BRITISH RED CROSS’ HAITI URBAN REGENERATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME (URRP)
FINAL EVALUATION (Summary)

Contains:
1. Management response | English
2. Evaluation summary | English

Photo © Swoan Parker/BRC

Refusing to ignore people in crisis
BRC welcomes the conclusion from the Final Evaluation of BRC’s Haiti Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP) that the programme “represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work”. The scale of devastation following the 2010 Haitian earthquake, as well as the complex urban environment in which affected communities lived, posed unprecedented challenges for those seeking to undertake meaningful recovery activities. With the benefit of hindsight, there were undoubtedly parts of the programme approach and decisions taken that could have been improved. However, it remains correct to acknowledge that the British Red Cross’ intervention was “successful in helping thousands of vulnerable people recover their homes and their communities, and move on with their lives.”

Evaluation Recommendations¹:

BRC generally accepts all the recommendations presented by the evaluators.

Regarding Recommendation 1, and the “establishment of international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts to help identify an on-going source of appropriate human resources”, BRC notes that it did have existing registers, but its members were either unavailable or lacked the skillset that the urban context required. BRC did engage a large number of delegates, often in non-traditional areas of expertise for the organisation. Learning from the challenges associated with engaging appropriate resources in a competitive market, BRC has since made a commitment to move away from direct implementation of construction programmes in the future.

BRC also notes Recommendations 2 and 6 regarding the engagement and inclusion of local authorities with caution. BRC acknowledges that it is absolutely correct to engage local authorities at all stages of a programme and notes that it did commit extensive time and resources to achieving this aim under the URRP. However, the challenges of effectively engaging the local Haitian authorities to support the implementation and maintenance of the infrastructure work made the desired outcome unlikely within a meaningful timeframe. An under-resourced, overwhelmed and dysfunctional administration made it extremely difficult to arrange even a face-to-face meeting, let alone engage on a meaningful level to support programmes in an inner city slum.

BRC also highlights Recommendation 3 concerning beneficiary involvement in housing design. While some did not receive the final designs and layouts they had requested, this was not due to a lack of participatory approaches, but rather resulted from Haiti’s notoriously poor and dangerous building practices, as well as the need to ensure an equitable use of space and access.

Evaluators’ Lessons Identified:

BRC agrees with the seven lessons identified by the evaluators and will ensure that efforts are taken to apply them to similar interventions in the future.

¹ As numbered in AdviseM’s Evaluation Summary document.
Notes

Urban Context

The Final Evaluation references the challenges of working in the densely populated Delmas 19, which was characterised by endemic urban violence and a lack of community cohesion, and was also extremely vulnerable as a result of underlying poverty as well as the effects of the earthquake. BRC has undertaken extensive analysis of its engagement in Haiti and other contexts to inform programme approaches in such contexts. However, the social, political and economic networks of any densely populated, urban environment are incredibly complex and ceaselessly changing. At the time, BRC took the risky decision to locate its entire project team in the heart of the community, investing heavily to develop a ‘Community Mobilisation Team’ (CMT) in an effort to foster greater links, transparency and accountability with the community it was seeking to support. While the relationships and tensions between BRC and the community ebbed and flowed, it is important to highlight that BRC was able to work with the entire community to plan and design the URRP. The fact that there were no major security incidents, and that BRC was able to successfully close all areas of its intended programmes, speaks to the level of acceptance with which the URRP was received.

Community Engagement and Participatory Approaches

BRC intentionally pursued a participatory approach in the design and delivery of the URRP, which increased levels of engagement and transparency. However, it also led directly to delays in programme delivery, as it took time to consult and engage with the multitude of participants with vested interests, from single individuals to local unelected committees up to Mayoral elected authorities. The CMT was central to the URRP delivery, convening the community and programme team, communicating information and mitigating challenges from pre-design to post-exit phases. Taking on the community mobilisation role in the absence of Red Cross volunteers, the CMT comprised a number of community members, and came to be seen as independent from any vested interest.

However, reaching consensus amongst stakeholders in an urban environment, let alone a dense urban slum such as Delmas 19, is incredibly difficult. Many of the delays incurred were due to the scale of the beneficiary assessment process, which ensured accurate and triangulated vulnerability data, but also involved negotiating with a large community of residents to determine the most appropriate programme option. With finite time and resources, and a physical location that restricted what was structurally possible (e.g. it was not appropriate to locate latrines and septic tanks inside the rear of each dwelling due to basic sanitation and access issues), compromise from all sides was to be expected in the final specification and coverage of support.

