REPORT ON EMERGENCY CAPACITY

Analysis for the
Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity

CARE USA
Catholic Relief Services
International Rescue Committee
Mercy Corps
Oxfam GB
Save the Children US
World Vision International

July 2004

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ACRONYMS

ALNAP    Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CRS      Catholic Relief Services
C-SAFE   Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency
ECHO     Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Commission
ER       Emergency Response
EW       Early Warning
FACTS    Food and Commodity Tracking System
FFP      Food for Peace (USAID)
H LEARN  Humanitarian Learning, Evaluation, Analysis and Research Network (WVI)
HAP      Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International
HSP      Humanitarian Support Personnel (Oxfam GB)
ICT      Information and communications technology
IR       Intermediate Result
IRC      International Rescue Committee
IT       Information Technology
IWG      Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity
MC       Mercy Corps
M&E      Monitoring and evaluation
MIS      Management Information Systems
NGO      Non-Governmental Organization
R&R      Rest and recuperation
SC-US    Save the Children US
USAID    United States Agency for International Development
WVI      World Vision International
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity (IWG) is a consortium of seven NGOs undertaking a collaborative capacity-building effort. Its members – CARE USA, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children US (SC-US), and World Vision International (WVI) – are leading relief and development organizations that, combined, program $3 billion annually in over 100 countries around the world. In early 2004, the IWG hired a consultant to conduct a detailed analysis of their member organizations’ emergency capacity. This report presents the results of the review and of subsequent consultations regarding funding initiatives in support of emergency capacity.

The review found that over the past five years, IWG members have made significant progress in building their emergency capacity, most notably in rapid funding, rapid response systems, adoption of Sphere and other standards, analyses of required competencies, staff safety and security, and organizational commitment. Major capacity gaps remain, inhibiting both the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian action. The report identifies those areas most critical to future humanitarian performance and most likely to benefit from collective action, and proposes four major initiatives:

Initiative #1 – Increasing the Pool of Humanitarian Workers, addressing the most serious challenge identified through the review, which is the limited pool of humanitarian leaders who have the required technical competencies and are available when needed

Initiative #2 – Accountability and Impact Measurement, improving organizational learning and enhancing accountability to standards, working toward more consistent institutionalization of Sphere standards in the field, and advancing the state of the practice in impact measurement of humanitarian action

Initiative #3 – Improving NGO Models for Building Local Capacity, testing models that strengthen country offices, local partners, and communities in emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response, with special attention to the creation of community participation standards and guidelines

Initiative #4 – Improving Information and Communications Technology, working collectively on ways to provide rapid, reliable multi-media communications technology in support of humanitarian action and learning, with immediate priority given to training field staff in its use

The review demonstrated that in addition to these four initiatives, other joint learning and research could significantly enhance IWG members’ emergency capacity. Among the topics most apt for discussion, training, and other low-cost collaborative action are: structuring Emergency Units for optimal capacity building, successfully driving organizational change, and making the most of NGO Alliances with sister organizations. Additionally, a top priority for research is early warning systems, with a focus on field-level research.
The IWG is well positioned for success in these capacity-building efforts. They have already made significant strides in the past few years, they are benefiting from increasing organizational commitment to emergency response, they are positioned to build on numerous existing collaborative efforts, and they can draw on their considerable global operational capacity. The challenge will be finding and dedicating the resources for capacity building while they continue responding to a never-ending stream of humanitarian crises around the world.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity (IWG) was launched in early 2003 to promote a collaborative capacity-building effort among several leading relief and development NGOs. The goal of the IWG is to advance the more effective delivery of emergency assistance by its member organizations and, as possible, by all organizations engaged in this work.

The IWG currently has seven members: CARE USA, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Save the Children US (SC-US), and World Vision International (WVI). All have mandates in both international relief and development and possess significant global operational capacity. Combined, these seven organizations have 50,000 staff members operating and supporting programs in over 100 countries around the world. Together they raise and spend approximately $3 billion annually (see Table 1).

Table 1. IWG Members’ Global Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>FY03 Budget</th>
<th># of Field Staff</th>
<th>International Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE USA</td>
<td>$524 million</td>
<td>- 250 internationals - 12,000 nationals</td>
<td>37 Country Offices, programs in 70 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>$521 million</td>
<td>- 305 internationals - 3,700 nationals</td>
<td>54 Country Offices, programs in 94 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>$152 million</td>
<td>- 250 internationals - 6,000 nationals</td>
<td>25 Country Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>$133 million</td>
<td>- 125 internationals - 1,100 nationals</td>
<td>38 Country Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>£115 million ($211 million)</td>
<td>- 80 internationals - 2,100 nationals</td>
<td>62 Country Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC-US</td>
<td>$240 million</td>
<td>- 330 internationals - 2,900 nationals</td>
<td>45 Field Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>$1.25 billion</td>
<td>- 400 internationals in ERDM programs - 20,000 nationals</td>
<td>65 National Offices, programs in 92 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The IWG members are committed to more timely and efficient prevention and response to humanitarian crises. Aware of the context and current trends, they recognize the benefits of collaboration to tackle significant unmet humanitarian needs created by increasing numbers of crises. They plan to continue their current operational modes, where the majority of their programs are in countries where they have a long-term commitment to tackling the roots of
poverty and fulfilling the rights of those in need. They envision continuing their current humanitarian approach, where they stay beyond the period of initial crisis, serving the affected population long after the media has lost interest and many disaster organizations have departed.

In March 2004, a consultant was hired to conduct a detailed analysis of the emergency capacity of IWG member organizations and to assist in the development of a proposal to access financial resources in support of improved emergency delivery capacity (see Appendix 1 for the terms of reference). Priority areas identified for the review were staff capacity, logistics and rapid mobilization capacity, early warning systems, and coordination in emergency response. In addition, the terms of reference called for development of key indicators for measuring how each of these four areas impact overall performance in humanitarian action.

In the first phase of the project, the consultant visited head offices and interviewed in person or by telephone an average of 14 individuals from each organization. Not only was time spent with Emergency Unit personnel, but also with the point person for security and representatives from advocacy, finance, fundraising, human resources, information services, logistics/procurement, media relations, program management, and other program technical areas. Data was collected through these interviews as well as through a short written survey on emergency capacity (see Appendix 2), focus-group discussions, review of documentation, and a survey for prioritization of thematic topics (see Appendix 3). In the second phase of the project, initiatives for inclusion in funding proposals were prioritized through a series of discussions among IWG members.

This report presents the findings of the emergency capacity review and analysis. Section II lays out the current capacity of IWG member organizations, describes the gaps that hinder the quality and rapidity of humanitarian action, and puts forward recommendations. Section III identifies opportunities for coordination and strategic investments that will advance not only the performance of the collective group but also of humanitarian action in general. Specific initiatives are suggested for inclusion in funding proposals. Section IV provides a summary of other opportunities for collaboration under the rubric of the IWG.

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Organizational capacity is about money, people, systems, policies, and technical resources. It is built through actions that develop competencies and mobilize resources, and through commitment, influence, and negotiation that produce organizational change. The review found that the IWG members have, in recent years, been successfully engaging in building their emergency capacity. They have made notable progress in the areas of rapid funding; rapid response systems, including modes of decision making and formation and equipping of teams; training in and promotion of Sphere and other standards; analysis of required competencies; and staff safety and security.
This section on findings focuses on those areas most critical to the capacity required for rapid and effective humanitarian action. The first is organizational commitment, which in turn drives the allocation of resources to this sector. The second is organizational structure and organizational change, which provides the leadership in the emergency sector with access to and support from the significant organizational resources found in each IWG member agency. The third and fourth areas critical to emergency capacity focus on the quantity, quality, and mobility of resources such as staff, funds, and project materials. The fifth and sixth deal with technical capacity, which is critical to the effectiveness of humanitarian action, while the last looks at coordination in emergency response for both rapidity and effectiveness.

A. Organizational Commitment

With the exception of the International Rescue Committee,¹ the IWG member organizations have historically focused on development work and built substantial technical expertise in sectors such as health, food security, and education. Notably, most organizations were founded in response to a humanitarian crisis, such as those caused by the Great Depression in the United States and World War II, and have continued to use responses to humanitarian crises as opportunities for long-term presence in dozens of new countries over the past thirty years.

In the last decade, these organizations have identified emergency work as a core competency and priority for capacity building. Data collected through the emergency capacity review demonstrates substantially increased organizational commitment to this sector in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, as measured in prioritization at the strategic level and in the level of investment in technical capacity and rapid response.

1. Strategic Prioritization of Emergency Work

Drawn from organizational strategic plans, Table 2 on the following page shows that all seven IWG members have humanitarian action as a primary strategic direction and most have accompanying goals and objectives. While these high-level strategic objectives do not, in and of themselves, strengthen capacity, they do promise to facilitate emergency capacity-building efforts in their organizations.

Recommendations: IWG members might benefit from interagency learning on how strategic prioritization can support their efforts to build capacity through organizational change.

¹ The IRC has focused on relief and rehabilitation since its founding in 1933. In recent years, it has broadened its mission to include protection of rights, post-conflict development, and advocacy.
Table 2. Organizational Strategies and Objectives for Emergency Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IWG Member</th>
<th>Organizational Strategy/Vision for Emergency Programs</th>
<th>Specific Goals and Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Strategic Direction 2: Strengthen CARE’s emergency response capacity</td>
<td>Strategic Objectives: - An operational framework established that strengthens and supports emergency response, and affirms emergency response as central to CARE’s mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Organizational Strategy Map has 3 Core Capacities, of which 2 are relevant to emergency response</td>
<td>- Be prepared to deliver a rapid, comprehensive system of emergency response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Mission is to serve refugees and communities victimized by oppression or violent conflict through the provision of emergency relief, protection of rights, post-conflict development, and advocacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Committed to providing humanitarian support that is appropriate, timely, and respectful of people’s dignity</td>
<td>- Rapidly respond to humanitarian crises to save lives and reduce suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>Aim 3: Right to Life and Security</td>
<td>Strategic Objectives: - Fewer people will die, fall sick, and suffer deprivation as a result of armed conflict or natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC-US</td>
<td>High Impact Initiative #2: Children in Emergencies and Crisis</td>
<td>Goal: Work for and with children at risk in natural or created emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>Organizational Core Value (1 of 6)</td>
<td>The impact of humanitarian disasters on vulnerable groups is reduced and their quality of life promoted by using strategies that reflect best practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Investment in Stronger Emergency Units

In the last decade, IWG members have created or significantly expanded their Emergency Units in support of the strategic prioritization to which their organizations have committed (see Table 3 on the next page).

Many of these units have as a primary function to serve as an emergency response team, while others take the lead in forming and directing such teams but their staff remain in the head or regional offices. In addition, these Emergency Units serve as the locus of emergency technical expertise and generally are responsible for promoting professional standards, building technical skills and capacity, setting strategic directions, fostering innovation, leading program learning and exchange, participating in policy change efforts, and mobilizing resources. Some are available to respond to requests for other technical assistance from country and regional offices.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IWG Member</th>
<th>Emergency Unit Name and Size</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Staff Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| CARE USA   | Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance Unit (8 staff, of which 2 are at 50%) | Has been in place for more than a decade; reconfigured in 2002 | Director  
Deputy Director/Preparedness  
Sr. Adv. Cmty Mgmt & Logistics  
Sr. Adv. Assessment, Design, M&E  
Sr. Adv. Staff Development  
Program Officer  
Iraq Program Officer  
Program Assistant/HOTSPOTS  
Executive Assistant |
| CRS        | Emergency Response Team (7 staff, of which 1 is based in Baltimore, rest in Nairobi) | 1994 Reconfigured in 1999 | Team Leader  
Deputy Team Leader  
Security & Telecommunications  
Logistics  
Public Nutrition  
Shelter & Community Infrastructure  
Admin Assistant |
| IRC        | Emergency Response Unit (7 staff, 5 of which comprise the Emergency Response Team and are based in the field) | 1997 | Director  
Program Manager  
Emerg Response Team Coordinator  
Emergency Finance Coordinator  
Emergency Operations Coordinator  
Emergency Health Coordinator  
Emerg Environ Health Coordinator |
| Mercy Corps| Global Emergency Operations Unit (4 staff) | 2000 | Director  
Emergency Program Officers (2)  
Procurement, Admin & Logistics Manager |
| Oxfam GB   | Humanitarian Department (100 staff, with 50 of them serving as roving Humanitarian Support Personnel – HSPs) | Has been in place for more than a decade; recently expanded by adding HSPs | Director  
Deputy Director  
Senior Representative  
Program Advisory Division (8)  
Humanitarian Coordinators (about 50)  
Logistics Division (13)  
Water & Sanitation Division (3)  
Health Division (3)  
Food & Nutrition Division (3)  
Finance Division (13)  
Human Resources Division (3) |
| SC-US      | Emergencies and Protection Unit (7 staff) in the Children in Emergencies and Crisis (CEC) Department | 2001 (The CEC department was created in 1992) | Director  
Children & War Specialist  
Emergency Education Specialist  
Humanitarian Operations Specialist  
Emerg Health & Nutrition Specialist  
Program Associate  
Iraq Program Manager |
| WVI        | Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs Department (15 staff) (Emergency Response & Disaster Mitigation from 1999-2002, small Relief Department pre-1999) | 1999 Reconfigured in 2003 | Vice President  
Director, Humanitarian Planning  
Director, Strategic Operations  
Director, Human Resources  
Director, Finance  
Director, Information Management  
Assoc Dir, Resource Development  
Dir, Accountability & Transparency  
Assoc Dir, Logistics & Pre-positioning  
Director, Humanitarian Best Practice  
Support staff (5) |
Despite this significant investment in technical as well as rapid response capacity, Emergency Units of IWG member organizations are overly stretched. The most significantly under-resourced areas seem to be (1) preparedness, (2) emergency assessment, (3) program design, and (4) monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The most well resourced areas among the IWG members are operations, logistics, and response-team leadership. Well resourced, in this case, however, means there is one or possibly two staff positions to lead in a specific technical area for at least $40 million in worldwide emergency operations (with some exceptions at Oxfam GB).

