EVALUATION

Evaluation on Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy
This Evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Particip GmbH/Indufor. This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of the data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Al Shabaab (Somalia)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Cash based transfer</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CIVMIL</td>
<td>Civilian Military</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Centre</td>
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<td>CODEV</td>
<td>EU Council Working Party on Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Common Reporting Standard</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Common Space Initiative</td>
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<td>Development Evaluation Unit</td>
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<td>DG</td>
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<td>DIE</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
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<td>Durable Solutions Initiative</td>
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<td>EASO</td>
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<td>EBA</td>
<td>Expertgruppen für biständigssanalys</td>
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<td>EM</td>
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<td>Evaluation Management Services</td>
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<td>ESRF</td>
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<td>ACronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Judgement Criteria</td>
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<td>JSRP</td>
<td>Justice and Security Research Program</td>
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<td>KEO</td>
<td>Kehitysytteystyöosasto (Department for Development Policy, in Finnish)</td>
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<td>KNOMAD</td>
<td>Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief, Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<td>LSV</td>
<td>Physicians for social responsibility</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDN</td>
<td>Migration-Development Nexus</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MEAE</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEAL</td>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEUR</td>
<td>Million of Euros</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland</td>
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<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
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<td>MIGRI</td>
<td>Finnish Immigration Service</td>
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<td>MOLSAMD</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrdom and the Disabled</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
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<td>MUSD</td>
<td>Million of United Stated Dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDICI</td>
<td>Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Deal Partnership</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Development Organisation</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Non-State Actors</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<td>PCM</td>
<td>Finland’s migration policy</td>
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<td>PCSD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>Policy Development and Studies Branch</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Policy and Influencing Plans</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Policy Priority Areas</td>
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<td>PQAT</td>
<td>Performance and Quality Assurance Team</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
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<td>QAB</td>
<td>Quality Assurance Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMS</td>
<td>Quality Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Result Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDPP</td>
<td>Regional Development and Protection Programme</td>
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<td>3RP</td>
<td>Syrian Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Refugee Studies Centre</td>
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<td>RSD</td>
<td>Refugee Statut Determination</td>
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<td>SALAM</td>
<td>Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility</td>
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<td>SASK</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
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<td>SEZs</td>
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<td>Somalia Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights</td>
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<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Disease</td>
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<td>SWD</td>
<td>Staff Working Document</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Temporary Working Group</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nation</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution(s)</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value Added Tax</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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Evaluointi tarkastelee sitä, “miten johdonmukaisesti Suomen kehityspolitiikkaa ja sen pakkomuutuksen liittyvää tavoitteita on pantu toimeen ja miten johdonmukaisuutta voitaisiin vahvistaa” Suomen kehitysyhteistyössä.

Suomi on monenvälisten ja kahdenvälisten yhteistyömahdollisuuksa arvostama toimijana ja yleisesti ottaen Suomen politiikka on hyvin yhteensopiva kumppaniensa tavoitteiden kanssa. Suomen poliittinen vaikutus kansainvälisesti on merkittävä erityisesti sellaissa painopistealueilla kuin naisten ja tyttöjen sekä vammaisten oikeudet.

Suomi on kuitenkin vain rajoitetussa määrin sitoutunut nousevaan kansainväliseen pyrkimykseen näköä saumattomasti yhteen humanitaarinen apu ja kehitysväline, ja pakkomuutuksen käsitte, on toistaiseksi vain rajoitetusti toiminnallisesti tarkoitetun ulkoministeriössä (vaihtoehtoisen termin pakkomuutolle: tahdonvastainen muutto). Suomella on pitkä ja kansainvälisesti tunnistettu politiikkakohdonmukaisuuden tavoittelemisen perinne, mutta se ei vielä ole rakentanut vahvaa kehikkoa, joten miten ja missä määrin kehitysyhteistyötä tulisi ja voisi käyttää muuttoihin liittyen, eikä näitä ja niistä seuraa vahvuutta humanitaarisen ja kehityspolitiikan toteuttamisen välillä. Tämä heikentää vuoden 2016 kehityspoliittisen ohjelman tavoitteiden saavuttamista ja johdonmukaisuutta muiden läheisten ulkopoliittisten ohjelmien kanssa.

Vuodesta 2015 alkaen maahanmuutto ja sen hallinta on leimmann Suomen politiikkaa. Ulkoministeriön sisällä sekä sen ja muiden valtioneuvoston ministeriöiden välillä on jännitteitä siitä, miten ja missä määrin kehitysyhteistyötä tulisi ja voisi käyttää muuttoihin liittyen, eikä näitä jännitteitä ja niistä seuraavaa johdonmukaisuuden puutetta ole ratkaistu.

Pakkomuuton käsitteen kautta tarkasteltuna Suomen kahdenvälisestä kehitysyhteistyöstä ja multi-bi-avusta paljastuu joitakin merkittäviä aukkoja, kuten tuki tietyille hallintoyhteyksille ja aukkoihin liittyen, sekä näitä jännitteitä ja niistä seuraavaa johdonmukaisuuden puutetta ole ratkaistu.

Avainsanat: 1 humanitaarinen, 2 kehitysyhteistyö, 3 neksus, kaksois- ja kolmoissidos, 4 pakkomuutto, 5 politiikkakohdonmukaisuus.
REFERAT

Denna utvärdering bedömer koherensen i Finlands utvecklingspolitik och dess mål angående påtvingad migration, samt hur koherensen kan förbättras.

Finland har ett högt anseende bland sina multilateral och bilaterala partners, och har policyer som ligger i linje med dessa samarbetspartners. Finlands har stort inflytande vad gäller prioriterade områden som berör kvinnor, flickor, personer med funktionsnedsättningar och inkludering.

Däremot har Finland endast i begränsad utsträckning tagit del av internationella erfarenheter vad gäller samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samt när det gäller ofrivillig migration. Samtidigt som Finland har goda erfarenheter av att främja koherens mellan olika policyområden, saknas man ett bra ramverk för koherens mellan humanitär policy och utvecklingspolicyer och deras koppling till utvecklingspolicyprogrammet från 2016, och andra grundläggande policyområden såsom fredsbyggande och civil krisshantering.

Finlands policy-arbete har sedan 2015 dominerats av migrationsfrågor. Det har funnits motsättningar inom utrikesministeriet och mellan utrikesministeriet och andra ministerier om, och hur, utvecklingssamarbetet skall användas för att nå migrationsmål, vilket tyder på en brist på koherens mellan olika policyområden.

En närmare granskning av tvångsmigrationsfrågor visar att det finns betydande svagheter i Finlands bilaterala och multi-bilaterala bistånd till vissa utsatta grupper – internflyktingar, migranter i städer och flyktingar relaterade till klimatförändringar.

Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att inleda ett internt förändringsarbete för att införliva samspelet mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling och tvångsmigrationsfrågor inom organisationen och i utvecklingspolicyprogrammet för 2020. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas även att stärka kopplingarna mellan humanitär stöd och utvecklingssamarbete i budgetering, och att se över med vilka medel man kan behålla policyinflytande och skapa ett fokus inom programmen. En annan rekommendation är att utveckla påverkansarbetet vad gäller funktionsnedsättningar, inkludering, kvinnor och flickor inom ramen av påtvingad migration, samspelet mellan utvecklingspolicy och humanitär policy, och i skärningspunkten mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling. Utrikesministeriet föreslås även att verka för att näringsliv och fackförbund kan spela en mer aktiv roll.

Nyckelord: 1 humanitär, 2 utvecklingssamarbete, 3 samspelet, 4 tvångsmigration, 5 koherens
ABSTRACT

The evaluation assesses ‘how coherently [Finland’s] development policy and its targets relating to forced displacement have been implemented and how the coherence could be enhanced’.

Finland is valued by its multi- and bi-lateral partners with whom its policies are generally well aligned; its policy influence in priority areas such as women and girls and disability and inclusion is significant.

However, Finland has only limited engagement with both emerging international experience of the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN), and the concept of forced displacement (FD). Whilst Finland has a track record in policy coherence, it has not established a strong framework for coherence between its humanitarian and development policies, their linkage to the 2016 Development Policy Programme (DPP) or other policy ‘pillars’ such as peace building and civilian crisis management.

Since 2015 domestic migration agendas have dominated Finland’s policy making. Tension within the MFA and between the MFA and other ministries over the use of development cooperation for migration objectives highlights unresolved incoherencies between these policies.

A forced displacement lens reveals significant gaps in Finland’s bilateral and multi-bilateral assistance to some vulnerable populations - internally displaced people, those displaced to urban areas and climate change induced displacement.

The MFA is recommended to: deploy internal reform processes to embed the HDN and FD in the MFA and the 2020 DPP; strengthen internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting; review the means to sustain policy influence and avoid programme over-reach; develop high level advocacy for disability and inclusion, and women and girls in the context of the HDN and FD, and the ‘triple’ humanitarian–peace-development nexus (HPDN); facilitate a more active role of the corporate sector and trade unions.

Keywords: 1 humanitarian, 2 development cooperation, 3 nexus, 4 forced displacement, 5 coherence
Johdanto

Suomi on kansainvälisesti erittäin arvostettu kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun toimija ja puolestapuhuja, jota pidetään periaatteellisena avunantajana ja johtavana kehityksen politiikkajohdonmukaisuuden edistäjänä.

Evaluointi on tehty ulkoministeriön toimeksiannosta ja kattaa ajanjakson vuodesta 2012 vuoteen 2018. Evaluoinnin tavoitteena on toimeksiannon mukaan tarkastella, ”miten johdonmukaisesti Suomen kehityspoliittika ja sen pakkomuuttoon liittyvät tavoitteet on toteutettu, ja miten johdonmukaisuutta voitaisiin vahvistaa Suomen kehitysyhteistyössä”. Evaluointi on kohdistunut erityisesti kolmeen kysymykseen:

• Miten ja missä määrin ulkoministeriö on kehittänyt selkeitä pakkomuuttoon (myös: tahdonvastaiseen muuttoliikkeeseen) kohdistuvia ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehityspolitiikan tavoitteet yhteen nivovia toimintatapoja evaluoinnin tarkastelujaksossa?

• Missä määrin ja miten nämä toimintatavat ja -ohjeet ovat olleet riittävät välineet vastata niihin haasteisiin, joita pakkomuutto ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehitystavoitteiden yhteensovittaminen (kaksoissidos, neksus) asettaa Suomelle kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun toimijana?

• Missä määrin ja miten nämä vuosien 2012 ja 2016 kehityspoliittisiin ohjelmiin perustuvat toimintatavat ja -ohjeet edistävät johdonmukaisuutta Suomen kehityspolitiikan ja muiden politiikkalohkojen välillä?

Evaluointi on formatiivinen, jonka tulosten tarkoituksena on auttaa oppimisprosessissa. Tavoitteena on ensisijaisesti edistää tietoa ja ymmärrystä humanitaarisen avun ja kehitystavoitteiden kaksoissidoksesta, neksuksesta, ja pakkomuuton käsittestä ulkoministeriössä sekä auttaa näiden toiminnallistamisessa ulkoministeriön käytännöissä. Tästä kaksoissidoksesta on Suomessa totuttu käyttämään termiä jatkumo, vaikka tiedossa on, että kyse ei ole lineaarisesta “ensinsitten” prosessista. Kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun tehokkaampi yhteensovittaminen pakkomuuttoon kohdistuvissa toimenpiteissä lisäisi politiikkajohdonmukaisuutta ulkoministeriöin sisällä erityisesti suunnitteilla olevassa vuoden 2020 kehityspoliittisessa ohjelmassa sekä laajemminkin suhteessa yhteistyötäihin.

Käytetyt menetelmät

koskien Syyrian pakolaiskriisiä; 4) rahavirtojen analyysi liittyen kehityshankkeiden ja humanitaarisen avun painotuksiin.

Evaluoinnin rajoituksista epäilemättä merkittävin on ollut sen etupainottuneisuus, eli se että kansainvälistä käsittetä pakkomuutto ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehityksen nekus, kaksoisside, ovat vielä suhteellisen tuntemattomia käsitteitä ulkoministeriössä.

**Tausta**

Evaluoinnin taustana on kaksi merkittävää maailmanlaajuista kehityskulkua. Ensimmäinen on pakkomuuton (tai tahdonvastaisen muuttoliikkeen) syiden, muotojen ja dynamiikan enenevä monimutkaisuus, historiallisen korkean kotoaan siirtymään joutuneiden lukumäärä (virallisesti noin 68,5 miljoonaa vuonna 2017) ja yhä pitemmiksi käyvät pakolaisuuden ajanjakso. Muiden vaikutusten lisäksi nähä olosuhteet muodostavat globaalilla tasolla suureen rauhalle ja turvallisuudelle, ihmisten hyvinvoinnille sekä kestävän kehityksen tavoitteiden saavuttamiselle (Agenda 2030).

Tässä tilanteessa ja erityisesti Euroopan vuoden 2015 niin sanotun pakolaiskriisin jälkeen Suomi on muiden Euroopan unionin jäsen maiden tavoin suorittanut kehityspoliittikansa uudelleenarviointia ja joutunut pohtimaan uusista lähtökohtista pitkääkaista sitoutumistaan kehitysyhteistyöhön ja vähäisemmässä määrin myös humanitaariseen apuun. Nää poliittikalohkoja on yhä enenevässä mitassa alettu katsoa kansallisesta maahanmuuton näkökulmasta.

Toinen taustatekijä evaluoinnille on pitkistyneen pakolaisuuden ja pakkomuuton globaalien käsittelystä uudelleennyttä. On muodostumassa kansainvälinen yhteisymmärrys siitä, miten näitä koskevaa politiikkaa ja strategioita tulee lähestyä. Sitä kutsutaan humanitaarisen avun ja kehitystavoitteiden kaksoissidokseksi ja se on vahvistettu kansainvälisessä pakolaispöytäkirjassa (Global Compact on Refugees), joka suomeksi tunnetaan myös nimellä globaalikomppakti. Kyseessä on paradigmian muutos, ja tämän muutoksen kautta on havaittu, että pitkittynyt pakolaisuus tarjoaa kehitysyhteistyölle sekä haasteita että mahdollisuuksia. Kaksoissidoksen, jatkumon eli nekuksen, ytimessä on tavoite helpottaa pakolaisia vastaanottavien maiden ja yhteisöjen tilannetta, kun vähitellen siirtyytaan pakolaisiin kohdistuvasta humanitaarisen avustusta pakolaisistä pitemmään tähtäyksen itsenäistä toimeentuloa edistäviin toimiin.

Myös Suomi on väästämättä mukana näissä maailmanlaajuissais kinävien ja haasteissa. Siinä määrin kuin ulkoministeriö saavuttaa johdonmukaisuutta humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välissä suhteessa, se vahvistaa kyykkyyttään suunnitelta ja toteuttaa kokonaisvaltaisia toimenpiteitä ja samalla pitää kiinni kansainvälisistä velvoitteistaan.

**Havainnot**

Merkittävän evaluoinnin havainto on, että vaikka ulkoministeriö pyrkii sovittamaan pakkomuuttoon ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysvoitteiden kaksoissidokseen liittyvät määritelmänsä ja kannanottonsa kansainvälisten suuntausten, normien ja käsitteiden mukaisiksi, se ei ole kohdennut selkeitä ja vakiintuneita politiikkaohjauksen ja ohjelmoinnin tapoja kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun nivomiseksi yhteen. Mainitut käsitteet eivät vielä edistä Suomen kehitys-

Ulkoministeriön kahdenvälissessä ja multi-bi-avussa on merkittäviä aukkoja kaksiosidoksen ja pakkamuuton suhteen: sisäiset pakolaisten, ihmisoikeusperustaisuus, pakolaisuus kaupunkioloisutteissa, ilmastopakolaisuus, pakolaisten omahoitoineen toimeentulo, vaikka tarpeelliset mekanismit ovat olemassa.

Huomattava pitkästä ja tunnustetusta politiikkajohdonmukaisuuden tavoitteleminen perinteestä Suomen ei vielä voida katsoa rakentaneen vahvaa johdonmukaisuutta tukevaa kehikkoa humanitaarisen apupoliittikan ja kehityspoliittikan tavoitteiden välille, vaikka tarpeelliset mekanismit ovat olemassa.

Mittä poliittiseen vaikuttamiseen tulee, Suomea pidetään luotettavana kumppanina, jolla on selkeät, vakiintuneet painopisteleuvute kuten naiset ja (tyttö)lapset, vammaiset ja erityistarpeita omava henkilöitä. Mutta kokonaisuutena ottaen Suomi ei ole toiminnallaan vahvasti edistänyt kaksiosidoksen ja pakkamuutoon liittyviä strategioita ja politiikkaa kansainvälisillä areenoilla.

Evaluoinnissa on selkeästi noussut esiin Suomen merkittävää asema naisten ja tyttöjen oikeuksien edistäjänä, ja tämän vahvustunteen on tehtävä myös politiikkojen tasolla. Näiden käsittelyjen puolesta käsitteiden potentiaalia ei ole vielä täysin käytetty koko naisten ja naisvähemmistön asemaa vahvistamiseksi siten, että kehityşä ja humanitaarista apua koskeva politiikka olisivat eri yhteyksissä yhtenäisiä.

1. Huolimatta edistyksestä pakkomuuton ja kaksiosidoksen huomioonottamisessa käsitteinä, niiden tarkoituksenmukaisuus (relevanssi) politiikka-ohjauksessa sekä ulkoministeriön ohjelmoinnissa on edelleen kohtuullisen rajoitettu. Näiden käsittelyiden potentiaalit käsittevät koko naisten ja naisvähemmistöä lähestymistapojen vahvistamiseksi siten, että kehitystä ja humanitaarista apua koskeva politiikka olisivat eri yhteyksissä yhtenäisiä.

2. Ulkoministeriö ja laajemmassa Suomen hallitus eivät ole vielä pystyneet sovittamaan yhteen keskenään ristiriidassa olevia muuttoliikkeen hallinnon tavoitteita ja kehitysyhteistyötä tilanteessa, jonka vuoden 2015 Euroopan laajuinen pakolaiskriisi aiheutti.

3. Suunnitteilla oleva ulkoministeriön sisäinen kehitysyhteistyön toimintatapojen uudistus sekä vuorevaa humanitaarisen avun ja kehityksen kaksiosidoksen organisaationlaajuinen toimeenpanosuunnitelma tarjoavat oikea-aikeisen

Johtopäätökset

Evaluoinnista on vedetty seuraavat pääasialliset johtopäätökset:

1. Huolimatta edistyksestä pakkomuuton ja kaksiosidoksen huomioonottamisessa käsitteinä, niiden tarkoituksenmukaisuus (relevanssi) politiikka-ohjauksessa sekä ulkoministeriön ohjelmoinnissa on edelleen kohtuullisen rajoitettu. Näiden käsittelyiden potentiaalit käsittevät koko naisten ja naisvähemmistöä lähestymistapojen vahvistamiseksi siten, että kehitystä ja humanitaarista apua koskeva politiikka olisivat eri yhteyksissä yhtenäisiä.

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mahdollisuuden kirkastaa käsitteenmäärittelyä ja luoda johdonmukaisempia, pakkomuutuennon ja kaksioissidokseen kohdistuvia toimintamalleja.

4. Suomi on hyvin asemoitunut voidakseen edelleenestää kansainvälisesti nou-sevaa kolmoissidosta (humanitaarinen apu-rauhanrakentaminen-kehitys).

5. Vaikka Suomen politiikkavaikuttimen kansainvälisesti on toiminut hyvin sellaisilla perinteisillä, vakiintuneilla painopistealueilla kuin naisten ja tyttöjen asema ja oikeudet, useat rakenteelliset, toiminnalliset sekä institutio-
naliset tekijät saavat aikaan, että ulkoministeriö poliittika ei ole niin vai-
kuttavaa kuin se voisi olla pakkomuutuennon ja kaksiois- ja kolmoissidokseen liittyvissä kysymyksissä.

6. Pakkomuuton ja kaksiois- ja kolmoissidoksen rajoittunut käsitteellistäminen ulkoministeriössä on estänyt politiikkajohdonmukaisuuden eteenpäinviemis-
tä niihin liittyvissä kysymyksissä. Sisäiset johdonmukaisuuden puutteet eivät kuitenkaan ole vielä näkyneet Suomen keskustelukumpaneille kansainväl-
sillä areenoilta.

7. Olemassa olevien koordinaation mekanisminen – kuten muuttopoliittinen työ-
ryhmä – mandaatit eivät ole olleet riittävät ratkaisemaan hallituksen sisäisiä politiikan epäjohdonmukaisuuksia.

8. Suomi kunnioittaa yleismaailmallisia arvoja, ihmisoikeuksia ja humanitaari-
sia suojelun periaatteita, mutta niitä ei ole politiikkahjauksella kattavasti toiminnallistettu pakkomuuton tilanteissa ja kaksiois- ja kolmoissidoksessa.

9. Ulkoministeriöllä olisi edelleen tilaa laajentaa vaikuttamistyötään vammais-
ten ja haavoittuvaisen sekä naisten ja tyttöjen aseman edistämisessä pakkomuuton sekä kaksiois- ja kolmoissidoksen yhteydessä.

10. Yksityisen sektorin rooli ei vielä ole niin vahva, että se merkittävästi edistäisi Suomen asemaa kansainvälisesti.

**Suositukset**

Evaluoinnin perusteella tehdään seitsemän pääasiallista suositusta, joita raport-
tissa tarkennetaan:

1. Suositellaan, että ulkoministeriö panee toimeen olemassa olevat tai suun-
nitellut sisäiset aloitteet, jotka liittyvät tiedonhallinnan ja toimintatapojen uudistamiseen. Suositellaan myös, että ulkoministeriö ottaa käyttöön strategioita ja hallinnon tapoja, jotka lisäyvät ymmärrystä kaksiois- ja kolmois-
2. Suositellaan, että ulkoministeriö tarkistaa politiikkavaikuttamisensa keinot ja välitteen kaksois- ja kolmoissidoksen suhteen samalla välttää liialliseen tavoitteisiin pyrkimistä sekä niin, että aloitteiden seuranta ei vaarannu.

3. Poliittikajohdonmukaisuuden lisäämiseksi suositellaan, että ulkoministeriö valtavirtaistaa kaksoissidoksen, pakkomuuton ja kolmoissidoksen käsittet koko organisaation laajuisesti. Ulkoministeriö voisi myös ottaa aktiivisen roolin hallituksen sisäisten, kehityspolitiikan ja maahanmuuttopolitiikan välisten jännitysten ja epäjohdonmukaisuuksien ratkaisemiseksi esimerkiksi ministeriöiden välisen muuttoliikepoliittisen työryhmän avulla. Sisäministeriön ja ulkoministeriön yhteisesti tilaamia maineleviä asioita pyrkimisiin välttämään, malleista ja dynamiikasta esimerkiksi joissakin kumppanimaisissa voisivat tarjota pohjan jaettuun ymmärrykseen kehityksen ja muuttoliikkeen suhteesta, joten ne auttaisivat tuottamaan parempia politiikkalinjauksia.


5. Suositellaan, että ulkoministeriö tulee luottaa selkeästi ja järjestelmällisesti vammaiset ja erityistarpeita omaavalta henkilöt pakkomuuttoa koskeviin pitkän tähtäimen kehityspolitiisiin tavoitteisiin sekä kaksois- ja kolmoissidokseen. Lisäksi uositellaan, että tähän liitteen ulkoministeriö nostaa vammaltuuteen liittyvän poliittisen vaikuttamisensa uudelle tasolle kansainvälisesti.


7. Ulkoministeriöitä suositellaan rohkaisemaan ja edistämään yksityisen sektorin yritysten ja ammattiyhdistysten roolia kehityspolitiikassa ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välisessä sidoksessa.
SAMMANFATTNING

Inledning

Internationellt sett är Finland en högt ansedd aktör inom humanitära bistånd, och ses som en principfast givare samt förebild vad gäller policy-koherens inom utvecklingsområdet.

Denna utvärdering omfattar perioden från 2012 till slutet på 2018 och gjordes på uppdrag av Finlands utrikesministerium. Utvärderingens övergripande mål är att ”bedöma hur konsekvent Finlands utvecklingspolitik och dess målsättningar angående påtvingad migration har genomförts, samt hur koherensen kan förbättras”. Mer specifikt har utvärderingen riktat sig på tre frågor:

• Hur och i vilken utsträckning har utrikesministeriet tagit fram tydliga förhållningssätt till påtvingad migration och samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling under utvärderingsperioden?
• Hur och i vilken utsträckning har Finlands förhållningssätt till eller tolkning av påtvingad migration, och samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, svarat mot den utmaning som Finland står inför som statlig aktör inom utvecklingsfrågor och humanitära frågor?
• Hur och i vilken utsträckning har dessa förhållningssätt, som grundar sig i utvecklingspolicyprogrammen från 2012 och 2016, bidragit till att skapa policy-koherens i Finland?

Detta är en framåtblickande utvärdering med fokus på lärande. Det övergripande syftet är att förbättra kunskapen och medvetenheten om, och förverkligandet av, samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och av begreppet ”ofrivillig migration” inom utrikesministeriet. Genom att åstadkomma en större samstämmighet mellan utvecklingsamarbete och humanitärt bistånd vad gäller påtvingad migration, kommer policykoherensen att öka inom utrikesministeriet, särskilt i det kommande utvecklingspolicyprogrammet för 2020, och för ministeriets samarbetspartners.

Metod

Utvärderingen genomfördes med hjälp av flera olika metoder för insamling och analys av både primärdata och sekundärdatal. fyra metoder användes: 1) dokumentanalys, 2) intervjuer med 123 representanter för den finska regeringen och utrikesministeriets samarbetspartners, 3) tre fallstudier: Afghanistan, Somalia och Jordanien/Libanon/Syrien (med fokus på den syriska flyktingkrisen) och 4) kostnadsanalys av prioriteringar för utvecklingsamarbete och humanitärt bistånd.

Den största begränsning var att utvärderingen gjordes på ett tidigt skede vad gäller utrikesministeriets engagemang i frågor som berör samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samt ofrivillig migration.
Kontext


I detta sammanhang och den så kallade europeiska migrations-/flyktingkrisen är 2015, har Finland, liksom övriga medlemsstater i Europeiska Unionen omvärderat sitt långvariga engagemang för utvecklingssamarbete och, i mindre utsträckning, humanitärt bistånd. Dessa policyer projiceras på nationell nivå i ökande utsträckning genom en ”migrations-lins”.


Finland är oundvikligen en del av denna globala utveckling och dessa globala utmaningar. En mer samstämmig politik skulle stärka utrikesministeriets för- måga att forma och genomföra ett integrerat förhållningssätt till sina utvecklingspolicyer och humanitära policyer, samtidigt som at respektera internationella åtaganden.

Resultat

Det mest framträdande resultatet av utvärderingen är att, trots att utrikesministeriets definitioner och ställningstaganden överensstämmer med globala trender, normer och concept när det gäller samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, långsiktig utveckling och ofrivillig migration, finns det ännu inga tydligt definierade och etablerade metoder för policyutveckling för skärningspunkten mellan utvecklingssamarbete och det humanitära biståndet. Dessa concept bidrar ännu inte med något mervärde vad gäller Finlands policyprioriteringar. Däremot finns det ett växande spelrum för att införliva sådana tillvägagångssätt, samt kapacitet att stödja ett bättre samförstånd kring samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred och utveckling. Trots detta är Finlands engagemang i denna fråga varierande, vilket märks särskilt tydligt på lokal nivå och programnivå. Effekterna av den europeiska migrations-/flyktingkrisen från 2015, som har inneburit att utvecklingssamarbetet används i högre grad som ett medel för att motverka migration, gör sig fortfarande påmärkande.

Det finns betydande brister i omfattning av utrikesministeriets policyer om samspelet och tvångsmigration: internflytktingar, rättighetsbaserat stöd, tvångsflyttningen i städer, flytktingar relaterade till klimatförändring, självförsörjning, utsatthet och den privata sektorns deltagande.
Angående policykoherens i utvecklingssammanhang har utrikesministeriet, trots fullgoda processer och sin långa och erkända erfarenhet, ännu inte tillräckligt utvecklat ramverk för att skapa policy-koherens mellan utvecklingspolitiska mål och humanitärt stöd i kontext av ofrivillig migration.

Även om Finland ses som en tillförlitlig samarbetspartner med tydliga policy-prioritering, t ex vad gäller kvinnor och flickor, funktionsnedsättning och inkludering, så har man, överlag, inte på ett proaktivt sätt utövat inflytande på strategier och policyer i förhållande till samspelet och tvångsmigration på ett internationellt plan.

Finlands styrka – att verka för och prioritera kvinnors och flickors rättigheter – kommer fram tydligt på flera ställen i utvärderingen, och flera av rekommendationerna fokuserar på hur denna styrka kan vidareutvecklas. De framgångar som Finlands internationella påverkansarbete rönt i fråga om integrering av policyer gällande funktionsnedsättning och inkludering i humanitärt bistånd och utvecklingssamarbete är vida erkända. Finlands policyer och praxis skulle däremot kunna ligga mer i linje med de gryende koncepten vad gäller samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred och utveckling samt tvångsmigrationsfrågor.

**Slutsatser**

De huvudsakliga slutsatserna av utvärderingen är följande:


2. Utrikesministeriet och den finska regeringen i stort har inte lyckats ena motstridiga tendenser (som påskyndades av den europeiska ”migrationskrisen” 2015) mellan migrations- och utvecklingspolicyer.

3. Den pågående reformen av praxis inom utvecklingspolicy och den interna handlingsplanen för processer i samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling inom utrikesministeriet ger möjlighet till att tydliggöra koncept och skapa en mer sammanhängande policy-arbete i förhållande till ofrivillig migration och samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling.

4. Finland befinner sig i ett bra läge att stärka engagemanget för det växande internationella stödet till samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred och utveckling.

5. Även om Finlands policyinflytande har varit stort inom traditionella policyområden såsom kvinnor och flickors rättigheter, finns det flera strukturerella, operationella och institutionella faktorer som på ett negativt sätt påverkar utrikesministeriets påverkan på policyer inom tvångsmigration, samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred och utveckling.
6. En begränsad tillämpning av vissa koncept har hållit tillbaka framsteg vad gäller policykoherens på utvecklingsområdet i samband med ofrivillig migration, samspel mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspel mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling. Dessa inre motsättningar har däremot inte varit synliga för Finlands externa samtalspartners.

7. Nuvarande samordningsmekanismer såsom migrationsarbetsgruppen, har inte haft tillräckliga befogenheter att lösa policymotstridigheter inom regeringen.

8. Finlands beaktande av “universella värden”, grundläggande mänskliga rättigheter, humanitära principer och humanitär beskydd har inte genomsyrat policyer och värderingar gällande påtvingad migration, samspel mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspel mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling.

9. Det finns utrymme för att ytterligare stärka påverkansarbete och program för funktionsvariationer, inkludering och kvinnors och flickors rättigheter inom ramen för tvångsmigration, samspel mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspel mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling.


Rekommendationer

Utvärderingen mynnar ut i sju huvudrekommendationer, som presenteras i rapporten:


2. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att se över sina verktyg och tillvägagångssätt avseende policypåverkan och programutveckling inom ramen för samspel mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspel mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling, för att försäkra sig om fortsatt inflytande, motverka spridning och tillförsäkra adekvat uppföljning.

3. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att använda och integrera samspel mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samspel mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling och tvångsmigrationsfrågor för att stärka policykoherens i utvecklingssammanhang. Utrikesministeriet bör också spela en aktiv roll i att lösa nuvarande motsättningar inom regeringen mellan
utvecklings- och migrationspolicyer, framförallt med hjälp av den ministerieöverskrider migrationsarbetsgruppen. Utrikesministeriet och inrikesministeriet kan till exempel tillsammans beställa utredningar för att ta reda på orsaker, mönster och processer gällande migration och förflyttning i samarbetsländer. Detta kan bidra till gemensamma insikter och skapa bättre policyer.

4. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att öka sitt engagemang för mänskliga rättigheter och humanitära principer i samband med samspelet mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samspelet mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling och med tvångsmigrationsfrågor.

5. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att på ett tydligare sätt införliva frågor om funktionsnedsättning och inkludering i samband med samspelet mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samspelet mellan humanitär stöd, fred och utveckling och med tvångsmigrationsfrågor. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas även att utvidga sitt globala påverkansarbete för frågor som rör funktionsnedsättning och inkludering i dessa sammanhang.


7. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att uppmuntra och göra det enklare för näringsliv och fackförbund att spela en mer aktiv roll i genomförandet av utvecklingspolicyer i samband med samspelet mellan humanitär stöd och långsiktig utveckling.
Introduction

Internationally, Finland is a highly respected development and humanitarian actor and advocate, valued as a principled donor and as a leading exponent of policy coherence for development.

Covering the period 2012 until late-2018, the main objective of the evaluation, commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland, is to ‘assess how coherently Finland’s development policy and its targets relating to forced displacement have been implemented and how the coherence could be enhanced’. Specifically, the evaluation has addressed three questions:

• How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus over the evaluation period?

• To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?

• To what extent and how do these approaches, rooted in the 2012 and 2016 Development Policy Programmes help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

This is a formative evaluation, steering the outputs towards a learning process, the main purpose of which is to increase knowledge, awareness and the operationalisation of the humanitarian-development nexus and the concept of forced displacement within the MFA.Aligning development cooperation and humanitarian assistance programming more effectively in relation to forced displacement will enhance policy coherence within the MFA, notably in the forthcoming 2020 Development Policy Programme (DPP), and with its partners.

Methodology

The evaluation deployed a mixed methods approach using both primary and secondary data collection and analysis. Four methods were used: 1) Document analysis; 2) Key Informant Interviews with the Government of Finland and the MFA’s main partners comprising 123 key informants; 3) Three case studies – Afghanistan, Somalia and Jordan/Lebanon/Syria (covering the Syrian refugee crisis); 4) Financial tracking in relation to development and humanitarian priorities.

Amongst the limitations of the study, the most significant is its prematurity in relation to the MFA’s limited engagement to date with the international concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus and forced displacement.
Context

Two significant global developments provide the backdrop to this evaluation. The first is the growing complexity of the drivers, dynamics and patterns of forced displacement, the historically high numbers of those displaced – some 68.5 million officially documented worldwide in 2017 – and the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. Amongst many other impacts, these conditions constitute major global challenges for peace and security, human wellbeing and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

Within this context and the so-called European migration/refugee crisis in 2015, Finland, like all European Union Member States, has reassessed its longstanding commitment to development co-operation and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian assistance. These policies are increasingly projected through a national level ‘migration lens’.

Reconfiguring global action for protracted refugee and forced displacement situations is the second contextual factor: an international approach to strategy and policy making is emerging – the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN), underpinned by the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). This paradigm shift recognises that protracted conditions of forced displacement (FD) pose development challenges and opportunities. Mediating the impacts on receiving countries and communities whilst, transitioning from humanitarian assistance to longer-term, sustainable self-reliance for displaced populations are core elements of the nexus.

Finland is inevitably engaged with these global developments and challenges. Achieving policy coherence between these precepts offers the potential to strengthen the MFA’s capacity to design and implement an integrated approach for its development and humanitarian policies, whilst ensuring that it fulfils its international commitments.

Findings

The principal finding is that whilst the MFA aligns its definitions and positions on the HDN and FD with current international trends, norms and concepts, it has not developed clearly formulated and well-established approaches that effectively inform its policy making and programmes for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. The concepts do not yet add value and strength to Finland’s policy priorities. However, there is growing momentum to embed such approaches, as well as the capacity to support the emerging consensus for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development (HPDN). Even so, engagement is uneven and particularly noticeable at field and programme level. The impacts of the 2015 European migration/refugee crisis, after which development cooperation has been increasingly promoted as an instrument of migration control, are still being experienced.

There are significant gaps in MFA policy coverage of the nexus and forced displacement: internally displaced persons (IDPs), human rights-based approaches, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, vulnerability, and private sector engagement.
On promoting policy coherence for development (PCD), despite having adequate mechanisms in place and a long track record acknowledged among its partners, the MFA does not yet have a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between its current policy priorities and the nexus and FD.

On policy influence, although Finland is perceived as a reliable partner with well-established policy priorities – e.g. for women and girls, and disability and inclusion – on the whole it has not proactively influenced the development of strategies and policies for the nexus or FD in international fora.

Finland’s strength in promoting and prioritising the rights of women and girls is apparent in many parts of the evaluation and the scope for enhancing this strength features across several recommendations. The success of Finland’s international advocacy for disability and inclusion policies in humanitarian and development work is widely recognised, although its policies and practices could be better aligned with emerging developments in the context of the nexus, the triple nexus and forced displacement.

**Conclusions**

The principal conclusions of the evaluation are:

1. Despite progress in engaging with the concepts of FD and the HDN, their relevance to policy making and programming remains somewhat limited; their potential to strengthen integrated approaches to development and humanitarian policy making in different contexts is not yet fully developed.

2. The MFA, and more generally the government of Finland, have not yet been able to reconcile the contradictory tendencies, (precipitated by the 2015 threshold moment of the European ‘migration crisis’), between migration and development policies.

3. The Reform of Development Policy Practices and Internal Action Plan for HDN processes within the MFA provide a timely opportunity for improving conceptual clarity and creating a more coherence policy apparatus related to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

4. Finland is well positioned to further engage with emerging international support for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development.

5. Although Finland’s policy influence has worked well in its longstanding policy areas such as the rights of women and girls, several structural, operational and institutional factors impair the influence that the MFA might have for its policies in the context of forced displacement (FD) and humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HDN/HPDN).

6. Limited uptake of the concepts has inhibited progress on Policy Coherence for Development in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. However, internal incoherencies have not yet manifested themselves to any degree to Finland’s external interlocutors.

7. The mandates of current coordination mechanisms such as the Migration Task Force, have not enabled policy incoherencies within the government to be reconciled.
8. Finland’s respect for ‘universal values’, human rights and humanitarian principles and protection has not been effectively tackled in relation to its HDN/HPDN and FD policies and values.

9. There is scope for further promoting advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies and for the rights of women and girls in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

10. Private sector engagement is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role.

**Recommendations**

The evaluation makes seven principal recommendations – elaborated in the report:

1. Deploying appropriate knowledge management platforms and reform processes currently under way, the MFA is recommended to adopt strategies and processes that will enhance the understanding and the mainstreaming of the concepts of the nexus, the triple nexus and forced displacement in its policy making, aligning these concepts with its development priorities in the forthcoming 2020 DPP. Internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting should be strengthened by promoting joint analyses leading to complementary programming, and by experimenting with more flexible funding protocols between humanitarian assistance and development-oriented purposes. Significant policy gaps in the four policy priority areas should be addressed in the 2020 DPP.

2. The MFA is recommended to review its instruments and approaches for policy influencing and programming in the context of HDN/HPDN in order to sustain policy influence, avoid over-reach and to ensure proper monitoring.

3. The MFA is recommended to employ the roll-out and mainstreaming of the nexus, the triple nexus and forced displacement to enhance PCD. The MFA should also take an active role in resolving the current tensions within the government between its development and migration policies by prioritising the use of the inter-ministerial Migration Task Force (MTF). Jointly commissioned MFA/MoI research through the MTF into the drivers, patterns and processes of migration and displacement, for example in some of its partner countries, could improve shared comprehension and promote better policies.

4. The MFA is recommended to strengthen its commitment to fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to the nexus, the triple nexus and forced displacement.

5. The MFA is recommended to more clearly embed disability and inclusion policies in the context of forced displacement, the humanitarian-development nexus and the triple nexus. The MFA is also recommended to scale up its global advocacy for disability and inclusion policies in these contexts.

6. The MFA is recommended to: enhance its international advocacy for the promotion of the rights of women and girls in the HDN/HPDN; and strengthen the linkages between policies for women and girls in situations of FD.

