and attracting the most concrete commitments. The Grand Bargain, a specialised agreement amongst a sub-set of donors, UN agencies, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and the IFRC, included several commitments to support the role of local and national responders. The Charter for Change (C4C), an agreement between national and international NGOs to support more locally led humanitarian action, set out a range of commitments to improving INGO–national-NGO partnerships and supporting leadership roles for national actors within humanitarian coordination and decision-making structures.

In support of Transformation 4B, the Annex to the Report of the Secretary General for the World Humanitarian Summit calls for increased ‘financial and human resources for collecting data and monitoring and analysing risk before, during and after crises’, for consolidated and openly shared data to ‘inform joint analysis and a common picture [...] risks’, and for the establishment of national and local risk management strategies (OCHA, 2016a). Many of the commitments under 4B refer to ongoing support and implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which had been agreed a year prior.
TRANSFORMATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformations addressed in this chapter</th>
<th>Number of commitments made that aligned with this</th>
<th>Reports submitted in 2017 on progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformation 4A Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation 4B Anticipate, do not wait, for crises</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (OCHA, 2016: 13)

There is a steep climb to monitor progress on 4A, but good investments in data and tracking are being made

While many actors have embraced the language of local empowerment in humanitarian action, ‘debates around how this needs to happen in different contexts and the lack of shared definitions have slowed progress to embed this norm within programmes, financing arrangements, decision-making structures and the international delivery footprint’ (OCHA, 2017: 63).

Many of the most concrete and specific commitments made under 4A were financial: Grand Bargain signatories committed to a global, aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders as directly as possible by 2020 while the signatories to the C4C set a financial target of 20% of each INGO’s humanitarian funding to go directly to national NGOs.

There is wide recognition that actions need to go beyond financial support to local and national actors, to achieve better power sharing and truly locally led humanitarian response. Yet there remains a fundamental lack of clarity on what exactly this looks like and on what are the desired outcomes of empowerment to local actors. Efforts to define and monitor progress on locally led humanitarian action over the past two years have predominantly focused on agreeing definitions and monitoring inputs: ‘Existing initiatives are focused on reporting activities of international actors without a method of measuring progress across the humanitarian sector in a particular context’ (HAG, 2018: 7). In the second annual progress report for the Grand Bargain, the authors note that, despite having agreed basic definitions of ‘local organisation’ and ‘as direct as possible,’ for Grand Bargain signatories ‘the desired end goal of “localisation” is unclear’ (Metcalfe-Hough and Poole, 2018: 34).

One of the areas that is most difficult to define and measure is ‘humanitarian capacity’. Until recently, many humanitarian actors have lacked a consistent and robust method for assessing capacity strengthening and therefore have little evidence on the most effective approaches to achieving an enhanced national capacity for humanitarian response.
For some, capacity is a matter of being able to comply with financing and donor requirements, while for others it is about the ability to respond in the most relevant and appropriate way. Capacity-building programmes have typically been based on what humanitarian actors think to be key skills and competencies, rather than based on evidence linking certain competencies to humanitarian performance criteria, such as greater effectiveness and timeliness or higher number of lives saved (Disaster Resilience Group, 2014). Moreover, peer review highlighted that the language of ‘capacity strengthening’ in itself implies a power relationship of one actor (international) helping the other (local), rather than offering capacity-sharing opportunities to equal partners in a shared endeavour. The lack of a more outcome-oriented approach to humanitarian capacity has been a real gap in the sector and has allowed personal perspectives and interests to dominate what should be an objective and measured approach to assessing whether certain actors have the competencies to respond to a disaster.

That said, a few initiatives are working on monitoring and measuring progress in this area. Although not yet sector-wide, these frameworks could provide proxy measurements until a more comprehensive source is identified or could test indicators that might over time serve as drivers for change across the sector. Over the course of 2017, the Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG) worked with the Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisation (PIANGO) to develop a set of indicators to inform a monitoring framework for localisation in the Pacific region (HAG 2018; PIANGO and HAG, 2018). The Network for Aid Response (NEAR, 2018) a civil society movement from the global south, has undertaken several activities to measure localisation. These include an Organisational Capacity Assessment for local organisations, modelled on a similar assessment framework used by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and a Localisation Performance Measurement Framework, drawing from the HAG indicators and validated by various stakeholders including local and national actors, INGOs, donors and researchers. The NEAR Localisation Performance Measurement framework will be released in January 2019 and several of its indicators have been incorporated here based on an advance copy provided to ALNAP during the peer review process. The C4C has been reviewing annually the progress of its members using self-reported assessments of compliance with each of the C4C commitments (C4C, 2018; 2017).

As highlighted in a recent review of indicators for measuring localisation by the HAG, indicators can fall within three main categories along the ‘results chain’ of locally led humanitarian action (HAG 2018).
Inputs/activities that support locally led humanitarian action to happen

Characteristics of locally-led humanitarian action

Outcomes/impacts of locally-led humanitarian action

Current reporting focuses primarily on the first category—and, some peer reviewers noted, tracking activities is relevant for this Transformation, as it is meant to reflect a change in practices by international actors (shifting from ‘replacing’ to ‘reinforcing’). The HAG suggests a range of indicators that would be useful for assessing the third category, in particular on how locally led humanitarian action leads to gains in effectiveness and efficiency.

For the purposes of this report, ALNAP has focused on indicators relevant to the second category: the characteristics of locally led humanitarian action itself. In doing so, we also draw on the work of ECHO’s INFORM Index, the IASC, the HAG, NEAR, C4C and the Humanitarian Leadership Academy, although most of the indicators proposed are not yet being used in any routine and global monitoring process.

Overall, peer reviewers raised several concerns and caveats about the value and feasibility of having global indicators to track local capacities, given the inherent context-specific (and often political) nature of crises and the ways governments and other local actors should respond. Two particularly salient challenges were noted, the first being the trade-offs between relevance and cross-country comparability. Several peer reviewers felt that measuring localisation is a highly contextualised process and that indicators that work for certain contexts would not be relevant to others. ALNAP originally proposed building on the IFRC’s Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification (OCAC) framework used to assess the response capacities of the Red Cross Movement National Societies, in order to reach a set of common indicators of local capacity for humanitarian response to apply across all countries. The peer review process highlighted, however, that these assessments could be contentious and those reviewers with awareness of the OCAC felt that rather than highlighting the potential for a common framework, the process demonstrated the significant challenges and limitations in trying to apply the same framework to very different countries. And yet, the greater the contextualisation of indicators, the harder it is to compare across countries. This will be a persistent challenge to achieving any meaningful comparison of localisation efforts across different countries in the coming years.
The second challenge raised by peer reviewers relates to the variation of ‘capacity’, even within a single context, depending on the type of crisis. Governments and local actors may be well resourced and capacitated for particular crisis risks – e.g. floods – and poorly for others – e.g. conflict or pandemics. This means that indicators to measure capacity or other aspects of locally led humanitarian response may need to be disaggregated based on type of crisis driver or risk, which poses further complications for regular monitoring. Sendai monitoring will help track WHS progress, but not perfectly.

The measurement of indicators related to Transformation 4B is made easier by the overlap with the inter-governmentally agreed Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction – but is not perfect. The Sendai Framework (‘Sendai’ hereafter) has a series of accompanying indicators that could be relevant to monitor the WHS commitments, in particular:

- **Global target E:** Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.
- **Global target F:** Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030.
- **Global target G:** Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.

Sendai’s indicators were conceived closely with those of the SDGs. Within the wider framework, there are overlaps with SDGs 1, 11 and 13 (although indicators within global targets F and G are not linked to these) (Prevention Web, n.d.a). Additionally, UNISDR is working with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and UN Habitat to explore using Sendai indicators to monitor the progress of the Paris Agreement and the New Urban Agenda (UNISDR, 2017b). No similar relationship involving the WHS appears to exist.

