

Violence in Africa

Trends, drivers and prospects to 2023

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This report analyses prospects for violence in Africa to 2023. It first presents recent conflict trends including slowly declining fatality rates in several countries, noting Africa's large burden of non-state conflict and the increase in riots and protests. The report then turns to seven structural (or deep) drivers of violence, and how they are likely to impact Africa in future. In conclusion, the structural transitions that will push Africa towards a more stable and peaceful future are discussed.

Key findings

- ▶ The launch in 2013 of the African Union's Agenda 2063 coincided with a strong upward trend in armed conflict to peak in 2015. The subsequent trend has been downward, with violence involving militant Islamist groups (and state responses) remaining the most resilient.
- ▶ It is unlikely that Africa will be able to 'silence the guns by 2020', or indeed by 2023. Yet progress in advancing peace, stability and growth is evident across the continent.
- ▶ Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor, young and badly governed, but also because it is growing and dynamic.
- ▶ Effective responses to violent Islamist extremism in key countries would rapidly reduce armed conflict in Africa.
- ▶ The countries likely to continue having high levels of armed violence are Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, Libya, Cameroon, Angola and Chad.
- ▶ South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Kenya and Somalia will probably continue experiencing high levels of political protest and riots, but Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Rwanda, Madagascar and Angola have higher per capita protest levels.
- ▶ Violence is changing in Africa. The ballot, not the gun, is becoming the main source of political contestation, accompanied by a shift to urban rather than rural violence.
- ▶ In the long term only much more rapid, inclusive economic development combined with good governance and developmentally oriented leadership will make Africa less vulnerable to violence and instability.

Recommendations

- ▶ African governments in countries affected by violent extremism should ensure effective civilian oversight of their security forces to avoid the negative impact of security force actions as an impetus to violent radicalisation.
- ▶ African governments need to roll out the basic functions of governing such as effective documentation of populations and cross-border management, improving the state of African police, military and intelligence functions, management of migration, refugees and displaced persons and the transformation of the criminal justice system.
- ▶ Given the size of Africa's youth bulge, governments need to prioritise education and training opportunities and create jobs, as high rates of youth unemployment will exacerbate instability.
- ▶ The United Nations system needs to step up its commitment to peacekeeping in Africa as the most important, cost-effective and proven means through which to respond to conflict.
- ▶ The African Union and Regional Economic Communities should:
 - Prioritise their diplomatic, military and police efforts in countries with small populations such as in Liberia, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Burundi that have an extraordinarily high casualty burden.
 - Pay much greater attention to the quality of governance as the most effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool.

Recent trends in violence in Africa

From a long-term perspective, i.e. over successive generations, armed violence is declining globally.¹ This trend is more pronounced when measuring fatalities relative to the size of population since population numbers continue to increase, particularly in conflict-affected regions that typically have much younger population structures than more stable, developed countries.

The decline is largely the result of the establishment of clearly defined territorial states and the associated reductions in conflict between them, and the extension of state authority within these defined borders. This is because casualties from clashes between armed forces of opposing countries, which are trained and equipped for large-scale deadly combat, are generally much higher than from minor armed conflict events and internal wars, even those involving police or paramilitary forces.

Rebel (and extremist) groups are more numerous and often fracture into additional groupings

The exception to this broad trend of declining fatalities due to armed conflict in recent years is to be found in the Middle East following the impact of terrorism, the Arab Spring and the invasion of Iraq.

The long-term decline in armed violence is also evident in Africa, when, after the peak that followed the end of the Cold War, a larger number of conflicts ended than started.²

Today conflict in Africa generally takes place within states (rather than as a function of war between countries), although a number of armed groups operate regionally, such as Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army. Whereas in 2010 only five countries experienced sustained activity from violent Islamist extremism (Algeria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia), that number has grown to 12 countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Tunisia).³

Conflict in Africa is becoming more complex as the numbers of conflict actors have increased. Rebel (and extremist) groups are more numerous and often fracture into additional groupings. The link between transnational

organised crime and terrorism is also growing and the allegiances between Africa's domestic violent radicals and those in the Middle East have shifted from al-Qaeda to Islamic State.⁴ Reported incidents of political violence such as riots, violence against civilians and suchlike are also increasing and have recently been responsible for significantly more incidents and higher levels of casualties than in the past.

Political violence in Africa is already largely urban-based, and instability in Africa is likely to affect cities and the unpoliced and unplanned urban sprawls rather than rural areas going forward.⁵ This is also true for the activities of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, particularly where they resort to the use of suicide bombers, a trend that has increased in Africa.

The analysis that follows builds on previous work undertaken by the African Futures and Innovation programme at the Pretoria office of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).⁶ It complements a separate ISS report by Julia Bello-Schünemann and Jonathan Moyer, *Structural pressures and political instability in sub-Saharan Africa: future trajectories*, that undertakes a longer-term structural assessment on pressures and political instability in sub-Saharan Africa with a time horizon to 2040.

The data is from the most recent versions of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)⁷ and the Armed Conflict

International Futures (IFs) is a tool for thinking about development over long time horizons for 186 countries to 2100. Where available, historical data is from 1960. IFs leverages over 3 500 historical data series from global data providers such as the World Bank and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. It integrates forecasts across different sub-models, including agriculture, demography, economy, education, energy, environment, governance, health, infrastructure, international politics and technology. These sub-models are dynamically connected, so IFs simulates how changes in one system lead to changes across all other systems. As a result, IFs endogenises a large number of relationships from a wide range of key global systems. The model is an open source tool and is available for free at www.pardee.edu.

Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)⁸ as well as organisations as diverse as the International Labour Organisation and the Ibrahim Institute of African Governance. The International Futures (IFs) forecasting system version 7.34 – developed and housed at the Frederick S Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of Denver – is used for most of the associated forecasts.⁹

Conflict data in Africa is inevitably controversial. Both UCDP and ACLED rely on media sources to collect and categorise events and fatalities. Beyond the limits of reportage (meaning that only events mentioned in various media and public reports are captured), the classification of events as politically motivated and of fatalities as the result of political rather than criminal violence, for example, is necessarily fraught with challenges. The analysis that follows therefore offers an overview of broad trends and prospects and cannot be presumed to accurately reflect reality.

The first section presents recent conflict trends in Africa, namely that:


- Fatality rates from armed conflict are decreasing.
- They are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.
- Africa has a particularly large burden of non-state conflict.
- The numbers of riots and protests are increasing.

A second section turns to the issue of seven structural (or deep) drivers of violence, and how they are likely to impact on African countries to 2023. The report concludes with a set of structural transitions that collectively will push Africa towards a more stable and peaceful future.

Armed conflict fatality rates are coming down

Figure 1 presents the total number of fatalities from armed conflict events in Africa since 1989 (red bar graph

Figure 1: Total fatalities in Africa vs. population growth (1989 to 2017)



Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global UCDP edition version 18.1, population from UNPD in IFs v 7.34.

and left-hand axis) compared to Africa's increased population size (area graph to right-hand axis) from 617 million to 1.253 billion in 2017.¹⁰ The four years that saw the highest number of fatalities, excluding the Rwandan genocide, were in 1990 (95 067 fatalities), 1999/2000 (98 805 and 91 279 fatalities), 2000 (67 843 fatalities) and 2014/15 (67 594 and 67 683 fatalities).¹¹

The absolute number of fatalities from armed conflict has slowly declined over time

The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war (in and around the town of Badme in 1999 and 2000), the impact of the large-scale conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (generally known as the Second Congo War or Great War of Africa that wound down from July 2003 having involved nine African countries and nearly

20 rebel groups) and the surge in fatalities associated with Boko Haram in Nigeria in 2014-15 are all evident in figure 1.¹²


With the notable exception of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war, the genocide in Rwanda and the struggle against Boko Haram, the absolute number of fatalities from armed conflict has slowly declined over time.

Fatalities through armed conflict are concentrated in a few countries

Figure 2 shows the period from 2001 (i.e. after the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war) to 2017 and identifies the seven countries that experienced the highest number of fatalities due to armed conflict during this period in addition to showing fatalities in the rest of Africa. These countries are Sudan, Nigeria, the DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Libya.

The spike in fatalities in 2002 is largely driven by events in the DRC as the Second Congo War wound down with

Figure 2: Seven countries with highest total fatalities from 2001 to 2017 vs. rest of Africa



Source: UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Global Edition version 18.1, population from UNDP in IFs v 7.34.

the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) reported to have killed thousands of pygmy civilians and combatants in the east. Events in the DRC also resulted in the increase in fatalities in 2009 when the governments of the DRC and Rwanda as well as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as MONUC and subsequently renamed MONUSCO) sought to evict rebels in the east and north of the country.¹³

From 2013 to 2015 the increase in fatality levels was mostly driven by events in Nigeria associated with Boko Haram and to a lesser extent the reaction/campaigns by the Nigerian military to combat violent Islamist extremism.