An acutely felt challenge is the dual mandate of Emergency Units, where they are expected to serve as rapid response teams while also building the organization’s long-term capacity and promoting technical standards. With such arrangements, emergency responses in the field have the first priority, and other work is carried out as time permits. Because of the nature of emergency work, there are periods where all staff are fully engaged in an immediate crisis, and in between emergencies there may or may not be quiet periods. The capacity review found that during the quiet periods, NGOs are giving priority to building staff capacity, especially through formal training. Technical areas that tend to get the short shrift are program innovation, learning and exchange, accountability, and monitoring and evaluation. When these tasks – which are critical to program quality and impact – are given attention, it is often intermittent, resulting in delayed completion of initiatives and/or lower quality output.

**Recommendations:** All IWG members would benefit from interagency learning in Emergency Unit structures and staffing. One specific topic for discussion and sharing of best practices might be the usefulness of having clearer distinctions and divisions between the emergency technical specialist teams and the emergency operational (response) teams. Another topic might be how to structure Emergency Units for optimal organizational capacity building.

3. **Investment in Broader Rapid Response Capacity**

Table 4 on the following page presents the usual composition of the teams that each organization forms for an emergency response. Most IWG members have taken steps not only to expand the rapid response capacity of their Emergency Units but also to build larger cadres of trained personnel. World Vision has Regional Relief Directors, Regional Rapid Response Teams, and a Global Rapid Response Team; Oxfam GB has a large cadre of Humanitarian Support Personnel (HSPs); CRS has initiated an Emergency Corps, and others have launched plans to do the same. With the exception of Oxfam’s HSPs and a few CRS and WVI staff positions, these personnel have other job responsibilities, which leads to serious limitations in emergency capacity, as discussed in Section II.C. below.
Table 4. IWG Members’ Emergency Response Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IWG Member</th>
<th>Emergency Response Team’s Composition*</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE USA</td>
<td>Team Leader&lt;br&gt;Emergency Assessment&lt;br&gt;Security&lt;br&gt;Finance&lt;br&gt;Logistics</td>
<td>Many in Head Office, some field-based</td>
<td>Have pre-release agreements with the supervisors (CARE International is forming an Emergency Response Team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRS Team Leader&lt;br&gt;Deputy Team Leader&lt;br&gt;Security &amp; Telecommunications&lt;br&gt;Logistics&lt;br&gt;Public Nutrition&lt;br&gt;Shelter &amp; Community Infrastructure&lt;br&gt;Admin Assistant</td>
<td>All in Nairobi except Deputy Team Leader in Head Office</td>
<td>Also have 8 Regional Emergency Focal Points (2 are fulltime Regional Emergency Technical Advisors and 6 are part-time), and an Emergency Corps**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Emerg Response Team Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Emergency Finance Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Emergency Operations Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Emergency Health Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Emerg Environ Health Coordinator</td>
<td>Field-based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Director&lt;br&gt;Emergency Program Officers (2)&lt;br&gt;Procurement, Admin &amp; Logistics Manager</td>
<td>Two in D.C. Head Office, one in Portland Head Office, one in Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>Team Leader&lt;br&gt;Logistician&lt;br&gt;Finance Manager&lt;br&gt;Program Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Public Health Specialist</td>
<td>Many in Head Office, many field-based</td>
<td>Draw on HSPs:&lt;br&gt;- Humanitarian Coordinators&lt;br&gt;- Humanitarian Programme Representatives&lt;br&gt;- Regional Humanitarian Officers&lt;br&gt;- Humanitarian Project Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC-US</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Specialist&lt;br&gt;Children &amp; War Specialist&lt;br&gt;Emerg Health &amp; Nutrition Specialist&lt;br&gt;Others as identified</td>
<td>Based in D.C. Head Office</td>
<td>Currently forming a Global Emergency Team**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>Senior Relief Coordinator&lt;br&gt;Program Officer&lt;br&gt;Finance Officer&lt;br&gt;HR Officer&lt;br&gt;Logistics Officer&lt;br&gt;Sectoral Specialists (Child Protection, Health, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Security Officer&lt;br&gt;Communications Officer&lt;br&gt;IT/MIS Officer</td>
<td>Based in Head Offices and the field</td>
<td>Global Rapid Response Team (22 members, deployed 50-70% of the time)&lt;br&gt;Regional Relief Directors&lt;br&gt;Regional Rapid Response Teams**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Teams may include more than one person with these titles

**Team members have other part-time or fulltime jobs, while they are also committed in one form or another to assisting in emergency response operations.

**Recommendations:** See Section II.C. below for recommendations on emergency corps. This report offers no recommendations on the composition of emergency response teams, as the size and competencies necessarily vary from one emergency to another, as well as...
from one organization to the next because of organizational priorities, level of available resources, and ability to access the desired competencies.

B. Organizational Structure and Organizational Change

In addition to organizational commitment and investment in emergency structures and personnel, IWG members need capacity to leverage the spectrum of resources across their organizations in support of humanitarian work. This capacity is affected by organizational structure, which shapes how consultations take place, where and by whom decisions are made, and how resources are allocated. It is also affected by mechanisms for organizational change and the Emergency Units’ access to these mechanisms and ability to use these effectively. An additional element to this picture is the capacity of IWG members to leverage the resources available through the NGO alliances of sister organizations to which they belong. The IWG members have common challenges in all three of these areas, providing the opportunity for collective initiatives to improve their capacity.

1. Leveraging Organizational Capacity

Emergency capacity depends to some extent on the ability to leverage other organizational resources, including (1) the operational capacity of the program line-management structure, (2) the technical capacity in the development sectors, such as agriculture, health, and education, and (3) the capacity of other departments such as Finance, Human Resources, Fundraising, and Information Systems. The review found that the degree to which this leveraging is happening depends in large part on organizational structure, specifically, the placement of the Emergency Unit in the structure, norms of inter- and intradepartmental interaction, and physical location of personnel.

Program Line Management: The review found that the most strategic linkages for leveraging and building operational capacity are with the program line management, particularly the regional directors. The structural linkages between the Emergency Units and the regional directors were examined and found to vary among the IWG member organizations as follows:

- 2 IWG members have regional directors in the same department and on the same organizational level as the Emergency Unit (CARE, MC)
- 3 members have regional directors in a different department on the same level as the Emergency Unit (Oxfam GB, SC-US, WVI)
- 2 members have regional directors in a different department on a higher level than Emergency Unit (CRS, IRC)

IWG members generally have strong linkages with their regional structures; they often invest in personal relationships to compensate for the structural distances that exist.
The area most cited as difficult was in transitioning management of emergency operations from the Emergency Unit to regional management. Each organization has different policies and even within the organization uses different modes for the variety of emergency responses. Most commonly, however, when establishing a presence in a new country the Emergency Unit takes the management lead, working closely with the regional structures. At a certain point in time, a determination is made to continue operations beyond the initial weeks/months and transition to regional management is arranged. In exceptional cases, lengthy emergency operations remain under the direction of Emergency Units for the duration, most likely when the management and oversight competencies called for are more readily found in the Emergency Unit (Iraq is one current example). The tension arises most frequently around the timing of the transition and the roles and authorities prior to, during, and after that transition. Another source of tension – not pervasive, but commented upon in a few interviews – comes from clashes in organizational culture, with emergency personnel in some cases viewed as “cowboys,” apparently a reference to what others perceive as a tendency to move quickly and with little caution, rather than to plan carefully, communicate extensively, and take the time for establishment of and adherence to policies and procedures.

Much less difficult from a management perspective are the emergency responses that take place in countries where organizations already have a presence (a “presence country”). Generally, the country office directs the response with or without support from the regional office, and when desired, calls upon the Emergency Unit to lead or provide support to the operation while it remains under the direction of program line management. Occasionally, Emergency Units run emergency operations in a presence country; sometimes tensions arise over this dual structure, but not always.

**Technical Sectors:** As with the linkages to the regional structures, there is also quite a bit of variation in the structural linkages between the Emergency Units and the units housing other technical expertise, such as in education, food security, health, and livelihood:

- 1 IWG member has other technical units *subsumed* in the emergency department (Oxfam GB)
- 3 members have other technical units in the *same* department on the *same* organizational level as the Emergency Unit (CRS, IRC, MC)
- 1 member has other technical units in both the *same* and a *different* department on the *same* level as the Emergency Unit (SC-US)
- 2 members have other technical units in a *different* department at a *lower* level than the Emergency Unit (CARE USA, WVI)

The review found that linkages with other technical units are generally weak, with the notable exception of Oxfam GB, where other technical capacity (ranging from public health to gender mainstreaming) is imbedded in the Humanitarian Department. It is worth noting that CRS, IRC, and SC-US have set up a mixed arrangement, where the Emergency Units house emergency health, emergency nutrition, and emergency
education personnel, who have varying degrees of association with their organizational health, nutrition, and education technical units.

**Other Head-Office Departments:** Emergency Units are having mixed success in leveraging the capacity of support units in their head office. They need the services of these units most critically for recruitment of staff, information and communications technology (ICT) support, and fundraising. The review found that departments such as Information Services, Fundraising, and Media tend to be actively engaged in supporting emergency efforts. Others tend to be less reliable, although in some instances, departments such as Advocacy and Human Resources have point people assigned to give primary support to emergency programs. In some organizations, capacity in these support functions has been brought into the Emergency Units, as seen by the Human Resources Team in Oxfam GB’s Humanitarian Department, the Associate Director for Resource Development in WVI’s Humanitarian & Emergency Affairs Department, and the Senior Advisor for Staff Development in the Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance Unit at CARE USA. Not surprisingly, the latter arrangements show signs of most successfully boosting the overall emergency capacity of these organizations.

**Recommendations:** Improvements in leveraging other organizational capacity will come through several mechanisms. One is reorganization, which is outside the work of the IWG. Another is through more effective relationships across departments, a topic that IWG members might benefit from exploring with one another. A third mechanism is through strategic prioritization at the highest levels of the organization and the translation of that prioritization into enhanced support of emergency programming by all organizational departments and divisions. It is recommended that the IWG explore further how inter-organizational exchange might support capacity building in this area. One possibility that might be of interest to IWG members is collective training in negotiation skills (see the next section for more on this).

2. **Creating Organizational Change**

The IWG organizations tend to be highly decentralized, with much authority residing with the country directors and regional directors. As seen above, none of the Emergency Units has line management authority over its organization’s long-term country programs. Most emergency responses are undertaken in collaboration with or under the direction of country directors or, in the case of non-presence countries, with the regional management structure. On the technical side, the Emergency Units promote standards and offer training, but rarely are empowered to require technical changes in regional and country offices.