BRC did engage with local authorities to ensure that all activities were in line with local standards and national strategies. However, meaningful engagement was extremely hard to foster. Haiti’s civil administration was badly affected by the earthquake and overwhelmed by the aftermath. The country’s seemingly constant political turmoil would often create paralysis in government offices, making it extremely difficult to get traction and support for BRC’s intervention in Delmas 19.

As Delmas 19 sits at the foot of the hills that surround Port-au-Prince, and parts of BRC’s target area, such as Cité 4, were located approximately two metres below the existing canal, the intervention area was extremely vulnerable to flooding. The Final Evaluation highlights that the canal and other drainage and paving infrastructure works “had the greatest and most positive impact upon the community”. Table 1 outlines the final infrastructure outputs, which differ from those quoted by the Evaluation Team. While the infrastructure projects were identified through the PASSA, then designed and developed with widespread input from the community affected, the Evaluation accurately highlights the challenge of ensuring effective maintenance in the future. There were numerous attempts to create a shared responsibility within the community for minimum on-going care and maintenance of the infrastructure, but only time will tell whether this physical backbone of the community will survive if neglected.

Any attempt to support housing and shelter solutions in a context such as Haiti, especially Delmas 19, was going to be challenging. The paucity of the land tenure system in Haiti is well known, and Delmas 19 provides its own challenges, being located on what essentially used to be a swamp and with a population comprised mainly of squatters. BRC took on a mixed modality approach to supporting Automeca Camp residents made homeless by the earthquake, which included house construction and repair, cash grants for repair, and financial and technical assistance to find, secure and pay for new rental accommodation through the IFRC’s Integrated Neighbourhood Approach (see Table 2). The construction and housing intervention comprised the largest part of the $4.48m budget. It is fair to say that BRC was not initially set up for such a construction project, was slow to scale up, and found it difficult to attract and retain appropriate staff, relying on some key dedicated individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction Intervention</th>
<th>Number/size</th>
<th>Housing Intervention</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canal</td>
<td>302m</td>
<td>New houses</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketplace</td>
<td>191m²</td>
<td>Household toilets</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar lamps</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Repairs (including 101 cash grants)</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paving</td>
<td>4,595m²</td>
<td>Households supported through INA</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>1,962m</td>
<td>Masons completing apprenticeships</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community clinic building</td>
<td>134m²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public areas</td>
<td>Basketball court Community garden Concrete planters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
who were able to drive and deliver all the agreed activities.

While the initial PASSA was taking place in Delmas 19, the wider humanitarian sector was investing heavily in thousands of transitional shelters. BRC sought to train and use local labour for construction, and supported each recipient of a complete shelter to formally register with the authorities, in order to legally demonstrate ownership. BRC also helped the Delmas 19 residents agree and submit a formal planning application to the Mairie’s office, which required laborious consultation and negotiation.

Undertaking housing construction was one of the most sensitive interventions amongst the community. Beneficiary identification consumed a large amount of time and resources, where BRC went to great lengths to ensure it was targeting those households who were most in need and unable to undertake their own recovery. When negotiating rights of way and housing design in a densely-built environment, quite literally every inch is haggled over. For many, Haiti has proved to be an incredibly difficult context in which to engage in housing construction. The housing stock inside Delmas 19 has changed remarkably for the better and residents are without doubt better prepared to withstand future disasters – not only through the houses BRC built, which were designed to withstand and recover from major earthquakes, but also by implementing property rights and construction project management skillset. BRC will therefore not engage in future in the implementation of housing construction on this scale, but will seek to partner with other organisations instead.

Livelihoods

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods intervention</th>
<th>Tally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Businesses receiving loans</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance groups formed</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance members</td>
<td>1,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health insurance beneficiaries</td>
<td>Over 7,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attempting to strengthen the economic security of residents and businesses in Delmas 19 was imperative to ensure a truly integrated recovery model. The range of livelihoods interventions was multifaceted, including business loans, establishment of savings groups, health insurance, literacy training and vocational training for youth. However, despite heavy engagement in sensitisation and training, impact in this sector was the hardest to achieve. BRC has reflected heavily upon the challenges of engaging in livelihoods in Haiti.

One of the largest obstacles was the predominance and influence of unconditional cash grants in the relief and early recovery phases of the earthquake response. This created a very high expectation for unconditional cash dispersal and undermined longer-term approaches such as the mutual savings groups (MUSOs), which are a well-understood and oft-utilised approach in rural parts of Haiti.