Generally countries with large populations such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt and the DRC tend to experience a corresponding high number of fatalities from armed conflict. However, when African countries are ranked by their per capita fatality rates (or the risk of any given individual being killed during armed conflict), none of these countries are in the top seven (see table 1). When taking population size into consideration, the seven countries where citizens were most at risk (when measured as fatalities against population size for 2001 to 2017) are CAR, Somalia, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan and Burundi.¹⁴

Table 1: Number of fatalities compared with fatality/population ratio (average for 2001 to 2017)

| Ranking | Number of fatalities | Fatality rate to population |
|---------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 | Sudan | CAR |
| 2 | Nigeria | Somalia |
| 3 | DRC | Liberia |
| 4 | Somalia | Libya |
| 5 | CAR | Sudan |
| 6 | South Sudan | South Sudan |
| 7 | Libya | Burundi |

Source: UCPD GED fatalities.

What is striking is the extent to which countries with small populations (Liberia, Somalia, CAR and Burundi) have an extraordinarily high casualty burden and the extent to which activities from violent Islamic extremism

is driving fatality counts. Should Africa and the international community be able to bring stability here, it would have a disproportionate impact on continental levels of armed conflict.

Data compiled by ACLED confirms that the general trend of falling fatality rates also holds for the broader category of political violence that includes deaths from protests and riots in Africa from 2001 to 2017 (see figure 3). When total fatalities are adjusted for Africa's rapid population growth to represent the ratio of fatalities per million people in the population (right-hand scale and blue line), it is clear that the fatality rate has come down over long time horizons, but slowly.

What is striking is the extent to which countries with small populations have an extraordinarily high casualty burden

Data from ACLED and UCDP also concur in presenting the cyclical pattern of conflict in Africa. Both sets of data indicate that a new cycle of increased conflict started in Africa in 2004–6 that accelerated after 2010 with the events associated with the Arab Spring and the increase of violent Islamist terrorism in Africa, peaking in 2014–15 before starting to decline.


Africa has a large burden of non-state conflict

UCDP captures all 'incidents where armed force was used by an organised actor against another organised actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a specific date', with at least 25 fatalities in a year.¹⁵ It makes a distinction between three types of events: where the state is involved (state-based conflict), where the state is not involved (non-state-based conflict) and one-sided violence.¹⁶

The associated definitions are presented in table 2 and the fatalities from the three types of violence are reflected in a stacked area graph in figure 4 (left-hand axis). The black line represents the total population of Africa (right-hand axis). The cyclical pattern of conflict is again evident with peaks in 2002¹⁷ and 2014.¹⁸

All three categories of conflict and violence declined significantly until 2005, increased thereafter, then peaked in 2014 and 2015 before declining.¹⁹

Figure 3: Trends in fatalities in Africa



Source: ACLED, population from UNPD in IFs v 7.33.

Table 2: Types of conflict captured by UCDP


| UCDP category | UCDP description |
|----------------------|--|
| State-based conflict | A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. |
| Non-state conflict | The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. |
| One-sided violence | The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. It excludes extrajudicial killings in custody. |

Source: UCDP codebooks.

Africa has consistently suffered the largest burden of non-state conflict globally. Examples include rebel groups that battle for control of populations and resources in the eastern DRC, or in rural CAR or northern Mali. More

than any other measure, this reflects the limited territorial control of many African governments that are unable to ensure stability and law and order across large stretches of state land and subsequent community violence over

Figure 4: Fatalities in Africa from state-based conflict, one-sided conflict and non-state violence



Source: UCDP, population from UNPD in IFs v 7.33.

water, land and other scarce resources. In addition, many non-state conflicts are related to state-based conflicts. Solving state-based conflicts would very often solve non-state conflicts.

Where governments don't have the means or capacity to provide stability, and the criminal justice system is weak, armed opposition parties, rebels, terrorists and criminals exploit the security vacuum to their benefit. Since income levels in Africa (and hence government revenues) are slowly rising, it would be reasonable to expect that the number of non-state conflicts will also decrease, reflecting the steady improvements in state capacity that normally accompany such a change.

Riots and protests have increased, but are less deadly

According to ACLED the number of non-violent protests and violent riots in Africa have increased twelvefold since 2001 and particularly rapidly after the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010. The Arab Spring eventually impacted a belt of North African countries

from Morocco to Egypt, as well as Somalia, Nigeria and Sudan, but only Tunisia emerges from that period with significantly improved levels of democracy.²⁰ These extraordinary increases probably also reflect the extent to which social media and internet access have simultaneously expanded.

Since income levels in Africa are slowly rising, the number of non-state conflicts will also decrease

On the face of it South Africa appears to be most affected by riots and protests, although it is also, by comparative African standards, more democratic than most, therefore allowing space for protest that is generally not available elsewhere. Since South Africa has undergone a fairly recent political transition (from apartheid), it is inherently more prone to civil conflict. During this recent period the political crisis associated


with slow growth, corruption and patronage under President Jacob Zuma was gathering speed, explaining the increase in protests across the country as part of the #ZumaMustFall campaign. However it is Somalia where riots/protests are most fatal and Ethiopia that has the most riots/protests when these are calculated per million people for the period 2011 to 2017.

Figure 5 presents the number of events from 2001 to 2017 for the seven countries that experienced the most incidents during this period (South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Algeria, Kenya and Somalia) and the rest of Africa. It illustrates the dramatic impact the Arab Spring had on the event count, also showing the increase in Africa's population and, in a separate window, the

increase in mobile subscribers per 100 Africans during the same period that facilitated mobilisation within countries and regional communication.

The number of riot and protest events peaked in Egypt in 2013 with the one-year anniversary of the inauguration of President Mohamed Morsi as president in June when millions of Egyptians called for his departure. This culminated in the coup d'état or Second Egyptian Revolution that led to the assumption of power of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Riot and protest events also peaked in Nigeria in 2015 during the country's closely contested national elections when incumbent Goodluck Jonathan lost out to General Muhammadu Buhari. Riots and protests have also been increasing in Tunisia, Algeria and Kenya in recent years.

Figure 5: Number of riots and protests in Africa since 2001: top 7 and rest of Africa



Source: ACLED 1997 to 2018, population from UNPD in IFs v 7.33.

In addition to the countries identified separately in figure 5, the very large increase in the number of riots and protests in the rest of the Africa group is overwhelmingly due to events in Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the CAR and to a lesser extent in Burkina Faso, Burundi and the DRC.

On average, riots and protests appear to have become less deadly over time


In 2016 Ethiopia experienced an extraordinary increase in the number of riots and protests as the Oromo and eventually also the Amhara ethnic groups protested against the perceived dominance of the minority Tigray ethnic group. Discontent was accentuated by the impact of an acute drought and then floods in the highlands of Ethiopia, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia regions. Whereas Tigrayans make up only about 6% of Ethiopia’s population, they have long been accused of holding inordinate economic, political and security influence.

The first reaction from the Tigrayan-dominated government was the institution of a 2016 national state of emergency and brutal suppression. But eventually, in March 2018, prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn stepped down to make way for a much younger replacement, Abiy Ahmed, from the Oromo group. He has embarked on a raft of reforms such as ending the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, reforming the security agencies, reaching out to Eritrea and opening up the economy.

On average, however, riots and protests appear to have become less deadly, meaning that there are fewer fatalities per event when measured over time (see figure 6). For example, while Africa experienced an average of eight fatalities per riot/protest event from 2001–3, for 2015–17 that average declined to three. That said, more non-deadly protests appear to find their way into the ACLED data than previously, also due to better reporting, and this interpretation is necessarily also tentative.

One would expect that the steady rate of urbanisation would affect the trend of the increasing number of

Figure 6: Average number of fatalities per riot/protest in Africa and urban/rural Africa



Source: ACLED Africa 1997 to 2018, population from UNPD in IFs v 7.33.

riots and protests since these are overwhelming urban phenomena.

Although average rates conceal vast country-level differences, Africa was on average only 34% urban in 2001 at the start of the historical period in figure 6, increasing to 41% by 2017. Being significantly less urbanised than other regions in the world, the potential for rapid catch-up could prove unsettling. The change in the number of urban vs rural Africans is contained in the inset graph of figure 6.

North Africa, the location of the Arab Spring, is significantly more urban than sub-Saharan Africa. In 2010, the year in which it erupted, 53% of people in North Africa lived in urban areas compared to 35% in the rest of (sub-Saharan) Africa. With a large portion of people in towns and cities, that population concentration facilitated the kind of crowd and mass dynamics that eventually ejected Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from his presidency in Tunisia, forced a rotation in the governing elite in Egypt and culminated in civil war in Libya.

Sub-Saharan Africa is, however, experiencing rapid urbanisation, a trend that will increase the opportunity and probably the number of riots and protests since the region is also undergoing changes in regime type and democratising. Both of these are discussed separately elsewhere in this report.

