

CITIES AND DIVERSITY

Should We Want It?

Can We Plan For It?

SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN

Columbia University

Diversity has become the new orthodoxy of city planning. The term has several meanings: a varied physical design, mixes of uses, an expanded public realm, and multiple social groupings exercising their “right to the city.” Its impetus lies in the postmodernist/poststructuralist critique of modernism’s master narratives and more specifically in reactions to the urban landscape created by segregation, urban renewal, massive housing projects, and highway building programs. Privileging diversity raises significant issues. Can planned environments produce diversity or only a “staged authenticity”? Does emphasizing diversity obscure the economic structure? Is there a connection between diversity and economic innovation? Does social diversity necessarily contribute to equity and a broadly satisfying public realm? Rather than setting diversity as the principal goal of city planning, I argue for the model of the just city, based on Nussbaum’s concept of capacities and a recognition of the inevitable trade-offs among equity, diversity, growth, and sustainability.

Keywords: just city; urban planning; diversity; capacities

Diversity represents the new guiding principle for city planners. As such, it constitutes an antithesis to previous orientations toward urban design, in which segregation of homogeneous districts was the governing orthodoxy. Typical of revolutions in thought, the present rebellion against earlier dogmas has been shaped by them. The elevation of diversity as the primary criterion for evaluating urban form, to the neglect of other values, responds to

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article was originally presented at the Leverhulme International Symposium 2004: *The Resurgent City*, London School of Economics, April 19–21, 2004.

URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW, Vol. 41, No. 1, September 2005 3-19

DOI: 10.1177/1078087405278968

© 2005 Sage Publications

earlier obsessions with orderliness, efficiency, and protection of property values, which are now alleged to have produced dullness and discrimination against “the other.” In relation to the two broad purposes of urban policy—stimulating growth and achieving equity—it is now claimed that ensuring diversity is key. According to this view, diversity attracts human capital, encourages innovation, and ensures fairness and equal access to a variety of groups. Indeed, by this logic, the competitive advantage of cities, and thus the most promising approach to attaining economic success, lies in enhancing diversity within the society, economic base, and built environment. The purpose of this article is to explore the usefulness of elevating diversity to its current status—to describe its content, locate its intellectual and practical context, examine the arguments in its favor, consider whether planners can actually achieve diverse environments, and propose an alternate formulation of the just city.

THE IDEAL OF DIVERSITY

The term *diversity* has a variety of meanings in urban literature. Among urban designers it refers to mixing building types; among planners it may mean mixed uses or class and racial-ethnic heterogeneity; for sociologists and cultural analysts it primarily takes on the latter meaning. Some writers focus on only one of these interpretations; many, however, see each type of diversity as linked to the others, even while there is considerable disagreement as to the direction of causality.

Writers from different intellectual backgrounds have, since the 1960s, made eloquent pleas for a strategy of urban redevelopment that stimulates physical and social heterogeneity. Most influential within the discipline of planning was Jane Jacobs’s call for a cityscape based on multiple uses, which she argues would promote economic and social diversity:

One principle emerges . . . ubiquitously, and in so many and such complex different forms [that] . . . it becomes the heart of my argument. This ubiquitous principle is the need of cities for a most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant mutual support, both economically and socially. The components of this diversity can differ enormously, but they must supplement each other in certain concrete ways. (Jacobs 1961, p. 14)

Jacobs urges planners to eschew abstract models of ideal cities, which she sarcastically collapses into a single paradigm entitled “radiant garden city beautiful.” Instead she exhorts them to look at the real cities that people love

and which are characterized by congestion, multiple interactions among strangers, short streets, and mixed uses. In later works she contends that diversity not only makes cities more appealing but is the source of economic productivity. Her reasoning anticipates the recent, widely publicized argument of Richard Florida (2002, p. 30), who asserts that “places have replaced companies as the key organizing units in our economy.” They do so, as both he and Jacobs argue, because their diversity stimulates creativity. Thus, she links physical, economic, and social diversity and gives physical differentiation a causal role in producing the other types.