The evaluators label the URRP programme “bold and brave”, and this is perhaps most appropriate when describing the livelihoods approach. BRC’s programme timeframe was limited, given finite funds, and had a clear strategy of focusing on earthquake recovery rather than establishing a long-term presence. It is accepted that in order to change attitudes towards savings in a meaningful and measurable way, a much longer programme lifecycle was needed. This short timeframe was compounded by BRC’s inability to attract and retain appropriate staff for the Haiti URRP. However, the intervention was brave in that it attempted to energise a complex local economy through jobs and resilience-building savings schemes. There are many factors that will have an influence on the future prosperity of Delmas 19 and its residents, and only time will tell whether the small loans provided to 26 businesses, or the effort that went into creating 81 savings groups, will have a lasting effect. However, to not engage in livelihoods as part of the URRP would have been to neglect a fundamental area of recovery. BRC continues to learn in the area of livelihoods, and has committed to better understanding how to use cash effectively in the early stages of a response, as well as how to responsibly engage in livelihoods interventions later on in the disaster lifecycle.

Community Governance

The evaluation highlights the inadequacies of engaging with unelected and unrepresentative local community groups and committees. It was a constant challenge for BRC throughout the programme lifecycle to engage and consult with those who would speak loudest, while trying to support those who were most vulnerable. However, BRC was rigorous in attempting to engage with the entire community, whether through a committee or otherwise. The CMT was a constant presence in the community, gathering feedback and recording every question and complaint, with a commitment to providing a response. With the introduction of 81 MUSOs, a multitude of structured groups sprang up who were able to mobilise and represent themselves. BRC underpinned its entire engagement with the community with complete transparency. Every committee meeting was minuted, and every recruitment process was detailed and made public with clear selection criteria (there were over 1100 applicants processed for the 50 mason roles from the community). While there will always be vested interests and powerful individuals in every context with whom to contend, BRC undertook more community participation and employed greater levels of transparency in Haiti than it had on any previous major programme.

Application of Lessons Identified

BRC has also undertaken to learn more from Haiti than it has done from previous programmes. In addition to this evaluation, BRC carried out regular audits of the URRP to ensure that appropriate levels of risk management and corporate assurance were applied and the programme team undertook a thorough learning review.

The URRP was an unusual BRC international programme, differing significantly in the type of programme activities, scale of funds, and the undertaking of a direct implementation role rather than the normal supporting or enabling partners. The programme therefore required different programme governance and management oversight, with tighter quality assurance and accountability mechanisms. BRC invested considerable efforts and resources to introduce and develop stronger
and more robust programme management for the URRP, such as accountable Major Programme Boards, comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks, and a Programme Cycle Methodology, none of which were in place at the outset. These programme management systems are now standardised and adapted for other BRC programmes, and two standalone workstreams have been established to continue enhancing the effectiveness of BRC support systems and HR recruitment and retention, learning from the Haiti experience.

Working in partnership with the residents, BRC was able to deliver a large and complex recovery programme in Delmas 19 following the devastating 2010 earthquake. Working in a participatory manner, BRC was able to design, develop and deliver all aspects of the URRP, and will commit to undertaking an impact study to better understand its full effects. BRC is wholeheartedly committed to ensuring it is accountable to those it seeks to support and will continue to work as part of the global Red Cross Movement to respond to humanitarian needs around the world and put people in crisis at the heart of everything it does.

David Peppiatt
Director of International, British Red Cross

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Cost (to the nearest $1,000)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to Shelter and Housing Solutions</td>
<td>$ 5,123,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Infrastructure Construction</td>
<td>$ 2,512,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-finance support</td>
<td>$ 1,316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business loan support &amp; training</td>
<td>$ 1,196,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latrine Construction and Sanitation</td>
<td>$ 557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Health and Hygiene Promotion Activities</td>
<td>$ 201,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Insurance</td>
<td>$ 233,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Trainings &amp; governance (literacy, DPPR, waste mgmt)</td>
<td>$ 497,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction awareness raising, training &amp; governance</td>
<td>$ 353,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian Red Cross Support</td>
<td>$ 152,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$ 12,140,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 3
BRITISH RED CROSS HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

12 January
EARTHQUAKE STRIKES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
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**Tropical Storm Isaac**

**Hurricane Sandy**

**Chikungunya epidemic**

**GENERAL PROGRAMME**

**Camp work**

Response to recovery phase

URRP Phase 3

Planning and transition phase

URRP evaluation

**CONSTRUCTION**

Pilot houses

Canal

Marketplace

Zones 3 and 5

Tropical Storm Isaac

**LIVELIHOODS**

URRP microfinance programme

URRP SME programme

Automec camp clearance

SME business loans transferred

Microcredit loans transferred

Transfer of revolving microfinance and SME funds to community boards

**COMMUNITY CAPACITY BUILDING**

Health insurance coverage

Literacy initiative

Health and DRR campaigns

Community and committee training

**2010**    | **2011**    | **2012**    | **2013**    | **2014**    | **2015**    |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
Final Evaluation of the British Red Cross’

HAITI EARTHQUAKE 2010 RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PROGRAMME: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Presented to the British Red Cross
Submitted by Advisem Services Inc.