7. The MFA is recommended to encourage and facilitate the private corporate sector and trade unions to play a more active role in supporting its development policies in the context of the nexus.
# KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The numbering of the entries in this matrix conforms to the numerical order in which they appear in the main body of the evaluation report. However, because some of the Findings transect the main Evaluation Questions, they are located in the most logical order for this matrix in relation to the Conclusions and Recommendations to which they refer.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Findings</th>
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| **1. Engaging and mainstreaming the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HDN/HPDN) and forced displacement (FD) into policy making** | 1: Despite some progress in engaging with the concepts of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus, there still remains somewhat limited understanding and know-how overall and, notably, limited shared understanding, of both the concepts of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their relevance to policy making and programming and, above all, their capacity to strengthen integrated approaches to development and humanitarian policy making in different contexts. | 1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to adopt organisational strategies and processes that will further enhance its knowledge base and the mainstreaming of the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace development nexus and forced displacement in its existing policy making and programming. These concepts should be aligned with its four development policy priority areas and the five policy pillars in the proposed 2020 Development Policy Plan.  
1.1: Greater clarity and consensus around the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus and forced displacement should be promoted within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by boosting the scope of the current Internal Action Plan on the roll-out of the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus.  
1.2: Using appropriate knowledge management platforms, at different levels (e.g. senior management and Policy Priority Ambassadors; Unit Managers; Desk Officers), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to promote know-how on development and policy mainstreaming of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN).  
1.3: The MFA is recommended to commission a lessons learned evaluation of its HDN engagement in the Syria crisis to consolidate experience and provide guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN involvement. |  
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1.2: The humanitarian-development nexus lacks clarity as a core operational concept for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The 2015 threshold moment significantly shaped the approach to policies on forced displacement by aligning development cooperation, as an instrument to tackle root causes, with domestic agendas for migration deterrence (under the aegis of the MoI). This left little space to comprehend and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs engagement with concept of forced displacement has since accelerated although this has not been systematic and remains in tension with MoI policies which undermines policy coherence.  
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1.3: The MFA is recommended to commission a lessons learned evaluation of its HDN engagement in the Syria crisis to consolidate experience and provide guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN involvement. |
**Findings**

Although approaches to the humanitarian-development nexus have been more positive than for forced displacement, they are not clearly formulated and do not yet add value and strength to Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

1.3: Towards a humanitarian-peace-development nexus

Evidence points to Finland’s capacity to support the emerging consensus for developing a triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development programming.

1.4: Gaps in Coverage

Despite increasing attention to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus, there are significant gaps in Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy coverage (Internally Displaced Persons, a Human Rights Based Approach HRBA, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, private sector).

1.5: A positive way forward

There is evidence of growing momentum within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to engage with and embed approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus in departmental policies and structures.

**Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements**

**Summary answer**

Whilst humanitarian expenditure has remained relatively immune from budget cuts, there has been a significant reduction in the state budget for development cooperation coinciding with the ‘threshold moment’ of 2015. Conversely there has been a greater concentration of expenditure in the three case study countries.

Expenditure on gender equality has increased in the three case study countries but is still surprisingly small proportionately and in total given the profile of this policy area.

There is almost no evidence of the use of humanitarian-development nexus or forced displacement terminology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>4: Finland is well positioned to further engage with emerging international support for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development (HPDN).</td>
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<td>1.5: The Development Policy Programme 2020 review provides a key opportunity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fill gaps in forced displacement gaps concerning: Internally Displaced Persons, urban displacement, the HRBA, self-reliance, and displacement in the context of climate change</td>
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<td>1.6: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encouraged to promote and champion international adoption of the ‘triple’ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.</td>
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### Findings

**Summary answer to Evaluation Question 2:**
Finland aligns itself with current international trends and norms for forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus and is perceived as a reliable partner with well-established policy priorities; but has not proactively influenced the development of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus in international fora.

2.1: Incipient approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

Evidence of incipient approaches exists but is patchy and lacks strategic vision.

2.2: Policy influence and Policy Priority Areas

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence is recognised in the promotion of well-established Development Policy Programme priorities. Nevertheless, forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus elements remain largely absent.

2.3: Pooled funding and policy influence

Finland’s multilateral budgetary contributions, largely channelled through pooled funding or multi-partner trust funds, achieve complementarity and influence, and are valued by its partners; but there is a lack of evidence that this influence has been used to promote forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus thinking and policies.

2.4: Field presence and policy influence

Lack of field presence limits policy influence.

### Conclusions

5: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence has worked well when it has been related to long standing and familiar policy areas but has proven to be less operationally effective where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds itself in less familiar and changing organisational and operational contexts. Several structural, operational and institutional factors impair the influence that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might have in regard to its policy aims in the context of forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

### Recommendations

2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to review its instruments and approaches for policy influencing and programming in humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus contexts in order to sustain policy influence, avoid over-reach and to ensure proper monitoring.

2.1: To reinforce influence of its Policy Priority Areas and disability and inclusion policies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended: to pay particular attention to the efforts of other donors and look for complementarity with them in HDN contexts; and review its ‘soft-earmarking’ instruments (e.g. Policy and Influencing Plans) in order to enhance policy influence with its partners in humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus contexts.

2.2: Where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is engaged in humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus or Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework settings, it is recommended to maintain a clear programme and project focus to avoid over-reach.

2.3: The MFA should ensure that the forthcoming evaluation of country strategies of fragile countries, takes forward and reviews relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on forced displacement and the humanitarian-peace-development nexus.
Summary answer to Evaluation Question 3:

Despite a long, solid and acknowledged track record in promoting Policy Coherence for Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policies for forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus cannot be said to provide, as yet, a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies.

3.1: 2015 and the impact on policy coherence

The 2015 threshold moment precipitated significant and continuing policy incoherence within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and across ministries. This has negatively impacted the achievement of policy coherence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.3: The adequacy of mechanisms for Policy Coherence for Development.

Finland has adequate mechanisms in place to promote policy coherence. These are generally used effectively although they have not been effectively mobilised in relation to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.4: Policy coherence and interlocutors

Despite these findings, Finland’s policies are generally perceived by external interlocutors as being coherent and well-coordinated both within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Ministry of the Interior. Equally, they are generally well aligned with those of its partners.

6: The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding and uptake of the concepts have obstructed policy coherence and inhibited progress on Policy Coherence for Development in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

7: The role that current coordination mechanisms such as the Migration Task Force, could play is not sufficiently recognised; or that their mandates need to be extended if they are to play this role.

8: Internal incoherencies have not yet manifested themselves to any degree to Finland’s external interlocutors.

3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encouraged to use its increasing engagement with the concept of forced displacement concepts and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus to establish Policy Coherence for Development and rethink inter-ministerial management structures such as the Migration Task Force to improve Policy Coherence for Development.

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3.2: Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior management is encouraged, in partnership with the Ministry of the Interior to: revise the Terms of Reference of the Migration Task Force (jointly-run with the Ministry of the Interior) to promote it as the main internal forum, inter alia, in which to seek to resolve incoherencies in migration and development policies; and elevate membership of the Migration Task Force to senior management level within both ministries.

3.3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to jointly commission research with the Ministry of the Interior, through the Migration Task Force, into the relationships between development, migration and displacement to promote better policy coherence.
## Transecting Issues

### 4. Promoting protection, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of forced displacement (FD) and humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HDN/HPDN)

#### 2.5: Human rights and policy influence
Finland’s position on and influence on human rights is perceived, externally, to be changing in the context of forced displacement.

#### 3.2: Human rights and a Human Rights Based Approach
The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding of and uptake of the concepts has obstructed policy coherence and inhibited progress on Policy Coherence for development in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

#### 9: Finland’s respect for ‘universal values’, human rights and humanitarian principles and protection has not been effectively tackled in relation to its humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus and forced displacement policies and values.

#### 4: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to strengthen its commitment to a Human Rights Based Approach, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

#### 4.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to strengthen its adherence to a Human Rights Based Approach, human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus by ensuring that they are aligned in the 2020 Development Policy Programme.

#### 4.2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to advocate, in its partnerships and in international fora, stronger adherence to the HRBA, human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

### 5. Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion in FD and HDN/HPDN

#### 1.6: Disability and Inclusion
The success of Finland’s international advocacy efforts to get the international community to recognise the importance of disability and inclusion in humanitarian and development work are widely recognised. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could do more to ensure its own policies and practices align with emerging policy developments in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

#### 10: Advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies could be further promoted in the context of forced displacement, the humanitarian-development-nexus and the humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

#### 5: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to more clearly and systematically embed disability and inclusion policies in the context of forced displacement and in longer-term development approaches in the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus; and enhance its international advocacy.

#### 5.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

#### 5.2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encouraged to extend its disability and inclusion policies to take account of forcibly displaced people with psychosocial needs alongside its well-established physical disability and inclusion policies in situations of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

#### 5.3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should now scale up advocacy for disability and inclusion policies in the specific contexts of forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus to the global level.
### Findings

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<td>1.7: Rights of women and girls&lt;br&gt;The evaluation reveals some positive evidence of the linkage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ rights of women and girls Priority Policy Area to humanitarian-development nexus approaches, but limited evidence in relation to forced displacement policy.</td>
<td>6: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to: enhance its internal policies and international advocacy for the promotion of the rights of women and girls in the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus; and strengthen the linkages between policies for women and girls in situations of forced displacement. 6.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encouraged to pay particular attention to the review of the Priority Policy Area on women and girls in relation to forced displacement. 6.2: To enhance internal policy development and international advocacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to commission an evaluation of its experience in gender and humanitarian-development nexus and forced displacement programming and a pilot project on a women- and girls-based humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus strategy in partnership with UNHCR and UNDP, taking account of UNSCR 1325.</td>
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| **7. Promoting the private sector** | 12: Private sector engagement in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role. | 7: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Development in partnership with other relevant departments, ministries and stakeholders is encouraged to set up a task forced to develop a joint strategy to facilitate the corporate sector and trade unions to play a more active role in supporting its development policies in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus. |

| 1.4: Gaps in Coverage<br>The evaluation reveals that, despite increasing attention to forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus, there are significant gaps in Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy coverage (Internally Displaced Persons, a Human Rights Based Approach, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, private sector). | 11: Progress already achieved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in promoting the rights of women and girls in the humanitarian-development nexus provides the grounding for further progress in national policies and at the international level. Less evident progress in forced displacement constitutes an opportunity to promote these rights more meaningfully in national policies and in international fora. | |
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview and objectives

This evaluation has been commissioned by the Development Evaluation Unit (DEU) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Finland. It was managed through the Evaluation Management Services (EMS) framework contract implemented by ParticP GmbH and Indufor Oy.

The evaluation has followed the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation (Annex 1), the overall guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) set out in its Evaluation Manual of 2018 (MFA 2018), and the MFA reporting requirements.

The main objective of the evaluation is to: ‘assess how coherently Finland’s development policy and its targets relating to forced displacement have been implemented and how the coherence could be enhanced’.

The evaluation covers the period 2012 until late–2018 which includes the two last Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) of 2012 (MFA 2012) and 2016 (MFA 2016), with emphasis on the latter part of the period.

The backdrop to this evaluation is the growing complexity of the drivers of forced displacement, the historically high numbers of those displaced – some 68.5 million officially documented worldwide (UNHCR 2018) – and the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. These conditions constitute major global challenges for peace and security, human wellbeing and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) amongst many other impacts. As a highly respected international development and humanitarian actor and advocate on these issues, Finland is inevitably engaged with these challenges.

New modalities of action, notably the 2015 Grand Bargain, the World Bank IDA18 (International Development Association) sub-window for Refugees and Host Communities, the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GRC), the 2018 Global Compact for Safe Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), and the rolling out of sustainable resilience strategies in the shape of the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN), are also of key interest to Finland. This is because many of the countries with whom Finland engages in its development cooperation and humanitarian assistance are countries of origin (CoO) or refuge for the forcibly displaced. In this context, Finland retains a strong international profile for its human rights-based approaches to development cooperation, its commitment to humanitarian values in refugee crises, and its commitment to policy coherence for development (PCD).

As stated in the ToR this is a formative evaluation, steering the outputs towards a learning process, the main purpose of which is to increase knowledge, awareness and the operationalisation of the humanitarian development nexus (HDN) and the concept of forced displacement (FD) within the MFA. Aligning develop-
ment cooperation and humanitarian assistance programming more effectively in relation to forced displacement expected to enhance PCD within the MFA and with its partners. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that both in the MFA and internationally, these are emerging rather than fully worked out approaches to the many displacement crises globally.

The Evaluation also serves wider policy making intentions: it will contribute significantly to the preparation of the MFA’s 2020 DPP, and it will also contribute to increased knowledge on how to better promote the 2030 SDGs Agenda.

This is not a formal accountability or performance evaluation as such. Nevertheless, it provides significant insights into how the MFA has developed and implemented its main policy priorities for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, and their coherence. To this extent, it provides evidence and findings that can inform stakeholders and interested parties – e.g. the Development Policy Committee (DPC), members of parliament and the public – about the effectiveness of the MFA and its capacity to deliver the government’s objectives and policies.

The main users of the evaluation are the Finnish MFA, other ministries with policies relevant to developing countries and issues relating to forced displacement and migration such as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), as well as Finnish Embassies, the DPC, the Parliament, Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders.

The evaluation was divided into five phases, namely: a) Planning phase, b) Start-up phase, c) Inception phase, d) Implementation phase and e) Reporting/Dissemination phase.

**Figure 1: Evaluation process**

1. Planning phase
   December 2017 – March 2018
2. Start-up phase
   March 2018
3. Inception phase
   April – June 2018
4. Implementation phase
   July – October 2018.
5. Reporting and dissemination phase
   November 2018 – March 2019

1.2 Outline of the report

The report comprises six chapters which cover the standard reporting requirements for MFA evaluations.

- Chapter 1 has introduced the evaluation;
- Chapter 2 elaborates the approach to the study, the methodology and the limitations to the evaluation;
- Chapter 3 provides a context analysis for the evaluation;
- Chapter 4 presents the findings;
- Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the evaluation;
- Chapter 6 provides recommendations.

A number of annexes provide detailed accounts of the evaluation data and analysis.
2 APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

2.1 Approach

This chapter presents the methodology for the evaluation and it is in two parts. The first part details the Evaluation Matrix developed for this evaluation, whilst the second part elaborates the research methods.

2.2 Evaluation questions and matrix

The Evaluation Matrix (EM) has been the main building block for this evaluation. It was the primary instrument for the document analysis and was used in a less in-depth form for the key informant interviews (KIIs) and country case studies – discussed in chapter 2.3 below. The EM has three Evaluation Questions (EQs), 9 Judgement Criteria (JC), and 23 Indicators as shown in Annex 2.

The three questions seek to ascertain: the overall understanding of and approach to FD and HDN and how it has evolved over the evaluation period 2012–2018 (EQ 1); its adequacy and the scope of policy influence in this context (EQ 2); and the extent of policy coherence (EQ 3).

- EQ 1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the evaluation period?
- EQ 2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?
- EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

In all EQs we made an assumption about an emerging ‘approach’ to FD and HDN over the evaluation period. However, given that the terms are rarely used in MFA policy documents and understanding of these concepts is still developing, we used the working definitions provided in chapter 3.3 as a benchmark for interpreting other similar words and phrases used by the MFA.
2.3 Methodology

The evaluation deployed a mixed methods approach using both primary and secondary data collection and analysis using four methods:

- Document analysis;
- Key Informant Interviews (KII);  
- Country case studies;
- Financial tracking;

As far as possible the methods followed a sequence. The document analysis was conducted first to establish a factual base line and built on a shorter document analysis for the Inception Phase. This was followed by KIIIs with the Government of Finland (predominantly the MFA) and the MFA’s main partners, although there was some overlap in the timetable for the two sets of KIIIs, and then the case studies. The sequencing methodology, together with the multiple and complementary sources of data, provided a robust evidence base, simultaneously ensuring triangulation and also highlighting gaps.

The results of the overall evaluation for each EQ (i.e. comprising document, KII, case study data, and relevant financial data) are presented in Annexes 5 (EQ. 1), 6 (EQ. 2), 7 (EQ. 3), whilst the detailed case study evaluations are presented in Annexes 8, 9 and 10.

2.3.1 Document analysis

The document analysis utilised the EM to closely interrogate an extensive collection of MFA policy documents from 2012 to the present. Establishing the factual source, basis and extent of engagement with HDN and FD through document review constituted the core of the data collection and analysis: 48 documents were reviewed (listed in Annex 3), provided by DEU at the start of the evaluation.

The documents reviewed comprised policies and policy statements, evaluations published by the MFA, and a smaller number of similar documents from the MoI and PMO. Relevant documents published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission (EC) were also analysed. The selection was determined by:

- Cross-checking the selection of priority documents reviewed in the Inception Phase;
- Identifying ‘landmark documents’ on central themes of the evaluation such as the DPPs, reports on Human Rights, Fragile States, Women Peace and Security;
- Appraisal of a large number of other documents using key words in the title or rapid review of their likely relevance;
- Coverage across the time period of the review.

The document analysis was completed in four stages using a standardised template to ensure systematic collection of evidence and content assessment across all indicators and JCs. For each EQ, the relevant indicators were used to solicit
fine-grained evidence from the documents which was then aggregated into an overall assessment of each indicator. Building on the indicator assessment, the key findings for each JC were then established and used to formulate the overall response to the relevant EQ.

In addition, other documents were also reviewed such as relevant Policy and Influencing Plans (PIPs), Quality Assurance Board (QAB) Minutes and funding proposals, Migration Task Force (MTF) Minutes, and MFA Internal Working Briefs on Migration and Development Priorities (the so called ‘One-Pagers’). The form and substance of these additional documents did not lend themselves to the same detailed method of analysis. But brief assessments were fed into the final stage of the document analysis which was a 3–4-page narrative rationale to explain and interpret the EQ and JC findings in more detail.

### 2.3.2 Key Informant Interviews: Government of Finland and Partners

The second method involved primary data collection using Key Informant’s Interviews (KII) with:
- a) selected Finnish government staff, mainly from the MFA in Helsinki but also staff in missions and including staff from the MoI and MoD;
- b) the MFA’s main bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and development partners.

The objectives of KII were: to derive individual insights and perceptions from government policy makers and their partners into how and to what extent HDN and FD were being embedded in MFA policies; to assess the perceived strengths and limitations of these approaches; to understand the challenges posed for PCD and policy influence; to assess the modalities of partner engagement with the MFA on these issues; and to triangulate and further interpret the findings of the baseline document analysis.

In total 123 people were interviewed: Annex 4 provides a full list. Twenty-four interviews were conducted with GoF staff and 26 interviews with MFA partners. Not included in this total are the additional KIIIs conducted for the case studies, discussed in chapter 2.3.3. KIIIs were selected as follows:

- In the MFA and other Ministries of the Government of Finland (GoF): recommendations from the Reference Group in the Inception Phase; including directorate level and senior staff (e.g. Ambassadors) in the Department for Development Policy, MFA; relevant Unit Heads, Senior Advisors and desk officers; and the members of the DPC. Recommendations from these participants also extended the selection of KIIIs.

- KIIIs with MFA partners in the core policy areas of the evaluation: recommendations from the Reference Group in the Inception Phase; a sample of Finland’s main multilateral partners such as the European Commission (EC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and partners – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); relevant principal CSOs funded by MFA, e.g. Finnish Red Cross (FRC), Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (FELM), Finn Church Aid (FCA).
The KIIIs were conducted face to face, and in some cases by conference call, using an open-ended discussion format of a standardised set of topics based on the core evaluation themes and framed by the EM: EQ. 1 – Finland’s evolving understanding and approach to FD and HDN; Eq. 2 – approach and policy influencing; Eq. 3 – policy coherence. In addition, the KI’s responsibilities in relation to the core themes were discussed, and each KI was invited to suggest recommendations to enhance the MFA’s approach to these policy areas. Interviewing protocols such as confidentiality were followed. Almost all the interviews were conducted by two team members. The paired interviewing approach generated richer and more detailed coverage of topics as well as allowing the interview narrative to be more fully and accurately captured. Joint interviewing was particularly valuable for group interviews. Interviews were written up in detail by one interviewer using the interview topic framework and then edited/corrected by the second interviewer. Summary findings were completed for KIIIs with the MFA’s main EC partners in Brussels and the main humanitarian partners in Geneva and the OECD in Paris.

Data from each KII write up and the two summary accounts were then entered into a separate EM, to JC and EQ levels, not the indicator level. A similar three 3–4-page overall narrative rationale was completed to explain and interpret the EQ and JC findings.

The KIIIs provided particularly rich insights into institutional knowledge and the dynamics of policy development not captured in the document analysis. It revealed new data on the scope of understanding and informal engagement already taking place with HDN and FD within the MFA and the extent of policy influence – factors which had not been apparent in the policy documents.

2.3.3 Country/regional case studies

The evaluation undertook three country/regional case studies: Afghanistan and Jordan/Lebanon/Syria (covering the Syrian refugee crisis and termed MENA (Middle East and North Africa for short)), were pre-selected in the ToR; Somalia was added in discussion with EVA-11 because it offered additional features of the MFA’s engagement in long-term displacement and development contexts.

The selection of the case studies aimed to provide a representative cross-section of countries, humanitarian and development conditions, complex structural conditions and policy environment, forced displacement processes, and partner settings with which Finland is engaged. Additionally, Afghanistan and Somalia are two countries which typify Finland’s strategy of long-term commitment, whilst the MENA case is more recent but exemplifies the emergence of the international HDN approach to protracted displacement crises with which Finland is also engaged.

The objectives of the case studies were to assess how and to what extent the MFA was mobilising HDN and FD policies in the field through its multi- and bi-lateral partners, and how policy influence and policy coherence were transmitted from the MFA to ‘end users’ in the field and programme settings. Additional purposes of the case studies were to assess constraints and opportunities for HDN and FD in the field, and to triangulate findings from other methods. The case studies represent a cross section of many different policy modalities of Finland’s policy
engagement – development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, crises management, humanitarian-development nexus, and migration.

All the case studies followed a standard method: i) a ‘mapping’ and documentation stage involving documentary review, consultation and briefing from relevant desk officers, preliminary financial tracking; and ii) KIIs with desk officers, multi- and bi-lateral implementing partners in the countries – country programme directors, programme staff – using a similar survey instrument to the main KIIs with open-ended, standardised question and discussion themes and using the same protocols; iii) analysis, evaluation and synthesis of the evidence using a separate EM similar to that for the KIIs to JC and EQ levels: a 3–4 page narrative synthesis/meta-analysis was completed to explain and interpret the EQ and JC findings in more detail. All three case studies were conducted with various degrees of ‘remoteness’: Afghanistan and MENA from desks, whilst the Somalia case study was conducted from Nairobi where most development and humanitarian entities for Somalia have headquarters, and the Finnish embassy in Nairobi is responsible for covering for Finland’s development cooperation in Somalia.

### 2.3.4 Financial Tracking

Analysis of extensive financial data on MFA development and humanitarian disbursements over the evaluation period, 2012–2018, was undertaken in order to: track significant overall or sectoral shifts in development and humanitarian disbursements and what this might indicate about policy influence and PCD with respect to HDN and FD; and to provide supporting information on the country case studies. The long lead times between policy formation and disbursement make correlation hard to discern, a difficulty compounded by the lack of clear MFA policies and policy objectives in the field of HDN and FD.

The results are presented in chapter 4.4 and the key findings, where relevant, incorporated into the EQ analysis in Annexes 5, 6 and 7. An additional financial tracking exercise was conducted with data provided by the QAB, and the key results are included in chapter 4.4. The full methodological explanation is presented in Annex 12.

### 2.4 Limitations and mitigation strategies

The following limitations to the methods, and the strategies adopted to mitigate them, are now presented.

**In relation to the overall Evaluation:**

1. **Time period for results:** The most significant limitation of the evaluation is its prematurity in relation to the MFA’s policy engagement with the core concepts of the HDN and FD. Normally four to five years after the adoption of policies is recommended for the evaluation of influence and policy coherence. As the evaluation makes clear, the MFA has only limited engagement with emerging international experience in the HDN and a limited awareness of FD. These concepts are not fully articulated and embedded in MFA policies. Accordingly, a standardised method normally used for policy evaluations of this kind was not deemed appropriate. This limitation has been overcome by triangulating evidence across the three main evaluation methods – document
analysis, internal and external KIIIs and case studies. This has established reasonable confidence levels in the findings. Approaching the evaluation as a learning process has also guided our overall approach.

2. **Complex policy environments**: Multilateral and bilateral political and policy making environments on development and humanitarian issues are extremely complex. Many actors and factors contribute to the likely effects of MFA policy influence on its partners, and thus the extent to which the objectives of MFA’s policies are achieved. Our methodology as a whole and, in particular, the sequencing of the methods to trace and triangulate policy influence and PCD/PCSD, have provided reasonably robust instruments to mitigate this limitation.

3. **Policy coherence**: The ToR limited the evaluation to the MFA. But as chapter 3.2 explains, and as will be become clear in other chapters of this evaluation, a particular challenge has been to address policy coherence in respect of development co-operation and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian assistance since, after the European migration/refugee crisis of 2015, these policies are increasingly projected through a national level ‘migration lens’ within the remit of the MoI. Thus, our approach was constrained, and our recommendations could only be formulated within the mandate of the MFA.

**In relation to the evaluation methods:**

1. **Complex methods**: The strength of the methodology – its diverse yet rigorous methods – is simultaneously a potential limitation by yielding rich and large amounts of data to be analysed and concomitant time pressures. We have mitigated these limitations by our sequencing method, debriefing team meetings at key stages and phases of the evaluation, and our systematic use of the Evaluation Matrix. In addition, the team composition has covered multiple experience of the four methods which has reinforced our approach.

2. **KIIIs**: KIIIs rely on personal opinions and interpretations of the KI, and the position of the interviewer: both factors introduce subjectivity. We have mitigated these limitations by the interview procedures and writing up protocols we have adopted. Using two team members for most interviews allowed better validation and triangulation of respondents’ opinions. Joint interviewing and writing-up enabled the interviewers to cross check and validate their own assumptions, findings and notes.

3. **Selection of KIIIs**: The team relied on the advice and recommendations of the Reference Group for the initial identification of GoF and partner KIIIs. However, as explained in chapter 2.3.2, we adopted a range of criteria to substantially widen and stratify the selection of KIIIs. This mitigated potential bias in selection. In the small number of instances where a KI was not available, we used conference calls in order to retain the sample size and coverage. An acknowledged gap in our KIIIs, given the significance of the lack of policy coherence between MFA development cooperation and MoI migration policy we have identified, is the very small number of interviews with the MoI and none with the PMO. Whilst document evaluation has covered some aspects, clearly more extensive interviewing would have allowed us to develop a more nuanced picture.
4. **Case studies:** All the case studies were undertaken with various degrees of remoteness (chapter 2.3.3 above), with KIIs by conference call for Afghanistan and MENA. Although there was concern that KIIs undertaken by conference call might be inferior, our experience suggests that they have delivered very good results and a very efficient use of staff resources and time given the very tight timetable for the evaluation. Lack of on-the-ground presence may have limited a deeper understanding of context and possible attendance at relevant donors’ meetings for example; but snowballing methods for finding other KIs worked well and access to documents, most of which are electronically available, did not appear to be limited.

5. **Staff rotation and reassignment:** KIIs with the MFA staff were hampered by what seems to have been an unusually high degree of staff rotation in autumn 2018 when we were conducting the interview phase. To mitigate the potential loss of ‘institutional memory’ of key policy making processes and decisions we endeavoured, mostly successfully, to interview previous relevant post holders.

6. **Financial tracking:** The scope and volume of financial data provided to us for analysis was enormous and we have only focused on core elements that support the main objectives of the study. A second constraint was that whilst financial tracking would have informed an understanding of changing sectoral and thematic priorities and coherence with existing policy priorities, it told us very little, if anything, about the HDN and FD since these lack a measurable presence. This shortcoming was partly mitigated by use of the QAB documentation.
3 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The context analysis comprises three chapters: the first situates the evaluation within the context of the changing dynamics of migration and displacement and their political consequences; the second part then elaborates the key concepts with which the evaluation is concerned – FD and the HDN – and identifies their relevance to the MFA and the evaluation; the third chapter outlines current MFA development and humanitarian policies, the scope of its programmes and operations, and PCD.

3.1 Setting the context

Four contextual factors define the scope of this evaluation.

1. Dynamics of international migration

The first key contextual factor is the dynamics of international migration, and in particular the scale and dynamics of refugee and internal displacement. These result from a complex interplay of socio-economic and political circumstances and existential threats that are manifest in different configurations of conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. This is amplified in chapter 3.2.1. Whilst these dynamics are always in flux, the last decade and in particular the last five years present a period of exceptional turbulence. In 2017, displacement reached a historic high with 68.5 million forcibly displaced people officially recorded (UNCHR 2018). The widely accepted UNHCR benchmark does not account for potentially millions more forcibly displaced people who are not recorded in official and/or verified data sources.

Underlying the scale of displacement are root causes (discussed in the next chapter – see also Zetter 2014), which appear to be more complex and intractable than in earlier era which, combined with physical destruction and the collapse of economies, services, and social fabric make the preferred ‘durable solution’ of return, brokered by the international community, largely unattainable (Harild et al., 2015). The other two durable solutions of resettlement and local integration are also increasingly difficult to achieve: in an era of migrant ‘push-back’, third countries are resistant to resettlement, which in any case has always been a marginal solution, whilst the main host countries, often poor countries struggling for development, deter local integration on economic grounds and push for return to countries of origin. As a result, protracted displacement is now the norm which, without substantial and proactive international responsibility sharing for sustainable responses, produces negative consequences for the displaced populations themselves, their host countries and communities, and international donors who all bear the heavy economic and social costs of forced displacement (Milner 2014).

These conditions bear heavily on both host countries and donors such as Finland. They have provided the political impetus for the reframing of the international norms and responses to refugee crises. This commenced at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2015 (which resulted in the Grand Bargain...
2. Trajectories of displacement

The second contextual factor is the trajectories of forcibly displaced people and migrants. Most refugee displacement is still largely contained in regions of origin – estimated to be about 85% – and, globally, south-south voluntary migration substantially exceeds south-north migration. But increasingly, large numbers of forcibly displaced people, and those who move voluntarily, now travel in ‘mixed flows’ and by ‘irregular’ means from the ‘global south’ to post-industrial countries of the ‘global north’. This will be discussed in chapter 3.2.2.

3. Recipient countries

The third contextual factor is the consequence of these global dynamics for countries in the ‘global north’ such as Finland. The combination of the historically high level of forced displacement and irregular migration combined with the impacts this has on receiving countries, both in the ‘global south’ and the ‘global north’, pose substantial policy making challenges in respect of humanitarian, development and national domestic priorities. These challenges bear heavily on Finland, given its strong international political commitment to development cooperation and human rights. Thus the 2016 DPP contained a new theme, not included in earlier DPPs, which emphasised the need to address these evolving refugee situations and migration through humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and security as well as development co-operation efforts in partnership with multilateral actors – in other words an embryonic humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN) – discussed in chapter 3.2.2.

4. Finnish and EU migration policy

These international policy objectives segue to the fourth contextual factor – national and EU migration policy – resulting in objectives that seek to manage the domestic impacts of the global processes of forced displacement and migration.

A number of factors converged in 2015 to create what we have defined as the threshold moment in policy formulation with respect to the Finnish Government’s migration policies and their relationship to the MFA’s development cooperation strategies and humanitarian assistance to refugees and other contexts of forced displacement.
At the national level, the arrival of some 32,000 asylum seekers in Finland in 2015 put migration and forced displacement at the forefront of policy agendas. From that point, national policies, implemented by a new Finnish government from May 2015, and European political and policy agendas converged. Tightening immigration controls at home were paralleled by policies to use development co-operation to tackle root causes of displacement in the countries of origin with the aim of preventing both initial and secondary displacements from regional host countries, regardless of the complex factors causing these migratory movements. At the same time, deep cuts in Finland’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) – an almost immediate 43% reduction from 870 million EUR p.a. in 2015/6 – were symptomatic of a reassertion of domestic priorities over Finland’s longstanding international commitments.

But the shifting policy focus on migration from 2015 put pressure on MFA development policies which increasingly tilted towards migration control and a ‘migration-development nexus’ (MDN) taking precedence over the HDN. Migration emerged as a policy issue in the 2016 – a major change since it had never before appeared in a DPP. However, these challenges were finessed in the 2016 DPP due to the MFA’s efforts to manage development related expectations in the context of migration.

At the supranational level, aligned with EU policy, the Finnish Government has supported the EU’s commitment to make development an instrument of migration control in policy making. For example, Finland is one of the funders of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF). In parallel, Finland has become incrementally co-opted into the securitised/militarised EU approach to fight irregular migration and terrorism, including through the active support of Frontex operations.

These developments have posed significant challenges and tensions for policy coherence with respect to development, migration and in particular forced displacement, as the MFA has attempted to reconcile long standing pillars of development policy, such as human rights and mainstreaming gender, with shifting national political and EU agendas and priorities. These are elaborated in chapter 4 – the Findings.

3.2 Core concepts: forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus

Given the formative nature of this Evaluation, increasing knowledge and developing a shared understanding of the core concepts and terms amongst the relevant stakeholders is an important objective, which this chapter of the report seeks to fulfil.

3.2.1 Forced displacement

Whilst many millions of migrants move both within their own countries and internationally on a largely voluntary basis, millions more people migrate because of violence, armed conflict, persecution and human rights violations, and state fragility, as well as because of natural disasters including the effects
of climate change and environmental degradation. Accordingly, despite the fundamental importance of the term refugee in international law (the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol, known as the 1951 Geneva Convention and abbreviated to the acronym CSR 1951), it inadequately captures this substantially growing number of people who are forcibly displaced like refugees and in need of protection and other forms of assistance, but who fall outside the defining characteristic of the CSR. To some extent the 2018 GCR acknowledges this wider grouping, although still strongly focused on those who qualify as ‘conventional’ refugees. Likewise, the 2018 GCM, which deals with all forms of migration, also recognises the vulnerability to which many ‘voluntary’ migrants are exposed but lacks a mandated international body to afford effective protection and safeguarding of rights.

To distinguish between refugees and this much larger category of people, the term ‘forced displacement’ is used. Often used interchangeably with the term forced migration, forced displacement is the terminology of the ToR and the preferred term for this evaluation. The WHS noted that ‘forced displacement is not only a humanitarian challenge, but also a political, development and human rights one’ and specifically recorded the aim of ‘reducing forced displacement’ in its core pledge to ‘leave no-one behind’ (United Nations 2016). Forced displacement is rarely mono-causal or a uniquely cause-effect outcome. Multiple factors, often in combination, but always context-specific precipitate forced displacement rendering those who are forcibly displaced highly vulnerable (Betts 2009, 2013; Castles 2003; Chimni 2009; Colson 2003; Hathaway 2007; Lindley 2014; Richmond 1988; Turton 2003).

An initial working definition of forced displacement produced for this evaluation captures the discussion which follows:

‘the involuntary movement of people – within or across national borders – as a result of: existential threats caused by state fragility and human insecurity, food insecurity and deprivation of livelihood opportunities; generalised violence and armed conflict; severe human rights violations, repression and discrimination; the effects of climate change and environmental degradation including disasters; or other situations that endanger freedoms or livelihoods.’

Like all definitions this is open to debate and interpretation, and it is offered here as a baseline for the MFA to develop and consolidate a shared understanding. Already in the MFA there is some recognition and understanding of the term forced displacement/migration. An internal discussion paper on terminology introduced the Finnish equivalent of ‘pakkomuutto’ (forced displacement or forced migration). Although not without problems in interpretation and meaning beyond immediate use amongst professionals, it has been approved by linguistic authorities as the official translation.

Two overarching and complementary perspectives – the complex drivers of forced displacement, and the patterns and processes of mobility that underpin forced displacement – elaborate the concept (see also Zetter 2014, 2015, 2018).
Drivers of forced displacement

A number of distinctive drivers broadly define contemporary and emerging situations of forced displacement.

1. Existential threats – from involuntary migration to forced displacement

A broad grouping of drivers captures structural conditions where the distinction between involuntary displacement and more recognisable drivers, discussed below, is blurred (Betts 2013; Flahaux and de Haas 2016; Lindley 2013, 2014; Martin 2014). Often described as root causes, they comprise three main conditions:

- Socio-economic vulnerability: impoverishment, lack of livelihood opportunities, food insecurity, depletion of natural resources, contested land rights;
- Governance fragility: state and political fragility, together with weak public institutions and the erosion of essential public services;
- Rights deficits: religious or ethnic discrimination (usually against minorities), persistent human rights violations and low-level repression, generalised violence and failure of the rule of law;

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

- The MFA is engaged in development cooperation in many countries, such as Somalia and Afghanistan, where these structural conditions may precipitate forced displacement.
- Women and girls have distinctive experiences of these drivers. Socio-economic marginalisation of women and girls usually impacts most forcefully on this group, heightening their precarious position and vulnerability to forced displacement.
- Finland’s ‘triple lock’ of humanitarian assistance, development co-operation and civil crisis management (CCM)/peace and security policies offers scope to mitigate potential or actual situations of forced displacement bears directly on the existential threats of socio-economic vulnerability, and rights and state fragility that may drive forced displacement: ‘Development cooperation is a good way of influencing the development of societies in developing countries….to create...peaceful living conditions.... so that people do not have to leave their native countries, or they can return there’ (MFA 2016).
- Policy coherence between humanitarian assistance, development co-operation and civilian crisis management in contexts of FD is a major challenge. With its PCD expertise Finland is well placed to tackle FD situations in a ‘comprehensive manner’ where existential threats and vulnerabilities, rights and protection can be addressed through development policies.
2. The nexus of armed conflict, other situations of violence and severe human rights violations

Armed conflict – intra-state conflict involving non-state actors (NSAs) such as in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen and South Sudan, and state-led forces (such as in Syria) and the persecution of the Rohingya from Myanmar – plays a crucial role in forcing people to flee either internally or across national borders (Duffield 2001; Keen 2007; Kaldor 2007, Zolberg 1993). Armed conflict and other situations of violence are usually the outcome of, and exacerbated by, the structural conditions discussed above. This form of forced migration epitomises the popular conception of the refugee. Yet the very large number of Afghan ‘refugees’ in Pakistan and Iran (or indeed in Finland) and many of those in transit are refugees fleeing conflict and violence but have not been recognised as such by the states where they reside or through which they are in transit. Lack of recognition shows that, even though the majority of refugees in the world (but not in Europe) attain refugee status via prima facie determination, this status is not easily attained. Instead the millions without refugee status are designated as ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘irregular migrant’, or person in ‘refugee-like situations’, with vastly inferior or no rights or protection.

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

- Promoting human rights, CCM, peacebuilding and development, and peacekeeping in situations of armed conflict, constitute core elements of MFA policy making. The need to ensure that the rights of women and girls, and recognition that they are actors and decision makers in this context are core issues in this context. Analysis of how this nexus and structural weaknesses precipitate or sustain protracted conditions of FD could help to identify critical barriers to promoting policy coherence.

- Given the ‘political’ linkage in Finland between development co-operation as the means of tackling root causes and diminishing migration, such analysis would help to better demonstrate the complexity of this linkage.

- Armed conflict and violence impact women and girls – one of the MFA’s 4 PPAs – with particular force. Rape and gender-based violence are widely used as instruments of war. Female headed households are a feature of many war-torn societies and forcibly displaced populations: they face particular vulnerabilities.

- Indiscriminate and generalised violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights (HR) increasingly propel FD, generating severe needs- and rights-based vulnerabilities and protection gaps, and demanding coherence in humanitarian, development and CCM interventions.
3. Environmental degradation and climate change

Environmental degradation and climate change are an increasingly significant element in the context of population displacement, although attributing a cause-effect relationship is contested and the populist term 'climate refugees' is misleading (Zetter 2017). Climatic and environmental conditions are rarely unique drivers of FD, but they may produce a 'tipping point' in conjunction with structural factors such as economic, social and political conditions, and linked to existing vulnerabilities (Barnett and Adger 2007; Forsyth and Schomerus McAdam 2010; Piguet et al 2011; Zetter and Morrissey 2014).

