LESSONS FROM AN EVALUATION OF THE EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING (ECB) PROJECT

A DECADE OF LEARNING

Lessons from an Evaluation of the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project

September 2014
Disaster Relief Location

CLOSE GATE
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<td>AIM</td>
<td>Accountability and Impact Measurement</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>BMGF</td>
<td>Bill &amp; Melinda Gates Foundation</td>
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<td>CBHA</td>
<td>Consortium of British Humanitarian Associations</td>
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<td>CDMP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Disaster Management Project, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>CEP R&amp;R</td>
<td>Country Engagement Plans Review and Revision</td>
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<td>CLR</td>
<td>Consortium Learning Review</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>CSAS</td>
<td>Consortia Self-Assessment Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development (UK aid)</td>
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<td>DRG</td>
<td>Disaster Resilience Group</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster risk management</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>Emergency Capacity Building Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENHAnce</td>
<td>Expanding National Humanitarian Ability training program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHP</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Platform</td>
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<td>GEG</td>
<td>Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: The Good Enough Guide</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Project</td>
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<td>HEA</td>
<td>Humanitarian emergency assistance</td>
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<td>HPN</td>
<td>Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee, an IWG member</td>
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<td>ISDR</td>
<td>UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWG</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Working Group (ECB agencies plus IRC)</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Joint needs assessment</td>
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<td>KIRA</td>
<td>Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lngo</td>
<td>Local non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCI</td>
<td>Mercy Corps International</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;L</td>
<td>Management and leadership (core skills for ENHAnce)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDP</td>
<td>National Staff Development Program</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAHO</td>
<td>Pan American Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDRA</td>
<td>Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROCOSI</td>
<td>Programa de Coordinación en Salud Integral (Integral Health Coordination Program), a Bolivian network of non-profit organizations</td>
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<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Federation</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIDECI</td>
<td>Vice Minister of Civil Defense, Bolivia</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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### Other Terms

- **CARE International**: International humanitarian and development organization and ECB Project lead
- **Caritas Internationalis**: Confederation of 164 Catholic relief, development and social service organizations
- **ECBinter-active**: Regional Learning Conferences hosted by the ECB Project in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Horn of Africa, Indonesia and Niger for project agencies to share collaborative work and training experience, focusing on the project’s core themes of accountability and impact measurement, disaster risk reduction and national staff development
- **NetHope**: New-generation information technology collaboration of 33 international NGOs and ECB collaborator
- **People in Aid**: Membership organization that improves organizational effectiveness in the humanitarian and development sectors
- **Sphere Project**: Voluntary initiative of humanitarian response practitioners to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance, author of the Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
JAPAN LEVELED BY 9.0 QUAKE...
Executive Summary

Over the past decade, the global humanitarian agenda has moved from saving lives and providing basic services in emergencies toward building resilience to crises. In 2005 the United Nations launched a process to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian response. As a result, in 2011, the United Nations (UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agreed on a set of actions focusing on stronger leadership, more effective coordination and improved accountability. This transformation requires new competencies and approaches to capacity building.

In 2003, seven relief and development organizations conceived a project to strengthen the capacity of the humanitarian and emergency assistance (HEA) community to deliver humanitarian aid. The resulting Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project aimed to improve the quality and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response by improving field-level capacity, collaborating with other partners and organizations and enhancing resources for field set-up, communication and training. These initiatives focused on the themes of (1) staff capacity building, (2) accountability and impact measurement and (3) disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. In Phase I, the project conducted research and produced field tools and guidelines. In Phase II, interventions were implemented through consortia in Bolivia, Bangladesh, the Horn of Africa, Indonesia and Niger.

This report presents the findings of a study commissioned by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and conducted by the Disaster Resilience Group to distill learning from the ECB Project and other major HEA capacity building interventions over the past decade. The evaluation included a desk review of capacity building practices and trends, surveys of HEA and ECB stakeholders and the use of ECB Project materials and interviews with the ECB Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG), project staff and field stakeholders in Niger, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa. Field visits were made to Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, London and Niger. The evaluation examined the relevance of the competencies built by the project vis-à-vis HEA needs and trends, the viability and success of the project’s approaches to improve capacity, the targets of its capacity building initiatives and the outcomes and sustainability of the project’s initiatives.

Emergency Response Competencies Built by the ECB Project

The evaluation surveyed the competencies prioritized by the broader HEA community and found that the ECB Project responded effectively to needs identified in areas associated with successful emergency capacity building, described below.

The project addressed human resources by commissioning a Humanitarian Competencies Study, developing a Staff Capacity Framework and sharing learning on accreditation systems, best practices, staff retention and surge capacity with humanitarian networks, platforms and fora. The National Staff Development Program (NSDP) and other training initiatives were created to increase national agency staff capacity to lead and manage emergency programs. Evaluation respondents rated the quality of the materials and training highly and reported remarkable improvement in staff and member agency surge capacity and staff confidence.

Although the ECB Project did not articulate partnerships/collaboration/coordination as a theory of change for capacity building, it drew on the strengths of global humanitarian organization partnerships and collaborated with local agencies, governments, international organizations and the UN. Local partnerships were a cornerstone of the project in Phase II to build the capacity of national governments and local agencies to respond to emergencies. The trust and respect the consortia built in each country made them effective agents for change, accomplishing more than any one agency could do on its own.

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) was integrated into project proposals in Phase I. In Phase II, DRR training and joint needs assessments brought groups together to address a common problem, strengthening relationships with governments and government trust and respect in most of the consortia countries and the Horn of Africa. DRR and climate change adaptation are also areas of interest for donors. The ECB Project enabled a small but significant group of international and local organizations to advance learning, skills and preparedness for disasters, addressing the key emergency response issues of accountability, staff capacity and resilience. The project’s Toward Resilience: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation and was immediately popular, generating greater demand than the Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. In Bolivia, Bangladesh and Indonesia, ECB consortia advocated for improved emergency laws. Most ECB agencies, which have a worldwide presence, integrated ECB-sponsored DRR work into the work of their organizations.

ICT received low priority from the HEA community but high priority from the ECB Project. The project disseminated information and tools on collaboration, programming and emergency response through the ECB website, the websites of other partnership organizations, Facebook, Twitter and e-newsletters. The direct ICT capacity building that was part of Phase I would have been useful in Phase II, particularly for joint needs assessment (JNA) data entry from multiple agencies.

The ECB Project built capacity in adherence to humanitarian standards and principles and accountability and impact measurement through training on the Sphere core humanitarian standards, developing accountability tools such
as the community feedback tool in Bolivia and publishing the Good Enough Guide: Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies. This guide was used worldwide by at least half of the core agencies surveyed and mentioned by other agencies as an important contribution to humanitarian agency accountability. However, the project did not effectively measure or evaluate the accountability of all its own objectives, and there was little or no accountability if agencies did not meet the intended objectives.

The ECB Project prioritized working with national and local governments in training and tools on the Sphere standards, accountability and impact measurement (AIM), DRR and JNAs. These actions fostered government buy-in and good will to work more closely with ECB agencies in emergency response. Governments have cited or used Sphere standards and sought feedback on accountability from affected communities at the municipal level. In Bolivia, a former ECB Project staff carried accountability measures promoted by the project over into national statistical measurements.

**ECB Project Capacity Building Approaches**

The evaluation team examined the capacity building approaches considered effective by HEA stakeholders, identified the most successful approaches and compared them with those used by the ECB Project.

**People-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches** were significantly associated with the evaluation’s success index and identified by stakeholders as among the most effective approaches for capacity building. Field-centeredness was both an approach and an aim of the ECB Project, which focused on four disaster-prone countries and the one region. The project supported Oxfam and World Vision International in developing materials for disaster-affected communities in 13 languages based on the Good Enough Guide. The development of Toward Resilience and JNA tools engaged local actors. Two ECB consortium members established community-led feedback mechanisms and trained community members in accountability. Nonetheless, evaluation respondents felt the ECB Project should have done more to cascade training beyond national-level staff to the field and community level.

Both HEA respondents and ECB Project prioritized partnerships/coordination/collaboration as a capacity building approach. Consortia were a powerful way to carry out the project’s objectives and increase credibility with other networks. The consortium model was also a sound platform for planning, fund raising, coordination of emergency responses and advocacy. The consortium’s success in advocating for the enactment or revision of emergency laws, drawing attention to disaster-affected areas and developing emergency assessment tools with governments and UN agencies would not have been possible for individual NGOs. However, some partnership relationships were strained in emergencies, and member agencies sometimes prioritized their own interests over collaboration. Working with national and local governments was also identified as a successful and effective capacity building approach. Under the ECB Project, NGOs established respectful and collaborative relationship with governments and platforms for long-lasting organizational relationships. The JNA tools developed with Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) partners involved governments as well as communities. The ECB consortia collaborated with governments to facilitate humanitarian programs, projects and policies in DRR, mitigation, preparedness and response. Three countries worked with the UN and governments through advocacy to modify emergency laws.

Facilitating training and education was the most common HEA community capacity building approach and one used effectively by the ECB Project. Hundreds of ECB trainers and government and NGO staff were trained in management and leadership under the Expanding National Humanitarian Ability (ENHANCE) initiative and NSDP. Agencies interviewed during the evaluation said that ECB accountability training had transformed the way they operated. More than 650 humanitarian, government, academic, donor, UN and private sector representatives attended ECB interactive Regional Learning Conferences. The project also developed e-learning and downloadable courses. HEA community participation in ECB capacity building initiatives was partly limited by funds, but respondents spoke highly of the training, especially longer-term hands-on training such as ENHANCE, simulations, consortia exchanges and interactive events.

The ECB Project facilitated communication, information sharing and materials/best practices dissemination by developing tools on various capacity building issues and disseminating them to member agencies and the broader humanitarian community. Non-ECB member organizations used the Good Enough Guide to promote humanitarian accountability and to develop training materials. Website visitors, including emergency and development NGOs, from over 200 countries and territories downloaded ECB Project materials for training and use in emergencies. More than half of the materials survey respondents felt the materials and their development had positively influenced their organizations’ capacity building and DRR programming. Communication and information sharing challenges included inadequate funding and staff time, staff turnover and lack of buy-in support from ECB agencies to promote and disseminate learning and project results. Some local partners reported that they were unaware of all the materials available, lacked the bandwidth to download large documents or had limited resources to buy copies.

**ECB Project Capacity Building Targets**

Both the project and global HEA community prioritized organizations for capacity building. Integrating DRR and accountability into organizations’ policies, programs and staff training contributed to the sustainability of the project’s capacity building initiatives.

The evaluation showed a negative correlation between prioritizing stakeholders at headquarters level and successful capacity building. This finding validates the ECB
Project’s shift in focus from IWG headquarters in Phase I to forming field consortia to create impact in the field in Phase II. In each country, capacity building focused on national stakeholders (emergency management authorities and the military if relevant). Many field respondents felt training should have been cascaded more intensely to field- and community-level staff and government officials, although this would have stretched the project’s resources. Other respondents said the project should have reached more local emergency responders. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were commonly left out of consortium capacity building efforts, as were the media and private sector, an important gap that should be addressed in similar projects in the future.

The project focused somewhat on the macro level, building partnerships and networks. ECBinter- active promoted global, South-South sharing from a central hub. ECB staff who participated in exchange visits with other countries took back tools, ideas and approaches to share with local networks. Effective partnering with ACAPS, UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDR), Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and Sphere Project enhanced the effectiveness and reach of the project and in many cases also improved the visibility and importance of the partners.

**The ECB Project’s Legacy**

The ECB Project was a timely and effective mechanism to address new global requirements in humanitarian and emergency assistance. It built capacity to strengthen leadership at some levels, improve strategic planning, strengthen needs assessment for a more effective and strategic response, improve coordination and enhance accountability for collective results and to affected communities.

Several agencies with global reach have expanded the accountability and DRR work conducted under the ECB Project to all countries where they operate. In many cases, organizations have incorporated project tools and materials into their own training. Other project outcomes identified by an evaluation respondent include stronger interaction and collaboration, formal accountability, internal agency performance improvement plans, biannual meetings and continued communication among IWG principals. In some countries, agencies have applied for joint funding since the project ended. Both ECB agencies and donors have shown keen interest in an ECB-like follow-on in Bolivia and Indonesia. Most agencies in Indonesia still use the JNAs, and the trust, communication and collaboration built during the project are reflected in ongoing informal meetings between technical staff and focal points. To date, many agency ECB focal points continue to interact on behalf of their agencies with peers and sector networks.

New competency needs and new programming approaches will emerge with the changing humanitarian landscape, the evolving cluster system model and the impact of climate change and expanding political instability on complex emergencies. A project similar to ECB may evolve, perhaps not a permanent mechanism but one that can be called on when needed, regardless of staff turnover and policy vagaries.
1. Introduction

The global discourse on relief and development has changed significantly over the past decade. The United Nations is shaping the next generation of Millennium Development Goals, and a post-2015 development agenda will prioritize sustainable development, inclusive economic transformation, peace and governance and global partnerships (United Nations 2013). These changes require broader goals for improving the lives of vulnerable people than providing life-saving assistance and basic services. A 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review concluded that “to simply improve our capacity to meet the status quo in emergency response was not enough” and that the humanitarian community needed new capacity building competencies and approaches to new challenges (DFID, 2011). An example is the recognition of the importance of addressing risks before disasters and building community resilience after disasters.

This report presents findings of a study commissioned by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and conducted by the Disaster Resilience Group (DRG) to distill learning from the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project and other major capacity building interventions in the global humanitarian emergency assistance (HEA) sector over the past decade. The report includes an analysis of data from a two-phase desk review of global capacity building practices and trends, a survey of stakeholders in the HEA sector, a survey of the use of ECB materials and key informant interviews with ECB stakeholders, including meetings at Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG) headquarters and in Niger, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Horn of Africa, Indonesia and London. It proposes recommendations to guide investments to strengthen existing and future HEA capacity to support vulnerable communities more effectively to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters.

1.1. Challenges and Trends in the HEA Sector

Large-scale disasters such as the Darfur Crisis in 2004, South East Asia tsunami in December 2004 and Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 exposed weaknesses in humanitarian emergency response, prompting reflection and significant changes. For example, a 2005 Humanitarian Response Review (OCHA, 2005) commissioned by UN Emergency Response Coordinator Jan Egeland recommended a number of UN and non-UN actions to improve performance in humanitarian emergencies, including in regions of conflict. The OCHA review focused on management, coordination and financing, with less attention to host government response to emergencies. As a result of the review, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) launched a humanitarian reform initiative that focused on three pillars—improved leadership through Humanitarian Coordinators (HCS), improved coordination of humanitarian action through a cluster approach and improved financing mechanisms.

