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CART Lessons Learned

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<td>CART Lessons Learned Workshop Sectoral Groupings</td>
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Background Info.

CART Total Funds: US $5,745,000

Food Aid: US $2,000,000
Food Distribution: US $1.1 million
Non-food Items: US $330,040

Number of Beneficiaries: 206,000
Number of Children: 41,200
Seeds and Tools Recipients: 15,300 families (91,800 individuals)
Food for work Beneficiaries: 8,200 families (49,200 individuals)
Food Aid: 6,760 MT

Anticipated (March – December, 2002)
♦ 70,000 families to receive immediate food assistance
♦ 160,000 mothers and children to receive nutrition support
♦ 12,000 children will have access to better school facilities

Additional emergency response program and operations data may be accessed through the Central Asia Relief Response database (on WVIO_COMI).

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is a landlocked country of 647,500 sq.km. It is bounded to the west by Iran, to the south and the east by Pakistan, and to the north by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. It also has small border with the People's Republic of China in the far northeast.

Mountains dominate the geography of Afghanistan. The Hindu Kush sweeps down from the northeast through the central regions of the country and flattens out into the deserts of the southwest plateau. On either side of these majestic mountains, to the north, and to the east, the land is more fertile, and it is in these areas that most agricultural activity takes place. Afghanistan is an Islamic country. Sunni Muslim's are the majority, 84%, with a minority of Shi'a Muslim's, 15%. The ethnic composition of the people is Pashtu 38%, Tajik 25%, Hazara 19%, Uzbek 6% and various other ethnic groups (Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch and others) making up the remaining 12%.

The most common language is Dari, the Afghan form of Persian, spoken by 50% of the population. Other major languages, which reflect the ethnic composition of the population, are Pashtu, 35%, and Turkic 11%.
(Source: Afghanistan Information Management Service)
The Central Asia/Afghanistan Lessons Learned Workshop provides a unique opportunity to identify, document, and share, through open discussion, those criteria for more effective work in operationalizing a Category III emergency response, particularly in a region where WV lacked significant presence. Lessons learned documentation provides a mechanism for evaluation, bringing together varying levels of sectoral expertise and experience that contribute to the ongoing process of skill building within the organization. In addition to facilitating institutional learning and building memory, identified lessons can be applied to future complex emergencies for more effective strategic planning and operations, engaging the wider international community for feedback and 'cross-fertilization' of best practices. The ongoing challenge continues to be intentionally documenting lessons around emergencies and then making the effort to apply the appropriate lessons to current and future initiatives.

The following were several workshop expectations:

♦ To gain a better understanding of the ongoing crisis in Central Asia/Afghanistan.
♦ To engage the learning process through open discussion
♦ To develop working criteria for continuing to respond to large scale and complex emergencies.
♦ To begin the process of probing into the application of lessons learned through information sharing and consolidation of key findings

An appreciative inquiry approach: What went well and what didn’t?

Context: This was a difficult disaster – WV had no presence in Afghanistan or neighboring countries – Access to Afghanistan was not possible at the outset – WV is a Christian NGO working in a fundamentalist Islamic context – WV Partnership expectations were overwhelming.

The following are summary points:

♦ Information sharing was beneficial as daily updates and telephone conferences kept the Partnership informed, allowing those informed to understand the complexities of the response. As a result, our response to the unfolding crisis was quick.

♦ The efficiency of the emergency response decision-making process was enhanced because of a Partnership approach to disaster mitigation. Individual and particular SO interests were superceded by Partnership agreement on strategic priorities, sectors, and areas where WV could become operational.

♦ Networking and alliance building with other organizations that had operational experience in the region proved to be an important aspect
of our response. Collaborating with other agencies in a non-Christian environment encouraged WV to formulate creative approaches to obtaining a presence and mobilizing a rapid response, while at the same time maintaining our Christian identity.

♦ Greater emphasis should have been placed on support systems for emergency response teams. For example, the Pakistan team lacked senior management level experience working with the Government in negotiating and designing programs. Having an experienced liaison officer on the ground to coordinate specifically with government agencies is important for providing logistical and programming technical assistance.

♦ Contingency security plans should have been more carefully developed and adhered to. Whether a small, medium or large-scale emergency, orientation and regular debriefing sessions are important for staff. These sessions can include a review of checklists and evacuation procedures, a system for crisis monitoring and emergency communications, a clear structure for staff deployment and support, and updates on legal/political issues (immigration, site access, work permits, and socio-political policies, e.g., curfews).