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

- The 2016 DPP (MFA 2016) draws attention to the potential migration/FD effects of climate change. Given Finland’s strong domestic and international commitment to environmental sustainability and mitigating the causes and impacts of climate change, tackling FD in this context should constitute a major policy objective. However, the 2012 DPP (MFA 2012) gave greater prominence to climate change and climate sustainability and its relationship to development than the 2016 DPP (MFA 2016).
- Exposure to most of the hazards which underpin FD in this context is not random. Overwhelmingly, it is pre-existing socio-economic marginalisation and vulnerabilities that render such groups most exposed. Long-term development and resilience policies rooted in PCSD are essential.
- Goal 13 of the 2030 Agenda explicitly pledges commitment to 'take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’, which could include FD and reinforces the challenge for PCSD.

4. Other drivers of forced displacement

This far the typology has presented the drivers of displacement that are most relevant to the MFA’s development and humanitarian policies. But other drivers are now briefly noted to ensure a comprehensive picture. Natural disasters are a major driver, displacing on average over 25 million people a year (IDMC 2016). Most often the displaced eventually return but to do so usually requires substantial international assistance for reconstruction. The MFA is an important donor for reconstruction in Nepal after the 2015 earthquake. Development – removing informal settlements, urban infrastructure, dam construction, commercial land grabbing from subsistence farming communities – is also a significant displacement driver perhaps (McDowell and Bennett 2012), accounting for up to 15 million people a year (Oliver-Smith 2010). Underlying the physical vulnerabilities to which disaster and development displaced people are susceptible, their socio-economic marginalisation also means they, like other forcibly displaced groups discussed above, have more limited access to rights that might help protect them.
Patterns and processes of forced displacement

The second overarching conceptual characteristic of FD is the processes and patterns of movement that forcibly displaced people follow.

1. Internal displacement

Most people do not willingly leave their homes or country of origin and often believe forced displacement will only be temporary (Zetter 2014). The global ratio of IDPs to refugees is approximately 2:1 (40 million IDPs and 19.9 million refugees (IDMC 2016; UNHCR 2018). But internal displacement creates a reservoir that inexorably spills across international borders – exemplified by the 6.6 million IDPs in Syria alongside the sustained flow of 6.3 million refugees (UNCHR 2018).

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

- Despite the primacy of countries with significant volumes of IDPs (Afghanistan 1.7 m IDPs), Somalia (2.6 m IDPs), as well as Syria (6.2 m) and Iraq (3.0 m), that Finland assists, this FD population constitutes a significant gap in the MFA’s current humanitarian and development policies.
- Ensuring policy coherence between development and humanitarian policies for IDPs is a significant challenge.

2. Time-space discontinuities

Contemporary patterns of FD are complex (within the country of origin, across borders, with onward and sometimes return movement) and episodic, oscillating unpredictably between transit or settled or returning conditions. These trajectories involve different stages of exposure to risks, vulnerability and humanitarian and protection needs (Lindley 2013).

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

Finland provides development cooperation and humanitarian assistance to countries displaying these FD characteristics – Somalia, Afghanistan, parts of Syria. These complex trajectories pose policy and programming challenges to humanitarian and development actors, not least in sustaining policy coherence through time and with populations who are not necessarily in a fixed location.

3. Routes and pathways – ‘irregular migration’ and ‘mixed movements’

Many forcibly displaced people use complex and/or unusual routes and means of travel and lack formal travel documents and visas (Crawley et al 2018). They increasingly rely on smugglers to assist them. Often the term ‘irregular migration’ is used to describe the informal processes and channels for such mobility (Mountz 2010; Scheel and Squire 2014). Irregular migration exposes all migrants, but
especially forced migrants, to high levels of vulnerability, especially women and children, as journeys have become more hazardous and access to territory more difficult because of push back policies. Again, these situations expose significant gaps in protection.

Complex routes and pathways segue with a related and distinctive feature of forced displacement – ‘mixed movements’ of people. Former IDPs who have become putative refugees, voluntary migrants, other forcibly displaced people, and trafficked and smuggled persons, may often be travelling together, along the same routes and using the same irregular means. They are frequently exposed to situations that endanger their lives and rights and livelihoods: women and girls are particularly vulnerable.

Mixed movements blur the distinctions between different categories of forced displacement. This is reflected in the EUMS’ and Finland’s increasingly robust response to the unprecedented influx of refugees, forcibly displaced people, smuggled people and migrants, marked by the ‘threshold moment’ in 2015 and the realigning of Finland’s development policies to migration management. As the 2016 DPP emphasised, one objective of development policies was that ‘people do not have to leave their native countries, or they can return therein’ (MFA 2016).

**Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies**

- Finland’s international development co-operation is demarcated by long-term engagement in countries in conflict or impacted by displacement, but less with transit countries with forcibly displaced people on the move. However, the growing importance of securitisation and ‘push back’ in the EU’s migration apparatus (and for many EUMSs such as Finland) throws irregular migration and what happens in transit countries into sharper focus for this evaluation.

- Mixed and irregular movements demand a more nuanced understanding of the rights, needs and vulnerabilities of different categories of forcibly displaced people on the move and the appropriate development and humanitarian policies and programmes responding to these conditions.

**4. From camps to cities**

Expressing their agency, in general the majority of forcibly displaced people now reside in urban areas not in archetypal refugee camps (Landau 2014) – an outcome at first resisted but now accepted by humanitarian agencies. Economic and livelihood opportunities are more diverse and abundant, even though vulnerability may be accentuated by inferior living conditions, protection and material assistance. With no formal refugee camps in Lebanon, although there are some formal settlements, the majority of one million refugees live in urban areas or close by informal settlements, in a country which is 87% urbanised (UN Habitat n.d.). In the MENA region as a whole, less than 10% of Syrian refugees are encamped (UNHCR n.d.). Both IDPs and returning refugees tend to locate in urban areas for the same...
reasons. Approximately 70% of Kabul’s population may be returnees and/or IDPs; IDPs in Syria are largely urban-based (Index Mundi 2018).

Urban locations as the destination reshape a conceptualisation of the patterns and processes of forced displacement and policy priorities.

**Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies**

Urban livelihoods, vulnerability, protection and gender-based priorities, and engagement with local governance structures require specifically tailored joint host-displaced population policies, programmes and modalities of engagement by development and humanitarian actors. This poses new challenges for policy coherence. Urban displacement constitutes a significant gap in MFA development co-operation and humanitarian policies and programmes.

**5. Protracted displacement**

Almost all contemporary situations of forced displacement (whether internal or cross border), are protracted – e.g. Afghanistan (since 1980s), Somalia (since 1990s), Syria (since 2011). Almost 70% of UNHCR documented refugees, 13.4 million, have been displaced for more than five years and the mean duration of exile is about 10 years (Milner 2014; UNHCR 2018). Since protracted displacement is due to several complex factors, as described above, most forcibly displaced people will not return home quickly (Harild et al., 2015). Women and girls, often in female headed households face particular challenges in situations of protracted displacement – access to long term protection, health and reproductive care, livelihood resources, education and changing gender roles.

Whilst protracted displacement can be a driver of onward migration such as the Syrian refugees in 2015/16, the main consequence is the need to transition from humanitarian to long term development strategies in host countries, to reduce the, usually, negative social and economic impacts of spontaneous settlement. It also demands long term humanitarian and development interventions in countries of origin to enable eventual return. Addressing these longer-term consequences and impacts of protracted displacement is a pressing international priority and the entry point for development actors to work alongside humanitarian counterparts. This is explored in chapter 3.2.2 below.

**Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies**

Finland’s predisposition for long-term engagement in crisis-affected countries, its expertise in CCM and peace building and security, as well as its gender priorities, makes it well-placed to tackle protracted displacement by bridging humanitarian and development needs. It has less but growing experience in countries hosting forcibly displaced populations in protracted displacement. However, policies and programmes to tackle protracted displacement place a special burden on the need for policy coherence.
Forced Displacement and the MFA – Making Connections

As well as specific implications, this conceptualisation of forced displacement has wider implications for the evaluation and strengthening a more integrated approach to its development and humanitarian policies.

Many of the countries where Finland is engaged as a development and humanitarian actor reveal different components of this typology of drivers and patterns and processes of mobility. Yet, although the terminology ‘pakkomuutto’ (forced displacement), and also ‘tahdonvastainen muuttoliike’ (involuntary migration) are used in the MFA, they are not explicitly deployed in MFA policies and policy making.

Summary of Implications for the MFA – Strengthening an integrated approach to humanitarian and development policy

By transcending status-based definitions such as refugee, the definition of forced displacement and the conceptualisation elaborated here, potentially offers a valuable analytical tool for the MFA’s humanitarian, development, human rights and human security policy makers. A more nuanced and holistic understanding of the vulnerabilities, and the rights-based and needs-based conditions of forcibly displaced people can strengthen a more integrated approach to the MFA’s humanitarian and development policies and enhance policy coherence. This potential will be elaborated in the conclusions and recommendations.

3.2.2 Humanitarian-Development Nexus

This subchapter presents the second conceptual building block of this evaluation, the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN), an international approach to strategy and policy making processes that is currently underpinning the reconfiguring of global responses to protracted refugee and forced displacement crises. Termed the ‘New Way of Working’ since the WHS (OCHA 2017), the impetus for the paradigm shift and its significance in situations of large scale forced displacement are now elaborated (see also UNEG-HEIG 2018); the relevance of these global movements towards greater coherence for the MFA’s humanitarian and development policies is also discussed.

Two precepts underpin humanitarian assistance. First, assistance is predicated on short term and flexible funding, programming and reporting priorities – often on an annual basis – e.g., to tackle the ‘emergency’ life saving conditions which usually characterise the early stages of refugee crises. However, as we have seen many situations of FD are protracted. The second precept is that humanitarian assistance is unconditionally ‘needs-based’ according to humanitarian principles. Even where displacement is protracted, humanitarian principles still endure although the often-political nature of displacement crises poses challenges for neutrality and independence.

By contrast, development is a medium to long term project for, inter alia, improving social and economic conditions and so these two precepts play out rather differ-
Whilst the displacement of refugees, IDPs and other forcibly displaced people has pre-eminently been framed as a humanitarian and protection challenge, it is also a significant development challenge, and opportunity.

The HDN approach aims to tackle two enduring challenges in refugee crises: mediating the impacts of protracted forced displacement on receiving countries and communities; and transitioning from humanitarian assistance to addressing the longer-term livelihood and other needs of the displaced themselves in sustainable ways.

ently and funding and programming have to align with these different circumstances. Whereas humanitarian assistance is explicitly targeted to countries and projects on the basis of needs and vulnerability – the ‘humanitarian imperative’ – development assistance, particularly under OECD-DAC guidance, tends to be focused on a limited set of countries, over a longer time scale and mediated by political interests and objectives.

Whilst the displacement of refugees, IDPs and other forcibly displaced people has pre-eminently been framed as a humanitarian and protection challenge, it is also a significant development challenge, and opportunity. This is because protracted conditions of FD require longer term development to provide sustainable livelihoods for displaced people and hosts.

Reconciling these different precepts, in other words achieving policy coherence, lies at the heart of establishing the HDN and the Findings chapter (Chapter 4) will demonstrate the challenges faced by the MFA and indeed by all donors.

For many decades, the aim of incorporating development approaches into responses to forced displacement has been a persistent objective of the international donor community, frustrated by the escalating costs of humanitarian assistance, and by host countries contesting the unfair fiscal and socio-economic burdens that refugees place on their countries (Ross et al., 1994). More generally, the need to ensure that humanitarian interventions took account of their longer-term impacts, and, also the need to avert the loss or underutilisation of a potentially productive economic resource – the labour of refugees – were also concerns.

With many institutional stakeholders, donors and governments involved, as well as the need to establish effective funding mechanisms, the design and implementation of a coherent and comprehensive framework to deliver this objective has been persistently problematic. Several attempts in the last two decades to promote and co-ordinate developmental responses that complement humanitarian assistance have failed to gain traction (Mosel. and Levine 2014; Zetter 2014a).

The impetus for the resurgent interest has largely come about because of the regional and global impacts of large-scale refugee displacement in the MENA region and Horn of Africa (HoA). Significant buy-in from development actors, notably concessionary funding by the World Bank (World Bank 2017) and also the European Investment Bank (EIB) has assisted progress. But many other actors are also involved (see e.g. DANIDA 2017; European Parliament 2012; Save the Children 2018; UNEG-HEIG 2018; UNDP 2016; UNICEF 2016). The scale and impact of these current crises transcend immediate humanitarian situations and have crystallised in policy approaches that firmly swing towards promoting development-led responses that complement, transition from and build on humanitarian assistance. The Syrian refugee crisis has in many ways become a testing ground for the HDN.

The HDN approach aims to tackle two enduring challenges in refugee crises: mediating the impacts of protracted forced displacement on receiving countries and communities; and transitioning from humanitarian assistance to addressing the longer-term livelihood and other needs of the displaced themselves in sustainable ways. This requires new modalities of responsibility sharing and
sustained commitment to development-focused, longer-term economic strategies to support the needs of forcibly displaced people, the countries and the communities supporting them. This support is driven by the concept of resilience building, well embedded in the disaster context but now being mainstreamed in displacement crises. Equally, development-led approaches should also promote durable solutions to situations of forced displacement and underpin policies that tackle prevention and root causes.

The HDN approach includes, inter alia, the following principal conditions and requirements:

1. **The humanitarian and development interface**
   - The humanitarian system, and its normative and international legal framework of protection under the 1951 CSR, is vital but insufficient in itself to provide comprehensive and sustainable responses to the complex and protracted situations of forced displacement. Moreover, as discussed in 3.2.1, large numbers of forcibly displaced people fall outside the CSR but experience the same vulnerabilities and needs as refugees.
   - The distinction between humanitarian needs and development interventions can be artificial – for example child protection, education and healthcare, and all basic services require both modes of action and they may overlap. This means that development strategies and programmes should be built in from the beginning of a crisis, aligned simultaneously with humanitarian assistance and ensuring complementarity between the two modes.

2. **Development modalities**
   - Development actors may need to work in partnership with governments that may be absent, weak or part of the conflict and donors may not have development programmes in the country. Moreover, the lack of flexibility of development instruments makes it hard to use them in volatile contexts; donors might have rules that prevent them undertaking development programmes in refugee hosting countries.
   - Development actors play a key role in supporting the resilience of refugees and affected communities, and in fostering self-reliance. At the same time, the HDN opens opportunities for new development actors such as private and corporate sectors and new modes of investment funding for development operations at levels of economic activity (Zetter 2014a).
   - New, or reinforced, modalities of responsibility sharing are required which include the commitment of the international community to long term and predictable collective funding for host countries, as envisaged in the CRRF.
   - The challenges of strategic planning, funding and programme coordination in a multi-stakeholder setting exert a critical demand for policy coherence at every level of the HDN – donor precepts, strategic planning, funding and reporting protocols, project design, needs assessment, local programming and multi-stakeholder coordination.
• A significant for the private sector is envisaged, for example in employment generation for the displaced and their host. This is increasingly promoted by the main international actors – World Bank, UNHCR, UNDP.

3. The forcibly displaced and hosts – agency and support

• Forcibly displaced people have resources, skills and agency, as well as the potential to contribute to economic demand and supply; these should be fostered to add to the productive capacity and development of impacted countries and regions.

• An important precept of the HDN is to assist forcibly displaced people and locally impacted communities, who are often subject to pre-existing vulnerabilities and whose living standards and livelihoods are severely negatively impacted by the large-scale arrival of refugees and other displaced populations.

• Sustainable interventions that support resilience and self-sufficiency better respect and foster the dignity of forcibly displaced people and their hosts.

• Innovative modes of assistance such as cash-based transfers (CBT) for basic needs and livelihoods for forcibly displaced populations, potentially connect humanitarian relief operations to wider economic developmental objectives by incorporating the displaced into local economies as consumers but also potentially as producers, for example, with micro-enterprise start-up capital.

4. The wider context

• In some contexts, including many of those in which Finland is an actor, the HDN should also embrace peacebuilding, security, rule of law and human rights policies, amongst others, as this may play a crucial role in limiting the conditions that precipitate displacement and may facilitate return.

• More broadly, the HDN links to the 2030 SDGs.

As with FD, a specific issue in the MFA has been to find the right terminology for nexus where the Finnish word ‘jatkumo’ = continuum (verb ‘jatkua’ means continue) unfortunately gives a false impression of the nexus as a linear concept. Partly for this reason, the terminology used in internal documents has been 'linking development cooperation and humanitarian assistance'. However, there is now greater understanding that the concept is not linear.
Drawing these factors together, a **working definition of HDN**, provided for this evaluation is:

*The HDN approach seeks complementarity between humanitarian and development programming, funding, time scales and priorities, whilst recognising that different principles apply and need to be understood and respected. It aims to achieve coherence between short term emergency assistance and sustainable, resilience-building development for forcibly displaced people and their host communities.*

The HDN is not yet a fully developed policy model; in any case, it is very important to note that a standardised approach cannot be applied in different contexts of displacement (Sandie-Lie 2017; UNEG-HEIG 2018). However, the HDN is being rolled out in a reshaped global architecture of international responses to forced displacement, underpinned by the 2018 GCR (UNHCR 2018a) which actively promotes the HDN and development-led approaches involving bilateral, multilateral and private stakeholders. It is also being rolled out at an operational level through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), agreed by UN Member States in Annex I of the 2016 New York Declaration on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. The CRRF, adopted in 15 countries including Somalia (one of the case studies of this evaluation) provides for improved strategic planning and co-ordination of responses in situations of protracted displacement.

In the MENA region the UNHCR-UNDP Co-ordinated Syrian Regional Reliance and Response Plan (Syrian 3RP) has been promoted as an archetype of a more sustainable longer term HDN response. This coordinates country-driven resilience plans and funding processes across the region impacted by Syrian refugees. In Jordan, a national Compact between international donors and the government aims to promote development with Special Enterprise Zones (SEZs) and provide refugees and nationals with new employment opportunities in order to promote livelihoods. The right to work for refugees, a key instrument in achieving sustainable livelihoods for them, but which is usually denied or heavily circumscribed in practice in most low-income countries, is being promoted by the World Bank, the ILO as well as UNHCR and UNDP (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). Turning theory into practice has not been without numerous problems for example, the extent to which it is a regional strategy rather than an assembly of non-compatible different country plans; and very substantial underfunding. For these reasons it is often described as a pilot even after five years in existence. It is certainly evolving. Perhaps the main achievement has been to mainstream resilience as the core objective.

Self-evidently, the global reframing of responses to forced displacement is a central concern of the evaluation, and the HDN has critical relevance to PCD. These are the focal concerns of Chapter 4.
3.2.3 FD and the HDN: what are the links?

Evolving as core elements for MFA policy making, FD and the HDN/HPDN constitute the twin pillars of the evaluation. The concepts have been treated separately in this Chapter, not only to highlight their specific characteristics, but also because they have very different properties. Whereas FD is an analytical concept describing a phenomenon – a complex category of people on the move – the HDN is a formulation describing a particular type of policy apparatus.

Given these different characteristics, the question arises, are the terms independent of each other, or alternatively, are they related and if so how?

The evaluation is built on the contention that the two terms are inter-related, very much so in the policy making context. This is because the rationale for the HDN is that the outcomes of FD (the drivers, patterns and processes discussed in chapter 3.3.1) demand a policy apparatus which embraces both humanitarian responses to the many different needs- and rights- based assistance for people who are forcibly displaced, and longer-term development support as well – the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.3. MFA: development and humanitarian context

3.3.1 Development and humanitarian policy framework

In 2018, 886 million MEUR, 0.38% of Finland’s gross national income (GNI), had been reserved for development cooperation. Of this total official development assistance (ODA), 554 MEUR were projected to be administered by MFA whilst 342 MEUR was appropriated for other development assistance, for example EU development cooperation and investments made in the Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation. Some 32 MEUR was allocated for refugee reception in Finland. ODA also included humanitarian assistance allocations discussed below. Approximately 55% of ODA was allocated to bilateral partnerships and 45% to multilaterals. Country programmes to which Finland allocated more than 15 MEUR were Nepal, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

The budget allocations for 2018 show a marginal reduction on the 2017 ODA of 935 MEUR which represented 0.41% of Finland’s GNI with 565 MEUR of ODA administered by the MFA. Overall, there is a progressive diminution of ODA from the highpoint of 1,232 MEUR in 2014 (chapter 4.4 provides more details).

Two development policy programmes for 2012 and 2016 (MFA 2012, 2016) define the development co-operation context for this evaluation. Emphasis is on the more recent DPP which sets out four priority policy areas (PPAs) which are bench marks in the evaluation. These are:

- Enhancing the rights and status of women and girls;
- Improving the economies of developing countries to ensure more jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being;
- Democratic and better-functioning societies;
- Increased food security and better access to water and energy and the sustainability of natural resources.
Although not one of the four PPAs, the team have also noted the rising profile given to disability and inclusion policies in the MFA portfolio, reflecting its successful global advocacy for these policies in the context of international humanitarian responses.

In addition, the evaluation identified what we have termed ‘policy pillars’: further delineating the MFA’s strategic objectives and policy actions, these are:

• Development co-operation (including the four main Policy Priorities) – remit of the MFA;
• Humanitarian aid policy (including multilateral partnerships with humanitarian actors, support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) – remit of the MFA;
• Human rights and HRBA – remit of the MFA;
• Crisis management policy (including security, peacebuilding, civilian military (CIVMIL) relations and civilian crisis management (CCM)) – remit of the MFA but also of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and MoI;
• Migration policy (including domestic political agendas/European political agenda/ asylum policy/labour policy) – mainly the remit of the MoI and PMO but intersecting with MFA remit.

In 2017, Finland’s humanitarian assistance, funded from development cooperation appropriations, amounted to 73.3 MEUR, showing a reduction in allocations from 84 MEUR in 2016 and 97.8 MEUR in 2015.

Humanitarian funding is provided for country and regional operations. The main recipients of assistance are countries impacted by the Syria crisis (currently the main priority), South Sudan, Iraq and Yemen – and core funding for specialist humanitarian organisations considered key partners for Finland’s priorities. These include UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Red Cross Federation (ICRC and IFRC), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The MFA prepares ‘policy and influencing plans’ (PIPs) that define the priorities it wants to ‘influence’ in these agencies’ policies and strategies.

The overall objective of Finland’s humanitarian assistance set out in 2012 (MFA 2012:11), ‘is to save lives, alleviate human suffering and maintain human dignity during times of crisis and in their immediate aftermath’. This main objective translates into a number of goals and policies, including:

• Goal 1: Finland is a responsible, timely and predictable donor;
• Goal 2: Promoting an effective, well-led and coordinated international humanitarian assistance system;
• Goal 3: Ensuring support is channelled through capable and experienced non-governmental organisations;
• Goal 4: Ensuring that humanitarian principles are known and adhered to;
• Development of Finnish business and expertise related to natural disasters is also promoted but is not a goal as such.
These goals are further promoted by policy guidelines, which aim to strengthen the international humanitarian system and ensure that funding modalities support its priorities and principles by:

- Following UN consolidated appeals as the basis for country selection;
- Channelling support through experienced, principled organisations; support for EU humanitarian action;
- Recognising protection is an integral part of humanitarian assistance;
- Supporting humanitarian mine action.

Since the so-called European migration/refugee crisis, Finland, like all European Union Member States (EUMSs), has undergone a process of reassessing the purposes of, and reframing its longstanding commitment to development cooperation and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian assistance. Projected through a ‘migration lens’ its development cooperation policy apparatus has been subjected to intense scrutiny – explored above in chapter 3.2 and in chapter 4.3 below on Findings – and to an extent is still in flux as the MFA seeks to reconcile the interplay between now prevailing national migration policies and its portfolio of international development cooperation policies. The introduction of the new concepts of FD and the HDN offers both a set of further challenges for the MFA in reshaping its development and humanitarian policy framework in this period of flux, but also constructive opportunities for strengthening its policy apparatus and policy coherence by better aligning these two major components both within the house and with significant development in international practice.

### 3.3.2 The HDN, the HPDN and the MFA – Making Connections

The MFA has been actively engaged with the HDN processes at a global level, through effective advocacy, and operationally, for example, in the Syria response in the field and described in the MFA’s Strategy for Development Cooperation: MENA 2017–2020 (MFA 2017). But progress to embed the approach comprehensively in the MFA’s development and humanitarian policies, and at the programme and project level has been limited. Chapter 4 provides evidence of this engagement and the limitations.

Of potentially great importance to the MFA is that whilst the HDN has been rolled out in countries impacted by forced displacement, as the Secretary General’s Report for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit noted, conflict remains ‘the biggest obstacle to human development’. For these reasons, there is growing interest in promoting peace and security as the missing link in the nexus between humanitarian action and sustainable development – the so-called ‘triple nexus’ of the humanitarian-development and peace nexus (Barnett 2011; Chandler 2014; Uvin 2002). Although this ordering of the processes is used internationally, the logic is to consider peace as a transitional stage between humanitarian and development interventions and for this reason humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN) is used in this report. This is precisely the niche in which the MFA specialises, prioritising it in its DPP as a humanitarian and development actor linked to civilian crisis management (CCM), peace and stability processes, and governance in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia but also Syria.
Summary of Implications for the MFA – Strengthening an integrated approach to humanitarian and development policy

Finland’s 2016 DPP, which promotes development in the context of refugees and forced displacement (although the term migration is actually used), resonates powerfully with the ambitions of the HDN and the CRRF. The HDN also resonates with Finland’s wider commitment to human rights and the dignity of affected populations noted in Chapter 5 of the DPP.

The MFA has been closely involved with international processes addressing forced displacement such as the Global Compact and its membership of the UNHCR donors’ group has enabled it to exert some leverage on these developments and align them with its own policy interests.

The global transformation of the HDN has a special bearing on PCD both within the MFA and in relation to its humanitarian and development partners.

The MFA is well placed to advocate international commitment to the emerging concept of the HPDN and to operationalise it in its country and regional strategies.

IDPs remain a significant gap in the HDN processes. This has important implications for how conflict dynamics within such countries bear on the humanitarian-development nexus and peacebuilding and stabilisation policies promoted by the MFA.

In sum, mainstreaming the discussion so far, HDN/HPDN offers the potential to strengthen the MFA’s capacity to design and implement an integrated approach for its development and humanitarian policies, whilst ensuring that it fulfils its international commitments. The conclusions (chapter 5) and recommendations (chapter 6) further elaborate this potential.

3.3.3 Policy Coherence in Development

The MFA’s Department for Development Policy has lead responsibility for PCD. The relatively small size of the ministry also permits the discussion on policy coherence to take place informally. The DPC, appointed by each new Government, also has a mandate to look at policy coherence and provides a platform for dialogue on coherence dilemmas with external stakeholders (MPs, NGOs, private sector, trade unions, etc.). In the field of humanitarian assistance, the MFA prepares PIPs to guide its relations with its main multilateral partners (e.g. UNHCR) whereby it seeks to extend the influence of, and thus coherence with, its policy priorities.
At the same time, the relatively weaker framework for ‘state’ policy coherence has been highlighted by the 2015 ‘threshold moment’. Political and policy debate over the interplay between development and migration (discussed in more detail in chapter 3.2) has brought to the fore tensions between the MFA and, principally, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) (responsible for migration policies), and between the MFA and Finland’s alignment with EU migration policies. The continuing lack of policy coherence in this area is a prominent feature of this evaluation. A Migration Task Force (MTF) was established by the MFA to promote coherence but the lack of inter-ministerial joint committees/task forces and management/leadership between desk officers and the political actors remains, as the evaluation subsequently points out – a so called ‘missing middle’.

With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and its reference to policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD), responsibility for policy coherence shifted to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Coordination unit in the Prime Minister’s office. As a result, the specific focal point for PCD in the MFA no longer exists; this implies that the emphasis may be weakened by the shift to wider integrated policy making. On the other hand, the location in the PM’s office does ensure the unit is well placed to encourage policy coherence right across government.
4 FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation in four parts, one each dealing with the three evaluation questions of the EM and the fourth providing analysis of development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements. Recognising that MFA policy development for FD and the HDN is still ‘work in progress’ rather than extant polices being formally evaluated, some of the Judgement Criteria (JC) on the findings cut across the three EQs, and other transecting themes are also presented later in this chapter.

4.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies

EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the evaluation period?

Summary answer to EQ 1

The MFA has not developed clear approaches to FD and the HDN, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation. Whilst more active, but very uneven, engagement is visible in the recent period of the evaluation, the MFA has not managed to develop approaches to the concepts that are clearly formulated and well-established in ways that can effectively inform its policy making and programmes in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. Uneven, but generally, limited engagement is particularly noticeable at field and programme level. The negative impacts of the 2015 moment of transition, which promoted development cooperation as an instrument of migration control, are still being experienced. Institutional barriers constitute further constraints on progress.

On the HDN, most of the documents examined do not engage with the nexus as a tool to link and mutually reinforce humanitarian and development work. Policy documents in the later period covered by the evaluation move away from the more classic complementarity [or continuum] approach to the HDN, towards an emphasis on migration control that links migration and development which is problematic. Documentary evidence is supported by KII evidence (within the MFA and with partners) that FD and the HDN are not, as yet, clearly formulated and well-established in the MFA’s development co-operation and humanitarian assistance policies. However, much KII evidence indicates that the HDN (but not FD) is at least topical, and
The MENA case shows very positive engagement with the principles and strategic aspects of the HDN, including some evidence of peace building in the triple nexus.

The subject of informal dialogue; and there is a discernible interest in engaging with the concept and developing relevant policy.

By contrast, of the three case studies, the MENA case shows very positive engagement with the principles and strategic aspects of the HDN, including some evidence of peace building in the triple nexus; but this engagement with HDN is scarcely evident at the programme level.

Extensive evidence of programmes and projects for the ‘rights of women and girls’ PPA is found in the case study countries but is yet to be fully articulated into an HDN approach.

The gap in coverage of FD is significant: engagement with the issue is only partial, mainly focused on refugees [from the humanitarian perspective] or migration [from the domestic perspective]. This dichotomy becomes more apparent after 2015, when large numbers of asylum seekers arrive in Europe and Finland, with increased evidence in subsequent years of a stronger focus on migration control. This ‘partial narrative’ fails to address the complexity of drivers, manifestations and impacts of movement patterns with the related risk of a narrower policy spectrum and scope in terms of development and humanitarian programme undertaken. Yet, in the most recent part of the evaluation, some attempts to widen the debate and present a broader picture of FD are noted.

(JC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and case studies)

There is substantial and consistent evidence – documentary, KII (both GoF and bilateral and multilateral partners), and case study – underpinning the main finding summarised above. MFA engagement with the emerging concepts of FD and the HDN, explored in chapter 3, does not as yet yield significant strengthening of the 4PPAs in the 2016 DPP and the five policy pillars. Some partner KIs go so far as to indicate that they have no clear sense of Finland’s understanding/approach on these matters. With one exception, case study evidence reveals limited engagement with HDN at the programme level. This is in the MENA case where the MFA has been a powerful advocate for the HDN strategy embodied in the 3RP (UNHCR-UNDP 2017), but not at a programme level. The SALAM project for Afghanistan, albeit a single project, is engaging with both concepts by addressing FD in all its complexity and is an illustration of how the HDN approach can focus on supporting self-reliance, poverty reduction.

The evidence explaining this finding, drawn mainly from KIs, is that concern by some parts of the public about migration and refugees has been the determining factor of policy making on these matters since 2015. At the same time there is high public commitment to international development cooperation, contradicted by government cuts in the development budget; commitment to humanitarian policies remains strong. Accentuating the sense that the ‘development side’ of the MFA has felt ‘sidestepped’ by the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, were the development budget cuts. At the EU level, KIs reinforced the conclusion that 2015 marks the dividing line in Finland as in many EUMSs, when the narrative on migration
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started to change and to take a more prominent role in the debate, notably with the introduction of conditionality on development assistance related to migration. Taken together these factors have significantly shaped the approach to policy development on FD and HDN by politicising the debate and oversimplified the framing of development as a migration mitigation and a securitisation measure. Consequently, progress on linking new policy apparatus and concepts such as HDN and FD to existing PPAs and policy pillars, has been constrained.

Despite the lack of evidence of formal progress in the MFA, there is evidence in the evaluation of a growing momentum within the MFA to engage with and embed FD and HDN. Several KIIs observed that many informal discussions between MFA staff on the subjects have taken place and this was helping to embed a common understanding. Institutional reform processes and an Action Plan rolling out HDN are further signs of this progress.

The principle finding is now elaborated with five more detailed findings.

**Finding 1.1: The uptake of FD in the MFA remains limited**

The threshold moment associated with the 2015 migration crisis significantly shaped the approach to policies on FD by aligning development cooperation, as an instrument to tackle root causes, with domestic agendas for migration deterrence (under the aegis of the MoI). This left little space to comprehend and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement. Since that time MFA policy engagement with FD has accelerated although this has not been systematic. Moreover, the dichotomy with MoI approaches remains, undermining policy coherence. (JC 1.1, 1.2, 2.3, and case studies)

In relation to FD, the uptake in the MFA is more limited than for HDN. The term only appears, and then rather sparsely, from 2016–2017 in documents such as Lives in Dignity (EC 2016) and The National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights 2017–2019 (Ministry of Justice 2017) which uses the term forced migration once. Nevertheless, related terms are found more frequently, especially refugees (the most common reference), IDPs (reference only found in humanitarian documents), asylum-seekers (only mentioned in documents related to domestic policies about asylum in Finland) and migrants (or migration referred to almost exclusively in relation to domestic concerns). When they exist, most references to FD, in the broader sense, tend to be brief and are not always in the core of the text.

Thus, whilst some documents identify factors that render people more vulnerable to displacement, they fall short of making explicit links with FD. For example, the 2015 Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation (MFA 2015b) fails to link crisis management to FD in relation to IDPs and refugees as a potential security issue. The lack of reference to FD in human rights documents is most striking; the 2014 Human Right Report (MFA 2014a) makes links between the causes of armed violence and insecurity and its effects but neglects FD. A similar gap appears in documents concerned with fragile states, for example Finland’s Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation (MFA 2014b)
and the *Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding* (MFA 2015a) given that displacement is very often a characteristic of these environments and could therefore be expected to be a key policy dimension in addressing state fragility.

Albeit limited, this evidence shows that FD originally fell within the humanitarian sphere with a strong focus on refugees. However, there is substantial and consistent evidence both in documents and from KIIs that this model shifted following the 2015 ‘threshold moment’ in EU and Finnish policy, a ‘shock’ that is otherwise described as well managed in Finland by a large majority of KIs. To the extent it is linked with FD, the term migration then came to the fore, largely within the sphere of domestic policy (mainly in the MoI). *Finland’s Action Plan on Asylum Policy* (GoF 2015) exemplifies the strong emphasis placed on correlated development assistance with migration deterrence in tackling root causes (despite the lack of empirical evidence for this correlation). KIIs indicate that following the threshold moment, this linkage was reinforced, leaving little space to comprehend and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement, explained in chapter 3.2.1.

Turning to MFA financial evidence, very limited indication is detected of budget spending for conditions of FD in development cooperation in the 2016–2017 sample period of QAB decisions. In this latter period there was spending on migration and refugees. Civilian crisis management increased from 14.5 MEUR to 17.8 MEUR in 2016, and 15.6 MEUR in 2017 – showing no obvious tendency.

The documentary evidence is more ambivalent about the effects of the threshold moment on MFA engagement with FD.

On the one hand, documents with a ‘domestic’ focus fail to make the link with the wider picture of forcibly displaced people in developing countries. For instance, the 2017 *National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights* concentrates on the way Finland had been affected by the increased number of asylum seekers whilst failing to address the causes of displacement and making no reference to refugees in host or transit countries (MoJ 2017, 18 and 23). The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) puts the emphasis on the EU refugee dimension but not in the context of the humanitarian crisis in Syria (MFA 2018, 10). The 2017 DAC *Peer Reviews* also emphasises the links of the migration situation in Europe to the interventions of Finnish development policy in fragile states (OECD 2017a).

On the other hand, despite the changing national agenda, this same moment of transition precipitated a proactive response in the MFA. The inclusion of a Chapter on refugees and migration in the 2016 *DPP* finessed the relationship between development and migration, providing evidence that FD had begun to make its way into MFA policy. This opened the potential, not yet realised, for the MFA’s engagement with the concept including by creating greater linkage with its PPAs.

Inevitably, documentary evidence is slower to manifest itself than engagement with the concept itself which, as MFA KIIs suggest, is progressing. Nevertheless, documentary evidence of closer articulation of FD with its PPAs is apparent, if not overall, then at least in relation to the rights of women and girls PPA, where the 2018 *Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan* provides an entire page related to ‘migration’ with evidence of the vocabulary and concept of FD
(different drivers, protracted displacement (MFA 2018, 57)). The most recent policy development in 2018 is the preparation of the Internal Working Briefs on Migration and Development Priorities by the MFA’s Unit for Sectoral Policies. Again, migration is used in preference to FD, but the aim is to enrich the discussion (beyond the focus on migration), break down some common myths, notably on the link between migration and development and unify the thinking on the topic. The Internal Working Briefs cover the four PPAs, and two more are expected on climate change and population growth, both factors that are commonly described as main drivers of future migration trends. In addition, the Result Based Management Action Plan (RBM) released in November 2018 by the MFA’s Development Policy Unit also contains in its chapter on humanitarian assistance a chapter which provides a comprehensive overview of FD, including a sophisticated depiction of migration patterns and drivers.

Sitting between the MFA and the MoJ (and the unresolved tensions between their respective policy priorities), is the inter-ministerial Migration Task Force (MTF). Activated in September 2015 to share MFA thinking on migration and development, but at the same time to accede to MoJ policies to coordinate the management and control the flux of asylum seekers/refugees seeking access to Finland, the MTF has not enabled a shared understanding of FD to take hold between the MFA and MoJ. This is symptomatic of the continuing tension between these two ministries leading to a lack of policy coherence which is discussed in chapter 4.3, on EQ. 3. Bridges made by the MFA, notably through the creation of new posts such as the Senior Advisor on Repatriation and a Senior Adviser on Migration have yet to yield a better shared understanding or common purpose.

The findings from multilateral and bilateral partner KII s and the case studies also provide evidence of the limited up-take of FD, although the partners accepted that the concept itself was only loosely formulated. In the Afghanistan case study, FD, in the shape of both IDPs and large scale refugee return, was recognised as a significant phenomenon in the policy mix but had yet to find its way into MFA (and indeed other donors’) advocacy or programmes; the exception is a single project, the Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility project (SALAM) that aims to address the livelihood needs of several displaced groups (returnees and IDPs) and host communities. That the project, devised as a pilot, may not yield the results initially expected, is in part because of its limited scope and unrealistic timescale. In the MENA case study, the regional strategy does indeed recognise this as a FD crisis. The case studies highlight a number of programme (and policy) gaps which are discussed in a Finding 1.4 below.

**Finding 1.2: The MFA lacks clarity on the HDN as a core operational concept**

Although approaches to the HDN have been more positive and tangible than for FD, as yet, they are not clearly formulated and cannot be construed as adding value and strength to Finland’s policy priorities in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. However, there is evidence of growing momentum within the MFA to engage with and embed approaches to the HDN in departmental policies and structures. (JC 1.1, 1.2, and case studies)
The actual term, the HDN, is rarely used in documents which tend to focus on one or the other component of the nexus rather than engaging with the nexus as an instrument to join and mutually reinforce humanitarian and development work. For instance, in Finland’s Development Policy Programme (MFA 2012) while there is no direct reference to the HDN, there is an entire chapter on humanitarian assistance with an explicit discussion of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Arguably, this is an older term for the nexus, suggesting that the terminology of the nexus, rather than the concept itself was novel in the MFA. The 2014 Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation (MFA 2014b) make a rigid distinction between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation: ‘Differences in relation to starting points, approaches and procedures may result in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation following two separate tracks in fragile states’ (MFA 2014b, 25). Similarly, the Guidance note on HRBA in Finland’s Development Cooperation (MFA 2015) makes broad reference to development and conflict but without tackling the humanitarian consequences of conflicts and crises.