ALNAP suggests using these Sendai indicators to measure progress against Transformation 4B. The long-term maintenance of these indicators is assured due to their inclusion in Sendai and they have wide support, having been developed by an intergovernmental expert working group (Prevention Web, n.d.b), comprising experts nominated by States and supported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR).

While baseline data for 2015 and 2016 will be available in the future, it does not currently exist, as measurement for the indicators is only recently underway. The Sendai reporting function only became available from January 2018 (UNISDR, n.d.b) and the first report is expected to be available in 2019. This first report will cover trends in implementation between 2015 and 2016, and 2017 and 2018, making it ideal for assessing WHS progress.
However, there are significant caveats to this approach. First are issues pertaining to the quality and coverage of the data collected for Sendai. In UNISDRs review of Member States’ readiness to monitor progress on Sendai (UNISDR, 2017a), global targets F and G – the most relevant to humanitarian preparedness – are given a low ranking of having ‘wide variations’ in data availability. Global target F was found to have the lowest data availability of all the targets (only around 20%–25% countries state that data is available).

The report also found that, in some cases, while data may be available, government entities might be ‘charged a premium to receive (official) statistical data’ (UNISDR, 2017a) and data sharing between government institutions (and internationally) can be ‘challenging’ or even non-existent. There are also significant caveats regarding the data collection capacity of national statistics offices, who are relied on as the primary data collectors for Sendai monitoring (SDSN, 2017) This presents a clear barrier to transparent global monitoring of Sendai and, by association, any efforts to track progress against the Agenda for Humanity.

A further limitation, raised by peer reviewers, is that the Sendai indicators do not directly attempt to measure anticipatory capacity itself; for this, different indicators and sources of data would be necessary. One potential source could be the data collected through the Global Network for Disaster Risk Reduction’s (GNDRR) Views from the Frontline report, a regular global survey of the quality of participation of local and national actors in resilience processes. ALNAP was unable to explore the potential for these indicators in detail for the final revision of this study, but looking at composite indicators for resilience and other indicators to track anticipatory capacity should be priorities for further work in this area.

Looking ahead, the 2018–2020 Action Plan coming out of the July 2018 Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction lists a range of actions to ‘strengthen and sustain’ the ‘data ecosystem’ required for Sendai. These actions include increasing data collection and establishing baselines and strengthening linkages between Sendai monitoring and respective national statistical counterparts (UNISDR – Regional Office for Asia and Pacific, 2018). The Action Plan also states that it is UNISDR’s responsibility to ‘strengthen national disaster loss databases in the region, and provide technical support to countries to ensure collection of required data to report on the Sendai Framework’ (UNISDR – Regional Office for Asia and Pacific, 2018: section 4.4). Albeit an important initiative and indication of political will, achieving this will require increased funds for data collection and technical support, further coherence between data collection approaches and clear roles and responsibilities for local authorities to feasibly be able to collect all this data.
### Core Responsibility 4: indicators with rankings – at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Potential/Actual source</th>
<th>Positive or negative progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4A Reinforce, do not replace, national and local systems</td>
<td>4A.1. % of host country-based actors (government and non-government) implementing contextualised humanitarian standards, tools and policies</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>NEAR; Humanitarian Advisory Group; HQAI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.2. Strength of national and local non-governmental capacity to respond to emergency</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.3. Strength of national and sub-national governmental capacity to respond to emergency</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.4. # of countries leading the development of Humanitarian Response Plans</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.5. # of countries requiring Humanitarian Response Plans</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>UNOCHA HNOs</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.6. # of coordination mechanisms led by national and local actors (government or non-governmental)</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.7. % of seats for national and local actors in the HCTs or other relevant national humanitarian leadership forums</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.8. # of coordination mechanisms and associated documentation held and written in the local language</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4A.9. # of local &amp; national NGOs report being engaged in humanitarian policy processes, standard setting and compliance mechanisms</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B Anticipate, do not wait, for crises</td>
<td>4B.1. # of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai Indicators</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4B.2. # of countries with an adequate % of disaster risk population covered by pre-emptive evacuation</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai Indicators</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4B.3. % of global disaster risk population covered by pre-emptive evacuation</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai Indicators</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4B.4. Total official international support for national DRR actions</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai Indicators</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment and discussion

Indicator 4A.1 Percentage of host country-based actors (governmental or non-governmental) implementing contextualised humanitarian standards, tools and policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>4A.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>4A.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations

Commonly agreed standards and tools can provide a shared basis for assessing capacity in humanitarian actors. They can also recognise that capacity will vary from context to context: the 2018 Sphere Handbook edition and the Core Humanitarian Standards have been contextualised and made more adaptable for use in different settings, in the recognition that the application of these shared principles and standards will need to look different based on sociocultural factors, crisis types, vulnerability profiles and other factors. In their work, the HAG proposes an indicator to track the spread of contextualised tools and standards, as well as the translation of key documents, which can be used as a proxy for capacity. Ensuring localised involvement in and support to the development of these standards is also important.

Peer review highlighted that it was equally important to understand whether standards were being applied consistently. We therefore updated this indicator to focus on implementation of contextualised standards. The Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative (HQAI) or similar verification approach could provide independent quality assurance in this regard.

While no actors are currently using this indicator to monitor progress at a global level, future work by the HAG-PIANGO collaboration in the Pacific and by the NEAR Network could support global monitoring. The Localisation Performance Measurement Framework developed by the NEAR Network include two indicators under ‘Capacity’ on quality standards:

3.3. Quality standards.

- Contextualised humanitarian standards, tools and policies are available in relevant local languages
- Programme and technical staff of L/NA have a sound understanding of humanitarian principles and contextualised quality standards' (NEAR, 2019)
Indicator 4A.2  Strength of national and local non-governmental capacity to respond to emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.2</td>
<td>Strength of national and local non-governmental capacity to respond to emergency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations
Funding for capacity strengthening is covered in the next section under indicator 5A.3. Tracking funding for capacity strengthening offers a perspective on the degree to which international humanitarian actors and donors are investing in the future response capabilities of national and local actors. Ideally, though, we might develop an indicator to understand the success of these investments by tracking capacity itself.

This is an area that needs much more considered thinking, which was highlighted by dynamic discussion during the peer review process. In some circles, capacity strengthening refers to the compliance capacity of local and national actors, such as following procurement processes or donor reporting requirements. For other actors, capacity refers to technical capacity to deliver emergency assistance, or to organisational capacities such as HR management and accounting.

The WHS first-year progress report highlights the need for a shared understanding amongst internationals and national/local actors on where best to focus capacity strengthening efforts for non-governmental actors. The draft report considered IFRC’s capacity assessment framework for Red Cross/Crescent National Societies as a potential source for building a global capacity assessment framework. The Organizational Capacity Assessment and Certification (OCAC) is a broad framework of indicators used to assess the capacity for disaster preparedness and response of National Societies. However, peer review suggested it would not be appropriate to adapt this tool more broadly for NGOs across different contexts and raised questions about the feasibility of a measure of local capacity that works globally and is also meaningful.

Instead, NEAR’s Organisation Capacity Assessment tool or Localisation Performance Measurement Framework and Oxfam’s Humanitarian Country Capacity Assessment framework could provide useful ideas for relevant indicators in the future. The Localisation Performance Measurement Framework assess localisation in six areas: partnerships; funding; capacity; coordination and complementarity; policy, influence and visibility; and participation. Several of these indicators have been incorporated to this text under Transformations 4A.1 and 4A.5–4A.9.
**Indicators 4A.3-4A.5** Strength of national and sub-national governmental capacity to respond to emergency; Number of countries that lead the development of HRPs; Number of countries requiring HRPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.3</td>
<td>Strength of national and sub-national governmental capacity to respond to emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.4</td>
<td># countries that lead the development of HRPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.5</td>
<td># countries requiring HRPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress for 4A.3 and 4A.4 at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

The number of countries worldwide requiring HRPs has dropped steadily, from 37 in 2015 to 26 in 2017. In some countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, this is due to a shift from HRPs to a more nationally owned and led framework for emergency response, in which international actors play a supporting role.