Urbanisation in West Africa is proceeding significantly more rapidly than in East/the Horn of, Central or Southern Africa. In fact, by 2030, West Africa will overtake North Africa as the most urban region in Africa while East Africa/the Horn will remain the most rural.²¹

Apart from the impact of the Arab Spring and urbanisation, it is again important to point out that Africa's population increased by almost 50% from 836 million people in 2001 to 1.2 billion in 2017 (see the separate section below on youth bulge). By that measure the number of riots and protests would have increased as well due to the steady improvements in political freedom during this period – but not to the extent shown in figure 6.

Seven structural drivers of violence in Africa

Beyond external developments such as a potential global economic downturn, broadly seven structural relationships help explain violence in Africa and will largely determine future levels.²² These relate to poverty,

democratisation, regime type, population age structure, repeat violence, the bad-neighbourhood effect and poor governance.

The propensity towards violence emerges from the collective impact and interaction of some or all of these drivers. Even then, violence typically requires politicisation and triggering event(s), such as the decision by the young Tunisian fruit seller Mohamed Bouazizi to self-immolate on 18 December 2010 – the event that is generally accepted as having triggered the Arab Spring.

For that spark to ignite the widespread violence and unrest that followed, societies need to be afflicted by very high levels of social tension and discontent. In this instance that tension was largely the result of limited social, economic and political opportunity in North Africa and the Middle East against a backdrop of relatively high levels of education. In addition, North Africa experienced a downturn in economic growth before the Arab Spring that inevitably increased the sense of relative deprivation.²³


Urbanisation in West Africa is proceeding significantly faster than in East Africa, the Horn, Central or Southern Africa

These structural relations don't operate at the same level (i.e. they have different impacts on the propensity to violence) and the list is not exhaustive. Poverty is a deeper and less direct driver of violence than governance, for example.

There is also no scholarly consensus, for example, on popular causal pathways such as that purportedly linking climate change-induced factors, such as desertification, and the outbreak of conflict in Sudan (Darfur) and Mali, although it is clear that specific events such as droughts sometimes directly affect subsequent violence such as in Ethiopia before the 2016 riots and protests.²⁴

The salience of drivers changes as income levels rise. For example, based on longitudinal exploration of the associated data, Hughes et al. have found that economic downturns and youth bulges tend not to increase the probability of internal war at income levels of \$18 000 (in 2005 dollars at purchasing power parity) and above.²⁵

Figure 7: Schematic of structural drivers of internal violence



Adapted from J Cilliers and TD Sisk, *Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 'more fragile' countries*, Institute for Security Studies, 2016, p 22.

Finally, nothing in this report should detract from the saliency of agency. As the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) noted in their analysis of trends in armed conflict from 1946 to 2016:

Utopian ideologies are a potent threat to peace. In the previous century, fascism and communism were the main obstacles to peace. Today, political Islam presents the gravest challenge.²⁶

It takes opportunity, time, resources, leadership and a sanctuary to translate grievances into a rebellion. By 2018 some of the momentum associated with political Islam imported from elsewhere had dissipated, and political violence in West Africa and the Sahel was once again being driven by deeply felt marginalisation and exclusion from the political centre in countries such as Mali and Nigeria.

High levels of poverty and exclusion

Generally large portions of poor people in a country necessarily correlate with weak state capacity since limited tax revenues accrue to the government which means that it has limited capacity and human resource capacity is generally low.²⁷ Contrary to popular perception, government spending on security in Africa tends to be low when compared to the level of insecurity on the continent. Spending is often skewed towards

providing security for the president or governing elite. Many areas in Africa are unpoliced and national and local government representation is thin or non-existent. Institutions are weak and because of the high levels of poverty, rent-seeking is high.

For these and other reasons internal armed conflict is much more prevalent in poorer countries than in richer countries. The early stages of industrialisation have also generally increased class conflict, with the result that 'for the poorest countries, development may actually stimulate violence'.²⁸

Today, around 37% of Africans (or 470 million people) live in extreme poverty, defined as living below US\$1.90 per person per day. The share of Africans living in extreme poverty is estimated to reduce by about 1 percentage point by 2023, but because of rapid population growth the absolute number of extremely poor people will probably increase to around 513 million people.


Currently the countries with the highest poverty burden (as a percentage of their total populations) are Burundi, Madagascar, the DRC, Liberia, Somalia, the CAR, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, South Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Togo. In those countries, more than 50% of the total population live in extreme poverty.

By 2018 political violence in West Africa and the Sahel was once again being driven by deeply felt marginalisation

Figure 8 presents a forecast of the share of the population in each African country that is likely to still live in extreme poverty by 2023. Given the concomitant lack of government capacity, the countries towards the left of the graph are more likely to experience violence than countries with lower rates of poverty.


It is very unlikely that Africa will meet the United Nations' (UN) Sustainable Development Goal 1 on ending absolute poverty by 2030. Figure 9 presents the absolute number of people in Africa living in extreme poverty in 2013 when Agenda 2063 was launched and a forecast from 2023 to 2030 using a five-year moving average. By 2030 around 535 million Africans would still be living in extreme poverty, representing around 32% of Africa's total population, roughly 5 percentage points less than today.

Figure 8: Africa: Poverty rates per country, 2023



Source: IFs v 7.33 initialising from UNDP data.

Figure 9: Extreme poverty in Africa, 2013 to 2030



Source: IFs v 7.33 initialising from World Development Indicators.

While the level of resources within a country impacts on state capacity, it is generally not the absolute level of resources (or the absence thereof) that leads to conflict but the distribution of resources within and between groupings.

The composition of societies also plays a role. Generally civil wars are more frequent in countries with a dominant population from one or more ethnic, linguistic or religious grouping.²⁹

In the longer term much higher economic growth combined with targeted efforts to reduce inequality would lead to more significant reductions in poverty levels. This requires improving governance and accountability and building a more inclusive economy, including a more productive agricultural sector. The concluding section makes a number of recommendations in this regard.

Democracy and democratisation

Generally, as levels of income and education increase, countries transition from unrepresentative systems first to (thin) electoral democracy.

Should general human development continue, states develop the institutions and norms that embed the rule of law ensuring respect for civil liberties, and constraints on the executive by the judiciary, as well as by the legislature – all characteristic of liberal (substantive or thick) democracy.³⁰ These transitions seldom proceed smoothly or in a linear fashion.

As from 2008 a general democratic backslide has been evident globally, particularly in regions such as

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) distinguishes between five high-level indices of democracy ideals: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian, and collects data to measure these and numerous component indices and indicators. It is a large collaborative project, with headquarters at the V-Dem Institute at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. In version 8 of its data release (June 2018) the project now covers 201 political units with historical data from 1789 to 2017.

Europe and North America where liberal democracy is generally well established. This can be attributed to the decline in democratic rights and freedoms in Western Europe (Poland) and North America (the United States); and also because of autocratisation in countries with large populations such as India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine and the DRC.³¹

The main reason for widespread support for democracy in Africa is the experience of decades of authoritarianism

Sub-Saharan Africa has not suffered from this wider trend of autocratisation since 2008 with Burkina Faso and The Gambia considered 'main advancers' in terms of substantive and positive democratisation changes from 2015 to 2017.³²


Figure 10 uses V-Dem data to show average levels of liberal democracy for five sub-regions in Africa

compared to the global average from 1985 to 2017. The impact of the third wave of democracy that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 is apparent, as are the continued and steady improvements in levels of democracy in Africa since then. In fact improvements in the levels of democracy have outpaced improvements in levels of income and education in Africa.

Democracy has probably also been advanced because of the conditional engagement by Western donors over several decades and indigenous pressures such as the series of national conferences in French-speaking Africa (Benin, Gabon, Congo, Mali, Togo, Niger and former Zaire) that infused a number of countries with pro-democracy reforms.³³

The main reason for early and sustained high levels of democratisation in Africa is, however, simply the lived experience of decades of brutal authoritarianism. Numerous opinion surveys such as those conducted by Afrobarometer that have conducted repeat surveys in more than 30 African countries point to the strong and growing support for democracy in Africa.³⁴

Figure 10: Historical levels of liberal democracy in world and African sub-regions³⁵



Source: V-Dem version 8.

In the 10 years from 2007 to 2017, only two African countries were downgraded from liberal to electoral democracies by V-Dem – Mauritius and South Africa. The latter is likely to regain its liberal classification with the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of the ruling African National Congress in December 2017.

The Comoros and Zambia are now classified as electoral autocracies (both were previously classified as electoral democracies). Tunisia is the only country that V-Dem has transitioned from autocracy to become a liberal democracy in this 10-year period, while Guinea-Bissau and Malawi both advanced to become liberal democracies.³⁶

Given the widespread support for democracy, efforts to roll it back are likely to be met with popular resistance and could result in instability, readily apparent in a number of countries such as Burundi and the DRC. In fact many leaders and ruling parties in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, Togo, Chad and Uganda have taken to manipulating election processes and even their constitutions to retain power.