In 2006, leaders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and UN humanitarian organizations established the Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP). The GHP identified partnership and collaboration among UN and non-UN actors as the fourth pillar of humanitarian reform. Through the GHP, the Principles of Partnership were developed to highlight the need for equality, transparency, a results-oriented approach and responsibility and complementarity among humanitarian actors to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian action. However, evaluations of the 2010 disasters in Haiti and Pakistan revealed an urgent need to shift the goal from humanitarian reform to improving the performance of the humanitarian assistance system as a whole. In 2010, a second evaluation of the IASC Cluster System (Steets et al., 2010) made a number of recommendations to strengthen capacity in humanitarian coordination, including increasing the participation and capacity of national and local NGOs.

1.2. The Emergency Capacity Building Project

In response to evolving HEA trends and the increasing challenges facing disaster response and risk management agencies and affected communities, the ECB Project hoped to learn lessons to support efforts to strengthen the capacity of the HEA sector to prepare for, respond to and adapt to adversity. The project was conceived in 2003 by humanitarian directors from seven international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) engaged in relief and development. These organizations, which later became known as the IWG, included CARE International, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children (SCF), Oxfam GB, Mercy Corps International (MCI), World Vision International (WVI) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

Concerned about the escalating challenges their organizations faced in delivering humanitarian aid, the IWG proposed interagency collaboration to build the capacity of the humanitarian sector to address these challenges. With seed funding from the BMGF and Microsoft Corporation, the resulting ECB Project began in March 2005 and ran almost continuously through 2013, with a 1-year break between Phase I and Phase II. Annex 1 is a chronology of the project.

The goal of the ECB Project was to strengthen the humanitarian community’s capacity to save lives and protect the welfare and rights of people in emergency situations. To accomplish that goal, the project’s objectives were to:

1. Improve field-level capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies in disaster-prone countries;
2. Increase the speed, quality, and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response mechanisms within and across IWG agencies;
3. Contribute to improving the sector’s emergency preparedness and re-sponse
through collective dialogue, knowledge sharing, learning and collaborative work with other partners and organizations; and

4. Enhance resources for field set-up, rapid and reliable information and communication technology (ICT) and training of humanitarian field staff (Phase I).

The project’s initiatives and tools to build capacity and strengthen collaboration centered on the following cross-cutting themes:

- **Staff capacity building** to improve agency effectiveness in sourcing, developing and retaining high-quality staff;
- **Accountability and impact measurement (AIM)** to improve adherence to humanitarian standards in emergencies and measurement of impact; and
- **Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation** to improve emergency preparedness and improve the capacity of member NGOs to help communities reduce their vulnerability to disasters.

The ECB Project was implemented in two separately funded phases. Phase I (2005–2008) involved compiling research findings and developing field tools and practical guides. In Phase II (2008–2013), the project put concepts developed in Phase I into practice in the field. Many staff from the Global team in Phase I were replaced by new staff in Phase II.

Funding for Phase II was provided primarily by the BMGF, followed by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and several private donors. Interventions were implemented in four countries (Bolivia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Niger) and one region (the Horn of Africa). In each of these, participating agencies formed a consortium. These consortia were at the center of planning and implementation to strengthen ownership, engagement and impact.
2. Evaluation Methodology

The DRG evaluation team collected data to answer questions about emergency capacity building in the HEA sector, primarily in non-conflict settings, with a focus on the ECB Project. The team defined “capacity” as the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner (UNDP, 2006) and “capacity building” as the process through which this ability is obtained, strengthened, adapted and maintained over time.

2.1. Conceptual Framework

The evaluation examined capacity building practices at three levels: the macro-societal level (in this study, networks of organizations), the meso-organizational level (organizations) and the micro-Individual level (staff and teams). At each different level, capacity was intrinsically linked with goals, structures, processes, technology, resources and human capital.

The team mapped the most common HEA approaches to capacity building over the past decade to examine the project’s impact on HEA capacity. The framework in Figure 1 was applied to synthesize these approaches. The framework shows the interconnection between areas of competence (What), targeted stakeholder groups (Who) and strategies used (How) and cross cutting aspects such as accomplishments and challenges.

2.2. Evaluation Questions

Based on the assessment model, the DRG evaluation team used the following questions to organize data collection:

A. What competencies were built?
   • What capacities were built in the various competency areas?
   • Were the ECB Project objectives the right/relevant ones, and were they feasible?

B. How were the capacities improved?
   • What activities, approaches or strategies were used to strengthen capacities?
   • To what extent did the funding mechanism (through the IWG) affect/influence project processes and results, either positively or negatively?

C. Who was targeted?
   • What was the ECB’s rationale for selecting the stakeholder groups to consult (e.g., field/ national vs. local staff, individuals vs. networks)?
   • Which stakeholder groups were targeted for which interventions?
   • Were these groups relevant, appropriate and strategic in terms of the intended outcomes?
   • At the end of the project, how were the different groups affected (intended and unintended impacts, intended and unintended groups)?

D. Cross-cutting: What worked or didn’t work and why?
   • How did agencies plan to continue some of the core ECB activities beyond the project lifespan?
   • What aspects of the projects would continue in organizations and at the country level?
   • What were the major accomplishments, challenges and facilitating and enabling factors?

2.3. Data Collection

The evaluation was conducted over 8 months in four phases: (1) inception/planning, (2) initial desk review analysis and scoping interviews, (3) field data collection and surveys and (4) data processing and reporting. The learning from each phase was intended to influence the scope and approach of subsequent phases, and the DRG team consulted the BMGF team to revise the terms of reference (TOR) as necessary. There were four main sources of data: (1) a two-phase desk review analysis, (2) a stakeholder survey of leaders in the HEA sector, (3) a materials use survey and (4) key informant interviews at IWG member headquarters, with other key stakeholders and in Niger, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and London.

2.3.1 Desk Review Analysis

The DRG trained and closely supervised a team of graduate research assistants to use a pretested tool (Annex 2) to review 88 emergency capacity building reports (Annex 3). Most of the reports were evaluations or research studies written or published by leading umbrella organizations or consortia in the HEA sector. Annex 4 lists the operational definitions used in the desk review analysis. Documents were coded electronically using PASW Statistics software. The initial findings from 33 reports guided field data collection. The findings in this report represent the final analysis of all 88 reports. The team synthesized these findings and triangulated them with the findings from the stakeholder and materials use surveys and key informant interviews.
The DRG created a success index of 18 variables from the capacity building reports analyzed in the desk review to show whether stated capacity building goals had been achieved (Table 1). The index was examined for adequate statistical reliability (a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .731, above the threshold of .70). The minimum possible score was 0, and the maximum possible score was 100. Simultaneous regression models were constructed to examine relationships between competencies, approaches and targeted stakeholder groups (predictors) and the success index (outcome). A simultaneous regression tests the effect of independent variables such as competencies as a block on an outcome or dependent variable such as a success index, as well as the effect of each independent variable when controlling for the other independent variables. The success index was normalized with a square root transformation to meet assumptions of regression models. The regression analysis was not used to prove or disprove causal relationships but rather to test the associations, magnitude and significance of the associations between competencies and success.

### Review questions (response codes: Not stated/stated and achieved/stated and not achieved/information inconclusive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity building goals stated and achieved:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training/education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening institutional system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening private sector involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing hardware/infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of people–centered/field–centered/community–based approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening adherence to standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessments, research, evaluation, evidence and learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening humanitarian response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency preparedness strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovations and information and communication technology (ICT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with national and local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) into policy and programs/legal frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking/coordination/partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication/sharing best practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Items included in the success index*

1 The success index scores of the reports reviewed ranged from 0 to 64.7, with a mean of 18.2, a median of 17.6 and a standard deviation of 16.4.

2.3.2 HEA Stakeholder Survey

The DRG developed an online survey of capacity building trends in the context of humanitarian emergencies for key informants. Annex 5 is the HEA stakeholder questionnaire. The survey obtained 52 responses: 74% from the original members of the ECB Project (CARE, CRS, MCI, Oxfam, SCF, IRC and WVI), and the rest from non-ECB NGOs, research institutions and donors. Headquarters responses accounted for 63.04%, regional responses for 10.87% and country responses for 34.18%. The location of respondents spanned the globe, from Europe (27.19%) to the United States (25.58%), Asia (16.28%), Africa (16.28%), Australia (4.65%), Latin America (6.98%) and the Middle East (2.33%).

The preliminary findings of the HEA stakeholder survey were used to guide key informant interviews and field data collection. Data from the stakeholder survey were further synthesized and triangulated with findings from the desk review analysis, materials use survey and key informant interviews.

2.3.3 Materials Use Survey

The DRG conducted an online survey of stakeholders in the humanitarian sector who were identified in the ECB Project records as having accessed ECB materials on the project website. Of the respondents, 74.4% were in managerial positions, 11.6% were in technical and advisory positions and the remaining 14% had non-managerial or non-advisory roles. The survey questionnaire (Annex 6) was a mixture of pre-coded and open-ended questions about the utility and use of the materials. The survey received 133 responses, including feedback on the following ECB resources:

- Good Enough Guide: Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies (2007);
- Good Enough Guide Training of Trainers Module (2012);
- Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods (EFSL) 48 Hour Assessment Tool (2012);
- Toward Resilience: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation (2013);
- National Staff Development Program (NSDP) Pilot Project: External Strategic Review (2008);
- Accountability–Key Elements/Core Understanding for ECP Project Agencies (2010);
- Emergency Simulations Administrators Guide (2007);
- Simulations;
- Case studies;
- Surge capacity research;
- Staff retention and turnover studies (Addressing Staff Retention in the Horn of Africa, 2010);
- Exchange visits;
- Staff Capacity Framework;
- Working with Quality and Accountability Initiatives;
- DRR country documents; and
- UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (ISDR) Global Platform (a biennial forum for stakeholder coordination and information exchange).
Annex 7 describes the purpose, scope and intended audience of most of these materials.

The evaluation team synthesized findings from the materials use survey and triangulated them with findings from the desk review analysis, HEA survey and key informant interviews.

2.3.4 Key Informant Interviews
The DRG team first conducted 34 scoping interviews about ECB Phases I and II with stakeholders in a variety of positions to determine which questions and themes to take into the third phase of the evaluation. This phase would probe more deeply into emergency capacity building issues and the (unarticulated) theory of change of the ECB Project. The results of these interviews were used to guide data collection in a second round of field interviews.

During field visits to Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, London and Niger between February and April 2014 (Table 2), the evaluators interviewed about 120 ECB Project stakeholders using a semi-structured questionnaire that addressed information gaps identified in Phase II. Annex 8 lists the stakeholders interviewed and their designations/roles, organizational affiliations and countries. The interviewers adapted the questions to the target groups interviewed. Findings from the field visits form the major part of this report. The evaluation team made efforts to triangulate these findings with data from other surveys and the desk review.

2.3.5. Constraints and Limitations
Methodological issues in the desk review analysis included the varying levels of completeness and focus of the reports. To address this, the review team prioritized emergency capacity building reports by donors, policy makers and umbrella organizations known to have significant influence and represent trends in the HEA sector. Second, while the review aimed to examine common patterns in the HEA sector, it may not have captured unique practices in specific geographical areas. Third, it did not capture all the variations in reported outcomes. The document review tool examined whether the documents provided evidence of specific capacity building priorities and practices or were inconclusive. The subjectivity that differences in reviewer judgment could have introduced into the data was limited by training and closely supervising reviewers for consistent coding, as well as developing a manual with clear operational definitions for coding terms.

Table 2: Field interview schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Headquarters and other scoping interviews</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Horn of Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of stakeholders interviewed</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMPETENCES
(WHAT)
3. Findings

This section follows the conceptual framework in Figure 1 to synthesize and compare lessons on emergency capacity building practices in the broader HEA community (from the desk review analysis, HEA stakeholder survey and materials use survey) and the ECB Project (from the key informant interviews). HEA sector priorities and practices provide a context for assessing ECB Project innovation, prioritization, effectiveness, gaps and missed opportunities.

3.1. What Competencies Were Prioritized?

An important element of capacity building is the dimensions (themes, aspects, issues or forms) of capacity targeted by capacity building efforts, referred to as “competencies” in this evaluation. This section compares the competencies prioritized by the HEA community with the competencies prioritized by the ECB Project, based on data from the desk review analysis, materials use survey, HEA stakeholder survey and key informant scoping and field interviews. This comparison is followed by a discussion of competencies recognized by HEA stakeholders as critical but inadequately addressed and competencies associated with successful capacity building in the HEA sector. Finally, the section highlights the ECB Project’s accomplishments and challenges in building prioritized competencies.

3.1.1 Capacity Building Competencies Prioritized by the HEA Community

Figure 2 shows how important HEA practitioners considered various capacity building competencies.

![Figure 2: Distribution of priority competencies (desk review and materials use survey)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESK REVIEW</th>
<th>MATERIALS USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>12%</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Programming</td>
<td>Improved Programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics/Supply Chains</td>
<td>Logistics/Supply Chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships/Coordination</td>
<td>Partnerships/Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Structures</td>
<td>Organizational Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure &amp; ICT</td>
<td>Infrastructure &amp; ICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence Measurements</td>
<td>Evidence Measurements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.7%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Overlap of competencies prioritized by both the HEA community and the ECB Project
3.1.2. Competencies Prioritized by the ECB Project

According to project documents and interviews with stakeholders, the ECB Project prioritized the competencies of accountability and impact measurement (both Phases I and II); agency capacities for emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction (both Phases I and II); developing staff capacity to improve effectiveness in sourcing, developing and retaining quality staff (both Phases I and II); ICT (Phase I); partnerships/collaboration/coordination (Phase II); working with national and local governments (Phase II); and sharing learning and innovation (Phase II). In Phase I, field consortia had some flexibility in how to build on the core competences in Figure 2.

3.1.3 Alignment of ECB Project and HEA Community Priorities

Data from the desk review and materials use survey showed that the priorities of the ECB Project and broader HEA community overlapped considerably (Figure 3). This indicates that the project was responsive to sector capacity building needs and priorities.

Adherence to humanitarian standards and principles was moderately prioritized in documents reviewed but highly prioritized by the ECB Project (addressed under accountability and impact measurement). The importance of humanitarian standards was increasingly acknowledged in the decade after the project began. Organizations such as People in Aid and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) addressed areas beyond the Sphere standards, which had been developed in 1997. In keeping with this trend, the core agencies in the ECB Project recognized that improved knowledge and use of standards were important to their stakeholders and prioritized them in both phases of implementation. An example is the ECB AIT team’s 2007 publication in 13 languages of the Good Enough Guide: Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies and supporting training materials. Key informants were enthusiastic about the guide and training, and at least half of the core agencies surveyed had used it in their programs worldwide. Other agencies mentioned it as an important contribution to their work and to the general accountability of NGOs.