♦ While the Partnership response to the crisis in Central Asia/Afghanistan was rapid, there was a need to more clearly define the scope and geographic focus of our operations. To an extent, the complexity of events demanded a ‘global’ perspective. But, it would have been more beneficial to identify key focus areas where WV can become operational from the onset. A more targeted approach would have contributed to a more balanced allocation of resources and effort.
## Top 10 Identified Priority Lessons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Areas</th>
<th>Sectoral Lessons*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications &amp; Marketing</strong></td>
<td>Com/Mark HR PlanMgmt Res.Mgmt Prog. Prep/RR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications roles (e.g., media contact, marketing, advocacy, resource gathering, etc) should be carefully defined. This will help in getting the right people in the right places at the right time. But, it is important to count the cost (financial and operational) of a quickly rotating roster of communications staff. Using creativity and accessing non WV purchased marketing resources (images) can provide good funding appeal results (WV Canada) even when we are not operational.</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rapid Response Teams Deployment</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>It is important to define a deployment strategy for regional RRT members.</td>
<td>X X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Information Sharing &amp; Decision Making</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly CMT conference calls with the Partnership were beneficial for decision-making. However, it is important to also have SOs represented in the decision-making process.</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Program Planning &amp; Decision Making</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program and geographic priorities must be clear, and decisions for changing these priorities must be collaborative</td>
<td>X X X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IT Systems and Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Need broader Partnership solution to systems management on the ground (high-capacity sat phones, new communications (LN) technology, equipment use)</td>
<td>X X X X X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Resource Decision Making</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Need clarification on mechanisms for staffing decisions in highly fluid situations; need comprehensive HRM solutions</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security Planning</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The development of security and evacuation plans is essential. Travel plans should be carefully arranged to facilitate adequate security precautions (e.g., single entry visas).</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Preparedness for Crisis Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WV should mobilize resources prior to the emergency onset – identify, track, monitor and prepare for impending emergencies. Prepare IDPP, MOUs, registration, bank accounts, etc.</td>
<td>X X X</td>
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Building & Fostering Partnerships
Need trained negotiators to liaise with partners based on clear policy (definitions of goals, expectations) and strategies behind alliances, particularly guidance for working in non-Christian environments.

Access to Essential Planning Resources
Need to increase the efficient of use of the GPU by addressing knowledge/practice/use gap. Also, there is a need to increase the depth of experienced commodities (FRMG) staff for negotiating and reviewing projects.

Lessons Learned about Lessons Learned
♦ A systems/mechanism needs to be developed so that the process and information generated can be disseminated wider.

♦ There is an appreciation for the clarity and importance placed on identifying lessons learned. This reflects the Partnership’s support for consensus and commitment to best practice.

♦ The lessons learned process is an excellent opportunity to prepare for next steps.

♦ It will be important to continue to identify and review regional lessons learned to identify potential ‘trouble spots’. Some of these include HR deployment and staff support systems, communications and IT capacity, security challenges.

♦ Preferred futures and priorities will be reviewed. Commitment and ‘horse power’, i.e., the right resources (leadership, financial, staffing, technical), are needed to find solutions.

♦ There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

  o Human Resources
  o Communications & Marketing
  o IT/Management Information Systems
  o Funding & Resource Management
  o Logistics & GIK
  o Emergency Preparedness & Response
  o Program Development
  o Policy & Advocacy
  o Networking & Collaboration
CART Lessons Learned

Communications Management/Media Relations

♦ Communications roles (e.g., media contact, marketing, advocacy, resource gathering, etc) should be carefully defined. Clearly defined roles facilitate operational efficiency, and should be included as a component of our capacity assessment for CAT III deployment strategies to make sure we get the right skill sets and persons deployed.

♦ For evolving CAT III crisis situations, WV should maintain more visibility on the ground in the early stages of the response. In the Central Asia/Afghanistan emergency, communications staff/spokespersons were not as close to the actual field work as they could have been. Timeliness and presence in the field can increase our access to media representatives for early donor contact and the identification of opportunities to present WV’s position on key humanitarian issues.

♦ A key lesson identified is the added value of having senior WV leadership actively engaged in marketing efforts for increased awareness and visibility. WV should continue to explore creative approaches to marketing, which may be exercised in those situations where it may be difficult to get senior communicators on the ground because of cost, security concerns, or a lack of access.

♦ WV collaborating partners in emergency response should demonstrate and maintain a level of communications capacity (media/marketing savvy) that is in line with WV Emergency Response Standards. Conducting an assessment of the communications capacity of our alliance partners will be needed in future emergencies where collaborative partnerships become important for efficient early engagement.

♦ Regular communication and information exchange with our partners for emergency response helps to nurture the strategic intent of those alliances.