Generally, political violence is more severe where the integrity of the electoral process appears to be in doubt

Similar efforts will invariably continue to inflame tensions in these countries and elsewhere in Africa. These efforts have, on average, met with only limited success but the potential for an African democratic regression remains real.

A large body of literature has been established as part of the so-called democratic peace theory that posits that, in general, democracies are considered less inclined to be involved in inter-state conflict with other identified democracies.³⁷

Previous work from the ISS concurs with the general consensus in the research community regarding intrastate violence that:

democratic governments use less violence against civilians and engage in less repression [i.e. incidents of one-sided violence involving government forces should be less common and less deadly] but that rebel groups tend to make

more extensive use of violence against civilians when fighting democratic regimes ... because of the stronger constraints on the use of violence against insurgents by democracies compared with other regime types.³⁸

To a large degree democracy expands the conflict management and social absorption capacity of a society, meaning that while democracies may experience more volatility such as riots and protests (in part because reportage is generally unrestricted), democracies have significantly more conflict management abilities.

However democratisation is often turbulent. An example would be events in Kenya following the 2007 elections that left 1 600 people dead and caused massive displacement throughout the country. Elections in many African countries have recently been accompanied by significant violence since they have become the primary means of political (and economic) contestation.

These events are included in figure 5 that show the increase in riots and protests in recent years. Generally, political violence is more severe during the electioneering period in situations where the integrity of the electoral process appears to be in doubt.

Regime type and regime dissonance

In addition to the process of democratisation, the nature of regimes (democratic or autocratic, thin/electoral democracy or thick/liberal democracy) affects conflict vulnerability.

The Polity dataset (now in version IV) pioneered the distinction between democracy and autocracy in its annual data evaluations as two contrasting and distinct regime types – a relationship that has been extended and refined with the V-Dem dataset referred to previously.³⁹

Most African countries are of a mixed/intermediate regime type (so-called anocracies in the combined Polity index), with a score from +5 to -5.⁴⁰ These are countries that have elements of both autocracy and democracy such as where regular competitive elections occur, but for a legislature that exercises little effective control over the executive branch of government. Thus anocracies are:

... characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially

The Polity IV dataset provides a spectrum of governing authority that spans the range from full autocracy through mixed systems (anocracies or intermediate regimes) to fully institutionalised democracies. Its composite score (on a scale from -10 to +10) culminates in a three-part categorisation of ‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5) and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10). The term ‘anocracy’ is an effort to capture the extent to which countries in this range have both autocratic and democratic characteristics. A score of -10 generally indicates a hereditary monarchy and +10 a consolidated multiparty democracy. Principal differences, Polity argues, are to be found in (a) the ways in which executive power is acquired (executive recruitment) and transferred, (b) constraints on executive action, and (c) how much influence public interests and opinion have on the decision-making process (political competition).

Source: Center for Systemic Peace.

vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g. a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader in a coup). Anocracies are a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance.⁴¹

The three broad regime types can be further broken down into subcategories by making a distinction between full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy and autocracy – see examples in table 3.

A number of African countries have been able to make rapid progress as measured using the Polity index. Ghana, for example, improved from a rating of -7 in 1990 to +8 in 2004. South Africa moved from +4 to +9 on the Polity score in three years and Tunisia changed its ranking from -4 in 2010 to +7 four years later.

Kenya improved its ranking by 10 points in 2002 when the country saw the end of decades of dominance by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) which had governed the country since independence in 1963. The Gambia, which saw a major regime change in early 2017,

Table 3: Examples of regime type in Africa: 2017 data

| Regime type (Polity range in brackets) | Example (Polity score in brackets) |
|--|--|
| Full/liberal democracy (+10) | Cape Verde and Mauritius (+10) |
| Democracy (+6 to +9) | South Africa and Kenya (+9); Zambia and Namibia (+6) |
| Open anocracy (+1 to +5) | Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe (+4); Tanzania (+3); Algeria (+2) |
| Closed anocracy (0 to -5) | Burundi (-1) and The Gambia (-5) |
| Autocracy (-6 to -10) | Equatorial Guinea (-6), Eritrea (-7) and Swaziland (-9) |
| Failed/occupied | Libya, South Sudan |

Source: Polity IV.

is expected to move substantially up in the Polity index when new data is released.

The analysis undertaken with V-Dem and Polity data finds that anocracies or intermediate regime types are more unstable than full autocracies which are in turn less stable than consolidated democracies. The relationship takes the form of an inverted U shape with intermediate regime types six times more likely than democracies and 2.5 times more likely than an autocracy to experience new outbreaks of civil conflict. More than half of anocracies/intermediate regime types experience a major regime change within five years and 70% within 10 years.⁴²

Intermediate regimes are more unstable than autocracies which are in turn less stable than consolidated democracies

Anocracies with factionalised party systems, where one ethnic (or other) grouping is advantaged (typical of Ethiopia and others), are particularly vulnerable to political instability. It is for this reason that the comprehensive 2018 World Bank/United Nations report *Pathways for Peace* highlights that: ‘Exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security creates fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances to violence, especially

in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or in the context of human rights abuses.⁴³

Although ethnic composition can play a role, it's leadership and poor governance that often translate Africa's diversity into violence in a context of extreme deprivation and resource competition.

Using the Polity dataset within IFs, the forecast is that 23 African countries could be characterised as anocratic regimes ranging from Zimbabwe (on the verge of exiting its anocratic status by 2023) to The Gambia, an example of a recent, closed anocracy. Ironically, the expected improvements in the Polity score of The Gambia will ensure that it is likely to be less stable (since anocracies are typically less stable than autocracies). Africa is democratising and that process is inevitably unstable and could be violent.

Open anocracies are particularly vulnerable to conflict when the threat of a power transition looms

Those countries most deeply within the anocratic state in 2023 using Polity in IFs could be listed as Algeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Mauritania, Togo, Chad, Angola, Rwanda and Ethiopia. These would be countries where the nature of the regime is inherently more prone to civil conflict.⁴⁴

The nature of violence and instability seems to change as countries transition. Whereas political change is often associated with large-scale violent rupture, democracies have more riots and protests regardless of income, South Africa and Kenya being two examples. Open anocracies (or emerging democracies) are particularly vulnerable to conflict when the threat of a power transition looms, as with elections in Liberia late last year.

An additional step in this analysis is to compare the Polity score for each country with the global average for other countries at similar levels of income and education. That analysis, also done within IFs, reveals the extent to which a country has a regime type that is a mismatch when compared to other countries at similar levels of development (measured using average levels of income and education). The results of this analysis are presented in figure 11. Only countries where the

mismatch is more than 5 (or 25 percentage points) on the Polity score are included.

These two approaches, the nature of the regime and regime dissonance, reveal the tentative and unstable nature of many African regimes.

Analysis using V-Dem data confirms the fragile nature of democracy in Africa. West and Southern Africa generally score better on all indices of democracy (also when considering electoral vs liberal democracy) compared to Central, North and East Africa that score significantly lower.

Whereas levels of electoral/thin democracy in Africa are comparable with global averages, Africa trails significantly below the global average on substantive/liberal democracy. Many African countries show a veneer of democracy, going through the motions of regular elections, but data shows that this thin democracy is unlikely to translate into a lived experience of a regime that actually walks the (democratic) talk.


Finally, ISS research points to two important albeit tentative outcomes that relate to violence as these relate to regime type:

- If a country is significantly more democratic than expected given its levels of income and education (i.e. it has experienced premature democratisation), such an imbalance increases opportunities for corruption and the risk to experience acute episodes of violent protests and demonstrations. Examples include Mozambique (low-income), Kenya (lower-middle-income) and South Africa (upper-middle-income).
- If a country is significantly less democratic than could be expected given its levels of income and education (i.e. it suffers from a democratic deficit), the pressure for political participation and accountability is likely to grow, with Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland most often quoted as text-case examples. Such pressure could lead to instability and even a violent rupture, particularly around leadership renewal. Other examples include North Africa before the Arab Spring but also possibly Ethiopia (low-income), the Republic of the Congo (lower-middle-income) and Libya (upper-middle-income).

Youthful population

Large youth bulges, defined as a large population between 15 and 29 years of age relative to the total

Figure 11: Regime dissonance according to Polity – forecast for 2023 using IFs




Source: Democratic deficit forecast in IFs v 7.33, initiating from Polity data.

adult population, are robustly associated with an increased risk of conflict and high rates of criminal violence in poor countries, particularly when young people lack opportunities in terms of education, training and employment and have no sense of voice and participation.⁴⁵ However youth bulges appear to be more

closely related to low-intensity conflict than to civil war.⁴⁶ Figure 12 shows the current size of the youth bulge in key global regions compared from 2013 and includes a forecast to the final year of Agenda 2063.


Given its current median age of 19, Africa has an exceptionally youthful population. Fertility rates are

Figure 12: History and forecast of ratio of youth (15 to 29) to adults (+15), selected regions



Source: IFs v 7.33 initialising from UNPD.