In the writings of more abstract theorists, diversity also plays a leading role. The philosopher Iris Marion Young, in her defense of “the politics of difference,” looks to the city as the venue in which such difference can flourish. Young is less concerned with issues of economic growth than Jacobs and Florida and more focused on the achievement of social justice. She differs somewhat from other advocates of urban heterogeneity in that she accepts the domination of specific neighborhoods by single groups, as long as boundaries between neighborhoods remain blurred. But she too regards diversity as key to her goals:

In the ideal of city life freedom leads to group differentiation, to the formation of affinity groups, but this social and spatial differentiation of groups is without exclusion. . . . The interfusion of groups in the city occurs partly because of the multiuse differentiation of social space. What makes urban spaces interesting, draws people out in public to them, gives people pleasure and excitement, is the diversity of activities they support. (Young 1990, pp. 238–39)

The planning theorist Leonie Sandercock (1997) terms her ideal city *Cosmopolis*. Like Young she regards urban diversity as the basis for a just city. She describes a metropolis that allows people from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds equal rights to city space, calls for a multiplicity of people that allows “the pleasures of anonymity,” which she claims is closely related to sexual desire and fantasy, and considers that the function of city planning should be to create urbanity. Going beyond the goals of efficiency and equity, she wishes the development of a city that provides joy:

Rational planners have been obsessed with controlling how and when and which people use public as well as private space. Meanwhile, ordinary people continue to find creative ways of appropriating spaces and creating places, in spite of planning, to fulfil their desires as well as their needs, to tend the spirit as well as take care of the rent. (Sandercock 2003, p. 406)¹

Still, despite the seeming unanimity of urban theorists on the merits of diversity, they differ substantially concerning the kinds of environments planners should aim to produce—and how and whether conscious planning can create them. Thus, Richard Sennett, commenting on the widely praised development of New York's Battery Park City, laments:

Battery Park City . . . is planned according to current enlightened wisdom about mixed uses and the virtues of diversity. Within this model of community, however, one has the sense . . . “of an illustration of life” rather than life itself. (Sennett 1992)

Planned communities designed with the goal of diversity, whether within inner cities or in new-urbanist or neotraditional greenfields developments, seem inevitably to attract accusations of inauthenticity, of being a simulacrum rather than the real thing. Thus, planners appear caught in an insoluble dilemma—either leave the market to take its course or impose an oxymoronic diverse order.

Jacobs's critique implies that markets will produce diversity of their own accord.² Nevertheless, her examples of successful urban milieus of the past do not anticipate the impact of present market tendencies. Whereas once the city developed organically primarily in response to local forces, now all cities are caught within the web of global exchange and display similarities resulting from impulses within the global economy and development strategies that are widely shared. Previously urban centers and inner-city neighborhoods typically were characterized by multiple ownership and small lot sizes.³ In contrast, the scale of recent developments tends to be vast and driven by imitation. Shopping malls and office buildings look the same the world over, taking on somewhat different forms depending only on whether they are in central cities or the outskirts. Occasional efforts by commercial developers to give their constructions a local character are rare and superficial—the Pudong extension of Shanghai looks little different from London's Docklands.⁴ Residential development shows more architectural originality in some places, but cost considerations and marketing imperatives limit variety here too. The popularity of gated communities around the world, with houses built according to a standard suburban model, is partly attributable to residents' desires for security (Low 2003). It also, however, results from imitation of a successful product formula that, as disseminated by the global media, becomes seen as desirable by consumers everywhere.

To understand the route to this impasse wherein planners are committed to diversity but seem unable to attain it, it is useful to analyze the contemporary

critique of modernism and to show how it gave rise to the present extreme emphasis on diversity.

THE CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF MODERNISM

Daniel Burnham famously stated: “Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men’s blood.”⁵ Burnham’s view of the urban designer as visionary inspired early practitioners of city planning in America. Although his influence mainly left its imprint within the United States, the concept of the master plan spread throughout the developed world and was imposed in numerous colonial territories. Seen as the application of science to nature and society, the high modernism embodied in the planning principles of most of the last century represented a certain form of idealism. In the words of James C. Scott (1998, p. 88), planners and other professionals “envisioned a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition.” Seen from below, however, the effort to create brave new cities represented an undemocratic imposition of a particularist vision masquerading as the public interest. To be sure, efforts at urban beautification and rationalization won widespread support. Lacking, however, were alternative visions that, while mitigating the discomforts of the industrial city, would at the same time improve the circumstances of those most disadvantaged by it. Instead twentieth-century planners typically presented one best solution that would separate different physical uses and social strata, enhance efficiency rather than equity, and, for the most part, aim at a bland uniformity.