This presents a common challenge to the Emergency Units as they seek organizational change in support of stronger emergency capacity. Typically, they have a high level of responsibility for the speed and effectiveness of emergency programs without a commensurate level of authority. Creating organizational change, then, takes not only good ideas, organization skills, and training, but also very strong communication skills, especially skills in persuasion and negotiation. It also takes finesse and experience in
how to “work” the organizational structure. The review found that successes with
organizational change have most frequently come through sessions at regional meetings.
To obtain time on the meeting agendas, the emergency directors negotiate with whoever
is in charge of organizing and directing the meetings, usually the regional directors. They
present a case for their topic making it onto the agenda and then negotiate the time, which
may range from one hour to share a new initiative, to a two- to three-hour session that
allows for substantive discussion, to a half-day or full-day workshop tagged on to the
regional meeting. Other methods used for rolling out organizational change include
training workshops, both internal and external, manuals and other guidelines, and
organizational policy change, e.g., direction from senior management that all country
offices must have emergency preparedness plans in place.

In sum, Emergency Units are required to use “carrots” much more frequently than
“sticks.” They may have programmatic standards they would like to institutionalize, but
because of their technical advisory role, the mechanisms for accomplishing institutionalization are not straightforward. An area where the Emergency Units’ lack of authority causes the most frustration is when they are unable to borrow personnel for emergency response operations. This is discussed further in Section II.C.

Recommendations: The challenge of creating organizational change that builds
emergency capacity is shared by all IWG members and there is real potential for
collective strengthening in this area through interagency learning. By sharing their
experiences, IWG members could help one another identify successful ways to drive
organizational change in support of their goals. They could discuss lessons learned in
working with line management and how to affect organizational attitudes and behavior.
Such sharing could be done simply through a group discussion, or it could be addressed
in a training setting, e.g., the IWG might hold a workshop for emergency directors.
Training could target specific areas such as communication and negotiation skills.

3. The Globalization of NGOs

The movement to globalize NGOs through the formation of NGO alliances of sister
organizations has drawn in or spawned all seven members of the IWG. As shown in
Table 5 on the following page, there is a range of affiliations among the IWG members:

- 1 IWG member is the international NGO alliance itself (World Vision
  International)
- 1 member is heavily committed to working in partnership with affiliate partners
  on the ground (CRS)
- 3 members have mandates to collaborate closely with affiliate partners, but are
  not required to do so (CARE USA, Oxfam GB, and SC-US)
- 2 members participate in very small alliances, with just one or two European
  affiliates that are much smaller and more recently created (IRC, Mercy Corps)

The review found that these affiliations are having a direct impact – both positive and
negative – on the emergency capacity of these organizations. On the positive side, they
are enhancing IWG members’ technical and operational capacity when sister organizations bring to bear complementary resources such as existing presence in a country, staffing, funding, and specific competencies in the sector. In addition, the affiliations are providing IWG members with greater access to both private and institutional funds for humanitarian programs. For example, the U.S.-based organizations are benefiting from leveraging their alliances to access European donors such as ECHO.2

Table 5. IWG Members’ Affiliations with Confederations of Sister Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Alliance or Confederation of Sister Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE USA</td>
<td>CARE International – 12 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Caritas Internationalis – 146 organizations in 200+ countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Affiliate organizations in the UK and Belgium (founded in ’97 and’01 respectively)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps US</td>
<td>Affiliated with Mercy Corps Scotland (founded in ’90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>Oxfam International – 12 organizations in 100+ countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC-US</td>
<td>Save the Children Alliance – 27 organizations in 100+ countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>Yes, 92 members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the negative side, the review found the affiliations are in numerous instances causing delays and compromising the effectiveness of IWG members’ work in the humanitarian sector.

• **Decision Making:** Deciding on, planning, organizing, and directing an emergency response is complicated enough within one organization, but when done in collaboration with a confederation of organizations, the process is often slower. At times, when faced with a humanitarian crisis calling for an immediate response, productive time is spent on issues such as allocation of roles among alliance members to the detriment of rapid mobilization.

• **Capacity Building:** Several IWG members are directing time and energy into building the capacity of sister organizations at some cost to building their own in-house capacity.

• **Field Operations:** In some instances, a sister organization is charged with leading an emergency operation or assuming responsibility for a specific aspect, such as communications logistics. The IWG member, then, may find itself in a position where it is relying on smaller, less experienced, and less well resourced partners. Among the negative results reported are on-the-ground delays, inefficiencies, and less effective humanitarian programs.

It should be noted that many of these confederation arrangements are relatively new and it appears that systems of interaction are still in the development stage. One could anticipate that after the initial period of adjustment, the drawbacks cited above will diminish or disappear all together.

**Recommendation:** Among the IWG members, there is a wealth of experience and lessons learned in this area of leveraging international confederations and alliances to

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2 Likely there are other benefits, such as facilitation of participation in international policy settings, but these were not explored under the scope of the emergency capacity review.
strengthen emergency capacity. At a minimum, the IWG might facilitate discussion on the challenges and successes they have experienced in this realm. The results of this review suggest, however, that this is an area worthy of greater investment, as it appears the individual alliances are struggling with evolution without the benefit of learning from others in similar situations. One possible IWG initiative is to hold a forum for all large NGO alliances working in the humanitarian sector to study the issues. Another possibility is to commission a research paper to examine the topic in more depth and then hold a seminar for practitioners dealing with NGO alliances in emergency work. A third is to lobby the leadership of the IWG organizations to implement an initiative that examines NGO alliances more broadly than from the emergency capacity perspective.

C. Staff Capacity

Over the past five years, IWG members have made significant strides in building staff capacity in several areas:

- Addition of technical specialists, staffing the newly formed or expanded technical units and, in some cases, regional technical positions
- Widespread training in Sphere and other international standards
- Initial use of competency analysis
- Staff safety and security, including staff care

Some organizations also succeeded in building staff capacity in technical areas such as emergency preparedness, rapid response, mitigation, and protection. Yet, across the board, IWG members identified staff capacity as the biggest gap in their organizational ability to work effectively in the humanitarian sector.

1. Staff Capacity of Emergency Units

As mentioned above, most of the Emergency Units are thinly staffed and its personnel overly stretched. With an average of 8 staff members (excluding Oxfam GB, which has 100 in its Humanitarian Department), they are responsible for program technical quality as well as rapid response for huge, complex worldwide emergency operations. Not surprisingly, the review found a close correlation between overall organizational emergency capacity and the staff capacity of Emergency Units. Despite recent advances in their capacity, most Emergency Units are working in one fashion or another to increase their staffing levels. Arguments include a need to increase the competencies of the unit, a response to global trends in humanitarian emergencies, and an effort to address staff turnover caused by individuals assisting in one field emergency after the next with little reprieve.

Recommendations: These findings indicate that the IWG will need to consider carefully how to support members in participating in IWG capacity-building initiatives, which may stretch staff even further.
2. Rapid Mobilization of Qualified Personnel

Without argument, the greatest hindrance to timely, effective delivery of humanitarian action for IWG members is finding qualified personnel to lead emergency response operations. Those personnel who are qualified are often not available when they are called upon or are not available for the duration required. This causes (1) delays in start-up while recruitment is taking place, (2) hiring of external candidates who require greater orientation, direction, and support, and (3) hiring of individuals who are not fully qualified, which in turn leads to a whole host of other problems ranging from slow implementation of less effective programs, to weak and even damaging relations with the affected population, partners, government, multinational organizations, and donors.

The review identified multiple underlying causes to the shortage of qualified, available personnel for these jobs. Because of their importance to emergency capacity, these causes are discussed in detail below.

a) Limitations of Formal Training and Education

Although growing, there are few training and academic institutions around the world offering degrees or certificates in the field of humanitarian assistance. The number of individuals these programs are graduating each year tends to be relatively small compared to the number of organizations hiring personnel in this sector. Especially hard to find are graduates of programs in management of humanitarian programs. While an increase in the pool of graduates would be helpful, IWG members consistently said that formal training and education were not enough in preparing individuals for leadership positions in emergency response. They highly value – and usually demand – substantial prior experience in the field, on the ground, not only for the learning humanitarian workers gain, but also as a demonstration of the workers’ ability to perform effectively in difficult circumstances.

b) Preference for Internal Candidates

IWG members are hesitant to hire new staff for key positions on emergency response teams; they want to hire “known quantities” to lead these critical operations. Because of the fast pace and often high risk in emergency contexts, NGOs must be able to count on their field leaders’ strong interpersonal and representational skills, good judgment, and effective leadership. One gap in the humanitarian sector is a mechanism for sharing performance appraisals of those professionals who move from one emergency short-term contract to another. That challenge aside, the IWG members themselves, with one exception, have weak systems for tracking of performance of internal staff in emergency programs.

c) Limited Success with Rosters and Emergency Corps

One way organizations have striven to increase the timely hiring of emergency personnel is through having computerized rosters or registers with the names of potential candidates
and their skills and experience. The review found that most IWG members were on their second or third try with rosters, having failed in earlier attempts for a number of reasons, or they had abandoned the concept all together. Most commonly, rosters did not meet their intended objective because they quickly became useless when the data was not kept up to date. Another frequent problem was that the roster systems were set up to contain the maximum number of names that could be collected, while at the same time not enough specific data on the individuals was entered. This meant that they were not serving well their function of allowing for rapid and accurate culling of personnel. Some IWG members had come to the conclusion that maintaining a roster required an inordinate amount of time between keeping in regular contact with those on the list and inputting changes and additions to the database. There was some speculation that this could be a fulltime job for one person, which would be an unacceptably heavy draw on scarce resources for the Emergency Units or their organizations’ Human Resources departments. Also, experience showed that when a humanitarian crisis hit, people turned to their informal, non-computerized roster systems – whereby staff members asked other staff members to suggest names of who might serve the need on the particular emergency response – and found they served the purpose quite nicely.

IWG members are generally moving toward an emergency corps concept instead. This involves identifying in-house field and headquarters staff who have the potential and can be made available to serve on emergency response teams. Emergency Units are focusing on preparing these identified staff through training and other staff development endeavors. Challenges they are facing include (1) finding the resources to carry out a full training program, rather than a once-round training workshop, (2) obtaining the time of corps members for training and later for assignments, as they usually have significant job responsibilities elsewhere and their supervisors are reluctant to release them, and (3) having to continuously feed new members into the corps to replace staff who have left or are no longer available.

d) Heavy Reliance on International Staff

There tends to be a high level of reliance on international staff (primarily Europeans and North Americans) for emergency programs, especially when compared to development programs. The reasons for this tendency need more research, but one reason may just be habit: the review found that while none of the IWG members had made a serious commitment to reducing reliance on international personnel, many felt such a change would serve them well. These sentiments were supported in part by the increasing number of operating contexts where European and American personnel are at greater risk than others. Another reason for reliance on international staff is the perception, perhaps supported by reality, that both the external and internal pools of non-European/non-American personnel qualified to assume management and technical positions in emergency work are very limited.
e) Weak National Staff Capacity

Closely linked to the historic dependence on international staff is the weak capacity of national staff. The emergency capacity review revealed that all IWG member organizations implicitly or explicitly have policies promoting development of national staff and many promote “graduating” national staff into the international corps, yet none has adopted a specific strategy targeting national staff as part of building emergency capacity. In addition, staff capacity building in the emergency sector has largely focused on international field staff. However, some small steps are being taken; for example, each year CARE USA is sending a handful of senior national staff to attend Georgetown University’s course on management of complex emergencies. Much more could be done, as the cadres of national staff – totaling over 47,000 in number among the seven IWG members – is the most important untapped resource identified through the review.

f) Weak Staff Development Systems

IWG members consistently cite as a weakness their capacity to undertake staff development in a systematic way. Even if they do have in place the complete system of job descriptions, competency analyses, annual performance objectives, annual personnel development plans, and annual performance assessments, these are not used consistently. Especially difficult is applying this system to short-term emergency personnel. For example, all but one organization cited an inability to conduct routine, effective, documented evaluation of the performance of these individuals. Most also indicated systemic weaknesses in drafting meaningful individual development plans as well as in following through with their implementation. IWG members understand how critical staff development is to overall staff capacity and express a strong interest in strengthening this area, with the goal of creating an internal pool of personnel with steadily improving qualifications and competencies.

g) Challenges with Obtaining Internal Staff for Emergency Assignments

As noted above, internal candidates with the desired skills and experience to serve on rapid response teams are usually more than fully occupied in positions of significant responsibility. One of the greatest challenges for those organizing emergency responses is obtaining the release of these individuals for emergency assignments. Supervisors or higher-level directors most often resist lending staff because of the difficulty of “backfilling” positions left vacant by those deployed to an emergency operation. On the one hand, they find it difficult to identify and quickly transfer qualified individuals into those positions on a temporary basis, and on the other hand, they do not have the staff capacity to simply reassign the responsibilities of those positions to other team members. These difficulties reflect the fact that NGOs operate with thin management structures and rarely have enough staffing redundancy to fill in readily for those away on a temporary assignment. They point to the unexplored possibility of systematically developing national staff in ways that address these second-tier gaps in capacity.
In addition to these challenges, most IWG organizations are not yet committed to emergency programs to the extent that senior management will demand that regional and country directors lend personnel from their long-term development programs. The decision to re-assign personnel temporarily to emergency teams still rests largely in the hands of the program line management, which as described before, is separate from the emergency management team. However, the review found that most IWG members are seeing a slow shift in the direction of more forceful organizational mandates to lend personnel to emergency responses.