According to the desk review analysis, infrastructure and ICT and emergency preparedness were among the least prioritized competencies in the global HEA community, but they received considerable attention from the ECB Project, especially shelter and information technology. In the past decade, an explosion in IT capabilities, with global positioning systems (GPS), internet training and mapping of emergencies, programs and affected people brought the field of IT to the fore. In Phase I, the ECB Project recognized the significant gap in ICT skills among frontline NGOs at headquarters and in the field and collaborated with NetHope, a new-generation information technology collaboration of 33 international NGOs and ECB collaborators, to address this gap. The project did not articulate logistics as a priority for capacity building, although shelter and infrastructure capacity building were part of DRR in both phases—in Phase I to mainstream DRR activities into proposals (e.g., to improve the hazard resiliency of reconstructed infrastructure) and in Phase II to build overall shelter-related knowledge and capacity. The HEA community may have appeared to focus less on infrastructure and ICT because of their specialized nature and greater interest in DRR.

Neither the HEA community nor the ECB Project prioritized competency in logistics and supply chains. Research by the Fritz Institute (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) found that only a few aid agencies prioritized “high performing logistics and supply chain operations,” and this is largely true today (in large-scale emergencies, NGO supply managers are in short supply). The ECB Project did, however, bring to light the need for capacity building in supply and logistics, although it was a minor effort overall. SCF has developed its surge capacity in this area, with over 200 on-call response staff trained in logistics, management and other courses who move around the world. The ECB Project carried out logistics training in Phase I. These relatively small efforts, however, do not appear to have met the need for capacity building in this area, either for INGOs or national and local bodies that respond to disasters.

An important observation for further investigation is that the ECB Project made less effort to address logistics than it did to address ICT, a competency that was given lower priority by the HEA sector. Key informants in Bolivia and Indonesia and UN agencies mentioned logistics as a gap the ECB Project should have addressed, and ECB agencies in Indonesia missed an opportunity to pair with a large volunteer youth group that specialized in protection and logistics in emergencies. However, WVI in Bolivia included logistics in its core emergency training courses and the Expanding National Humanitarian Ability (ENHAnce) training on emergency management.1

Finally, the desk review analysis found that the ECB Project placed a higher priority on working with national and local governments than the broader HEA community. As discussed later in this report, this was identified this as an important area for capacity building.

The importance of working with national and local governments in emergencies appears more often in the literature than in reality, and the same is true of developing local partnerships. Often it is easier in emergency response to establish systems parallel to those of the government, particularly when government structures are weak, troubled or nonexistent. However, the ECB Project specifically included working with governments in general competency training such as Sphere, the Good Enough Guide, DRR and joint needs assessment (JNA) tools, to improve core humanitarian assistance skills and emergency laws and policies. These actions fostered government buy-in and good will to work with ECB agencies more closely in emergency response.

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1 A 2004 study that determined the direction and emphasis of the ECB Project (Braun, 2004) identified logistics as a gap but not a significant enough one to be a project focus: “The areas of procurement and logistics do not emerge as priority areas for collaborative capacity building, yet the review indicated that the IWG and the humanitarian sector as a whole would benefit from documentation and dissemination of best practices for working with global suppliers. In addition, the IWG may want to consider ways to exploit the capacity of some IWG members to build the capacity of others in procurement and logistics, perhaps through contracted services.”
Figure 4: Critical but neglected competencies in the HEA sector (stakeholder survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>-10.1%</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information &amp; Communication Technology (ICT)</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships/collaboration/coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Learning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.1%</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-16.3%</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Programming Approaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure &amp; facilities including ICT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1.4. Critical but Neglected Competencies

To better understand how the HEA community prioritized essential competencies, the evaluation team asked global HEA leaders in the stakeholders survey what they saw as the most critical yet unaddressed competencies in view of current challenges. Figure 4 shows their responses.

Program accountability (discussed earlier under evidence measurement) and partnerships/collaboration/coordination were among the critical capacity building issues HEA leaders felt had received inadequate attention. Others were elements of improved programming approaches, such as working in urban settings, implementing effective exit strategies and gender—understanding of vulnerable populations.

Competencies that received minor attention in the documents included in the desk review and materials use survey but were listed by some stakeholders as among the most critical but inadequately addressed were surge capacity (part of emergency response), dealing with insecure settings and security issues, innovative thinking and response design, infrastructure and facilities including ICT and better knowledge of the military in humanitarian operations. The competencies most often prioritized by the HEA community—improved programming approaches, accountability/evidence measurement and partnerships/collaboration/coordination—were also considered by HEA leaders as the least adequately addressed. This indicates that the HEA community needs to find innovative and effective ways to address these critical competencies.

3.1.5 Competency Prioritization and Capacity Building Success

The evaluation team used the success index discussed in section 2.3.1 to gauge whether competencies that the HEA community prioritized were associated with successful capacity building. According to the desk review analysis, the competencies significantly associated with successful emergency capacity building were human resources, infrastructure and facilities including ICT and partnerships/collaboration/coordination (Table 3). These competencies account for 24.2% of the variation in the success index.

Every capacity building report that documented prioritization of infrastructure and facilities including ICT, human resources or partnership/collaboration/coordination increased the success index score by more than 20 percentage points (28% for infrastructure and facilities including ICT). The following sections discuss the ECB Project’s success and limitations in regard to these three competencies.

A. Competency associated with success: Partnerships/collaboration/coordination

According to the desk review analysis, the partnerships/collaboration/coordination competency was among the most highly prioritized and most associated with successful capacity building. Local partnerships were a cornerstone of Phase II to build the capacity of national governments and local agencies to respond to emergencies. Most ECB consortia members partnered with local organizations for simulations and other capacity building, for example, CRS with Caritas and Oxfam with FUNDECHO in Bolivia. A number of organizations, including UN agencies, adapted tools from the ECB Project.

The project did not articulate collaboration and coordination as a theory of change for capacity building, but these were de facto results. Coordination improved through simulations, JNAs and evaluations. ACAPS was a key partner in fostering coordination, helping to develop the JNA tool for each of the five country consortia.

ECB Project accomplishments: Partnership/collaboration/coordination

Field interviews found significant project achievements in collaboration and coordination. Both the ECB Project structure and its relationship with the BMGF provided a flexible and safe space for agencies to discuss concerns, explore options, share lessons learned and collaborate effectively. Interactive events, exchanges, simulations and Sphere training also strengthened collaboration and coordination.

The ECB collaboration broke down communication barriers, beginning in Phase I and increasingly in Phase II. This aspect of communication began before the project with the establishment of the IWG. The project served as a rallying point for the IWG to do more than hold periodic meetings. Although all individuals involved in the original IWG and early ECB Project have moved on, the seven initial agencies continue monthly phone calls and annual meetings with a new cast of personalities, proving that the project built abiding links among organizations and not only a few people.

To some extent, this partnership and collaboration carried over to the proposal process during emergencies. While one ECB agency director in Bolivia said, We must work together for the common result, another in the same country said, Things will have to change after this emergency; some agencies in the consortium are going alone to funders. Similar sentiments were expressed during interviews in Indonesia.

An important strategy for capacity building in both phases of the ECB Project was to draw on the strengths of humanitarian organization partnerships to complement its work and enhance its products. The project envisioned that partners such as People in Aid, HAP and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) could house jointly developed ECB products for humanitarian community access. Today People in Aid houses documents from the interactive learning events and ECB staff retention workshops, and ALNAP maintains part of the ECB resource library in its online learning database. Important collaborative partnerships were also developed with NetHope in Phase I and the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) in Phase II.

The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), which supports humanitarian needs assessments before, during and after crises, and the Start Network (formerly...
CBHA), a consortium of 19 NGOs working to strengthen the humanitarian aid system, are now expanding collaboration started during the project. The Start Network is staffed with some former ECB employees and modeled to some extent after the project. As mentioned earlier, ACAPS was a key ECB partner in developing JNAs and training, and the ECB Project was the perfect “docking station” for ACAPS because of its network. The ACAPS director has said, ECB made ACAPS. In the beginning, ACAPS had a troubled relationship with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), but ECB gave it a chance to prove itself and build its credibility. ACAPS’ neutrality and specific expertise allowed it to play a role that no single NGO could have played in directing and assisting a variety of organizations.

**Bolivia.** Another successful ECB partnership was the nearly seamless merging of the Bolivian ECB consortium agencies with CBHA agencies to number 11 members, with an MOU that reached beyond the formal end of the project. Members of this larger consortium anticipate signing another MOU in 2015 when the current one expires. Member agencies pooled resources to pay for a coordinator. While seemingly successful in non-emergency times, however, relationships under this partnership were strained in responses to emergencies.

The broad range of partnerships developed by the Bolivia consortium perhaps best exemplified collaboration and may have contributed to the sustainability of the consortium. Partners included local NGOs, national and local government, the UN and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The consortium members chose to cast the net widely in inviting individuals and organizations to training and offered courses more than once. It successfully partnered with the military in its RAMBO training in emergency management and response (Box 1). A Bolivian NGO staff member mentioned that NGOs generally had no problem training the military and said in reference to the Good Enough Guide and Sphere standards, The Army knows about standards!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1. RAMBO Training Case Study, Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Scaled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In High Demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Topics: Sphere, logistics, management, assessment and other skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The collaboration in Bolivia not only built relationships and good will, but also aided networking and established contacts for immediate access when an emergency occurred. The DRG evaluation team was able to see the ECB in action during the flood in the city of Trinidad in Beni Province, where the consortium concentrated most of its activity. WVI, Oxfam, CARE, HelpAge and other NGOs supported by the BMGF were helping the displaced people, although most of the aid flowed from the federal government.

The ECB-instigated Humanitarian Consortium in Bolivia walked a delicate line between providing effective relief and recovery assistance and coordinating closely with both local authorities and federal civil affairs officials. Most ECB members responded to the floods, some through the consortium, which pooled contributions through a bucket mechanism.

**Bangladesh.** The INGO Disaster Forum in Bangladesh was another good example of coordination and collaboration, beginning with the ECB consortium and adding members until it included about 30 organizations. ECB members participated in other consortia such as the National Alliance for Risk Reduction Initiatives (NARRI), Developing and Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance and Risk Reduction Initiatives (DESHARI), Action Research for Community-Based Adaptation in Bangladesh (ARCB) and another DRR/climate change consortium. The ECB was recognized by the Government of Bangladesh and other partners as more credible and neutral than other actors, networks, consortia and coordination frameworks, which were sometimes believed to further the interests of certain organizations rather than to represent a common voice.

**Horn of Africa.** A former ECB staff member from the Horn of Africa said that one of the most significant differences the project had made for him was the multi-agency approach to capacity building: It is valuable. We are a system [and] we are all [in it] together. Translating ECB documents into local languages, conducting bilingual training and bringing together diverse agencies, governments and individuals in training and simulations to solve common problems helped break down communication barriers. Notably, the ECB Project sent tools in Arabic to all ECB agencies, other contacts and NGOs in Arabic-speaking countries, receiving praise from both the BMGF and OFDA.

**Indonesia.** Consortium subgroups of two to three NGOs applied jointly for funding in various emergencies, pooling skills to address disaster needs in complementary geographical areas. Finding that agencies faced challenges as a consortium in rapid decision-making at the onset of emergencies, the Indonesian consortium agencies collaborated to develop a Disaster Response Engagement Protocol (DREP). This protocol was adopted by all agencies and shared with other country consortia. It could be an important tool for other consortia worldwide to plan actions, identify geographical locations and allocate skills before an emergency. The Indonesia consortium also successfully collaborated to design a JNA tool that was endorsed and adapted by UNOCHA and recognized by the Government of Indonesia’s emergency response office, the National Board for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, or BNPB). Donors pleased with the JNA hoped that the ECB consortium would develop a community assessment tool, but many consortium activities ceased at the end of the formal funding.
Many stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation said that it would have been difficult to build relationships during an emergency response without a consortium platform and mentioned the trust developed among ECB agencies. The consortium helped agencies bid collaboratively on proposals, conduct JNAs and share tools and resources, making donor investments more productive. Elements that made collaboration work were identified as circular learning (creation of a virtual group when a representative from one agency demonstrated how something worked to another) and incentives for personal development. A request from NGOs in Haiti to help establish a similar consortium for the earthquake/tsunami response in that country illustrated the importance of consortia in building relationships and trust.

**ECB Project challenges: Partnership/collaboration/coordination**

Although partnerships were developed under the ECB Project, some members and organizations felt more stakeholders should have been included in activities, materials distribution and training in Phase I. An ECB agency director in Bolivia said ... before we were building our own capacities, but now need to look more broadly, with more tools, more outreach, more advocacy.

Even with the Bolivian consortium’s large training pool, some local NGOs would have liked more access to ECB materials. The Indonesian consortium did not cast the net as widely as the Bolivian one in inviting participants to training, simulations and other capacity-building activities, citing funding limitations. An ECB partner organization also mentioned the exclusivity of the proposal appeal process, while understanding the reason for this. Another local partner would have liked more of its staff to have been included in training and the "general conversation," to have received more ECB materials and to have been invited to more consortium meetings. In Niger, access to training decreased when fees were charged.

It is unclear whether the ECB Project had a strategic plan to identify field partners in Phase I. Consortium partnerships with non-NGOs (e.g., the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and to some extent indigenous NGOs) were limited. Field informants mentioned a failure to reach out to local humanitarian players. Some agencies managed collaboration with partners better than others. In Bolivia, a local NGO that partnered with an ECB NGO said it did not know how to find ECB documents and had not been informed of the project’s capacity-building resources.

HEA stakeholders rated competency building in partnerships/collaboration as inadequately addressed, and in some cases this was true of the ECB Project. Several ECB member agencies interviewed in Bolivia said that they planned to review their partnership arrangements after the 2014 emergency response, and a Bolivian NGO focal point said, Agencies didn’t realize that they had to leave their agency jackets behind and take on the cloak of the consortia. While the ECB Project focused on emergency capacity building, all the members had larger development program portfolios that often took priority. Members continued to apply for funds on their own, some to different donors. Joint assessments and tools did not always meet information needs and requirements. Nonetheless, most respondents acknowledged that it was best to lay down their agencies’ flags to ensure a better, coordinated response.

The collaborative environment under the ECB Project is not necessarily being transferred to other countries or emergency situations. The NGOs that were part of the ECB have not all been successful in collaborative partnerships throughout their agencies or in non-ECB countries, with the exception of the Philippines during Typhoon Haiyan, when six agencies received 1.5 million in funding and conducted a JNA.

One of the greatest challenges to increased collaboration was the project’s commitment to match the initial $5 million in BMGF funding with $7 million from other donors. Agencies coordinated to mobilize the funds despite their disinclination to share donor lists and organizational financial information, particularly during the economic downturn in 2008 and 2009. The challenge of finding funding strained relationships, primarily at headquarters level. In the end, the match was successful, but some ECB member staff felt that donor funding was restrictive and stifled intended innovation by being driven by expected project results. Most headquarters and field respondents said the large required match was a distraction and added burden.