It was not until the post–World War II period that critics on the left mobilized against planning. During the 1930s, planning was associated with progressive solutions to the Great Depression and was regarded as the means to overcome economic disaster. The right attacked planning as socialist; the left defended it because of the same perception. The great dams and other public works of the period, reflective of a faith in national planning to generate growth and protect against environmental hazards, were celebrated as triumphs. Even the United States, always the laggard as compared to Europe in regard to both planning and welfare measures, embarked after the war on a program of federally sponsored new towns and urban renewal. The new commitment to planning, however, had consequences that led to its loss of legitimacy. Construction of dams and roads turned out to be ecologically destructive, and the postwar rebuilding effort in both Europe and the United States, like Haussmann’s of the previous century, caused massive displacement (Harvey 2004). Furthermore, unlike Haussmann’s Parisian schemes,

twentieth-century urban redevelopment produced acres of dreary, concrete-clad structures and broad highways in the middle of cities.

The “great planning disasters” (Hall 1982) of the latter half of the twentieth century sparked a middle-class revolt against the destruction of beloved buildings and districts and a working-class resistance to the demolition of neighborhoods. What Jane Jacobs (1961, p. 4) referred to as “the sacking of cities” had been justified with the argument that preservation of the existing urban fabric would contaminate the new projects being developed on reclaimed land. The multiple ownership and uses characteristic of the traditional central business district were seen as precluding the unified management that made suburban shopping centers and office parks successful. Planners identified traffic congestion as the most serious barrier to reviving central city retailing. Although less openly pronounced but widely known, views on the undesirability of impoverished populations in central locations prevailed within both European and American cities, even if the specific populations targeted for removal and their ultimate relocations differed. As James Q. Wilson frankly stated the issue during the heyday of the US urban renewal program:

Adjusting the goals of renewal to the demands of the lower classes means, among other things, substantially reducing the prospects for assembling sufficiently large tracts of cleared land to make feasible the construction of dwelling units attractive to the middle-class suburbanites whom the city is anxious to woo back into its taxing jurisdiction. This, in turn, means the central city may have to abandon the goal of recolonizing itself with a tax-paying, culture-loving, free spending middle class and be content instead with serving as a slightly dilapidated way-station in which lower-income and minority groups find shelter and a minimal level of public services. . . . (Wilson 1966, p. 418).

In both Europe and the United States displacement was justified as providing a better living environment for those forced out. Indeed, for many, it did result in an improved physical environment, although usually at the cost of historic ties and community cohesion.

This, then, was the situation to which the advocates of diversity were responding. Whereas the modernists had reacted to the squalor and congestion of the industrial city, the more recent critics castigated the boredom and emptiness of the reordered metropolis. The initial ripostes tended to be simply preservationist in their aims, although gradually a new model developed that has begun to imprint itself on the urban-built environment. It takes the form of neotraditional design, mixed uses that may include craft workshops but continue to exclude factories, and development of arts-related facilities, festive retailing, and entertainment venues. Even where the lessons of the

past appear forgotten and megaprojects have been planned, as in current proposals for Manhattan's far West Side or the recent development of Paris's east and London's Docklands, developers seek diversity of uses and retain certain Jacobsonian nostrums such as active streetscapes. The questions that deserve analysis are whether there is an inherent connection between physical and social diversity, what sorts of diversity in fact foster economic innovation, and, further, whether social diversity necessarily contributes to equity and a broadly satisfying public realm. I have argued elsewhere that diversity is a problematic concept that can have negative as well as positive effects depending on its context (Fainstein 2000a). As will be discussed below, realization of the just city requires the nurturing of multiple capacities, and the role of urban diversity in enhancing them is not assured.

FORMS OF DIVERSITY

Within the discussion of urban form, the term *diversity* has a multiplicity of meanings. At its most basic, it simply refers to building types—a mix of high- and low-rise structures, of streetscapes encompassing a range of architectural styles. For example, in the new residential developments in Amsterdam harbor, there are both apartment buildings and townhouses, and the latter, rather than displaying the uniformity of traditional Amsterdam, incorporate a jumble of design motifs. This variety of styles, however, exists within a rather unvarying pattern of streets and canals, and residential and commercial areas are fairly strictly segregated. In contrast, in old Amsterdam, we see the juxtaposition of workshops, entertainment venues, residences, and offices, side by side despite architectural homogeneity on individual streets. It is this mix of uses that Jane Jacobs intends when calling for urban diversity.