**h) Need for Medium-Term Commitments**

When candidates with the desired skills and experience can be released from current responsibilities, they often are unwilling to take on assignments away from their place of residence for more than a couple of weeks. While emergency response operations can successfully employ team members who rotate out after two or three weeks during the first wave, their efficiency and effectiveness depend on team members staying three to six months during the second wave. The review found several reasons that candidates are reluctant to commit to assignments of several months’ duration: (1) they give higher priority to family commitments and a more stable personal lifestyle, (2) their current work is enjoyable and comfortable, providing little incentive to assume the risk and discomfort that accompany most of these assignments, and (3) the professional incentives to serve in these capacities (e.g., to increase one’s chances of a promotion) are minimal. For external candidates, they may not be willing to assume the risk of unsteady employment that accompanies a career of taking three- to six-month assignments as they come along, depending on unpredictable factors such as natural disasters’ striking.

**i) Challenges with Timely Availability**

Even when systems are in place to release qualified internal candidates or mobilize qualified external candidates, the challenge is having people available when they are needed. Because of the nature of humanitarian operations, often emergency response teams must be formed with little warning. The aim, which some IWG members are pursuing, is to pre-position staff, placing them in a location and with the long-term employment arrangement that allow for rapid deployment. One major limitation is the lack of unrestricted funding required to pay personnel expenses when these staff members are not working on a specific emergency response. Oxfam GB has the most developed initiative in this area, with a cadre of 50 Humanitarian Support Personnel who spend time in between emergency field assignments working on documentation of lessons learned, research, and capacity building. Yet even with this large cadre, Oxfam GB continues to face situations where they do not have sufficient personnel available on short notice, primarily because most HSPs are already in the midst of a multi-month assignment at any given point in time.
j) Increasingly Insecure Operating Environments

The IWG members are acutely aware that they are taking greater risks than they have historically by operating humanitarian programs in war zones and other insecure areas. Increasing numbers of their field positions are in areas where humanitarian aid workers are at risk and even targeted. The result is that qualified personnel often do not accept assignments in such insecure environments, even knowing of the growing organizational capacity in staff safety and security that stands behind them. One practical aspect is that those staff members who have the desired experience and professional maturity for the job are less likely to agree to risk such insecurity than younger, less experienced candidates are. In addition, there is a gender factor, with women less often willing to accept assignments in insecure environments and hiring organizations unwilling to subject them to what at times are greater risks than faced by men. It should also be noted that solutions to this problem are tied to the discussion above about which nationalities are at greater or lesser risk in these contexts and how to change recruitment strategies accordingly.

k) Staff Burn-Out

The review did not identify staff turnover as a top issue in staff capacity, but did find a great deal of concern about burn-out. A key contributing factor cited widely by emergency response personnel is the inadequate orientation and preparation they receive prior to and during the initial days on the ground. Another factor is stress, to which IWG members have responded by giving greater and more professional attention to staff physical and emotional care. This appears to be helping to mitigate post-traumatic stress and other problems. However, the more central issue to staff burn-out is that most individuals are unable to maintain the lifestyle of an emergency response team member, where one is home for a couple of weeks now and then and spending the remainder of the time working long hours in difficult circumstances, often under intense pressure. Addressing this issue ties in closely with addressing the need for medium-term commitments discussed above.

While it is helpful to examine the underlying causes to the shortage of qualified, available personnel for these jobs, it is also useful to identify what is working and what opportunities exist. The review found elements of staff capacity-building efforts that, when combined, commend themselves to all IWG members. Three of those elements are:

- Emergency corps at the regional level, where corps members receive specific training on a regular basis and are otherwise well prepared, where the size of the corps is small enough that those trained have opportunities to apply their training soon after its completion, where agreements are in place with supervisors for the rapid release of staff, and where temporary assignment periods are fixed and those time limitations respected (e.g., staff members are returned home when originally planned)
• Decentralized feeder systems, where organizations have explicit career tracking for emergency and/or management personnel, complemented by strong staff development and training programs; and which draw on national as well as international staff, train the best managers from the development side in emergency response, and train the best emergency-response technicians in leadership and management

• A thought-out system of incentives, which includes financial incentives (such as emergency pay), personal incentives (such as frequent R&R and visits home), and professional incentives (such as participation in an emergency response as an expectation prior to promotion to country director)

**Recommendations:** See Initiative #1 below for a series of recommendations to address the gap in staff capacity.

**D. Rapid Mobilization of Other Resources**

Timely emergency response relies not only on rapid mobilization of human resources, but also on rapid mobilization of funds and materials both for emergency personnel and for the humanitarian programs. The review found that generally IWG members have good capacity in rapid mobilization of both funds and materials, with one notable and significant gap in the area of information and communications technology.

1. **Rapid Funding**

One clear finding of the review was that all but one IWG member have succeeded in putting funds in place for rapid mobilization. Most of this capacity was built only in the last few years, primarily through the establishment of Emergency Funds that rely heavily on replenishment through reclassification of expenses to other sources of income (grants and private contributions) as they are obtained weeks or even months into an emergency response. Table 6 on the next page provides a summary of the financial resources that each organization can rapidly mobilize for emergency response.

The review found that these Emergency Funds, combined with improved systems for rapid authorization of their release, have substantially enhanced the NGOs’ capacity for rapid response. While in the not too distant past, NGOs deferred mobilizing an emergency response for weeks or even months until they were confident that institutional donors and the general public would fund a sizeable emergency response effort, such long delays have been largely eliminated.\(^3\) In addition, the NGOs have gained greater confidence over the past few years in predicting donor interest in an emergency, though such predictions are still far from scientific.

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\(^3\) In the case of Mercy Corps, which has no established emergency fund, they also have enhanced their decision-making mechanism so that start-up funds can be made available quickly on an ad hoc basis.
### Table 6. Sources of Funding for Rapid Emergency Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IWG Member</th>
<th>Name of Fund</th>
<th>Level of Resources</th>
<th>How Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARE USA</td>
<td>-Emergency Response Fund</td>
<td>-$2 million, of which $1 million is revolving*</td>
<td>-Response to small emergencies, allocations of up to $50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Board Endowment Fund</td>
<td>-$5 million</td>
<td>-Response to large emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-aCERT Contingency Fund</td>
<td>-$500,000</td>
<td>-Can access up to $250,000 for an emergency response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE International</td>
<td>-Regional Operational Reserves</td>
<td>-Varies</td>
<td>-Available at the discretion of the Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Individual funds like the Africa Crisis Fund</td>
<td>-Varies</td>
<td>-Has some restrictions on what can fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-O’Neil Funds</td>
<td>-$1 million/year</td>
<td>-Has some restrictions on what can fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                  | -Emergency Reserve of the Overseas Operations Reserve | -varies (annual)                                                                   | -Fills in gaps in funding from grants, regional private funds and O’Neil Funds |}

| IRC              | -Whitehead Fund                                   | $2.5 million                                                                       | Interest is used according to the priorities of the Emergency Response Unit; capital is for specific emergency responses, with an effort made to replenish with private or grant funds |
|                  | -Leo Cherne Fund                                  | $2 million                                                                         |                                                                          |
| Mercy Corps      | (no formal fund in place)                          |                                                                                   | On an ad hoc basis, private funds may be released for emergency response, with the understanding that these are revolving funds* |
| Oxfam GB         | Catastrophe Fund                                  | £5 million in 2004 (varies annually)                                              | For rapid response prior to receipt of other donor income for the emergency program; effort made to replenish with private or grant funds |
| SC-US            | Halaby-Murphy Revolving Emergency Fund             | $5.5 million, revolving*                                                           | Initial stage of emergency response only                                  |
| WVI              | Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund          | $6 million, partially revolving                                                   | Mostly for initial stage of emergency response; can use up to 25% for preparedness. Regional Relief Directors may allocate up to $100,000 without broader consultation. Effort made to repay with private or grant funds (goal is for 50% replenishment coming from grant/contract funds) |

*Revolving funds have a requirement that funds drawn down must be fully replaced through back-charging or reclassification of costs to grants or contracts and through private fundraising (usually direct-mail appeals).

Progress has also been made in providing rapid response teams with laptop computers loaded with the organization’s financial management software. However, that software is generally so complex and specialized for each organization that emergency response teams must include a member who is an in-house trained finance manager. Several organizations are now working on how to pre-position finance specialists, ensuring they are available when needed and appropriately prepared for the emergency contexts in which they will operate.

Emergency personnel in many IWG organizations expressed frustration with the in-house finance bureaucracy. A common problem is that finance departments are unable to provide timely, useful financial information to those leading responses to rapid-onset emergencies. Most organizations’ financial systems operate on rigid schedules according to strict procedures that are not established for maximum speed. For emergency responses that require rapid movement and intense programming in the initial weeks,
decision making is hampered unless leaders receive accurate, up-to-date data on income and expenses by funding source.

**Recommendations:** While not a priority area for capacity building, the review identified several financial areas where interagency learning might be most helpful:

- Having emergency finance specialists work in the head-office finance department in between field assignments
- Using spreadsheets vs. complex financial software during the initial phase of an emergency response
- Working with finance departments to produce weekly income and expense updates on an extraordinary basis
- Establishing more efficient ways to handle charges of personnel costs to grants and frequent reclassifications thereof

2. **Rapid Mobilization of Materials**

IWG members also made good progress over the past few years in building their capacity to mobilize materials rapidly. All now have in place some form of an “Office in a Box” or other kits with the supplies that rapidly deployed staff require for program management and their personal welfare. This includes manuals, office supplies, generic forms and job descriptions, logo items, communications and computer equipment, as well as first aid kits and water filters.

In the area of project materials, most IWG members have established or are in the process of establishing relationships – and even formal pre-arranged contracts – with international suppliers for the most commonly required items. This is a way to pre-position supplies such as blankets and jerry cans, as well as equipment such as vehicles, without assuming the cost and responsibility for storage. Such arrangements have become increasingly attractive, aided by the facility of global commercial arrangements. With two exceptions (Mercy Corps and SC-US), IWG members expressed confidence in their ability to identify reliable suppliers who will provide the materials when needed and transport them quickly to the required destination.

A few organizations have tried pre-positioning project supplies in emergency-prone areas either as individual NGOs or in collaboration with others. The main challenge posed by pre-positioning has been funding the procurement. To date, institutional donors have not agreed to reimburse organizations for items procured prior to an identified emergency program. Therefore, only those IWG Emergency Units with access to significant levels of private, unrestricted funds have been able to consider pre-positioning, and some of these have moved to the commercial contracts mentioned above to place warehousing responsibility in the hands of their suppliers rather than in their own hands.

While many interviewees expressed the need for greater logistical and supply chain capacity in their organizations, their self-assessments rated their capacity in this area as more than adequate, except in the cases of Mercy Corps and SC-US. (See the *Emergency...*
Capacity Review – Tabulation of Self Ratings in Appendix 4.) Moreover, the overall emergency capacity analysis revealed that gaps in rapid mobilization of supplies and materials were not major inhibitors to rapid, effective emergency programming – with one exception. That exception is the need for rapid, reliable communications technology and a system for training field staff in its use. This gap was found in all IWG member organizations and is significant enough to warrant separate consideration in this report (see below).