Figure 13: Forecast of youth bulge per region in Africa and neighbouring regions: 2023



Source: IFs v 7.33.

generally high but differ significantly across regions and countries. North and Southern Africa are the regions most advanced in the demographic transition, i.e. in the process of moving from high death and birth rates to low death and birth rates.

Currently in Niger, Somalia, the DRC and Mali, women will on average have more than six children in their lifetime. At the same time, fertility rates in Cape Verde, Seychelles, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritius are rapidly approaching replacement levels that will see the population size stabilise (generally accepted as occurring at a rate of 2.1 children per woman of childbearing age).

Generally, higher education levels are associated with lower conflict vulnerability, but this depends on the size of the youth bulge, levels of employment and rates of urbanisation.⁴⁷ Many of these correlations were evident in North Africa at the time of the Arab Spring where comparatively high levels of education among the youth


were contrasted with a lack of economic, social and political opportunity.⁴⁸

Figure 13 consists of a forecast of the size of the youth bulge per African sub-region for 2023 compared to two neighbouring regions, Europe and the Middle East. North Africa would have the smallest youth bulge, followed by Southern, Western, East and Central Africa. Although the youth bulge of each region will slowly reduce over time,

sub-Saharan Africa retains its large youth bulge that is significantly larger than other regions globally.

Figure 14 presents the expected size of the youth bulge vs the total adult population in 2023 for each country in Africa. Uganda, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Mali, Angola, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Burkina Faso would in 2023 have the largest youth bulges in Africa and therefore be particularly at risk of criminal violence and

Figure 14: Youth bulge in Africa by 2023: percent of youth (15-29 years) to adults (15+)



Source: IFs v 7.33 initialising from UNDP data.

conflict since all these states also have high levels of unemployment, among others.⁴⁹

Given the size of Africa's youth bulge, governments need to prioritise education and training opportunities and create jobs as high rates of youth unemployment will exacerbate instability.

Figure 15 presents the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) estimate of unemployment for each African country in 2021, the last year for which it has released a forecast.

According to the ILO, South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, Libya, Mozambique and Lesotho have the highest levels of unemployment in Africa.⁵⁰ These are all countries where the informal sector is smaller than could be expected given levels of income. In fact Southern Africa is the only sub-region in Africa with less than half of the employed population in informal employment at 40.2% when employment in the agricultural sector is included, and 36.1% when excluded.⁵¹ Employees with little or no education are highly likely to be employed in the informal rather than the formal sector and are often women (except in North Africa where men are slightly more likely to be employed in the informal sector), youth or elderly and are more likely to be in rural than urban locations.⁵² Whereas the informal sector cushions large populations from abject poverty elsewhere, that seems to be less the case in Southern Africa.

It is often only the imposition of a peacekeeping force that is able to prevent wars from recurring

A recent study on the size of the informal sector globally points to the dominant role that this sector plays in Africa compared to other regions in the world, representing 85.8% of total employment (or 71.9% excluding the agricultural sector).⁵³ Employment in the informal sector is, of course, better than no employment and generally 'not by choice, but as a consequence of a lack of opportunities in the formal economy and in the absence of other means of livelihood.'⁵⁴ Thus:

workers in the informal economy face a higher risk of poverty than those in the formal economy, while informal economic units face lower productivity and income. Indeed, most people

enter the informal economy not by choice but as a consequence of a lack of opportunities in the formal economy and in the absence of any other means of earning a living.⁵⁵

A causal link between youth unemployment and violence in developing countries is widely assumed, particularly crime, gang violence and domestic violence, but solid evidence remains insufficient.⁵⁶

Repeat violence

Once a country has experienced large-scale violence, the chances of recurring violence is strong – evident from a previous section in this report that presented the historical trends in armed conflict in Africa and the extent of repeat violence in selected African countries.

In recent years the trend towards conflict recurrence has been more common than the onset of new conflicts on the continent. Generally, conflict is not spreading to so many new geographical areas; but 'rather the rise of new actors and motivations for conflict' in existing conflict areas. For several years these new actors and motivations have been driven by at least one party affiliated with some strand of political Islam.⁵⁷ According to the *World Development Report 2011*, '90% of the last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years'.⁵⁸

According to PRIO:


around 60% of conflicts recur. Globally, cycles of war tend to repeat themselves in the same countries, inhibit development and spill over into the neighbourhood.⁵⁹

The reasons for repeat violence are not difficult to understand since it reflects unaddressed grievances, implying that lasting peace will not be achieved until these issues are resolved.

It is often only the imposition of a peacekeeping force that is able to prevent wars from recurring, but in the longer term, fundamental political, social and economic reforms are required to ensure durable peace. Based on extensive research, PRIO offers a number of explanations as to why conflict recurs, some of which overlap with the presentations in this report:

conflicts between different ethnic groups strengthen divisions and hatred and make durable peace less likely; poor and underdeveloped countries

Figure 15: Unemployment rate in African countries by 2021



Source: ILO.

are more likely to see conflict resumption because groups opposing the state have little to lose; lack of democracy prevents peaceful resolution of conflict; settlements without a clear victory create incentives to continue fighting to improve one's position; and a lack of a security guarantee provokes resumption as a means to avoid marginalization by antagonistic groups. Lastly, natural resources have been shown to be related to conflict recurrence by exasperating grievances, providing a means of financing rebellion, and increasing the value of controlling the state. ... Indeed, the seeds of war are often sown during the war. Atrocities associated with the violence of armed conflict ... can fester during periods of low-level and latent conflict.⁶⁰

PRIO expands on this theme by pointing to the extent to which many of the consequences of armed conflict, such as the spread of young males with military experience, and the circulation of arms, have not been quantified. Then, in the wake of civil conflict the trend is often for the state to become increasingly exclusive if not repressive, fuelling resentment and grievances.

Bad-neighbourhood effect

The spillover or bad-neighbourhood effect is a further consideration. Being situated in a conflict-ridden region is a major risk factor and these countries are far more likely to experience the spillover effect of instability.⁶¹

According to the *World Development Report 2011*, a 'country making development advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7% of GDP every year for each neighbour in conflict'.⁶² Tanzania has for example received over 250 000 refugees from Burundi since the start of the political crisis there at the end of 2014 – in addition to the impact of violence in the DRC with which it also shares a border (Lake Tanganyika).

Neighbouring countries that are themselves in turmoil offer safe havens for rebel groups and insurgents that can operate across borders.⁶³ There are also other negative effects from proximity to countries in conflict or those with high rates of violent crime and illicit trafficking, and, conversely, positive effects accrue from being in a neighbourhood largely at peace.⁶⁴

Poor governance

Previous work by the ISS⁶⁵ indicates that at low levels of income and development, the nature of the governing

elite is more important for economic growth and the achievement of positive development outcomes than the extent to which countries are democratic or authoritarian. Hence countries that are fortunate enough to produce a developmentally oriented governing elite grow much more rapidly, particularly if this is in the form of a cohesive governing party or coterie of leadership that is clear in its pursuit of development.

Growth is, however, in itself insufficient – demonstrated by recent events in one of Africa's most rapidly developing countries, Ethiopia, and the need to institute a national state of emergency in October 2016 after a decade of remarkable economic growth in response to widening discontent.

At low levels of income and development, the nature of the governing elite is most important for economic growth


The difference between stable and unstable poor countries is often a political elite that, through its control of government, effectively distributes services (particularly to different ethnic groups), develops sustainable institutions, minimises corruption and encourages the development of the private sector while itself focusing on equity during growth.

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) defines governance as 'the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens'.⁶⁶

It measures a country's overall governance performance across four key components of governance, namely safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. Figure 16 presents the results from its most recent report.

Countries that score the worst in the overall governance index are Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, the CAR, Sudan, Libya, the DRC, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Burundi. All of these countries were allocated a score below 40 out of a possible 100. Given its high levels of inequality and unemployment it is probably only its relatively high scores of governance (and democracy)

Figure 16: Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2017 report)



Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

outcomes that have been able to constrain violence in South Africa.

Figure 17 presents a forecast of the Gini index for African countries in 2023 using IFs with South Africa continuing to be the most unequal country in Africa, followed closely by Botswana, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Comoros, Zambia and the CAR.⁶⁷ High levels of inequality reflect a government that could largely be looking at the interests of specific sectors or elites (or unwilling to undertake the measures to address inequality).

Beyond the high levels of inequality in Southern Africa (a legacy of colonialism, white settler dominance and apartheid), governments in the region are dominated by former liberation parties that have grown complacent in power without having been able to shift the inherited patterns of inequality. With no prospects for political, generational and policy renewal that could impact on these structural imbalances, the promise inherent in regular free and fair elections is now also being frustrated.

This is perhaps best reflected in the recent change in top leadership in Zimbabwe that appears to offer little substantive change to a country that has levels of income lower than when its white minority government declared unilateral independence from Britain several decades ago.⁶⁸ Eventually, without leadership and political renewal, countries inevitably grow below their potential and social challenges continue to fester.