**Method and limitations**

Similar to national and local NGOs, there is a lack of understanding of how much financial support is provided to governments for disaster management capacity and no shared, consistent, measurement of the strength of government capacity for disaster response.

The closest measure is the national coping capacity indicator produced by DG-ECHO’s INFORM index. The INFORM index is a useful resource that attempts to track country-level indicators on an annual basis in order to identify countries at greatest risk of a disaster requiring humanitarian support. One of its measures is ‘Lack of Coping Capacity’, which is meant to track the institutional and infrastructural capacities of each country worldwide to cope with a disaster (see Figure 7).

While substantial thought and work has been put into this measure, it is not clear that it would be a useful marker of progress in enhancing national government capacity to respond to emergencies.
The inputs for the INFORM coping capacity indicator do not seem to include assessments of the emergency response systems within a country, such as police, fire and ambulance services (de Groeve et al., 2015). Instead, the indicator relies on the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index as one of its inputs. This index already includes measures for physical infrastructure and communication and therefore slightly duplicates the INFORM’s other input sources, potentially giving too much weight to these infrastructural factors over others.

More significantly, the rankings on the Government Effectiveness Index expose how the absence of any measure of emergency response capacity makes these measures less relevant for humanitarian purposes. While the bottom quarter of the Index features countries well-known to humanitarian actors, the middle quadrants produce some surprises: Puerto Rico nudges out China by one spot, even though the former required significant international support in 2017 and the latter has not requested international support for a crisis for decades. Similarly, countries like Ukraine or Lebanon rank higher on the coping capacity list than several countries where there has been a much lower need for international humanitarian support (World Bank, n.d.). Therefore, the Government Effectiveness Index may need some adaptations if it is to be used as a relevant measure for assessing and tracking changes in government capacities to respond adequately on their own to shocks.

Another way of assessing state capacity for response is to monitor the existence and support to National Disaster Management Authorities (NDMAs), one of the areas monitored under the Hyogo Framework for DRR. This addition was suggested in peer review, but requires further investigation into reliable sources, and therefore no recommended indicator could be identified at this time.

A final potential proxy for understanding state capacity for leading a response to a humanitarian crisis within its own borders is to track the number of HRP s and/or the role of national governments in the development of such plans. While governments can be engaged in the development of HRP s, these are typically UN-driven and internationally owned plans for emergency response. Several countries that have taken greater control and leadership in their country’s crisis response – such as Ethiopia and Kenya – have moved away from an HRP to establishing their own country response plans.
To monitor state response capacity, one could refer to the number of HRPs annually, on the assumption that, as national governments exercise greater leadership in crisis response, HRPs would be set aside in favour of a state-run planning process. This is the indicator suggested for 4A.5.

Peer reviewers suggested looking at the indicator from the national or local perspective rather than from an international perspective, by focusing on leadership within the HRP process rather than only the total numbers of HRPs. ALNAP has added this new indicator as 4A.4.
**Indicators 4A.6-4A.8** Number of coordination mechanisms led by host country-based actors (governmental or non-governmental); Percentage of seats for national and local actors in the humanitarian country teams or other relevant national humanitarian leadership forums; Number of coordination mechanisms with associated documentation held and written in the local language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4A.6</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.7</td>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.8</td>
<td>NEAR; OCHA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

**Method and limitations**
Research on coordination mechanisms by ALNAP has indicated that ‘Existing country-level coordination systems are not good at facilitating the inclusion of national civil society actors’ (Knox Clarke and Campbell, 2017: 6), due to a variety of reasons, including language barriers, lack of resource/time, lack of knowledge in how to engage, and lack of formal opportunities to engage. Coordination structures represent the most formal type of ‘governance’ structure for humanitarian action at the country level and therefore they offer a good proxy for understanding the power that local and national actors have in humanitarian decision-making. The Humanitarian Advisory Group recommend an indicator on leadership in coordination mechanisms as a way of tracking the decision-making power that local and national actors can exercise, and while there is no routine approach to monitoring this trend, the indicator could feasibly be tracked quite easily drawing on OCHA statistics. The 2018 Grand Bargain Progress Report states that there has been an increase in the participation of local and national actors in international coordination mechanisms, however it does not provide any figures for this, nor a citation (Metcalfe-Hough and Poole, 2018).
The peer review process highlighted that it can be difficult to determine the definition of ‘leadership’ within coordination mechanisms, apart from the specific role of the humanitarian coordinator. Although humanitarian country teams (HCTs) are not in every crisis and this approach risks starting from an international perspective of what is considered a coordination mechanism, it was suggested that the indicator could be improved by focusing on the number or percentage composition of national and local actors within the HCTs or other relevant national humanitarian leadership forums. ALNAP has modified this indicator to match the language of one of the coordination indicators being tracked in the NEAR Network Localisation Performance Measurement Framework.

Holding coordination meetings in the relevant local language was raised during peer review as critical to understanding the degree to which national and local actors can participate meaningfully. This indicator is also included in the NEAR Network Localisation Performance Measurement Framework.
Indicator 4A.9  Number of local and national NGOs report being engaged in humanitarian policy processes, standard setting and compliance mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A.9</td>
<td># of local and national NGOs report being engaged in humanitarian policy processes, standard setting and compliance mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations

The peer review process led to the recommendation that ALNAP include an indicator to track the policy influence of local and national actors on humanitarian issues. Accurately assessing policy influence, particularly using a quantitative indicator, is challenging. Policy influence is one of the six main areas covered in NEAR Network’s framework already mentioned. However, very few of the indicators lend themselves to quantitative measurement; the only quantitative indicator is ‘Number of local and national actors that participate in the preparation of the HNO and HRP’. C4C is also looking at issues related to policy influence, by tracking how well its INGO members credit their local and national NGO partners in donor reports and public communications.

Based on these efforts, ALNAP has suggested a quantitative indicator based on the number of local and national NGOs reporting that they are engaged in humanitarian policy processes, compliance mechanisms and standard setting. This is imperfect and a quantitative scoring based on the NEAR Network’s framework may be a more viable alternative in the future.
Indicator 4B.1  Number of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4B.1 # of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai global indicator G-1 (compound of G-2–G-5)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly. However, methodologies are currently under development as this is a Sendai indicator.

**Method and limitations**

The data source for this indicator is Sendai indicator G-1, a compound of Sendai indicators G-2–G-5:

- **G-2**: Number of countries that have multi-hazard monitoring and forecasting systems.
- **G-3**: Number of people per 100,000 that are covered by early warning information through local governments or through national dissemination mechanisms.
- **G-4**: Percentage of local governments having a plan to act on early warnings.
- **G-5**: Number of countries that have accessible, understandable, usable and relevant disaster risk information and assessment available to the people at the national and local levels.

In the Sendai data readiness review, consistently less than half of the reporting countries provided readiness information in this area. For those that did, the overwhelming majority cited finance, capacity and technology transfers as the resources required to collect the data. For indicators G-2 and G-3, less than a quarter of the reporting countries reported having data available to construct a baseline up to 2015. The current data availability for these two indicators is more positive, however, with 62% of the reporting countries stating that it is available. For indicator G-4, only 41% of reporting countries reported having this data available, while for indicator G-5 a stronger 72% said this was available (UNISDR, 2017a). The peer review process also highlighted that even with systems in place, political challenges and/or lack of access to required finances can always hinder implementation or use of such systems.
Indicator 4B.2 Number of countries with an ‘adequate’ percentage of disaster risk population covered by pre-emptive evacuation; percentage of the global disaster risk population covered by pre-emptive evacuation

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly. However, methodologies are currently under development as this is a Sendai indicator.