Ottawa, Canada
March 2016
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# Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEDP</td>
<td>Association des entrepreneurs pour le développement de Delmas (Entrepreneurs’ Association for the Development of Delmas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINEPA</td>
<td>Direction nationale de l’eau potable et de l’assainissement (Haitian National Water and Sanitation Directorate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>Pound sterling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Haitian Red Cross Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFP</td>
<td>Institut national de formation professionnelle (Haitian National Training Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTPTC</td>
<td>Ministère des Travaux publics, Transports et Communications (Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MuSo</td>
<td>Mutuelle de solidarité (community savings and credit association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASSA</td>
<td>Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRC Movement</td>
<td>International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and micro-enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URRP</td>
<td>Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE CONTEXT

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti near Port-au-Prince. More than 2 million people were affected—around 220,000 were estimated dead and 1.5 million were left homeless and living in one of about 1,200 temporary settlements.

The earthquake and subsequent aftershocks also caused extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas. The impact of the earthquake’s effects was magnified by the chronic poverty and underdevelopment that have long plagued Haiti and were further compounded by the subsequent cholera epidemic in October 2010 (see Box 1).

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC Movement) launched its biggest single country response, sending 21 emergency teams to provide food, water, shelter and health support. As part of this effort, the British Red Cross (BRC) implemented its Haiti 2010 Earthquake Response and Recovery Programme, which officially began in April 2010.

THE PROGRAMME

The Haiti Earthquake 2010 Response and Recovery Programme was a multifaceted initiative implemented by BRC over a period of five years ending in June 2015. It sought to provide both an immediate response to the most vulnerable earthquake victims, as well as lasting solutions for their recovery.

The programme evolved out of a process through which BRC learned from and built on the work it did. Following an early review in 2010, BRC saw the potential for an integrated approach with displaced camp populations that would combine livelihoods, shelter, and water and sanitation interventions. When the land owner evicted residents from the Automeca camp later that year, BRC saw an opportunity to use such an approach to help displaced families as they return to their neighbourhood and start rebuilding their lives. This final stage of the initiative, which ran from June 2012 to June 2015, was called the Urban Regeneration and Reconstruction Programme (URRP).

URRP was designed to meet the needs of people returning from Automeca camp to their original neighbourhood of Delmas 19, an inner-city slum of Port-au-Prince. A community-driven initiative, it promoted the regeneration of some of the most affected and vulnerable areas of the neighbourhood.

URRP delivered assistance to 4,000 households located mostly in Delmas 19, more specifically in three locations referred to as the “target area,” “zone 3” and “zone 5” (see in Figure 1). Specifically, the target area consisted of four small communes named Aloulou, Cité 4, Roman and St-Ange; Zone 3 extended across four small communes named Haut Spatule, Bas Spatule, Haut Renoncule and Bas Renoncule; and Zone 5 was made up of five small communes named Vye Blan, Tchocho, Italis, Mayôt and Kajou.

Box 1. The Situation in Pre-Earthquake Haiti

Before the earthquake, Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America, was facing numerous problems that made the Haitian context already extraordinarily complex. Among them were:

- Port-au-Prince, the capital city, is in fact a high density conurbation of several municipalities without common planning or urban authority aside from that held by the Government of Haiti. The need for land planning to solve this problem was well stated.
- An estimated 70% of the urban population lived in slums, and the same percentage of the urban population lived in rented houses.
- Rental arrangements are usually for one year, and fees must be paid in advance at the end of the previous year.
- Not all of the population is registered.
- Very low coverage of public services (water and sewer systems, electricity, waste management, etc.) in both urban and rural areas.
- Poor quality of infrastructure and housing stock; lack of urban planning and public spaces, especially in Port-Au-Prince.
- High population density, especially in the main urban areas.
- Deficient transportation and logistics infrastructure.
- Lack of land tenure and property clarity and a significant number of homeless people.
- Insecurity, poverty, inequity and lack of livelihood opportunities.
- Governmental institutional capacities were very weak. A United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti was established on June 2004 by the Security Council in the aftermath of an armed conflict that spread to several cities across the country.
Figure 1
Location of Programme Activities

The total budget for URRP was USD 12 million, broken down as follows:

- Shelter and infrastructures: 55%
- Livelihoods: 20%
- Public health: 11%
- Community Governance: 14%

**URRP Expenditure, by Programme Component**

The programme integrated a series of inter-related interventions grouped under three distinct components:

- **Housing and infrastructure:** Under this component, households received different packages of sheltering solutions, including house reconstruction, repairs, provision of repair materials, and technical assistance in seismic and general building and reconstruction techniques. The programme also built or repaired public infrastructure (rehabilitation of a canal to improve flow and drainage, walkways, public space, market), and provided complementary support in water and sanitation and public health education.