**B. Competency Associated with Success: Human Resources**

The human resources competency includes sourcing, developing and retaining quality staff. Although this competency is significantly associated with successful emergency capacity building, the desk review analysis found that it was rarely prioritized by the HEA community.

The ECB Project addressed human resources under its staff capacity building theme. Providing adequate, trained and ready-to-go staff, consultants and experts in emergencies is a well-documented challenge for humanitarian agencies. Research by People in Aid, an ECB partner in both phases, found that surge capacity was a prerequisite for effective emergency response, that developing this capacity was a continual process, not only during emergency deployment, and that it required a broad organizational approach to human resources, programs, logistics, fundraising, communications and finance, as well as pre-planning and response and transition planning (Houghton and Emmens, 2008).

The ECB Project shared learning and tools with numerous humanitarian networks, platforms and fora at the global level. These included the IASC, ALNAP, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Humanitarian Practice Institute (HPN), ISDR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, Sphere, HAP, People in Aid, Inter-Action, Voluntary Organization in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE) and ECHO. Key events for this dissemination were the ALNAP annual conference, the U.S. Inter-Action Forum, IASC New York meetings, and the Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance (ELHRA) Conference.

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3 The original project design did not include consortia, only mention of the need for field collaboration. The ECB DRR advisors chose the DRR consortia with little consultation with countries involved. The AIM advisors took a different approach, identifying people to be on the Standing Team no matter where they were based. The positive experience with the DRR consortia led to the inclusion of consortia as a key design component of Phase II (along with a focus on government collaboration).
The consortium in Bangladesh studied emergency capacity building in the country from 2004 to 2009 and organized a national workshop was organized to disseminate the findings. The workshop was also used to advocate for strengthening the emergency capacity of Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) at the union level (the lowest administrative unit).

Another major ECB effort to strengthen staff capacity was the National Staff Development Program (NSDP). Deploying the right people in the right place at the right time is always a considerable challenge. ECB research concluded that the pool of qualified and experienced international personnel is always too small to meet the demand of humanitarian organizations, especially during an emergency response. Recognizing that “the single most important resource for humanitarian agencies in an emergency environment is experienced and capable staff able to provide the expertise and leadership essential for an effective response” (Damerell, 2008), the project designed the NSDP as a pilot to increase the number of national-level agency staff capable of leading and managing emergency programs. CARE and Oxfam developed and led an ECB National Staff Development working group that included IRC, MCI, SCF and WVI. The NSDP included the following components:

1. A review of the 2006 Humanitarian Competencies Study commissioned by the ECB Project, which highlighted personal and technical competencies critical for career development;
2. A 2006 learning needs analysis of national staff;
3. A study of accreditation systems and best practices disseminated among ECB members;
4. An assessment of on-the-job learning best practices disseminated among ECB members;
5. A Foundation Module adapted from a Save the Children-UK Foundations and Operations course that included on-line learning and simulation-based training modules from Pakistan and Thailand.

The ECB Project also organized exchange visits between country consortia and produced and disseminated information on behaviors that lead to effective performance in humanitarian response, a staff retention and turnover survey report and a Staff Capacity Framework. Section 3.4 discusses these and other ECB materials.

ECB resources focused on the project’s three themes—staff capacity building, AIM and DRR. To improve agency effectiveness in sourcing, developing and retaining high-quality staff, the project trained ECB staff and non-staff in managing teams and programs, leading staff in challenging contexts, understanding and using Sphere standards and supporting non-humanitarian staff with core humanitarian skills. The following materials and training programs focused on staff capacity building:

- Building Trust in Diverse Teams;
- Emergency Simulations Administrators’ Guide;
- “Addressing Staff Retention in the Horn of Africa,” report developed with People in Aid;
- Short Training: Addressing Staff Retention and Improving Staff Engagement;
- ECBinter-active conferences with staff capacity as a key core theme;
- The ENHAnce training program and simulations;
- Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) e-learning courses;
- The Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods 48-hour Assessment Tool and training materials;
- Shelter Module training materials; and
- Surge capacity research.

Key informants rated the quality of these materials and training as good to excellent. Although attrition plagued two of the consortia, as it does across humanitarian agencies, the ENHAnce program addressed some of the broader needs articulated in the 2011 IASC Transformative Agenda, equipping agencies with more staff with leadership and management competencies.

Responses such as I gained personal confidence in my decisions and actions and I feel the quality of my work has improved in most ECB Project countries indicated that individual staff capacity improved significantly. Post-evaluations of most training courses scored the training 80% or higher. At the organizational level, member agencies have dramatically improved in surge capacity in the past 10 years. Most key informants said that their organizations responded faster to disasters after ECB, developing surge rosters and methods to maintain staff/consultants active on the rosters. During the flood disaster in Beni, Bolivia, ECB members felt they had enough in-country capacity and did not need special surge staff from international headquarters.

Both headquarters and field respondents interviewed in Phase I were aware that different units in NGOs needed to be engaged in emergency response, but respondents in Phase II said that ECB emergency operations, including human resources, remained in NGO emergency units (apart from DRR, which can straddle development and emergency units). WVI in Bolivia and MCI in Indonesia trained a core set of emergency responders from their development staff as part of internal capacity building. On the whole, however, the project targeted a narrower range of NGO staff for emergency capacity building in Phase II, when the groups for outreach in the field broadened.

C. Competency Associated with Success: Information, Communication and Technology

According to the desk review analysis, the HEA community did not prioritize the ICT competency, but it was significantly associated with successful emergency capacity building. One of the objectives of the ECB Project in Phase I was to address ICT challenges that slowed emergency response and made it less effective. While this theme was not articulated in Phase II, the project developed a communications strategy in 2012 to “capture learning, disseminate collaboration and programmatic learning and tools and share feedback from ECB agencies and the

The project’s outlets for information exchange and communication included its own website and the websites of People in Aid, HAP, ACAPS, ALNAP and other organizations. The number of Facebook participants and Twitter followers steadily grew over Phase II but remained smaller than that of ALNAP, HAP, CARE and others. More than 500 Twitter followers of the ECB project after project completion worked in the HEA sector, primarily in Africa and Asia but also in South America (they tweeted less often in Spanish). An ECB communication manager reported that people who had used a resource often re-tweeted it. The project promoted Twitter by targeting it to other partners and people in the field.

While the project issued 12 e-newsletters were issued between July 2009 (to 623 recipients) and September 2013 (to 3,777 recipients), Phase II could have benefited from capacity building in ICT, particularly for JNA data entry from multiple agencies. The Indonesian consortium had difficulty entering and harmonizing JNA data and finding the right balance of security and open access to the joint website. The project could also have benefited from ICT support to make ECBConnect a more user-friendly platform for information and improve project financial tracking.

According to the desk review analysis, competencies in humanitarian standards, evaluation and learning and improved programming approaches were not significantly associated with successful capacity building. However, key stakeholders identified these competencies as critical but inadequately addressed building (see Figure 4). The ECB Project attempted to address these issues in many ways, especially through DRR and AIM, which are discussed below.

3.2. How Did the ECB Project Approach Capacity Building?

The strategies that guide interventions, including interventions designed to strengthen capacity, are another important element of capacity building. This evaluation refers to these capacity building strategies and interventions as approaches. This section compares the capacity building approaches used by the HEA community and ECB Project based on data from the desk review analysis, materials use survey, HEA stakeholder survey and key informant scoping and field interviews. This is followed by a discussion of approaches associated with successful capacity building (based on the desk review analysis) and approaches considered most and least effective by HEA stakeholders. The discussion then highlights the ECB Project’s accomplishments and challenges in applying various capacity building approaches to achieve its goals.

3.2.1 Capacity Building Approaches Prioritized by the HEA Community

The most common capacity building approaches identified in the desk review analysis were partnerships/coordination/collaboration, people-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches, integrating DRR into policy and pro-
grams/legal frameworks, strengthening systems and working with local and national governments. Less common approaches included strengthening private sector involvement, development of hardware and infrastructure and strengthening financing and insurance.

The materials use survey also asked respondents which capacity building approaches their organizations used most often. Figure 5 shows that the approaches mentioned most often were training (knowledge) (such as short courses and workshops), training (skills) (such as simulations and drills), consultation (such as coaching), providing access to information repositories and partnerships/coordination/collaboration. Strengthening/provision of human resources and strengthening financing and insurance were rarely mentioned. Other capacity building approaches highlighted in the desk review, such as integrating DRR into policies and programs/legal frameworks, were not mentioned at all.

The approaches highlighted in the two data sources may have differed because stakeholders tend to think about capacity building of individuals (staff/cadres), while the desk review assessed capacity building at all system levels (micro-individual, meso-organizational and macro-societal).

### 3.2.2. Capacity Building Approaches Prioritized by the ECB Project

The emergency capacity building approaches used most often by the ECB Project included partnerships/coordination/collaboration, training (skills and knowledge), people-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches, integrating DRR into policy and programs/legal frameworks (including advocacy and national HEA systems), data-driven planning and implementation (especially through the work on accountability), working with national and local governments, adherence to humanitarian standards (especially through the work on accountability) and facilitating sharing of information and materials and developing tools, guides and protocols (mostly assessment tools).

Most country consortia advocated for revision of emergency laws. The approaches differed, with three countries working with the UN and governments through advocacy to modify emergency laws. The Government of Bolivia invited the consortium to work on two conflicting laws, and funding from ECHO helped the consortium hire technical experts (see section 3.2.4).

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**Figure 5: Mention of capacity building approaches (materials use survey)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DESK REVIEW</strong></th>
<th><strong>MATERIALS USE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.1% Partnerships/Coordination/Collaboration</td>
<td>8.6% Partnerships/Coordination/Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.7% People/Field Centered Approaches</td>
<td>7.6% Provision of Resource Materials (e.g. Manuals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% Integrate DRR in Policy</td>
<td>12.2% Providing Access to Repositories of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% Strengthen Systems</td>
<td>15.7% Consultation (for Example, Coaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% Alliances with Local Governments</td>
<td>1% Strengthening/Provision of Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6% Facilitating Sharing of Best Practices</td>
<td>18.3% Training (Skills) for Example, Simulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9% Facilitate Training &amp; Education</td>
<td>34.5% Training (Knowledge: Short-term Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5% Adherence to Standards</td>
<td>1% Strengthening Financing &amp; Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2% Data Driven Planning &amp; Implementation</td>
<td>1% Development of Facilities &amp; Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8% Strengthen Private Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8% Strengthen Financing &amp; Insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4% Development of facilities &amp; infrastructure</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3.2.3. Alignment of ECB and HEA Community Capacity Building Approaches

Figure 6 shows a broad intersection of emergency capacity building approaches used by the global HEA community and ECB Project. This may be because the IWG identified strategies to fill critical gaps perceived by its members as well as the broader HEA community in response to the changing humanitarian landscape over the past decade. NGOs have been nimble in adapting to these changes. For example, agencies involved in mega evaluations of the South East Asian tsunami response integrated lessons from that response into their programming, including a “building back better” approach and more disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction, which by necessity includes local communities in planning. A field respondent mentioned paying more attention to climate change, and SCF developed a climate change guide booklet for Indonesia. NGOs also learned about the importance of surge capacity in responding to emergencies. Many agencies, particularly the ECB agencies, developed and maintained emergency rosters. Agencies also learned to take accountability to their clients and to standards, especially the Sphere standards, more seriously. Sphere training has become routine in a number of NGOs.

The desk review found that the global HEA community moderately prioritized strengthening private sector involvement, development of hardware and infrastructure and strengthening financing and insurance approaches, while the ECB Project did not prioritize these approaches. The project extensively used the developing tools, guides and protocols approach, which the HEA community did not prioritize (see Figure 6).

For the most part, ECB agencies at both global and national levels missed opportunities for constructive engagement with the private sector. NGOs have a residual fear of losing their neutrality or dealing with the politics involved with certain types of private sector entities and of the private sector exerting programming demands or influence that conflict with the organizations’ principles. Generally, INGOs look to the private sector for philanthropic funding rather than for value-added programming partnership. Another reason NGOs do not pursue partnerships with the private sector is lack of time, knowledge of the sector or skills in fund raising, networking and proposal writing. Moreover, agencies that receive the bulk of their funding from their governments have little incentive to be innovative in seeking other funding. NGOs could develop guides such as the ones produced under the ECB Project for engaging with private sector partners, but they also need to become more adept at demonstrating their value to private donors.

The ECB Project either underutilized or did not utilize development of hardware and infrastructure and strengthening financing and insurance for capacity building, as these approaches were seen as outside its mission and goals. Financing and insurance schemes appeared relatively recently in the HEA community and are primarily used for development initiatives. Insurance entities are a relatively unknown partner for disaster responders, and engaging with them requires a new skill for NGOs. Only a tiny percentage of household in low- and middle-income countries are insured, and others rely on their own assets in times of disaster. The ECB Project is probably not involved in these kind of approaches because developing these opportunities would be beyond the scope of any one NGO (and hardware and infrastructure would have been expensive for NGOs in a project already as complex as ECB).

3.2.4. Approach Prioritization and Capacity Building Success

As it did with capacity building competencies, the evaluation team examined which capacity building approaches were associated with success or recognized as effective by HEA stakeholders. The results of the desk review analysis and HEA stakeholder survey were used to determine whether prioritizing some approaches over others appeared to increase the likelihood of achieving capacity building goals. In the desk review analysis, multiple regression models were constructed to compare associations between emergency capacity building approaches and success index. In the HEA stakeholder survey, respondents were asked to identify the most effective and least effective capacity building methods or approaches for humanitarian emergencies. The evaluation team analyzed the responses thematically and coded emerging capacity building approaches accordingly.

The desk review analysis showed a less than moderate (18.6%) but statistically significant (.006) association between capacity building approaches and the success index (Table 4). People-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches (29.4%; P=.031), partnerships/coordination/collaboration (24.9%; P=.045) and working with national and local governments (23.6%; P=.064) were significantly associated with the success index.

The following sections discuss the ECB Project’s success and limitations in using the three approaches significantly associated with successful capacity building (people centered/field-centered/community-based approaches, partnerships/coordination/collaboration and working with national and local governments).