Still, the question arises: Does a mix of uses along with a mix of structures produce social diversity? New York's Battery Park City (BPC), mentioned by Sennett as manifesting only a simulacrum of diversity, contains retail establishments, restaurants, offices, housing, cultural institutions, a hotel, an indoor Winter Garden, and parks within close proximity. The office towers house the typical polarized employment mix of financial firms—high-end professionals and managers, on one hand, and low-paid cleaners and clerks on the other. The neatly manicured parks and Winter Garden are open to anyone, even though their location means that the preponderance of (but by no means all) users are drawn from among the office workers and the affluent residents of the neighboring apartment buildings within BPC and Tribeca. Tourists visit the various cultural, retail, and eating facilities. There is no

question that BPC is diverse in certain respects; still, the question remains—if its private spaces are reserved primarily for the well-off and its public spaces do not completely reflect New York City's social and cultural differences, can it claim to be genuinely diverse? Sennett's objection to BPC rests on this social homogeneity, and also on the preternatural neatness of the area, which, despite architectural styles that echo New York's traditional apartment blocks, bears little resemblance to the rest of this messy, hyperactive city.

To return to the Amsterdam example, social diversity exists in those parts of the city where architectural sameness dominates, because the Dutch state provides substantial subsidies both to bring down rents and to support households in domiciles more expensive than they could otherwise afford. Even in the most ghettoized parts of the city there is a mix of ethnicities and social classes (Musterd and Salet 2003). The source of this diversity then is not in the physical form of the city but in social programs. The potential for hostility that exists when different social groups occupy proximate space is mitigated by the generosity of the Dutch welfare state, which limits extremes of economic difference.

In contrast, New York and London exhibit great unevenness among neighborhoods as measured by both income and ethnic differences. Moreover, despite recent recognition among tourism promoters that they can market previously undervalued ethnic neighborhoods as tourist attractions (Rath 2005), traditions of exclusion persist and illustrate the difficulty of using ethnic diversity to foster both equity and growth. In a recent study of efforts to stimulate tourism in New York City's boroughs, based on their culinary variety, retail uniqueness, and local color, my coauthor and I found that, though citywide tourism officials paid lip service to the concept of dispersing tourist dollars, their actual effort at fostering such dispersion was minimal (Fainstein and Powers 2005b). We attributed this result to the power of centrally located hotel and restaurant interests, who provided the funds supporting the city's convention and tourism bureau and influenced the concierges in hotels. In other words, the tourism regime is far less diverse than the city itself, and much of the city remains invisible to it, even if being more inclusionary could improve the city's overall economic health.

Writers who desire urban diversity focus particularly on the character of public space. I. M. Young, while not demanding that each residential area be a microcosm of the city, emphasizes the importance of providing spaces that offer the opportunity for high levels of interaction among persons of different social background (see also Lofland 1998). We can easily name certain locations within old cities that meet her criterion—Trafalgar Square in London, Djemaa el-Fna Square in Marrakech, the Plaza Major in Madrid. The Place

Beaubourg in Paris is a relatively recently created public space that successfully acts as a meeting place for a great variety of individuals. Other attempts to create active public spaces, however, have met with contempt from cultural critics. MacCannell, in his derogation of the tourist's quest for meaning, contends that tourism promoters produce only a "staged authenticity" rather than the real thing. A new-urbanist downtown recently constructed in West Palm Beach, Florida, mimicking a Mediterranean village but filled with chain stores and themed restaurants, appears to exactly embody MacCannell's critique of artificiality. Many commentators on New York's rejuvenated Times Square, with its megasigns and flashy entertainment venues, castigate it for being "Disneyfied," despite its frenetic quality, enormous street life, and heterogeneity (e.g., Reichl 1999). Indeed the accusation of looking like a theme park—of appearing as a simulacrum of an old downtown—seems to be the extreme of opprobrium directed at those places consciously aiming at urban vitality (Sorkin 1992).

Intertwined with the critique of inauthentic places is a nostalgia for a golden age when cities did nurture greater interaction. In a previous work (Fainstein 2001, chap. 10), I critiqued this perception, noting that active policing and legal segregation were once vigorously used to maintain the exclusivity of upper- and middle-class spaces. Lofland (1998, pp. 238–9) notes that in the preindustrial city, "given the clear visual signaling of identities and a rigidly controlled system of hierarchy, diverse individuals and groups, despite sharing the same space at the same time, not only did not intersect socially, they often did not—in any meaningful sense—'see' one another." In the present era, use of spatial symbolism and zoning has become instrumental in maintaining separation of dissimilar groups as courts have limited the employment of vagrancy laws and other mechanisms for sweeping away undesirables (Lofland, 1998, chap. 7).