By and large, the need for complementarity between humanitarian and development policies does not seem to be articulated in ways that support use of the HDN as a core operational concept, even after the EU’s explicit support for the HDN in the Lives in Dignity (EU 2016a) communication and in the European Council Conclusions (2016). The Towards a More Just World report does not discuss the HDN per se, but it does discuss the differences between humanitarian assistance and development and about the need for both activities in a post-conflict situation (MFA 2014, 53).

However, it is important to recognise, as noted in chapter 3.2.2, that the HDN is an evolving concept dating back to the 1990s. There is an emerging international consensus, but no hard and fast agreement on the concept (chapter 3.2.2). In any case as noted in chapter 3.2.2 the HDN must be seen as a context-specific, not a monolithic process.

Signs of this evolution are visible from the MFA documents review. A landmark in the MFA’s approach was the preparation of an internal discussion paper in 2018 on the Humanitarian-development Continuum (MFA 2018a) now being rolled out in an Internal Action Plan. When comparing the 2009 LRRD paper (MFA 2009) with the Humanitarian-Development Continuum paper (MFA 2018a), there is an evident change of focus: the earlier document is concerned more with reconstruction rather than with development. It is worth repeating the observation made in chapter 3.3.2, that the problem of translating the word ‘nexus’ into Finnish is acknowledged by KIs. There is evolution of thinking from a model where development was consecutive to humanitarian assistance to one that is more about complementarity and transition.

External perspectives also depict limited and sporadic progress on embedding the HDN. Some KIs in multilateral organisations perceive little progress. Whilst the first DAC Peer Review suggested that ‘the HDN is somehow not yet well connected, nor well formulated’ (OECD 2012, 22), five years later the second DAC Peer Review still pointed out weaknesses with regards to the HDN and suggested that more work was needed to link humanitarian and development programme/co-operation (OECD 2017a). The 2018 MFA Humanitarian-development continuum paper was prepared in response to this finding.
However, as noted above, documentary evidence usually lags behind practice, with the exception of the Development-humanitarian Continuum paper (MFA 2018a); thus, a more positive finding comes from a small number of MFA KIs. They express enthusiastic interest in the concept, whilst acknowledging limited progress so far in developing a common understanding between, and a policy framework for, aligning humanitarian and development interests, despite the concrete steps of the ‘continuum’ policy paper (MFA 2018a) and its Internal Action Plan.

Likewise, field evidence offers one positive indicator from the MENA case where the MFA has been commended as a leading advocate for the HDN approach embedded in the Syrian 3RP strategy; this commitment has not, however, been effectively transferred down to the MFA’s programme level. Evidence from the Afghan case study suggests that although the international ‘comprehensive approach’ to peace building and development enables development and humanitarian objectives to coincide, the HDN has not been invoked in a direct fashion. These positive findings are somewhat counterbalanced by virtually no evidence from the Somalia case study. Programme level involvement has been complemented by the MFA’s international level involvement and commitment to the framing of the HDN in the CRRF.

Several factors explain this finding of the muted approach to the HDN and point to important conclusions and recommendations.

First, there is some evidence that the 2015 ‘threshold moment’ in Finnish migration policy diverted attention from engaging with the HDN, by linking root causes and migration control in what we have referred to as the migration-development nexus (chapter 3.3.2). In two internal memos on bilateral discussions with UNHCR (2015 and 2016), for example, Finland stresses that its development policy includes addressing root causes of migration, although acknowledging that it also supports humanitarian operations. A 2015 annotated agenda on bilateral consultation with UNHCR reveals language that shifted away from a more classical humanitarian approach to reflect some of Finland’s more ‘domestic concerns’ about migration control and the link between migration and development with discussion of irregular migration, transit countries and EU border control activities. Neither document reads as ‘nexus thinking’. Likewise, the 2016 DPP One World, Common Future, in its reference to refugee flows and migration, discusses channelling support to countries of origin, both in the form of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (MFA 2016, 23). This comes a little closer to nexus thinking but the link was precipitated by the need to respond to the migration control rhetoric, not a proactive engagement with the nexus.

The ‘securitisation narrative’ dominates other documents at this time, for instance in the 2015 Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperation (Reininika & Adams 2015) and the Prime Minister’s Office Government Report where links are made between crises and fragile states and migration, including trafficking, irregular migration, and exploitation of people in vulnerable situations (PMO 2017, 37). Political pressures have been acknowledged by some KIs as an internal challenge in the MFA in developing a fully articulated approach to the HDN; but the tension in policy objectives between the MFA and the MoI, as KIs indicate, have been even more challenging when the political agenda is going in the opposite direction to long held MFA principles and policies.
The severe cuts in the development cooperation budget decided in 2015, effective in 2016, were the concrete manifestation of changing priorities towards domestic rather than international budget expenditure, although they were later reversed to some extent.

Second, turning from political to institutional explanations the team finds different mandates, principles, funding regimes and the lack of common approach to situation analysis, as an explanation for the limited engagement with HDN. Evolution in thinking and application of the HDN in the MFA appears slow because of the firm commitment to retain the distinction between humanitarian and development cooperation on the basis of different principles, mandates and funding regimes. The HRBA is not clearly articulated between the development and humanitarian sectors: this is a shortcoming. The example of the Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action (MFA 2015c), highlights the inability to cement a policy relationship between development and humanitarian priorities. Documents related to humanitarian policy emphasise their humanitarian remit including listing activities that are not covered by humanitarian assistance funds.

Understandably, KIs on the humanitarian side are strongly committed to supporting and safeguarding international principles on international protection, human rights/refugee law and the rights of asylum seekers in their field of operations. And here, KI evidence suggests that, over the years, the MFA’s approach has actually changed very little in this regard, underpinned by relative immunity from budget cuts.

In short, the MFA has not been able to align development and humanitarian instruments closer: the funding and programming decisions are made separately, and this reflects the strength (and importance) of the underlying mandates.

This is not a critique staff for their genuinely held views and principles, but to illustrate the challenges of reconciling how these differences are expressed through funding, programming, and mandate responsibilities. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation apply different principles; this needs to be understood and respected, but at the same time this understanding could be the basis for then developing complementarity. A positive finding in this regard is that across the house, a small number of KIs offered strong support or positive interest for engagement with the HDN, not least to help resolve wider tensions within the MFA and with the MoI. The potential for the HDN to provide for a more objective analysis of the complexity of displacement contexts and a more holistic approach to humanitarian and development policy making was a theme raised by several KIs.

A third factor explaining the muted approach to the HDN is the breakdown of the traditional Nordic consensus on principled approaches to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. A third factor explaining the muted approach to the HDN is the breakdown of the traditional Nordic consensus on principled approaches to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (e.g. IHL, IRL, the HRBA). This was noted, and regretted, by some KIs. In the context of displacement/migration and development, this was thought to be an additional constraint on Finland being able to articulate a coherent approach to the HDN which, in the past, would have been based on the longstanding Nordic approach to principled development co-operation.
Finding 1.3: Towards a humanitarian-peace-development nexus

Evidence points to Finland’s capacity to support the emerging consensus for developing a triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development programming. (JC 2.3, and MENA case study)

Although there is not widespread evidence in the evaluation, a significant finding from KIs is that the strong ‘peace component’ in Finland’s policy framework – a long standing component of Finland’s development and humanitarian policies in the form of policy pillars such as CCM (including Defence Command training for crisis management), peace and security, and the HRBA – offers considerable potential for engaging with the HDN. Although not yet articulated into the HDN framework, the peace component could add value and strength to the nexus and could be an area of convergence within the MFA. In Syria and Lebanon, and also in Somalia, the MFA is already supporting such peace initiatives. Commitment and expertise around these pillars could be the ‘missing link’ which provides for a more balanced, transitional approach which could strengthen emerging support for the triple nexus of HPD noted in chapter 3.3.3.

Documentary and case study evidence from the MENA region, albeit limited, confirm the KI evidence that Finland is already supporting three programmatic areas simultaneously: alongside peace building there is continuing humanitarian assistance whilst it is also pursuing development goals. Finland’s bilateral partners are working with local populations in the highly complex interstices of peace, violence and displacement by supporting programmes to rebuild community cohesion and local governance structures in Syria and to reduce tension between refugee and host communities in Lebanon. These initiatives sit alongside Finland’s strong advocacy and funding support for the developmental aspirations of the UNDP-UNHCR Syrian 3RP, and programmes funded through multilateral and bilateral humanitarian partners such as UNHCR, UNICEF and FELM, and CSI whose programmes also transition to developmental objectives.

The Afghanistan UNDP-ILO SALAM project was found to have a solid FD component. Two peacebuilding projects implemented by Finnish NGOs (MENA (FELM) and Somalia (FCA)) suggest a way forward towards the triple nexus between humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and development (HPDN).

Finding 1.4: Gaps in Coverage

The evaluation reveals that, despite increasing attention to FD and the HDN, there are significant gaps in MFA policy coverage. (JC 1.3)

The limited evidence for clearly formulated and well-established FD and HDN policies means that, by default, there are gaps, even in policy and programme areas which are long standing constituents of Finland’s development and humanitarian policies. Significant gaps are identified in embracing, in MFA policy making an understanding of some of the drivers, patterns and processes of FD elaborated in chapter 3.2.1.
The first gap relates to **internal displacement**. While internal forced displacement is often a characteristic of fragile states, particularly those in which the MFA is involved, IDPs do not feature as an issue in, for example, the 2014 *Guidelines on Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States* (MFA 2014 b), or in *Finland’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (MFA 2018). KII evidence on IDPs is also muted, and the Afghanistan and Somalia case studies strongly reinforce the existence of this gap at programme level, although there has been an exploratory, but very small scale, programme with IDPs in Syria and in Afghanistan.

A second gap is the **lack of reference to the HRBA** or to protection in the, albeit limited, engagement with FD. This is at odds with Finland’s strong commitment to HRBA as one of its policy pillars. The main exception is found in the *Humanitarian Policy* (MFA 2012a, 18). There is also a short reference for the ‘protection of rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and their just treatment’ in the 2016 DPP (MFA 2016, 23–24). The Afghan case study revealed the general importance of human rights considerations, especially related to women’ and girls’ rights in justifying Finland’s presence and development projects. But no consideration is made of the specific situation and vulnerability experienced by displaced populations.

A third gap concerns **urban displacement**. The focus, even in documents published after 2014, remains almost exclusively on refugees in camp settings, despite the shift in the wider policy arena towards urban displacement noted in chapter 3.3.1. In the field, however there is evidence of urban programming in Lebanon and Jordan, but this seems to be driven by the MFA’s partners’ sectoral interests not a proactive policy priority of the MFA.

A fourth gap identified, again surprising given Finland’s commitment, is on **climate change**. There is a lack of systematic coverage of the links between climate change and displacement in many of the documents. Exceptions are the frequent reference to climate change in the 2016 DPP (MFA 2016) and in the *Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy* (Government of Finland 2015). Field evidence reinforces this gap, notably in Somalia which is a country prone to climate change related drought and food insecurity which has consistently precipitated population displacement alongside violence and conflict. In Afghanistan, some KIs noted the little attention that climate change and displacement received despite its relevance to the country.

A fifth gap concerns the limited documentary reference to **self-reliance and access to livelihoods**, despite being a key component of the HDN. On the other hand, field and KI evidence from some bilateral partners provides a more positive picture. For example, in Afghanistan, livelihood was listed as a priority issue under development cooperation; and the SALAM project, targeting the forcibly displaced population, is explicitly aimed at enhancing their livelihood and self-reliance. In Somalia, only some CSO/NGO projects funded by Finland address livelihoods and/or climate resilience, but there are a number of business partnership projects in the pipeline.
Fifth, although neither a strongly emerging finding, nor as obvious a policy gap as these other issues, the role of the private sector as a development actor in the context of the HDN/HPDN is an issue of potential significance. Involving the private sector as a development actor has been promoted in the GCR and, more generally is increasingly recognised as a component of the HDN noted in chapter 3.2.2. Likewise, the government of Finland is keen to promote private sector engagement in development and more specifically in refugee contexts. For example, a party of Finnish business people has toured refugee settlements in the MENA region under the auspices of the Embassy in Lebanon. In 2018, the Minister for Trade and Development partnered UNDP in 2018, in a Regional Resilience and Private Sector Innovation Workshop for Improved Crisis Response. The government is also encouraging private sector engagement through the Finnfund and FinnPartnerships; Somalia is one of the pilot countries of FinnPartnership with several business projects in the pipeline. SASK, the Trade Union Solidarity Centre of Finland, is already working with refugees in several contexts.

The potential synergy between these two axes of interest – the HDN and the private sector – is noted as a gap.

**Finding 1.5: A positive way forward**

There is evidence of growing momentum within the MFA to engage with and embed approaches to FD and the HDN/HPDN in departmental policies and structures. (JC 1.1, 2.1, 2.2)

Whilst, as yet, there is little concrete evidence in documents or from KIs or in the field on a comprehensive uptake of approaches to FD and the HDN, a firm marker was put down in the 2016 DPP which states that ‘Finland strives to ensure that humanitarian aid, peace mediation, reconstruction and development cooperation are mutually supportive and complementary’ (MFA 2016, 27). This could be read as a commitment to the HPDN. Despite the preoccupation with reconciling development and humanitarian priorities with domestic policies on migration, there is strong evidence from KIs in the MFA of an accelerating momentum for engagement with FD and the HDN, and the desire to embed approaches in policies and department structures. This positive evidence can be found in:

- frequent KI reference to and knowledge of the MFA internal discussion paper exploring the humanitarian-development continuum which put the issue ‘on the table’ for the first time (MFA 2017a) (HDN);
- the MFA’s Internal Action Plan to implement the principles of this paper, although the focus of the plan is more with operational and procedural rather than substantive matters (HDN);
- the Internal Working Briefs directed more towards addressing FD in this context (FD);
- The potential offered by the current Departmental Reform process to promote further engagement (HDN/HPDN and FD);
• The evidence from the MENA case study, noted in Finding 1.3 above, that the MFA has been an influential advocate, supported by its donor role, for the Syrian 3RP strategy which is internationally recognised as the most fully operational HDN model (HDN);

• MFA KII evidence that, despite the lack of formal progress, many informal discussions between MFA staff on the HDN take place and this is helping to embed a common understanding. To this end, a small government with few hierarchies was perceived to be an asset in enabling progress. (HDN/HPDN).

Finding 1.6: Disability and Inclusion

The success of Finland’s international advocacy efforts to get the international community to recognise the importance of disability and inclusion in humanitarian and development work are widely recognised. However, the MFA could do more to ensure its own policies and practices align with emerging policy developments in the context of the HDN and HPDN. There is a gap in the MFA’s current policy apparatus for psychosocial disability and exclusion. (JC 2.3)

In contrast to the gaps, there is extensive evidence, not just in EQ 1, of Finland’s successful international advocacy on disability and inclusion. With a long domestic tradition of supporting people with disability and the CSOs/NGOs that represent them, Finland has been well placed to become a leading international donor and a broker for social policy development in this sector. Major impact was made at the WHS 2016 and many external KIs noted that this was a landmark for mainstreaming disability and exclusion in humanitarian (and development) policies. Since then Finland has been proactive in sustaining advocacy in international fora. In the context of this evaluation it has been supporting UNHCR to address disability inclusion in refugee operations, and also the IFRC. In the field, as well, Finland has been influencing programme implementation, for example with UNICEF in Jordan. The recent MFA policy document The Finnish Approach to Addressing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Development Cooperation and Policy (MFA 2018c), sets out the main parameters of its policy, noting, again, with relevance to this evaluation, how ‘persons with disabilities are particularly exposed to targeted violence, exploitation and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence. Women and girls with disabilities often face double discrimination.’

However, one finding, which is of potentially wider significance than the MENA case where it was identified, is the gap in the MFA’s current policy apparatus for psychosocial disability and exclusion. Forced displacement is recognised as a major cause of psychosocial disability and exclusion, particularly amongst children; such exclusion is usually protracted and thus has longer-term development implications in addition to immediate humanitarian needs.

Policy development in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN provide Finland with the opportunity to take these commendable achievements to the next level of international commitment.
Finding 1.7: Rights of women and girls

The evaluation reveals some positive evidence of the linkage of the MFA’s rights of women and girls PPA to HDN approaches, but limited evidence in relation to FD policy. (EQ1 JC 1.3, and case studies)

In both European and international fora, Finland is perceived as a strong and consistent advocate for gender equality and women’s empowerment, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). At the EU level, as part of the Nordic group, Finland is also perceived to be vocal on various development issues, but these tend to be approached rather broadly with no specific links made to FD or HDN.

There is some, but limited, documentary evidence of FD articulated to the rights of women and girls PPA, with the exception of the 2018 Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan which provides an entire page related to ‘migration’ with evidence of the vocabulary and concept of FD and HDN (different drivers, protracted displacement) (MFA 2018a, 57). In general, however, despite ample documentary reference to ‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’ as a whole, the vulnerability or marginalisation of forcibly displaced people, including women and children and the disabled, remains somewhat neglected.

Policies for vulnerable groups, notably women and girls’, were frequently mentioned by KIIs in the context of, but not necessarily aligned with HDN thinking, and not at all in the context of FD. In this context, there is Defence Command training for crisis management that includes training of military on UNSC 1325, plus peace and security and human rights for women and other vulnerable groups. In the same vein the significant presence of women in Finland’s CCM operations is exemplary.

Yet, Finland has, in some instances, also pushed its PPAs in relation to migration and displacement issues: for example, Finland has successfully obtained a decision that the EUTF reporting mechanism includes a clear gender reporting perspective. Given the orientation of the EUTF this could arguably be construed as linking the women and girls PPA to the FD.

In Afghanistan the dominant priority areas, addressed systematically at both policy and programme levels, relate to issues around women, peace and security as well as gender equality and women’s rights. But the gap lies in the MFA’s weakness in forging linkages with FD and addressing the impact that displacement has on such groups. In Somalia, the main emphasis of Finland’s development cooperation is on reproductive and maternal and child health, addressing the vulnerable, but not specifically targeted to forcibly displaced people – notably IDPs – although some female and child IDPs have benefitted from the health project/s. In the MENA case there is stronger evidence of connectivity of the rights of women and girls PPA and FD and HDN. Finland supports multilateral education and training projects targeted to women and girls with the aim of facilitating their access to income earning employment – clearly a transition from humanitarian to development needs.
4.2 The adequacy of Finland’s approach to and policy influence on FD and HDN (EQ 2)

EQ2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?

Summary answer to EQ 2

Finland aligns its definitions and positions with current international trends and norms and adopts concepts from international actors. Particularly the norm-setting role of the UN system is recognised, and increasingly also of the EU. Interviewees perceive Finland as a reliable, if low key, partner with well-established policy priorities. But it has not proactively influenced the development of FD and HDN in international fora despite its financial contributions in order to sit at the table with larger donors. Indeed, KIIIs had only a slight idea about Finland’s approach to FD and HDN at the HQ level, and the same impression was present in case study countries. However, at least in one case Finland has given significant added value to a multilateral partner, namely the successful initiative to integrate the rights of the disabled among refugees and internally displaced persons in the operations of UNHCR; Finland was a pioneer in this area.

There also is a certain degree of complementarity with Finland’s multilateral partners through non-earmarked funding support and significant value added in some cases (the case of UNHCR with disability in refugee/humanitarian situations).

Documentary review did not reveal any explicit emphasis or approach to FD with one exception (Afghanistan SALAM project/UNDP-ILO). From the case study countries, MENA/Syrian crisis is the only context where several project proposals were justified in HDN terms in the documentation of the Quality Assurance Board.

Two peacebuilding projects (MENA and Somalia) implemented by Finnish NGOs suggest that there is a way forward towards the triple nexus between humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and development (called HPDN).

There is a growing interest by MFA staff to start elaborating approaches to FD. (JC 2.1, 2.2)

As a relatively small donor in international development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, and therefore reliant on collective rather than independent action, Finland is heavily dependent on the quality and choice of multilateral partnerships in the context of policy influence. In this context, it presents itself as an effective donor and is perceived to be a reliable and appreciated partner, particularly in its un-earmarked funding practices and with a firm commitment to the UN and the EU, and in some contexts, strong Nordic cooperation.
But the consequence is that, in relation to the emerging international policy challenges of FD and HDN and their rollout, the MFA is not perceived to have been proactively engaged. Instead influence and initiatives come from ‘above’. Finland is a norm-follower not a norm-setter. As an example, if FD is mentioned in the documentation of an international organisation or a project proposal, Finland’s policy and influencing plans (PIP) for the organisation or the MFA’s justification of project funding also operate with the same terminology. Due to its traditional stress on multilateralism, Finland particularly recognises the norm-setting role of the UN system, including in relation to HDN and migration and FD and is increasingly influenced by collective EU policies where it is also perceived to play a useful role as a broker in EU discussions on migration and development. Finland is perceived to have less impact and visibility than some other countries such as some other Nordics, the UK or Germany. Overall, many of Finland’s partners indicate that they have no clear sense of Finland’s understanding/approach to forced displacement and the ‘nexus’.

Equally, while international conventions, international law and the multilateral political and normative framework are presented as guiding principles for its humanitarian and development funding and partnerships practically in all policy documents of the MFA, there is little indication that Finland’s actions are explicitly aligned with FD and HDN. For the most part, FD and the HDN are indirectly invoked, if at all, and if invoked, they are not clearly formulated (see also EQ1 above in 4.1).

Overall, Finland’s generally acquiescent relationship with its partners in the development of the concepts of FD and HDN is symptomatic of the lack of a comprehensive and systematic approach identified in Finding 2.1.

Finding 2.1: Policy influence and priority policy areas
The MFA’s influence is recognised by partners as visible and effective in the promotion of Finland’s traditional, well-established priority policy areas and cross-cutting objectives, particularly in women, girls and the vulnerable and disabled. Nevertheless, the FD and the HDN elements remain largely absent. (JC 2.3)

The evaluation finds robust evidence both from documentary analysis, internal reports of policy influencing and interviews with partners that the MFA’s influence is recognised, among international agencies, in the promotion of Finland’s traditional, well-established priority policy areas, which are perceived to be compatible and complimentary with its partners’ international goals and policies. Two areas stand out as having the heaviest weight: women and girls, and the disabled – or vulnerable groups more generally.

Nevertheless, the FD and the HDN elements of these policies remain largely absent as the findings in chapter 4.1 have confirmed. As already stated above, Finland is a norm-follower, not a norm-setter, in the adoption of new concepts and norms related to development and humanitarian aid, and this frequent
observation seems to apply to FD and HDN, too. Uniformly across the board, in the interviews carried out for the evaluation, the key informants had a very slight, if any, idea of Finland’s position concerning FD and HDN.

Finding 2.2 Pooled funding and policy influence

Finland’s multilateral budgetary contributions, largely channelled through pooled funding or multi-partner trust funds, can increase complementarity and influence, and are valued by its partners; but there is a lack of evidence that this influence has been used to promote FD and the HDN thinking and policies. (JC 2.1, 2.2)

Finland’s compliance with the norms and interests of its multilateral partners is further reinforced by the fact that its humanitarian funds are largely provided un-earmarked. In Afghanistan and Somalia as two of its development partner countries, Finland channels the bulk of development funding through multi-donor trust funds. (e.g. in Afghanistan: Law and Order Trust Fund LOTFA, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF; in Somalia: European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa EUTF, and Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia MPF). The use of multilateral and multi-bilateral funding mechanisms by Finland is a justified choice and political decision for circumstances where there are no conditions for normal bilateral development cooperation projects, as is the case in Afghanistan and Somalia. Finland also takes great care to maintain the threshold of its financial contributions at the requisite level for the UNHCR, the ICRC/IFRC and trust funds (or multi-partner funds) in partner countries to guarantee privileged access, and with it, the potential for greater policy influence. Finland’s participation in the EUTF is another example of a conscious decision to get a seat on the Board, although it should be noted that in this case the impetus came from the PMO, and the funds were disbursed by the Ministry of Finance, not the MFA.

However, beyond acknowledging Finland’s policy priorities, and the obvious complementarity of interests between Finland and its preferred multilateral partners, the study found little evidence from the organisations of how effectively and consistently Finland uses its position either to influence policy priorities in general, or in relation to FD and the HDN in particular. To be more precise, evidence from interviews was mixed concerning the enthusiasm with which Finland uses its position to exert policy influence. According to some, the MFA representative only sits silent while according to some others, Finland takes an active position to push forward its policy priorities.

Finding 2.3: Field presence and policy influence

Finland has a reduced, thin field presence. Lack of field presence limits policy influence. (JC 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 (of case study component)
One reason that Finland has not been as proactively engaged in FD and the HDN as it might be is the lack of sufficient capacity to respond adequately in the field. Limited field presence to manage and overview programmes and projects on the ground is widely noted in KIIs and, particularly, in the field case studies. This finding also has significant consequences for policy influence since the consequent obligation to prioritise what to follow-up in the field seriously limits policy influence and indeed coherence.

In the case of Somalia and partially for MENA, limited field presence is further exacerbated by the geographically complex aid architecture. In the case of Somalia, the Embassy is not located in the country where activities take place. In the MENA region the programme is spread across three countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan – assistance to Turkey is separately administered). Whilst policy influence is strongly observed at the strategy/regional level, this is not the case at the operational level. A complex array of humanitarian, peace building and development projects lacks coherence with respect to HDN, which a stronger field presence might help to tackle.

Whereas Somalia and Afghanistan are official development cooperation partner countries and Finland is bound by national development plans, Syria and the neighbouring countries impacted by the crisis are not Finland’s official development partners. In this context, Finland has been relatively efficient in aligning its initiatives with an HDN focus, and partially also with FD. However, Finland has not been able to span the institutional divide between its humanitarian, peace building and development projects, each managed and controlled by different MFA units and departments. The Embassy staff for the whole region is three, and the potential to forge a more coherent field-level approach to HDN is not possible with minimal staff cover.

In both Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland’s policy influence is perceived by donors as ‘not absent’ but low profile, ‘low key’, ‘doing its part’, indicating relatively scant knowledge about what Finland does.

However, Finland is not perceived to be non-influential for its size and the size of its field presence. Partnership with like-minded donors demonstrably increases influence. In Somalia, Finland co-chairs (with Sweden) the ‘pillar working group’ of social and human development in the MPF. In Afghanistan, Finland increases its influence by teaming with the Nordic countries and others who have similar goals such as Germany. In all three case studies, Finland was found to be very actively promoting women’s and girls’ rights. This evidence suggests some engagement with the HDN.

However, the field studies did not discover any special influence of Finland in FD, with the exception of the peacebuilding efforts of FCA in Somalia and FCA/CSI in Syria.

**Finding 2.4: Human rights and policy influence**

Finland’s position on and influence on human rights is perceived to be changing in the context of FD. (JC 2.1, 3.2)
Traditionally a strong international defender of the need to uphold human rights and HRBA in development, our evidence indicates that Finland is now perceived to have adopted a nuanced, and thus less clear-cut approach, in the context of European policies on migration and forced displacement. Its position is described by some key informants as recognising that migration is not a crisis, nor a short-term phenomenon. At the same time, some KI evidence reports a perceived shift in Finland’s position towards a more restrictive and pro-migration control position in recent years. Overall, Finland is seen to be switching between ‘traditional’ human rights-centred positions (the traditional like-minded approach) and more anti-migration positions (typified as ‘approaching Visegrad group’s positions’), depending on the situation and context.

This diminishes Finland’s ability to influence international policy debates and standards on human rights in the context of policies related to FD and the HDN.

4.3 Establishing policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN and Finland’s development policies

EQ3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and the HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

Summary answer to EQ 3:

Despite a long and solid track record in promoting PCD that is acknowledged both internally and externally among partners, and despite having in place a series of mechanisms to promote coherence, the principal finding with regard to PCD is that FD and the HDN policies of the MFA cannot be said to provide, as yet, a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies. (JC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)

Promoting policy coherence was found to be not as prevalent in the case study partner countries where Finland is operating. A view also emerged from interviews that the role of Finland in advocating for PCD was more noticeable in the past. At the same time, it is apparent that the promotion of policy coherence also takes place informally at the personal level.

The major area of policy incoherence that emerged related to diverging views on migration and on the use of development policies to achieve migration-related outcomes. This divergence exists both within the MFA and across ministries and especially between the MFA and the MoI. The tensions between MFA development policies and domestic interests and policies on migration have not been fully resolved.

MFA policies are generally well aligned with those of its partners be they national NGOs and CSOs, or multi-lateral donors with whom Finland works closely such as the EU and the UN.
Finland’s long experience of PCD and mechanisms that support it have not yet been applied effectively to achieve PCD in relation to FD and the HDN. They are still poorly conceptualised in the MFA and have not yet crystallised in its policies: accordingly, they do not provide an adequate framework against which to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies in respect of FD and the HDN.

At the same time, Finland is a small country where many people in government know each other, and so the promotion of policy coherence also takes place informally at the personal level through extensive individual contacts across ministries and departments. This characteristic has helped to spread awareness and may help to support more formal methods to execute PCD.

Finding 3.1: 2015 and the impact on policy coherence

The so-called migration crisis of 2015 resulted in a push for a policy reorientation to set migration priorities above development. Internal resistance to this trend then precipitated significant and continuing policy incoherence within the MFA and across ministries. This has negatively impacted the achievement of policy coherence in the MFA’s approaches to FD and the HDN. (JC 3.2)

The major area of policy incoherence found in the evaluation surrounds diverging views on migration and on the use of development policies to achieve migration-related outcomes. Essentially divergence pertains to the implicit assumption, in the 2015 PMO Action Plan (Government of Finland 2015a), that there is an inverse causal relationship between development (as well as other related policies such as peace building, conflict reduction) and migration, a thesis contested by many staff in the MFA. This divergence was precipitated by a surge in immigration rates into the EU just as the approaches on HDN and FD were becoming more clearly articulated in the MFA. This policy divergence exists both within the MFA and across ministries and especially between the MFA and the MoI. In essence the problem here is that this agenda shifts coherence for development to another form of coherence, coherence for migration (management and control). Some Finnish NGOs and CSOs are also increasingly critical of what they see as a trend towards securitisation of aid and an undue emphasis on reducing migration creating a further source of tension to which the Ministry is poorly placed to respond as long as the policy differences remain unresolved.

A core document in this context is the PMO’s 2015 Action Plan on Asylum Policy (ibid.). This adopted the view that ‘the large-scale entry into a country is related primarily to the conditions prevailing in countries or areas of origin ... It is important that Finland, the EU and the international community influence these conditions’ which implies that some coordination of policy between different ministries (MoI and MFA at the very least) will be expected. The Action Plan however offers only simplistic assumptions on the relationship between migration and development (a causal relationship challenged by many MFA officials), rather than an understanding of the complexity of FD. Equally, the neglect of vulnerable groups (women, girls and children – one of the 4PPAs) in the Action
Plan further reinforces the finding of policy incoherence between ministries and the limited influence of the MFA on PMO policy in this area.

This divergence has negatively impacted policy coherence on the MFA’s approaches to FD and the HDN. Continuing tensions between MFA development policies and domestic interests and policies on migration have not been resolved and endure as a constraint to PCD.

Whilst the evaluation finds that this tension is particularly evident between the MFA and the MoI, there are also some officials inside the MFA who argue that the Ministry should adopt a different approach to development cooperation that is more closely adjusted to supporting the government’s interest-driven stance on migration. This group of officials argue that development cooperation policy should be made coherent with Finland’s migration policy (PCM), rather than the other way round (PCD). Others would like Finland’s development cooperation to continue focusing on long-standing country programmes in support of Finland’s main goal of poverty alleviation and argue that the evidence supporting the root causes approach is lacking. The increasing alignment of development with migration issues and securitisation is to a large extent incompatible with the objectives of development cooperation.

In the Afghan context, the policy coherence gradually achieved by the inclusion of FD and the HDN was then undermined mainly because of the strong emphasis on domestic migration control objectives in Finland and pressure for repatriation. These policies were driven by a short-term domestic political agenda, after the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, rather than longer-term and more holistic measures that would be required to address the root causes of conflict and displacement. Conversely, the Finnish MFA’s approach to FD and the HDN in Afghanistan appears to be to a certain extent coherent with its partners at the bilateral and multilateral level.

**Finding 3.2: Human rights and HRBA**

Policy coherence is lacking in respect of human rights and HRBAs in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. (JC 3.3)

A significant manifestation of incoherence relates to human rights and the HRBA – a guiding principle in the MFA. This reinforces Finding 2.5 above in relation to Finland’s perceived changing position on policy influence and human rights.

For example, in the MFA Guidance Note on Human Rights Based Approach in Finland’s Development Cooperation (MFA 2015), despite the references to mechanisms that may improve coherence (generally) in relation to HRBA, there is no evidence that FD and the HDN are linked to these themes.

Equally, across government there appears to be a hiatus. The Ministry of Justice stresses the importance of strengthening coordination on human rights within government. To promote this, it has appointed a Government network of fundamental and human rights contact persons, which has prepared a National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights 2017–2019 (Ministry of Justice 2017). But there is no evidence that this network is involved on FD and HDN issues.
Finding 3.3: The adequacy of mechanisms for PCD

Finland has adequate mechanisms in place to promote policy coherence. These are generally used effectively although they have not been effectively mobilised in relation to FD and the HDN. (JC 1.2, 3.3)

Finland has received positive comments on PCD promotion from a variety of sources including OECD Peer Reviews (OECD 2012, 2017). This reputation has been achieved partly because of the key mechanisms Finland has in place to promote policy coherence. In the present context these include, among others, a Task Force on Migration (MTF), the EU Coordinating Committee, the Result Based Management (RBM) and the Development Policy Results Report (DPR) processes, and the external Development Policy Committee (FDPC). Informal contacts and links between officials in different departments and ministries provide another level of mechanism, so that some promotion of policy coherence does still take place at the personal level even when formal mechanisms falter.

However, the evaluation finds that these mechanisms have not, as yet, been effective in promoting PCD in relation to FD and the HDN across ministries. Their mandates have been insufficiently strong to forge policy coherence between opposing conceptualisations of the purpose of development cooperation. Specifically, the Migration Task Force, set up in September 2015 to provide a forum for discussion between different ministries and state agencies on migration policy and its implementation can be seen as a mechanism to promote policy coherence. But in practice it functions as a desk officer implementation and information sharing level mechanism without a mandate for policy development or forging policy coherence. The evaluation found that there is little or no indication of how much this effort to exchange information and coordinate implementation actually affects policy formulation or adaptation to achieve greater coherence. Co-ordination though essential does not necessarily promote coherence.

Yet, ongoing efforts within the MFA to roll out FD and the HDN concepts and issues, such as the creation of One-page briefing notes, an Action Plan, new Thematic Ambassadorial posts responsible for the 2020 DPP review, are, in effect, also potential opportunities and mechanisms to foster policy coherence with respect to FD and the HDN.

Finding 3.4: External perceptions of policy coherence

Despite the findings presented above, Finland’s policies are generally perceived by external interlocutors as being coherent and well-coordinated both within the MFA and with the MoI. Equally, they are generally well aligned with those of its partners. (JC 3.2)

Aside from the clear tensions uncovered above (Finding 3.1) and the basis of policy incoherence that they generate, there appears to be high levels of coherence between most areas of policy dealt with by the MFA. This is consistent with the
fact that the Ministry has been strongly committed to promoting PCD throughout the period of the evaluation.

With the important exception of policy incoherence in relation to the migration-development interface, across government the evaluation finds ‘good enough’ coherence between ministries on many issues related to this evaluation (Mackie et al. 2018). A good example is Finland’s National Action Plan 2018–2021 on Women, Peace and Security published in 2018, which was prepared jointly by several ministries (MFA, MoI MoEd & Culture, MoD, MEAE), as well as by parties engaged in crisis management (Crisis Management Centre Finland, CMC Finland, and the Finnish Defence Forces), civil society organisations and experts working in research institutions (MFA 2018s). Coherence between the MFA and MoD is effective in relation to CCM and other areas of common interest but offers scope for enhancement: for example, the MFA Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action (MFA 2015d) argues that ‘Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assistance, plus an involvement with those NGOs...’

More generally, interview evidence indicated that Finland’s international partners consistently viewed Finnish policies as generally very well aligned with international policy norms advanced by various actors, be they national NGOs and CSOs, or multi-lateral donors with whom Finland works closely such as the EU and the UN.

However, an important caveat to this finding is that whilst there is policy coherence with international norms in relation to the existing PPAs and policy pillars, this does not apply in the context of FD and the HDN. It is not always clear how far the existing policy priorities and pillars go in forging coherence with these latter concepts, which are core to the evaluation.

### 4.4 Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements

**Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements**

*Summary findings*

Analysis of financial disbursements reveals that whilst humanitarian expenditure has remained relatively immune from budget cuts, there has been a significant reduction in the state budget for development cooperation coinciding with the ‘threshold moment’ of 2015. Conversely there has been a greater concentration of expenditure in the three case study countries.

Expenditure on gender equality has increased in the three case study countries but is still surprisingly small proportionately and in total given the profile of this policy area.

There is almost no evidence of the use of HDN or FD terminology.
Findings from the financial tracking of Finland’s development and humanitarian appropriations buttress many of the main findings so far presented on the three main EQs.

4.4.1 Findings on development cooperation (ODA total)

In total, the disbursements for Official Development Assistance (ODA, presented in Figure 2 below) increased from 1,026.7 MEUR in 2012 to 1,232 MEUR in 2014 and then decreased to 961.4 MEUR in 2017, representing a 25% reduction from the 2014 highpoint. At the time this report was written, no complete figures for 2018 were available but 886 MEUR had been reserved for disbursement, a further reduction of 8% in 2017.

Figure 2: Disbursements 2012–2017 on development cooperation, ODA total (MEUR)

A breakdown of the total development cooperation expenditure confirms the finding that indeed there was also a ‘threshold moment’ in 2015 in relation to ODA disbursements. The analysis shows a significant decrease in state budget for development cooperation for 2016 and 2017, although the tendency for decline had already commenced in 2015. From 991.3 MEUR in 2014, the highest year, the disbursements declined by 43% to 565 MEUR in 2017. The budget cuts in ‘exclusive’ ODA in one year only declined from 926.6 MEUR EUR in 2015 to 605.2 MEUR in 2016 (about 35%) (Table 1). ‘Exclusive ODA’ refers, according to OECD-DAC’s definition, to the bilateral, multilateral, EU development funding, humanitarian aid and support to NGOs that is directly under the control and management of the MFA.

Table 1: Disbursements of Finland for ‘exclusive’ ODA 2012–2017 (in MEUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disbursement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>788.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>861.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>991.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>926.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>605.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>565.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, governmental ‘other’ ODA disbursements, channelled through other ministries than the MFA including development finance for Finnfund, Finland’s share of EU development cooperation budget, civilian crisis management and expenses of the reception of refugees in Finland (see Table 2 below) and other
Conversely, governmental ‘other’ ODA disbursements actually increased from 237.8 MEUR in 2012 to 396.4 MEUR in 2017 – an increase of 66%. Counted together, ‘exclusive’ and ‘other’ ODA, therefore represent ‘only’ a 25% decline in total ODA.

Specifically, disbursement for refugees arriving in Finland, emphasising the impact of the European refugee and migration crisis, grew almost ten-fold from 12.1 MEUR EUR in 2014 to 117.7 MEUR in 2016, reducing again in 2017 as the number of arriving asylum seekers diminished significantly (Table 2). Projected disbursement for refugees in Finland for 2018 was reduced further to 32 MEUR.