A. Approach associated with success: People-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches

People-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches actively involve local target populations, focus on local/field-level impact and depend on community/stakeholder involvement. This approach had the highest correlation with the success index.
Figure 6: Intersection of approaches prioritized by the HEA community and ECB Project

Global HEA Community

Moderately Prioritized in HEA Community

Private Sector Involvement
Development of Hardware & Infrastructure
Financing & Insurance

Most Prioritized in HEA Community

People Centered/Participatory Approaches
DRR/Policy/Programs & Legal Frameworks
Strengthening HEA Systems

Working with National & Local Governments
Partnerships/Collaboration

Least Prioritized in HEA Community

Humanitarian Standards
Information Sharing
Data Driven Programming
Training & Education

ECB Community

Development of Tools, Guides & Protocols
Field-centeredness was not simply an approach of the ECB Project but one of its aims. The first of the three project objectives in Phase II was to improve field capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies in disaster-prone countries. The project selected four countries and the Horn of Africa to form consortia of IWG agencies, other agencies and local partners to improve emergency preparedness and collaborative response. Communities and governments at national, regional and to some extent local levels were brought into capacity development initiatives.

An example of a successful ECB community-based capacity building approach was a tool developed in Bolivia to gather community feedback on emergency response and aid delivered to improve accountability and future response. The Good Enough Guide similarly provided guidelines on accountability to communities served by NGOs. The development of Toward Resilience engaged local actors that would apply the actions to protect their homes, livelihoods and communities. UNOCHA was involved in developing the JNA in Indonesia and endorsed the tool. The development of JNA tools with ACAPS partners involved communities as well as governments.

Another people-centered approach employed by the ECB Project was the simulations developed in Phase I and used to a greater extent in Phase II. Having all parties working in and touched by disasters “play” reality brought together humanitarian actors that may not have engaged with one another before. This approach of learning by doing also led to deeper understanding of and greater interest in problems and an ability to transfer learning to future scenarios (Hockaday and Lumsdon, 2012). As a result of the simulations, ECB field staff in Bolivia and Indonesia said they felt more confident in their work and decision-making.

Project accomplishments: People-centered/field-centered/community-based approaches to capacity building

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The project held workshops and developed consortium engagement plans and Consortia Self-Assessment Study (CSAS) reports highlighting interesting capacity benchmarks and information that members could use as baseline data for planning activities and developing funding proposals. The consortia jointly planned and implemented preparedness and response activities with local communities, governments and partners and shared learning about innovative activities across the humanitarian sector.

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**ECB Project challenges: People–centered/field–centered/community–based approaches**

While the project made major strides in building field consortia, respondents in field interviews felt it should have invested more in capacity building of local staff, who are based in the communities and are the front line of action during any crisis. The ENHance, Sphere and other training modules were rolled out mostly to national-level staff in Bangladesh, Bolivia and Indonesia and translated into local languages, but informants mentioned lack of time and human and financial resources as constraints to reaching more local communities and local agencies.

**B. Approach associated with success: Working with national and local governments**

The desk review defined this approach as collaborating formally and informally and creating/supporting relationships with local governing bodies and officials to facilitate humanitarian programs, projects and policy. For the ECB Project, this was both a theme and an approach to advocate for improved policies to promote DRR, mitigation, preparedness and response.

**ECB Project accomplishments: Working with national and local governments**

The collaboration among ECB members and other partners gave them a unified voice and facilitated advocacy. Joint advocacy by ECB members was successful in each field setting, as described below.

**Bangladesh.** The ECB consortium established itself as more credible, neutral and transparent than other groups or individual organizations. Building credibility may have begun with the support of ACAPS and redevelopment of the assessment tools, drawing on global developments such as the UN Multi-cluster/sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) approach. Following an exchange visit to Indonesia and a scoping study on the JNA, the Bangladesh consortium collaborated with the Department of Disaster Management (DDM) on the first JNA, involving approximately 20 NGOs. The joint Government of Bangladesh, ECB and ACAPS interest in improving assessments grew over 18 months into an approach rooted in national coordination mechanisms, with the active buy-in of a broad array of stakeholders.

One of the landmark accomplishments of the Bangladesh consortium was joint advocacy that rallied over 20 organizations and communities to draw government, donor and media attention to areas affected by Cyclone Alia in May 2009. Hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless, and an estimated 20 million were exposed to post-disaster diseases. Structural challenges to delivering emergency assistance included the lack of role definition at various administrative levels. This gap inspired the consortium to launch another advocacy campaign to call for enactment of the Disaster Management Act. This Act, enacted in 2012:

- Articulates the roles of various actors in disaster management and outlines communities’ rights to receive as well as demand quality emergency response from local leaders (duty bearers);
- Allocates authority for emergency coordination to the local administration;
- Strengthens the national Standing Order on Disasters;
- Requires training of Union Disaster Management Committees in disaster risk management (DRM), including JNA;
- Spells out roles and responsibilities for JNA coordination;
- Spells out the responsibilities of actors during an emergency;
- Includes a clause that prevents salination (some cases have been filed against people who construct buildings that block water); and
- Highlights the need for emergency-related training (several universities have developed disaster management training programs, and at least eight have started DRM programs).

**Bolivia.** With funding from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department Disaster Preparedness Programme (DipECHO), the ECB consortium worked with the government to update Emergency Law 2140 and Law 31. The Vice Ministry of Civil Defense (VIDECI) acknowledged that INGO support, technical assistance and capacity building could bolster the plans of government ministries and underscored the need for INGOs to be support and respect the primary role of the State in disaster preparedness and response. The ECB consortium’s credibility with the government and sensitivity to its role enabled it to work closely with VIDECEI to modify the emergency laws. The consortium also helped improve multi-actor preparedness and response coordination at national level and in nine priority departments.

**Horn of Africa.** This ECB consortium made important gains with the Governments of Kenya and Uganda, particularly through collaborative development of two assessment tools. These were the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment (KIRA) tool developed with ACAPS, UNOCHA, UNICEF, ECB agencies and the Government of Kenya and the Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA) tool developed in Uganda with the Office of the Prime Minister, local government, local communities and ECB agencies. The KIRA approach was decentralized to regional focal points as part of contingency planning for the Kenyan elections in 2013. The Government of Uganda’s involvement in developing the PDRA, along with its participation in the ECB Interactive event, helped strengthen relationships with the consortium and allowed members to operationalize practices at the district level.

**Indonesia.** The Indonesia ECB consortium gained credibility with the government, as well as with UN agencies and donors, in part by working with ACAPS to design and implement JNAs. The government’s emergency division—BNPB—adapted much of the JNA work in its official assessment of disasters. The consortium advocated for the revision of Indonesian Law 22 on land use after emergencies and Law 24 on disaster management, as well as for a national Disaster Risk Reduction Plan that was adopted in 2006 (during Phase I).

**Niger.** UN agencies, donors and other development partners attended monthly coordination meetings held by ECB members during the 2012 food crisis in Niger to share what they were doing and discuss opportunities for collaboration. While these meetings, may not have been a result of the ECB project alone, the project had a major contribution to their functioning. Results of this collaboration between ECB members and other partners included a joint vulnerability and...
emergency assessment, with harmonized tools for data collection. This assessment supplemented a larger national assessment coordinated by the government by focusing on community levels not normally included in national data. The results also informed a joint communiqué to raise awareness in the international community to strengthen the response to the food crisis. The communiqué was disseminated through all the collaborating agencies, including ECB members. There is anecdotal evidence that this advocacy, together with other efforts, helped communicate the urgency of the food crisis and attract more partner resources.

These important accomplishments should not be underestimated. Building trust through dialogue, transparency, reputation, shared goals and participation in capacity building events (simulations, Sphere training, ECB Interactive) enabled these advances with national governments, something that is often not possible for individual NGOs. The fruits of the collaborative work on national laws and assessment tools go beyond trust. Consortia collaboration allowed key actors in each country to share expertise, experience and knowledge and understand and appreciate each other’s work as well as strengthening networks, an important pre-condition for effective emergency response. The relative neutrality of the ECB consortia enabled them to work more easily with different entities. A lesson learned from building these relationships is the need to translate collaborative efforts into documents, policies and agency protocols so they become institutionalized and are not lost with the inevitable turnover in NGO staff.

_C. Other Approaches to Capacity Building_

The desk review did not find that evidence-based planning and implementation (accountability and impact measurement), facilitating training and education, strengthening adherence to standards or facilitating communication and sharing and disseminating best practices were approaches significantly associated with successful capacity building. However, the ECB Project registered numerous achievements in these areas.

**ECB Project success: Evidence-based planning and implementation and strengthening adherence to standards**

The project used both these capacity building approaches in its AIM work. In Phase I, the project was a good research and testing ground for accountability indicators for partners such as HAP and Sphere. In Phase II, capacity building on accountability was well received in every consortium setting. The Good Enough Guide was translated and distributed more widely. Accountability tools such as the community feedback tool in Bolivia were developed, and agencies, governments and UN organizations adapted the tools and standards for their own use. While the ECB Project did not systematically measure or evaluate the accountability of its own objectives, it attempted to measure progress in accountability and some other aspects of the project. There was little or no accountability if ECB agencies did not meet the intended objectives.

Stakeholders interviewed in all ECB countries said that AIM capacity building was appreciated and successful. ECB accountability training in Bolivia brought new ideas to UNOCHA, PAHO and the World Food Program (WFP). An official with the Bureau of National Statistics reported that the training helped her measure individual feedback on the various issues she surveyed and use a rights-based approach to measure community groups, life conditions, labor, and income and expense statistics. The training influenced NGO policies and practices, particularly for accountability, and governments (Bolivia) and UN agencies (Bolivia and Indonesia) have cited or used Sphere standards and sought feedback at the municipal level on accountability from affected communities. The BNPB in Bolivia is more aware of the importance of accountability to its people as a result of ECB consortium awareness raising and competency building. In Indonesia, consortium members incorporated accountability mechanisms into project designs in some field sites using a format and mechanism similar to Bolivia’s for community feedback and complaints.

WVI and CRS had developed extensive accountability manuals and training before the ECB Project, but headquarters staff of CARE, MCI and SCF interviewed by the evaluation team said that ECB accountability capacity building had transformed the way they operated. CARE developed an International humanitarian accountability framework that it now uses in its programs worldwide. SCF’s accountability work expanded under the ECB Project, and the agency rolled out an accountability framework in all the countries where it operates. Oxfam also adapted the ECB accountability framework. The global reach of these agencies makes these significant achievements.
The ECB AIM Standing Team was deployed in Bangladesh in April and May 2012 and in other countries as a result of consortium requests. This team included humanitarian staff from all six ECB agencies with expertise in accountability, monitoring, evaluation and assessment. The main role of the team was to review and document the ECB member agencies’ AIM practices in emergency response and identify accountability strengths and gaps. The team recommended incorporating accountability into job descriptions of all staff working in emergencies and into annual performance appraisals and plans.

Agencies also developed Accountability Improvement Plans (AIPs) that were monitored bi-monthly. The ECB Internal Review report noted that Concern Worldwide and Oxfam had appointed accountability focal points and established community-led feedback mechanisms, along with training community members and staff in accountability. SCF initiated accountability training for staff and partners to ensure that project information was freely available to communities in its working areas, and WVI included accountability measures in the job descriptions of key staff. CARE organized annual training of trainers workshops for its Standing Team members and deployed them for both agency-specific and interagency assignments. Agencies included indicators of community participation in program proposals and designs. In Bolivia, communities appreciated the opportunity to give feedback on programs that affected them, and the feedback informed agency planning, and in Bolivia, were very responsive to the feedback tool developed by the consortium. The community-led feedback helped the consortium to better plan its programs. CARE organized annual Training of Trainer-style workshops for their Standing Team members and deployed them for both agency-specific and interagency assignments.

In Bangladesh, respondents spoke highly of the relevance of the Good Enough Guide and the participatory and empowering process of developing this resource. The guide was translated into Bangla to explain the basic principles of accountability to busy field workers. Non-ECB member organizations such as Caritas and the Network for Information Response and Preparedness Activities on Disasters (NIRAPAD), both with networks across the country, used the guide as a field tool to promote humanitarian accountability and to develop training modules and curricula. More than 176 staff were trained in AIM using the Good Enough Guide, and posters, leaflets, flip charts and audiovisual materials were produced to complement the training. Sixteen staff were trained on HAP’s Complaint Response Mechanism, and 77 staff participated in training on humanitarian advocacy.

ECB Project challenges: Data-driven planning and implementation and strengthening adherence to standards
In Bangladesh, ECB members had management commitments, frameworks and tools for accountability, but individual agencies defined and operationalized accountability differently. Also, agencies did not have a systematic approach to communicate the practice of accountability to staff, and staff awareness of the importance of accountability in emergencies and implementation of the principle differed.

ECB Project success: Facilitating training and education
HEA stakeholder survey respondents considered training (and education) as both the most effective and least effective capacity building approaches, indicating the importance of the quality of trainers and other factors. For example, an ECB staff member in Bolivia mentioned that a consultant who was a poor trainer had discouraged participants, making the consortium more diligent in finding a good trainer for the next event. A number of respondents in Bolivia and Indonesia remarked that the excellent quality of the ENHAnce trainers had made a difference in their learning.

Figure 7 breaks down the effectiveness of different training and education approaches according to stakeholder respondents. Most listed simulations and coaching/on-the-job training as the most effective approaches, and workshops, generalized training and online recordings as the least effective, with classroom sessions somewhere between.

Training was a major approach used by the ECB Project to build capacity. Hundreds of staff were trained as trainers in the Sphere accountability standards. ENHAnce training, a 6–9 month module on Management and Leadership and Core Skills Development based on the core Humanitarian Competencies Framework, included the following sessions:

1. Understanding humanitarian contexts and applying humanitarian principles;
2. Achieving results effectively, considering the need for speed, scale and quality;
3. Developing and maintaining collaborative relationships;
4. Operating safely and securely in high-risk environments;
5. Managing staff in a high-pressure and changing environment; and

This training was also extended to non-ECB members, including about 150 government and NGO staff. Demand was so high in Bangladesh that the project translated the core course materials into Bangla and trained national facilitators to roll out the training to local NGO staff. The Bangladesh consortium planned to continue training local NGOs and staff (especially female staff) if funding were secured for an ECB extension.

More than 650 humanitarian, government, academic, donor, UN and private sector representatives traveled from field programs and national and regional offices in over 33 countries to attend one of the five ECB interactive Regional Learning Conferences in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Indonesia, the Horn of Africa and Niger. E-learning and downloadable courses included the Shelter Module, two WASH e-learning courses in English and French (http://www.disasterready.org), Short Training: Addressing Staff Retention and Improving Staff Engagement, the Good Enough Guide and the Good Enough Guide Training of Trainers Module. Table 5 shows the number of courses and participants trained.