♦ It may be useful to develop a matching-profile communications database for the deployment of communications staff with the desired level of skills (multi-faceted) and experience. Language skills and background (ethnicity/nationality) become important in emergency response areas with heightened sensitivities to international assistance. Maintaining an up-to-date communications database can become an important management tool to

Lessons Learned Observation:
Why can’t we change the behaviors and practices around the issues that continue to surface? Because the pain hasn’t been felt high enough to make the necessary changes.
assist managers in the recruitment and rapid deployment of communications staff. The key is getting the right people in the right places at the right time.

♦ An early lesson learned in the Central Asia response is the need for communications staff to have ready access to spokespersons who are close to operations in the field, where they may engage ‘on-the-ground’ agencies and resources. Also, it is important to have a mechanism for feedback between media relations (SO) and spokespersons (field).

Notes from the field:
When WV ‘shows up’ donors notice. Be prepared for either positive or negative response.

♦ It is important to balance and count the cost of a rotating roster of communications staff. Staff rotating in and out of emergency operations present a financial cost that needs careful management. In addition, continuity and consistency are critical, as information flow is an essential component of our decision-making, particularly as this is closely tied into our marketing efforts.

♦ There is a need to review our advocacy protocols to define WV’s position on public policy issues affecting humanitarian access and aid, such as use of force, border policies, military bombing campaign activities, and security. Clearly defined messages should be included in our efforts to raise awareness. It was expressed that WV should have spoken out on the bombing campaign from a humanitarian perspective. It is important to remember that the WV web site is a place of interest for the industry for positions taken. It is crucial to develop a position and common message ahead of time, engaging key spokespersons early who represent WV’s advocacy position with clarity.

♦ Getting a Partnership IT person on the ground during the initial phases of the response will help facilitate cost-effective options to solve communication and equipment challenges in the field.
There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

- Human Resources
- Communications & Marketing
- IT/Management Information Systems
- Funding & Resource Management
- Logistics & GIK
- Emergency Preparedness & Response
- Program Development
- Policy & Advocacy
- Networking & Collaboration

**Networking & Collaboration**

- In areas where WV lacks operational history and experience, strategic links with organizations that have experience and presence in the region can become critical. There is a need for continuing participation in all networking opportunities with INGOs, UN agencies, local institutions, etc.

- “When choosing partners we cannot assume that specific country offices of INGO are competent”. In future emergencies of this nature, it will be important to assess local capacity and conduct regular partnership audits.

**Lesson Illustration:**
The Partnership donated Satphones to ( ), which field staff then seized in Pakistan due to misunderstandings about their ownership. In a situation with high staff turnover, WV needs to invest in proper documentation so that we do not lose track or our partnerships as management passes from one person to another. We need a clear strategy of how to manage these relationships that needs to be clearly communicated from the senior levels of the Partnership to the implementation level.

- The limited operational experience of WV in a region with an already tense socio-political environment demanded that we collaborate with local agencies for emergency response. Strategic approaches to alliance building should include strong mechanisms for monitoring operational effectiveness.

- Networking at various levels is required, and can include the involvement of appropriate technical and experienced staff (e.g. trained negotiators). Having a point person to coordinate with key NGO players becomes important for dialogue and relationship building. It will be helpful to appoint a Program Officer/Alliance Manager and have him/her on the ground as early as possible to foster relationships with a clear definition of
goals, expectations, and strategic intent. The early engagement of a Program Officer can be beneficial during new office start up when the need to set up operational procedures will be a significant drain on the Program Manager.

♦ WV should not assume that there is effective coordination among UN agencies. We should quickly assess if NGO coordination mechanisms are different from UN coordination mechanisms, and whether or not alliances for emergency response are up to speed with local NGO activities or humanitarian needs on the ground. Being sensitive to our potential for high level funding, we should be ready to emerge as a lead agency for coordination.

Notes from the field:
“We should acknowledge that there will be tensions when we enter a new place or when resources/programming suddenly increase in a place where we are already working. This is because NGOs compete with each other and we are, due to our size, a significant rival. With this in mind, we should take steps to reduce tensions like this but be realistic that there will be a crunch period during which misunderstandings will occur.”

♦ Alliances can be strategic or convenient but must be clearly communicated to all relevant staff.

♦ Greater sensitivity to already existing NGO infrastructures needs to be encouraged, particularly in areas where we have no prior experience. As alluded to earlier, our role in building and monitoring alliances for the coordination of humanitarian activities on the ground can become an important niche where we can excel.

♦ There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

  o Human Resources
  o Communications & Marketing
  o IT/Management Information Systems
  o Funding & Resource Management
  o Logistics & GIK
  o Emergency Preparedness & Response
  o Program Development
  o Policy & Advocacy
  o Networking & Collaboration
Funding & Resource Management/Marketing

Lessons application:
Should the use of non-WV marketing material be included as a strategic option in regions/countries where we lack presence and on the ground experience? How can we anticipate and plan for the possibility of not having WV marketing material available?