Table 2: Expenditure on refugee reception in Finland in Millions of Euros (MEUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disbursement</th>
<th>% of ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MFA statistics

Disbursements for humanitarian aid (which is included in the total ODA), reveal a more nuanced finding. Here, there is a similar trend with a significant 20% increase in disbursements from 2012 onwards peaking at 105.7 MEUR in 2014 (Table 3). Compared with the 43% reduction in overall ‘exclusive’ ODA, however, there is only a modest reduction of about 14% from 84.4 MEUR in 2014 to 73.3 MEUR in 2017. These findings seem to confirm Finland’s strong and enduring commitment to ‘non-political’ humanitarian matters, whilst the total development cooperation budget was severely reduced.

Table 3: Disbursements of humanitarian aid 2012–2017, total (MEUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Disbursement</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MFA statistics

Turning to findings on the three case study countries, Afghanistan has been the largest recipient country of ODA: over 30 MEUR in 2015 (Table 4). It was the only one of the three to experience an increase in funding in 2016, probably reflecting the arrival of Afghan refugees in Finland. Curiously, the same did not happen with Somalia nor Syria (NB: Table 4 presents figures for the Syrian Arab Republic only, not MENA). The evaluation has not found an explanation for this difference, but it cannot be excluded that the number of Somali and Syrian refugees arriving in Finland was not particularly high in 2015, and in any case, refugee status was automatically handed to Syrians fleeing the armed conflict.

Table 4: Disbursements of ODA funding (total) 2012–2017 to the case study countries (including civilian crisis management and humanitarian aid) (MEUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25.92</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>8.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>28.47</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>11.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>26.37</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>30.31</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>9.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>18.07</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>9.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MFA statistics
4.4.2 Findings on sectoral distribution in the three case study countries

Data from the Quality Assurance Board (QAB) of the MFA was analysed for the three case study countries in order to detect possible sectoral changes in ODA between 2012 and 2017 (Annex 12 explains the full methodology and attention is drawn to the important caveat that the figures presented are indicative only and therefore may not coincide with the official statistics of MFA).

In the first period (June 2012–December 2013) for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, the DPP 2012 had obvious impact on the sectors of the proposals approved by the QAB. Just over 50% (roughly 57% if human rights are added to the same category) of the 29.692 MEUR total has been in the field of democracy and rule of law (Figure 2). Conversely, migration and/or refugees are totally absent from the body of proposed projects. The overall proportion for the three countries represents 4.7% of all QAB-approved funding proposals during this period.

Figure 3: Funding proposals approved by the QAB 2012–2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, ODA total (MEUR)

For the following sample period (June 2016–December 2017) (Figure 3), overall QAB approved expenditure for the three case study countries increased sharply, more than doubling to 64.680 MEUR. Furthermore, the sectoral breakdown of expenditure shows some marked changes. Whereas approved expenditure on democracy and rule of law reduced by half absolutely and to only 10% proportionately of the substantially increased overall disbursement, QAB approved expenditure on human development/education/health increased more than eightfold to 18.5 MEUR, and proportionately doubled from about 9.0% to 18.5% of the total. Likewise, gender equality showed an even more marked increase, from 1.05 MEUR (or about 4% of the total) to 10.6 MEUR (almost 17%).
The sectoral distribution of approved proposals is also notably wider than in the previous period. Refugee and migration-related projects are included, totalling almost 10 MEUR (about 16% of the total of 64.68 MEUR) and approved humanitarian mine clearing expenditure (separate from humanitarian aid which does not go through QAB) now totals 12.4 MEUR, comprising 18%. Overall, at 12% of all QAB-approved funding proposals, the share of Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA is almost treble the 2012–2013 period.

While there had been a radical cut in development funding (particularly in exclusive ODA), the budgets for Afghanistan, Somalia and MENA related to the Syrian crisis had suffered much less than other partner countries.

Also significant is the relatively small total and proportion of QAB-approved expenditure for gender equality, and this despite the tenfold increase (in absolute figures) in approved project budgets between the two periods. This is perhaps surprising given the high profile for the women and girls policy priority area in Finland’s DPPs and internationally.

In the second phase of the QAB analysis, the documentation concerning the approved proposals was scrutinised in terms of FD and HDN. While many proposals were justified by desk officers and/or advisors by humanitarian and human rights concerns, the evaluation found only one proposal directly using the terminology and thinking of FD: the Afghanistan SALAM project implemented by UNDP and ILO.
5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies (based on EQ1)

Conclusion 1

Despite some progress in engaging with the concepts of FD and the HDN, there remains limited understanding and know-how overall and, notably, limited shared understanding, of the concepts of FD and the HDN in the MFA, their relevance to policy making and programming, and above all their capacity to strengthen integrated approaches to development and humanitarian policy making in different contexts.

The lack of a clear and systematic conceptualisation has resulted in a lack of consistency in HDN and FD policy making and programming across the MFA. In addition the core 4PPAs and the five policy pillars have not therefore been located within a wider analytical and programming framework. Remedying this situation would, on the one hand, sharpen the relevance and focus of MFA humanitarian and development policies in the countries it supports. On the other hand, it would better connect the MFA to wider international developments in the sector. In sum, there has been limited impetus for capitalising on the potential capacity to strengthen integrated approaches to development and humanitarian policies, as described in chapter 3.2.2.

The lack of an FD lens results in another challenge: that is the need to ensure that significant populations of concern to the MFA, such as IDPs and those displaced to urban areas, noted in Finding 1.4, are brought within the remit of its humanitarian and development policies. At the same time, the lack of an FD lens highlights the narrow application of the HRBA in humanitarian and development policies.

In addition, like many organisations, the MFA has many specialised departments – for example, the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy, the CSO Unit, the Department for Development Policy, and desk officer specialisation under the Minister of Trade and Development of the MFA and the Political Department, including e.g. the Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management and Unit for Human Rights under the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But as Finding 1.2 noted this constrains the creation of internal ‘horizontal’ linkages through programming and budgeting instruments which would be conducive to the HDN/HPDN and FD.
Limited explicit engagement on FD and the HDN is also evident in the analysis of financial disbursements in chapter 4.4.

**Conclusion 2**

The MFA, and more generally the Government of Finland, have not yet been able to reconcile the contradictory tendencies, precipitated by the 2015 threshold moment of the European ‘migration crisis’, between migration and development policies.

This deep structural constraint remains a major limitation on the MFA’s FD and HDN policy development. Resolving this deep-seated contradiction between promoting development cooperation as an instrument of ‘short-term’ migration control and the more traditional precepts of development cooperation which are to alleviate poverty – the core goal cited in Finland’s 2016 DPP – and promoting long-term development must be a major priority. The situation created by the 2015 threshold moment has left little political space to engage with and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement – the drivers, patterns and processes of forced displacement explained in chapter 3.2.1.

**Conclusion 3**

The Development Policy Practice Reform and the Internal Action Plan processes within the MFA provide a timely opportunity for improving conceptual clarity and more coherent policy apparatus related to FD and the HDN.

There is evidence of a growing momentum within the MFA – e.g. the Internal Action Plan roll-out of the Development Policy Practice Reform, the Internal Working Briefs, the RBM process, Theory of Change (ToC) preparation for the 4PPAs – to engage with and embed approaches to FD and the HDN in departmental policies and structures. Together with the review process for the 2020 DPP, these constitute an opportune moment to develop a systematic and comprehensive approach to promote the development and mainstreaming of FD and the HDN concepts and policy apparatus. In this context, strategic leadership and vision from the senior management team are important to ensure progress is achieved in a comprehensive and systematic manner.

**Conclusion 4**

Finland is well positioned to further engage with emerging international support for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development (HPDN).
This potential exists at several levels. At the international level, Finland’s capacity and expertise in peace and stabilisation policies, CCM and its long experience in working in fragile states enable it to play a leading advocacy role in international fora to promote the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development. Within the Government of Finland, the triple nexus offers some possibility for overcoming the current dichotomy between the MFA and the MoI by further nuancing the complex relationship between migration/FD and development. Finally, within the MFA, the triple nexus could constitute the means to transcend some of the barriers (institutional and precepts) between the humanitarian and development sectors. Although concern might exist that political interests in peace making could undermine humanitarian principles, policy making on a common concern that transcends both sectors but does not necessarily have a clear home in either, could yield significant benefits.

5.2 Adequacy of Finland’s approach to and policy influence on FD and the HDN (based on EQ 2)

The MFA’s influence has worked well when it has been related to long-standing and familiar policy areas but has proven to be less operationally effective where the MFA finds itself in less familiar and changing organisational and operational contexts. Several structural, operational and institutional factors impair the influence that the MFA might have in regard to its policy aims in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

The MFA has generally followed norms, concepts and practices on FD and the HDN set by other, mainly international multilateral, actors. It has, nevertheless, played an important advocacy role at a strategic level, for example in the UNHCR-UNDP Syrian regional response strategy. But it is not, in general, perceived to have been proactively engaged or influential in FD and the HDN at the operational level.

Of the structural constraints, the most significant that needs to be addressed is the lack of a comprehensive understanding of concepts and thus a lack of ability to be influential at all levels in a consistent fashion.

In relation to operational and organisational factors, the MFA projects and programmes are, on the whole, too widely dispersed, and somewhat disjointed. This leads to limited horizontal coherence in relation to the HDN; there are also gaps in FD coverage. These factors impair the influence that the MFA might have for its policy aims in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

Understaffing means the MFA lacks field presence to sustain both influence and oversight over the diversity and scope of its programmes and projects. This impairs a more integrated approach that the MFA could adopt in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN.
Conversely, changing priorities, for example some application of FD thinking in the case of Afghanistan, and focused advocacy, or in the case of disability and inclusion, can also play a part in promoting policy influence.

Whilst Finland has recognisable policy influence in key priority policies, it has yet to mobilise this experience to exert similar policy influence in the arena of FD and, to a lesser extent HDN/HPDN.

Overall, the problematic balance between policy and programme spread or focus poses challenges the MFA in how best to deploy its policy influence. It is crucial for the MFA to have an effective policy statements in linking its 4 PPAs to FD and HDN/HPDN which can guide its policy influence. This includes Finland’s country strategies and their influencing plans, and PIPs. Joint evaluations with implementing partner organisations is a possibility.

5.3 Policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN/HPDN and Finland’s development policies (based on EQ 3)

Conclusion 6

The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding, and uptake, of the concepts have obstructed policy coherence and inhibited progress on PCD in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

Whilst the evaluation recognises that FD and the HDN/HPDN are relatively new concepts in the MFA, the absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding of, and engagement with, the concepts have obstructed policy coherence.

In particular, the MFA has not been able to establish a strong coherent line between the current government’s policies on migration and on its own ‘traditional’ development cooperation policies. The current tension that exists between the government’s development and migration policies is starting to undermine Finland’s longstanding track record on PCD and has severely inhibited progress on PCD in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. While this misalignment can be finessed for a while, MFA staff are finding it increasingly difficult to manage and, in time, it has the potential to seriously undermine Finland’s track record as an effective donor. This is because the Government and the two Ministries need to be realistic about the impact that development cooperation can really have on reducing migration and balance this against the MFA’s high profile as an effective and trusted humanitarian and development actor.

Conclusion 7

The role that current coordination mechanisms, such as the Migration Task Force, could play is not sufficiently recognised; or that their mandates need to be extended if they are to play this role.
There is lack of clarity on whether the coordination mechanisms that do exist in different areas (e.g. MTF or the DPC) have a mandate that goes beyond coordination and information exchange and extends to promoting policy coherence within the government or with external partners. It would seem that the role that these could play in resolving the incoherencies that have emerged, is not necessarily sufficiently recognised.

**Conclusion 8**

Internal incoherencies have not yet manifested themselves to any degree to Finland’s external interlocutors.

Paradoxically, in relation to the 4PPAs, Finland’s development and humanitarian policies are, for the time being, still generally perceived by external interlocutors as being coherent and well-coordinated both within the MFA and with the MoI. Equally they are generally well aligned with those of its partners. This suggests that, in terms of PCD, the MFA displays a strong willingness to learn from external actors and adjust national policy to international experience and norms.

### 5.4 Transecting conclusions (based on EQ 1, EQ 2, EQ 3)

In addition to these conclusions directly originating from the findings on the EQs in chapter 4, the team has identified four other conclusions that emanate from, but cut across, the main EQ findings. These are now presented and lead into related recommendation in Chapter 6.

**Conclusion 9**

Finland’s respect for ‘universal values’, human rights and humanitarian principles and protection has not been effectively tackled in relation to its HDN/HPDN and FD policies and values.

Promoting protection, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles and values have been core and enduring precepts of Finland’s development and humanitarian policies. However, the political discourse on migration and especially migration control in Finland and more generally in Europe, increasingly conflict with basic human rights and humanitarian principles. Prioritising respect for ‘universal values’, human rights, humanitarian principles and protection at the core of its HDN/HPDN and FD policies, would help to reinforce Finland’s widely recognised adherence to these values.

Similarly, the diminishing presence of the reference group of Nordic countries, traditionally a bloc that strongly championed human rights and universal humanitarian principles in the international arena, means that Finland is losing a tool by which it could gain policy influence in the FD and the HDN/HPDN arena.
Advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies are generally Finland’s niche areas, and could be further promoted also in the context of FD and the HDN and HPDN.

Conclusion 10

Advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies are generally Finland’s niche areas, and could be further promoted also in the context of FD and the HDN and HPDN. Finland has shown its capacity to promote key issues internationally with concerted, coordinated effort when the political will is there – notably in the field of disability and inclusion in refugee/IDP situations. However, the MFA has not yet reflected on how these priorities could be further promoted and incorporated to strengthen social protection in the context of FD (where the disabled are highly vulnerable) and the HDN/HPDN. Psychosocial disability and exclusion is a gap in current MFA policy making and programming.

Moreover, the MFA has not yet developed its thinking on how its international advocacy could now be taken to the next level in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN and the international dividends that this could yield.

Conclusion 11

Progress already achieved by the MFA in promoting the rights of women and girls in the HDN provides the foundation for further progress in national policies and at the international level. Less evident progress in FD constitutes the opportunity to develop a more meaningful promotion of these rights in the MFA’s national policies and in international fora.

The strength and commendable effectiveness of Finland’s commitment to the rights of women and girls in its development and humanitarian policies, and internationally, has been evident in the findings for all three EQs. However, the specific linkage to HDN has not been systematically established. Building on its experience and achievements, the MFA has a platform to reinforce this priority policy area in national policy making and in international fora in the context of the HDN, and to promote similar potential in the HPDN.

On promoting the rights of women and girls in situations of FD, for example in relation to security and vulnerability, progress is less marked. Therefore, the linkages in policy making and programming in situations of FD within the MFA need to be strengthened. There is also potential to communicate this much-needed experience at the international level.

Conclusion 12

Private sector engagement in the context of the HDN/HPDN is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role.

Private sector engagement in the context of the HDN/HPDN is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role.
Despite the high financial risks, engaging the private sector – as investors, entrepreneurs, partners with local business people in counties impacted by FD – is one of the pillars of the GCR and is increasingly promoted as an essential component of the HDN.

The MFA’s involvement of the corporate sector as a development actor, in the context of the HDN and promoted by the GCR, is limited and pragmatic. There is some awareness of this potential in the MFA, there is political commitment to the engagement of the private sector in development cooperation, and there has been some Finnish private corporate interest expressed in the potential offered by the HDN e.g. in MENA region.

Given Finland’s social welfare model, promoting trade union involvement in this sector in conjunction with corporate stakeholders could add value to PCD in this policy area, and also enable Finland to influence international action.

5.5 Concluding Overview on the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Development Policy

Drawing together the findings and conclusion of the evaluation, this chapter summarise of the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Development Policy, from the perspective of the main themes of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

### Strengths

Finland is acknowledged as a valued, trusted, professional and principled donor and development and humanitarian partner. Its willingness to work in collaboration with other actors and openness to different views, ideas and innovation in development and humanitarian policies is recognised; and in this context its commitment to European-level solutions and joint approaches and ability to broker compromises within the EU group is also recognised. It also enjoys a recognised commitment to and expertise in promoting PCD.

Finland has a strong framework of development policies articulated around a small number of well worked out PPAs and also including disability and inclusion. For a small donor, this guides generally successful implementation, ensures focused partnerships, and establishes a firm basis for advocacy and a recognisable international profile. Finland’s expertise in promoting the rights of women and girls and the inclusion of disabled persons in humanitarian and development policies is widely commended.

Its strong commitment to peace building, security, CCM and HRBA in its development policies bodes well for contributing to the emerging international engagement with the triple nexus – humanitarian-peace-development.
Weaknesses

The MFA retains a strong distinction between humanitarian and development cooperation. This is demarcated by different principles, mandates and funding regimes. Working across the ‘divide’ does not readily happen. This situation is compounded by a lack of clarity on the HDN and FD as core operational concepts. Moreover, there is little concrete evidence, as yet, of the uptake of approaches to FD and the HDN in policy making. However, momentum is accelerating with some evidence of the wish to engage new approaches in policies and department structures, albeit unsystematic for the present.

The HRBA, although strong, is not clearly articulated between the development and humanitarian sectors in the context of the HDN and FD. In addition there are significant gaps in current policy apparatus around FD impacts on different groups and settings: IDPs, urban displacement, livelihoods, climate change and displacement.

A very limited commitment to engage the corporate sector or trade unions in development strategies or as a development partner constitutes a significant gap in the context of the HDN.

Communication by MFA officials in international fora comes across as too discrete and to a certain extent predictable. The MFA is perceived as a norm follower but is insufficiently strong in promoting the wider spectrum of its interests and expertise.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents seven 'headline' recommendations, supported by more specific recommendations for implementation. Country case study specific recommendations are presented in Annexes 8, 9, and 10.

Chapter 3.2.4 concluded that an important objective of the evaluation is to consolidate the synergy between humanitarian and development policies that address different groups of forcibly displaced people in ways that will strengthen MFA policy-making and PCD. Thus, the recommendations address both FD and the HDN/HPDN although, where appropriate in a few cases, they are targeted to one or other of these elements. The general principle is that recommendations for advancing the HDN/HPDN can be seen as contributing to, promoting and advancing engagement with context-specific FD challenges, and vice versa.

The recommendations are underpinned by a Theory of Change elaborated in Annex 11 which seeks to capture the logic of how all the MFA interventions, based on a shared understanding of key concepts of FD and the HDN, can expect to achieve their expected outputs, outcomes and impacts in relation to the 2016 DPP. In this way the ToC will help to strengthen the MFA’s policy coherence in respect of forcibly displaced populations in both countries of origin and impacted/host countries. It will also act as a learning tool by helping to clarify how the different modalities, implementation channels of delivery, and target groups adopted by the MFA may or may not fit with the general overall direction of change captured in the generic ToC.

6.1 Mainstreaming the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 1–5)

Recommends 1

The MFA is recommended to adopt organisational strategies and processes that will further enhance its knowledge base and the mainstreaming of the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD in its existing policy making and programming. These concepts should be aligned with its four PPAs and the five policy pillars for the proposed 2020 Development Policy Programme.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA – mainly Department for Development Policy but also Political Department

Priority: High

This recommendation harnesses the growing momentum within the MFA to engage with and embed approaches to FD and the HDN/HPDN in its policies and organisational structures. To this end, the four-yearly review of the DPP,
directed to the 2020 DPP, provides the strategic opportunity, and the Development Policy Practice Reform an implementation process, for harnessing this momentum. The assumption is made that the 4 PPAs and the five policy pillars will be retained.

Five implementation recommendations detail the strategies and processes by which the MFA will be able to overcome some of the internal institutional barriers, enhance its knowledge development, and mainstream these concepts in its policy making and programming.

Given the evolving nature of the concepts and the orientation of this evaluation as a learning process, these recommendations are complementary and self-reinforcing rather than ‘linear’. The imminence of the 2020 DPP review, already underway, and the election of a new government with a new mandate after April 2019, place heavy demands on MFA staff if the concepts are to be successfully mainstreamed into policy within a year. With limited time available to achieve this outcome, a co-ordinated plan will be needed.

**Sub-recommendation 1.1: Greater clarity and consensus around the concepts of the HDN and FD should be promoted within the MFA by boosting the scope of the current Internal Action Plan on the roll-out of the concepts of the HDN.** *(Priority: High)*

This recommendation establishes a systematic framework for knowledge development, using the internal HDN Action Plan (annex of MFA 2018b) and, by engaging MFA professional staff in the Department for Development Policy in this process, encourages a commitment to seeking consensus on the interpretation of the concepts.

Boost the scope of the internal HDN Action Plan roll-out to encourage relevant Departments and Units to work together to review, refine and share working definitions of the concepts set out in chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, of this evaluation and the Humanitarian Development ‘Continuum’ Paper (2018).

**Sub-recommendation 1.2: Using appropriate knowledge management platforms, at different levels (e.g. senior management and Policy Priority Ambassadors; Unit Managers; Desk Officers), the MFA is recommended to promote know-how on development and policy mainstreaming of FD and the HDN/HPDN.** *(Priority: High overall but see specifics)*

Complementing Recommendation 1.1, this operational recommendation proposes two specific strategic initiatives.

1. Knowledge development, led by Deputy Director General Department for Development Policy as part of Development Policy Practice Reform process, inter alia:
   a) Seminars/workshops programme for Department of Development Policy professional staff and QAB facilitated by external experts on the HDN/HPDN and FD *(high priority)*;
b) Simulation workshops based on (i) applying lessons learned from MFA engagement in the Syrian refugee response/HDN; and (ii) developing an integrated HDP/HPDN approach for the country strategies in Afghanistan and Somalia (inclusion a regional dimension in this case) (medium to low priority);

c) Pilot a nexus approach in one PPA in a country programme (e.g. economic empowerment and livelihoods linked to the Salam project in Afghanistan) to develop and test integrative instruments for an HDN/HPDN approach that are: complementary (humanitarian interventions meeting short-term needs while development actors put in place longer-term arrangements); sequenced (short term to longer term); and layered (humanitarian and development actors providing different forms of assistance or assistance to different groups in the same geographical area) (see Scott et al., 2016 for further explanation) (medium priority).

d) Involve Development Policy Committee in initiatives a) and b)

2. Mainstreaming concepts into policy, inter alia:

a) Make an Ambassador-level appointment within the MFA’s Department for Development Policy with overall responsibility as Thematic Special Adviser for the HDN/HPDN and FD (high priority);

b) Ensure that the Thematic Ambassadors, tasked with reviewing Finland’s 4PPAs in the Development Policy Reform (DPR) for the 2020 Development Plan, promote the mainstreaming of migration/FD and the HDN/HPDN in these priority policies, including in the relevant Theories of Change (high priority);

c) Commission relevant Unit Heads to undertake a parallel process to review the five policy pillars and disability and inclusion policies (on the latter see Recommendation 5.1), to ensure coherence with the HDN/HPDN and FD perspectives (medium priority).

Sub-recommendation 1.3: The MFA is recommended to commission a lessons learned evaluation of its HDN engagement in the Syria crisis to consolidate experience and provide guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN involvement. (Priority: Medium to High)

Since the Syrian refugee crisis response has emerged as an archetype (the only?) HDN programme the MFA will have gained significant strategic, policy and implementation experience, after eight years: it is essential that the MFA consolidates this in an evaluation. The evaluation should be comprehensive covering i) all levels – HQ, regional level (the 3RP), implementation (programmes and partnerships); ii) management processes – e.g. strategy development, application of policy instruments (e.g. the 4PPAs), staffing, funding, PCD.

Sub-recommendation 1.4: Internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting should be strengthened by promoting joint analyses leading to complementary programming, and by deploying more flexible funding protocols between humanitarian assistance and development-oriented purposes. (Priority: Medium to High)
Units for Development Policy and Humanitarian Assistance are recommended to trial joint pilot analyses of programmes for Afghanistan and Lebanon/Syria, including analysis of the implications for the complementarity of development and humanitarian financing. The pilots could then be extended into complementary, sequenced and layered programming (see Recommendation 1.2). On an experimental basis, a tranche of humanitarian and development assistance funds (e.g. up to 20% p.a. in each case as an indicative amount) should be committed to initiatives that explicitly link humanitarian and longer-term development projects/programmes in these two pilots.

**Sub-recommendation 1.5: The DPP 2020 review provides a key opportunity for the MFA to fill FD gaps concerning: IDPs, urban displacement, the HRBA, self-reliance, and displacement in the context of climate change.** *(Priority: High)*

Gaps in engaging with the concept of FD inhibit the traction of current MFA policies in three of the 4PPAs, which are core to FD: enhancing the rights and status of women and girls; improving the economies of developing countries to ensure more jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being; democratic and better-functioning societies.

Implementing the recommendation would also require appointing a small task force for joint working by relevant desk and thematic officers to review gaps and develop appropriate policy apparatus.

**Sub-recommendation 1.6: The MFA is encouraged to promote and champion international adoption of the ‘triple’ humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN).** *(Priority: Low to medium)*

Finland’s ‘peace component’ experience in the context of development and humanitarian policies offers potential for engaging with the HPDN. Within the MFA, harnessing the strong commitment to the ‘peace component’ in the review of the DPP 2020 provides a cohesive process for conceptualising and implementing the HPDN. Internationally, the ‘missing middle’ of peace in the HPDN is a policy niche where, as the evaluation has shown, Finland has expertise and is well placed to promote. Actions by the Department for Development Policy and the Political Department would include:

a) Strengthen the promotion of peace building in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN in the DPP 2020 *(medium priority)*;

b) Engage in international stabilisation/peace building advocacy and policy influence (including through PIPs) with its UN partner organisations (notably UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF), its other international partner organisations (notably OECD, EU-CODEV), and its bilateral humanitarian and development partners *(medium priority)*;

c) Develop joint advocacy with ‘Nordic Group’ countries by resurrecting the strong reputation which the Nordic Group of countries have enjoyed *(low priority)*;

d) Demonstrate a tangible commitment by pledging greater use of Trust Funds for peace building. Caution would be needed to ensure this commitment delivered the MFA’s objectives *(low priority).*
6.2 Enhancing capacity to influence and manage policy priorities for the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 1 and 5)

Recommendation 2
The MFA is recommended to review its instruments and approaches for policy influencing and programming in HDN/HPDN contexts in order to sustain policy influence, avoid over-reach and to ensure proper monitoring.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Department for Development Policy and Political Department

Priority: Medium to high

This recommendation aims at enhancing MFA policy influence at the multi-country programme/implementation level characteristic of HDN situations, typically dominated by much larger donors and stakeholders operating in multiple partnerships and where the MFA has insufficient staff on the ground.

Sub-recommendation 2.1: To reinforce influence of its PPAs and disability and inclusion policies, the MFA is recommended: to pay particular attention to the efforts of other donors and look for complementarity with them in HDN contexts; and review its ‘soft-earmarking’ instruments (e.g. PIPs) in order to enhance policy influence with its partners in HDN/HPDN contexts. (Priority: Medium to high).

The main actions would include:

a) Embassies to ensure that a rapid audit of likeminded donors is prepared at early stages of becoming engaged in an emerging HDN context (e.g. Horn of Africa) or a CRRF country programme to ensure complementarity and enhance influence e.g. at regional or country programme level donors’ meetings;

b) Review HDN regional/country and CRRF country strategies in the context of MFA multilateral policy dialogue plans and influencing plans to maximise influence for PPAs and disability and inclusion;

c) Consider an advocacy programme for international donors/OECD-DAC countries to develop protocols to harmonise the division of labour and funding in HDN/HPDN contexts similar to the EUMSs’ 2007 Code of Conduct on Division of Labour.

Sub-recommendation 2.2: Where the MFA is engaged in HDN/HPDN or CRRF settings it is recommended to maintain a clear programme and project focus to avoid over-reach. (Priority: Medium)

This sub-recommendation is proposed to safeguard against the overreach which small donors may face in multi-country programmes typical of the HDN approach or CRRF country programmes. It would require Country or regional
desk to prepare, and keep under review, context specific, medium-term programme and funding strategies (alongside the policy strategy) to guide engagement in HDN or CRRF settings. These strategies should assess/evaluate if a small volume of (more generously funded) projects, concentrated on fewer partners in its countries of operation could better enable the MFA to retain policy influence and monitoring capacity in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN.

**Sub-recommendation 2.3:** The MFA should ensure that the forthcoming evaluation of country strategies of fragile countries takes forward and reviews relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on FD and HPDN. *(Priority: Medium)*

MFA-EVA should consider that in particular, findings, conclusions and recommendations on PCD, policy influence and the recommendations on HPDN are taken into account.

### 6.3 Enhancing and promoting PCD for HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 2, 5–8)

**Recommendation 3**

The MFA is encouraged to use its increasing engagement with FD and the HDN/HPDN to establish PCD and rethink inter-ministerial management structures such as the Migration Task Force to improve Policy Coherence for Development.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Department for Development Policy with collaboration of MoI and also Development Policy Committee

*Priority: High*

The MFA has not been able to establish policy coherence in respect of FD and the HDN/HPDN largely because of the unresolved tension between development and migration policies (i.e. between MFA and MoI). The roll-out of FD concepts and the HDN/HPDN, and the review of the DPP 2020 provide the strategic opportunity.

**Sub-recommendation 3.1:** The MFA is encouraged to use the opportunity provided by the roll-out and mainstreaming of FD concepts and the HDN/HPDN to establish PCD in relation to development and migration policies. *(Priority: High)*

The roll-out processes in Recommendation 1.2 provide the means to achieve PCD in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN within the MFA. The roll out also provides an opportunity to involve the Development Policy Committee in developing a shared understanding.
Sub-recommendation 3.2: MFA senior management is encouraged, in partnership with the MoI, to: revise the ToR of the MTF (jointly-run with the MoI) to promote it as the main internal forum, inter alia, in which to seek to resolve incoherencies in migration and development policies; and elevate membership of the MTF to senior management level within both ministries. (Priority: High)

This would include:

a) Revise ToR, status and function of MTF;

b) The MTF should have ToR, explicitly recognised by both ministries, designating it as the prime forum in which they will work together to resolve incoherencies, build synergies and identify trade-offs to be made by senior management or at the political level;

c) Revise membership of the MTF as a decision making, rather than information exchange, committee. A first task for the revised MTF would be for the two Ministries (MFA and MoI) to develop a realistic appreciation of the impact that development cooperation can really have on reducing migration and weigh this up against the possible negative consequences of reorienting tried and trusted development programmes.

Sub-recommendation 3.3: The MFA is recommended to jointly commission research with MoI, through the MTF, into the relationships between development, migration and displacement to promote better policy coherence. (Priority: Medium)

This would include research into the drivers, patterns and process of migration and displacement and relationship to development, for example in selected partner countries. The objective is to improve shared comprehension and promote better policies and PCD.

6.4 Promoting protection, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of FD and HDN/HPDN (based on Conclusion 9)

Recommendation 4

The MFA is recommended to strengthen its commitment to HRBA, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Political Department and Department for Development Policy

Priority: Low to Medium
Adhering to HRBA and humanitarian principles is critical to meeting the needs of displaced and other crisis-affected people in a way that respects their dignity and rights and is also effective. This Recommendation will reinforce Finland’s widely recognised respect for these principles and values.

**Sub-recommendation 4.1:** The MFA is recommended to strengthen its adherence to the HRBA, human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN by ensuring that they are aligned in the revised 2020 DPP. *(Priority: Medium)*

The review for the 2020 DPP is a timely opportunity to reconfirm and strengthen Finland’s commitment to fundamental principles underpinning the HRBA, by ensuring that they align with the evolving context of FD and the HDN/HPDN applied to the four PPAs.

**Sub-recommendation 4.2:** The MFA is recommended to advocate, in its partnerships and in international fora, stronger adherence to the HRBA, human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. *(Priority: Low)*

Implementing this recommendation would require:

a) Augment the commitment to the fundamental principles underpinning the HRBA by further ‘soft-earmarking’ HRBA, human rights, and humanitarian principles and values in the MFA’s partnership agreements and PIPs;

b) Through the Nordic alliance, promote Nordic group action and advocacy for upholding the principles of international protection, respect for humanitarian principles and human rights to situations of FD and the HDN/HPDN.

### 6.5 Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion in FD and HDN/HPDN (based on Conclusion 10)

**Recommendation 5**

The MFA is recommended to: more clearly and systematically embed disability and inclusion policies in the context of FD and in its approaches in the HDN/HPDN; and enhance its international advocacy.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Department for Development Policy and Political Department, Development Policy Committee, and specialist CSOs and professionals

*Priority: Medium to Low*
Finland has within the MFA and among humanitarian and development actors. This recommendation encourages the MFA to reflect on how its successful promotion of disability and inclusion policies could be further promoted and incorporated to strengthen social protection in the context of FD (where the disabled are highly vulnerable) and the HDN/HPDN.

Sub-recommendation 5.1: The MFA is recommended to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. *(Priority: Medium)*

The roll-out processes in Recommendation 1.2 would provide the means to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN in the DPP under review for 2020.

Sub-recommendation 5.2: The MFA is encouraged to extend its disability and inclusion policies to take account of forcibly displaced people with psychosocial needs in situations of FD and the HDN/HPDN. *(Priority: Low)*

The reason for this recommendation is that forced displacement is recognised as a major cause of psychosocial disability and exclusion, particularly amongst children; such exclusion usually continues into longer-term development contexts. This constitutes a gap in the MFA’s current policy apparatus.

For this, the MFA would need to engage with specialist representative CSOs (DPOs), experts and professional bodies to develop policies to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN in the DPP under review for 2020.

Recommendation 5.3: The MFA should now scale up advocacy for disability and inclusion policies in the specific context of FD and HDN/HPDN to the global level. *(Priority: Medium)*

Building on Finland’s successful promotion of disability and inclusion amongst humanitarian and development actors, the MFA should now develop its thinking on how its international advocacy could be taken to the next level in the context of FD and HDN/HPDN and the international dividends this could yield, for example in relation to the SDGs.

Actions could include:

a) Use further ‘soft-earmarking’ in partnership agreements and PIPs to promote further uptake amongst multilateral partners;

b) Commission an evaluation on whether this policy on disability and inclusion is effective in encouraging developing country partners to accept the principle and adapt their policies.
6.6 Enhancing advocacy and programming on women and girls in the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusion 11)

Recommendation 6

The MFA is recommended to: enhance its internal policies and international advocacy for the promotion of the rights of women and girls in the HDN/HPDN; and strengthen the linkages between policies for women and girls in situations of FD.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Department for Development Policy, Political Department, and Development Policy Committee

Priority: Medium to High

Finland has very successfully promoted gender equality policies – the women and girls Policy Priority Area – in its DPPs and internationally among humanitarian and development actors. But more work is needed in relation to FD and international advocacy.

Sub-recommendation 6.1: The MFA is encouraged to pay particular attention to the review of the PPA on women and girls in relation to FD. (Priority: High)

The roll-out processes in Recommendation 1.2 provide the means to strengthen MFA policies (e.g. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)) that promote the rights of women and girls in situations of FD. The review could also serve as the basis for high level advocacy in international fora, anchored in the MFA's already recognised expertise on women and girls’ rights.

Sub-recommendation 6.2: To enhance internal policy development and international advocacy, the MFA is recommended to commission an evaluation of its experience in gender and HDN and FD programming and a pilot project on a women- and girls- based HPDN strategy in partnership with UNHCR and UNDP and taking account of UNSCR 1325. (Priority: Medium)

These studies would signal ways forward for the MFA’s support for stronger advocacy and policy influence with its partners, and wider advocacy in high-level international fora.

Activities would include:

a) Commission a lessons learned evaluation on the intersection of gender programmes with the nexus and in FD contexts, drawing on MFA programme experience with its partners in all the case study (and other) countries.
b) In partnership with UNHCR and UNDP and/or a bilateral partner, commission a pilot project explicitly focused on developing a women- and girls- based HPDN strategy. It could take into account, inter alia, UNSCR 1325, gender and CCM/peace building in situations at the intersection of humanitarian and development programmes. Lessons learned derived from the study could:

- Strengthen MFA policy making in this area;
- Provide expertise to enhance policy influence and advocacy (e.g. through PIPs) with its partners;
- Strengthen the MFA’s position as a leading international advocate in advancing gender dimensions of the HPDN;
- Form the basis for international advocacy in high level fora.

6.7 Promoting the private sector (based on Conclusion 12)

Recommendation 7

The MFA’s Department for Development Policy in partnership with other relevant departments, ministries and stakeholders is encouraged to set up a task force to develop a joint strategy to facilitate the corporate sector and trade unions to play a more active role in supporting its development policies in the context of the HDN/HPDN, notably employment provision for forcibly displaced people and their hosts.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA in partnership with Department of External Economic Relations, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development within the MFA, Finnish National Business Organisations and SASK. Involvement of Development Policy Committee

Priority: Low to Medium

The MFA has not as yet established a co-ordination framework or an effective strategy that brings together different stakeholders (corporate sector, trade unions, and other ministries) to promote private sector and labour organisation involvement in the HDN. This recommendation remedies that situation and could yield significant added value to Finland’s HDN policies and establish a pioneering role for Finland in international progress on implementing HDN strategies. Bringing trade unions on board would be a significant innovation that Finland would contribute to international progress on the HDN since they have not so far been involved.
The MFA would need to:

Establish an MFA task force (jointly led by Department for Development Policy and Department for External Economic Relations) to work with other relevant ministries, (e.g. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment), representative Finnish corporate sector organisations and labour organisations/trade unions to develop a strategy for their involvement in HDN-type projects in country programmes.

Undertake a pilot project e.g. in MENA region linked to the Jordan Compact, involving partnership of these stakeholders and UNDP/UNHCR Regional offices to develop expertise.
### 6.8 Summary of Recommendations

The following chapter, a quick access overview to the recommendations, portrays the main thematic characteristics of these recommendations plus a recapitulation of the priorities described above.

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<th>Policy development / PCD</th>
<th>Programming / Management</th>
<th>Policy Influence</th>
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<td>1.1: Boost Action Plan roll-out - encourage Departments and Units to review, refine, share working definitions of FD and HDN/HPDN concepts</td>
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| **R2: Enhancing capacity to influence and manage policy priorities for the HDN/HPDN and FD** |
| 2.1: Advocate for international donors protocol on funding in HDN/HPDN contexts |
| 2.2: Create medium-term programme and funding strategies in HDN/HPDN or CRRF settings to maintain programme project focus and avoid over-reach |
| 2.3: Ensure evaluation of country strategies of fragile countries, takes forward and reviews relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on FD and HPDN |

<p>| <strong>R3: Enhancing and promoting PCD for HDN/HPDN and FD</strong> |
| 3.1: Ensure roll-out/ mainstreaming of FD and HDN/HPDN establishes PCD for development and migration policies |
| 3.2: MFA/MoI revise ToR and membership of MTF to promote as internal decision-making forum on development and migration |
| 3.3: MFA-Mol joint research through the MTF into development-migration-displacement relationships to promote better policy coherence |</p>
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<td>Task Force pilot project on private sector e.g. in MENA region with stakeholders’ partnership and UNDP/UNHCR</td>
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Priority

- High
- Medium
- Low
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THE EVALUATION TEAM

This page provides a brief introduction of the evaluation team (e.g. composition, the background and skills of team members, division of work etc.) that enhances the credibility of the report.

The Evaluation Management Team is responsible for the overall coordination of the Evaluation. The DEU Evaluation manager, the Team Leader and the EMS Coordinator form the Management Team of the Evaluation. The Team Leader and the EMS Coordinator are representing the Evaluation team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the Evaluation results.

The composition of the Evaluation team, including quality assurance (QA), is as follows:

- Team Leader: Roger Zetter
- Senior Evaluator: James Mackie
- Senior Evaluator: Heloise Ruaudel
- Senior Evaluator: Maaria Seppanen
- External Evaluation Quality Assurance Expert/Advisor to the team: Tasneem Mowjee

The following and summarise the areas of expertise of the Evaluation team members.