Although authenticity has become a goal for seekers of the diverse city, of all concepts within the critical literature on urbanism, it is perhaps the most difficult to pin down. Is an authentic space one that accurately depicts a place at the time of construction? Its present use? Market processes? Democratic choice? Tolerance and variety, even if imposed from above? While it is difficult to find a definition of authenticity in the literature on cities—writers seem to assume that one knows it when one sees it—there is an implication that the authenticity that underlies a "genuine diversity" apparently can be attained only spontaneously. Nonetheless, if this is the case, how can one make that happen? Moreover, is there a rationale for the requirement of genuineness? If the amenities of contrived authenticity satisfy users and generate economic growth, are there grounds for dismissing it?

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PRIVILEGING DIVERSITY

Richard Florida's argument, referred to earlier, finds a happy reconciliation between the values of economic growth and social diversity: "Diversity and creativity work together to power innovation and economic growth" (p. 262). Thus, diversity, up to recently a value associated more with politically left cultural critics than progrowth coalitions, has become a mantra for public officials aiming at fostering urban resurgence.

The concept of the creative class promotes an elision between the previously analytically separated categories of production and consumption. Florida stresses the attractiveness of diverse environments characterized by small-scale enterprises, particularly creators of artfully constructed goods and purveyors of entertainment. On a similar note, Sassen and Roost (1999, p. 144) argue that the attraction of the new Times Square is that it is not simply a place where entertainment is viewed; rather it is a location where people can behold entertainment actually being produced. In other words, there is a synergy between production and consumption, and cities are the places where the two acts occur simultaneously.

Florida, however, is misinterpreted if he is taken to imply that diversity promotes equity as well as growth. He explicitly states:

While the Creative Class favors openness and diversity, to some degree it is a diversity of elites, limited to highly educated, creative people. Even though the rise of the Creative Class has opened up new avenues of advancement for women and members of ethnic minorities, its existence has certainly failed to put an end to long-standing divisions of race and gender. Within high-tech industries in particular these divisions still seem to hold (Florida 2002, p. 80).

He thus avoids, as many other authors do not, the conflation of social inclusion with economic competitiveness.⁶

The assertion of the value of diversity antedates the development of postmodernism and poststructuralism, but its contemporary proponents share the postmodernist/poststructuralist position that analyses of urban issues derived from economic structure are overly reductionist (see esp. Young 1990; M.P. Smith 1988). Recent sociological and political studies examining urban change further reinforce this outlook, identifying multiple factors shaping the contemporary city and asserting that the economic structure is not causally privileged (e.g., Castells 2003; M.P. Smith 2000; Logan and Swanstrom 1992). Writings, using epistemologies based in cultural and gender studies, deconstruct the city as text and identify the ways in which the

urban landscape reinforces power inequities and social exclusion (Zukin 1995, 1991; Urry 1995).

Overall the claims for diversity are important. Diversity underlies the appeal of the urban, it fosters creativity, it can encourage tolerance, and it leads city officials to see the value in previously underappreciated lifestyles. For instance, whereas gays were once the object of police raids, they now are viewed as urban pioneers, taming areas of the city once considered dangerous and nurturing innovative industries. At the same time, however, the argument for diversity can be carried too far, and it tends to lose sight of the continued importance of economic structure and the relations of production.

First, the relationship between diversity and tolerance is not clear. Sometimes exposure to “the other” evokes greater understanding, but if lifestyles are too incompatible, it only heightens prejudice. The story of Tompkins Square Park in New York’s East Village is a case in point. The park, located in an extremely heterogeneous neighborhood encompassing new gentrifiers; older, white working-class Eastern Europeans; self-styled anarchists, artists and other Bohemians; students; and bikers, was staked out by all these groups. It also sheltered drug users and a large encampment of homeless people, and throughout the night was the source of loud noise and raucous behavior. In the narrative of Neil Smith, intolerant city officials, responding to gentrifiers’ complaints, inhumanely cleared homeless residents from the park (N. Smith 1992). As the tale is told by David Harvey, the behaviors of the park’s different users were irreconcilable (Harvey 1992).⁷ Sennett, in *The Uses of Disorder* (1971), argues for the healthfulness of conflict. As the situation in the park illustrates, however, exposure does not always breed acceptance—it can, in fact, produce mutual loathing. While it is appropriate for the state to enforce norms of tolerance when the urge to exclusion derives simply from prejudices regarding skin color or religious beliefs, its mandate to do so weakens when the habits or customs of some intrude forcibly on the lives of others.