This is particularly symptomatic of Central Africa where the recent downturn in global commodity prices has exacerbated an already fragile situation. Governments are unable to deliver the most basic services yet the political elite have been exceptionally creative in designing strategies to retain their hold on power. This is largely through 'personalised presidential systems supported by patronage networks sustained mainly through elite bargaining and collusion with traditional rulers'.⁶⁹

Alongside a history of conflict and chronic underdevelopment, the countries in this region suffer severe inequality, rely heavily on primary commodities, will continue to have a large youth bulge and have some of the most oppressive regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷⁰ In these circumstances future instability and even a violent rupture is virtually ensured.

Perceptions about the distribution of wealth between groups and levels of equity in a society play an important role and fuel discontent. Inequality changes slowly. In the long term education is the great leveller in providing improved opportunities to poor people. The relationship between higher levels of education and income is strong.

As pupils progress from primary to secondary and eventually enter tertiary education, their subsequent remuneration prospects improve, eventually quite dramatically when comparing earnings of workers with secondary versus tertiary qualifications.

But improving education levels is a generational challenge. Since 2000 it takes around 11 years of dedicated effort to increase average education levels in Africa by one year, a period that has come down steadily from 14 years shortly after independence.⁷¹

In Southern Africa the promise inherent in regular free and fair elections is being frustrated


In the medium term the provision of jobs in the formal sector can structurally shift inequality and reduce poverty. This is because employment in the formal sector generally locks in worker rights and annual increases, and provides protection against unreasonable exploitation.

In the short term the provision of cash grants has proven particularly successful in reducing poverty and inequality. This is a strategy that is particularly well suited for use in poor countries that discover new mineral resources such as the gas potential of Tanzania and Mozambique.

The highly capital-intensive enclaves of economic wealth often associated with gas and oil extraction generally have little or no backward linkages to the hinterland within which they are located, and governments in these countries have to devise additional strategies to help deal with the associated impact.

From a developmental viewpoint Africa doesn't necessarily require democracy (although democracy is much preferred as a system of governance), but a governing and administrative elite that has the 'genuine developmental determination and autonomous capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental goals'.⁷²

Figure 17: Forecast of Gini in Africa in 2023



Source: IFs v 7.33 initialising from World Development Indicators.

The problem, previous work by the ISS points out, 'is that African states are often weak and inefficient, and that its elites, while no more greedy or self-serving than those elsewhere, tend to extract resources for "safe" investment outside the continent'⁷³ – which is generally different to the extent to which corrupt proceeds elsewhere are 'reinvested' locally.

Despite the successful authoritarian exceptions such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, authoritarian governments have generally been an unmitigated disaster for Africa's development – the reason for the strong support for democracy on the continent.

Within a democratic context the quality of elections and the selection of leaders are however crucial and robustly associated with improved human development. This is because electoral competition incentivises politicians to provide genuine public goods and services, and improved government effectiveness can therefore strongly be associated with electoral democracy.⁷⁴

Climate change?

As climate change alters the nature of resource dependence, it may have consequential effects on states with large natural resource benefits. But eventually people fight based on the mobilisation of perceptions of exclusion and injustice. Thus a report by Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan has found that:

water shocks may lead to social conflict via their effects on resource competition, poor macroeconomic outcomes, and reduced state capacity ... deviations from normal rainfall patterns have a significant effect on both large-scale and smaller-scale instances of political conflict. We find that ... wetter years are more likely to suffer from violent events. Extreme deviations in rainfall – particularly dry and wet years – are associated with all types of social conflict (violent and nonviolent, government-targeted and non/government-targeted), although the relationship is strongest with respect to violent events, which are more responsive to abundant rather than scarce rainfall.⁷⁵

Africa will experience widely different effects from climate change in the coming decades that will strain the ability of the environment to support local populations under current developmental conditions. Some areas of the continent are likely to become warmer and drier, and

thus experience more frequent and severe droughts close to major population centres (e.g. Cape Town).

Other parts of the continent may experience widespread drought and potentially famine without proper government intervention, or experience more extreme rains, which could also adversely affect crops and food security.

Improved government effectiveness can be strongly associated with electoral democracy

Current evidence on the impact of climate change and conflict remains inconclusive, however. For example:

the evidence from East Africa is that no single factor can fully explain conflict and the displacement of people. Instead, long-term population growth, short-term negative economic growth and extreme political instability seem to be primarily linked to conflict. ... socio-political factors [are] more important than climate change.⁷⁶

Prospects for 'Silencing the Guns by 2020'

The preceding sections have indicated that the structural drivers of conflict are both complex and country-specific. They are also interlinked with external factors such as the impact of radical ideology, currently in the form of political Islam. States in sub-Saharan Africa are younger and poorer (in terms of income) than most of their peers in the international system. Colonialism and its legacy severely disrupted their natural evolution, and political violence has been a central feature of the region's post-colonial history.⁷⁷

Against that backdrop the gains in peace and stability over the past two decades are impressive. These have included significant multilateral, regional and bilateral efforts and investments in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping⁷⁸ and peacebuilding.

The launch of Agenda 2063 in 2013 coincided with a strong upward trend in wars and minor armed conflict to peak in 2014-15 as the impacts of the Arab Spring, the spread of terrorism and external intervention in Libya washed across the continent.⁷⁹

The subsequent trend has again been downward with violence involving militant Islamist groups in Africa

(and state responses) remaining the most resilient. Should Africa be able to effectively respond to violent Islamist extremism (al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in particular), levels of armed conflict in Africa would rapidly decline.

It is possible to now tentatively list those countries that are at greatest risk of armed conflict in Africa in 2023 according to the seven different drivers.

- Levels of poverty are particularly high in Burundi, Madagascar, the DRC, Liberia, Somalia, the CAR, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Togo (in excess of 50%).
- The following countries have a large regime type dissonance: Libya, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Egypt, Morocco, the Republic of the Congo, Comoros, Eritrea, Cameroon, Sudan, Angola, The Gambia, the CAR, Mauritania, Somalia, Kenya, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Liberia.⁸⁰
- The anocratic regime type of the following countries is likely to ensure a degree of turbulence: Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the DRC, Mali, Somalia, The Gambia, Guinea, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, the Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Gabon, Cameroon, Egypt, Tanzania, Morocco, Algeria, São Tomé & Príncipe, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Togo, Mauritania, Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan.
- The youthful population age structure is a problem in all African countries, with the exception of Djibouti, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritius and Seychelles. Although South Africa has a relatively small youth bulge it has the highest unemployment rate in Africa and is also exceptionally unequal.
- Large-scale repeat violence is a huge problem in the CAR, Somalia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Chad, the DRC, Nigeria, Mali and Cameroon.
- Almost all countries are affected by the bad-neighbourhood problem except for some countries in Southern Africa and island states.
- Poor governance is particularly characteristic in Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, the CAR, Sudan, Libya, the DRC, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Burundi (scores below 40% on the Ibrahim index).

Somalia, the DRC, the CAR, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, Libya, Cameroon, Angola and Chad are at most risk of armed conflict

The countries that feature in three or more of these categories are: Somalia (five times), the DRC, the CAR, South Sudan, Sudan (four times), Burundi, Libya, Cameroon, Angola and Chad (three times).⁸¹

With the exception of Angola and Kenya, these findings correlate with the first 36-month pilot project data release from the Violence Early-Warning System (VIEWS) project by UCDP in July 2018. VIEWS considers Angola less at risk, and Kenya more at risk.



AFRICA WILL EXPERIENCE
WIDELY DIFFERENT
EFFECTS FROM
CLIMATE CHANGE


The reasons for the difference is that Angola has, in accordance with the preceding analysis, very poor governance and a large youth bulge; and that ViEWS is concerned that Kenya will be affected by spillover conflict from Somalia in the form of attacks from al-Shabaab. The ViEWS forecast for state-based violence at national and sub-national level is reproduced graphically in figure 18.⁸²

Armed violence is steadily declining, but riots and protests are increasing. While armed conflict is often more prevalent in rural areas, riots and protests are

overwhelmingly urban phenomena, particularly as the share of Africa's urban population living in slums is steadily rising. Clearly conflicts over land, property rights and services for urban residents need to be addressed by integrated urban development strategies.⁸³

Table 4 identifies (a) the seven African countries that have experienced the largest number of riot and protest events, (b) those that have experienced the most fatalities, and (c) the seven African countries that have experienced the most events per million people. All are for the period 2011 to 2017, i.e. the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Figure 18: Geographical three-year forecast from ViEWS for state-based conflict



Source: ViEWS (Hegre et al. 2018, <https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/views/historic-forecasts/>). Ensemble predictions, run ID r.2018.07.01.