Roger Zetter: is an Emeritus Professor at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, UK, and was the Centre’s Director from 2006–2011. He has BA and MA degrees from Cambridge University and completed his DPhil at the Institute of Development Studies, the University of Sussex. He has extensive experience and specialist capability in research, teaching, consultancy, evaluation and project management in the fields of forced displacement, refugees, and humanitarian and development strategy and policy, including related to the refugee crisis in the MENA region. His projects focus on strategy, policy development, analysis, project and programme evaluation, best practice guidance in refugee and asylum policy, migration and urban sector programmes in the developing world. He has acted as consultant to many governments and international organisations including: ICRC, IFRC, UNHCR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHabitat, IOM, ILO, EC, World Bank, Governments of UK, NZ, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, and Swiss Agency for International Development, Oxfam, Brookings-Bern Project, MPI.

James Mackie: is ECDPM’s Quality and Learning Support Unit. Dr. Mackie holds a PhD in Geography from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and a Bachelor in Town & Country Planning from the Heriot-Watt University & Edinburgh College of Art, Scotland. He has more than 30 years of experience in the international development sector particularly with policy institutes and non-governmental organisations, on policy advice, policy advocacy and project implementation. This includes extensive experience of working in relation to organisations at all levels from local, national, regional and continental. Dr. Mackie is also a Visiting Professor at the International Relations and Diplomacy Department of the College of Europe in Bruges where he teaches a Masters level course on the EU & International Development.
Heloise Ruaudel: has seventeen years of experience on humanitarian assistance and protection activities, including in fragile and post-conflict contexts. She has expertise in refugees, forced displacement, humanitarian and development policies. She served as policy analyst, evaluator, researcher, and project manager for a wide range of international organisations, government ministries, non-governmental organisations and academic institutions, including the OECD, the World Bank, the ILO, OCHA, the Danish and Swiss Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Start Network, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva Call, and the Refugee Studies Centre (University of Oxford). She has also worked both for and with UNHCR, in the field as well as at headquarters. She holds a Master of Economic and Social Studies in International Politics from Aberystwyth University in Wales and a Master (Hons) in Public Law from the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Rennes in France.

Maaria Seppanen: PhD (Development Geography) and E.MA (European Master’s in Human Rights and Democratisation), based in Luxembourg, has a long history of work in the three aspects of development cooperation: academic work and research, official governmental development cooperation and freelance consultant in Evaluation. She has worked long-term in Latin America (Central Andes and Central America) in research, international UN organisation (UNESCO, Peru) and held an embassy position as Counsellor for Development Cooperation at the Embassy of Finland in Managua, Nicaragua. After a long university career, she started as a consultant, and has done Evaluations mainly of Finnish development cooperation and theoretically and practically oriented studies for MFA and Finnish NGOs. For the EU, she has been engaged in research and studies concerning the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. She regularly teaches courses on development cooperation and Latin American development geography at the University of Helsinki as Adjunct Professor.

Tasneem Mowjee (External QA/Advisor) has extensive Evaluation experience, including of donor strategies and humanitarian funding mechanisms. She has undertaken a number of studies on the humanitarian-development nexus, including a study on ‘Coherence in Conflict’ for the Danish MFA in 2015 and a review of Swiss Development Cooperation’s efforts to link humanitarian and development assistance. She is currently working on a White Paper for USAID on humanitarian-development coherence in the education sector. Tasneem has used her considerable experience to provide quality assurance for Evaluations, including a Danish-commissioned Evaluation of the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPD) for Syrian refugees and Global Affairs Canada’s Evaluation of its humanitarian assistance programme.

The nucleus of the core Evaluation team is composed of the Team Leader who is physically present in all meetings with the MFA in Helsinki.

In addition, the team received inputs from Noemi Cascone (Evaluation Trainee).

In sum, all team members have extensive Evaluation and geographical experience combined with in-depth understanding of various aspects of forced displacement as well as sectoral expertise. The team members possess also long-term experience on working with the Evaluation key stakeholder groups; the multilateral organisations, governments, CSOs as well as Finnish stakeholders.

The quality management system (QMS) of Particip-Indufor consortium comprises of Quality Management System Manual, Process descriptions, Guidelines, and Records. Particip QMS covers all operations except for banking, accounting and invoicing, which fall under financial auditing. The system is applied in all projects, for which Indufor provides services as the lead company, and in this case, as the Evaluation Manager.
A Performance and Quality Assurance Team (PQAT) was established for the assignment to secure the quality of the service delivery and to make sure that the reports produced fulfil the Consortium requirements while meeting the Client’s expectations. The PQAT is composed of the following members:

- Pirkko Poutiainen, EMS Coordinator, internal quality assurance
- Tasneem Mowjee, External Quality Assurance Expert/Advisor to the team
- Georg Ladj, Director of Evaluations, Particip GmbH
- Dominika Socha, Internal Evaluation Manager, quality assurance, Particip GmbH
- Julia Schwarz, permanent employee of Particip, the lead contractor of the Evaluation Management Services (EMS) framework contract, provide backstopping services if and when required, as well as overall quality assurance

The internal QA System put in place aims at ensuring that the Evaluation activities are implemented in a timely manner, with rigor and impartiality, and fully respecting MFA’s Evaluation principles and standards, including ethical standards.
1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2016, displacement reached a historic high with 65.6 million individuals forcibly displaced due mostly to conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. The number of refugees reached 22.5 million persons meaning that the great majority of forcibly displaced people were internally displaced.

Given that displacement is at a historically high level and having negative effects on development and human rights, the 2016 development policy of Finland emphasizes the need to address refugee situations and migration. Large scale and protracted displacement has also resulted in significant increase in need for humanitarian assistance as well as development efforts. The aim in the development policy is to ensure that people are able to lead safe and secure lives and get sufficient income in their home countries. Finland supports the efforts in a comprehensive manner through development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, policy dialogue in the European Union (EU) and international for and crises management.

The Annex 2 of this ToR illustrates where Finland is active providing funding through development cooperation and humanitarian assistance as well as crisis management. Although the figures in Annex 2 are estimates, it still reveals that Finnish support in many countries consists of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and also crisis management (funds and persons). The figures do not cover only cooperation relating to refugees. Crisis management refers to civilian and military interventions that seek to contribute to improved rule of law in a comprehensive and integrated manner.

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) has been central part of Finland’s development policy. The Development Policy Programme (DPP) of 2012 emphasized the PCD as one of the priority targets and set five key themes in which policy coherence will be strengthened: food security, trade, tax, migration and security. The current development policy is guided by the 2030 Agenda. With the 2030 Agenda the principle of policy coherence has been extended to cover the whole scope of sustainable development. The global and national work on PCD has been praised internationally for example in OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) peer reviews.

The OECD definition for the PCD highlights the importance of ensuring that policies do not harm and where possible contribute to international development objectives. The DPP of 2016 clearly outlines that Finland supports efforts to respond to forced displacement in a comprehensive manner. This Evaluation at hand will combine the two themes (forced displacement and PCD/PCSD) and will assess how coher-
ently Finland has implemented one central theme (forced displacement) that has been highlighted in the development policy.

The Evaluation will cover development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, policy dialogue in international fora to some extent, crisis management and other policies relating to forced displacement. The Evaluation will cover the period from 2012 to mid-2018, with emphasis on the implementation of the current development policy.

The Evaluation will be formative evaluating processes internally within the MFA and externally with other stakeholders (e.g. other ministries). Other ministries will not be assessed for internal Evaluation of their policy coherence and implementation but only to the extent their policies cohere with the MFA’s forced displacement and development policy frame. The Evaluation will also consider how Finland engages its principal multilateral partners (initially UNHCR, EU, UNICEF) in policy dialogue in relation to its commitment to PCD in the context of forced displacement.

2. CONTEXT

2.1. Terminology

The Evaluation will refer to a number of terms and concepts in the area on forced displacement, refugees and development policy/cooperation. Some basic explanation for the purpose of reading the ToR is provided below but a fuller elaboration of the concepts and policy implications of forced displacement/migration will be undertaken as part of the inception phase.

Refugees are persons fleeing conflict or persecution. They are defined and protected in international law. The 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol remain the cornerstone of the international refugee protection regime. The 1951 Convention defines who is a refugee and outlines the basic rights which states should afford to refugees. One of the most fundamental principles laid down in international law is that refugees should not be expelled or returned to situations where their life and freedom would be under threat. The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the mandated UN organization responsible for the protection and assistance of refugees.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. (https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant)

Forced displacement refers to situations of persons who leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, persecution and/or human rights violations. Forcibly displaced people include refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Forced migration can be defined as a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, or famine).

2.2. Global context

At the end of 2016, displacement reached a historic high with 65.6 million individuals forcibly displaced due mostly to conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. The number of refugees reached 22.5 million persons meaning that the great majority of forcibly displaced people were internally displaced. While the current crisis is global, it affects some countries and regions disproportionately with high levels of displacement seen in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. 55% of the world’s ref-
ugees came from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and South-Sudan. Syrians comprise the largest displaced population. In 2016, barely 3% of refugees globally achieved any of the durable solutions (http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html).

International human rights apply to all and the division between different categories (refugee/migrants/displaced persons) is not clear. The former Special Representative on Migration, Mr. Peter Sutherland, stated in his report in February 2017 that ‘Reality is far from being so clear-cut and there is a large grey area between those who flee literally at gunpoint and those whose movement is entirely voluntary and the situation is not often black and white.’ (http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/15/documents/Report%20of%20SRSG%20on%20Migration%20-%20A.71.728_ADVANCE.pdf)

The 2030 Agenda emphasizes that peace, development, human rights and humanitarian responses are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. The 2030 Agenda consisting of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 associated targets seeks to ensure that all nations and all people everywhere are reached and included in achieving the SDGs. The 2030 Agenda as a whole addresses various root causes of refugee and migration situations. It offers a universal, integrated, transformative and human rights-based vision for sustainable development, peace and security which is applicable to all people and all countries. In a world increasingly shaped by climate change, poverty and conflict, the SDGs cannot be achieved without taking into account the rights and needs of refugees, internally displaced and stateless people. The principles that underpin the 2030 Agenda, notably leaving no one behind and ensuring human rights for all, provide a powerful basis for inclusion.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) convened the first ever World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 to generate commitments to reduce suffering and deliver better for people around the globe and to demonstrate support for new Agenda for Humanity. At the Summit global leaders discussed how to effectively respond and to be better prepared for major humanitarian challenges. One of the priority issues was a new global approach to manage forced displacement, with an emphasis on ensuring hope and dignity for refugees or internally displaced persons and support host countries and communities; empowering women and girls; and adapting new approaches to respond to protracted crises and recurrent disasters, reduce vulnerability and manage risk by bridging the divide between development and humanitarian partners. (www.agendaforhumanity.org).

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted on 19 September 2016 expressed the political will of world leaders to save lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale. (http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration and the full text http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1). The New York Declaration set out a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), with specific actions needed to ease pressure on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions, and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The High Commissioner for Refugees was requested to propose a Global Compact on Refugees to the General Assembly in 2018. The work towards the Global Compact is taking place in coordination with Member States and other relevant stakeholders. The Global Compact for Refugees will consist of both the already adopted CRR Framework and a Programme of Action to support the implementation of the new comprehensive approach. In addition, there is simultaneous process ongoing to develop Global Compact for Migration. The plan is to adopt this compact in an intergovernmental conference on international migration in 2018.

As the Member State of the European Union, the EU sets the common ground for Finland for her policies and actions. The European Commission (EC) has recently published its progress report on migration (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20171114_progress_report_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf).
In April 2016 the EC gave communication ‘Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance’ (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees- idp/Communication_Forced_Displacement_Development_2016.pdf) and adopted a new development-led approach to forced displacement, aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced and their host communities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. The objective is to make people’s lives more dignified during displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf).

The OECD is also relevant actor for Finland and it has recently published Development Policy Tools to address forced displacement. The guidance provides a clear and practical introduction to the challenges faced in working in situations of forced displacement, as well as some practical recommendations for donor staff seeking to mainstream responses to forced displacement into their development planning and co-operation. (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/addressing-forced-displacement-through-development-planning-and-assistance_9789264285590-en)

The 2030 Agenda transitioned PCD to PCSD

The OECD has defined policy coherence as ‘the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives’ and PCD as ‘ensuring that policies do not harm and where possible contribute to international development objectives’. The OECD has provided guidance and tools on PCD, known as ‘PCD Building Blocks’ and these include: 1) political commitments and policy statements to translate policy into action, 2) policy coordination, and 3) systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting. (Building Blocks for Policy Coherence for Development 2009: http://www.oecd.org/pcd/44704030.pdf).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) had policy coherence for development in the goal #8 concerning global partnership. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf), all UN members have committed to ‘pursue policy coherence and an enabling environment for sustainable development at all levels and by all actors’. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a target (17:14) on the means of implementation to ‘enhance policy coherence for sustainable development’ (http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/).

The 2030 Agenda transitioned PCD to PCSD. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda calls for whole-of-government approaches and strengthened institutional coordination and coherence at all levels of policy-making to ensure more integrated policy frameworks for sustainable development. The OECD defines the PCSD in the following way: ‘PCSD is an approach and policy tool to integrate the economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making. It aims to increase governments’ capacities to achieve the following objectives: 1) Foster synergies across economic, social and environmental policy areas; 2) Identify trade-offs and reconcile domestic policy objectives with internationally agreed objectives; and 3) Address the spillovers of domestic policies.’

The OECD has introduced eight building blocks for PCSD: 1) political commitment and leadership, 2) integrated approaches to implementation, 3) intergenerational timeframe, 4) analyses and assessments of potential policy effects, 5) policy and institutional coordination, 6) local involvement, 7) stakeholder participation and 8) monitoring & reporting. (http://www.oecd.org/development/policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-2017-9789264272576-en.htm)
The EU context is also important to guide Finnish policies and practice on PCD/PCSD. The Lisbon Treaty obliges to PCD, and the same principle was already included in the Maastrict Treaty. The political commitment to PCD was embedded in the European Consensus on Development (2006) and this commitment was reaffirmed in the European Consensus on Development (2017) that defined PCD as an important contribution to PCSD. The Consensus guides efforts in applying PCD across all policies and all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies notably on trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security. The Consensus puts in place a requirement for a holistic and cross-sector policy approach to be pursued in partnership with all stakeholders and on all levels. The Consensus calls for promotion of whole-of-government approaches and ensuring political oversight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation. (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en)

2.3. Policy context in Finland

The core goal of Finland’s development policy is to eradicate extreme poverty and to reduce poverty and inequality. In the DPP of 2016 Finland is committed to pursue development policy coherently to ensure that the individual policy goals listed in the Government Programme support the achievement of sustainable development. Finland has a special focus on four priority areas: 1) enhancing the rights and status of women and girls; 2) improving the economies of developing countries to ensure more jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being; 3) democratic and better-functioning societies; 4) increased food security and better access to water and energy and the sustainability of natural resources. Furthermore, the current development policy emphasizes the need to address refugee situations and migration which is a new theme that has not been included in the earlier DPPs. Violent conflicts and protracted crises and also the lack of future prospects have resulted in massive migration especially from Syria, Iraq, many African countries as well as Afghanistan.

For this Evaluation, it is also relevant that Finland has emphasized the mainstreaming of gender equality in all development policy. Protection and rights of women should be secured in conflict situations and their participation in resolution of conflicts in accordance with international conventions and treaties and UN decisions, including Resolution 1325. Furthermore, the realization of human rights has been a key goal in Finland’s development policy.

As regards PCD, it has been high on political agenda (e.g. included in the Government Programmes of 2011-2015, http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government/history/government-programmes-since-1917-new). It has also been highlighted in Finland’s development policies since the DPP of 2004. Central government’s high-level PCD network was established during the government period 2007-2011, and PCD has been promoted also internationally (e.g. during the EU presidency in 2006). The two most recent DPPs (2012 and 2016) have confirmed Finland’s commitment to promote PCD/PCSD by enhancing strategic management and cooperation between ministries. The DPP of 2012 included five priority themes to promote PCD: food security and right to food, trade, tax, migration and security. The current DPP of 2016 includes reference to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Development policy is pursued coherently to ensure that the individual policy goals listed in the Government Programme support the achievement of sustainable development. The DPP 2016 also clearly indicates ensuring that humanitarian aid, peace mediation, reconstruction and development cooperation are mutually supportive and complementary.


PCD/PCSD is target on the one hand, and approach and means on the other. The wide implementation of the 2030 Agenda has raised awareness and gives thus momentum to promote PCD/PCSD. The Evaluation at hand is timely and can provide information both internationally and nationally to enhance policy coherence. As part of the National Agenda 2030 implementation plan, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in cooperation with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) will commission a report on comprehensive assessment of the Agenda 2030 implementation, including on how Finland’s foreign policy can contribute to the achievement of SDGs across all administrative branches and how coherence can be developed. In addition, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is promoting budgeting for sustainable development.

2.4. Description of the Evaluation

Given that displacement is at a historically high level and has negative effects in terms of development and human rights, the 2016 DPP emphasizes the need to address refugee situations and migration. Violent conflicts and also the lack of future prospects have resulted in massive displacement especially from Syria, Iraq, many African countries as well as Afghanistan. It is estimated that significant population growth in certain countries, especially in Africa, and climate change will further increase risk of forced migration and displacement with time.

Securing that people are able to lead safe and secure lives and get sufficient income in their home and host countries is an important goal in the DPP of 2016. Development cooperation is seen as a good way of influencing the development of societies in developing countries to have the capacity to create sources of income and peaceful living conditions for their citizens. Support to the countries of origin, transit countries and countries that have received greatest numbers of refugees will be given in the form of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Efforts are supported in comprehensive manner, not only through development cooperation but also by other means. Finland also has policy dialogue with the EU and international partners. The main target regions and countries are Middle-Eastern countries, Horn of Africa region and Afghanistan.

This Evaluation at hand will combine the two themes, forced displacement and PCD/PCSD, and will assess how coherently Finland has implemented the DPP. The PCD will be evaluated in areas of Finnish development cooperation, humanitarian aid, EU coordination in Finland, Finland’s policy dialogue in international for a (initially UNHCR, UNICEF, EU), crisis management and other policies relating to forced displacement. The Evaluation will take into account the development of the actions during the period from 2012 to mid-2018, with emphasis on the implementation of the current development policy.

As described in chapter 2.3 PCD has been central part of Finland’s development policy for long time PCD has been included in the Governments Programmes making whole government responsible of development policy. Policy coherence has been ensured through different structures: partly through the EU policy coordination processes in matters falling under EU competence, and partly through the high-level inter-ministerial PCD network chaired by the Under-Secretary of State for Development Policy and Cooperation as well as bilateral contacts between the MFA’s Department for Development Policy and other authorities. Until 2015 the high-level inter-ministerial PCD network convened biannually and it served as a mechanism for information, awareness-raising, and feedback within the government. The main responsibility for preparing and promoting development policy, including PCD, lied within the Department for Development Policy at the MFA where the national focal point for PCD was located.

Finland has had an issues-based approach in addressing PCD. OECD’s tool for policy coherence was piloted on the food security and the pilot was completed in 2013. Finland also supported a Pilot Study on the Impacts of OCED Countries’ Policies on Food Security in Tanzania which was carried out by the ECDPM and Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). (http://ecdpm.org/publications/assessing-policy-coherence-development/). A study of food security policy area is useful as it was a pilot on PCD and it is the most systematically explored policy for PCD/PCSD. The study is useful to assess connectivity with
forced displacement/refugees/migration/development as part of the context analysis. In addition to food security, in 2016 Finland launched Action Programme for Tax and Development (2016–2019) which is a cross-government effort to reduce tax evasion, tax avoidance and corruption and to raise awareness of the links between taxation and public services in developing countries.

Although no official structures have existed, there has been cooperation between the MFA and the MoI on migration and development. Both ministries have participated in the Global Forum on Migration and Development. In 2015 the MFA formed the task force for migration especially for coordination in the MFA but also between other relevant ministries. This task force has representatives from different MFA departments as well as from MoI and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The task force is not a decision making body but coordinating and sharing information.

The 2030 Agenda brought changes to the institutional set up on PCD/PCSD demonstrating strong political commitment to promoting sustainable development in Finland. In the beginning of 2016 the PMO assumed responsibility for the coordination of the national implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The Prime Minister chairs the National Commission on Sustainable Development which brings together key actors in Finnish society. The Government Report on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sustainable Development in Finland – Long-term, Coherent and Action) was approved in February 2017 (http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/79455/VNK_J1117_Government_Report_2030Agenda_KANSILLA_netti.pdf?sequence=1).

The other most relevant bodies are the Coordination Secretariat functioning under the PMO, a Coordination Network consisting of representatives from all ministries, an expert panel for sustainable development comprising of eight professors from various ministries as well as the Development Policy Committee (PDC) that monitors and reviews the implementation of Finland’s development policy guidelines and international commitments. More information is available: http://kestavakehitys.fi/en/agenda2030/implementation-finland

As said earlier, another important coordination mechanism to ensure PCD is the EU policy coordination process. Main responsibility for the preparation, monitoring and determination of Finland’s position rests with the relevant ministries. The system consists of relevant ministries, sub-committees, the Committee for EU Affairs and the Ministerial Committee on European Union Affairs. Finland’s Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels takes also part in the preparation of EU affairs. More information is available: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/eu-asioiden-kasittely?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column2&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3_languageId=en_US

The established coordination with regard to Finland’s relationship with the UNHCR is based on the following division of labour: MFA is responsible for the overall organisational policy and support (funding), and MoI is responsible for matters relating to the resettlement programme. MFA informs and consults as appropriate the MoI on general policy matters, and MoI informs and consults MFA (among other stakeholders) on issues of resettlement that is done in cooperation with UNHCR.

The OECD definition for the PCD highlights the importance of ensuring that policies do not harm and where possible contribute to international development objectives. In addition to development policy there are number of other policies and strategies that are connected to forced displacement, e.g.:

* Foreign and security policy:


- **International Human Rights Policy:**


- **Policies, strategies and operational plans relating to migration**, e.g. Valtioneuvoston periaattepäätös: Maahanmuuton tulevaisuus 2020 -strategiasta, 2013 (http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/80057/Maahanmuuton_tulevaisuus_2020-fi.pdf) and Government’s operational plan on immigration policy, 2015 http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/334517/Hallituksen+maahanmuuttropoliittiset+toimenpiteet/186046e8-46c7-450c-98cf-45b2e2d19c2c

- **Policies, strategies and operational plans relating to asylum**, e.g. Government’s operational plan on asylum, 2015

For this Evaluation the most relevant ministries are the MFA (responsible for development policy and cooperation), the MoI (responsible for asylum policy), Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, MoEAE (responsible for integration policy), the PMO and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Other ministries and agencies as well as their duties can be found: http://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/agencies-and-responsibilities. Other ministries than the MFA are not included for internal Evaluation of their policy coherence and implementation but only to extent their policies cohere with the MFA’s forced displacement and development policy frame. Nevertheless it is important to note that the remit for the Evaluation includes PCD with respect to domestic policies for forced displacement within Finland, as well as the main focus on mass impacted countries, bearing in mind that MFA does not have a mandate to assess policy implementation of other ministries but only to evaluate policy coherence.

3. RATIONALE, PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The main objective of this Evaluation is to assess how coherently the development policy and its targets relating to forced displacement have been implemented and how the coherence could be enhanced. The main objective is initially divided to the following priorities/sub-objectives:

1. **Policy coherence efforts**
   - Map, analyze and assess the successes and challenges to ensure PCD/PCSD in issues related to forced displacement internally in the MFA and externally with other ministries relevant to Finland’s policies on forced displacement.
   - How the policy coherence in the MFA is translated into its engagement with its main international partners in this topic (initially EU, UNHCR, UNICEF).

2. **Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crisis management**
   - Assess what consequences the emphasis set in DPP of 2016 on refugees and migration has had on the financial volume and orientation of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crisis management?
   - Assess what are the strengths and weaknesses in promoting integrated approach/whole of government approach, including the nexus of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and provide practical solutions how these dilemmas can be overcome for the MFA and more generally for the engagement of MFA with its partners.
The MFA is constantly seeking more effective approaches for implementing development policy priorities. The main purpose of the Evaluation is to increase knowledge and awareness of the main actors dealing with issues relating to forced displacement on the coherence of their operations. This would lead to better PCD/PCSD practices among the stakeholders as well as more effective development cooperation and humanitarian assistance programming in relation with forced displacement. The Evaluation results are also intended to inform the development of the next development policy.

The Evaluation will also contribute to increased knowledge on how to evaluate the 2030 Agenda and themes covering and linking many different policy areas.

The main users of the Evaluation are the MFA and other ministries with policies relevant to developing countries and issues relating to forced displacement, Finnish Embassies, the Development Policy Committee, the Parliament, NGOs and other stakeholders. The Evaluation may also contribute to the debate on forced displacement and policy coherence in general.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation will be formative, process Evaluation serving both accountability and learning.

This Evaluation will cover the activities under the two last development policy programmes (with emphasis on the latter) from 2012 until the mid-2018. In addition, the Evaluation will take into account the following policies and guidelines: Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding Granted by the MFA (2015), Finland’s Humanitarian Policy (2013), Finland’s Development Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States (2014), Results based management (RBM) in Finland’s Development Cooperation (2015), Human Rights Based Approach in Finland’s Development Cooperation (2015), MFA’s Democracy Support Policy (2014), Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy (2017 and 2010) as well as MFA’s Democracy Support Policy (links to these and other policies can be found in the annex 1).

The Evaluation’s focus will be on conditions a) outside Europe (i.e. countries impacted by large scale forced displacement) and b) within Finland, internally within the MFA and externally related to policy coherence of the relevant ministries.

The Evaluation will not evaluate the results and impact of other than development policy but the effectiveness and impact of MFA’s influence on the realization of PCD/PCSD taking into consideration internal coherence in the MFA and external coherence in relation with other ministries. Therefore in order to be able to assess the PCD/PCSD it will be important to analyze development policy but also other policies that are connected to forced displacement, e.g. foreign and security policy, international human rights policy, crisis management and other governments policies, strategies and operational plans relating to forced displacement. These policies will be taken into account from the point of view of development policy and the PCD/PCSD but their effectiveness will not be assessed. This will also respect the mandate of EVA-11 to evaluate development policy and cooperation.

The Evaluation will not explore refugee/asylum policies and conditions within the EU itself (for example the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)), but will take note of the relevance of EU policies to Finland’s domestic policy framework with respect to PCD/PCSD. The Evaluation will not assess the effectiveness and impact of Finland’s policy dialogue in the EU or in the multilateral organizations but the process to ensure PCD/PCSD in the issues relating to forced displacement. The multilateral organizations will tentatively include UNHCR and UNICEF as well as EU.

A fuller elaboration of the concepts and policy implications of refugees/forced migration/forced displacement will be undertaken in the inception phase. This analysis needs to be informative and will support development policy discussions in Finland.
The reframing of the humanitarian paradigm around the humanitarian/development nexus and development–led responses to protracted displacement is a profound change in strategies to address situations of displacement. These dynamics have particular salience for Finland’s PCD/PCSD approach to its development policy and will be fully taken into account in the Evaluation.

It is essential that the Evaluation is useful and provides added-value for policy-makers. It needs to be framed in the current global context of policy development, in order to better respond to forced displacement. This includes — among others — the UN-led process to formulate a Global Compact on Refugees. The Evaluation will take full account of the relevance of the forthcoming Global Compact on Refugees (and the associated CRRF), and also the Global Compact on Migration to the PCD/PCSD framework of Finland’s development policy. The Evaluation will include analysis and proposals of alternatives and their feasibility to the MFA on how to contribute to the implementation of commitments made at global level.

The Evaluation will cover Finland’s bilateral, multilateral, multi-bi cooperation, (I)NGO and humanitarian assistance.

5. ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The main Evaluation question is following:
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Finnish Development Policy, including its target-setting and its implementation, with regard to addressing forced displacement and promoting policy coherence?

The main question is initially divided to the following sub-set of questions:

1. Policy coherence efforts
   - What are the strengths and weaknesses of approaches and coordination mechanisms to promote coherent implementation of development policy and cooperation and PCD/PCSD with Finland’s other policies that are relevant to addressing forced displacement?
   - How coordination in Finland has guided Finland’s actions in the EU in this topic?
   - How coordination in Finland has guided Finland’s actions in the main multilateral fora (initially UNHCR and UNICEF)?
   - How can Finland strengthen its Development Policy, its target-setting and implementation, with regard to addressing forced displacement and in a coherent manner?

2. Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crises management
   - To what extent has the focus on forced displacement affected the financial volume and orientation of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crisis management (e.g. changes in countries, modalities of cooperation, sectors)?
   - Has Finland followed internationally agreed principles on development cooperation and humanitarian assistance concerning forced displacement as laid out in the development policy?
   - How the emphasis on forced displacement has been taken into account in the theories of change developed for four priority areas of DPP of 2016?
   - Are there good practices of ways in which Finland has ensured the respect and realization of the rights of women and girls and easily marginalized and/or discriminated persons, e.g. persons with disabilities have been ensured?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the promotion of an integrated approach of different cooperation modalities/whole of government approach, including the nexus of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation? What are practical solutions to overcome the dilemmas?

- How can Finland most effectively strengthen its Development Policy, its target-setting and implementation, with regard to fulfilling its international commitments?

6. GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The Evaluation must be gender and culturally sensitive and respect the confidentiality, protection of source and dignity of those interviewed. Particular attention must be paid to the inclusion of women, girls and individuals/groups that are marginalized and/or discriminated against in the analysis.

Although the Evaluation will serve accountability, it will also try to ensure participatory approach by promoting learning of the MFA, staff and partners to the extent possible and developing good practices for the future.

All parts of the Evaluation shall adhere to recognized Evaluation principles and the OECD DAC’s quality standards for development Evaluation. The Evaluation will be Evaluation question -based but will take OECD DAC Evaluation criteria as a guide.

The Evaluation will reconstruct the theory of change (ToC) on the basis of the initial ToC in Annex 3 which was done on the base of the chapter 5 in the 2016 DPP. There is a separate process to develop ToCs for four priority areas of the DPP of 2016, and these ToCs will be finalized by the end March 2018.

An Evaluation matrix will be developed and finalized in the inception phase. Broadly the matrix will cover the three main elements of the Evaluation (policy coherence efforts; development co-operation and humanitarian assistance) and the use of process and substantive metrics applied on a benchmarking scale (met/partially met/unmet). The matrix will enhance the linkage between the documentary, key informant (KI) interviews, and field case study components and will be developed on the lines of Evaluation questions-matrix-structure of report.

A fully-fledged process tracing approach is unlikely to be used, rather, a process tracing ‘framework’ using some elements adjusted to fit the needs of the Evaluation. A harvesting of information and evidence perhaps captures the approach. This principle will be carried forward to detailed development of methodology in the inception phase.

A detailed methodology, work plan and Evaluation matrix will be developed during the inception phase. In summary the methodology comprises four components:

i. Documentary analysis (sample) including quantitative analyses of financial flows and possibly some statistics – in-depth desk study based on the policy documents, existing Evaluations, studies, project/programme related material and other material,

ii. KI interviews, Finland;

iii. KI interviews partners – multilateral (UNHCR, UNICEF, EU) and sample of bilateral and other partners;


The Evaluation should utilize mixed methods for data collection and analysis (both qualitative and quantitative but relying mainly on qualitative methods). The Evaluation shall demonstrate how triangulation of methods and multiple information sources are used to substantiate findings and assessments. Document-
tary evidence will be tested against KI responses and field case study evidence; conversely, KI and case study evidence will be triangulated against the documentary base line.

There will be in-depth desk study based on the existing Evaluations, studies and other material. This phase will also include portfolio analysis. In addition there will be three field case studies and visit to the headquarters of the multi-lateral organizations. For UNHCR visit to regional office in Stockholm might be worthwhile to interview relevant stakeholders on Finnish policies and their coherence. Although the Evaluation is limited to three field case studies, the Evaluation will try to identify lessons learned that can also be useful for different situations and contexts elsewhere. The Evaluation will also have to secure sufficient time for interviews in Finland in order to capture evidence on PCD/PCSD.

As regards sampling, the Evaluation will define the methodology for determining forced displacement relevant projects and ODA. The inception study will pay particular attention to these requirements and will work very closely with the MFA to develop these elements of the Evaluation. The Inception report will include the final sampling principles and data collection and analysis methods and an assessment of their effect to reliability and validity of the Evaluation. The Evaluation should be open and transparent what is included in the sample and also if something is left out on purpose.

In terms of multilateral selection, the Evaluation team will define the methodology for selecting main multilateral organizations (possibly UNHCR and UNICEF) and possibly EU. Given the small sampling size the Evaluation will ensure to cover the most relevant organizations taking into consideration Finland’s policy dialogue with the organizations and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in the field case study countries/region. The Evaluation team should dedicate sufficient time to visit the offices and meet with relevant stakeholders and Finnish Embassy.

In terms of bilateral and multi-bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, three countries/regions will be sampled for the Evaluation. Given the small sampling size the Evaluation will ensure to cover country of origin of refugees, transit country and country hosting large number of refugees. Since the Evaluation will assess PCD/PCSD it is important that the field case study countries/regions cover many cooperation modalities (development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crises management). Initially, Afghanistan and Syria (including the neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt suffering directly from the spill-over effects of the conflict) are selected as field case studies.

It will be important for the Evaluation team to plan sufficiently time to map and interview all relevant stakeholders both in Helsinki and in field case study countries/regions.

The final plan for the field phase, including how relevant beneficiaries/stakeholders will be selected for participation in groups and how groups will be organized, will be finalized in the inception report. The team members for the field visits have to be identified the way that they do not have any personal restrictions to travel to the possible field visit countries.

The final Evaluation plan will be included in the inception report. The inception report will then include the desk study on the evaluand, theory of change, further specification of the methodology and the finalized Evaluation matrix, plan for the field missions and reporting of the Evaluation.

The main document sources of information are earlier Evaluations and studies, policy influencing plans for multilateral organizations, meeting documents, MFA reports and project/programme related material. The documents will be identified in the desk study during the inception phase. It is important to note that large part of the material provided by MFA is available only in Finnish (e.g. meeting documents and influencing plans for multilateral organizations). Online translators cannot be used with MFA document materials classified as restricted use (classified as IV levels of protection in the MFA or confidential in any other organization).
As regards limitations, one limitation in the Evaluation is to find data on actions in policy coherence and one way to overcome this limitation is to map well all relevant stakeholders in Helsinki and to have sufficient time for interviews.

The security situation in field case study countries is also a limitation. The mitigation measure is to plan properly but also include flexibility in the implementation of the field visits. In severe cases and in order to have access to wide range of stakeholders remote interviews (skype etc.) are also possible. Another mitigation measure is to have national, senior level evaluators in the Evaluation team.

Furthermore, another limitation is that big part of documents, e.g. policy documents and meeting memos, are available only in Finnish. The mitigation measure is to have at least one senior team member fluent in Finnish with sufficient number of working days.

7. MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

EVA-11 will be responsible for the overall management of the Evaluation process. EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the MFA and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

A reference group for the Evaluation will be established and chaired by EVA-11. The reference group is constituted to facilitate the participation of relevant stakeholders in the design and scope of the Evaluation, raising awareness of the different information needs, quality assurance throughout the process and in disseminating the Evaluation results. The mandate of the reference group is to provide quality assurance, advisory support and inputs to the Evaluation, e.g. through participating in the planning of the Evaluation and commenting deliverables of the consultant.

The use of a reference group is a key step in guaranteeing the transparency, accountability and credibility of an Evaluation process and in validating the findings.

The members of the reference group will include:

- Development policy advisor on human rights, Unit for Sectoral Policy, Department for Development Policy
- Development policy advisor on conflict and fragility, Unit for Sectoral Policy, Department for Development Policy
- Desk officer for UNHCR, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for Development Policy
- Desk officer for Afghanistan, Unit for South Asia, Department for the Americas and Asia
- Desk officer for Syria, Unit Middle East and North Africa, Department for Africa and Middle East
- Desk officer for PCSD, Unit for Sustainable Development and Climate Policy, Department for Development Policy
- Desk officer for development policy, Unit for Development Policy, Department for Development Policy
- Desk officer for civilian crises management, Unit for Security Policy and Crises Management, Political Department

Other members may be added during the Evaluation if needed.

The tasks of the reference group are to:

- act as source of knowledge for the Evaluation;
- act as an informant of the Evaluation process;
- participate in the planning of the Evaluation (providing inputs to the ToR, identifying key external stakeholders to be consulted during the process etc.);
- assist in identifying external stakeholders to be consulted during the process;
- participate in the relevant meetings (e.g. start-up meeting, meeting to discuss the Evaluation plan, debriefing and validation meetings after the field visits);
- comment on the deliverables of the consultant (i.e. inception report, draft final report) to ensure that the Evaluation is based on factual knowledge about the subject of the Evaluation and
- play a key role in disseminating the findings of the Evaluation and support the implementation, dissemination and follow-up on the agreed Evaluation recommendations.

8. EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

The Evaluation will tentatively start in March 2018 and end in February 2019. The Evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. During the process particular attention should be paid to strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team. Communication between EVA-11 and Team Leader and Evaluation Management Service (EMS) Coordinator is crucial. It is highlighted that a new phase is initiated only when the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by EVA-11. The revised reports have to be accompanied by a table of received comments and responses to them.

The Evaluation is divided into five phases. A summary of the deliverables defining each phase is listed here, with more details below:

- **Phase A**: Planning phase (December 2017 – February 2018): Submission of Team Leader’s comments on ToR and discussion with the MFA
- **Phase B**: Start-up phase (March 2018): Start up meeting in Helsinki
- **Phase C**: Inception phase (March – May 2018): Submission of Draft Inception Report and Final Inception Report
- **Phase D**: Implementation phase (June – October 2018): Implementation of field visits and interviews in Finland

It should be noted that internationally recognised experts may be contracted by EVA-11 as external peer reviewer(s) for the whole Evaluation process or for some phases/deliverables of the Evaluation process, e.g. final and draft reports (inception report, draft final and final reports). In case of peer review, the views of the peer reviewers will be made available to the Consultant.

The language of all reports and possible other documents is English. Time needed for the commenting of different reports is 3 weeks. The timetables are tentative, except for the final reports.

A. PLANNING PHASE

EVA-11 will finalize the ToR of the Evaluation in consultations with the team leader. Therefore, the EMS will provide the Team Leader of the Evaluation already in planning phase. Service order 1 will describe the required services of the EMS for the planning phase in detail.
The following meetings will be organized during the planning phase. Meetings can be face-to-face or video meetings.

- A planning meeting with the EMS coordinator on required services, especially the qualifications and skills of the team leader.
- A planning meeting with the team leader on Evaluation approach and methodological requirements (with TL and EMS coordinator)
- A meeting for finalizing the ToR and identifying the skills and qualifications of the rest of the team (with TL and EMS Coordinator, liaison with the reference group)

**Deliverable:** TL suggestions on how to finalize the ToR (an issue paper and revisions to the ToR as track changes)

**B. START-UP PHASE**

The service order 2 will describe the required EMS services in detail. The following meetings will be organized during the start-up phase:

1. The administrative meeting will be held with the EMS consultant in Helsinki in March 2018. The purpose of the meeting is to go through the Evaluation process, related practicalities and to build common understanding on the ToR and administrative arrangements. Agreed minutes will be prepared by the consultant.

   Participants in the administrative meeting in Helsinki: EVA-11 and the Team Leader and the EMS coordinator of the Consultant in person. Other Team Members can participate in person or via electronic means.

2. The start-up meeting with the reference group will be held right before the administrative meeting and its purpose is to establish a community to enable dialogue and learning together as well as to get to know the Evaluation team and the reference group. The purpose is also to provide the Evaluation team with a general picture of the subject of the Evaluation. The Team Leader/ Evaluation team will present its understanding of the Evaluation, the initial approach of the Evaluation and the Evaluation questions.

   **Participants in the start-up meeting:** EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session), reference group, Team Leader and EMS coordinator of the Consultant in person.