It should be noted that IWG members currently tap a range of global resources that support technical and operational capacity. Some of these are listed in Appendix 5 and include the Fritz Institute, which specializes in mobilizing logistics and technology resources, and with whom the IWG has had contact about possible collaboration.

Recommendations: The areas of procurement and logistics do not emerge as priority areas for collaborative capacity building, yet the review indicated that the IWG and the humanitarian sector as a whole would benefit from documentation and dissemination of best practices for working with global suppliers. In addition, the IWG may want to consider ways to exploit the capacity of some IWG members to build the capacity of others in procurement and logistics, perhaps through contracted services.

3. Information and Communications Technology

Among the most significant gaps identified through the emergency capacity review was the need for rapid, reliable, flexible, multi-media communications. Especially when working in large, complex humanitarian crises, emergency response teams require immediate, reliable transmission of not only voice, but also data and images.

Across-the-board, IWG members have specific examples where ICT problems have significantly hampered their performance in emergency response operations – from the earthquake response in Iran, to the flood-relief efforts in the Dominican Republic, to the response to the complex emergency in Darfur, Sudan. Most typically, the members of the initial emergency response team receive equipment for which they have inadequate training while they also lack good access to technical support. In other cases, weeks or even months pass before the requisite equipment is in place.

The impact of not having trained operators and ICT equipment when it is needed is significant, negatively affecting both the timeliness and quality of the humanitarian response in many areas of operation. Those areas identified through the review were:

- Staff safety and security
- Rapid mobilization of appropriate personnel
- Timely program decision making that draws fully on organizational capacity
- Coordination and collaboration on the ground
- Efficient use of the time of program field staff
- Communication of the need to multiple audiences
• Adequate flow of information for fundraising
• Organizational learning, sharing of best practices and lessons learned

IWG members have increasingly recognized the critical importance of ICT, particularly as they have made serious commitments recently to bolster their ability to address security issues. They have learned that key tools for security – reliable and user-friendly satellite and cell phones, radios, codans, e-mail, and more – depend on state-of-the-art ICT. The review found indications of efforts to acquire and keep in place the required technology, but generally through incoherent overall approaches to ICT. None of the organizations has the full packet of knowledge and skills in place, which include:

• Technical knowledge, including reliability of equipment
• Procurement knowledge
• Set-up and installation of equipment
• Training skills
• Support for equipment operation and maintenance
• Transport and customs

One underlying cause detected is the absence of one named leader or unit for communications technology in the IWG member organizations. Responsibility for organizational capacity in communications technology, it was found, may lie with Information Systems, Procurement, the Security Director, the Emergency Unit, or some combination thereof.

Despite these problems, there have been a number of successful collaborative efforts, both formal, as with Cisco Systems and Microsoft supporting NetHope in Iraq, and informal, as with ICT technicians at an emergency site voluntarily assisting another NGO in setting up their equipment and training users. These efforts have begun to address the ICT gap, but there remains much to do to ensure that ICT is contributing to rapid, effective humanitarian action rather than inhibiting it.

ICT is an ideal area for NGO joint capacity building for several reasons: (1) the current gaps are having a negative impact on collaborative and efficient emergency work in the field, (2) the gaps tend to be common across organizations, readily identified, and relatively straightforward to address, (3) there are few reasons to have organizationally tailored ICT in emergency field work and many reasons to support standardization, and (4) there is high potential for implementing ICT capacity building in ways that benefit the entire humanitarian sector.

Following is a list of priority needs related to ICT and emergency capacity:

**Staff training on the ground:** The greatest need is organized training for field personnel in the installation and use of the ICT equipment that they have on site. Since most organizations cannot afford and perhaps do not need a fulltime ICT specialist on each emergency response team, consideration should be given to joint hires, shared positions, or other arrangements that would allow one ICT specialist to train the staff of multiple
organizations. The specialist’s job description might also include responsibilities for setting up ICT equipment for the same group of organizations.

**Minimum ICT standards:** Already NGOs are moving toward standardization of much of the equipment used in the field, but IWG members are calling for more explicit standardization to facilitate communication and coordination among humanitarian actors on the ground, to promote collaborative security work, and to pursue increased efficiencies through shared resources such as joint procurement, staff training, and technical support.

**Fundraising for procurement of ICT equipment:** During the first year of the Iraq emergency response (2003), the NetHope consortium was successful in raising funds and in-kind contributions from Cisco Systems and Microsoft for procurement of ICT equipment. IWG members expressed interest in further initiatives of this sort, perhaps next for the complex emergency on the Sudan-Chad border.

**ICT support to other areas of emergency capacity building:** As one interviewee pointed out, nearly all proposed areas of emergency capacity building will benefit from, if not depend upon, strategic and innovative use of ICT. For example, initiatives in staff capacity building include technology-supported learning, those in logistics include sophisticated computerized tracking systems, and those in accountability and impact measurement will rely heavily on information systems’ tools for tracking, analysis, and reporting.

**Recommendations:** See Initiative #4 below for recommendations on addressing the ICT gap in emergency capacity.

**E. Technical Capacity**

While staff capacity was identified as presenting the largest gap in IWG members’ ability to work effectively in the humanitarian sector, the review identified technical capacity as the second greatest area of need. The terms of reference for the review selected early warning systems as a priority, but during the course of the review it became apparent that other gaps in technical capacity call for greater attention. These are in field capacity and primarily reflect the challenge of turning program quality standards into operational capacity and subsequently operational reality. The three specific areas highlighted here are accountability, measurement of impact, and the capacity of country offices, partners, and communities. In view of the high potential for addressing technical gaps collectively and in a manner of interest and benefit to the broader humanitarian sector, this focus has been prioritized for two of the four initiatives the IWG may propose to funders.

1. **Early Warning Systems**

The review was unable to assess adequately organizational capacity in early warning (EW) systems, as few head-office staff were familiar with the EW work taking place in country offices around the world. Notably, head-office staff held perceptions of major
gaps in capacity in this area. Data collected through the *Emergency Capacity Review Preliminary Questionnaire* showed that respondents in all seven organizations considered their EW capacity as less than adequate and lower than the other three categories surveyed – staff capacity, logistics, and coordination in emergency response (see Appendix 4). They indicated there are poor linkages among EW systems, poor integration of EW data and analysis into field planning and emergency response programs, and weak staff capacity in this area. Yet, in the overall analysis, capacity in early warning systems did not surface as a gap significantly impinging on humanitarian action.

**Recommendations:** Further study, most of which should be conducted in emergency-prone countries around the world, is required to understand the extent of the capacity gap among the IWG members, as well as in the humanitarian sector at large. The study would assess not only capacity but also the impact of weak capacity on humanitarian action. If the IWG decides to initiate such a study, the first step should be researching prior analysis that has been done on this topic.

### 2. Accountability and Measurement of Impact

The review found that IWG members have made great strides in promoting staff knowledge and understanding of Sphere and other international standards, guidelines, and codes in the humanitarian sector. They have taken steps to build organizational capacity through training workshops, broad dissemination of the Sphere handbook, and other opportunities where they raised awareness and promoted adherence. As a result, head-office capacity in this area is generally strong, but the extent to which these standards and codes have been applied in the field is not known. Even without that knowledge, IWG members are aware that their current challenge is taking the process to the next stage – to a point where standards are consistently reflected in field staff behavior, program design and implementation, and impact measurement.

This review’s findings are supported by observations made in the recent Sphere report *Consultations on the Future of Sphere after 2004.*

> The report found, through the consultations, that: “Even in large organisations, which were ‘institutionalisation’ pilots, many people commented on the amount of work still to be done to achieve more consistent and effective application of Sphere. The high turnover of staff and various demands on time in humanitarian work were cited as reasons for this.”

It goes on to state:

> “Most people who expressed a view on how Sphere could contribute more effectively to improved quality and accountability, believed this could best be done by continuing to focus on the promotion and ‘institutionalisation’ – support to the effective incorporation of Sphere within the policy and practice of organisations – of Sphere itself. There was a strong feeling that a great deal

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4 Published online at [http://www.sphereproject.org/consultation.htm](http://www.sphereproject.org/consultation.htm), May 2004.

5 Ibid, page 5.
still needs to be done to achieve better ‘institutionalisation’, particularly at field level. This is the case both within agencies where this is supposed already to have happened – where the gap between nominal and actual use of Sphere was highlighted – and with new groups of people. UN agencies, governments in affected countries, and local NGOs, were particularly mentioned as areas where Sphere needs to be better promoted. Communities directly affected by disasters also need to be made aware of Sphere, which respondents say is an area where very little work has so far been done."

The IWG is in a position to launch initiatives that build on Sphere’s success to date and complement likely future work by a succession project as well as by other organizations such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP). The review found deep interest in and need for (1) capacity in accountability to the standards and (2) capacity in applying Sphere standards in community participation. It also found major gaps in the area of monitoring and evaluation, especially measurement of impact.

a) Accountability to Standards

The review found that IWG members do not systematically hold themselves accountable either to internal stakeholders or to external ones. While they do conduct emergency assessments, monitor program implementation, measure program outputs, produce donor reports, and process lessons learned for elements of each emergency operation, these activities are not carried out consistently, let alone with consistently high quality, and at times are done only to the extent necessary to meet donor requirements. The greatest gaps appear to be in monitoring program implementation and measuring program impact, which are discussed below.

With respect to accountability generally, the review found that Emergency Units have little information on the degree to which their field operations reflect Sphere and other standards. WVI, having recognized this gap, has designed an initiative to develop, monitor, and evaluate specific work plans to strengthen humanitarian accountability. This initiative seeks to systematize accountability practices within the organization by testing good practice models and documenting emergency good practice in humanitarian accountability. It intends to link at the coalition level to promote accountability learning while also developing accountability tools and other products as needed. It also includes linkages to sector-level accountability learning groups such as Sphere, HAP, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), and People in Aid and promotion of sector-level accountability publications based on tested good practice or emerging practice. WVI has asked the IWG to consider collaborating in these endeavors and the response has been favorable.

Of particular concern to IWG members is to improve in accountability to their beneficiaries. The recent Sphere consultation found a sector-wide gap in this area: “Respondents said that there were few examples of where Sphere has been discussed

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explicitly with communities, which means that there has so far been little progress towards the objective of improving accountability to people affected by disasters.” Part of the challenge is establishing systems to monitor accountability to beneficiaries and assessing whether or not participation and other standards are being met.

Also of concern to IWG members is the inconsistent progress they have made in incorporating protection in emergency programs. They are generally working on their own to build capacity to engage in protection activities as well as to ensure that humanitarian assistance activities have positive protection implications. It is this latter cross-cutting theme where all would benefit significantly from mutual learning and potentially shared models and tools.

b) Measurement of Impact

One aspect of accountability where the gap is particularly evident is in the area of monitoring and evaluation systems for emergency programs. The review found among IWG members:

- Mixed capacity in conducting good quality and rapid emergency assessments
- Mixed capacity in program design
- Lack of accepted, tested impact indicators for some areas of emergency programming
- Weak capacity in establishing baseline information against which to measure progress
- Mixed capacity in monitoring program performance
- Weak capacity in evaluation of impact

While the IWG member organizations have dedicated substantial time and attention over the years to their capacity in M&E of development programs, this has not necessarily carried over to emergency programs for a variety of reasons. The most obvious is that the design and implementation of emergency programs tend to take place under significant time duress and often under difficult circumstances. Priority is usually given to conducting assessments, designing programs, and initiating delivery of program services as rapidly as possible to save lives. The NGOs count on their rapid assessments and knowledge of best practice to ensure that programs address the humanitarian needs effectively. In many of these crisis environments, taking time for comprehensive baseline surveys is not practical nor is it easy to collect accurate data. Some organizations are looking at ways to address this situation, for example, through real-time evaluations or retrospective studies.

Even given the tools, IWG members will be challenged to move forward with building capacity in this area. As noted in Section II.C., Emergency Unit staff are stretched as it is with the dual responsibilities for rapid response and program technical quality, and M&E is one of the most commonly under-resourced areas of their technical work. Furthermore,

donors have been reluctant to fund M&E activities for emergency programs, although this is changing.