♦ WV marketing efforts should continue and extend beyond the actual event towards future rehabilitation or transitions programming. It will be important for SOs to continue to engage in discussions with the donor community to identify opportunities for funding beyond the initial moment of crisis. Our approaches to fundraising should continue to move towards a more integrated appeal for social and economic recovery.

♦ The new EPRF reimbursement process functioned well, adding flexibility to SOs allocation and use of funds.

♦ It is recommended that FRMG be included in all technical negotiation for food aid proposal development. However, there is a need to continue to build expertise in negotiating and reviewing projects. Key gatekeepers may be identified to train and monitor this aspect of skill building. Skills may include techniques for approaching donors for initial funding.

♦ It is important to remember to not let the pressure of being on the ground dictate or limit our approaches to fundraising. Think creatively.

♦ World Vision marketing strategies can sometimes limit the efficiency of the logistics management process. In the case of the Central Asia response, marketing strategies (obtaining logos and photos) seemed to delay the distribution of supplies to beneficiaries. A review of how we adapt our marketing and strategic priorities in fluid Cat III crisis situations needs to take place. One option may involve the use of non-WV visuals and stories for marketing, with accompanying guidelines for their selection and use. Increasing our capabilities for surveying non-WV communications and marketing materials for purchase will be important in the event that there is limited WV material to start the marketing process.

♦ A regularly updated database of priority funding needs and commitments should be set up and maintained to assist managers in the field.

♦ An important lesson learned in the Central Asia/Afghanistan emergency response is that even in the context of a fluid Cat III emergency, where we may have limited background information and operational history, donors can still be approached for funding. An operational framework with
clearly outlined strategic priorities demonstrates our preparedness to respond.

♦ It is important to have leadership presence at all levels – Partnership, Regional, and Support Offices. The involvement early of key stakeholders (Finance and Vice Presidents) demonstrates WV’s commitment to crisis mitigation, and boosts our profile, which can result in increased donor support.

♦ There should have been wider engagement of SOs early in the response with stronger management feedback to facilitate a more inclusive approach to disaster mitigation efforts.

♦ During Category III CHEs, the staging office needs to approve all budgets and proposals. When SOs take a bilateral approach to approve proposals from the field, budget caps may result when core costs are omitted resulting in additional expenditures to cover overheads.

♦ A key lesson identified is the importance of having Program Officer capacity in the field rather than just in the Regional Office. The implication here is that if funds are not accessed in the first tranche, then it will be less likely to successfully access second tranche funds through the submission of timely proposals.

♦ It is important to remember that while the use of cell phones can facilitate continual communication between team members, the costs associated their use need to be considered.

♦ It is critical to figure out how to keep the ‘pilot flame’ on in various countries/regions that are deteriorating or chronic humanitarian situations. To do this, we need to continue to develop effective systems to monitor trends, strategically forecast likely scenarios, align resources, preposition, negotiate and build alliances.

♦ There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:
  - Human Resources
  - Communications & Marketing
  - IT/Management Information Systems
  - Funding & Resource Management
  - Logistics & GIK
  - Emergency Preparedness & Response
  - Program Development
In an unfolding crisis that bridges access to two regions, clear delineation of management and support functions becomes critical. To assist in this area, it is useful to have available a protocol with guidelines on how to proceed with the identification and recruitment of relief staff. In the experience of CART, a 'one-stop' or more centralized management approach might have been more effective than having a breakdown of HR management responsibilities by region. In future responses, regional HR capacity indicators could provide 'lead-time' strategic options that may be used in a consultative manner for staff deployment.

HR is more than just recruitment, and should become more involved in the development and review of proposals for field operations, and particularly so in alliance/partnership building to ensure adequate staffing/capacity. HR management systems needed to be engaged in a more timely manner for additional strategic consultation. This is an important consideration for crisis regions where there is heightened sensitivity and limited access by international staff.

Staffing needs and plans changed as the scope of the response expanded to include additional geographic areas (Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). Under these circumstances, where available resources are stretched, a recruitment and HR matching/profiling database can become a powerful tool for managers to assist in the selection and deployment of technical staff. Information sharing between regions on the availability and positioning of skilled staff for emergency response can enhance the strategic planning process and operations start up.

There needed to be a clearer definition of a deployment strategy for RRT members.