   **Deliverables:** Presentation of the approach and methodology by the Team Leader, Agreed minutes of the two meetings by the consultant.

**C. INCEPTION PHASE**

The inception phase includes in-depth desk analysis and preparation of detailed Evaluation plan (see the current Evaluation manual p. 56 and 96; New manual will be ready in spring 2018.). The desk study includes a comprehensive context and document analysis based on existing Evaluations, studies and other material as well as project documentation of the field case countries/regions and relevant influencing plans for multilateral organizations. It will also include mapping of programmes and their different sources of funding.

As part of the inception phase concepts (refugees/forced migration/displacement as well as PCD/PCSD) will be elaborated and included in the inception report (either in main report or annexes). This information will also be included in the final Evaluation report as contextual information (either in main report or annexes).

Before the full inception report is drafted there will a consultative process to agree on the core Evaluation team members. Other team members can also be presented if feasible. In addition the consultant will present a draft work plan and a refined budget.
The inception report consists of the Evaluation desk study and Evaluation plan which include the following:

- context analysis
- brief elaboration of the concept and policy implications of forced migration/displacement
- brief elaboration of the reframing of the humanitarian paradigm around the humanitarian/development nexus and development-led responses to protracted displacement
- brief elaboration of the concept for PCD/PCSD
- initial findings and conclusions of the desk study, including hypotheses
- constructed theory of change
- finalization of the methodology and summarized in an Evaluation matrix including Evaluation questions, indicators, methods for data collection and analysis
- final work plan and division of work between team members
- tentative table of contents of final report
- data gaps
- detailed implementation plan for field visits with clear division of work (participation, interview questions/guides/notes, preliminary list of stakeholders and organizations to be contacted)
- budget.

The inception report will be presented, discussed and the needed changes agreed in the inception meeting in April 2018. The inception report must be submitted to EVA-11 two weeks prior to the inception meeting.

Plans for the field work, preliminary list of people and organizations to be contacted, participative methods, interviews, workshops, group interviews, questions, quantitative data to be collected etc. must be approved by EVA-11 at least three weeks before going to the field.

**Participants to the inception meeting:** EVA-11, reference group and the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session), and the EMS Coordinator in person. Other team members may participate in person or via electronic means.

**Venue:** MFA, Kirkkokatu 12, Helsinki.

**Deliverables:** Inception report including the Evaluation plan, desk study and the minutes of the inception meeting by the Consultant

## D. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

The implementation phase will take place in June – October 2018. It includes the field visits to a representative sample of projects and debriefing/validation workshops. During the field work particular attention should be paid to human rights-based approach, and to ensure that women, girls, children and easily marginalised groups will also participate (see UNEG guidelines). Attention has to be paid also to the adequate length of the field visits to enable the real participation as well as sufficient collection of information also from other sources outside the immediate stakeholders (e.g. statistics and comparison material). The team is encouraged to use statistical evidence whenever possible.

The field work in one country should last at least 2–3 weeks but can be done in parallel. Adequate amount of time should also be allocated for the interviews conducted with the stakeholders in Finland. The purpose of the field visits is to triangulate and validate the results and assessments of the document analysis. It should be noted that a representative of EVA-11 may participate in some of the field visits as an observer for learning purposes.
Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, but only anonymously ensuring that the interviewee cannot be identified from the quote.

The consultant will organise a debriefing/validation workshop at the end of each country visit. A debriefing/validation meeting of the initial findings (not yet conclusions or recommendations) will be arranged in Helsinki in November. An alternative meeting could be a workshop on initial findings, conclusions and recommendations when the draft Evaluation report is available. The purpose of the seminar is to share initial findings and also validate them.

After the field visits and workshops, it is likely that further interviews and document study in Finland will still be needed to complement the information collected during the earlier phases.

The Evaluation team is responsible for identifying relevant stakeholders to be interviewed and organizing the interviews. The MFA and embassies will not organize these interviews or meetings on behalf of the Evaluation team, but will assist in identification of people and organizations to be included in the Evaluation.

**Deliverables/meetings:** At least one debriefing/validation workshop supported by PowerPoint presentations on the preliminary results in each of the countries visited on initial findings and in addition debriefing work shop on initial findings or validation workshop on findings, conclusions and recommendations in Helsinki.

**Participants in the country workshops:** The team members of the Consultant participating in the country visit (responsible for inviting and chairing the session) and the relevant stakeholders/beneficiaries, including from the Embassy of Finland and relevant representatives of the local government.

**Participants in the MFA workshops:** EVA-11, reference group, other relevant staff/stakeholders, the Team Leader (responsible for chairing the session), team members and the EMS Coordinator

**E. REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION PHASE**

The reporting and dissemination phase will take place in November 2018 – February 2019 and produce the Final report. Dissemination of the results is organized during this phase.

The report should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report must follow writing instructions and template provided by EVA-11 and it should contain inter alia the Evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. The logic between those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report will be sent for a round of comments by the parties concerned. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors. The time needed for commenting is 3 weeks.

The final draft report must include abstract and summaries (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations). It must be of high and publishable quality. It must be ensured that the translations use commonly used terms in development cooperation. The consultant is responsible for the editing, proof-reading and quality control of the content and language.

The report will be finalised based on comments received and must be ready by mid-January 2019. The final report must include abstract and summaries (including the table on main findings, conclusions and recommendations) in Finnish, Swedish and English. The Finnish speaking senior evaluator will be responsible for Finnish translations of good quality. The final report will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats.

As part of reporting process, the Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control has been addressed during the Evaluation.
In addition, the MFA requires access to the Evaluation team’s interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. The MFA treats these documents as confidential if needed.

**Deliverables:** Final report (draft final report and final report) and methodological note by the quality assurance expert.

A management meeting on the final results will be organized in Helsinki tentatively in February 2019 and the Team Leader and the EMS Coordinator must be present in person.

A public presentation on the results will be organized on the same visit as the final management meeting. It is expected that at least the Team leader is present. It will be agreed later which other team members will participate.

A public Webinar will be organized by EVA-11. Team leader and other team members will give short presentation of the findings in a public Webinar. Presentation can be delivered from distance. Only a sufficient internet connection is required.

The MFA will prepare a management response to the recommendations.

9. EXPERTISE REQUIRED

There will be one Management Team, responsible for overall coordination of the Evaluation. The EVA-11 Evaluation Manager, Team Leader and the EMS coordinator will form the Management Team. The Team Leader and EMS Coordinator will represent the team in major coordination meetings and major events presenting the Evaluation results.

One Team Leader level expert will be identified as the Team Leader of the whole Evaluation. The Team Leader will lead the work and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The Evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team Leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the Evaluation.

The minimum criteria of the team members is defined in the EMS Consultant’s tender which is annexed to the EMS Contract. The required expertise and category of the Evaluation team will be as follows:

Senior evaluator 1-n. with the following specializations: Evaluator 1-n. with the following specializations:

The team should consist of limited number of experts covering the a balanced coverage os following knowledge/expertise areas:

- Strong thematic expertise in refugee issues and humanitarian policies
- Thematic expertise in humanitarian-development nexus
- Thematic expertise in PCD/PCSD
- Evaluation of humanitarian assistance
- Evaluation in fragile context
- Gender expertise and gender Evaluation expertise
- Evaluation of multilateral organizations
- Evaluation of bilateral cooperation
- Participatory methods
- Interviewing expertise
Field case study countries/regions will be selected according to certain criteria in the beginning of the Evaluation. The EMS Coordinator will propose evaluators from the selected case study countries to include them into the Evaluation team, because it is important to have within the team people understanding well the local culture and society. The skills and experience of the proposed experts have to correspond or exceed the minimum requirements of the Evaluation team members. The EVA-11 will approve the experts.

The competencies of the team members shall be complementary. All team members shall have fluency in English and at least one senior evaluator must have fluency in Finnish, because part of the documentation is available only in Finnish. MFA document material classified as restricted use (classified as IV levels in the MFA, or confidential in other organizations) cannot be saved, processed or transmitted by any cloud services or unsecured emails and google translators or any other web based translators cannot be used to translate these documents.

The Team Leader and the team have to be available until the reports have been approved by the EVA-11, even when the timetables change.

Quality assurance of the Consultant

The Team Leader and the EMS Coordinator, with support from the Representative of the Evaluation Manager, play a key role in making sure that the internal Quality Assurance system is adequately applied, especially for each deliverable prepared by the team. If required, corrective measures will be initiated by the EMS Coordinator at an earliest possible stage to avoid the accumulation of quality deficiencies that may be hard to remedy at a later stage. As a standard measure, the EMS Coordinator will carry out the first QA to all Evaluation deliverables.

To complement the internal QA, and External Quality Assurance Expert (EQAE) will be recruited. The EQAE will carry out an independent review of the deliverables. If deemed feasible, the EQAE could be engaged in the Evaluation process early-on rather than only commenting completed documents. This approach ensures that the Evaluation is able to benefit from his expertise and guidance given the complex nature of the assignment. He is also in charge of the formal quality assurance of the Evaluation deliverables, and submit comments in a written form by using a peer review template (EVA-11). EQAE will be presented as part of the Evaluation team for the approval by the EVA-11.

10. BUDGET

The Evaluation will not cost more than Euros (VAT excluded).

11. MANDATE
The Evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this Evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland or the Ministry. The Evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the end result under Creative Commons license in order to promote openness and public use of Evaluation results.

12. AUTHORISATION

Helsinki, 9.3.2018

Jyrki Pulkkinen
Director
Development Evaluation Unit
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
### EQ1 on Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies*

#### JC1.1 The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-JC1.1</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>There is evidence that MFA policies with respect to FD are clearly formulated and well-established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>There is evidence that MFA policies with respect to HDN are clearly formulated and well-established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>There is evidence of the evolution of MFA policies with respect to FD and HDN from 2012 to 2018 with evidence of a threshold moment in policy formulation occurring in 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4</td>
<td>There is evidence that linkages between FD and HDN are recognised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### JC1.2 The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-JC1.2</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>There is evidence that the MFA’s use of FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs are implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>There is evidence that the MFA’s use of FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Four PPAs are implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### JC1.3 The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-JC1.3</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>There is no evidence of any gaps in coverage, weaknesses or unnecessary complexity in the MFA approaches to FD and to HDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2</td>
<td>There is evidence that rights of particularly vulnerable groups of displaced persons (e.g. women, children, and other easily marginalized and/or discriminated persons or groups etc.) are ensured in MFA policies on FD and HDN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Five Policy Pillars (Five PPs) development co-operation, humanitarian aid, crisis management, migration policy and human rights policy

Four Policy Priority Areas (PPAs) (I. the rights and status of women and girls have strengthened; II. developing countries’ own economies have generated jobs, livelihood opportunities and well-being; III. societies have become more democratic and better-functioning; IV. food security and access to water and energy have improved, and natural resources are used sustainably)
**EQ 2 on the adequacy of Finland’s approach to FD and HDN**

**EQ2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC2.1 Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN reflect the thinking and policies advocated by norm setters (e.g. UNHCR, World Bank, OECD, EU, other UN agencies, etc.) and by relevant independent research and knowledge institutions (e.g. MPI, RSC, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN respect relevant international commitments, conventions and principles (e.g. humanitarian principles) in this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3 There is evidence that the MFA has systems in place to encourage external and internal learning and of their regular use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC2.2 Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is multilaterals and bilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR’) and CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN mesh well with that of these institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN provide added value relative to the work of these institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC2.3 Influence: MFA’s policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 There is evidence that policy influencing steps on FD and HDN have been taken over the Evaluation period towards bilateral and multilateral partners (UN, EU and CSOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 There is evidence that bilateral and multilateral development partners have influenced the MFA’s policy on FD and HDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 There is evidence of effects of MFA policy influencing positions on FD and HDN in bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners’ policies and programmes and in the field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EQ 3 on the approach to Policy Coherence**

**EQ3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC3.1 Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 There is evidence of mechanisms to promote policy coherence having been established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 There is evidence of a record of these mechanisms being used over time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC3.2 There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (e.g. MoI and PMO, MoD) and the MFA’s partners (bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 There is evidence of policy coherence between the MFA’s FD and HDN policies and those of other Government Ministries/Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 There is evidence of policy coherence between the MFA’s FD and HDN policies and those of its bilateral and multilateral development partners (UN, EU and CSOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 There is field evidence that FD and HDN policies are seen as coherent with the MFA’s development policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC3.3 The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 There is evidence that the level of policy coherence achieved is adequate and any remaining areas of incoherence are not having too great a detrimental effect on the implementation of FD and HDN policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 There is evidence that constraints on pushing for further policy coherence with policies of other departments and ministries exists, but this is not a serious problem in terms of its impact on FD and HDN work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED


MFA. Quality Assurance Board agendas, minutes June 2012-December 2013, and June 2016–December 2017, and statements on project proposals written by desk officers and/or sector advisors on funding proposals for Afghanistan, Syria/MENA and Somalia.


MFA. (2012). Finland’s Humanitarian Policy. Helsinki: MFA.


MFA. (2014). Evaluation of Peace and Development in Finland’s Development: MFA


MFA (2015). Results Based Management (RBM) in Finland’s Development Cooperation, Concept and Guiding Principles.

MFA. (2015). Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperation


ANNEX 4: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

N.B. Titles and positions reflect the situation that prevailed at the time of the interviews in 2018.

FINLAND

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Matti Anttonen, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Department for Development Policy
Satu Santala, Director General
Riitta Oksanen, Deputy Director General
Anna Gebremedhin, Senior Advisor, Development Policy Office of the Director General
Satu Lassila, former Advisor for Development Policy, at the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy, Permanent Representative of Finland for UN agencies in Rome

Unit for General Development Policy, Department for Development Policy
Katja Ahlfors, Head
Katja Karppinen-Njock, Desk Officer for international development policy and policy coherence
Johanna Rasimus, Desk Officer, EU Development policy
Suvi Turja, Desk Officer
Suvi Virkkunen, Senior Advisor, Development Policy

Unit for Sectoral Policy, Department for Development Policy
David Korpela, Senior Adviser, Development Policy, conflicts and development of societies
Tiina Markkinen, Advisor, Development policy, rule of law and human rights
Olli Ruohomäki, Senior Advisor, Conflict and development

Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy, Department for Development Policy
Claus Lindroos, Director
Renne Klinge, Senior Advisor, Global Migration
Anna Kokko, Desk Officer, Refugee Issues, UNHCR, UNRWA
Noora Rikalainen, Desk Officer, UN refugee organisations, the Middle East, mine action
Unit for Sustainable Development and Climate Change, Department for Development Policy
Kaarina Airas, Desk Officer, Sustainable Development
Maria Forslund, Desk Officer, UN Environmental Policy

Unit for Security Policy and Crises Management, Political Department
Heli Lehto, Desk Officer, Common security and defence policy of the EU (former Humanitarian Affairs Councillor at the Permanent Mission in Geneva)
Pekka Marttila, Desk Officer, Civilian crises management

Unit for Common EU Affairs and Coordination, Department for Europe
Pekka Hyvönen, Ambassador, Special Advisor on Migration

Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Political Department
Sirpa Mäenpää, Ambassador, Senior Advisor for Mediation
Eeva-Liisa Myllymäki, Desk Officer, Special questions

Unit for Human Rights Policy, Political Department
Matti Keppo, Desk Officer for refugee, asylum and migration policy

Unit for South Asia, Department for the Americas and Asia
Niko Heimola, Desk Officer for Afghanistan
Elina Leväniemi, Desk Officer for Afghanistan
Anne Meskanen, Desk Officer, special assignments (former Ambassador in Kabul)
Sinikka Koski, former Head of Cooperation at the Embassy in Kabul

Department for Africa and the Middle East
Olivia Packalén-Peltola, Advisor, Pan-African Team

Unit for Middle East and North Africa, Department for Africa and Middle East
Pertti Anttinen, Senior Adviser
Riikka Eela, Senior Advisor, Repatriation issues
Jussi Nummelin, First Secretary Syrian Transition and Reconstruction
Suvi Sipilä, Programme Officer
Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa, Department for Africa and Middle East

Pirjo Virtanen, Team Leader, Africa policy
Sara Karlsson, Desk Officer, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan

Finland’s Permanent Mission in Geneva

Sari Lehtiranta, Deputy Representative (former Director, Unit for Development Policy)
Kimmo Laukkanen, Councillor, Humanitarian Affairs

Finland’s Permanent Mission for OECD

Pekka Puustinen, Ambassador, Permanent Representative
Suvi Tuominen, Representative for OECD-DAC

Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union

Kaisa Heikkilä, CODEV and NDICI Delegate

Embassy of Finland in Beirut

Anna Savolainen, Deputy Head of Mission

Embassy of Finland in Kabul

Lotta Valtonen, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation

Embassy of Finland in Nairobi

Toni Sandell, First Secretary, Somalia Team Leader
Karita Laisi, Head of Cooperation, Somalia

Embassy of Finland in Lusaka

Matti Väänänen, Chargé d’Affaires (Former Consellor, gender and human rights at the Embassy in Kabul)

Development Policy Committee

Marikki Stocchetti, Secretary General
Rilli Lappalainen, Member and Secretary General of Kehys ry, Finnish Platform of NGDO for the EU
Katja Kandolin, Administrator
Ministry of Defence

*Defence Policy Unit*

Matti Kemppilä, Senior Staff Officer

*Training Department, Defence Command of Finland*

Esa Janatuinen, Special Planner

Ministry of the Interior

*Policy Unit, Department of Migration*

Annikki Vanamo-Alho, Senior Counsellor

Eero Koskenniemi, Senior Counsellor

Crisis Management Centre

Kirsi Henriksson, Director

FinnChurchAid

Jouni Hemberg, Executive Director

Mika Jokiranta, Country Director, Kenya and Somalia

Sara Linnoinen, Focal Point for Network of Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, Section Peace and Reconciliation

Alexandre Avramenko, Regional Development Manager, Middle East Regional Office

Jehan Zaben, Jordan Programme Manager

Finnish Red Cross

Kristiina Kumpula, Secretary General

Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission

Rolf Stefansson, Executive Director

Tero Norjanen, Director of Development Cooperation

Kristiina Rintakoski, Director, Peacebuilding and Advocacy

Somalia Network

Anna Diallo, Executive Director

Abdulkadir Abdi, Chair
European Union

Council of the European Union

Yves-Marie Leonet, Secretary to CODEV, Council Secretariat

European Commission, Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development

Enrico Mollica, Coordinator, EU Trust Fund for Africa. International Aid / Cooperation Officer – Programming, monitoring, reporting, Dir D — EU-AU relations, West and East Africa, 1. Western Africa

Ignacio Burrull, Team Leader, Deputy EU Trust Fund Manager for the Horn of Africa Window, Dir D — EU-AU relations, West and East Africa, 2. Eastern Africa, Horn of Africa


Santosh Persaud, Former International Aid and Cooperation Officer, Dir B — People and Peace 3. Migration and Employment

European Commission, Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (ECHO)

Alice Soukupova, Programme Officer, Dir B — Europe, Eastern Neighbourhood and Middle East 1. Policy Development and Regional Strategy I

European External Action Service

Marie-Laure De Bergh, Deputy Head of Division, Service of Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues GLOBAL — Human rights, global and multilateral issues 5. Development cooperation coordination

European Union Delegation to the Federal Republic of Somalia in Nairobi

Anders G. Djurfeldt, Programme Manager, Migration and Durable Solutions, European Emergency Fund for Africa, window Horn of Africa

BELGIUM

Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union

Leen Vestraelen, Delegate for Development Cooperation, Representative at CODEV Committee

DENMARK

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the European Union

Jørgen Pedersen, Counsellor, CODEV, NDICI and Agenda 2013 Delegate
Embassy of Denmark in Nairobi
Kim Schoultz Petersen, Counsellor, Development Cooperation

LUXEMBOURG

Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the European Union
Florence Ensch, Deputy Director of Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Humanitarian Affairs

LATVIA

Permanent Representation of Latvia to the European Union
Sintija Rupjā, Head of the General and Institutional Affairs Division (former CODEV and ACP Committee Representative at Permanent Representation of Latvia to the EU)

NETHERLANDS

Embassy of the Netherlands in Nairobi
Mareike Denissen, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

SWEDEN

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union
Helena Lagerlöf, Minister Counsellor, Foreign and Security Policy Department
Kristina Kühnel, Counsellor, SIDA coordinator

Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi
Bilan OsmanJama, Coordinator, humanitarian assistance and resilience

SWITZERLAND

Embassy of Switzerland in Nairobi
Séverine Weber, Deputy Regional Director, Swiss Cooperation Office, Horn of Africa
Geneva Call

Ann-Kirstin Sjöberg, Programme Manager and Desk, Coordination for Near and Middle East, Geneva
Katherine Kramer, MEAL Advisor, Geneva
Hiba Mikhail, Programme Coordinator for Lebanon, Beirut

TANZANIA

Uongozi Institute for African Leadership for Sustainable Development, Dar-es-Salaam
Mauri Starckman, Chief Partnership Advisor (former Head of Cooperation, Somalia, Embassy of Finland in Nairobi)

IFRC

Sylvie Chevalley, Senior Officer, Partnership and Resource Department, Geneva
Finnjarle Rode, Acting director, Partnership and Resource Department, Geneva

ICRC

Caroline Putman Cramer, Country Manager for Scandinavia, Donor Relations and Fundraising, Geneva
Angela Cotroneo, IDP Advisor, Protection Division, Geneva
Gwenaëlle Fontana, Migration Advisor, Geneva
Catherine Lune Grayson-Courtemanche, Policy Advisor, IDPs and Migration, Geneva
Daniel O’Malley, Deputy Head of Delegation, Somalia Delegation, Nairobi
Benjamin Wahren, Deputy Head of Delegation, Afghanistan Delegation, Kabul

OECD

Lisa Andersson, Development Centre, Migration Team
Rachel Scott, Head of Crisis and Fragility, Development Cooperation Directorate
Ebba Dohlman, Senior Advisor, Head, Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development Unit, Directorate for Public Governance
Ernesto Soria Morales, Senior Policy Analyst, Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development Unit, Directorate for Public Governance
Carina Lindberg, Policy Analyst, Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development Unit, Directorate for Public Governance
UNITED NATIONS

UNDP
Michael Moroz, Co-ordinator UNDP Sub-Regional Response Facility, Amman
Laura Rio, Chief of Section, Livelihood and Resilience Unit, Kabul
Paul Partner, Technical Adviser, SALAM project, Kabul

UNHCR
Daniel Enders, Director, Division of Resilience and Solution, Geneva
Ewan Macleod, Deputy Director, Division of Resilience and Solution, Geneva
Ellen Hansen, Senior policy Advisor on protection, Geneva
Daria Ruoholammi, Associate donor relations Officer, Geneva
Paul Stromberg, Head, Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation Service, Geneva
Ben Farrell, Associate Donor Relations Officer, Geneva (interviewed twice)
Ryan Marshall, Senior External Relations Officer, MENA
Karolina Linholm-Billing, Deputy Representative, Beirut
Lisa van Hogerlinden, External Relations Unit, Beirut
Aurvasi Patel, Deputy Representative, Kabul

UNESCO
Patricia McPhilips, Country Representative, Kabul

UNICEF
Jessica Chaix, Education Officer, Jordan
Adele Khodr, Country Representative, Kabul
Ettie Higgins, Deputy Representative, Jordan
Salene Marti Alvarez, Head of Partnerships, Jordan

UN Women
Dr. Ana Lakatela Head, Resilience and Empowerment Unit, Jordan Country Office.
Niina Tenhio, Monitoring, Reporting and Partnerships Development Officer, Kabul (former counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation at the Embassy of Finland in Kabul)
UN OCHA
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Synthesis of findings and key issues for the EQ

Answer to EQ

EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

The MFA approaches to FD and HDN have been very limited, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation. The arrival of refugees and migrants in 2015 is identified by a majority of KIIAs as the moment of policy transition from which development cooperation is increasingly framed as an instrument of migration control, under the impetus of the MoI and in alignment with policies at the EU level. From there on policy development on FD and HDN has been marked by the politicising of the debate that oversimplified the framing of development as migration mitigation and a securitisation measure and leaves little space to comprehend and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement.

Whilst more active, but very uneven, engagement is visible in the recent period of the evaluation, both in policies and at programmatic level, especially in the MENA region where the ‘operationalisation’ of HDN has been tested and received support, the MFA has yet to develop approaches to the concepts that are clearly formulated and well-established in ways that can effectively inform its policy making and programmes in a coherent and comprehensive fashion.

While there is evidence of growing momentum within the MFA to engage and embed approaches to HDN especially in departmental policies and structures, these have not yet been formulated and construed as adding value and strength to Finland’s four policy priorities and the five policy pillars.

However, evidence of Finland’s capacity to support the emerging consensus for developing a triple nexus of humanitarian–peace–development programming could provide the opportunity to move forward on conceptualisation moving beyond the current dichotomy and overcome the institutional barriers that constraint progress towards HDN.
The evaluation also reveals that, despite increasing attention to FD and HDN, there are significant gaps in MFA policy coverage. The gaps and weaknesses identified in policy documents as well as at field level and confirmed by interviews with the MFA and partners relate to the drivers, patterns and processes of FD and concern internal displacement, HRBA and protection, urban displacement, climate change and self-reliance and access to livelihood.

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

**JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established**

While Finland’s presence in both Somalia and Afghan is old and well established, there is no evidence of policy engagement with the concepts of FD and HDN in the earlier period of the evaluation as the presence was framed around the traditional policy pillars of the MFA focused on crisis management, notably peace-building, humanitarian response and development response. Despite very high levels and diverse manifestations of displacement (internal, cross-border and return movements) over several decades, Finland’s engagement with the concepts in both countries only takes place in post 2015 Europe’s refugee crisis period and is also triggered by massive returns of Afghans at the regional level in 2016.

Finland’s presence in the MENA region is more recent and markedly different, characterised – almost from the inception – especially after 2014 when the number of IDPs and refugees exploded as an FD crisis, one where the bulk of movement has taken place in the region but also reached Europe prompting a policy response framed around migration control. Different from the other two contexts, in the MENA region HDN is at the core of the international response (3RP) which Finland, has strongly supported but paradoxically almost by default not design’. By contrast in the Somalia and Afghanistan cases it has gradually been taken into consideration. In all three countries HPDN might have even more resonance, with the support of peace initiatives like in Somalia and Lebanon and on a small scale in Syria alongside developmental projects, and the overall peace building aim of many projects in Afghanistan. But ultimately, because Finland’s engagement with the concepts is just at the inception, its partners (except in MENA) have so far little knowledge of the level and nature of the MFA’s uptake of FD and also HDN to a lesser extent.

**JC 1.2: The manner manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented**

In Somalia and Afghanistan development cooperation programmes have been long-established, around the PPAs, especially over the enhancement of the rights of women and girls, a theme at the forefront of Finland’s priorities in Afghanistan. Despite the prevalence of the phenomenon, FD is not taken into consideration at policy level while the use of HDN is incipient, if at all present, also due to the application in both countries of the comprehensive approach that is broader than HDN and thus also link-up with Finland’s PPAs. The concept of HPDN has more resonance in the two countries given the importance of peace and state building components in the two policy programmes.

The greater focus on FD and HDN in the two countries – and even more explicitly in the MENA region – however has only had a limited impact on the PPs and PPAs given that the dominant attention to migration fails to engage with the wider complexity of the concept but also fails to use them as entry points to pursue the objectives Finland sets itself in the DPP. There are two possible exceptions. One is around the engagement on livelihood and job creation in Afghanistan which has been directly target towards displacement populations and their host, but the project is too limited (in term of timeframe, scale and geographical focus to have any significant impact). But the contrary direction of causality might be true and
the different fields of activity in which Finland participates in five policy pillars and development cooperation priority areas may add value to how FD and HDN/HPDN could be operationalised, at least in the long run. The second case is in MENA region where again Finland has promoted its 4PPAs and to a lesser extent the policy pillars. But paradoxically this engagement has taken place almost ‘outwith’ the HDN focus it has adopted at the regional strategic level.

**JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)**

While Finland’s PPAs are translated into programmes and projects at field level in the three countries covered by this evaluation, the increased attention over FD and HDN has not yet been extensively translated into programmes. There are thus weaknesses and gaps that are common to all three case studies. While there is a clear focus on ‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’ in various projects implemented in the three countries, especially focusing on women and girls and to a lesser extent the disabled – in alignment with the PPAs – this approach has not been extended to considering the specific vulnerabilities triggered by displacement. In terms of gaps, a main one concerns internal displacement: while some development project activities have benefitted IDP populations, notably in Somalia and Afghanistan, the needs and vulnerability of these populations have not been acknowledged and they have not been targeted as such with the exception of a small scale project in Afghanistan dedicated to addressing livelihood needs of different displaced populations, including IDPs and small scale exploratory programme with IDPs in Syria. Then urban displacement – despite being a characteristic of the displacement in the three countries to varying degrees, especially prevalent in the MENA region – is largely absent from Finnish funding and advocacy. In MENA there has been some engagement with urban populations, since this forms the majority of the displaced, but again this seems by default rather than as an explicit policy objective. There is also limited focus on climate change despite the important causal link with displacement as seen through historical (drought and famine in Somalia in 2011) and contemporary evidence (drought in Afghanistan) that these events have precipitated population displacement.

**Document analysis**

**Answer to EQ 1**

**EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?**

There is limited evidence, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation that the MFA has developed clear approaches to FD and HDN but more active engagement with the concept is nevertheless visible in the most recent period of the evaluation. In relation to FD, the exact terms only appear in the latest part of the evaluation and the use of related terms is also sporadic and confined to the specific policy interests covered by documents with notably a surprising lack of reference to FD in documents addressing human rights and state fragility. The gap in coverage of FD is significant and the engagement with the issue is only partial with mainly a focus on refugees [from the humanitarian perspective] or migration [from the domestic perspective]. This binary approach shifts further after 2015 when large numbers of asylum seekers arrive in Europe and Finland with increased evidence in subsequent years of a stronger focus on migration control. This ‘partial narrative’ fails to address the complexity of...
drivers, manifestations and impacts of movement patterns with the related risk of a narrower policy spectrum and scope in terms of development and humanitarian programme undertaken. Yet, in the most recent part of the evaluation, some attempts to widen the debate and present a broader picture of FD are noted.

As for HDN, most of the documents fail to engage with the nexus as a tool to join and mutually reinforce humanitarian and development work except when an integrated approach is advocated. The language used in some of the policy documents in the later part of the evaluation move away from the more classic complementarily [or continuum] approach to HDN to an emphasis on migration control that links between migration and development.

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

**JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established**

There is limited evidence, especially in the earlier period of the evaluation, that FD and HDN are clearly formulated or well-established in MFA’s development policies.

The actual use of the exact terms is limited and only concerns the latest phase of the evaluation even if some engagement with the concept of FD is found earlier as indicated by the use of related terms. Regarding FD, the choice of the terminology is also closely related to the nature of the documents concerned (i.e. terms like refugees and IDPs are almost exclusively found in humanitarian documents while the term asylum-seekers and migrants are mainly used in documents related to domestic policies). A number of policy documents, especially those pertaining to human rights and state fragility fall short of making any explicit link with FD even if they engage with the underlying factors.

The document analysis shows some inconsistencies in the policy formulation of HDN and a lack of a comprehensive approach in the way HDN is implemented. Furthermore, while very few documents engaged with HDN in the context of FD, in the second period of the evaluation more connections are made through the recognition that both development and humanitarian assistance are required to address not only the refugee and migration flows but also to address the root causes of migration. However, in a number of documents a ‘securitisation narrative’ prevails.

**JC 1.2: The manner manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented**

The documents reviewed contain multiple references to the four policy priorities of the 2016 DPP, and the five policy pillars but these citations are not clearly linked to a well formulated MFA approach to FD and HDN. Although framed in different vocabulary, more recent documents (from about 2016 onwards) provide some evidence of engagement with the concepts. However, overall the concepts cannot be conceived as adding strength to the way the PPA and PPs are implemented.

**JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)**

The review of documents has unrevealed a number of contradictions, gaps and weaknesses.

One contradiction relates to the fact that while most documents are concerned with conflict related displacement once the focus shifts to Europe and Finland the emphasis is mainly on migration control.

In terms of the thematic coverage of FD, four main gaps have been identified. The first notable gap relates to internal displacement, absent from recent policy documents despite the emphasis placed on the issue...
at the beginning of the evaluation period. The subsequent gaps concern lack of reference to HRBA or to protection, urban displacement, climate change and to some less extent also self-reliance and access to livelihood.

While Finnish development policies are often covering rights and needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups, they mainly fail to explicitly consider displacement people as vulnerable and therefore to understand and address the specific vulnerability linked to their condition.

Evidence

Overall there is limited reference to FD in the documents reviewed as part of the evaluation. In the earlier period, hardly any of the policy documents mention the actual term which only starts to appear from 2016-2017 in documents like in the Lives in Dignity (EC 2016a) while The National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights 2017–2019 (Ministry of Justice 2017) uses the term forced migration once.

Nevertheless, related terms are found more frequently, especially refugees (the most common reference), IDPs (reference only found in humanitarian documents), asylum-seekers (only mentioned in documents related to domestic policies about those seeking asylum in Finland) and migrants (or migration) (referred to almost exclusively in relation to domestic concerns).

When they exist, most references to FD [in the broader sense] tend to be brief and are not always in the core of the text, especially in the earlier period of the evaluation. It is the case for the Human Rights Report 2014 (MFA 2014 a) which only refers to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), and to related domestic legislation in the annex without any other reference to displacement in the rest of the report.

Some documents have identified factors that renders people more vulnerable to displacement but fall short to make an explicit link with FD. While the 2015 Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation (MFA 2015 b) has a link to crisis management, it fails to discuss FD which is a gap as IDPs (and refugees) are potentially a major security issue in the context of conflict and conflict resolution. Documents pertaining to human rights policies are those where the lack of reference to forced displacement is the most striking. This gap is surprising given that some of these documents, like the 2014 Human Right Report (MFA 2014 a) do make the link between common causes of armed violence and insecurity and its effects. Also surprising is the omission of clear reference to FD in policy documents concerned with fragile states like in Finland’s Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation (MFA 2014 b) and the Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding (MFA 2015 a) given that displacement is very often a characteristic of these environments and could therefore be expected to be a key policy dimension in addressing state fragility.

The impact at policy level of the increased arrival of asylum seekers and migrants in Europe generally and also in Finland in 2015 is not immediately ‘visible’ in policy documents with the exception of Finland Action Plan on Asylum Policy adopted at the end of 2015 which identify root causes of FD and proposes a set of measures to deal with the situation at different level (Government of Finland 2015). Government action plan on asylum policy. Evidence of a ‘threshold’ moment, i.e. the shift in policy is more evident from 2016 and 2017; this corresponds to the delay it has taken for the threshold ‘factual’ moment to be translated into policies. This than means that in general more recent documents tend to engage with FD more substantially, not necessarily using the term per se but covering the drivers behind refugee flows and migration. The 2016 Development Policy Programme has an additional chapter on ‘The effects of refugee flows and increased migration on development policy’ and in the 2018 Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan that has an entire page related to ‘migration’, there is evidence of the vocabulary and concept of FD (different drivers, protracted displacement... MFA 2018, 57). As part of a most recent policy development, in 2018 the MFA’s Unit for Sectoral Policies developed some ‘one-pagers on migration’ to enrich the discussion (beyond the focus on migration), break down some common myths, notably
on the link between migration and development and unify the thinking on the topic. These one-pagers are currently covering the four PPAs focused themes (‘women and girls’ rights and migration’, ‘economic development, employment and migration’ and ‘democratic and well-functioning societies and migration’ and food security, water and energy, and migration’). Two more are expected to be written on climate change and demographic growth. In addition, the Result Based Management (RBM) Action Plan released in November 2018 by the MFA’s Development Policy Unit also contains in its chapter on humanitarian assistance a chapter which provides a comprehensive overview of FD, including a sophisticated depiction of migration patterns and drivers. However, not all recent documents cover the issue and for instance the Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy (MFA 2017d) are surprisingly totally silent in FD and HDN.

In terms of substance, the identification of the threshold moment coincides with a stronger [domestic] focus on migration and evidence that the impact [of displacement] in Europe and Finland is a core concern. This is most obvious in documents that have mainly a ‘domestic’ focus to start with as they more easily fail to make the link with the ‘wider picture’ (i.e. the situation of the majority of the displaced in developing countries either in relation to internal displacement or cross-border movement). For instance the 2017 National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights takes note of the shifting operating environment including regarding forced migration but it focuses on the way Finland has been affected by the increased number of asylum seekers in the country; it does not address the causes of displacement and makes no reference to refugees in host or transit countries (Ministry of Justice 2017, 18 and 23). The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security puts the emphasis on the EU refugee dimension but not in the context of the humanitarian crisis in Syria (MFA 2018, 10). The 2017 DAC Peer Reviews also emphasises the links of the migration situation in Europe to the interventions of Finnish development policy in fragile states (OECD 2017a). At the country level this approach was materialised by the creation of the Migration Task Force set up in September 2015 to coordinate the management and control the flux of asylum seekers/refugees, and to restrict the number of people flowing into Finland.

In relation to HDN, like with FD, the actual term is rarely used as such and documents tend to focus on one or the other component of the nexus thus not really engaging with the nexus as a tool to join and mutually reinforce humanitarian and development work. For instance, in Finland’s Development Policy Programme (MFA 2012) while there is no direct reference to the HDN, it has an entire chapter on humanitarian assistance with an explicit discussion of LRRD. On the other hand, the Guidance note on HRBA in Finland’s Development Cooperation (MFA 2015), make broad reference to development and conflict but without tackling the humanitarian consequences of conflicts and crises.

While some documents focus on the need for close links between humanitarian and development policies, this does not seem to be articulated as clear support in Finland for using the HDN as a core operational concept (even after and despite the EU’s explicit support for HDN in the Lives in Dignity (2016 a) communication and in the European Council conclusions (2016). The Towards a More Just World Report does not discuss HDN per se but it does talk about the differences between humanitarian assistance development and about the need for both in a post-conflict situation (MFA 2014, 53). In the 2014 Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation, there is clearly a rigid distinction made between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation: ‘Differences in relation to starting points, approaches and procedures may result in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation following two separate tracks in fragile states’ (MFA 2014 b, 25). More generally documents related to humanitarian policy seem to pay attention to drawing the limits of their humanitarian remit including by listing activities that are not covered by humanitarian assistance funds. The ‘siló’ approach is noted as problematic in relation to the HMA portfolio which is described as not fitting clearly between or outside the development and humanitarian sectors and the HMA Evaluation highlights the lack of policy relationship to either development or humanitarian priorities (MFA 2015 e). While the first DAC Peer Review suggests that ‘the HDN is somehow not yet well connected, nor well formulated’ (OECD 2012, 22) the second DAC
Peer Review also point out to weaknesses with regards to HDN and suggests that more work is needed to link humanitarian and development programme/ co-operation (OECD 2017a). To address this gap, the MFA has developed a paper (MFA 2018b) which is directed very specifically to the humanitarian development nexus and a joint action plan to ‘implement it’. But on reflection, it is when Finland advocated for an integrated approach that potential tensions between the components of the nexus are most likely to be resolved: ‘Finland strives to ensure that humanitarian aid, peace mediation, reconstruction and development cooperation are mutually supportive and complementary’ (MFA 2016, 27).