The simple case is that of noise or cigarette smoking. Here we can fairly easily say that when one’s habits cause discomfort to one’s neighbors, they should be suppressed, or else one should exercise them in places where other members of the public do not have to deal with them. John Stuart Mill’s contention in *On Liberty* concerning people’s freedom to do as they please as long as they do not injure others applies when the injury is obvious and the activity is not essential to an individual’s identity. The issue, however, becomes much more difficult when we are discussing the veiling of women, the application of religious law, or a Texan’s right to bear arms. As much as a liberal may argue that these forms of self-expression (if that is the right

phrase to describe them) are not basic to anyone's well-being, the groups who hold such beliefs will repudiate this argument.

To get around this difficulty we need to frame the question in terms other than rights. It is useful to turn to Martha Nussbaum's (2000) argument concerning the development of capacities and, when laying out a normative framework for the city, to seek to describe the situation that will most enhance people's capacities.⁸ This shifts the discussion away from a focus on group identities and toward a framework that nurtures diversity but within a structure supporting a collective identity that does not privilege difference over other goods. In other words, it allows a normative approach that encompasses a set of values rather than giving primacy to a single value.

Nussbaum stresses that all capacities are equally important, and that sacrificing one to the other—for example, material well-being for health—is unacceptable. This viewpoint does not solve the problem of what to do when there are trade-offs among values; nevertheless, it does guard against a reflexive favoring of diversity when that value contravenes or subordinates others. Further, it means examining the effects of diversity on the development of capacities rather than simply assuming that the results will be beneficial. It therefore would not support favoring the interests or lifestyle of a group simply on the grounds that it is in a subordinate position; instead, it calls for investigating whether such an action would limit the capacities of other groups.

The debate over identity politics tends to lose sight of forms of exclusion based on detachment from or disadvantage in the labor market. William Julius Wilson has been attacked for disregarding the continuing significance of race in his work attributing African-American poverty to economic restructuring and consequent unemployment. On the other hand, the focus on diversity, and its corollary emphasis on attracting educated, creative individuals, loses sight of the importance of generating jobs for those who cannot claim membership in the creative class. Social exclusion and economic exclusion are intertwined, and even if the postmodernist critique of neo-Marxism—that it ignored noneconomic forms of oppression—rings true, failure to focus concern on economic injustice likewise represents a failure.⁹

THE JUST CITY

Nussbaum (2000) in *Women and Human Development* lists a set of capabilities necessary for the full development of the individual and asserts that each must be fulfilled to a threshold level if human development is to be achieved. Likewise we can list a set of values necessary for the just city and

require that each reach a minimum level. These are democracy, equity, diversity, growth, and sustainability. To some extent they must be traded off against each other—most notoriously growth and equity and growth and sustainability may be at odds (Campbell 1996), and diversity may undermine democracy if people's loyalty to group interests or symbols outweighs their participation in the common interest. These values may, however, also be mutually reinforcing. I like to use the example of Amsterdam, where despite frequent challenges to the balance among these virtues and the constant danger of slippage, we nevertheless see the existence of a reasonable model to emulate (Fainstein, 1999, 2000b; Soja 2000).

When we analyze the factors that produce Amsterdam, we can identify a path dependence that implies that other places, not having enjoyed a golden age in the seventeenth century and a long tradition of intelligent governance, would have difficulty in imitating Amsterdam's model. Nevertheless, much of that city's success results from postwar planning that did consciously commit itself to the values set forth above. When it did not, as in the 1980s' efforts to carry out wholesale urban renewal in its nineteenth-century ring, fierce opposition stopped the government's program.

The underpinning of successful planning in Amsterdam is a national housing policy that equalizes access to housing among different income and ethnic groups. The municipality, which administers the use of housing funds, does not prevent clustering by ethnicity. It does, however, make sure that no neighborhood is totally homogeneous and, in conformity with Iris Marion Young's call for fuzzy borders, it avoids the kinds of large projects that isolate their inhabitants from the rest of the city. (It has recently deconstructed its principal project of that sort—the Bijlmermeer—through in-fill housing and selective demolition.) Most of its neighborhoods involve mixed uses, and while the new construction within Amsterdam harbor lacks the excitement and texture of old Amsterdam, accommodation there still addresses diverse household types.¹⁰

Some might doubt that Amsterdam presents a case of urban regeneration, instead seeing it as always prosperous. In fact, not so long ago the Dutch economy was in trouble, Amsterdam was afflicted with high levels of crime and vandalism, and people and industry were leaving the city. The reversal required a national policy framework that supported the values of growth, equity, and sustainability. Within that framework the municipal regime could plan to maintain diversity within an open, participatory system of governance.