**Method and limitations**

The data source for these indicators are Sendai indicator G-6: percentage of population exposed to or at risk from disasters protected through pre-emptive evacuation following early warning. If, as anticipated, this is reported at the country level, we would assess this data and compile a list of countries that meet the ‘adequate’ threshold for protecting their disaster risk population. At this stage in the process we have not stipulated the ‘adequate percentage’, as this would need to be agreed in discussion with thematic experts. The peer review process highlighted that it would be difficult to define these in a meaningful way given the implicit country-specific nature. If reported as a national percentage, this data would be aggregated to give a picture of global disaster risk population coverage. By using both indicators, it is possible to better understand whether large countries are skewing the global percentage.

In the data readiness review, slightly over a quarter (26%) of the reporting countries stated that this data was available (UNISDR, 2017a). Most countries cited that additional financial resources would be required to collect this data, and both capacity and technology transfer were also mentioned by many.

The peer review process emphasised that ideally WHS indicators 4B.2 and 4B.3 would be disaggregated by those most vulnerable, as in many countries early warning systems do cover large numbers of people but these are often the most financial or physically able to cope with the crisis.
Indicator 4B.4 Total official international support for national disaster risk reduction actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4B.4</td>
<td>Proportion of total official international support for national DRR actions to total ODA</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Sendai global indicator F-6; Development Initiatives</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly. However, methodologies are currently under development as this is a Sendai indicator.

**Method and limitations**

Sendai indicator F-6 proposes to track ‘Total official international support, (official development assistance (ODA) plus other official flows), for national disaster risk reduction actions.’ Peer reviewers suggested that this indicator would be more meaningful if the amount of ODA is presented as a proportion of the total financing available. To do so, more robust and comprehensive data would need to be available. In its Global Humanitarian Assistance report, Development Initiatives noted that obtaining comprehensive data on spending towards DRR and disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP) is not possible, given current reporting methods: ‘In DAC-reported official development assistance (ODA), DPP is included as a sector under humanitarian assistance. As such, it does not capture additional investments in risk reduction delivered through other reported development assistance and so represents only one component of the total international effort. It also does not capture DRR and DPP spending that may be mainstreamed in other types of projects.’ (Development Initiatives, 2016: 56).

The summary of the Sendai data readiness report cites ‘critical gaps’ in the indicators for global target F. Of all reporting countries, 38% stated that the data for F-1 was available and only 24% reported having data sufficient to construct a baseline to 2015 (UNISDR, 2017a).
Core Responsibility 5: Invest in humanity

Transformations within Core Responsibility 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>Invest in local capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5E</td>
<td>Increase humanitarian resources, including from a more diverse range of actors, and improve transparency and cost-efficiency of humanitarian financing and response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background

Understanding the transformation

Financing received significant attention in the lead up to the WHS, in large part due to the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, which released its final report months prior to the Summit and formed the basis for the Grand Bargain, an agreement that addresses some themes of the Agenda for Humanity, but also other issues not fully addressed at the Summit.

The two transformations within this Core Responsibility that received the highest number of aligned commitments both had to do with diversification: 5A is focused on diversifying who receives humanitarian funding, seeking to increase the volume and directness of funding to national and local humanitarian responders and reducing the ‘layers’ through which these funds typically travel. Meanwhile, 5E is concerned with diversifying the supply side of humanitarian financing, expanding both the number and type of actor that funds international humanitarian assistance, particularly within the private sector. 5E also aims to address the lack of transparency in how humanitarian financing is reported and improve the overall cost-efficiency of humanitarian financing mechanisms.

Transformation 5A – invest in local capacities – focuses specifically on the financing side of the localisation issues discussed above under Core Responsibility 4. Because the focus here is on financing, indicators for 5A are at the input/activity level rather than pitched at the outcome level.

TRANSFORMATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformations addressed in this chapter</th>
<th>Number of commitments made that aligned with this</th>
<th>Reports on progress submitted in 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A Invest in local capacities</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5E Diversify the resource base, and improve transparency and cost-efficiency of humanitarian financing and response</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (OCHA, 2016: 13)
The ambitions of humanitarian finance reform expose the cracks in current data and monitoring systems

Several ambitious commitments related to humanitarian finance reform were made at the WHS in May 2016, and there has been high interest in tracking whether these commitments are being met. This attention has further highlighted the existing gaps in tracking humanitarian funds that prevent the sector from achieving a full understanding of cost-efficiencies and funding flows.

Tracking financial flows to local and national actors

Since the WHS, considerable energy has been put into setting baselines and monitoring performance for Transformation 5A.

Commissioned research led to baseline studies for certain countries, including a baseline of 13.7% funding to local and national actors in Somalia in 2017 (Majid et al., 2018) and baselines of 39% funding to local and national actors in Bangladesh and 12% in Uganda in 2015 (Parrish and Kattakuzhy, 2018).

Progress on getting global measures of direct funding to local and national actors has been slow but steady. In connection to the Grand Bargain workstream on localisation, the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team (HFTT) formed the Localisation Marker Working Group (LMWG) in mid-2016 to develop a ‘localisation’ marker to improve tracking of funds to national and local actors. The process took just over a year and was challenged by a lack of consensus on what measures would best reflect the spirit of the commitments made by the Grand Bargain signatories and others at the WHS to better support locally led humanitarian action. Specifically, debate centred around three core concepts in the marker:

1. What counts as a ‘local’ or ‘national’ actor
2. Defining ‘direct’ funding
3. Whether in-kind contributions could be counted towards the 25% target in the Grand Bargain agreement

At the close of 2017, the working group reached consensus on definitions of local and national actors and agreed a compromise on what counts as ‘direct’ funding – that is, whether a donor providing funding to national NGOs via an international NGO or a pooled fund counts as direct or indirect. (see Box 1). No agreement was reached as to whether to include in-kind contributions as part of the 25%. It was also decided to forgo a localisation marker.

As part of its work, the LMWG commissioned a form to support consistent and comparable tracking of funding going to national and local actors, using the agreed definitions of national and local actors. The IASC HFTT and Grand Bargain signatories have subsequently endorsed this form as the basis for categorising the funding flows (Grand Bargain/IASC, 2017). The use of this form, as well as the changes to the FTS tracking system, are expected by several peer reviewers to greatly improve the accuracy of data on funding flows to local and national actors, at least within the formal international system.
Outside of the IASC and Grand Bargain negotiations, INGOs have had their own conversations about how to define and track direct transfer of funds to local and national civil society organisations (CSOs). Through the C4C process, signatories are supported to improve the transparency of their funding flows to local and national NGOs in order to support better tracking. While C4C members are a sub-section of INGOs, their reported data – considered by peer reviewers to be robust – could serve as a case study for the wider system (albeit not a representative one, as their results are likely to skew much more positively than other INGOs that are not actively involved in reform processes around localisation).

**Seeking greater diversity and cost-efficiency**

The Grand Bargain agreement aims to reach $1 billion savings by 2020 through greater cost efficiencies achieved through its 10 workstreams, which include commitments to reduce donor reporting, to improve the accuracy of needs assessments and to provide more direct funding to frontline responders.

Thus far, the Grand Bargain reporting process has not produced a baseline measure against which the $1 billion figure will be achieved, nor is there a methodology for relevant cost-efficiency measures that would enable signatories to monitor progress on this ambition. Part of the challenge lies in the use of self-reported data from Grand Bargain members, which focuses primarily on implementation rather than outcomes or cost-effectiveness figures. But many of the root causes for this gap lie in well-known problems with how humanitarian financial data is categorised and reported, which limits the ability to assign costs to outputs or outcomes (Baker et al., 2013; Willitts-King, 2007; Stoddard et al., 2017; IRC, 2016; de Geoffroy et al., 2015; Obrecht, 2017).