- **Livelihoods:** Under this component, the programme provided training and loans to small and micro-enterprises (SMEs), established saving groups called community savings and credit association (MuSos) to improve access to credit, and provided health insurance coverage.

- **Community governance:** Under this component, the programme provided guidance and capacity building in disaster risk reduction and protection, and engaged communities, Delmas mayor’s office and other local stakeholders (committees) in decision-making, planning and implementation to promote long-term sustainability.

BRC led the program from on-the-ground in Haiti, reporting to its head office in London. It also coordinated with multiple stakeholders (see Box 2).
EVALUATING THE RESULTS

Purpose of the Evaluation

BRC commissioned a final evaluation of the programme to reflect on and learn from its experience in Haiti. The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

- To provide a summation of the extent to which BRC’s engagement in Haiti achieved its objectives across different interventions.
- To assess the effectiveness and impact of the integrated approach adopted in URRP in Port-au-Prince’s Delmas 19 area.
- To identify lessons (positive and negative) for improved programming and to inform strategic policy and planning.
- To inform management decision-making for ongoing and future work.

This report is a shorter version of the full evaluation report presented to BRC.

Methodology

An independent team of evaluators conducted the evaluation between June and September 2015. The team included: Maryvonne Arnould, Louis-Pierre Michaud, Aaron Budd, Patrick Robitaille and Luc Bourgie. The methodology included: a desk review (in-depth examination of 84 documents); individual interviews with 63 key stakeholders; consultations with 210 people in focus group discussions; a paper survey administered to collect information from 383 URRP beneficiaries living in Delmas 19; and a debrief with programme management in Haiti and London. The information gathered was triangulated in order to arrive at the findings recommendations and lessons presented herewith.

The evaluation team also travelled to London and Haiti to meet with people involved in the programme and to observe the operation first hand. The following are the evaluation team’s main findings.

Achievements

The programme has helped thousands of vulnerable people recover their homes and their communities, and move on with their lives. The following are some key achievements.

- Infrastructure upgrades had perhaps the most significant, positive and widespread impact on the community. Specific achievements included construction of 302 linear metres of new concrete and block canal, paving of 2,300 square metres of drainage, walkways and public space, and building a new marketplace (see Picture 1) with 34 stalls, a lottery shop and a barber shop. The programme also installed 26 solar-powered streetlamps. Canal and drainage interventions have had a significant and positive impact on the community and will greatly increase people’s resilience to future disasters. Capping the canal has provided a safe route for accessing shelter and other support and has helped prevent garbage from entering the

Picture 1. Front of marketplace.
canal system. The canal route, in combination with the paved paths, also provides the safest escape route in the event of another earthquake.

- The programme constructed 149 new houses with septic tanks using a basic, but flexible, design that was resistant to earthquakes and floods. It also repaired another 32 houses and distributed 101 cash grants to households so they could make their own repairs. In addition, and in collaboration with the ILO, the project trained 50 masons and provided other training related to construction and repair. This not only established a sustainable source of expertise right in the community; the training and accreditation increased the employability and earning potential of these community members.

- The programme also reduced health risks in the community by improving water supply and providing better access to facilities for sanitation and waste disposal. It promoted hygiene, the use of latrines and hand, washing and raised awareness about prevention and treatment of diseases (malaria, dengue, chikungunya). All beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluators reported that areas targeted by the programme were much cleaner now than before. There were also reported improvements in hygiene and disease prevention (see Box 3).

- The programme also helped people improve their ability to earn a living by helping them establish small businesses or learn new skills. URRP supported 26 SMEs with the provision of loans carrying no interest and no collateral requirement, and training. The amount of the loans granted fluctuated between USD 1,000 and USD 4,000, with the exception of one large loan of USD 15,000. As part of the housing and infrastructure component, the programme also trained masons and other construction workers. In addition, it created and trained 81 MuSos benefitting 2,000 people with loans averaging USD 123. It also provided health insurance coverage to SME and MuSo participants and their families—around 7,000 people. Members participating to focus group discussions (see Picture 2) confirmed that MuSos were very helpful in providing access to financial resources and had enabled them to conduct their income-generating activities or pay for household expenses and/or their children’s school fees.