This is an important lesson, because there is a tendency for urban administrations to jump on the latest bandwagon—public-private partnerships, social capital, diversity, clustering, creativity. The effectiveness of any of

these strategies, however, depends on the national policy context in which they operate. Without a national regime that is committed to equity, heightened competitiveness of a particular city will likely only produce polarization, and diversity may result in rivalry rather than tolerance. The term *urban revitalization* need not refer to success only by those at the top, but there is no necessary linkage between economic growth and social equity.

At the same time, despite the limits on what any city can do by itself, there are still possibilities available for producing social justice at the local level. Most important may simply be restraint—not displacing “marginal” uses for grandiose projects such as football stadiums and convention centers. Beyond that, requirements for construction of affordable housing by private developers through linkage policies and inclusionary zoning, allocation of the city’s own capital budget for housing provision, promotion of waterfront development that focuses on the needs of local residents, adoption of living wage ordinances, increased investment in education, and enforcement of fair labor standards and antidiscrimination laws are all measures that can support the development of capacities among a city’s residents and move toward the model of the just city.¹¹ The new urbanist approach of intermixing a variety of building types and levels of affordability, along with its support for transport-oriented development, is not the panacea that some of its supporters assume. If, however, it becomes the template for in-fill development (rather than the formula to justify destruction of public housing), it can provide a physical framework for a city that offers a higher quality of life to residents and visitors. Developing an appropriate physical setting for a heterogeneous urbanity, however, can go only so far in the generation of a just city. Most crucial is a political consciousness that supports progressive moves at national and local levels toward respectfulness of others and greater equality.

NOTES

1. Numerous urban historians have regarded the sharp separations between public and private space that have been demanded in most of city planning as a method of isolating women and thereby protecting them from sexual temptation (see Fainstein 2005a for a discussion of feminist critiques of planning).

2. She does, however, also show how unfettered markets can cause more profitable uses to overwhelm those that initially made a neighborhood attractive to investment.

3. Even when a single landowner possessed large central tracts, as in London’s Grosvenor Estates, they built a variety of structures catering to multiple uses over a lengthy period of time.

4. The first buildings constructed by Olympia & York (O&Y) at Canary Wharf in the Docklands boasted elaborate masonry and evoked the older buildings of central London. After the demise of O&Y, however, the new Canary Wharf Company built glassy, international-style buildings resembling skyscrapers in major cities the world over. While the original Canary

Wharf buildings did involve a substantial attempt to create an architecture representing a local vernacular, buildings in Pudong reflect only minimal gestures in this respect, usually involving roofs with upturned corners on top of standard office structures.

5. Although widely quoted, this statement is possibly apocryphal. (http://library.thinkquest.org/J002846/a_burnham.htm#q5; accessed April 15, 2004).

6. The recently concluded Cities Programme of the UK Economic and Social Research Council was based on the hypothesis that social inclusion and competitiveness were mutually reinforcing. The empirical studies conducted under the Programme's auspices, however, undermined this hope. (See Boddy and Parkinson 2004; Buck et al., 2002).

7. I do not mean to imply that Harvey favored the expulsion, only that he did not see much potential for mutual acceptance.

8. By "capacities," Nussbaum (2000) means the ability to obtain a satisfactory quality of life, as defined by a set of universal values. She does not require that individuals necessarily exercise these capacities but only that they be available.

9. Interestingly Richard Sennett's recent work has moved away from his earlier preoccupation with public space and the uses of disorder toward a much greater emphasis on the effect of the changing economy on people's well-being (see Sennett 2003).

10. When I presented this article as a conference paper, I received a communication from a Dutch PhD student who made the following comment: "The reason they [desirable, centrally located housing] are mixed is that we are now in a transitional phase; in the future, attractive neighborhoods will have less and less social housing. . . . In fact, they [the city government] want to reduce the social housing stock still further to attract higher incomes and make the city liveable. . . . By labeling Amsterdam as a just city, we can easily lose sight of . . . processes [similar to processes that are taking place elsewhere]. . . . Insofar as Amsterdam is a just city, this is because it is supported by a strong welfare state, a long social democratic tradition of building public housing and the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. You make this argument quite forcefully. But incidentally you make it seem as if present-day processes are also just. I believe this is not the case." (Communication from Justus L. Uitermark, April 26, 2004).