---

**Notes from the field:**

“The sudden change of Afghanistan’s accessibility led to increased pressure and workload in HR. Lots of people were needed immediately. However funding was coming through slowly, which led to insecurity for the recruitment process at first. An early warning message was sent out to the International Recruitment Network (IRN). The International Staffing Team (IST) was coordinating the communication and information between HR CART and IRN. This was very successful.

---

**Illustrated Lesson:**

"Human resource planning integration in wider program planning and implementation is essential to mobilize operations efficiently."
In the CART experience, there were some instances where HR managers in the field were unsure about when and how to engage regional partners for staff deployment. Information gaps sometimes may have led to delayed staffing efforts to identify the needed technical skills in a timely manner. Regular communication between CART-HR, ERDM-HR, and IST was useful for sharing information within a small group that was then expanded to include wider stakeholders. “However, it may have been useful to add to this group the HR people for the two regions”. We need to think of a better system to mainstream and access information on available staff with desired skill levels. It will be helpful to have available models for decision-making and consultation. These can be made available to operations staff in the field as part of the HR management toolkit.

Additional attention needs to be given to the use of a roster of potential relief team members. “With the use of such a list in CART, it appeared that many of the names on the lists were current WV staff members working with other projects who could not be made available.” A possible “…downside of this ‘referral system’ is that sometimes references may not be checked.”

HR management functions are closely interwoven with staff support. There should also be continuing review of HR support systems, including funding. In the CART experience, changes in field conditions and accessibility required significant changes in staffing and operations. In some cases, the demand for staff far exceeded their availability. Strategies for quick recruitment had to be implemented, but financing these positions was initially challenging. Close coordination between IRN and IST, as well as the Partnership, helped to facilitate workable solutions. In the future, it will be useful to have developed strategic terms of reference between stakeholders, including the PO, to assist regions in their human resource planning and capacity building efforts.

Notes from the field:
“The toolkits have proved to be very useful to me in the countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan) that had difficult email access. I mainly used the HR and Finance toolkit, but also the Africa HR database on NOTES”.

Observations from the field:
It maybe “unfair to expect someone from an ongoing field office to go to a relief office as staff when funding is not longer term, and thus, a longer term position is not assigned. (It is) difficult to bring on a high level professional for short term contracts based on limited, initial funding. How can we compensate the field office for the release of staff and not enable them to backfill for staff released?”
♦ There needs to be additional emphasis on building sectoral senior management expertise, particularly in the areas of commodities and logistics.

♦ As part of the HR management tool kit, it will be important to include additional new forms that provide vacancy profiles. Each profile could include a REQ, job description, position profile, candidate profile, and situation profile. These forms may be included as part of the recruitment package and forwarded to Program Managers in the field for feedback. This information can be maintained on a database for ready access.

♦ There needs to be a HR management database to document and ‘track’ staff with the experience, skill, and technical expertise for emergency response. The PO ERMD HR point person can assume this responsibility to assist in rapid deployment of available and knowledgeable staff. For instance, a staff deployment strategy can include a roster of global RRT members to help maintain levels of expertise and experience in the field.

♦ Additional emphasis should be placed on the importance of continuing to negotiate with insurers for less costly yet comprehensive insurance options before a Cat III. It will be worthwhile to develop a long-term arrangement with insurers prior to category III events. There could be legitimate use of EPRF funding to develop global agreements for insurance that could then be contextualized in the event of a category III. “We need to tackle the whole issue of insurance in advance.” The result could be returned savings that can be reinvested in programs.

♦ There should continue to be careful review of the inclusion of volunteer services in emergency response settings. In order to be effective in the field, volunteers should possess the needed technical/professional skills for emergency response, appropriate experience in an emergency environment, an appreciation for and an ability to function in the cultural context surrounding the crisis, and a commitment to the task.

Lessons from the field:
A few communication challenges taught us that HR has to be informed about all staffing issues. One example is the recruitment for the function of Finance Manager in Pakistan. There were two positively interviewed candidates when another internal WV referral was mentioned and became a third contact. This led to confusion and frustration with the existing candidates and recruiters.

“Another example is that a staff member had left Afghanistan without notifying HR. This had implications for insurance purposes and also in regards to security.”
There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

- Human Resources
- Communications & Marketing
- IT/Management Information Systems
- Funding & Resource Management
- Logistics & GIK
- Emergency Preparedness & Response
- Program Development
- Policy & Advocacy
- Networking & Collaboration

**Logistics Management**

- In crises where the situation on the ground remains dynamic, it is important to provide management and operations support tools and policies to assist logisticians with process documentation. This is especially crucial where strategic alliances for field-based operations may become necessary. Logistics operations support material can include:
  1. Outlines of our sectoral and geographic program focus with identified action steps.
  2. Evaluation and monitoring (tracking) information systems.
  4. Policies, etc.