Except for one-off studies and evaluations (Stoddard et al., 2017; ICVA, 2016; Mowjee and Poole, 2014), there is no routine, comparable analysis available on the efficiencies of different funding channels, on time spent on donor reporting, or on costs per programming outcome (e.g. cost per life saved). It may therefore be the case that the most important issue for improving humanitarian performance in relation to Transformation 5E is the call for greater data transparency. Without this, the added ambitions of diversification and greater cost-effectiveness will be impossible to monitor.

The Grand Bargain appears to have occupied most of the attention and energy around humanitarian financing since the WHS. Yet significantly more effort is required by both those working within and outside the Grand Bargain agreement to improve how cost efficiencies in the humanitarian system are measured and monitored. This may include heeding recommendations for a common set of metrics to assess efficiency (Stoddard et al., 2017) or learning from the application of new cost-efficiency methodologies in humanitarian contexts (IRC, 2018).
BOX 2: DEFINING LOCAL AND NATIONAL ACTORS

Defining local and national actors in the Grand Bargain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local and national non-state actors</td>
<td>Organisations engaged in relief that are headquartered and operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and sub-national state actors</td>
<td>State authorities of the affected aid recipient country engaged in relief, whether at local or national level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defining ‘local’ and ‘national’ actor in the FTS localisation marker:

Following the consultation process, including taking into account recommendations from the online survey, the IASC HFTT Localisation Marker Working Group proposes a set of definitions as follows:

- National NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs): National NGOs/CSOs operating in the aid recipient country in which they are headquartered, working in multiple subnational regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO. This category can also include national faith-based organisations.
- Local NGOs/CSOs: Local NGOs/CSOs operating in a specific, geographically defined, subnational area of an aid recipient country, without affiliation to an international NGO/CSO. This category can also include community-based organisations and local faith-based organisations.
- Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies: National Societies that are based in and operating within their own aid recipient countries.
- National governments: National government agencies, authorities, line ministries and state-owned institutions in aid recipient countries e.g. National Disaster Management Agencies (NDMAs). This category can also include federal or regional government authorities in countries where they exist.
- Local governments: Sub-national government entities in aid recipient countries exercising some degree of devolved authority over a specifically defined geographic constituency e.g. local/municipal authorities.
- Local and national private sector organizations: Organisations run by private individuals or groups as a means of enterprise for profit, that are based in and operating within their own aid recipient countries and not affiliated to an international private sector organisation.

Sources: Grand Bargain/IASC, 2017
A final caveat: is globally comprehensive data desirable?

Based on peer review inputs and the brief desk review carried out for this study, it is questionable as to whether globally comprehensive data on funding flows and cost-efficiency is really feasible. Certainly, if it is to be achieved, it will come at a significant cost, given the system reform and research capacity needed to provide such figures.

This prompts a further question as to whether gaining this full picture on financing flows is worth the investment. Several peer reviewers suggested that, for this Core Responsibility in particular, using a sample of countries paired with a more intensive data-gathering methodology might be more appropriate than attempting to collect detailed data for all countries receiving humanitarian assistance. Sample selection comes with its own challenges but it may be less costly, without requiring significant sacrifices in robustness.

Core Responsibility 5: indicators with rankings – at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Potential/Actual source</th>
<th>Positive or negative progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A Invest in local capacities</td>
<td>5A.1. % of total humanitarian spend given directly to local and national government</td>
<td>llb</td>
<td>Development Initiatives; FTS; Grand Bargain reporting process</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5A.2. % of total humanitarian spend given directly to local and national non-governmental organisations</td>
<td>llb</td>
<td>Development Initiatives; FTS; Charter for Change; Grand Bargain reporting processes</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5A.3. % of humanitarian funding to UN agencies and INGOs that is directed to capacity strengthening activities for local &amp; national NGOs</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Charter for Change reporting process; IATI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5A.4. # and types of mechanisms available in-country for local actors to access funding in a response, disaggregated by type</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5E Diversify resource base and improve transparency and cost-efficiency of humanitarian financing and response</td>
<td>5E.1. % increase in private sector cash flows to humanitarian response</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5E.2. Total # of non-state funders of humanitarian response</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5E.3. # of distinct types of financing mechanism in humanitarian action</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Development Initiatives</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5E.4. Ratio of transactional cost-to-programming spend, by donor or finance mechanism</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment and discussion

Indicators 5A.1 and 5A.2  Percentage of total humanitarian spend given directly to local and national government; Percentage of total humanitarian spend given directly to local and national NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A.1</td>
<td><img src="https://example.com/table.png" alt="Table" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A.2</td>
<td><img src="https://example.com/table.png" alt="Table" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress

Progress on funding to national and local actors is positive and steady, albeit incremental and starting from an extremely low base. The data reported in the table is from the Global Humanitarian Assistance reports (5A.1 and 5A.2) and the Charter for Change (5A.2 only) and does not reflect data gathered through the Grand Bargain reporting processes (the inclusion of this initiative’s data as a potential future source is explained in the ‘Method and limitations’ section).

Data reported on these indicators by Development Initiatives in the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report in 2015 and 2016 was based on partial data reported to the FTS. New methods for tracking funds to national and local actors – in particular to NGOs – were developed as part of the Grand Bargain and post-WHS discussions with the FTS. These new methods are expected to strengthen the accuracy and breadth of data on financial flows to local and national actors.

This may have some adverse impact on the ability to compare the figures post-2017 with those produced in 2015 and 2016, as the method for tracking these funds changed so significantly. Development Initiatives may have already begun to correct for these changes: the figure reported for percentage of total spend to local and national NGOs for the year 2016 was reported as 0.3% in the 2017 global humanitarian assistance (GHA) report but was raised to 1.7% in the 2018 edition. Similarly, after receiving additional reporting data, Charter for Change retroactively revised its 2016 baseline to 18.4% (down from 24%).
Method and limitations

As described in the introduction, significant work has been undertaken since 2016 to harmonise and strengthen the way in which financing flows to local and national actors are recorded, potentially leading to more accurate and comprehensive figures by which actors can assess whether they are meeting their targets (20% for C4C members; 25% for Grand Bargain signatories).

However, it is not clear at the time of writing what these changes will mean for the ability to compare the 2017 and 2018 reporting against previous years as baselines. Development Initiatives has been manually categorising organisations listed on the FTS as ‘local/national’ for their previous GHA reports and has consistently separated out national-level affiliates of international organisations from other national and local NGOs. The localisation marker has followed this logic and therefore the GHA data could be used as baselines. However, if the use of the localisation marker leads to a rise in reporting, it may become difficult to understand whether an increase in reported direct funding to national/local actors is due to an increase in funds or due to better reporting systems.¹

Similar issues arise in the C4C data, although these are being addressed through retroactive amendments to the baseline. In the first progress report, based on data from 14 agencies, C4C reported that these agencies directed 24% of their funding directly to local and national agencies. With improved tracking and a higher number of agencies reporting in 2017 (20 instead of 14), the 2016 figure was amended to 18.4% which, when compared to the figure for 2017 (19%), shows a slightly positive trend. Ensuring that data remains comparable as more agencies report their data will be essential to understanding the direction of travel.