**Recommendations:** See Initiative #2 below for a series of recommendations to address this gap in emergency capacity.

3. **Capacity of Country Offices, Partners, and Communities**

The real “First Responders” are the communities where the emergencies occur. NGOs are trying a variety of means to build community capacity in preparedness, mitigation, and response, but there are no tested and accepted models for this. In addition, the results of these efforts have not been well monitored nor the impact well measured. Minimal interagency learning is taking place.

The review found a sense that community capacity building has not been strong in large part because of the weak capacity of country offices and their partners in this realm of programming. While the scope of the review did not allow an in-depth look at this issue, these findings are supported in the above-referenced Sphere report, which highlighted the need to promote Sphere’s charter and standards with local government, local NGOs, and communities that may be directly affected by disasters.

A related concern is the challenge IWG members are facing in operationalizing community participation at multiple levels in multiple aspects of humanitarian work, as called for in the Sphere guidelines. There is a sense that NGOs are not doing enough of this and not doing it well, which is reported in a 2003 global study by ALNAP: “Involving affected populations in operations to ensure their survival is one of the most difficult challenges confronting the humanitarian world. Despite the rhetoric, and enshrinement of the notion in the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*, the participation of affected populations in humanitarian action remains, for the most part, extremely limited.”

While the review was unable to examine this question in the field, it did find an absence of generally accepted standards for community participation in emergencies. IWG members would like to create these standards and identify best practices for community participation to guide program design and to have benchmarks against which to hold themselves accountable. They have a wealth of organizational experience in community mobilization and program partnering to draw on for this. In addition, their long-term presence in over 100 countries with a cadre of 47,000 national staff represents untapped potential for building capacity in communities, districts, provinces, and nationally in countries prone to natural disasters and other emergencies.

**Recommendations:** See Initiative #3 below for a series of recommendations to address this gap in emergency capacity.

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F. Coordination in Emergency Response

One of the areas identified for special attention of the emergency capacity review was the effectiveness of IWG members in coordinating emergency response both internally and externally. The review found that capacity in this area is strong compared to other areas, a finding consistent with IWG members’ self-evaluation through the Emergency Capacity Review Preliminary Questionnaire, where coordination in emergency response was rated as more than adequate, and in the specific case of on-the-ground coordination with other responding organizations was rated as strong (see Appendix 4). Nevertheless, specific areas for IWG collaborative capacity building were identified.

1. Internal Coordination

With only three to four days for a review of each IWG organization, the research on internal coordination was limited to head-office staff primarily, as the time was insufficient for polling field directors to obtain their perspective on this topic. However, interviews were conducted with head-office personnel working in the line management (usually in operations units in separate departments from the Emergency Units) and extra time taken with those on the interview docket who had recently participated in a field operation.

The review’s findings in this area were:

- Improved capacity over the past five years to make rapid, effective decisions around emergency response, with high-level decision-making processes formalized and/or streamlined
- Effective and coordinated support of field operations, though transition of management responsibility from Emergency Units to the line management structure poses challenges (see Section II.B.)
- Indications that head-office departments are working together, though minor tensions and communication gaps exist (see Section II.B.)
- Reinventing of the wheel – both within and among organizations – primarily due to capacity gaps in information management and organizational learning
- Special challenges raised for those IWG members whose realm of internal coordination has or is expanding from a national NGO to an NGO alliance

**Recommendations:** Implementation of the recommendations put forward in Section II.B. should strengthen internal coordination, while those in Section II.E. should assist in addressing the capacity gaps in information management and organizational learning.

2. Inter-Organizational Collaboration

The review found IWG member organizations engaged in a plethora of collaborative activities with each other and with wider networks of organizations engaged in humanitarian action. Together they are working jointly on standards and policies as well
as tackling shared challenges such as information technology in emergency response and staff safety and security. Table 7 provides a list and brief description of 15 collaborative initiatives in which at least 3 IWG members are participating. (Also noted in parentheses are participating sister organizations/NGO alliances.)

Table 7. Existing Collaborative Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Effort</th>
<th>IWG Members Involved</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity (the IWG)</td>
<td>All IWG members</td>
<td>Collaborative effort in building emergency capacity, with the goal of advancing the more effective delivery of emergency assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Futures Context Mapping, with the Feinstein Intl. Famine Center of Tufts University</td>
<td>All IWG members</td>
<td>Collaborative research on what humanitarian response will look like by 2010, with recommendations for NGO programming, preparedness, staffing, and resourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Counsel Group</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, IRC, MC, SC-US, WVI (Oxfam America)</td>
<td>Mechanism for collective learning and pursuit of best practices in the area of legal counsel, including on the topics of employment, certification requirements, and model agreements for use in consortia arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Safer World Campaign</td>
<td>CARE, IRC, MC, SC-US, WVI (Oxfam America)</td>
<td>Coalition of NGOs working to raise public awareness among Americans about how they can make the world better and, consequently, make it safer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NetHope</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, MC, SC-US, WVI (Oxfam Intl)</td>
<td>Collaborative effort in IT focused on the establishment of standards, technical support, training, and addressing geopolitical obstructions, and accessing corporate resources collectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP International)</td>
<td>Initiators in 2003: CARE, IRC, Oxfam GB, WVI (Caritas Intl)</td>
<td>Partnership of member agencies to uphold humanitarian standards and make humanitarian action accountable to its intended beneficiaries through an international self-regulatory body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAction’s Humanitarian Policy and Practice Committee</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, IRC, MC, SC-US (WV-US, Oxfam America)</td>
<td>Committee of a large, formal U.S.-based alliance, providing a framework for consultation, coordination, and advocacy on humanitarian issues such as protection and operations, security, and coordination in disaster response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Training Manager Consortium</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, MC, SC-US (WV-US)</td>
<td>Recently formed group for technology-supported learning (eLearning) to share best practices in regards to employee training at international NGOs and, in the future, to share training content and tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in Aid</td>
<td>IRC, MC, Oxfam GB, SC-US</td>
<td>Network for promoting good practice in the management and support of humanitarian workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Incident Reporting Project (in the development stage)</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, SC-US, WVI</td>
<td>Collaborative effort to promote staff safety and security by sharing security information (incident reports, security situation reports) at the organizational level and then at the group level through a hub that provides data consolidation and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Effort</td>
<td>IWG Members Involved</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) <a href="http://www.alnap.org">www.alnap.org</a></td>
<td>CARE, Oxfam GB, WVI (Caritas Intl, IRC-UK, SC-UK)</td>
<td>Network for program learning, monitoring, and evaluation in the humanitarian sector, with the goal of improving accountability and quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sphere Project Management Committee <a href="http://www.sphereproject.org">www.sphereproject.org</a> (ending this year – 2004)</td>
<td>CARE, MC, Oxfam GB (Caritas Intl, SC-UK)</td>
<td>Interagency cooperative process to develop a framework for, and commitment to, quality and accountability in humanitarian practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative Benchmarking Group</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, MC (Oxfam America)</td>
<td>Learning group focused on direct marketing, with assistance from the Target Analysis Group, a firm that does analysis of marketing performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-SAFE – Consortium for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency (FY03-FY05)</td>
<td>CARE, CRS, WVI (SC-US is a subgrantee)</td>
<td>Collaboration to improve efficiencies in responding to the Southern Africa slow-onset emergency with one USAID FFP grant over 3 years (FY03-FY05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTS Project – Food and Commodity Tracking System (Microsoft-supported)</td>
<td>CRS, MC, SC-US</td>
<td>Collaborative project between Microsoft Corporation and NGOs to produce a Web-based software program for tracking commodities and other materials used in humanitarian programs and for streamlining reporting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A look at these collaborations reveals that nearly all were initiated in the past five years. Some, such as People in Aid and ALNAP, have dozens of members and strive for broad engagement in organizational exchange of learning and in setting policies and standards. They strive to be international in scope and have more formal structures, and tend to communicate through written documentation and gatherings. Other collaborative initiatives intentionally have small membership for maximum efficiency as they tackle a specific project and pursuing grant funding collectively. These tend to be more loosely affiliated through working groups or committees, and often communicate regularly by teleconference and e-mail.

Though they have a wide spectrum of purposes and operate through a range of modalities, the initiatives are given generally positive ratings by participants. Interviewees cited numerous examples of how these collaborations improved their organizational capacity, enhanced efficiencies, and indirectly improved programming.

**Recommendations:** Although the review did not entail an in-depth look at these collaborative activities, the information gathered would point to the following considerations for the IWG:

- The review found several cases where communication among organizational representatives (information systems specialists, security specialists, etc.) was stronger than in-house among staff who are participating on interagency working groups addressing issues of relevance to humanitarian work. Emergency directors may need to invest more time in facilitating communication among their organizations’ representatives, so that there is better coordination and less duplication of effort within each organization as well as among the various collaborative entities.
• Branding an initiative takes a great deal of investment of time and funds. The pay-off is not clear, as it needs to be measured against using the existing brands of the member organizations, which are generally very strong.
• It takes additional effort to work collaboratively with NGOs in North America and Europe, not to mention globally. If one of the IWG’s goals is to influence the humanitarian sector broadly, it must be committed to diversity as a necessary means to achieving that goal, even in the face of challenges that arise from working with greater diversity of experiences, ideas, viewpoints, values, and capacity.
• The question of diversity and global efforts links closely to one emerging concern, which is the Western face of humanitarianism. The IWG should discuss whether it shares this concern and wants to commit explicitly or implicitly to the internationalization of the face of humanitarianism.
• The Sphere Project has been repeatedly praised as having a process that effectively built the capacity of the humanitarian sector. In designing its key initiatives, the IWG should review that process and cull strategies applicable to its work.

One specific recommendation relates to media relations. The review found significant interest among the media representatives of the IWG members in collaborating, for example, to conduct joint media training in the field or to work collectively with the U.S. media to lift coverage of humanitarian work. Organizing a media working group might be a relatively simple response to this interest.

3. External Coordination and Collaboration in the Field

The structure of the review did not allow for an on-site assessment of how effectively IWG members collaborate in the field in emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response. However, opinions were sought from the largely head-office-based interviewees. They consistently rated capacity in this area higher than in other areas. They cited, in particular:

• organizational commitment to partnering and, in many cases, to implementing programs through partners
• capacity of field staff to work with or through local partners and build partner organizations’ institutional capacity
• steadily improving interagency coordination in emergency responses, although significant tensions and disorganization remain

In addition, numerous instances were cited where one NGO assisted another in some operational aspect for which the former had staff or logistical capacity that the latter did not have on hand.

In looking for practical examples, IWG members cited one current collaborative project and noted it provides lessons learned and best practices that may be useful for future IWG initiatives. The project is C-SAFE, the Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security Emergency, which is a collaboration to improve efficiencies in responding to
Southern Africa’s recent slow-onset emergency. The consortium has a three-year grant from USAID’s Food for Peace Office to improve household food security in targeted communities in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. There are three core NGOs – CARE, CRS, and WVI – each of which serves as lead member in one of the countries. The initiative has a Regional Program Unit in Johannesburg and is overseen by a Steering Committee. Among the benefits reaped through this interagency collaboration in the field are: (1) more effective program implementation through adoption of standard ration sizes for each country, (2) avoidance of competition, duplication, and overlap in operational areas, (3) standard programming principles in each country, (4) the ability to negotiate collectively with partners, governments, and donors, and (5) standard monitoring and evaluation procedures. While the benefits are substantial, the project has also faced challenges, most notably: (1) problems with bonding the agencies, given different policies, systems, and cultures, and (2) difficulties with working under a common platform.

Recommendations: The final evaluation of C-SAFE (planned for FY05) and of any other similar field-based collaborations should be shared among all IWG members.

III. INITIATIVES FOR FUNDING PROPOSALS

Based on the findings, this report suggests that the IWG pursue grant funding in support of four initiatives to increase their collective emergency capacity and strive to move forward the entire humanitarian sector. The initiatives were selected based on the following criteria:

**Potential Impact:** These four initiatives take on challenges and obstacles that are among those that most negatively affect the timeliness and effectiveness of humanitarian action at present, and are projected to continue to pose challenges over the coming five years.

**Collective Need:** They address emergency-capacity gaps that are shared among all IWG members and are of importance to others in the humanitarian sector.

**Likely Success and Sustainability:** The proposed actions are practical and focused, with a high potential for success in rapidly improving collective capacity and contributing to significant and sustained improvement in meeting the rights and needs of those affected by emergencies.

**Complementary, Not Duplicative:** They do not duplicate the efforts of other entities working on emergency capacity, while they do strive to complement existing initiatives.