- A profile of the rapid response capacity of the GPU should be available and include an understanding of the use and scope of services available. Important aspects of the GPU that need to be highlighted are its people and their level of expertise. The GPU is more than just a ‘thing’. Knowledge-practice-use gaps need to be addressed.

- Logistics management in the Central Asia/Afghanistan response could have included additional opportunities for cross-discipline evaluation (“how operations are done in Europe vs. how operations are done elsewhere”).

- There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:
Relief Supplies and GIK Management

♦ Gifts-in-kind become valuable when the product is wanted *as well as* appropriate to the field/context, and the process of procurement and delivery is well managed. Thorough assessments can assist managers to more effectively plan and implement a strategic GIK response.

♦ For more effective management, GIK needs to be a part of the entire programming and budget planning from the outset of an emergency. When GIK management plans are incorporated early on, a more adequate allocation of resources (material and information support systems) for the procurement and delivery of relief supplies can take place.

Notes from the field:
There was good cooperation between SO’s on GIK. For example, WV Korea’s winter coats were shipped at WV Taiwan’s expense, which then booked 50% of the value.

♦ There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

  o Human Resources
  o Communications & Marketing
  o IT/Management Information Systems
  o Funding & Resource Management
  o Logistics & GIK
  o Emergency Preparedness & Response
  o Program Development
  o Policy & Advocacy
  o Networking & Collaboration
Program Development, Implementation & Management

♦ The 7-30-90-day response mechanism may not be effective in situations where access is restricted, particularly in areas where we lack prior experience and our operations on the ground are limited. Our planning approach has to be flexible where situations on the ground change constantly.

♦ In future emergencies, it will be useful to conduct a more thorough risk/vulnerability assessment of the unfolding crisis. This is important as it provides relief staff with baseline data to help guide the planning and development of programs that fit the context within which we are functional (e.g., Iran vs. Pakistan).

♦ WV needs to have more integrated procedures for humanitarian program responses that are more operationally focused.

♦ The sharing of strategic program information needs to be more systematic so that all interested stakeholders are included in key programming decisions.

♦ Cross-fertilization in the use of planning tools can be beneficial. The use of the '10-seed' PRA tool, although primarily used for development, proved effective in CART relief programming. The technique enabled WV to quickly assess food security, and has been used successfully as a positioning tool. Continuing to document and share our findings with a range of donors, UN agencies, and NGOs can enhance our programming capabilities and credibility.

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  o Program Development
  o Policy & Advocacy
  o Networking & Collaboration
Management Information Systems

♦ Additional care is needed to avoid knowledge gaps in team members, especially with new hires. A full-time information (IT) manager based in the field may handle this. Opportunities for Partnership Office IT staff to spend more time in the field should be identified. In addition to troubleshooting, this helps to build local capacity.

♦ A full technology review and increase in IT budgets may be necessary as there seems to be a disconnect between service providers and users within WV ERDM in general. A global/Partnership assessment of IT challenges and proposed solutions will be helpful. For example, there seems to be a lack of integration and interface between various software packages.

♦ As the Partnership expands its capacity, it will become increasingly important to adequately budget for IT support during emergency responses.

♦ It may be worthwhile to examine the options of web-based access to Lotus Notes, with 24-hr technical support available. It will be useful to have a field-reference roster of IT specialists.

♦ Broader Partnership solutions are needed to resolve systems management challenges on the ground. Technical issues involving the use of laptops, Lotus Notes email, and satellite phones at times inhibited timely financial and program decision-making.

♦ Adequate support systems for communication need to be maintained. In this example, the lack of communication equipment (including email systems) limited communication exchange for consultative decision-making. A lack of information and perspective introduces the potential of management and operations staff making decisions in isolation, which leads to a fragmented approach to programming. Communication and strategy development in isolation also make it difficult to consolidate with stakeholders on key issues (e.g., policy and advocacy). Systems that encourage consultative decision making in highly fluid situations need to be documented and maintained.

♦ There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:
  - Human Resources
Preparedness & Rapid Response: Strategy

♦ Early warning mechanisms need to be anticipatory and continuous – not shifting or reactionary. This can be done through crisis monitoring, strategic forecasting, pre-positioning, registration, and alliance building, etc.

♦ There needed to be a clearer definition of goals and expectations that are in line with our deployment strategies, and support the formulation of alliances in the region.

♦ A mechanism needs to be developed where trained and experienced WV negotiators can clearly communicate the objectives and details of strategic alliances with RRT staff. In addition, WV representatives should be able to share with our partners our internal procedures for management and standards of operation (e.g., SPHERE Standards) as outlined in our policy and mission statements.