Finally, it is critical to highlight that all of the processes outlined above focus on official international funding flows, which comprise only a fraction of total resource flows to local and national actors. Data on informal or ‘non-traditional’ resources has been difficult to calculate, although efforts are underway to improve this (Development Initiatives, 2018; HPG, 2017).
Indicator 5A.3  Percentage of humanitarian funding to UN agencies and INGOs that is directed to capacity strengthening activities for local and national NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of humanitarian funding to UN agencies and INGOs that is directed to capacity strengthening activities for local and national NGOs</td>
<td>C4C, IATI; OCHA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations
In the original draft, ALNAP did not look at financial support to capacity strengthening, as this is at the input/activity level and the focus was initially on finding indicators to track the characteristics of locally led humanitarian action. However, peer reviewers felt that tracking financial flows to capacity strengthening was an important indicator to include for tracking progress on this Transformation.

Currently, it is impossible to comprehensively assess financial flows to civil society capacity-strengthening activities in the humanitarian sector. There is no ‘marker’, or specific category, for tagging humanitarian spend on capacity strengthening, which means that data on capacity strengthening must be pulled out manually from individual project reports on FTS, DAC or other financial tracking systems. C4C members have made the greatest progress in this area but even here, with dedicated support to improving the tracking of financial flows, the data is highly partial. In the second progress report for C4C, ‘Out of the 29 reporting signatories, only eight provided data on the value of their capacity strengthening activities’ (C4C, 2018). Of these eight, a reported $11 million was spent on capacity strengthening with local and national NGOs, occupying from 1.4%–4.0% of their total expenses (C4C, 2018). It is still unclear whether this figure can be used as a baseline, for the reasons already cited in the discussion of 5A.2.

C4C has made some suggestions for possible ways to measure the progress of its eight commitments by reporting financial data, primarily through use of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), on which WHS signatories have committed to working. The IATI system was originally developed for development partners but has recently been adapted to suit humanitarian data tracking. This information could also feasibly be collected through the FTS.
**Indicator 5A.4** Number and types of mechanisms available in-country for local actors to access funding in a response, disaggregated by type (e.g. multi-year; earmarked)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5A.4</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

**Method and limitations**

Improving funding to local and national actors means more than simply increasing funding levels. NEAR and C4C have emphasised that, to support the capacity and leadership of local and national organisations, quality of funding must also improve. Linking Transformations 5A and 5E, ALNAP suggested an indicator to track the diversification of financing mechanisms available for frontline responders. While peer reviewers noted that diversity of funding options is not a proxy for quality, monitoring the diversity of funding mechanisms can assist in disaggregating funding levels according to different types of mechanism – for instance, multi-year grants vs annual or sub-annual contracts. Peer reviewers also noted that this indicator should include other finance flows outside of humanitarian aid.

There are currently no global, regular reviews of the number and variety of mechanisms available for local actors and therefore no way to track whether progress is being made.
Indicators 5E.1 and 5E.2  Percentage increase in private sector cash flows to humanitarian response; and total number of non-state funders of humanitarian response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% increase in private sector cash flows to humanitarian response</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of non-state funders of humanitarian response</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations
Despite the policy rhetoric around the potential of the private sector to fund and support humanitarian response and bring new efficiencies to the system, no significant shift has been seen in practice and there is very little data to support any objective assessment of this contribution.

Private-sector cash flows to humanitarian response are not currently reported and tracked at a global level. The GHA has reported estimated figures on private-sector contributions – disaggregated by individual donors, private-sector companies, trusts and foundations, and others – but these are based on extrapolations from a sample of humanitarian agencies who provide this data to Development Initiatives. And while the OECD tracks private-sector contributions to development assistance, this is not disaggregated for humanitarian aid. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) tracks contributions from the private sector and could be a potential proxy measure; however, it is unclear whether CERF contributions would be adequately representative of wider private sector funding to humanitarian response.

Tracking a percentage increase in private-sector cash flows to humanitarian response or tracking the overall number of active non-state funders of humanitarian response could serve as potentially useful markers of the diversification of the humanitarian resource base. But this will require changes to how funds are currently reported and tracked, to make it easier for private-sector actors to report their contributions. This illustrates a tension that sits at the heart of attempts to diversify the humanitarian resource base. At a policy level, humanitarian donors and actors have for years advocated greater engagement with the private sector and yet the mechanisms and processes used for tracking humanitarian financing have remain largely unchanged. The IATI standard may provide a way to address these challenges, as IATI is a platform for use across aid sectors and across multiple stakeholders in the private and public sectors. However, the use of IATI for humanitarian data tracking is still in its early stages.
**Indicator 5E.3 Number of distinct types of financing mechanism in humanitarian action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Tier ranking</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
<th>2015 (baseline)</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5E.3</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Development Initiatives</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assessing progress**

It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

**Method and limitations**

As reported in the previous two global humanitarian assistance reports (2017; 2018), an increasing array of innovative financing mechanisms are being used to support humanitarian action (Development Initiatives, 2017: Chapter 2; Chapter 3). This includes the World Bank’s increased role in providing funding to fragile states and in the development of new funding instruments modelled on insurance or social impact investment, such as the World Bank–ICRC Humanitarian Impact Bond.

Counting the number of these mechanisms, or classifying and counting the different types of mechanisms, could provide a snapshot of how diverse the humanitarian financing landscape is becoming. Of course, of even greater interest is whether these new financing mechanisms are effective at reducing costs or at achieving greater effectiveness in humanitarian delivery. Peer reviewers also noted that tracking the number of financing mechanisms does not offer a good understanding of the *quality* of funding.

Currently, ‘it is hard to know the exact magnitude of these types of finance, and too early to evaluate their impact. Tracking and learning from them will be important, however, to know if, where and how they can feasibly be replicated and scaled up’ (Development Initiatives, 2017: 54). Simply producing a map or lay of the landscape at this stage may be a beneficial first step, before more meaningful indicators of performance can be developed and tracked.
Indicator 5E.4 Ratio of transactional cost-to-programming spend, by donor or finance mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5E.4</td>
<td>Ratio of transactional cost-to-programming spend, by donor or finance mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessing progress
It is not possible to assess progress at present, as this data is not being collected regularly.

Method and limitations
In the development sector, effectiveness measures – as well as different measures relating to overheads (e.g. administrative costs, the ratio of salaries and benefits to aid flows and total aid) – are used to compare different mechanisms for development funding, such as multilateral vs bilateral aid (Guljarani, 2016). Obtaining these figures in the humanitarian sector has been much harder (Baker et al., 2013; Pongracz et al., 2016).

An initial step towards tracking cost-efficiency gains in the system could be an indicator that tracks the ratio of the transactional costs involved in different funding mechanisms against the spend on programming. This could eventually pave the way for comparing cost-to-outcome ratios. Applications of cost-efficiency analysis by some INGOs (Metcalfe-Hough and Poole, 2018: 42) if taken up more widely, could also contribute to more comprehensive analysis and monitoring in the future.

Endnotes
1. Particular thanks to Anne Street for providing clarification on this.
2. Development Initiatives’ analysis in the 2018 GHA suggests it is due to changes in reporting, not changing trends.
Key Findings and Conclusion

In the two years since the WHS, it is unclear how progress against the commitments made under the Agenda for Humanity will be judged. Shared indicators (measures that can be applied across multiple organisations or countries in order to understand changes in a particular area of interest) are one of many potential methods to monitor progress and performance. This study examined whether it is feasible to look beyond inputs and activities and use shared indicators to track progress in achieving the outcomes of the Agenda for Humanity.

The simple answer is that better collective monitoring is possible in several areas— if the sector considers it to be a priority. There are different ways to set shared indicators (summarised in this concluding chapter), which have different implications for the cost and feasibility of collecting and analysing the data. Because this will vary across topics, there may be stronger cases for monitoring certain parts of the Agenda for Humanity than others. Regardless of the method used, greater coordination and consortia work would support collective monitoring and the use of this data to reliably inform changes in policy and practice.

However, these efforts would need financial support: for several indicators, the data available for assessing progress is produced by a single organisation relying on medium-term grant funding. This not only places a great burden of responsibility onto these organisations, but can also threaten the stability of data pipelines, if an organisation faces financial difficulty or decides to cease its data collection.