- URRP took an innovative, community-driven approach to the regeneration of Delmas 19. Using a consultation process called the Participatory Approach to Safer Shelter Awareness (PASSA), BRC not only raised the community’s awareness on their built environment, but also fostered its engagement to improve its living environment and therefore helped the programme respond more closely to beneficiaries’ needs. It also trained participants to continue using PASSA as the community’s ongoing approach to problem-solving and planning. The project also established strong ties with the Delmas mayor’s office.

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**Box 3. Testimonies from Beneficiaries**

- "If we don’t know what causes the disease we cannot protect ourselves and our family. I know now that the water jar needs to be covered, and that stagnant water attracts mosquitoes and needs to be treated to prevent catching malaria or chikungunya.”
  — A focus group participant

- "Thanks to what we have learned with BRC, we now understand that hygiene and cleanliness in the household and surroundings prevent the occurrence of disease.”
  — A female focus group participant

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**Picture 2. Focus group discussion.**
Challenges

The project also faced a number of challenges that will affect the depth and sustainability of its impact. These included the following.

- Planning and implementing programme activities in a slum environment was an ongoing challenge. It made it more difficult to identify the causes of vulnerability—that is, those that already existed before the earthquake as opposed to those that were caused by it. Moreover, the slum environment made it more challenging to establish trust, solidarity and collaboration among participants and with programme staff.

- BRC made considerable effort to consult with the community and local government and provided many opportunities for local input. Still, there were misunderstandings by and disappointment among the beneficiaries about some aspects of the houses which could have been avoided through better engagement and communication with the community.

- As part of its efforts to engage the community, BRC worked with “zonal committees” that had sprung up spontaneously after the earthquake. However, these bodies were not representatives of the community, as BRC had assumed. The legitimacy of these committees was one of the most difficult issues confronting the programme.

- Difficulties in recruiting construction delegates, local authority planning requirements, poor labour productivity, security issues and disease outbreaks all caused delays in construction.

- Loan repayment for SMEs and MuSos has been very slow and a high percentage of loans remained unpaid by the end of the project. The problem of loan repayment has prompted BRC to assess the market to identify a sustainable supplier for managing the SME programme in the future. It was determined that the most appropriate solution was to set up a formal SME community committee—legally constituted as the Entrepreneurs’ Association for the Development of Delmas (AEDP)—and to transfer funds to this body. BRC also set up formal MuSo committees to be responsible for follow-up of the loan repayment after the end of the programme. However, the burden on these committees will be great, including the pressure from zonal committees wanting to access funding.

- The capacity of national and local government bodies to maintain the infrastructure is weak and they have limited resources. The Delmas 19 community has not shown signs of being proactive. It is not clear from the evaluation who will take on ownership and maintenance of these systems.

- The governance mechanisms established and involvement of community groups are unlikely to be sustainable over time which, in turn, could threaten the sustainability of other aspects of the programme.

Appropriateness and Coherence

BRC’s decision to launch the programme was bold and brave, especially as Delmas 19—where urban violence is high and the sense of community and solidarity weak—was a particularly challenging environment. The programme was well-justified, evolving over time from the initial response and recovery stages to meet the longer-term needs of people returning to their communities. URRP aligned with the Haitian government’s strategy to move people out of camps and return them to safe homes, and Delmas 19 was a priority neighbourhood—60 percent of those being evicted from the camps were returning there. The project components responded to key needs expressed by the beneficiaries.
themselves. Livelihoods support, governance and resilience were all sound approaches to ensuring that the project would achieve sustainable results.

However, despite its strengths, URRP was ambitious, and BRC lacked both the time and the critical means to fully realise its ambitions in the face of numerous constraints. Some of these were internal (it took nearly a year to set up the full URRP team of delegates and to organise support services); others were external (the challenging socio-economic context of an urban slum like Delmas, space in the city was limited, the land tenure system was complex, and there was a lack of defined and practical urban planning processes in Delmas).

BRC also made a major contribution to the operation of coordination mechanisms within the RCRC Movement, in order to prevent duplication of efforts and maintain a central focus on equitable housing solutions. In support of this role, BRC seconded senior delegates to IFRC and HRC and nurtured a spirit of close collaboration between both organisations. In the early stages of the programme, BRC worked fairly closely with HRC, playing an instrumental role in developing the latter’s strategy for the 2010 to 2015 period. Nevertheless, as the programme evolved it became increasingly difficult for BRC to align its objectives and strategies with those of HRC, which were focused on community health, disaster preparedness and the administration of a blood bank.

Efficiency

In short order, BRC established the equivalent of a medium-sized NGO in Haiti, operating in a complex and challenging environment. In implementing its response and recovery programme in Haiti, BRC had to pursue avenues that are outside its normal mandate and expertise, which made it very difficult to create adequate control frameworks. Key informants interviewed by the evaluation team argued that ongoing resources put into administration and human resources were insufficient for an operation of such magnitude. The head office in London had limited capacity to assist with logistics, finance and human resources, and some of its personnel lacked field experience. Numerous problems in recruiting and retaining key staff resulted in implementation delays and involved more than 50 delegates in the programme.