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3 http://qualityandaccountabilitynetwork.care2share.wikispaces.net/Standing+Team
Figure 7: Most and least effective training approaches (stakeholder survey)

**Most Effective Training Approaches**
- Simulations: 55.6%
- One on one Trainings: 18.5%
- Classroom sessions: 14.8%
- On-the-job trainings/coaching: 7.4%
- Workshops: 3.7%

**Least Effective**
- Online Recordings: 27%
- Case Studies/Documents: 18%
- Workshops: 18%
- Classroom sessions: 14%
- On-the-job trainings: 9%
- Lectures: 5%
- Generalized Training: 9%
Local initiatives that met local needs or global initiatives that were tailored to local needs were rated as more successful than globally driven ones. A former ECB focal point in Bolivia commented that the broad-perspective disaster risk reduction capacity building approaches directed by the Global team did not match field needs and perspectives. ECB funding limited the participation of the HEA community in project capacity building initiatives. The consortia had to charge for some courses when funding ran out for that line item. A few key informants in Niger and Indonesia noted that more funding would have allowed more courses for more participants. The head of an ECB agency in Niger commented, Training informal workshops worked when things were financed, but when they asked [people] to contribute, things didn’t work so well.

**ECB Project challenges: Facilitating training and education**

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**ECB Project success: Facilitating communication, information sharing and materials/best practices dissemination**

The main focus of ECB Project communication and information sharing was to develop resource materials to address capacity issues and disseminate them to member agencies and the broader humanitarian community. Over the life of the project, agencies worked together to develop numerous tools. While this collaboration was not without its challenges, it helped generate buy-in, some sense of neutrality of ownership and technical credibility.

According to ECB communications, between November 25, 2008, and July 31, 2013, the project website received 96,821 unique visitors and 52,204 downloads of project tools, newsletters and resources from over 200 countries and territories. Most downloads came from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Somalia, the UK and the United States. The organizations that downloaded the most resources were CARE International, CRS, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), MCI, Oxfam, SCF, WVI and UNICEF. Frequent visits to the ECB website continued after the project ended and ALNAP began hosting the website. Project records show that between May 1 and July 23, 2014, 15,885 users (including 13,815 new users) visited the website and viewed 35,161 pages. People around the world, from Kazakhstan to Nepal to Madagascar, continue to access the site.

The materials use survey on the perceived relevance and effectiveness of the ECB Project materials showed that 52% of the respondents had visited the website less than once a month and 24% had visited it only once. A small percentage had visited it many times every month, week or day. It is difficult to draw definitive results from these figures because some users may have held positions that required frequent access to ECB resources and others might have downloaded materials in a single visit. The reasons respondents reported for downloading or using ECB materials included capacity building/training/other workshops (24.1%), emergencies (e.g., assessments) (20.5%), personal interest (15%), program design and other (13.3%), research (11.6%), policy development (6.4%), advocacy/campaigns (5.8%) and no action (3.3%).
TSUNAMI HAZARD ZONE

IN CASE OF EARTHQUAKE, GO TO HIGH GROUND OR INLAND
Figure 8: Actions taken by frequency of ECB website visits (materials use survey)
Figure 8 shows the actions taken by website visitors by frequency of visit. These actions align with the ECB Project’s purpose of building emergency capacity and reflect the main goals of online resource development and availability. They also correspond with the frequency of website visits, as many users may have accessed materials only in emergency situations.

Figure 9 shows that the Good Enough Guide, Toward Resilience and the EFSL 48-Hour Assessment Tool were the most frequently used resources. The actions taken and use of the materials match the ECB Project goals and intended use of the resources. The Good Enough Guide, which was developed to guide accountability and operational changes for impact measurement, was mainly downloaded for capacity building workshops (56%), emergencies (48%), and program design and proposal development (33%). These uses correlated with the document’s aim of guiding accountability and making operational changes for impact measurement. Toward Resilience was mainly downloaded for program design and proposal development (40%), capacity building workshops (31%), research (25%) and personal interest (26%). The guide provides introductory information, useful guidelines and principles of effective practice for these actions. All resources rated highly for use in emergencies, capacity building and program design and proposal writing, but low for use in advocacy and policy development. The resources were used most often in emergencies and for capacity building and program design and proposal development (their intended purposes) and least often for advocacy and policy development.

Figure 9: Actions taken/uses for specific materials (materials use survey)
While respondents rated the Good Enough Guide and Toward Resilience as the most useful downloads, all documents were downloaded and rated by most respondents as useful or very useful. Users perceived the guides as concise, collaborative, and critical for capacity building and training (Figure 10).

The respondent quotations below represent the positive reception the ECB Project materials received.

- I have known the ECB Project for a long time and regularly visited the website. I could have checked on many more documents than those ticked above. I have always found the approach of ECB very attractive and helpful in guiding practitioners and supporting capacity building. In particular, the Good Enough Guide was (and is!) just excellent and extraordinarily helpful in its short and precise form. Things don’t have to be so complicated!
- Good to know about collaboration key lessons in consortium building and useful for development workers employed on programs. Good quality documents and resources on accountability.
- I really believe this work is so important and especially downloadable resources. I am not familiar with all your resources, but I have come to realize how critical it is to have these resources and training in this field. It is needed to focus on this area.

Of the materials use survey respondents, 67% felt the ECB Project materials influenced individual or organizational capacity building approaches. Below are both positive and negative comments from the survey.

- The ECB materials have in particular been helpful in working with capacity building, understanding accountability and also addressing attitudes of aid workers.
- As mentioned above, we are tied to our organization’s systems, but the ECB materials provide evidence of other ways of doing things. I personally have a reputation of being outspoken, advocating simplicity with application of the principle of “optimal ignorance,” which is to find out what you need to know, not what you’d “like” to know. Because the ECB materials and approaches were an interagency effort, they tend to boil the complex down to understandable elements. Rest assured, if I were in a smaller organization that didn’t have the processes and tools already rolled out on an organization-wide basis, I would use ECB materials even more.
- … not because they weren’t useful but because we were already overwhelmed with information and approaches.
- …we offer training not only to INGOs, but also to national NGOs, CBOs, governments and journalists, which requires flexible and a slightly different approach. Also, we deliver training worldwide, therefore we are very sensitive regarding the contextualization of training material as well as approaches used to achieve the learning objectives.

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents felt that the ECB Project materials had positively influenced their organizations’ disaster risk reduction. A few comments are shown below.

- Yes, the ECB materials have been the core documents World Vision uses for training field staff in humanitarian emergency work. The ECB handbook is a must have for every staff.
- Getting local providers to buy in to different programs has been a problem for us in East Africa, but we have used principles here to implement projects from their inception using local leaders, with better results.
- The Joint Needs Assessment work in Bangladesh is one of the biggest ECB legacies to the country.

Field interview respondents provided further feedback on the value of ECB materials as well as the way they were developed. For example, the development of Toward Resilience was considered instrumental in strengthening programming for disaster risk reduction and influential on organizational and staff thinking regarding the need to strengthen disaster risk reduction. The collaborative process used to develop the guide was also considered an important strength. According to the report of the 2013 ECB London Learning Event, development of the guide involved:

- 6 ECB agencies plus others in the consortia;
- 24 people consulted on the scoping study;
- 2 international summits;
- 10 consortium workshops with up to 100 participants;
- 6 field tests in 6 countries;
- 33 field participants in the global workshops;
- 6 ECB project staff and managers (including 2 ex-staff);
- 6 editorial committee members;
- 1 editor;
- 2 translators;
- 2 agency managers; and
- 1,500 reader responses.

Respondents said that Toward Resilience clarified a complicated topic, giving agencies a common definition and understanding of resilience. Partners found this resource useful in designing resilience-related interventions. According to one of the agency focal points in Niger, before this resource was developed, it was not well understood that the crises in Niger were mostly slow onset. This guide lays out strategies for addressing vulnerabilities associated with such crises.

Stakeholders also reported the usefulness of the Good Enough Guide. One respondent said that one of the critical issues addressed by this resource was how to define and articulate targets. The guide also suggested ways to involve stakeholders in strategy development, accountability processes, integrating “do no harm” and working with people with disabilities in programming.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Useful</th>
<th>Not Useful</th>
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<td>Drr Country Documents</td>
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<td>Working with Quality &amp; Accountability Initiatives</td>
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<td>Exchange Visits &amp; the Staff Capacity Framework</td>
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<td>Staff Retention &amp; Turnover Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECB Simulations Administrators Guide</td>
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<td>Key elements of accountability</td>
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<td>National Staff Development Program</td>
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<td>Toward Resilience guide</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFSL 48 Hour Assessment Tool</td>
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<td>Case studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies</td>
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<td>Good Enough Guide Training of Trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good Enough Guide</td>
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*Figure 10: Usefulness/relevance of ECB materials*
Project outreach communication challenges included inadequate funding, resources and staff time; staff turnover; and getting buy-in support even from the ECB agencies to promote and disseminate learning and project results. Communication outreach was limited at the consortium level before 2012, although it was better defined in Phase I than in Phase II. Information about ECB materials reached the broader HEA community through ad hoc training and occasional emails, newsletters and meetings. Despite the relative accessibility of the ECB website, local partners complained that they were unaware of all the materials available and how to access them. Some did not have the bandwidth to download large documents or had limited resources to buy copies.

3.3. Whose Capacity? Stakeholder Groups Targeted by the ECB Project

Along with competencies (What) and approaches (How), targeted groups (Who) is the third important element of capacity building. This section examines stakeholder groups targeted by the ECB Project’s capacity building efforts at three levels, which approximately parallel the three objectives of the ECB Project:

1. **Micro-individual level** (staff/cadres) = Objective 1. Improve field-level capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies in disaster-prone countries;
2. **Meso-organizational level** (institutions/organizations) = Objective 2. Increase the speed, quality and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response mechanisms within and across IWG agencies; and
3. **Macro-societal level** (national or global networks of organizations) = Objective 3. Contribute to improving the sector’s emergency preparedness and response through collective dialogue, knowledge sharing, learning and collaborative work with other partners and organizations.

This section discusses the stakeholder groups most and least prioritized by the HEA sector and ECB Project and the relative effectiveness of focusing on different stakeholder groups, it then identifies the stakeholder groups targeted by the ECB Project and assesses the project’s accomplishments and challenges in targeting appropriate stakeholder groups.

3.3.1. Stakeholder Groups and System Levels Targeted by the HEA Community

Emergency response requires the engagement of a wide variety of humanitarian actors. This evaluation looked at the stakeholder groups that the ECB consortia involved in capacity building as well as response. At the national level, each consortium targeted the host government, emergency management authorities, the military if relevant, UN agencies and select NGO partners. The media was occasionally engaged in emergency response communications, although this was mentioned as a gap in some countries. In Bolivia, the government encouraged the consortia to use the media for educational purposes during the flood emergency, but in other countries the con
sortia rarely engaged the media for strategic educational or fund raising purposes. The private sector was another gap mentioned in interviews with key stakeholders. One international staff member in Bolivia noted that there were many sources of funding in the private sector, even in small localities. A cement company, for example, had volunteered on its own to contribute cement to rebuild houses after the 2011 landslides. Private money exists in most places, but INGOs seldom make use of it. One reason may be that they are at a disadvantage in the eyes of local corporations as outsiders, less well known than local organizations and NGOs. Another reason may be that few NGO workers have the skill set needed to tap private resources. Few consortia tapped the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, typically the first responders in emergencies. The reasons are not clear, although the Red Cross societies may not have been interested in being involved with the project.

Overall, consortia engaged with many key humanitarian actors in capacity building activities. This varied by country and HEA environment. Nevertheless, consortia could have been more strategic and inclusive in engaging with partners. The quality of ECB training, simulations, JNAs and materials elevated the image of the consortia, giving them a more commanding role in the HEA community than single agencies. Most UN agency personnel interviewed in Bolivia and Indonesia were positive about ECB capacity building initiatives because they felt the JNA process was very useful (especially the involvement of ACAPS) and the quality of training was generally quite good. Some UN agencies reported using information from some of the training in their work, and one agency mentioned including aspects of the standards training in its in-house capacity building.

The desk review analysis found that most capacity building interventions focused on organizations (meso level). In addition, interventions focused less on individual staff (micro level) in 2012–2014 than in 2003–2005 (Figure 11). This is probably because the project increasingly targeted organizations for capacity building. Few documents distinguished between national INGO and NGO stakeholders.

As mentioned earlier, the meso level (organizations) includes headquarters, regional, national and field/local stakeholders. As shown in Figure 12, most respondents in the materials use survey reported using ECB materials to build capacity at field and national level. This is consistent with HEA literature pointing to the need to build resiliency at local level, but the desk review suggests that the HEA community considers headquarters capacity building more important. Further analysis may answer whether the humanitarian system is gravitating toward strengthening the capacity of headquarters stakeholders to enact field-level changes. Figure 13 shows that there has been an increasing focus on headquarters, national and field-level stakeholders, while attention to regional stakeholders has been inconsistent.

Figure 11: Trends in system level focus (desk review analysis)
Figure 12: Stakeholder groups targeted by capacity building interventions (desk review analysis and materials use survey)

**DESK REVIEW**

- National level organization staff/networks: 21.4%
- Headquarters/Global level organization staff/networks: 27%
- Field/local organization/partner/staff/networks: 23.7%
- Regional level organization staff/networks: 27.9%

**MATERIALS USE SURVEY**

- National level stakeholders: 15.3%
- Field/local stakeholders: 45.8%
- Regional stakeholder group targeted: 4.2%
- HQ stakeholder group targeted: 40.7%

Figure 13: Trends in focus on stakeholder groups (desk review analysis)

- HQ
- National
- Field/Local
- Regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Field/Local</th>
<th>Regional</th>
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<td>2003–2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006–2008</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2009–2011</td>
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<td>2012–2014</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015–2017</td>
<td>25</td>
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were frequently downloaded.

ing intranets of the ECB member agencies. Respondents said that these materials were piloted by ECB agency WASH field staff around the world. These modules are available as open source on many websites, such as Disaster Ready, and on the training intranets of the ECB member agencies. Respondents said that these materials were frequently downloaded.

3.3.2. Stakeholder Groups and System Levels Prioritized by the ECB Project
Phase I of the project focused mainly on IWG headquarters capacity building, with select pilot field activities. Field-level workshops targeted individual staff rather than organizations. Phase II focused on creating impact in the field by forming consortia to plan and implement activities that targeted member organizations (meso level) as well as the broader HEA community (macro level). Most of the ECB agencies already worked with local partners (e.g., CRS worked with local branches of Caritas, and WVI worked with Samaritan’s Purse). ECB Project respondents mentioned that INGOs to some extent were moving away from direct implementation to working with local partners and building local capacity. In emergencies, NGOs do not work in a vacuum. Involving other key humanitarian actors in capacity building is a prudent strategy to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of emergency response (a rising tide lifts all boats). This philosophy was echoed in many interviews in Bolivia and other countries visited. A video the Bolivian consortium produced about the project and consortium (Video de presentación. Consorcio de Agencias Humanitarias en Bolivia6 contains worthwhile information on the utility of consortia in general.