11. There are numerous examples of cities adopting at least some of these measures: for example, Chicago, San Francisco, and Boston have adopted linkage policies; New York City supplies funds from its own revenues to build and rehabilitate housing; Los Angeles has adopted a strong living-wage ordinance; Stockholm and Helsinki have developed inclusionary waterfront projects.

REFERENCES

- Boddy, M., and M. Parkinson. 2004. *City matters: Competitiveness, cohesion and urban governance*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Buck, N., I. Gordon, P. Hall, M. Harloe, and M. Kleinman. 2002. *Working capital: Life and labour in contemporary London*. London: Routledge.
- Campbell, S. 1996. Green cities, growing cities, just cities? Urban planning and the contradictions of sustainable development. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 62 (3) (Summer): 296–312.
- Castells, M. 2003. *The power of identity*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fainstein, S. S. 2005. Gender and planning: theoretical issues. In *Gender and planning: A reader*, edited by S. S. Fainstein and L. Servon, pp. 1-12. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

- . 2001. *The city builders*. Rev. edit. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- . 2000a. New directions in planning theory. *Urban Affairs Review*, 35 (4) (March): 451–78.
- . 2000b. The egalitarian city: Images of Amsterdam. In *Understanding Amsterdam*, 2nd ed., edited by L. Deben, W. Heinemeijer, and D. van der Vaart, 93–116. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2000.
- . 1999. Can we make the cities we want? In *The urban moment*, edited by R. A. Beauregard and S. Body-Gendrot, 249–71. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Fainstein, S. S., and J. C. Powers. 2005. Tourism and New York's ethnic diversity: An underutilized resource? In *Tourism, ethnic diversity and the city*, edited by J. Rath. London: Routledge.
- Florida, R. 2002. *The rise of the creative class*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hall, P. G. 1982. *Great Planning Disasters*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Harvey, D. 1992. Social justice, postmodernism, and the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 16 (December): 588–601.
- Jacobs, J. 1985. *Cities and the wealth of nations*. New York: Vintage.
- . 1969. *The economy of cities*. New York: Random House.
- . 1961. *The death and life of great American cities*. New York: Vintage.
- Lofland, L. H. 1998. *The Public Realm*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Logan, J., and T. Swanstrom, eds. 1992. *Beyond the city limits*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Low, S. M. 2003. *Behind the gates: Life, security, and the pursuit of happiness in fortress America*. New York: Routledge.
- Musterd, S., and W. Salet, eds. 2003. *Amsterdam human capital*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press.
- Nussbaum, M. 2000. *Women and human development*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Rath, J. ed. 2005. *Tourism, ethnic diversity and the city*. London: Routledge.
- Reichl, A. J. 1999. *Reconstructing Times Square*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Sandercock, L. 2003. Toward Cosmopolis: Utopia as construction site. In *Readings in planning theory*, 2nd ed., edited by S. Campbell and S. S. Fainstein, pp. 401–10. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 1997. Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for multicultural cities. New York: John Wiley.
- Sassen, S., and F. Roost. 1999. The city: Strategic site for the global entertainment industry. In *The tourist city*, edited by D. R. Judd and S. S. Fainstein, pp. 143–154. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. C. 1998. *Seeing like a state*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sennett, R. 2003. *Respect in a world of inequality*. New York: Norton.
- . 1998. *Corrosion of character*. New York: Norton.
- . 1992. *The conscience of the eye*. New York: Norton.
- . 1971. *The uses of disorder*. New York: Vintage.
- Smith, M. P. 2000. *Transnational urbanism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- . 1988. *City, state & market*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, N. 1992. New city, new frontier: The Lower East Side as wild, wild west. In *Variations on a theme park*, edited by M. Sorkin, pp. 61–93. NY: Hill and Wang.
- Soja, E. 2000. The stimulus of a little confusion. In *Understanding Amsterdam*, 2nd ed., edited by L. Deben, W. Heinemeijer, and D. van der Vaart, pp. 117–142. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Sorkin, M., ed. 1992. *Variations on a theme park*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Urry, J. 1995. *Consuming places*. London: Routledge.
- Wilson, J. Q. 1966. *Urban renewal*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Young, I. M. 1990. *Justice and the politics of difference*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

- Zukin, S. 1995 *The cultures of cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1991. *Landscapes of power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Susan S. Fainstein is Professor and Acting Director of the Urban Planning Program in the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University. Her teaching and research have focused on comparative urban public policy, planning theory, and urban redevelopment. She is the recipient of the 2004 Distinguished Educator Award of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP). Beginning in the 2006–2007 academic year, she will be a Professor of Urban Planning in the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University.