Because URRP was unlike BRC’s usual programming, considerable time and effort was spent developing new tools for addressing the programme’s specific needs. A positive outcome has been the new systems that are now being rolled up and used for a series of responses in other countries, such as Nepal. Overall, however, the programme lacked of proper monitoring and evaluation tools.

URRP suffered significant delays in implementation, caused by a mix of external factors, staggered decision-making, recruitment issues, and operational challenges. The project was extended several times and the delays made it difficult to synchronise activities. In mid-2013, a major programme board was established to oversee operations and ensured that BRC’s corporate strategy, policy and procedures were an integral part of programme development, implementation and learning. The board has fostered a change of culture characterised by more involvement, less siloing and piece-meal working, and bringing the right people around the table to discuss and make decisions. Financial management greatly improved with the adoption of an activity-based budget, leading to more efficient use of resources.

Impact

It is too early to determine with any certainty the long-term effects of the programme. Nevertheless, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and survey results have all confirmed that the PASSA consultation process not only gave the community a voice and a way of channelling their concerns to

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1 With an annual turnover of some GBP 5 million.
BRC, but also introduced a structured, logical approach to identifying needs and/or problems, setting priorities and adopting a plan of action. The infrastructure and housing initiatives have improved the quality of life in Delmas 19. The construction of the canal and other infrastructure has probably had the greatest and most positive impact on the community.

The community is livelier and cleaner than before. People have become more aware of health issues because they have been sensitised to the risk associated with mosquitoes and stagnant water. Testimonies from Delmas suggest that the hygiene campaign conducted by BRC has inspired people to adjust their behaviour to minimise potential sources of contamination. Waste disposal habits have changed: 41% of survey respondents said they now place waste in garbage bags rather than throwing it in the canal. People are also much more informed about diseases such as fevers and diarrhoea and methods to prevent them—65% attributed this to the health campaign. The community has gained from such developments that promote the adoption of sustainable healthy habits.

The support provided to SMEs has slightly enhanced the potential for business development by building capacity in administrative and financial management and improving access to credit. Despite some challenges faced by the SMEs, support provided by BRC has sparked economic activity in the community. Programme activities have also contributed to generating employment opportunities. The training of masons and other construction workers has given several beneficiaries new employable skills. The MuSos introduced savings and financing instruments to marginalised people who otherwise had no access to credit and even less to banks.

**Sustainability**

Implementation delays, the challenging socio-economic context of Delmas 19, and shortcomings in community governance have all limited the sustainability of the programme’s results. The community is fragmented and remains highly vulnerable. Some livelihoods results have been achieved, but the sustainability of MuSos remains a concern. Certainly, the community in Delmas 19 is more organised now than before, and PASSA consultations have given them some tools and understanding about organising. However, community-level governance remains fragile. BRC’s focus was on delivering housing, infrastructure and livelihoods support as a means to improve resilience, but what the community needed to build its self-reliance was a sound and functioning governance model. Although BRC involved the appropriate government authorities in planning and decision-making, it failed to establish, early on, mechanisms to ensure government’s responsibility for maintaining infrastructure. Given the issues with the zonal committees, it is questionable if they provide the best structure on which to build for sustainable community governance. There are no indications in the behaviour of community members to suggest that they are motivated to maintain the infrastructure themselves.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The evaluation team proposes the following to improve the implementation or delivery of future programming.

1. Appoint a team experienced in construction and livelihoods to prevent delays associated with lengthy recruitment and to be able to initiate recovery interventions as soon as possible. Establishing an international roster of livelihoods, infrastructure and governance experts would help identify an ongoing source of appropriate human resources.

2. Fully incorporate local authorities into the planning and implementation of infrastructure interventions to ensure that ownership and maintenance of infrastructures will continue to be their responsibility.
3. Ensure that beneficiaries are involved in and adequately informed about housing designs, to reduce the gap between their expectations and what is delivered. Use models and other public-friendly ways of communicating design and make sure that was is represented is exactly the same as what is delivered.

4. Expand the timeframe for developing livelihoods interventions, especially if it is supporting the establishment of savings groups, which require significant sensitisation and regular monitoring and coaching over time. Usually such interventions require at least two years (two full savings cycles) and follow-up lasting from six months to a year. Consider using proven methodologies and adopting existing software to monitor the health of savings groups. One example is VSLA Associates’ Savings Groups Portfolio Tracking System, an off-the-shelf application used to monitor savings groups.