♦ Regional Offices, as well as the Partnership Office, should continue to examine approaches to incorporating WV policy into pre-agreements with government agencies and other partners, i.e., the ‘pilot flame’ concept. This is helpful as it facilitates a more streamlined process to collaborative networking.

♦ WV should mobilize resources prior to the emergency onset – identify, track, monitor and prepare for impending emergencies. Activities can

Illustrated Lesson:
It is critical to figure out how to keep the ‘pilot flame’ on in various countries/regions that are deteriorating or chronic humanitarian situations. To do this, we need to continue to develop effective systems to monitor trends, strategically forecast likely scenarios, align resources, preposition, negotiate and build alliances.
include geographic and sectoral options to address the needs of IDPPs, the negotiation of MOUs, agency registration, bank accounts, etc.

Lesson Illustration:
Were contextualized strategies for a CAT III emergency applicable in this situation? Our entry strategy was worked well, but what about the ongoing (long term) and exit strategies. Have these been taken into consideration?

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- Logistics & GIK
- Emergency Preparedness & Response
- Program Development
- Policy & Advocacy
- Networking & Collaboration

Preparedness and Response: Decision-making

Notes from the field:
At the start of the emergency (in terms of WV), frameworks and priorities were clear despite uncertainties and only presence through partners! As time went on, clarity of direction was lost and consultative decision-making was not as well maintained. The lesson being: with leadership at a distance from operations as contextual realities change and increased access is obtained, there is increasing danger of unclear or inappropriate frameworks, priorities, structures, and decision-making.

♦ For more effective Cat III emergency decision-making, a consultative approach to decision-making is essential for clearly defining operational priorities. Emergency response decision-making should highlight strategic priorities in complex and fluid situations yet include an analysis of points of flexibility.

♦ Management decision-making protocols need to include a clearly outlined framework that describes how World Vision plans to respond. This framework should include decision support systems such as a database to document the changes in crisis sectors (e.g. health, security, population movements) and matching WV competencies/capacity for emergency response.
Weekly CMT conference calls with the Partnership were beneficial for decision-making. However, it is important to possibly have more SOs represented in the decision-making process.

There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

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**Response Standards**

- “Where no operational presence exists in a region/country, the declaration of a CAT III should incorporate appropriate strategies for partnerships/alliances and (appropriate) exit strategies.”

- SPHERE compliance requires strong mechanisms for information dissemination, follow-up, and tracking. The following are important points:
  - Monitoring SPHERE compliance includes the use of both input and outcome indicators, and may require direct access to communities and beneficiaries for measuring standards.
  - When working with partners to implement SPHERE standards, compliance measures can be included in project agreements and MOUs.
  - We cannot assume that all agencies for relief (e.g. local NGOs) are aware of and use SPHERE guidelines. For more effective work, toolkits may be designed to train partner organizations in the use of appropriate indicators for effective response programming.
Emergency response funding should include adequate allocations for monitoring and advocating for the use of SPHERE guidelines.

Other Questions

Security
Advocacy
Emergency Response Staff Support
Challenges

Security

- The development of security and evacuation plans is essential. Travel plans should have been more carefully arranged to facilitate adequate security considerations (e.g., single entry visas).

- Security concerns should have been more adequately addressed. Having available better communications equipment, planned and prioritized entry and exit strategies in case of danger, and training (debriefing) prior to field assignments are essential. WV policies security protocols have been developed but are not always implemented. This is an area that demands further review and improvement, and should include an orientation package with checklists and regular communication prior to and during staff deployment. Simulation training exercises may be developed for inexperienced staff.

- WV can benefit from developing guidelines and procedures to address security concerns for countries where we have no prior presence. In such circumstances, security plans and the related equipment should be developed and made available within the first month of a major CHE. Security plans can address security threats, potential factional fighting, landmines, logistics, and potential exposure to risks, etc.

Observations from the field:
“Safety and security for staff is not just a process but a management and leadership attitude.”

Notes from the field:
As late as mid February there were real problems to do with a lack of equipment on the ground and a lack of staff training in the maintenance of vital equipment (eg satphones). The staff of the GPU and the RRT IT officer were excellent in providing the technical support that is necessary to meet minimum safety standards and to get equipment up and running. It would have been really useful if these staff had been able to visit Herat to assess security and look into equipment needs for the program in the first month of the operation. This would ensure that equipment is properly maintained, build up respect for equipment among national staff, and establish effective communications. Getting in HF radios between sites and the M4 for e-mail earlier would have saved a fortune in satphone bills. Getting the GPU in to implement security measures and setting up radios/ bunkers etc will significantly reduce the risks inherent in setting up a program and maximize the potential for stewardship in the program. Drawing on the technical support of the GPU and getting a security plan functional (not just written) should be in the Category III standards as a first 30-day activity.
Advocacy

There needed to be stronger WV advocacy statements and representation during the crisis. From this experience, we learned the importance of speaking with one voice, and recognizing the unique opportunities we have to make key policy statements. Examples include:

1. Speaking out against the bombing from a humanitarian perspective.
2. Speaking out on the humanitarian food drops and dangers

Proactively defining our strategic messages and appropriately adapting to fit the changing context becomes important in crises where social and political challenges compound basic emergency needs of the affected population(s).