**Commitment:** The IWG members have agreed that these are priority areas and that their organizations are committed to investing in them.
The initiatives seek to build capacity at the organizational (IGW member) level, the consortium (IGW) level, and the humanitarian sector level by:

- Increasing the pool of humanitarian workers who are available for leadership positions when needed and have the technical competencies required for the changing professional environment
- Enhancing capacity in accountability to standards and measurement of impact
- Improving NGO models for building local capacity in emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response
- Improving information and communications technology in support of humanitarian action and learning

A. Proposed Initiatives for the Gates Proposal

The following outlines results, intermediate results, and sample activities for the first three initiatives. Also noted are with whom the IWG should work to ensure their initiatives complement those of others already underway.

1. Initiative #1 – Increasing the Pool of Humanitarian Workers

Result 1: Increased pool of available humanitarian leaders with the required technical competencies

IR 1.1 Enhanced internal and external staff feeder systems

Sample activities:
1. Enhance organizational feeder systems
2. Identify and share best practices for developing national staff for leadership positions
3. Expand partnerships with universities and training institutions

IR 1.2 Improved models for registers/rosters/emergency corps

Sample activities:
1. Test the emergency corps model vs. the use of rosters and registers
2. Share best practices for funding time gaps and backfilling positions, so that trained, qualified staff can be on stand-by for assignment to an emergency response

IR 1.3 Increased organizational commitment to systematic staff development and career tracking, with an emphasis on national staff

Sample activities:
1. Develop shared understanding of the required competencies in this field of work
2. Draw the best managers from the development side and train them in emergency response
3. Draw the best emergency response technicians and train them in management
4. Establish incentive systems for experienced professionals
Complementing existing work in this realm by: UNHCR’s Reach Out Project, Red R’s trainings, WVI’s partnership with Melbourne University, People in Aid.

2. Initiative #2 – Accountability and Measurement of Impact

Result 2: Enhanced capacity in accountability to standards and measurement of impact

IR 2.1 Improved country office capacity to operationalize Sphere and other standards

Sample activities:
1. Design and implement joint training for field staff
2. Facilitate the sharing of successful strategies among field leaders

IR 2.2 Improved incorporation of protection in emergency programming

Sample activities:
1. Develop a common understanding of protection in emergencies and develop mutually agreed upon standards
2. Share program strategies that have worked
3. Link into UNHCR’s Reach Out Project
4. Identify training needs and then design and implement joint training of field staff in protection in emergencies

IR 2.3 Improved organizational capacity to assess accountability

Sample activities:
1. Test good-practice accountability models in 2-3 of the NGOs
2. Document new, emerging good practice and disseminate
3. Enhance IWG members’ collective engagement with external accountability mechanisms and institutions

IR 2.4 Improved approaches to measuring impact

Sample activities:
1. Develop standards for assessing the baseline situation in an emergency context
2. Review the indicators provided by Sphere, identify areas where there are gaps (such as in community participation), and work with other institutions to develop indicators to fill the gaps

Complementing existing work in this realm by: The Sphere Project, HAP, ALNAP, Reach Out Project
3. **Initiative #3 – Improving Models for Building Local Capacity**

**Result 3: Improved NGO models for building local capacity in emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response**

IR 3.1 Increased availability of tested models for local emergency-capacity building

Sample activities:
1. Research existing models, lessons learned, best practices
2. Develop joint standards for community preparedness (have lead organization – conduct research, hold workshop, produce documentation)
3. Conduct training at the country-office level to build competencies in local emergency-capacity building
4. Pilot model programs in three emergency-prone countries where several IWG members operate long term
   - Africa: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan
   - Asia: Afghanistan, Indonesia, or Vietnam
   - Latin America/Caribbean: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Central America as a sub-region

IR 3.2 Improved application of community participation principles

Sample activities:
1. Develop joint standards for community participation in emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response
2. Design and implement joint training for community participation in emergency work, with an emphasis on national staff’s capacity in this realm

Complementing existing work in this realm by: The Sphere Project and ALNAP, and drawing on current IWG member capacity in: community mobilization; food security programming that addresses mitigation of certain emergencies; building community resiliency and implementing peace-building or conflict mitigation programs; experimentation with models for building local emergency capacity; and working in consortia to build local capacity in other sectors, e.g., NGO Networks for Health.

Note: Initiative #1 supports Initiative #3, in that #1 should result in increased organizational decentralization of technical expertise and building of national staff capacity, which in turn should increase capacity at the country-office level. In addition, Initiative #3’s efforts in community participation support Initiative #2’s work on accountability to standards.

**B. Proposed Initiatives for a Separate Proposal**

The fourth initiative is one that could be implemented independently of the other three, but would best be done at the same time, given the significant role information and
communications technology can and should play in building staff capacity, putting in places systems of accountability and impact measurement, and enhancing the capacity of local actors.

1. **Initiative #4 – Information and Communications Technology**

**Result 4: Improved information and communications technology in support of humanitarian action and learning**

IR 4.1 Increased effectiveness through establishment of minimum ICT standards

Sample activities:
1. Build on the initial progress in moving toward ICT standardization by establishing minimum ICT standards

IR 4.2 Increased efficiency through shared resources (ICT training, technical support, joint procurement, etc.)

Sample activities:
1. Collaborate to find ways to train field users on the ground
2. Plan for collaborative technical support in the next rapid-onset emergencies to which several IWG members respond
3. Conduct an evaluation of the NetHope initiative, including a look at coordination between IT personnel and humanitarian practitioners, and apply the lessons learned to future joint fundraising and procurement of equipment

IR 4.3 Increased shared learning

Sample activities:
1. Increase usage of technology in support of learning, complementing other efforts to use a package of approaches for training to build competencies
2. Expand World Vision’s technology-driven H LEARN (Humanitarian Learning, Evaluation, Analysis and Research Network) project to benefit individual members of the IWG and the working group as a whole
3. Establish an annual meeting and exposition of a Humanitarian Forum to bring together practitioners as well as academicians, researchers, and donors, and use technology to reach large numbers of field practitioners

Complementing existing work in this realm by: NetHope, the Online Incident Reporting Project, the NGO Training Managers Consortium, ALNAP

C. **Cost Estimates for the Proposed Initiatives**

Appendix 6 provides a rough budget estimate for each of the four initiatives, with a total of $1.5 million for increasing the pool of humanitarian workers, $2.5 million for accountability and impact measurement, $4 million for improved models for building
local capacity, and $2 million for information and communications technology, for a total of $10 million. Of this $10 million, the IWG might potentially apply for $8 million for the first three initiatives from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and $2 million from Microsoft Corporation.

IV. PRIORITY AREAS FOR OTHER IWG ACTIVITY

Aside from the four major initiatives proposed above, the review identified specific opportunities for interagency learning that would significantly boost the capacity not only of IWG members but also that of the humanitarian sector. Most of the key issues with which the NGOs are wrestling are ones also of concern to their colleague organizations. Some IWG organizations may have already found ways to move ahead successfully and can share best practices; others may be able to share important lessons learned from their failures, thereby saving colleague NGOs time and frustration.

Below is a prioritized list of areas with the greatest potential for enhancing the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian action through IWG collaboration. The review found a range of capacity in these five areas and widespread interest in learning about other organizations’ approaches to them. They are:

1. **Emergency Unit structures and staffing**, including best practices in handling the dual mandate of rapid response team and technical unit, and optimal configurations to support capacity building

2. **Organizational influence and change**, including leveraging other organizational resources, building organizational commitment, and successfully driving new practices and policies throughout the field structure

3. **NGO Alliances**, focusing on emergency capacity building in conjunction with sister organizations

4. **Financial Management and Staffing in Emergency Programs**

5. **Mechanisms for Rapid Procurement and Transport**, including documentation and dissemination of best practices in contracting global suppliers

The review also identified two priority areas for research that the IWG might undertake:

1. **Early Warning Systems**, focusing on research at the field level

2. **The Western Face of Humanitarianism**, studying how to internationalize that “face”

With the four major initiatives previously identified, it may not be realistic for the IWG to undertake additional capacity-building activities at this time. However, the IWG could
encourage informal exchange on these topics and lobby other entities to take on such initiatives. Regardless, one can be sure that this collaborative effort to improve humanitarian action will accomplish much in the coming years.
APPENDIX 1: Terms of Reference
Emergency Capacity Review Analysis
The Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity

I. Overview

The Interagency Working Group (IWG) consists of the following organizations: CARE USA, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam GB, Save the Children-US, and World Vision International. It is a collaborative effort dedicated to the advancement of a more effective delivery of emergency assistance by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) through a joint capacity building strategy.

The IWG is seeking a consultant to assist in the development of a proposal to access financial resources to support the building of improved emergency delivery capacity of the agencies. He/She will conduct a detailed analysis of the emergency response capacity of member organizations, including identifying gaps that hinder the quality and rapidity of humanitarian action. The analysis will also identify opportunities for coordination and strategic investments that will advance the performance of the collective group and humanitarian action in general. The results of this analysis will be used to seek donor resources to improve the collective emergency capacity of the group.

The consultant will spend four days at each agency headquarter for research. He/She will complement this information by using a simple questionnaire to solicit input from selected COs of the members.

II. Objectives

1. Analyze key elements of emergency capacity within the five member organizations.

The consultant will assess the strengths and weaknesses of participating organizations with respect to the following four areas listed below. Findings will be aggregated and presented according to the categories below (rather than by organization).

(i) Staff capacity. The consultant will assess, contrast/compare members’ staff development policies, cultures, procedures and strategies for contingency planning, staff performance monitoring procedures, training facilities and practices, and procedures for rapidly deploying staff in emergencies. The IWG will be undertaking a more thorough analysis of staff capacity issues in the coming year. This project will help to lay the groundwork for the longer-term project, and therefore should be closely coordinated with the IWG capacity building Facilitator.

(ii) Logistics, supply chain, and rapid response mobilization capacity. The consultant will assess logistics capacity within each member agency, to include: procurement procedures, pre-positioning of supplies or a system for rapid acquisition of the same, availability of equipment, transport capacity,
communications, and safeguards to ensure integrity of supply shipments. The consultant will also analyze each member’s ability to mobilize effectively and rapidly for sudden onset emergencies, such as natural disasters.

(iii) Early warning (EW) systems. The consultant will assess the effectiveness of each organization’s ability to use early warning systems in shaping timely and effective responses to (mainly natural) disasters. Factors to be considered include: effective integration of early warning data/systems into emergency response and on-the-ground planning, demonstrated linkages to community and national early warning response structures, timely availability of early warning data to emergency response staff, quality of available data, and facility of emergency response staff in using data provided by EW systems.

(iv) Coordination. Finally, the consultant will examine the effectiveness of each organization in coordinating with others both internally and externally. Effective support of field operations will also be assessed. Weaknesses in internal coordination and opportunities to resolve them will be addressed. However, this project element will focus mainly on identifying effective partnerships and modalities of interagency communication and coordination, especially those that lead to “win-win” situations that save time, resources, and result in better programming. The consultant will identify effective coordination practices, mechanisms, or groups in which member NGOs participate (or should consider participating).

As part of the analysis of each organization’s capacity, the consultant will develop a list of key indicators for measuring how each of the four areas above impact overall performance in humanitarian action. These indicators should specify the most important programming outcomes that emergency response organizations seek to achieve in their work. The consultant will consult with the IWG on the list of indicators as it is developed throughout the project. The group proposes, as a starting point, the following list of indicators, which the consultant will be expected to expand and refine:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Emergency Response Areas</th>
<th>Indicators of Program Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Capacity:</td>
<td>• Current levels of staff availability on demand (&lt;1 week).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Staff have desired capacities and appropriate level of training, mechanisms in place to deploy staff with complex, rapidly-changing skill sets (demonstrating key core competencies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics, Supply Chain, Rapid Mobilization Capacity:</td>
<td>• Emergency response mobilization period minimized (e.g., &lt; 72 hours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Losses of food, supplies, and equipment minimized (e.g., &lt; 2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring systems effectively flag deficiencies, losses, or corruption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Procurement problems do not delay delivery of programs.
• Adequate light and heavy transport capacity available on demand.
• Immediate access to pre-positioned supplies in all operating regions or ability to acquire supplies rapidly.
• Contingency planning processes predict outcomes; improve operations.