In this conclusion we outline key findings and suggestions for ways forward.

Key findings

Assessing progress

Over two years on, is progress being made on the Agenda for Humanity? Based on the indicators explored for this paper, it is difficult to say. Of 71 indicators, only 20 had sufficient data to allow for an analysis of progress. Among these 20, there were broadly as many positive changes as there were negative changes compared with the 2015 baseline – and, in nearly all cases, the increases or decreases were slight. Data collected for Transformation 1D reflects a general trend towards fewer conflicts and fewer fatalities in conflict worldwide, although conflicts are also now concentrated in fewer countries. Overall, displacement is

Key Message 1 | More than two years on, progress on the Agenda for Humanity is mixed, with some slight positive and slight negative trends.
rising, while displacement disaggregated by cause (conflict vs disaster) fluctuates from year to year. Under Core Responsibility 4, global funding to local and national actors is increasing steadily. But funding levels started from a low baseline, far below intended targets.

It is important to stress that, as mentioned in this paper’s Introduction, indicators are not sufficient to support attribution of any trends to particular actions or initiatives. Other research methodologies would be needed in order to draw claims of contribution or attribution. Given that it is only two years since the Summit and many reforms are still early in their implementation, it is unlikely that changes in the indicators are due to any specific acts of implementation (with the potential exception of the input indicator on global funding to local and national actors).

Assessing feasibility

After peer review, the total number of indicators in this study came to 71. Each indicator was assessed for its potential for monitoring progress using a tier ranking system adapted by ALNAP from the SDG indicator ranking system. Breakdowns of these indicators based on tier ranking are provided in the table below. Tier III was the most common ranking, reflecting the many efforts underway to improve data collection and monitoring across several areas of the Agenda for Humanity. Only four indicators were given the highest rating (Tier I) and more than a quarter of the indicators were rated Tier IV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Number of indicators assessed at this tier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier I</td>
<td>Indicator is conceptually clear, is based on a rigorous, internationally established methodology and is sourced by a dataset that is comprehensive (covering all or most countries in which humanitarian assistance and protection is delivered), transparent (publicly available) and current (regularly updated).</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IIa</td>
<td>Rigorous, internationally established methodologies and standards are available, with active attempts to collect data, and there is sector-wide consensus on which methodology to use, but data is either not regularly updated, or is only partially available.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IIb</td>
<td>Rigorous, internationally established methodologies and standards are available, with active attempts to collect data, but data is partial or not regularly updated, and there is no sector-wide consensus on which methodology to use.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>No internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the indicator, but methodology/standards are being (or will be) developed or tested.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier IV</td>
<td>No internationally established methodology or standards are yet available for the indicator, and no concerted effort is underway to develop or test such methods.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The peer review process identified three areas for strengthening the five-tier ranking system for future use. First, incorporating the relevance of an indicator into the ranking system: ALNAP requested peer reviewers to assess the relevance of the proposed indicators for each Transformation, removing any indicators felt to be irrelevant and adding new indicators suggested by peer reviewers. However, the assessment of relevance was not reflected within the ranking system itself. In many cases, the indicators which peer reviewers suggested or felt were most relevant to understanding progress were those ranked at Tier IV, as they were hardest to measure. Incorporating a rating for relevance could offer a more balanced assessment of indicators that are seen as useful but difficult to practically measure.

A second issue raised by peer reviewers was on the verification of data. The ranking system developed by ALNAP for this study gives greater weight to comprehensiveness of data; indicators for which data was only ‘partial’ were given the lower ranking of IIa or IIb. Some peer reviewers, particularly for Core Responsibility 2 and 4, noted that some initiatives work with a smaller set of data that is better verified and therefore potentially more accurate than data that is collected globally but not verified.

The need for consensus as a criterion of the quality of an indicator was also mentioned—while this is included in the ALNAP ranking system (as it also appears in the SDG indicator ranking system), one peer reviewer felt it should be given greater priority, with methods and approaches built on consensus achieving a higher ranking, even if data is partial.

Different ways of thinking about collective monitoring

This study identified different ways to think about collective monitoring, which have direct bearing on feasibility and cost. Any monitoring exercise should begin with a clear purpose: who will be using the data and to what end. Methodological choices need to be informed by a careful consideration of whether the data is being used for accountability, incentivising change or informing course corrections. For informing changes in policy or approach, shared indicators will need to be supplemented with other information, as they will be too general on their own to guide context-specific decision-making.

Collective monitoring can be organised around three distinct levels of disaggregation. At the highest level is the tracking of global trends – e.g. worldwide rates of poverty, violence, or displacement using aggregated data. A second level is country-by-country disaggregation.
to allow for comparisons or country-specific monitoring—e.g. poverty rates by country or a country ranking based on shared indicators, such as the Fragile States Index. At a more granular level, collective monitoring can be disaggregated by particular actors—e.g. amount of funding directed towards protection programming, or a ranking of organisations according to a set of shared indicators.

As well as varying in its level of disaggregation, collective monitoring may also differ in terms of approach, being either comprehensive or sample-based. In a comprehensive approach, data is collected for all places relevant to the indicator of interest. A sample-based approach collects data on a sub-set of actors or countries and uses this as a proxy to understand broader trends.

Global trends are the least granular, and therefore potentially the least useful for informing course corrections. However, for the humanitarian sector, and for the Agenda for Humanity in particular, a global trends orientation can be extremely useful for understanding the bigger picture on key issues such as respect for IHL and protection of the humanitarian mission, or gender-responsive programming.

The SDG and Sendai Framework indicators generate data that can be used at the level of global trends but is primarily organised at the country level (and builds a picture of global trends by aggregating data across countries). Many other monitoring frameworks in the development sector also focus on country-level use. This enables the comparison or benchmarking of individual countries and the identification of outliers from global trends.

For the humanitarian sector, a country-based approach may be less relevant, as humanitarian response occurs in a sub-set of countries and is often better assessed and understood on a crisis, rather than country, basis. Also, to allow for comparisons across countries, indicators must be pitched at a fairly general level and cannot be too context-specific, which can make them less relevant for within-country decision-makers.

Most efforts to track progress in the Agenda for Humanity are using an actor-based disaggregation, where actors include non-state actors (UN and NGO) as well as a sub-set of Member States (typically represented by their foreign aid ministries). In drafting this study, ALNAP initially discounted actor-specific monitoring processes such as the Grand Bargain or Charter For Change, on the basis that these would not provide comprehensive data on progress (whereby ‘comprehensive data’ was understood as that which reflected...
the entire range of humanitarian response worldwide). However, several peer reviewers felt that these initiatives, while not comprehensive, could serve as proxies for the broader humanitarian system. This approach might also be more effective at incentivising change, as a group of dedicated actors is more inclined to use monitoring data for course corrections. Others suggested that an actor-oriented monitoring system is the only legitimate way to assess progress, given that the Agenda for Humanity is stakeholder-based and not an intergovernmental agreement (which would lend itself to the country-based model).

One major limitation of the actor-based monitoring model is that it will rely heavily on activity and input indicators, as these are closest to an actor’s sphere of control. However, it is not impossible to track outcomes in an actor-based monitoring model: the selection of geographical areas for outcome monitoring would need to be based on where those actors are working, or other sample criteria. The OECD-led surveys of crisis-affected people being carried out for monitoring the Grand Bargain implementation are an example of an actor-based monitoring model that collects outcome data (Ground Truth Solutions, n.d.).

The difference between a comprehensive approach and a sample-based approach is also highly important when considering feasibility of using collective indicators. Globally comprehensive approaches, in which data is collected worldwide, are resource-intensive and can rely on data that is less easily verifiable as that which is collected for a smaller group of countries or actors.