Illustrated Lesson:
It is important to speak with one voice. Policy and advocacy needs to be integrated into our response. Clarity, timeliness, and relevance. Proactively define strategic messages and continue to adapt it in a changing context.”

Christian Witness

Efforts should continue in developing formal WV policies on working in non-Christian environments to address common principles and core values.

Program Visits

Terms of Reference for all visitors to emergency sites should be developed in coordination with SOs. And, when planning for site visits, the necessary preparations (e.g., security, travel appointments, expectations, and constraints) should be cleared through a designated point person who should be assigned.

Open Questions

We should have had available background information of the area, with specific details for emergency response in the region. In the future it will be helpful for the Partnership to continue to build its understanding of the complexities/challenges encountered when working in specific contexts of disaster-prone regions.
There is wisdom in pulling together smaller, specific groups to look at the lessons learned for CART from a more delineated sectoral perspective to highlight the specific lessons from each of these areas:

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Illustrative Map #1 (Source: Government of the United States of America)

@200,000 new IDPs since 9/11

Barge shipments postponed 11/20-21 due to winter weather conditions

WFP airlifts began 11/23 from Kulob, TI to Feyzabad for most inaccessible districts in northeast AF

Pakistan
2 million

UNHCR distributed its first humanitarian aid in Kabul on 11/21 since the return of international staff on 11/17

431 refugees moved to Kotkai from Jalozai (Kotkai total pop: 1,700)

60,000-80,000

At approximately 670 families arrived on 11/20 at Killi Faizo staging area

Internal Food Distribution

Afghanistan

Cross Border

6436 11-01 STATE (INR/GGI)
Illustrative Map #2
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Mark Janz  Associate Director, ERDM, PO
Dan Kelly  Associate Director, ERDM Strategic Operations, PO
Dave Robinson  Regional Vice President, MEERO
Ian Ridley  Rapid Response Team Senior Relief Administrator
Paolo Sabbatini  Government Relations Coordinator, MEERO
Ton van Zutphen  Regional Relief Manager, MEERO
Vince Edwards  Regional Relief Manager, Asia
Raveendran Gopal Rao  Regional Director, South Asia
Keith Buck  RRT Business Manager, CART Dep. Director of Operations

Dineen Tupa  CART Director
Robyn Kennedy  Liaison Officer, Pakistan
Mark Neeson  CART Dep. Director of Operations
Sue McIntyre  WV US ERDM Team Leader
Brian Ingle  Program Officer, CART
Sanjay Sojwal  Communications Manager, APRO
Lars Gustavsson  Director, ERDM WVI
Rupen Das  Director, Humanitarian Assistance, WV Canada
Pauline Awitty  CART HR
Julian Srodecki  RRT Program Officer
Susan Barbar  ERDM HR Team Leader
Debs Harris  Program Officer, WV UK
Bev Irwin  Director, Staff Support, PO
Lessons Learned Workshop Sectoral Groupings

♦ Com/Mark: Communications & Marketing
Communications, Info. Sys. Mgmt., & Donor Visits

Questionnaire items 1, 2, & 10. Follow-up with Rupen on any questions

♦ HR: Staffing
Staffing, Volunteers, Networking & Collaboration, Other

Questionnaire items 3, 4, 6, & 15. Follow-up with Susan on any questions.

♦ Plan Mgmt: Logistics & Program Implementation
Logistics, Relief Supplies/GIK Mgmt., Networking & Collaboration, Preparedness & Response Decision-making

Questionnaire items 4, 7, 8, & 12. Follow-up with Brian on any questions.

♦ Res. Mgmt: Funding & Resource Management
Funding & Resources, Info. Sys. Mgmt., Preparedness & Response Decision-making, other

Questionnaire items 5, 10, 12, & 15. Follow-up with Keith on any questions.

♦ Prog.: Program Planning & Implementation

Questionnaire items 4, 9, 10, 12, & 13. Follow-up with Paolo on any questions

♦ Prep/RR: Preparedness, Rapid Response, & Strategy

Questionnaire items 11, 12, 14, & 15. Follow-up with Lars on any questions.