Early Warning Systems:
• Reliability and availability of data
• Quality of data.
• Evidence of consistent/effective data use by emergency response planning staff.
• Evidence of effective linkages between NGOs/donors/UN/government and community-based systems.

Staff and necessary resources allocated to EW.

Coordination:
• Cost savings achieved through pooled resources, pre-positioned supplies, partnerships, or field collaborations.
• Programs implemented by NGOs are complementary (versus overlapping), with maximum benefit to those in need.
• Participation in effective mechanisms that extend NGO collaboration beyond ad hoc mechanisms of individual emergencies.
• NGOs can and do clearly state their principles to each other, donors, governments, the military, and beneficiaries during emergencies.

Overall Indicators:
• Number of lives at risk versus number saved (per emergency).
• Number of food/shelter insecure at outset and end of emergency programming.
• Timescale of response (change from relief to rehabilitation programming)
• Adherence to SPHERE standards.
• Cost per beneficiary served, versus comparable emergencies in region.

2. Identify promising areas for improved inter-organizational coordination and strengthening of collective emergency capacity.
The consultant will aggregate his or her results in each section and analyze the findings from a sectoral, rather than an organizational, perspective. This section will identify changes in staffing, logistics & mobilization capacity, early warning systems, and coordination that could be made by all IWGs in a way that would strengthen their collective ability to respond to emergencies. This information will feed into the development of a proposal to acquire resources from donors. This section will focus on:

- Addressing problems and capacity gaps that are consistent across the sector
- Improvements to interagency coordination that would result in more efficient and effective functioning of the field overall
- New organizational structures or supports that could strengthen NGO performance (e.g. committees, working groups, coalitions, donor groups)

3. **Rank, estimate costs, and identify indicators of success for proposed initiatives.**

In this section, the consultant will roughly cost out the options for improving NGO sector performance identified in section 2. (This will be done with the assistance of member organizations.) The consultant will develop cost estimates for the most significant five to ten sector reforms identified in the study. In cases where the development of cost estimates is too complex or lengthy, the consultant will instead briefly describe the process that would be required to develop such an estimate and provide an order of magnitude estimate.

The consultant shall also rank, in priority order, the reforms proposed in section 2, in terms of their potential impact, using the key indicators developed in section 1 as a benchmark.

Finally, the consultant’s specific recommendations will be used to develop proposal to be submitted to selected donors.

**III. Activities**

The consultant will visit each of the participating organizations for two days each to conduct interviews and research. He/She will use a simple questionnaire to conduct a survey of selected country offices of participating agencies. A point person to facilitate these visits will be provided for each agency to coordinate staff contacts and make facilities and resources available to the consultant for his/her work. After the visits, the consultant will continue consulting with staff by e-mail and telephone.

The consultant will also be allocated five days of preparation, writing, and analysis time throughout the duration of the project.

The consultant will submit his or her report at the end of the project and then present the findings to the group, most likely via teleconference. The consultant will incorporate changes proposed by the group, if needed. The project may be extended by up to 5 days, if a need is demonstrated and the IWG members approve an extension.
IV. Deliverables

The consultant is principally responsible for producing a report and drafts of core pieces of a technical proposal as outlined in section II. Member organizations are responsible for providing the material, information, communications support, and feedback necessary to ensure success.

V. Skills and Qualifications

The consultant will demonstrate considerable expertise and experience in the development sector, with emphasis on the work of non-governmental organizations. Experience in humanitarian relief and actual on-the-ground experience in emergency response is highly desirable. The successful candidate will also demonstrate strong analytical and synthesis skills and successful experience in developing policy or management strategies for complex organizations or coalitions.

A. Education and Professional Experience

Master’s degree in Public Policy, International Relations, Economic Development, Business, or equivalent (or greater).

- 10 years work experience in humanitarian, emergency, or development field.
- Five years experience in the management and delivery of humanitarian services.
- Experience in analyzing emergency response operations.

B. Skills and Competencies

- Demonstrated success in coordinating complex analyses (particularly desirable: evidence of coordination with committees, coalitions, or other multi-organizational entities).
- Ability to work independently and to set priorities for self and a team.
- Strong presentation and communications capabilities, particularly writing.
- Evidence of ability to meet demanding deadlines.
- Experience in analyzing and resolving management problems in complex organizations.
- Understanding of the humanitarian relief donor environment.
- Evidence of project and program budgeting experience.
APPENDIX 2: Emergency Capacity Review Preliminary Questionnaire

Instructions: *Rate your organization’s capacity in the following areas as they pertain to emergency response.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Capacity</th>
<th>Very Weak</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Adequate</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and hiring</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New staff orientation and preparation</td>
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<td>Staff performance monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff training and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composition of emergency response teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid mobilization of teams</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff safety and security</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff retention</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Logistics, Supply Chain                                                        |           |      |          |        |             |
| Rapid equipping of emergency response teams                                    |           |      |          |        |             |
| Procurement procedures                                                         |           |      |          |        |             |
| Rapid procurement                                                              |           |      |          |        |             |
| Transport capacity                                                             |           |      |          |        |             |
| Communications systems                                                         |           |      |          |        |             |
| Shipping and warehousing safeguards                                            |           |      |          |        |             |
| Commodity management                                                           |           |      |          |        |             |

| Early Warning Systems                                                          |           |      |          |        |             |
| Existence of relevant EW systems                                               |           |      |          |        |             |
| Linkages of EW systems to community and national systems                       |           |      |          |        |             |
| Quality of data                                                                |           |      |          |        |             |
| Integration of EW data/systems into field planning and emergency response programs |           |      |          |        |             |
| Staff capacity in EW systems and their use                                     |           |      |          |        |             |

| Coordination in Emergency Response                                             |           |      |          |        |             |
| On-the-ground coordination with other responding organizations                |           |      |          |        |             |
| Internal coordination in emergency response                                    |           |      |          |        |             |
| Effective internal support of field operations                                 |           |      |          |        |             |
| Effective partnerships in emergency response                                   |           |      |          |        |             |

| Other                                                                          |           |      |          |        |             |
| Financial management systems                                                   |           |      |          |        |             |
| Advocacy and public policy                                                     |           |      |          |        |             |

S. Braun, 4/4/04
APPENDIX 3: Survey on Priority Thematic Topics  
Emergency Capacity Review – Gates Proposal Development

Your organization: _________________________

**Directions:** Rank all eight topics from 1 to 8, with 1 being the highest priority for inclusion in the Gates proposal and 8 being the lowest priority. *The aim is to select cross-cutting program areas identified as having a high potential for moving the humanitarian sector forward through the development and application of standards, tools, and capacity-building strategies among the IWG and beyond.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Topic</th>
<th>Includes</th>
<th>Priority Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Environment and emergencies</td>
<td>- Rapid environmental assessment in emergency contexts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preparedness and prevention measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic recovery</td>
<td>- Structured, coordinated approach to tackling this area of need</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HIV/AIDS in emergencies</td>
<td>- Identification of how traditional emergency work needs to be modified in environments of high HIV/AIDS prevalence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Capacity building of communities in preparedness and response</td>
<td>- Grassroots level only – “First Responders”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Emphasis on capacity building of the general population as well as local institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Capacity building of national partners</td>
<td>- Transferring IWG members’ core competencies to National Offices and governmental as well as non-governmental organizations providing direct services in disaster mitigation and emergency response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Protection in emergencies</td>
<td>- Emphasis on consistent application of protection principles in program design and implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Special attention to gender and child issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Community participation</td>
<td>- Translating Sphere’s references on this subject into standards and best practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reaching marginalized populations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promoting community ownership of programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. M&amp;E in emergencies</td>
<td>- Monitoring and evaluating impact of mitigation, preparedness, and emergency response programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Standards for determining how to assess the impact of a response when the status of those affected by the emergency is unclear for weeks, if not months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S. Braun, 1 June 2004
APPENDIX 4: Emergency Capacity Review – Tabulation of Self Ratings for All IWG Members

Ratings: 1=Very weak, 2=Weak, 3=Adequate, 4=Strong, 5=Very Strong

Shaded areas are those rated as weakest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CARE</th>
<th>CRS</th>
<th>IRC</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>Oxfam GB</th>
<th>SC-US</th>
<th>WVI</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong># of Respondents</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Capacity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and hiring</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New staff orientation and preparation</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff performance monitoring</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff training and development</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of emergency response teams</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid mobilization of teams</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff safety and security</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff retention</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics, Supply Chain</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid equipping of emergency response teams</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement procedures</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid procurement</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>Transport capacity</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications systems</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping and warehousing safeguards</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity management</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The low number of responses from these organizations makes the data less reliable.*
## APPENDIX 4 (continued): Tabulation of Self Ratings for All IWG Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CARE</th>
<th>CRS</th>
<th>IRC</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>Oxfam GB</th>
<th>SC-US</th>
<th>WVI</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong># of Respondents</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early Warning Systems</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of relevant EW systems</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkages of EW systems to community and national systems</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of data</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of EW data/systems into field planning and emergency response programs</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff capacity in EW systems and their use</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination in Emergency Response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>On-the-ground coordination with other responding organizations</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal coordination in emergency response</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective internal support of field operations</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective partnerships in emergency response</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management systems</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy and public policy</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The low number of responses from these organizations makes the data less reliable.
APPENDIX 5: SOME RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE IWG

Note: There are a multitude of organizations, university programs, and other resources that the IWG could tap for implementation of its new initiatives. Those mentioned frequently during the review are included here or in Table 7 of this report.

AlertNet – www.alertnet.org – Reuters Foundation’s AlertNet provides global news, communications and logistics services to the international disaster relief community and the public

Fritz Institute – www.fritzinstitute.org - strengthens the infrastructures of humanitarian relief organizations by mobilizing logistics and technology expertise and resources from the corporate and academic communities – Humanitarian Logistics Software

International Crisis Group – www.icg.org - independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. CrisisWatch is released monthly, interim publications on specific countries or regions.

Reach Out Project (UNHCR) - www.reachout.ch - to enhance refugee protection awareness, knowledge and skills of those persons responsible for the delivery of humanitarian assistance within NGOs, RCRC National Societies and their International Federation and to improve operational co-operation between UNHCR and course participants. It constitutes a three-year program to disseminate basic refugee protection knowledge by means of workshops targeting mid-level humanitarian assistance practitioners from NGOs and the Red Cross/Crescent Movement.

Red R – www.redr.org - relieves suffering in disasters by selecting, training and providing competent and effective personnel to humanitarian relief agencies world-wide

Relief Web – www.reliefnet.int – (OCHA) – limited to where national disasters are declared
## APPENDIX 6: Rough Budget Estimates for the Four Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative #1 (Pool of Workers)</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>$1.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishment of feeder systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IWG planning workshop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Testing of emergency corps models</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Competency analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of collaborative initiatives with universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training workshops and other capacity-building actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative #2 (Accountability/Impact)</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1.25 million</td>
<td>$1.25 million</td>
<td>$1.25 million</td>
<td>$2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- IWG workshop on operationalizing standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of protection standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training workshops and other capacity-building actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Testing accountability models</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Documentation and dissemination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Engagement with other institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Standards for baselines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative #3 (Local Capacity Models)</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
<td>$4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Researching models for building local emergency capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of community preparedness standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pilot programs in 3 countries (6 months only - $250,000 per country) $750,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of community participation standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Training workshops and other capacity-building actions in country offices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Less research, development of standards, training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 12 months for the pilot programs ($500,000 per country) $1.5 million</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX 6 (continued): Rough Budget Estimates for the Four Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative #4 (ICT)</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1 million&lt;br&gt;- Workshop to develop strategies for on-the-ground collaboration&lt;br&gt;- Establishment of ICT standards&lt;br&gt;- NetHope evaluation&lt;br&gt;- Expansion in technology-supported learning&lt;br&gt;- Development of website for Humanitarian Forum&lt;br&gt;- Expansion of H LEARN&lt;br&gt;- Equipment</td>
<td>$1 million&lt;br&gt;- Less strategy development, standards, NetHope evaluation&lt;br&gt;- More technology-supported learning, expansion of H LEARN</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>$5 million</td>
<td>$5 million</td>
<td>$9 million</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gates Total (Initiatives #1, 2, and 3)</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$4 million</td>
<td>$4 million</td>
<td>$8 million</td>
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