Several peer reviewers suggested that a sample-based approach might be better for Core Responsibilities 4 and 5, where a sub-set of actors or contexts are selected and tracked as proxies for the broader progress on the Agenda for Humanity over time. Future use of a ranking system for collective indicators may need to be modified to better reflect sample-based approaches.

**Key Message 4** | Truly assessing the progress made post-WHS will require the sector to look beyond intentions and actions to whether the Agenda for Humanity Transformations are actually taking place, particularly for people in crisis.
Ways forward

This study does not seek to provide recommendations to decision-makers but outlines six areas of work that could help facilitate a more collective picture of progress, if desired.

1. Resourcing data collection and analysis for priority areas

Better data comes at a cost. More resourcing for data collection and analysis is needed, but resources also need to be prioritised according to who will use this data and for what purpose. For example, it may be better to invest in collecting comprehensive data on the length and severity of displacement, than in systems that achieve more comprehensive figures on private-sector contributions to humanitarian action, based on differences in how these data sets are used to inform humanitarian policy priorities.

Data collection in the humanitarian sector relies primarily on the work of statistical/data divisions within UN agencies and on independent research organisations, who typically depend on grant funding to maintain high-quality datasets over time. Gaps in support to these agencies quickly translates into gaps in the global dataset. Moderate and predictable increases in resources for a select group of high-priority indicators could support a more reliable pipeline of data.

2. Getting more out of current data and research

Alongside targeted resources, more can be done to maximise the value of existing data and research efforts. There is a wide range of data that is being collected in humanitarian crises which either remains too raw or is not shared. To address this, collaborations such as the Safeguarding Healthcare in Conflict Coalition and hubs such as the Center for Humanitarian Data’s Humanitarian Data Exchange are providing platforms to triangulate and combine data sets from multiple actors, potentially creating a more comprehensive data set than could be achieved by individual agencies.

There are also other areas where efficiency gains could be made. Under Core Responsibility 2, several organisations are monitoring overlapping indicators related to peace, conflict risk and fragility. These efforts could be harmonised to track different aspects of fragility and conflict risk more efficiently. In the area of financing and localisation, where sample-based approaches to monitoring progress may be more realistic, agencies and reform initiatives have commissioned in-depth country-based research to create baseline measures for capacity-strengthening efforts and funding flows to local and national organisations (Majid et al., 2018; Parrish and Kattakuzhy, 2018). More could be done to share and replicate these methodologies across different agencies to achieve a wider sample, or to ensure that the same methodologies are applied over time to support progress tracking.
3. Creating more opportunities for sector-wide collaboration and reflection on progress

None of the ways forward mentioned so far will be fully realised without more formal opportunities to bring together actors and initiatives working on similar areas of the Agenda for Humanity. This includes platforms to share data as well as events and processes that enable joint analysis and coordinated action to reduce duplication of efforts and to strengthen data sharing. While some initiatives, such as Charter for Change, have their regular opportunities for meeting and reflecting on progress, there could be additional value in bringing initiatives together to further share and cross-fertilise learning based on their work to achieve change.

4. Protecting the independence of humanitarian statistics

This study looked at relevant monitoring efforts in the broader 2030 Agenda and how these might support the monitoring of progress against the Agenda for Humanity. There are areas in the SDG and Sendai monitoring frameworks that are relevant for humanitarians and, for certain topics such as disaster prevention and preparedness, it may be appropriate to rely primarily on the statistics collected through national statistics offices (which will be the case for all data collected on indicators for the SDGs and Sendai Framework).

However, for many other parts of the Agenda for Humanity – particularly Core Responsibilities 1 (prevent and end conflict) and 2 (respect the rules of war) – it is important to retain an independent approach to data collection and analysis to ensure that figures are accurate and not influenced by political bias. At the same time, the independence of much of the humanitarian statistical capacity (relying on non-profit institutions or organisations) comes with distinct downsides, including issues around intellectual property and the lack of long-term reliability due to the reliance on continued grant or private funding. But this independence, like the operational independence of humanitarian agencies, is critical for developing a more robust and timely picture of trends, and should be considered in complement to efforts to support National Statistics Offices, particularly in fragile settings (Samman et al., 2018).

5. Clarifying baselines

In the two years since the WHS, many actors have worked to establish baseline measures for the commitments they made. Across several areas of the Agenda for Humanity, data availability is improving year by year – the most significant examples being in relation to the numbers of attacks on aid workers and the amount of funding going to local and national NGOs. As more organisations report their data, and as more information becomes available, an increasingly comprehensive picture of these issues is emerging. Yet, while improvements in data collection are welcome, these rapid year-on-year changes in the dataset mean it is difficult to draw robust comparisons from one year to the next. In the future, any reported improvements
or accomplishments against the Agenda for Humanity or Grand Bargain will need to explain how a baseline was selected. More importantly, humanitarian actors could achieve appropriate baseline measures more effectively if they employ one of two strategies: (1) for organisations that are joining reporting initiatives, back-dating data to 2015 if possible; or (2) using sector-wide collaboration to speed up the process of baseline measurement and ensure that appropriate baseline measures can be in place by the end of 2019.

6. Remembering that indicators are only one part of the picture

Regardless of the orientation (global, country, actor) or approach (comprehensive vs sample), indicators help us understand trends but not their underlying causes or drivers. A broader range of research and evidence will always be needed to parse and analyse the contributing factors to these trends – a point that was emphasised by many of this study’s peer reviewers. Successfully achieving the aims of the Agenda for Humanity requires better knowledge of the underlying drivers for displacement, attacks on humanitarian missions, localised capacity for response and many other issues addressed in the five Core Responsibilities. It also requires evidence for what works best for seeing progress on these issues in different contexts. Indicators can tell the sector which way the needle is pointing, but on their own, they are not enough to direct change.

Is collective monitoring desirable?

One of the reasons for the humanitarian sector’s reliance on self-reported and largely inconsistent approaches to monitoring progress is that, historically, a more collectively systematic approach was not considered feasible. This study explicitly avoided an in-depth look at the value of collective monitoring. However, it has taken a step towards dismantling a common argument against collective monitoring by illustrating that better data is difficult, but not impossible, to obtain. It requires a combination of targeted resource, coordination of efforts, and recognition that there are different ways to achieve a more robust collective picture of progress, depending on whether this information is being used for accountability or to guide reform.

The bottom line is that, if humanitarian actors have committed to making progress on a set of core issues, data will be essential to understanding whether this is being achieved. Humanitarians cannot ‘reduce forced displacement by 50% by 2030’ without knowing how many people are currently displaced. It is not possible to ‘enhance the capacities of local and national actors for emergency response’ if there is no clear conception of what these capacities are, or how to tell if they are improving or declining. Donors cannot achieve cost savings of $1 million – or even $1 – on delivery mechanisms for aid if there is no baseline data on what it costs to deliver through current funding channels. Truly assessing the progress made post-WHS will require the sector to look beyond intentions and actions to whether the Agenda for Humanity Transformations are actually taking place, particularly for people in crisis.
Endnotes

1. Due to the time implications of re-categorising all 71 indicators, ALNAP was unable to make changes to the ranking system after peer review, however notes these revisions for future use.

2. ALNAP is indebted to peer reviewers, especially Anne Street and Barnaby Willitts-King, whose comments brought this distinction to the fore.

3. For example, a widely used database on mortality and morbidity statistics for people in protracted conflict – the Complex Emergencies Database, managed by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) – has not been updated for several years due to gaps in funding.

4. Peer reviewers also noted what they saw as a broader cultural problem with operational data collection in the humanitarian sector, with staff feeling it was not important to collect disaggregated or high quality data.
Bibliography


Related ALNAP publications
State of the Humanitarian System 2018
Making it Count Summary
Counting what counts: performance and effectiveness in the humanitarian sector

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