Table 4: Riots/protests from 2011 to 2017 (with population size and median age for 2017)

| Rank | Largest number of events from 2011 to 2017 | Most fatalities from 2011 to 2017 | Number of events by population size from 2011 to 2017 |
|------|---|---|---|
| 1 | South Africa (57 million people, median age 27 years) | Somalia (15 million people, median age 17 years) | Ethiopia (107 million people, median age 19 years) |
| 2 | Egypt (100 million people, median age 25 years) | Nigeria (190 million people, median age 18 years) | Chad (15 million people, median age 16 years) |
| 3 | Nigeria (190 million people, median age 18 years) | Egypt (100 million people, median age 25 years) | Niger (21 million people, median age 15 years) |
| 4 | Tunisia (12 million people, median age 32 years) | South Africa (57 million people, median age 27 years) | Cameroon (24 million people, median age 18 years) |
| 5 | Algeria (41 million people, median age 28 years) | Sudan (41 million people, median age 19 years) | Rwanda (12 million people, median age 20 years) |
| 6 | Kenya (50 million people, median age 19 years) | DRC (81 million people, median age 17 years) | Madagascar (26 million people, median age 19 years) |
| 7 | Somalia (15 million people, median age 17 years) | Libya (6 million people, median age 18 years) | Angola (30 million people, median age 17 years) |

Source: ACLED Africa 1989 to 2017, population data from IFs v 7.34.

Five of the seven countries in this last column are below the African average for levels of urbanisation, pointing to the salience of other factors, such as median age, rates of population growth and levels of democracy.

Countries that have more events per million people (the right-hand column) generally have a young population. When the level of democracy for the countries in the right-hand column is compared with the averages of others at similar levels of education and income these seven countries either have significantly more or less democracy than otherwise expected.⁸⁴

As expected, countries with large populations such as South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria feature prominently in the number of events and also appear in the ranking of countries that have the most fatalities. With the exception of Ethiopia, countries with smaller populations had more riots/protests from 2011 to 2017 than countries with larger populations.

In conclusion: prospects for progress

This report presents a big-picture analysis of recent conflict trends in Africa based on an analysis of the structural drivers of conflict with a time horizon to 2023, sometimes extending the horizon of that forecast to

2030, such as with poverty, and to 2063 to illustrate the momentum associated with Africa's youthful population.

Africa will remain turbulent because it is poor, young and badly governed, but also because it is growing and dynamic. Many African countries are experiencing a political awakening that is uncharacteristic of a continent that has long suffered silently at the hands of foreign intervention and autocratic exploitation from their own elites. Unlike the situation elsewhere, Africa is not experiencing a democratic regression and protest is more acceptable public behaviour in many countries since an increased number are electoral democracies. This is reflected in the changed nature of violence where the ballot, not the gun, is slowly becoming the main source of political contestation, accompanied by a shift in focus to instability in urban rather than rural areas.

In a small number of countries violence has gained self-reinforcing dynamics. New social tensions have emerged, such as increased criminality, parallel economies, youth violence, and gender-based and sexual violence. It will take time for this momentum to subside – and it often requires a comprehensive political response.⁸⁵

What is striking is the extent to which countries with small populations (Liberia, Somalia, the CAR and

Burundi) have an extraordinarily high casualty burden. Should Africa and the international community be able to bring stability to these arguably more manageable instances, it would have a disproportionate impact on continental levels of armed conflict, turbulence and suffering.

Passing reference has been made to the extent to which Africans are leading in the prevention and management of conflict in Africa, largely through the African Union (AU) but also in the role played by regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States and Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The establishment of the AU's Peace and Security Council and the resources dedicated to conflict prevention and management from Africa and the international community has provided African ownership to an unprecedented degree.

The risk of conflict recurrence drops by as much as 75% in countries where UN peacekeepers are deployed

Clearly violence, instability and armed conflict in Africa will remain a large concern requiring an ongoing and dedicated response from the AU, its member states and the international community for the provision of continued aid and humanitarian assistance to poor countries, in peacekeeping in fragile ones and towards the promise of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Peacekeeping remains the most important (and effective) means through which to respond to conflict. PRIO holds that the risk of conflict recurrence drops by as much as 75% in countries where UN peacekeepers are deployed.⁸⁶

In the long term only much more rapid, inclusive economic development combined with good governance and developmentally oriented leadership will make Africa less vulnerable to violence and instability.

A few African countries are expected to grow very rapidly, particularly some low-income African countries, but generally growth after the 2007-8 global recession is slower in Africa (and globally) than before. It is for this reason that the *Pathways for Peace* report summarises its expansive work by noting that 'the best way to prevent societies from descending into crisis, including but not limited to conflict, is to ensure that they are resilient through investment in inclusive and sustainable development'.⁸⁷ The report continues:

Preventing violence requires departing from traditional economic and social policies when risks are building up or are high. It also means seeking inclusive solutions through dialogue, adapted macroeconomic policies, institutional reform in core state functions, and redistributive policies. ... Inclusive decision making is fundamental to sustaining peace at all levels, as are long-term policies to address economic, social, and political aspirations.⁸⁸



DETERMINED EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA ARE ESSENTIAL

Unlocking rapid, inclusive economic growth for the long term requires a change in the productive structures of African economies, particularly by moving labour and capital into higher value sectors – manufacturing in particular.⁸⁹ Africa also needs to unlock its huge agricultural potential, changing the slow improvements in average yields, expanding land under irrigation and reducing the amount of food that is lost from production to consumption. Then Africa needs to find ways of getting more rapidly to its demographic dividend, i.e. decreasing the number of dependents relative to people of working age (typically defined as those in the age bracket 15 to 64). Even then Africa will only be able to reap that benefit if it sufficiently invests in education, service delivery and jobs.⁹⁰

None of the above are possible without determined efforts to change the way in which Africa is governed and without much greater attention by organisations such as the AU to the quality of governance on the continent. Democracy in much of Africa is constrained from delivering on its development potential because of the lack of governance capacity, the thin quality of electoral democracies and the extent to which neopatrimonialism undermines electoral democracy.⁹¹

Although it is very unlikely that Africa will be able to ‘silence the guns by 2020’, or indeed even by 2023, progress is evident across the continent

Although it is very unlikely that Africa will be able to ‘silence the guns by 2020’, or indeed even by 2023, progress in advancing peace, stability and growth is evident across the continent. Much still needs to be done, however, particularly in rolling out basic functions of governing such as effective documentation of populations and cross-border management, improving the state of African police, military and intelligence functions, management of migration, refugees and displaced persons and the transformation of the criminal justice system.

Work by the ISS and a recent report from UNDP come to the same conclusion, namely that action by security forces, particularly the military and police, often serve as the ‘tipping point’ by affected individuals to join an extremist group and participate in violent events. Such action is often the ‘killing or arrest of a family member or friend’.⁹² This leads to the obvious conclusion that security sector reform is perhaps the single most important component in countering violent extremism.

Notes

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- 1 See, for example, S Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity*, Penguin Books, London, 2011.
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- 3 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Militant Islamist Groups in Africa Show Resiliency over Past Decade, Spotlight, 28 June 2018, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militant-islamist-groups-in-africa-show-resiliency-over-past-decade/?utm_source=June+2018+Month+in+Review&utm_campaign=June+2018+Newsletter&utm_medium=email.
- 4 E Alda and J Sala, Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel Region, Stability, *International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1), p. Art. 27. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ea>.
- 5 See, for example, S Commins, From Urban Fragility to Urban Stability, Africa Security Brief no 35, June 2018, African Center for Strategic Studies, <https://africacenter.org/publication/from-urban-fragility-to-urban-stability/>.
- 6 J Cilliers and J Schünemann, The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?, Institute for Security Studies, 15 May 2013, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace>; J Cilliers, Africa's conflict burden in a global context, Institute for Security Studies, 22 October 2014, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/africas-conflict-burden-in-a-global-context>; J Cilliers and S Hedden, Africa's current and future stability, Institute for Security Studies, 20 November 2014, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/africas-current-and-future-stability>; J Cilliers, Violent Islamist extremism and terror in Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 1 October 2015, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/violent-islamist-extremism-and-terror-in-africa>; J Cilliers, Future (im) perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa, 1 October 2015, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/future-im-perfect-mapping-conflict-violence-and-extremism-in-africa>.
- 7 <http://ucdp.uu.se/>.
- 8 www.acleddata.com/.
- 9 www.pardee.du.edu.
- 10 UCDP defines such events as 'an incident where armed force was used by an organised actor against another organised actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a specific date', <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ged/ged172.pdf>, p 9.
- 11 Egypt was added to the UCP region of Africa for this calculation.
- 12 The support of Rwanda and Uganda enabled Congolese rebel Laurent-Désiré Kabila to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko during the First Congo War. Then, after Kabila was installed as the new president, he broke ties with both countries who retaliated by invading the DRC, starting the Second Congo War. A Thompsell, the Second Congo War, ThoughtCo, updated 6 March 2017, <https://www.thoughtco.com/second-congo-war-43698>.
- 13 MONUC, the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo, was renamed MONUSCO in 2010 also using the French acronym for Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo.
- 14 While per capita fatality measures can be helpful to get a better sense of the conflict burden across countries, it does obscure sub-national discrepancies. For instance in Nigeria, people in the north are significantly more likely than people in Lagos to experience violence at the hands of Boko Haram.
- 15 M Croicu and R Sundberg, UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Codebook Version 17.1, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, p 9.
- 16 Ibid., p 6. K Eck and L Hultman, UCDP One-sided Violence Codebook, version 17.2, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-onesided-172.pdf>, p 2. R Sundberg, K Eck and J Kreutz, UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook, version 17.2, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-nonstate-172.pdf>, p 2. L Themnér, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, version 17.2, 2017, pp 1-2.
- 17 Large spikes of non-state conflict in the DRC; one-sided violence in Liberia and the DRC; state-based conflict generally declined in that year. UCDP GED data.
- 18 Large spikes of non-state conflict in Libya, Nigeria and the CAR; one-sided violence in Nigeria and the CAR; state-based conflict spiked in Cameroon and South Sudan. UCDP GED data.
- 19 The recent increase in fatalities from one-sided violence is largely as a result of terrorism in Cameroon (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad against civilians), Nigeria (government forces against civilians), Somalia (al-Shabaab against civilians), violence in Sudan (government forces against civilians), South Sudan (government forces, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in opposition against civilians), the CAR (anti-Balaka, Lord's Resistance Army, the Popular Front for the Rebirth of Central African Republic, Union for Peace in the Central African Republic against civilians) and the DRC (government forces, Allied Democratic Forces, Mayi-Mayi against civilians). UCDP recorded fatalities from non-state violence in 2014 and 2015 in the DRC, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and South Sudan and most prominently in Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and the CAR. Since 2013 state-based conflict has seen the majority of fatalities in Cameroon, the DRC, Egypt, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. UCDP also recorded fatalities from state-based conflict in Algeria, Angola,