3.3.3. Alignment of ECB and Broader HEA Priorities
The ECB filled some important gaps in emergency response—defining DRR, designing effective JNAs, improving adherence to standards and building capacity in areas such as the Core Humanitarian Competencies framework, leadership and emergency management. These gaps were then turned into objectives, most of which were identified by local consortia to fit the local context.

3.3.4. Relevance of ECB Project and HEA Community Priorities
The desk review found that an increasing focus on building the capacity of headquarters-level stakeholders matched a decreasing focus on field-level stakeholders. On the other hand, in Phase II the ECB Project increasingly targeted capacity building to the field level to create more impact. In each of the countries where the ECB consortia operated, capacity building focused on national-level stakeholders, with limited training at regional and local levels. In field interviews, many respondents said the project should have reached more local emergency responders, including the national Red Cross societies, which either weren’t invited to training or didn’t participate when invited.

3.3.5. Stakeholder Targeting and Capacity Building Success
Regression analysis of desk review data showed that focusing on headquarters (macro level) has a significant negative association with the success index and focusing on organizations or national staff (meso level) has a significant positive association with the success index (table 6).

The negative association between headquarters (macro level) systems and the success index can be explained in part because humanitarian efforts, primarily “foreign-driven” efforts, tend to take a top-down approach. Delivery of aid is often misinformed by reports by other organizations or news media without sufficient needs assessment or involvement of local decision makers. Language and cultural barriers factor into poor communication and lack of ownership of response, even though communities are the first responders (Namibobya, 2008).

Building emergency capacity requires leadership at various levels, not only at headquarters. Humanitarian reform efforts have identified leadership as a key factor in the success of emergency response in the field, and it is one of the three pillars in the IASC Principals Transformative Agenda. For sustainability, emergency capacity building has to target the national and local stakeholders who are the first responders.
The desk review findings validate the importance of the ECB Project’s emphasis on building field capacity in Phase II. Recognition of the importance of building national leadership and emergency management (Buchanan-Smith and Scriven, 2011) informed the design of the ENHAnce curriculum. The ECB Project hosted ENHAnce training for 189 staff from 18 countries. A follow-up survey found that 99% of the participants thought the training had been effective or very effective in helping them apply humanitarian principles and standards (ECB Project Newsletter, September 2013). An NGO staff member in Indonesia said ENHAnce was the most worthwhile emergency management training, and an NGO staff member in Bolivia said had given him confidence in his decision-making.

Both member and non-member agencies were involved in ECB Project activities, creating more opportunities to scale up impact. A number of organizations adapted and translated training materials for field staff. The Bangladesh consortium translated the HAP and Sphere standards and Good Enough Guide into Bangla, and materials were translated into Bahasa Indonesia in Indonesia, Spanish in Bolivia and French in Niger. Altogether, the Good Enough Guide was translated into 13 languages, including translations not foreseen in activity plans. Demand for the guide exceeded that for the Sphere Handbook in Phase I. Sphere and other networks have acknowledged ECB’s significant contribution to accountability work in the humanitarian arena.

The evaluation team heard from respondents that the ECB Project should have cascaded training beyond national-level staff to field/community-level staff and local government officials. This was done in Bolivia and Indonesia to a limited extent. The Government of Bolivia directed emergency-related activities, including targeting locations, hampering NGOs’ freedom to build the capacity of local actors. In Indonesia, municipal government managers were frequently rotated elsewhere, increasing the need for multiple training courses. Funding was the overriding factor that limited the reach of ECB Project training. Consortium agencies worked in disparate locations in the countries where they operated and the cost of multiple local courses, as well as limited time, made scale-up unrealistic.

The consortium model proved to be an effective way to accomplish the ECB Project’s goals and objectives and was a sound platform for networking, planning, capacity building and fundraising, as well as coordination of emergency response. The project generally was a good bridging mechanism to connect NGOs to cluster meetings. The Accountability team (AIM Advisors) built linkages with the clusters into their work plans, and their focal points were part of the various cluster teams (e.g., shelter and WASH). In most countries, the consortia engaged clusters in JNAs. On the other hand, while the larger humanitarian community was brought into developing the various capacity building objectives in the five ECB countries and region, this involvement did not transform the community in the way the UN cluster system transformed the way agencies approach large-scale disasters.

The ECB Project had unintended benefits in the South America region. The Bolivia consortium became a model hub for training and information exchange for many other countries and was asked to share lessons learned on collaboration with agencies working in Haiti.

### 3.3.6. Stakeholder Targeting and Sustainability

An exit strategy and corresponding sustainability approach are critical components of capacity building. Sixty percent of the documents reviewed by the evaluation team mentioned measures of sustainability. Figure 14 shows that these documents focused on developing local capacity, partnerships/collaboration/coordination and accountability/evaluation. Developing facilities and infrastructure and strengthening private sector involvement received minimal attention.

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materials were incorporated into agencies’ own training and tools and will likely lose the ECB brand name over time. One key informant was unaware that one of the tools his agency used regularly had been developed as a joint ECB agency effort.

The ECB Project conducted 17 simulations in six countries, including Kenya and Uganda. The simulations taught participants how to coordinate and work collectively in situations of civil conflict, cyclones, earthquakes, drought, refugees and famine. Of the 145 respondents, 96% thought the simulations had effectively reinforced the skills they had developed in the ENHAnce training.

ECBinter- active regional learning conferences promoted global, South-South sharing from a central hub. Applications were competitive, and only two or three people were chosen from each country. Over 70% of stakeholder survey respondents said they had been able to use learning from these conferences in their daily work. The exchanges were considered very useful for the cross-fertilization of ideas. The relatively inexpensive exchange visits of ECB staff to other countries helped develop strong and long-term leaders who brought back tools, ideas and approaches to share within their networks.

ENHAnce training helped build skills in managing disasters and leadership. The success of training was perceived to depend on personal commitment and active participation, a well-known good practice in adult learning. The ECB Project also created systems for emergency planning and preparedness that had not existed before.

### 3.4. What Worked and Didn’t Work and Why

Will the ECB accomplishments outlive the project’s life? This section explores the most and least successful aspects of the project and member agency plans to continue some of its core activities.

#### 3.4.1. ECB Project Governance

Governance of the ECB was criticized from the beginning of Phase I. The governance model chosen was cited as burdensome, frequently underfunded (particularly for focal point positions in the field during Phase II), top heavy yet unable to provide enough technical assistance or feedback to the field and limited to emergency units in the core agencies.

#### 3.4.2. The Consortium Model

Consortia proved to be a powerful way to carry out the ECB Project capacity building objectives and increase credibility with other networks. The Bolivia consortium, for example, networked regionally, invited other agencies to training and is now seen as a central training hub for emergency capacity building. In extensive field interviews, respondents explained why they preferred the consortium approach to agencies acting individually in emergency response and how the project’s consortium model contributed to its success:

- Ease of communication with donors, governments, UN and other partners with one voice from the consortium and to the consortium;

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Summary of Proposal to BMGF, 2008.
• Rapid understanding of consortium and member skills and capabilities to handle specific kinds of response;
• Allocation of resources to agencies based on specific skills;
• Training by all humanitarian actors on a variety of topics that creates relationships, builds trust and brings skill levels to a common standard;
• Integration of coordination and response;
• Trust and confidence built with government, Red Cross and Red Crescent and UN agencies;
• Sharing of tools and experience to avoid reinventing the wheel;
• Common approach at all levels and with communities;
• Ability to influence the larger NGO sector in a country;
• One voice for NGOs with humanitarian actors;
• Common agreements and future outlooks;
• Ability to advocate with government with a stronger unified voice;
• Coverage of emergency response gaps and reduction of duplication in principal;
• Geographical and technical (skills) distribution on response;
• Development of capacities of all humanitarian actors to be better prepared; and
• Rapid dissemination of news, actions needed and response through consortium leads.

Size was one factor that limited the effectiveness of the consortium model. The evaluation found that no one size fit all in terms of agencies involved in country consortia. Including too few agencies made the consortia look exclusive to other INGOs and local NGOs, limiting acceptance of products and services (as seen in Phase I), but including too many complicated rapid response to emergencies. In Niger, the involvement of consortium members was reportedly low at the beginning but grew toward the end of the project because it took a long time for people to understand the aims and activities.

Emergency response demands substantial coordination, and NGOs interviewed during the evaluation admitted that this was not always successful. One agency called the response to the 2011 landslide in Bolivia “chaotic.” Most NGO staff interviewed mentioned inadequate consortium coordination, with some agencies approaching donors unilaterally to further their own interests. Territoriality got in the way of a harmonized response. The Bolivia consortium felt it responded better to the flood emergency in 2014 than in 2011 (although the latest response has not yet been evaluated), and agencies that worked in the flood emergency in Indonesia reported that coordination had improved but needed to be revisited and changed for future responses. Many voices on the multi-partner telephone or Skype calls and, in Niger, language barriers challenged decision-making, particularly on technical matters. Despite these failings, the ECB consortia developed important ties with the UN system, and the UN agencies viewed the consortia as an entry point to bringing other NGOs into the UN coordination system.

How funding is spent and which agencies receive the funding can be a source of contention. In both Phase I and Phase II, CARE received criticism because it was the lead agency at global level that controlled ECB Project funds. Lack of transparent funding processes was noted as a problem. For example, agencies committed to contributing funds for a coordinator, but the salary amount was substantially more than the local scale for such work, and agencies questioned where the “extra” went. Some organizations did not have funding for their focal points, who had to be funded by different projects that prioritized their own work over the objectives of the consortia. The proposal process was also unclear. Some groups of agencies applied for ECHO funding directly (outside the consortium structure), while individual agencies were told they could not apply for funding individually but only as a consortium.

In the ECB structure, it was often unclear who was in charge of management decisions. The management and administrative layers of the project, as well as the financial match burden during the worldwide financial crisis, hampered the complete fulfillment of its objectives. Because there were five countries to manage and six ECB agencies, one agency was left out of the country management configuration. Consortium focal points were busy with commitments to their own organizations’ work, which took priority over the ECB Project’s. Because they were not funded by the project, these focal points were more like volunteers who were available to the project only when they had free time. Staff turnover, particularly after the withdrawal of pay to focal points, had its most harmful impact on the Niger consortium.

Finally, a number of respondents felt that ECB staff should have explained what the project aimed to accomplish in a broader sense—transforming the NGO community’s emergency response capacity with its model of operations and its products.

3.4.3. Continuation of Activities at Country Level

The ECB Project did not develop a phase-out/exit strategy as envisioned because of the late decision not to go forward with Phase III, leaving little time for consortia to fundraise and move forward. A key sustainability strategy for the project was to build the capacity of country consortia to mobilize resources for their country-specific capacity building plans. This was realized in varying degrees in each consortium.

A CARE headquarters emergency staff member interviewed in the stakeholder survey mentioned the following sustainable outcomes of the ECB Project:

• Resources developed for common use;
• Internal performance improvement plans around areas developed by each agency;
• Stronger interaction;
• Collaborative work;
• Honesty about lessons learned and other areas;
• Formal accountability;
• Informal telephone communication and networking;
• Terms of reference and meetings of IWG principals twice a year; and
• The spirit of ECB (cooperation/collaboration/partnerships) inculcated into member agencies.
Developing a LinkedIn website was an innovative strategy to help the thematic group teams (staff capacity, AIM and DRR) and an ECB alumni group continue to share ideas as a kind of community of practice. A year after the project ended, accountability issues are still being discussed on this website. The other technical teams have not established social interaction fora or formalized information sharing, but a former Global team member said that many agency ECB focal points continued to interact on behalf of their agencies with peers and sector networks. This is less formal and structured than the communities of practice established during the ECB project (Baker, 2014).

Collaboration among former ECB members continues at the individual (micro) level. IWG members call each other at least once a month to discuss current emergencies (e.g., Syria and South Sudan). They report that they are pushing collaboration into the field, for example, sharing information and meeting during the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan. The former focal points in Indonesia and Bangladesh continue to meet informally and share training, and agencies were said to be combining resources and skills to apply for joint funding more than they did before the project.

More than a year after the project ended, field consortia members had a lot to say about the sustainability of the project’s efforts. Their responses are summarized below.

Bolivia. Bolivia was well positioned to continue the ECB Project because an MOU had been signed and agencies were contributing funds to manage a coordinator. All NGO respondents believed activities would carry on but in a modified form, to be determined after an After Action Review following the most recent flood response. The idea of enlarging the group of NGOs beyond 11 agencies received mixed reactions. Generally, agencies were positive about including more agencies, such as local partners (Practical Solutions, FUNDEPCO and Caritas) but acknowledged this would complicate communications. The issue of merging PROCOSI with the consortium was raised, but Oxfam noted that this association of mainly health agencies formerly funded by USAID/Bolivia had the “stink of the dirty uncle” after USAID was asked to leave Bolivia. Other NGOs seemed more open to including the emergency agencies under PROCOSI because they needed assistance in health and nutrition technical areas. The consortium was seen as useful, especially in dealing with the government and perceived, rightly or wrongly, as protecting NGO members from expulsion (staff of Project Concern and Ibis, a Danish agency, were asked to leave Bolivia for political reasons).

Indonesia. Most agencies still use the JNA, and the DREP is ready to use in case a large-scale emergency response is needed in the future. Foundations of trust, communication and collaboration laid during the project are reflected in ongoing informal meetings between technical staff and focal points. From the NGO perspective, training initiatives such as ENHAnce have had a long-term impact. ECB agencies and donors alike have shown keen interest in an ECB-like follow-on in the country.

Bangladesh. Respondents noted that like all projects, ECB was conceived with a specific work plan and finite life. Consortium members tried to extend the project and were willing to contribute fees to keep the secretariat going. When they realized that it would be a challenge to transfer these contributions through the financial systems of individual organizations, WVI offered to fund the secretariat without contributions from other members until a proposal could be written and funds raised. SCF, which was hosting the secretariat, decided to continue doing so with its own funding.

Consortium members submitted an ECB extension proposal to ECHO to develop a framework for urban DRR that would include identifying urban hazards, mostly in the earthquake-prone areas of Sylhet and Dhaka, the likely secondary impacts of those hazards (WASH, electricity, gas systems) and measures to address them (risk analysis, preparedness and resource mobilization). The follow-on project would also continue emergency leadership and core skills training, roll out Toward Resilience and strengthen JNAs by integrating them into the Standing Order on Disasters. The proposal did not follow through, and it was not clear why. Nonetheless, the ECB Project played a significant role in raising the attention of partners to the issue of urban DRR, both at country and global levels, and all the former ECB members work on this issue individually.