5. Pay more attention to the legitimacy and representativeness of the local structures with which to collaborate, or limit the influence of non-representative groups in the early stages and throughout the programme, so they do not interfere with the implementation of its interventions.

6. Consider applying processes that shift responsibilities to appropriate governmental authorities once the programme is finished. These processes should be discussed early on in the programme, with a view to ensuring the viability of interventions.

7. Prepare and deploy advocacy and awareness-building efforts with the community and authorities to ensure that mechanisms are discussed and established, with a view to ensuring the sustainability of interventions.

8. Enforce a more rigorous monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approach that features a clear, overarching vision of outcomes to be achieved (logic model), a precise description of how programme components fit into each other, the development of “SMART” (which stands for Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timely) indicators, and the utilisation of effective tools to measure progress in achieving the expected results (performance measurement framework). Assign M&E delegates in the field to ensure timely, complete and accurate data collection. BRC should plan sufficient investments in M&E training, coaching and supervision to ensure that team members have all the required skills.

LEARNING FROM THIS EXPERIENCE

The evaluation has identified seven lessons stemming from the implementation of URRP:

1. Rapid scale-up of large programmes can only be achieved if significant inputs are invested to ensure that administrative, human resources, finance and logistics systems are in place, as well as to support recruitment and training for local and international technical programme staff.

2. In developing a large programme, particularly in a complex environment such as post-Haiti earthquake, it is essential that the focus and scale of any intervention are consistent with the organisation’s mandate, experience and delivery capacities. A thorough risk assessment, with appropriate governance sign-off, should be undertaken where such parameters will be exceeded.

3. It is essential to develop strong relationships with government authorities, not only to ensure they are informed, but also to foster their collaboration in planning efforts and their involvement in important decisions; this way, buy-in can be secured, and responsibilities can be formalised and handed out beyond the programme completion period, thus promoting greater sustainability.
4. In urban settings, it is essential to have good knowledge and understanding of the social fabric and local economic and political structures, with a view to identifying and selecting the proper community structures with which to work, set common interests, foster beneficiary engagement and promote sustained participation in order to facilitate programme delivery.

5. The sequencing of livelihoods activities, from emergency to recovery, needs to be clearly defined and communicated to beneficiaries and must be sustained with effective, ongoing technical support and expertise from head office and from the field.

6. The creation of savings groups may require more time and a different sequencing of operations than anticipated at first, due to the need for programmes to sensitise beneficiaries beforehand in order to generate their trust and collaboration, train them in and build their understanding of financial concepts and administrative procedures, and give them a chance to work together to apply new concepts they have acquired.

7. A sound understanding of local culture and behaviours and a good knowledge of the national language are critical assets for communicating effectively with members of the community and for fostering their collaboration.

CONCLUSION

The evaluation team believes that, even though the results appear to be mixed, URRP still represents a major achievement, considering the conditions that prevailed in Delmas 19 and the significant constraints within which BRC had to work.

On the whole, the housing and infrastructure component achieved fairly good results, especially in public infrastructure. The livelihoods component achieved modest results and could have done more, had it not been for the lack of time and the high turnover in programme staff. Of all three components, governance was the most severely affected by the programme’s tight implementation deadlines. Some progress was made in building the skills and capacities of local stakeholders; however, in the absence of any meaningful follow-up, this progress is unlikely to be sustainable.

Unlike emergency humanitarian aid efforts that rely primarily on short-term technical assistance, development interventions need to address longer-term issues, such as sustainability and empowerment. Nowhere is this difference more evident than in the programme’s governance component. BRC sought to promote a significant shift in mind-set within a poor and highly vulnerable community; however, this was a goal that required far more time and greater investment than the programme could afford. For instance, the training on good governance practices was useful, but without subsequent coaching—especially in a setting where people were so disempowered—it had little lasting impact. Similarly, supplying funding directly to MuSos not only ran against one of the fundamental operating principles of community savings groups, but was ill-advised in a context where survival instincts outweighed community spirit. These longer-term issues are best addressed by building relationships with communities and creating partnerships with local stakeholders. They also require an intimate knowledge of the local context and the way targeted beneficiaries think. An organisation from outside the country and with no history in the community can only gain such knowledge by building close partnerships with trustworthy, local counterparts that can implement programme activities at the community level, and continue as a local resource after the programme ends.
ABOUT THE EVALUATION TEAM

Advisem Associates is a Canadian consulting firm that specialises in conducting evaluations, surveys and studies to determine the success of international development programming around the world. Its clients include donor agencies, international organisations, foundations, NGOs and government departments. Through its team of experienced partners and associates, Advisem provides its clients with enlightened advice, while adhering to the highest quality and ethical standards.

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