- Burundi, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali and Mozambique.
- 20 According to the ACLED codebook: 'A protest describes a non-violent, group public demonstration, often against a government institution. Rioting is a violent form of demonstration.' C Raleigh and C Dowd, *Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook 2015*, https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf, p 9.
- 21 See J Schünemann and C Aucoin, *African Urban Futures*, African Futures Paper no 20, Institute for Security Studies, 23 November 2016, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/african-urban-futures>. Note that East and West Africa are significantly more populous than North, South or Central Africa.
- 22 This section draws upon J Cilliers and J Schünemann, *The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?*, Institute for Security Studies, 15 May 2013, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace>.
- 23 In respect of the latter, Hughes found that 'a 1.0 percent drop in a moving average of economic growth (carrying 60 percent of the moving average forward) is associated with a 0.04 point increase on a 0-1 scale for the rate of internal war'. B Hughes, *Exploring and Understanding International Futures: Building a Global Forecasting System*, Elsevier, forthcoming, 180. Also see E Ianchovichina, L Mottaghi, and S Devarajan, *Equality, uprisings, and conflict in the Arab World*, Economic Monitor, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015, executive summary at <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/publicdoc/2015/10/403861445437269211/MEM-2015-ex-sum-ENG.pdf>.
- 24 See, for example, H Buhaug, N P Gleditsch and OM Theisen, *Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict*, Working Paper, Social Dimensions of Climate Change workshop, Washington, DC: Social Development Department, World Bank, 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDCCWorkingPaper_Conflict.pdf. Also see P Andrews-Speed, R Bleischwitz, T Boersma et al., *The struggles for land, energy, food, water, and minerals*, Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2012, 3-4.
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- 27 Poverty is complex and affected by many considerations such as household size and composition. As a result, attempting to quantify poverty remains an immensely challenging task. People in formal employment may benefit from decent working conditions and still be below the poverty line, despite earnings that are in excess of the poverty line, because they share their income with many dependants. On the other hand, people in informal employment (where income levels are often very low) may not be poor. International Labour Office, *Women and Men in the Informal Sector: A statistical picture*, Third Edition, Geneva, 2018, p 48.
- 28 H Hegre, T Ellingsen, S Gates and NP Gleditsch, *Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992*, American Political Science Association, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1, (March 2001), p 37, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117627>.
- 29 H Hegre, T Ellingsen, S Gates and NP Gleditsch, *Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992*, American Political Science Association, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1, (March 2001), pp 37 & 40-41, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117627>.
- 30 For the V-Dem Institute liberal democracy is measured as the existence of electoral democracy in combination with three additional components: rule of law, constraints on the executive by the judiciary, and constraints on the executive by the legislature. After the third wave of democratisation that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, levels of democratisation steadily improved and globally peaked around 2004, remaining flat for several years thereafter. When democratisation scores globally are weighted by population size (to determine how many people as opposed to the number of countries who experience democratisation or autocratisation), the 'last six years [2012 to 2017] alone have unfortunately brought us back 25 years in time.' See A Lüührmann, V Mechkova, S Dahlum, L Maxwell, M Olin, CS Petrarca, R Sigman, MC Wilson and SI Lindberg, *State of the world 2017: autocratization and exclusion?* 18 May 2018, Routledge, forthcoming, p 1, also A Lüührmann, V Mechkova and SI Lindberg, Section 1: *State of the World 2017 – Liberal and Electoral Democracy*, in V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, University of Gothenburg, 2018, p 16.
- 31 V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, University of Gothenburg, 2018, p 19. An analysis of the global trend by V-Dem provides a picture of how ruling elites in many democratic countries are pursuing autocratic agendas. Elections and the institutions surrounding elections are visible but government censorship of the media and harassment of journalists are increasing as leaders incrementally constrain the space for autonomous academia, civil society organisations and cultural institutions. A Lüührmann et al., p 12.
- 32 V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, University of Gothenburg, 2018, pp 20-21.
- 33 J Cilliers, *The future of democracy in Africa*, African Futures paper no 19, Institute for Security Studies, 20 October 2016, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-democracy-in-africa>; also see National Conferences in French-speaking Africa at https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conf%C3%A9rences_nationales_en_Afrique_francophone.
- 34 www.afrobarometer.org/.
- 35 North Africa consists of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco


- and Tunisia. West Africa consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. East Africa consists of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Central Africa consists of Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DRC, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. Southern Africa consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- 36 V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*, University of Gothenburg, 2018, pp 20-21.
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- 39 MG Marshall and G Elzinga-Marshall, *Global Report 2017: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility*, Center for Systemic Peace, 27 August 2017, Vienna, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2017.pdf>, p 29.
- 40 V-Dem distinguishes between different types of democracy each with its own index and does not provide a comparable classification system on a single index.
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- 42 M Marshall and B Cole, *Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility*, *Global Report 2011*, Center for Systemic Peace, 12; JA Goldstone, RH Bates, DL Epstein, TR Gurr et al., *A global model for forecasting political instability*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1) (2010), p 195; CH Knutsen and HM Nygård, *Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi-Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?* *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 59, No. 3, July 2015, pp. 656-670, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12168>. H Hegre, T Ellingsen, S Gates and NP Gleditsch, *Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992*, *American Political Science Association, The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1, (March 2001), pp 33-48, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117627>.
- 43 World Bank Group, United Nations, *Pathways for Peace – Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, 2018, Washington DC, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28337/9781464811623.pdf?sequence=12&isAllowed=y>, p xviii.
- 44 Other countries that IFs forecasts to also be anocratic in 2023 (with scores between +5 to +3) are: Zimbabwe, Mozambique, DRC, Mali, Somalia, Guinea, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Algeria (scores -3 to -5) Morocco, Egypt, Cameroon, Sudan, Republic of Congo and The Gambia.
- 45 H Urdal, *Demography and Armed Conflict: Assessing the Role of Population Growth and Youth Bulges*, Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Working Paper No. 2, 2011; World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, p 6.
- 46 H Hegre et al., *Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010-2050*, *International Studies Quarterly*, 2012, p 6.
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- 48 Although the size of the youth bulge is often considered an important factor in the Arab Spring, the size of the bulge in North Africa is considerably lower than that in the rest of Africa, pointing to the role played by other complementary considerations, most likely the low levels of political, economic and social inclusion in the region compared to other countries at similar levels of income and education. Tunisia had the lowest poverty rates among these countries but inequality is significantly lower in Egypt. The average income levels of Libya and Algeria are substantially higher than that of Tunisia and Egypt. Mobile phone subscriptions were highest in Libya. Country level differences are important. For example the youth bulge in Tunisia (where the Arab Spring started) was 8 percentage points below the average in Algeria, Egypt and Libya (all at roughly 42/42% in 2010). Yet Tunisia, a much smaller and more homogeneous country, is the only one to have seen a successful transition from autocracy to democracy. Some reasons for the heterogeneous outcomes are self-evident, for example Egypt and Algeria both have strong central governments and large security structures while Libya was a dysfunctional state that descended into civil war even before the NATO military intervention that tipped the country into widespread instability and chaos. L Carl Brown, *The Tunisian Exception*, *Informed Comment*, 14 October 2014, <https://www.juancole.com/2014/10/the-tunisian-exception.html>.
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