Members felt that the ECB Project was overall a success and worth continuing. The training and materials had an excellent reputation, and both NGO and government officials mentioned the project’s strong standing in the community. They did not feel its conclusion or non-extension was a sign of failure. Collaboration continues through the Inter-Agency Sub Committee on HEA, the Developing and Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance and Risk Reduction Initiatives (DeSHARI) consortium born at the closure of the ECB Project and the National Alliance for Risk Reduction and Response Initiatives (NARRI) that existed before the ECB. Members continued their involvement in other activities and other consortia. SCF, for example, chairs the DESHERI consortium, and seven out of nine ECB members are members of Action Research for Community-based Adaptation in Bangladesh (ARCAB), another DRR/climate change consortium. The AIM advisory team has a LinkedIn website (“WER”) for exchange of ideas.

Donors are ready and willing to fund consortia for DRR and climate change initiatives, among other activities. The NGOs have established respectful and collaborative relationship with the government, and platforms have been established for long-lasting organizational relationships. A Global team member suggested that the AIM, DRR and staff capacity communities of practice established during the project could continue in virtual mode, opening sites up to the wider humanitarian community.

Niger and the Horn of Africa. In Niger, lack of enthusiasm, funding and global support probably kept the consortium from planning further formal activities. Consortium countries in the Horn of Africa were fragile and involved only a few ECB core agencies. ECB agencies themselves were involved in few activities. When the regional Horn of Africa coordinator’s work finished at the end of the project, consortium activities presumably ended as well, but the evaluation team did not visit countries in the region to verify this.
4. Concluding Remarks

The ECB Project, which ran for nearly a decade, enabled a small but significant group of INGOs, local NGOs (LNGOs) and key stakeholders in the field—UN agencies, government and the military, among others—to advance learning, skills and preparedness for disasters. The project was flexible in responding to developments in the greater humanitarian community by addressing key current issues such as accountability, staff capacity and resilience. This section summarizes the relevance and feasibility of the capacities built by the ECB Project, the viability and success of the approaches used, the impact of project activities on the stakeholder groups it targeted for capacity building and the project’s likely impacts at country and global level.

4.1. WHAT Emergency Response Competencies Did the ECB Project Build?

The competencies prioritized by the ECB Project intersected to some extent with trends in the greater HEA community—accountability/evidence measurement, integrating DRR into policy and programs/legal frameworks, strengthening/providing human resources, improved programming approaches and partnerships/collaboration/coordination. Developing facilities and infrastructure, including ICT was the least prioritized emergency preparedness competency, although the ECB Project addressed this competency, particularly ICT, in Phase I.

The desk review analysis found that the competences significantly associated with successful emergency capacity building were strengthening/providing human resources, developing facilities and infrastructure, including ICT, and partnerships/collaboration/coordination. The ECB Project, like the HEA community, valued partnership and collaboration at organizational and global levels as important for successful emergency response. For the ECB however, partnership and collaborative skills development often lacked strategic direction and vision, or a theory of change, resulting in mixed success. Capacity building in these competencies was not targeted to individuals, but that is where the project was most successful, according to key informants, as individual relationships carried on post-project and into new positions. The ECB Project agencies reported that the project had clearly increased collaboration, but it is uncertain how long this collaboration will last as staff rotate and new staff are unaware of the atmosphere the project established.

Even without a clearly articulated theory of change, the ECB Project focused on some of the most important issues facing the HEA community, trying them into objectives and results statements. While they did not exactly match the gaps identified in the desk review analysis, the project identified a few of the most critical and feasible to address: Improving field staff capacity for emergency management and leadership, improving accountability to victims of disasters and guiding the integration of DRR into programming. The increasing importance of the evolving ICT domain suggests this area should not be ignored in a future model of ECB. The project design should not be faulted for not including all gaps identified, as activity overload would have been more detrimental than helpful.

The progression of capacity building focus from headquarters in Phase I to field level in Phase II made sense given the project’s goals. The consortium model was relatively successful in establishing credibility, advocating for improved emergency legislation and developing linkages with international and local partners, particularly the most important actors in emergency response.

While NGOs recognize the importance of partnerships and collaboration, there is an innate tension between their individual missions and funding resources and their desire or need to collaborate in emergency operations. Donors in Indonesia and Bolivia observed this tension among agencies that applied for funding. Donors knew that agencies had complementary strengths and encouraged collaborative proposals, but some agencies felt they alone had all the skills needed and were reluctant to respond jointly to some funding opportunities. Establishing relationships through activities such as the JNAs and training was an important step toward reducing those tensions during the project. Donors can play a key role in encouraging collaboration in geographical focus and skills sharing by the way they structure requests for proposals.

4.2. HOW Did the ECB Project Build Capacities for Emergency Response?

In both Phase I and Phase II, the ECB Project developed many tools and capacity building approaches identified by NGOs as needed for improved emergency response and used them to train broader audiences. The project’s materials development approach helped develop relationships among individuals and agencies, and the training built relationships and enhanced collaboration among key humanitarian actors, important factors for capacity building success.

ECB research results, articles, documents and training materials filled an important gap for the NGO sector in the humanitarian aid apparatus. Agencies used elements of the ECB products to write country engagement plans and MOUs. The project’s guide to training on standards in emergency operations (the Good Enough Guide) was widely welcomed for its simplicity and accessibility, and the Toward Resilience guide helped NGOs better understand the nature of disaster risk reduction. Broad participation in the development of these guides and translation into other languages ensured their acceptance by other agencies and use beyond the five ECB consortium countries. Numerous other materials and documents produced over
the life of the project were well received by people interviewed or surveyed during this evaluation. The ECB Project also contributed to the general knowledge of NGO surge capacity and staff retention, areas of persistent need in rapid onset and longer-term emergency settings.

ECB had an innovative approach to capacity development for more effective and speedier response to disasters, starting with a core group of major international aid response agencies and expanding to the field with the idea that networking and building consortia would equip agencies to respond better than they could individually. By and large, this approach met with success in three of the five field settings. Donors, UN agencies, governments and UN clusters confirmed that the consortium model of emergency response agencies as a platform for implementation, capacity building and obtaining funding is useful and easier to work with in emergencies.

The joint action that was the foundation of this project enabled it to accomplish its objectives. Organizations were able to build trust with one another in the highly competitive environment of emergency response. The productive and collaborative environment established before emergencies was put to the test during emergencies, however, particularly when agencies were pressured to obtain funding for themselves, although the experience helped them improve the next time around.

If seed money is available for a consortium and a leader or rotating leaders are selected, local consortia will likely be able to find the technical resources to move forward. The evaluation found that the success and sustainability of consortia depend on the following factors:

- Establishing written agency commitment (MOUs) with clear management, budget and communication roles, including headquarters management;
- Starting small with four or five agencies and expanding if the members find this appropriate;
- Engaging a focal point at the consortium level and in each agency headquarters and having clearly defined technical and management support from headquarters;
- Identifying local capacity strengthening needs, providing quality training to meet those needs and involving key actors in the training;
- Forming consortia over time, building trust and engaging in partnership activities in “peace time” when attention is not divided, essentially building a platform to build capacities, ease donor communication and reach out to NGOs, the private sector, Red Cross and others;
- Establishing a robust communications/sharing protocol to reach defined target groups in the HEA community;
- Staying relevant to members, paying attention to diversity and mitigating fragmentation of the consortium;
- Balancing technical support and higher-level strategies;
- Providing reliable services and expertise while remaining nimble to address/engage with emerging issues;
- Finding ways to link “traditional” and emerging organizations;
- Meeting and working face to face, including socializing opportunities; and
- Sharing agencies’ expertise and resources to achieve a common goal.

Aid agencies are continually plagued by staff turnover, and the ECB Project suffered from this problem in both phases, to some extent crippling the effectiveness of one of the consortia. Because this is a general problem in the humanitarian arena, the project commissioned a staff retention study by People in Aid to improve agencies’ ability to retain emergency staff. Agencies that found sustainable solutions were those that trained both their development and emergency personnel in an emergency core curriculum course, such as MCI in Indonesia, WVI in Bolivia and SCF at headquarters.

In Niger, consortium members generally felt that the ECB Project had improved collaboration, information exchange and coordination during emergency response. In the Horn of Africa, the evaluation found little information from the countries that experienced emergencies, other than Kenya, where the KIRA may have contributed to a clearer assessment of the needs and roles of agencies to avoid violence during the elections.

Both the key informant interviews and desk review analysis confirmed that the most effective capacity building approaches are driven by local priorities. This was the project’s intended approach in Phase II, and even though it was not always realized.

Anecdotal evidence, joint evaluations and After Action reviews of how the project’s capacity building affected agencies’ response during emergencies suggest mixed outcomes. Making simulations, JNAs, and the Sphere and ENHAnce training available to a range of humanitarian players (governments, UN agencies, local NGOs) helped establish trust, good will and cooperation before emergencies and enabled a smoother response during emergencies. In Bolivia and Indonesia, consortia responded and coordinated better in each successive emergency, with the JNAs as a positive factor in Indonesia. In Bangladesh, where the government has to approve all emergency response fundraising and implementation, the government’s involvement in the JNA made it easier to secure funding and act effectively. The Humanitarian Coordination Task Team (HCTT), a multi-stakeholder coordination body for emergency response, also used the JNA approach.

Overall, the prioritization of programming approaches found in this evaluation echo the reason the ECB Project was conceived: to give NGOs a new way of doing business together, new approaches to responding to emergencies and better skills to do so.
The Global team and IWG helped standardize country consortia approaches, disseminate project products and provide encouragement and support from agency heads, but it is doubtful whether a future project along the lines of the ECB would need this kind of management structure. An agency director in Niger suggested that if another ECB Project were formed, each NGO should choose two people from different headquarters units (not only emergency units) as IWG principals to improve information gathering and exchange and consolidate emergency response within organizations. This notion was echoed in Phase I and a number of other interviews during this evaluation.

4.3. WHO Did the ECB Project Target for Capacity Building?

Most respondents in the materials use survey indicated that HEA stakeholders prioritized field- and national-level stakeholders for capacity building. The desk review analysis showed that headquarters than individual staff capacity building. The ECB Project moved from building the capacity of its own headquarters staff to targeting field organization staff and involving broader humanitarian response networks. The conclusion from Phase I was that the project had targeted the appropriate groups but had been somewhat exclusive in its outreach and communication. In Phase II, more stakeholders were targeted at the field level, contributing to more holistic capacity building.

ECB attempted to improve the emergency sector’s preparedness and response through collective dialogue, knowledge sharing, and collaboration with other partners and networks (meso level). Consortia engaged groups such as ISDR, ALNAP, Sphere, and ACAPS, giving the project a reputation for neutrality. In Bangladesh, consortium members coordinated with WFP, UNICEF, and the Comprehensive Disaster Management Project (CDMP) with support from ACAPS in 2011 to determine the relief and recovery needs of communities affected by a major flood. ACAPS brought together humanitarian actors who may not have sat at the table together before to determine joint needs. Outcomes of collaboration with ACAPS were almost universally positive in all ECB countries. These network and community relationships contributed to meeting the project’s goal.

At country level, however, the ECB consortia missed opportunities to include a broader range of partners, especially the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the private sector, in their emergency capacity building efforts. Most consortia worked with the UN clusters, which had more access than NGOs to government perspectives. Where the clusters weren’t functioning, the consortia should have helped address this problem, as in Indonesia, where the consortium set up a shelter working group.

Generally, the greater the interaction with key entities involved in humanitarian response, the more effective and coordinated the response, particularly if these entities are involved in training, simulations and planning exercises before emergencies. This was one of the ECB Project’s strengths. Where the project succeeded in the field, it was because members had buy-in and support from their agency headquarters and the ECB Global team and aligned capacity building with the needs of national and local stakeholders, who are the first responders in an emergency.

4.4. Looking to the Future

Other consortia with ECB-like elements have sprung up over the years. A notable example was Food Aid Management (FAM), which, like the ECB Project, was created by the department heads of a half dozen major NGOs. FAM was began in 1999 and continued to function as a network and a secretariat for about 15 years. Like the ECB Project, it had a prime funder and a secretariat based in CARE, which also housed the Washington DC office. Like the ECB, FAM had several thematic working areas, including accountability (resulting in a new set of standards agreed by its members) and capacity building, which included training workshops in the United States and in the field. FAM was a network of heads of NGO food aid departments, not emergency departments, and grew over time, whereas the ECB Project diminished. FAM eventually had members from all the larger U.S. food aid NGOs and welcomed open participation by NGOs such as Technoserve, Counterpart International, ACDI/VOCA and Feed the Children, whose work in food aid was peripheral though important.

Both FAM and the ECB originated in grants from joint proposals by NGO members. While ECB was a project funded by the BMGF’s emergency department, FAM was a network and secretariat funded by USAID’s Office of Food for Peace. Like the ECB Project, FAM produced a series of publications and newsletters and notably increased understanding and trust among members, primarily CARE, WVI, CRS and SCF. As in the ECB Project, FAM’s secretariat staff proposed incorporating FAM as a stand-alone legal entity to facilitate long-term planning, growth and direct fundraising, but the principals rejected the idea, preferring their existing working relationship.

As with the ECB, the leadership of FAM and the principals changed over time, along with natural staff turnover, which in FAM’s case was related to staff rotation to field assignments (the burnout rate is lower among food programmers than among disaster specialists). This turnover in leadership resulted in a palpable shift in vision. The novelty wore off, the “dream” was forgotten and the network was taken for granted as just another industry mechanism looking for tasks from year to year. Over time, FAM’s members lost the initiative to explain why it should continue, and the consortium closed with a whimper. One lesson for the ECB Project is the
common and inevitable fact that the original mission of a consortium is lost as new personnel take for granted its value added.

Notably, several years after FAM ended, both its members and USAID’s Food for Peace realized they needed a consortium and created one all over again. Technical and Operational Performance Support (TOPS), like FAM, is funded by Food for Peace, comprises the same key NGO members, promotes training and standards development for NGOs involved in food aid and is based in Washington, DC.

With the changing humanitarian landscape, evolving cluster system model and more challenging complex emergencies caused by climate change and expanding political instability, new competency needs and new programming approaches will emerge. Does this suggest that a new ECB, under a different name, will arise in 5 years?

The need to coordinate and form consortia may be more pronounced in the food aid sector because of the unique logistics of dealing with a physical commodity. It is not the need for programming coordination or allocation of funds that distinguishes this type of aid from other forms of nutrition and sustenance assistance, but the management function of assuring proper delivery of food (as opposed to money) to specific locations, in good condition, in specified quantities and by secure means. In a future model for emergency response capacity building, one of the main challenges will be financing and management arrangements, which most evaluations of the ECB Project found less than ideal. A possible option would be use a common administrative system with a joint ICT platform, in which individual agency mandates and systems will not interfere. This story may also argue for some type of permanent coordinating mechanism, not always fully operational but in place to be called on when needed, regardless of staff turnover and policy vagaries.

The full report, including the annexes, can be found at www.disasterresiliencegroup.com
REFERENCES