In very few of the documents reviewed there is a clear and explicit link made between FD and HDN which can be partly explained by the limited reference to FD in general as well as the limited invocation of HDN in a large part of the documents reviewed. Nevertheless, the Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding engages with the issue mainly by reintegrating the distinction between humanitarian and development aid mentioned above: ‘humanitarian assistance is not generally allocated to the reconstruction of hospitals, schools and housing in regions where returning refugees arrive. Reconstruction must be financed through other instruments’ (MFA 2015 a, 8). It is not explained whether this complementary function needs to be fulfilled by development aid with the inherent risk of not including host communities in refugee response which is a key component of the HDN applied in refugee contexts. The 2016 One World, Common Future comes closer to providing evidence when it refers to the channelling of support both in the form of development and humanitarian assistance to countries of origin to address refugee and migration flow, even if HDN as an operational concept is not explicitly mentioned (MFA 2016, 23). A 2015 MFA- UNHCR internal memo on discussion in the annual bilateral consultation goes a bit further in achieving HDN in the context of FD. In this document, UNHCR puts forward how preserving a humanitarian refugee space can be achieved in bringing in development cooperation programmes for the benefits of both the displaced and local (non-refugee) population, especially in border areas where needs are the greatest. In the same document the MFA highlights [what we assume is Finland’s efforts] to bring along the aspect of development in the early phases of crisis, not only to promote the HDN. A 2015 annotated agenda of the bilateral consultation with UNHCR highlights how all possibilities to act in coordinated manners and allocate financial means to address challenges related to irregular and forced migration should be explored, including strengthening synergies and the nexus between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The 2017 Evaluation of the Finnish Red Cross is most likely the document that contains the clearest indicators of the linkage and interplay of FD and HDN and programmes transitioning from one to the other, highlighting notably the objectives of ‘improving the capacity [of the displaced] to be self-reliant and to participate more actively in decision-making and development activities in the [host] communities’ (MFA 2017 c, 42). The refugee/IDP-host interplay is an important marker of progressive thinking. While the language in this publication seems more ‘progressive’ than that found in MFA documents, this is an evaluation of a MFA partner not the MFA itself.

Identifying a threshold moment or signs of a shift in policy in relation to HDN is more challenging than for FD. HDN as a concept dates back to the 1990s yet it is also an evolving one and signs of this evolution are visible from the documents review. When comparing on previous MFA paper on the linkages of relief, rehabilitation and development (MFA 2009) with the recent one (MFA 2018b), there is an evident change of focus with the earlier document concerned more with reconstruction rather than with development. But evolution over the HDN appears slow for reasons related to the strong will to preserve the distinction between humanitarian and development cooperation.

In documents that make connections with development and humanitarian assistance, the focus is on root causes. In two UNHCR memos (2015 and 2016) on bilateral discussions with UNHCR, Finland stresses that Finland’s development policy includes addressing root causes of migration at the same time as (supporting) humanitarian operations. Likewise, the 2016 One World, Common Future in its reference to refugee flows and migration talks about channelling support to countries of origin, both in the form of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (MFA 2016, 23). A 2015 annotated agenda on bilateral
consultation with UNHCR stresses the benefits of well managed and safe migration and emphasises the need to strengthen the migration capacity of countries of origin and transit [through cooperation with third countries]; the fight towards irregular migration which feeds criminal networks and that is a risk to migrants and compromises the right of sovereign states to control entry, materialized in the European context in the support of the activities of Frontex, EASO, Europol and EMSA and put forward a militarized approach (e.g. emphasis on the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy to find solutions to the ‘on-going crisis in the Mediterranean’. This language is shifting away from a more classical humanitarian approach to reflect some of Finland’s more ‘domestic concerns’ about migration control and on the link between migration and development what we have referred to as the migration-development nexus. In the *Evaluation of the Finnish Refugee Council* the absence of correlation between the countries where the FRC intervene and the nationalities of the migrant populations seem to even be presented as a weakness: ‘FRC has no presence in or around the ‘hot spots’ where most refugees come from or are hosted: none of the countries where FRC is working are major sources of refugees for Europe in general or Finland in particular’ (MFA 2017c, 26). In some documents a ‘securitisation narrative’ dominates. For instance, in the 2015 *Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperation* connections are found between global security/crisis/conflict/state fragility and other phenomena related to FD like human trafficking and illegal migration with some specific reference made to situations in Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya and Syria (MFA 2015c, 35). Equally, the *Prime Minister’s Office Government Report* mentions a link between crisis and fragile States and negative phenomena associated with migration, including human trafficking and smuggling, irregular migration, and exploitation of people in a vulnerable position (PMO 2017, 37).

The document analysis has also revealed several significant gaps in the coverage of FD and HDN.

In terms of the thematic coverage of FD, what emerges is that despite the increasing attention to FD [and migration especially] over time, the gaps listed below have remained throughout the entire period of the evaluation [and even accentuated in relation to protection and internal displacement].

- The first notable gap relates to internal displacement. While internal forced displacement is often a characteristic of many fragile states, particularly those in which the MFA has involvement, especially Afghanistan and Somalia, IDPs do not feature as an issue anywhere in 2014 *Guidelines on Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States* (MFA 2014b). It is worth adding that the Guidelines are silent as well on refugees, also a product of state fragility while refugee returns have substantial implications for post-conflict peace building. Internal displacement does not feature either as an issue anywhere in the more recent *Finland’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security*. This lack of reference to internal displacement shows a lack of coherence with the 2012 *Humanitarian Policy* which did put the emphasis on the increased number of IDPs and their specific plight, including the fact that ‘economic and legal position of IDPs is often even weaker than that of refugees’ (MFA 2012a, 7).

- A second gap is the lack of reference to HRBA or to protection when referring to forcibly displaced people. This is at odd with the rights-based approach that underpins refugee law and institutions as well as policies on IDPs. The main exception is again found in the *Humanitarian Policy* that puts forward the importance of importance of protecting civilians in conflict including those displaced and emphasises on the protection mandate of global actors such as the UN and the role of policy and normative instruments (MFA 2012a, 18). There is also a short reference about Finland’s support in host and transit countries ‘thus improving refugee protection and preventing human trade and trafficking’ and on Finland’s advocacy [in international organisation and fora] for the ‘protection of rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and their just treatment’ in the 2016 Development Policy Programme (MFA 2016, 23–24).
• A third gap concerns urban displacement. The focus even in documents published after 2014 remains almost exclusively on refugees in camp set-up despite the shift in the wider policy arena towards urban displacement.

• A fourth gap identified is on climate change which overall is characterised by a lack of systematic coverage of its link to displacement in many of the documents, including the more recent ones. For instance, the 2015 Guidance Note on HRBA mentions that ‘climate change directly affects the enjoyment of many human rights such as right to food, water and health’ but omits to mention that displacement can be a consequence of the deprivation of such rights. The exception to that is the frequent reference to climate change in the 2016 DPP described as ‘one of mankind’s greatest challenges’ and both an obstacle to development and a cause of migration (MFA 2016, 5 and 23). The other is the forecast made in the Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy that ‘Migration to Europe will increase in the coming decades significantly from present levels if no successful response if found [notably] to the problems posed by climate change’.

• A fifth gap concerns the limited reference to self-reliance and access to livelihood which tends to be viewed only in terms of support for returnees despite being a key component of the HDN that has been given greater emphasis in the policy [and programmatic arena] to address protracted displacement. One possible explanation is the limited support for livelihood programmes as illustrated in the Guideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding: ‘development-oriented measures, which aim at greater self-sufficiency and improved livelihood opportunities for refugees can be supported on a case-by-case basis’ (MFA 2015a, 5).

Many of the documents reviewed place specific attention on ‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’. The 2015 HRBA Guidance Note notably mentions the overall objective of reducing inequalities between individuals, groups and societies (MFA 2015, 21) while the 2014 Human Rights Report reiterates that non-discrimination is ‘an important objective of the Government’s fundamental and human rights activities’ (MFA 2014a, 10). Not all documents specify who the marginalised and vulnerable groups are but those that do most often put forward the specific vulnerabilities of notably women (with a focus on gender equality and the prevention and elimination of violence) and children like in 2014 Finland’s Guidelines on Fragile States. The 2014 Towards a More Just World Free of Poverty Report states that ‘within the sphere of humanitarian actors Finland promotes an increasingly greater consideration of persons with disabilities’ (MFA 2014, 22). This could be identified as one of the initial references to disability which gradually developed into a priority area in subsequent years.

What is important to highlight in the context of this evaluation is that very few of the documents reviewed make specific reference to the vulnerability or marginalisation of displaced people [despite the array of literature that has documented this link]. Similarly, in most of the documents, discussions on women, children and disabled is in context of development co-operation but not in context of FD and HDN. This is surprising given the global policy focus (and related research) on the specific vulnerability of these groups (e.g. greater exposure to sexual abuses, children disproportionately out of school and engaging in child labour, additional challenges for persons with disabilities during flight, in displacement and return...). One exception is the reference made in the 2015 Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action to SC’s Resolution 1325 which address the situation of women refugees and internally displaced women (MFA 2015d, 85). The other is the specific reference to young asylum-seekers and the support envisaged for youth centres and more generally to the intention to access ‘hard to reach’ population whether men, women or children made in the National Action Plan on Fundamental Human Rights (MFA, 2017).
**Answer to EQ 1**

EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

Evaluating KII evidence, the MFA has yet to develop clear approaches to FD and HDN.

Traditionally FD (although the term itself is still not commonly used in Finland) has essentially fallen within the humanitarian sphere with a strong focus on refugees while migration was dealt with both as a domestic matter (mainly in the MoI) and also linked to development. KIIIs recognise that this model shifted in Finland (but also at the EU level) following the ‘2015 crisis’ with stronger emphasis put on migration control mainly under the aegis of the MoI, correlating development assistance with the root causes narrative and migration deterrence (despite the lack of evidence for this correlation). This has left little space to understand complex processes behind people’s movement. However, the inclusion of a Chapter on refugees and migration in the 2016 DPP provides evidence of the fact that FD made its way into policy and opened up the way for MFA’s engagement with the concept including by creating greater linked with its PPAs.

KII evidence indicates that the reframing of development policy to serve national interests has been equally problematic for engaging with the concept of HDN. Whilst KIIIs express enthusiastic interest in the concept, they acknowledge limited progress so far in developing a common understanding between humanitarian and development interests in the MFA and a policy framework despite concrete steps having been taken through the production of a policy paper and the Internal Action Plan.

But KII evidence also shows that beefing up Finland’s commitment and expertise around peace building could be the ‘missing link’ to overcome the challenges around the binary H and D nexus model and also identify a convergent objective in tackling the root causes of FD.

**Key findings on the Judgement Criteria**

**JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established**

There is very little KII evidence (within the MFA and with partners) that the manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development co-operation and humanitarian assistance policies is, as yet, clearly formulated and well-established. However, much KII evidence indicates that HDN (but not FD) is at least topical, and the subject of informal dialogue, and there is a discernible interest in engaging with the concept and developing relevant policy. The potential for HDN to provide for a more objective analysis of the complexity of development and displacement contexts and a more holistic approach to policy making was a theme raised by several KIIIs. But KIIIs also mentioned that the peace component could add value and sense to the nexus and could be an area of convergence.

There is KII evidence that the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ significantly affected the approach to policy development in HDN and FD. There was also a clear sense from partners that Finland’s position regarding migration in the broader sense was aligned to the approach of many other European countries (i.e. orientated funding towards migration control; use development as a mean to deter onwards movements of migrants
and towards return objectives). But the EU also engages with the wider issue of FD since the term emerged as a result of the Council conclusions from 2016.

**Evidence**

All KIIs, both within GoF and Finland’s bilateral and multilateral partners convey the firm impression that the MFA has not proactively engaged in depth with the emerging policy areas of FD and the current formulation of HDN. But while, overall, external KIs indicate that they have no clear sense of Finland’s understanding/approach to forced displacement and the ‘nexus’, they acknowledge that this impression must be nuanced by the fact that the concepts have not yet ‘completely matured’ and that different actors may engage in different ways.

On the other hand, the MFA paper on the humanitarian-development ‘continuum’ (MFA 2018b) is clearly a significant landmark in MFA thinking on HDN – evidenced in a number of KIIs who endorsed its role in helping to develop a clearer formulation and to make progress in establishing the concept in the MFA’s policy apparatus. According to one KI Finland acknowledged the evolution from a model where development was subsequent to humanitarian aid to one that is more about integration – recognising that both may be required at the same time and at the inception of a crisis and that humanitarian support cannot cover development needs. However, beyond these objectives Finland will need to address tensions and obstacles on HDN for the implementation the Refugee Compact. It was however noted that the word continuum that is still being used both in the HDN paper (MFA 2018b) and the MFA’s Internal Action Plan (annex of MFA 2018b) may not accurately capture on-going thinking about HDN. KIIs agreed that there is not yet a full understanding of the concept and that it has not yet become a main priority in the MFA. One KI went further by acknowledging that there is no real push towards the nexus and both streams remaining independent from each other with each side committed to its cause highlighting that ‘this is an institutional challenge as much as a conceptual issue’.

There is substantial and consistent KII evidence that the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ shock (otherwise described as well managed in Finland by a large majority of KIs) and the cut in the development budget significantly shaped the approach to policy development on FD and HDN by politicising the debate and oversimplified the framing of development as a migration mitigation and a securitisation measure. At the EU level, KIIs reinforced the conclusion that 2015 marks the dividing line when the narrative on migration started to change and to take a more prominent role in the debate, notably with the introduction of conditionality on development assistance related to migration. From 2017 with the adoption of a new Consensus and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), migration made it even higher in development debates, right up to the level of heads of States. One KI observed that in Finland, the wider political and public focus on migration and refugees contributed to the sense that the ‘development side’ of the MFA had felt ‘sidestepped’ although commitment to humanitarian policies had been retained. KIs suggested two consequences. It denied scope for understanding complex processes such as FD by simply focusing on the migration impacts on Finland. And KIs note how the crisis challenged the MFA both to retain the ‘integrity of development policy’ and its traditional support for human rights vis a vis the conflicting policy stance of following the EU mainstream of security policy. Another KI highlighted that Finland is increasing cooperation with certain countries (e.g. Somalia and Iraq) because of migration.

With migration the determining factor, international development and humanitarian assistance have been ‘tolerated’ but progress on linking these to new policy apparatus and concepts such as HDN and FD was not possible. One external partner raised the point that pressure had been applied by donors, including Finland, to use development co-operation for migration control objectives and how in such an environment it is hard for organisations to maintain a principled approach.
KIIs also noted how the migration emphasis revealed difficulties for MFA and MoI to develop a common approach even if bridges were made, notably through the creation of new positions within the MFA, such as a Senior Advisor on repatriation issues and a Senior Adviser on Migration.

The breakdown of the traditional Nordic consensus on displacement/migration and development was noted as an additional constraint by one KI on Finland being able to articulate a coherent approach to HDN based on the longstanding Nordic approach to principles-based development co-operation. Some KIs noted that chapter 5 of 2016 DPP (MFA 2016, on refugees and migration) had been a very important entry point into engaging the context of FD and HDN followed up by the MFA paper (MFA 2018b).

At the EU level, Finland is mainly seen has having a nuanced approach, recognising that migration is not a crisis (although it reacted in this way in 2015), nor a short-term phenomenon. Partner KIIs largely concur that Finland has aligned with these changes although it does not publicly advocate its position strongly. Somewhat divergent approaches among MS are notably visible in relation to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) with some states pushing to use it as a migration management tool while others, including Finland, tend to see the EUTF as a way to address the root causes of irregular migration and instability. Some KIs at EU level nevertheless noted a shift among Finnish delegates towards a more restrictive and pro-migration management stance that coincided with the emergence of more right-wing politicians in the Finnish political scene.

Observing that FD does not explicitly appear in the ‘continuum’ paper (MFA 2018b) and does only succinctly in other recent MFA policies/papers, although it is discussed in other terms in a wider range of policies, draws attention to the fact that KIs much less readily engaged with the concept of FD. Although the MFA participation in the IFRC’s Migration Task Force and in the DAC Temporary Working Group on Refugee and Migration, can be construed as some commitment to a wider conceptualisation of migration/displacement concepts and policies. But this engagement has been more circumstantial [than proactive] and their participation especially in the OECD TWG was more centred on the in-donor refugee costs than towards the production of a policy guidance on FD. At the EU level, KIIs noted Finland’s contribution to both the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the ‘Madad Fund’) as a positive sign as the latter trust fund is an attempt to address forced displacement issues with a common EU approach, pulling resources from different sources.

One KI interestingly put forward the view that ‘the Finns tend to interpret FD/refugees as humanitarian issues while migration is seen as a development issue to be addressed mainly thought poverty alleviation’ (the root causes link). This helps to explain why FD did not appear in previous Finnish development documents of the MFA. A KI confirmed how at the EU level, too, FD used to be in the hands of humanitarian colleagues and how now (post 2015) FD and irregular migration are tackled together.

More generally Finland is not perceived externally to have had a strong impact on the policy formulation process on HDN compared to countries such as Denmark, the UK, Germany and Switzerland, possibly because Finland is perceived as still having a ‘powerful humanitarian’ disposition. The MFA has, however, been involved and committed at a more general level in the framing of HDN in the CRRF, especially in Uganda, one of the pilot countries and through its support to UNDP for the 3 RP in the MENA region. Finland’s role in promoting private sector engagement in displacement situations, and in its support for cash transfers has also been highlighted in partner KIIs.

In terms of advancing an understanding and engagement with HDN and FD, GoF KIIs offered a range of views. Accepting the limited progress to date, there was considerable variation expressed by GoF KIIs about how to prioritise and make progress on HDN uptake. KIIs offered different opinions – a small number of KIIs wanted a more pragmatic approach, for example trying to mainstream HDN thinking by the end of 2019, mainly through Regional Departments. Another view was that the aim should be to prepare a White paper in 2020 which suggests that HDN may not feature in a revised 2020 DPP. That a strategy is
not, for example, in the 3+1 Director General’s strategic plan for the Department was noted as a limitation although ‘it is getting there’.

On the other hand, despite the lack of formal MFA documentary progress and evidence, several KIIIs observed that many informal discussions between MFA staff on the subject took place and this was helping to embed a common understanding. Whilst there was less KI engagement with FD, conversely, a small number of KIIIs revealed strong support or positive interest for engagement with HDN. To this end a small government with few hierarchies was perceived to be an asset in enabling progress. Several KIIIs mentioned the importance of ‘personal’ links in this context in enabling progress.

Equally some KIIIs recognised there was also the perception that strong development and humanitarian identities need to be overcome to reach a common understanding for policy development and breaking out of ‘silos’ which were reinforced, to the detriment of engaging with HDN and FD, by different programming and budgeting processes for humanitarian assistance and development co-operation – given the relatively high degree of funding flexibility on the humanitarian side – and by very different methods of engagement with governments and partners. Needs- and rights-based principles and impartiality, the KIIIs noted, drive humanitarian interventions whereas development is a much more political process. Some KIs also recognised that achieving long term development goals without compromising human rights principles was a major challenge in the context of HDN especially where the MFA is increasingly engaged in fragile states and situations of FD. These differences need to be reconciled.

In short, as one KI observed, ‘space is needed for a common understanding of the concepts to develop and be embedded’ and this was noted to be ‘the challenge for senior managers’. The MFA’s Development Policy reform process, noted by one KI, provides a potentially important vehicle for promoting the uptake of HDN and FD. In this respect, another KI noted that engaging with HDN and FD would need ‘significant buy-in at higher political levels’. And beyond the MFA, another KI noted that a fully developed HDN strategy, which implicitly requires long term programming and commitment, could further isolate MFA and MoI from each other since the MoI oppose long-standing country programmes and favour giving priority to countries of origin and transit of migrants coming to Finland.

But other KIIIs highlighted how in many instances Finland is supporting three programmatic areas simultaneously and how peace building alongside continuing humanitarian assistance while pursuing development goals could strengthen the nexus. This would still involve addressing constraints and lack of flexibility to respond to evolving realities and needs.

**JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented**

Given the limited uptake of HD and FD noted in JC1 it is hardly surprising that there is virtually no KII evidence that MFA’s use of FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented. Yet, from 2016 onwards, FD issues are gradually taking a more prominent place in Finnish migration, development and humanitarian policies. There is some scepticism over the MFA’s policy apparatus for development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, and criticisms over the reluctance of the MFA to engage in rethinking its policies in ways that reflect the debates on migration. On the other hand others KIs, including some of Finland’s partners were critical of ‘aid tied to politics’ arguing that the focus on migration (including through the prioritisation of return policies) affects and limits the scope of some of Finland’s other PPs, wider development, humanitarian and human rights policies.

**Evidence**

Although there is some limited documentary evidence that FD and HDN add value to and strengthen the implementation of the PPAs and the policy pillars, KII evidence is very muted. One KI notes that although the MFA has been involved in the Grand Bargain and is seeking to bring H and D together, it has no
specific policies or strategies that it is specifically activating or pushing. This suggests at least a lack of awareness across the MFA of some of the initiatives such as the ‘one-pagers’ and the ‘continuum’ paper (MFA 2018b) and Internal Action Plan.

But there is maybe more evidence that Finland’s priorities provide useful elements to address FD. As mentioned by one KI, the work on peace building, security related issues, increasing economic opportunities, including through the engagement of the private sector contribute to addressing root causes. At the same time, there is a realisation that these issues are best also tackled from the ‘grassroots’; hence the importance of engagement with civil society especially around peace building.

Trenchant criticism from MoI mainly of current MFA development policies as outdated geographical focus in countries where Finland has no inherent interest (i.e. they are not CoO of refugees) and of policies focused on poverty reduction that do not in fact create development or tackle the root causes. View also expressed that EC policies could force greater realism for Finland’s development policies. This contribution is a one off but essentially challenges some of the premises of the DPP 2016 and the five pillars. Instead one KI promotes the D in HDN as a focus on tackling root causes in countries which are CoO (and transit countries) for Finland or where Finland has a commercial interest.

In both European and international fora, Finland is seen as a strong and consistent advocate for human rights, humanitarian principles, gender equality and women’s empowerment, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and disability. In the EU level, as part of the Nordic group, Finland is also perceived as vocal on issues related to stimulating local economies in developing countries, creating jobs, promoting democracy, governance and the rule of law, as well as supporting actions fostering food security. While these issues tend to be approached more broadly with no specific link made to FD, Finland has in some instances also pushed their PPAs in relation to migration and displacement issues (e.g. Finland has successful obtained that the EUTF reporting mechanism includes a proper gender reporting perspective).

JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)

The limited KII evidence for clearly formulated and well-established FD and HDN policies means that, by default (i.e. not raised by KIs) there are gaps but there are also policy areas where evidence from KIIKIs indicate that the development policies contain ‘useful’ elements.

Significant gaps pertain to climate change, urban displacement and IDPs. Conversely, human rights, crisis management, and vulnerable groups (notably women and girls’ policies), were frequently mentioned by KIs although not necessarily in the context of HDN – and not in the context of FD.

Evidence

The limited KII evidence for clearly formulated and well-established FD and HDN policies means that, by default there are gaps. Although some KIs noted it as a gap, only one KI explicitly mentioned climate change pointing to the limited evidence and visibility for climate change (e.g. impact on food security/drought) as a potential driver of displacement in present policy formulation. Likewise, the lack of discussion by KIs on internal displacement was also noticeable. Finland’s partners noted similar gaps on IDPs (where Finland has ‘not been a visible donor’ in relevant meetings as ‘it is not on their radar’ despite the importance of internal displacement in Finland’s partner countries such as Afghanistan, and also Somalia). The gap in IDP policy in this context compares to the proactive engagement of other Nordic countries, noted by partner KIIKIs, who are seen as ‘champion states’ on the issue. There is also a gap on urban displacement policy, noted by one KI, however, as ‘a gap for every donor’.

By contrast, human rights, crisis management, and vulnerable groups (notably women and girls’ policies), were frequently mentioned by KIIKIs in the context of but not necessarily aligned with HDN thinking,
but not at all in the context of FD. In the same vein, Defence Command training for crisis management includes training of military on UNSC 1325, plus peace and security and human rights for women and other vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, GoF KIIIs accepted that because of the limited traction so far for HDN, these policy pillars remain as long-standing constituents of Finland’s development and humanitarian policies rather than articulated into the HDN framework.

Although not conceived in this context at present, KIIIs recognise that HDN could potentially become an important vehicle to develop and embrace these longstanding policy priorities (PPAs) and policy pillars. For example, one KI suggested that the HDN could help to re-establish the prominence of human rights at the core of Finland’s development cooperation programming which had been captured by an agenda to securitise migration.

The role of the private sector in HDN, highlighted in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), and by the World Bank in a 2018 Evaluation, for example, was only mentioned by one KI who saw it as key to enhance the economic dynamic of major hosting countries and ensure the success of a development-based approach to displacement. This emerges as a gap in current MFA thinking on HND, which with the current political prominence given to the private sector in development needs to be addressed.

**Case studies**

**Answer to EQ 1**

**EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?**

The three case studies illustrate the trend observed in the documents analysis and confirmed in the interviews that the MFA has not yet developed clear approaches to FD and HDN, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation. There is however evidence of more proactive engagement with the concepts in the post 2015 period, triggered by Finnish and more widely EU policy responses to the so called ‘European refugee crisis’ and to displacement patterns at the regional level too. But this greater engagement is however marked by a focus on migration and the use of development as an instrument of migration control.

Each case studies present commonalities in their approaches [or lack thereof] to the concepts but also small differences in the way that engagement is taking place notably because of a later engagement as in the case of the MENA region with an initial strong support for HDN or because other frameworks have been established for longer periods as with the concept of integrated approach in Afghanistan and Somalia.

**JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established**

While Finland’s presence in both Somalia and Afghan is old and well established, there is no evidence of policy engagement with the concepts of FD and HDN in the earlier period of the evaluation as the presence was framed around the traditional policy pillars of the MFA focused on crisis management, notably peace-building, humanitarian response and development response. Despite very high levels and diverse manifestations of displacement (internal, cross-border and return movements) over several decades, Finland’s engagement with the concepts in both countries only takes place in post 2015 Europe’s refugee crisis period and is also triggered by massive returns of Afghans at the regional level in 2016.
Finland’s presence in the MENA region is more recent and markedly different, characterised – almost from the inception – especially after 2014 when the number of IDPs and refugees exploded as an FD crisis, one where the bulk of movement has taken place in the region but also reached Europe prompting a policy response framed around migration control. Different from the other two contexts, in the MENA region HDN is at the core of the international response (3RP) which Finland has strongly supported but paradoxically almost by default not design. By contrast in the Somalia and Afghanistan cases it has gradually been taken into consideration. In all three countries HPDN might have even more resonance, with the support of peace initiatives like in Somalia and Lebanon and on a small scale in Syria alongside developmental projects, and the overall peace building aim of many projects in Afghanistan. But ultimately, because Finland’s engagement with the concepts is just at the inception, its partners (except in MENA) have so far little knowledge of the level and nature of the MFA’s uptake of FD and also HDN to a lesser extent.

**JC 1.2: The manner manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented**

In Somalia and Afghanistan development cooperation programmes have been long-established, around the PPAs, especially over the enhancement of the rights of women and girls, a theme at the forefront of Finland’s priorities in Afghanistan. Despite the prevalence of the phenomenon, FD is not taken into consideration at policy level while the use of HDN is incipient, if at all present, also due to the application in both countries of the comprehensive approach that is broader than HDN and thus also link-up with Finland’s PPs. The concept of HPDN has more resonance in the two countries given the importance of peace and state building components in the two policy programmes.

The greater focus on FD and HDN in the two countries – and even more explicitly in the MENA region – however has only had a limited impact on the PPs and PPAs given that the dominant attention to migration fails to engage with the wider complexity of the concept but also fails to use them as entry points to pursue the objectives Finland sets itself in the DPP. There are two possible exceptions. One is around the engagement on livelihood and job creation in Afghanistan which has been directly target towards displacement populations and their host, but the project is too limited (in term of timeframe, scale and geographical focus to have any significant impact). But the contrary direction of causality might be true and the different fields of activity in which Finland participates in five policy pillars and development cooperation priority areas may add value to how FD and HDN/HPDN could be operationalised, at least in the long run. The second case is in MENA region where again Finland has promoted its 4PPAs and to a lesser extent the policy pillars. But paradoxically this engagement has taken place almost ‘outwith’ the HDN focus it has adopted at the regional strategic level.

**JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)**

While Finland’s PPAs are translated into programmes and projects at field level in the three countries covered by this evaluation, the increased attention over FD and HDN has not yet been extensively translated into programmes. There are thus weaknesses and gaps that are common to all three case studies. While there is a clear focus on ‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’ in various projects implemented in the three countries, especially focusing on women and girls and to a lesser extent the disabled – in alignment with the PPAs – this approach has not been extended to considering the specific vulnerabilities triggered by displacement. In terms of gaps, a main one concerns internal displacement: while some development project activities have benefitted IDP populations, notably in Somalia and Afghanistan, the needs and vulnerability of these populations have not been acknowledged and they have not been targeted as such with the exception of a small scale project in Afghanistan dedicated to addressing livelihood needs of different displaced populations, including IDPs and small scale exploratory programme with IDPs in Syria. Then
urban displacement – despite being a characteristic of the displacement in the three countries to varying degrees, especially prevalent in the MENA region – is largely absent from Finnish funding and advocacy. In MENA there has been some engagement with urban populations, since this forms the majority of the displaced, but again this seems by default rather than as an explicit policy objective. There is also limited focus on climate change despite the important causal link with displacement as seen through historical (drought and famine in Somalia in 2011) and contemporary evidence (drought in Afghanistan) that these events have precipitated population displacement.
Annex 6: Evaluation Question 2 on Adequacy of Finland’s Approach to FD and HDN

Synthesis of findings and key issues for the EQ

Answer to EQ

EQ2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?

Aggregate response to EQ2

Concerning the adequacy and complementarity of Finland’s approaches towards FD and HDN and policy influence, the evaluation found a relatively homogeneous and conclusive answer to the Evaluation Question. The documentary evidence clearly shows that Finland aligns her definitions and positions according to current international trends and adopts concepts from international actors. Particularly Finland recognises the norm-setting role of the UN system, and increasingly also of the EU. In some contexts, Nordic cooperation is emphasised but lately with less frequency. There also is a certain degree of complementarity with Finland’s multilateral partners. At least in one case Finland has given significant added value to a multilateral partner, namely the successful initiative to integrate the rights of the disabled among refugees and IDPs in the operations of UNHCR; Finland was a precursor in the topic.

Finland also pays much attention to financial contributions in order to sit at the tables of larger donors, found in internal documentation as explicit purpose of funding decision and in KII’s in partner organisations.

Finland is perceived as a reliable, non-nonsense partner and donor and appreciated as such. Yet, Finland is also considered a low key, low profile country that does ‘not speak too much’ but gets to the point when it has something to say. The interviewed partners had a very slight idea, if any, about what would be Finland’s approach to FD and HDN at the HQ level, and the same impression was present in case study countries. There also is a certain degree of complementarity with Finland’s multilateral partners through non-earmarked funding support and significant value added in some cases (disability in refugee/humanitarian situations). In development cooperation partner countries Finland aligns its support according to national development plans, and CSO cooperation is highly complementary with GoF support, particularly in Somalia.

But the documentary review did not reveal any explicit emphasis or approach to FD with one exception (Afghanistan SALAM project/UNDP-ILO). From the case study countries, MENA/Syrian crisis in the only context where several projects were justified in HDN terms in internal documentation (QAB memos). There is, however, a growing interest by MFA staff to start elaborating approaches to FD, as revealed in interviews.
Summing up, Finland’s approach to and interpretation of FD/HDN is incipient, and this FD evaluation is part of the process. Two peacebuilding projects (MENA and Somalia) implemented by Finnish NGOs suggest that there is a way forward towards the triple nexus between humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and development (HPDN).

Document analysis

Answer to EQ 2

EQ2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?

Answer to EQ 2

The documentary evidence clearly shows that Finland aligns her definitions and positions according to current international trends and adopts concepts from international actors. International conventions, international law and the multilateral political and normative framework are presented as guiding principles of policy papers and internal documents. Policy papers of the administration, evaluations and internal documents, all claim being under the umbrella of and support to international conventions and multilateral initiatives in human rights, crisis management, humanitarian action and development cooperation. Based on the reviewed documents, Finland presents itself as a team player in the international community, and this corresponds to the traditional Finnish position as firm supporter of multilateralism that comes from her delicate geopolitical situation during the Cold War.

But then, the documentary review did not reveal any explicit emphasis or approach to FD, nor to the nexus between FD and development, or the indicators are tangential at most or at the end of a long chain of imagination. Finland’s response has not been adequate as there hardly has been any response at all as concerns FD, slightly more in relation to HDN, such as in the case of several projects for MENA in the QAB database. One project funded by Finland in Afghanistan was justified by FD terms/terminology in internal documentation. The very significant exception is the very recent internal policy paper and action plan of organisation-wide internal training in HDN that will be started in 2018, although this action plan is more concerned about procedures than contents and concepts.

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

JC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.

There is wide and solid documentary evidence that Finland aligns her definitions and positions according to the current international trends and adopts concepts from international actors. International conventions, international law and the multilateral political and normative framework are presented as guiding principles of all policy papers. Particularly Finland recognises the norm-setting role of the UN system, and
increasingly also of the EU. In internal documentation, Finland supports and aligns with several initiatives of multilateral organisations. A further proof of compliance is the fact that Finland’s humanitarian funds are largely given unearmarked, as well as the participation in several multi-donor trust funds that do not allow earmarking. Finland responds to ideas and initiatives from the UN system and the EU and aligns her arguments accordingly but internal horizontal learning (from unit to unit, or from desk officer to desk officer) has not yet happened as can be observed from most PIPs and funding proposals presented to the QAB where the topic is almost totally absent, and initiatives justified mainly on human rights or development arguments (except several projects for MENA). The only cases where the link between migration/refugees and development explicitly came up in the document review was in two recent internal documents, in both cases in response to the terminology and concepts of UN agencies (QAB memos on the SALAM project in Afghanistan, and PIPs for UNHCR).

The evaluation function is an expression of internal learning and it should not be overlooked that the current evaluation on FD and development policy, in its nature as formative evaluation, is part of internal learning, too. Since a decade, Finland has tried to apply RBM to its projects, which is a channel of internal learning. The main exception to the relative lack of FD and HDN is an organisation-wide action plan for HDN that will be started in 2018 (MFA 2018b with annex).

But the documentary review did not reveal any particular emphasis or approach to FD but yes to a slightly higher degree to HDN.

**JC 2.2: Complementarity:** The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ’guided actions’ in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs

Based on the reviewed documents, Finland presents itself as a team player in the international community, with firm commitment with the UN and the EU, and in some contexts, strong Nordic cooperation. This is the traditional Finnish position that comes from her delicate geopolitical position during the Cold War, with strong emphasis on multilateralism. The reviewed documents, including policy papers of the administration, evaluations and internal documents, all claim being under the umbrella of and support to international conventions and multilateral initiatives in human rights, crisis management, humanitarian action and development cooperation, particularly in civilian crisis management where Finland punches well above its weight.

The approach Finland takes is derived from the Development Policy Programmes (MFA 2012, MFA 2016). Finland gives humanitarian aid funding only through CSOs/NGOs registered with ECHO, but the guidelines for CSO funding from 2017 are totally silent about any FD or HDN. One additional factor to increase coherence is that Finland gives most of its humanitarian aid as non-earmarked funding to international organisations, and channels part of its ODA through multi-donor trust funds that do not allow earmarking (esp. in Afghanistan and Somalia). In this way, it can be said that Finland’s action is complementary and aligned with its multilateral and bilateral partners; it ‘meshes’ well with them

However, very little has been found concerning FD and HDN. The most explicit and elaborated (clearly formulated) references to FD (in the sense of the nexus between forced displacement/migration and development) are found in relatively recent internal documents: one project funding initiative (UNDP-ILO in Afghanistan, SALAM) from the second half of 2017 in the papers of the QAB for FD, and an internal action plan for HDN (MFA 2018b), in addition to the PIPs for UNHCR where Finland’s position includes the nexus of development and FD. In both cases where the FD-development nexus is taken into account, the initiative comes from ‘above’, that is from the UN system, and Finland responds to existing ideas/propositions and uses the arguments to formulate her own position. For the great majority of the documents, FD-development nexus and HDN are indirect, not clearly formulated and/or at the end of a long chain of imagination.
Concerning Finland’s influence towards partners and added value relative to the work of multilateral institutions, it is non-negligible, significant in some cases. Finland is considered as a loyal team player that brings forth issues compatible and complimentary with its multilateral partners (the body of documents reviewed did not include any papers relating to bilateral partners). The topics Finland promotes come from DPPs whose priority policy areas complement and are not contradictory with any international development goals.

Perhaps the most significant achievement in the field of Finland’s added value is the inclusion of the rights of people with disabilities in refugee/IDP situations that UNHCR has adopted at the initiative of Finland as the only donor stressing this topic (later joined by others) and funded a pilot project whose lessons will be adopted in the workings of the institution. Finland also takes great care to maintain her financial contributions at a level to sit at the table of decision makers in international organisations; this commitment is confirmed by internal and some external documents with robust evidence. The interviews will bring more light on whether Finland actively and effectively uses this position within the larger donors’ ‘golden table’ group.

But again, FD and to a slightly lesser degree HDN are absent from the reviewed documents.

**KIIS – GoF and Partners Combined**

**Answer to EQ 2**

*To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?*

*Answer to EQ 2*

The results of the documentary analysis coincide with the perception multilateral, external partners of Finland have, mainly at the headquarters’ level. Finland is perceived as a reliable, non-nonsense partner and donor and appreciated as such. Particularly humanitarian agencies appreciate the fact that Finland gives its financial support as non-earmarked (or earmarked only for a certain country, not purpose). Yet, Finland is also considered a low key, low profile country that does ‘not speak too much’ but gets to the point when it has something to say. (In fact, this corresponds perfectly to the image Finns have of themselves.) The interviewed partners had a very slight idea, if any, about what would be Finland’s approach to FD and HDN. The exception is the MENA region (field level) where Finland is perceived as a strong donor promoting HDN.

Internally in Finland, the interviews revealed growing interest and intense personal communication on FD and HDN within MFA, although at the governmental level, for many KIIs Forced Displacement was a new term.
Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

JC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.

Among international humanitarian agencies, MFA is not perceived to have proactively engaged in the emerging policy issues FD and HDN and their roll out, whilst the MFA’s influence is recognised in the promotion of more traditional, well-established policies and policy priorities such as women, girls and gender equality. Finland is perceived to have less impact and visibility than some other countries such as Denmark, the UK, Germany and Switzerland. Overall, key informants indicate that they have no clear sense of Finland’s understanding/approach to forced displacement and the ‘nexus’. At the same time, through Finland’s engagement in promoting cash transfers and the private sector in humanitarian situations, MFA is showing some degree of humanitarian innovation. For KIs interviewed in EU institutions, Finns are recognised by interviewed EU member states representatives as well as EU officials as strong and consistent advocates of the human rights-based approach, humanitarian principles, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and sexual reproductive health rights, while Finland is perceived to have adopted a nuanced approach to migration and forced displacement, recognising that migration is not a crisis, nor a short-term phenomenon. At the same time, some KIs in Brussels reported having perceived a shift in Finland’s position towards a more restrictive and pro-migration control position in recent years. Overall, Finland is seen to be switching between ‘traditional’ human rights-centred positions (the traditional Like-minded approach) and more anti-migration positions (approaching Visegrad group’s positions), depending on occasions (and probably of the person representing Finland).

The gaps identified by non-Finnish KIs were urban displacement and IDPs in general in which Finland is most passive. MFA informants also point out the small number of funding and projects for combating climate change and in favour of climate resilience, and the lack of attention to climate change-induced FD.

The interviews in Finland were, naturally, more diverging depending on the position, institution and personal opinions of the interviewee. All agree, however, that the 2015 refugee ‘crisis’ changed the terms of the debate, making FD an issue in the development agenda. On one hand there are – inside and outside – MFA those who would like to see development cooperation adapted to the migration control and management agenda (and not the other way round); on the other there are those who resist this or even feel threatened in their professional integrity. The development-migration nexus has been politicised with the result that little rational debate on it is possible (at least until the elections of April 2019); the debate is ‘stuck’ in divergencies between MFA and MoI/Migri. Concerning HDN, most interviewees did not raise the organisation-wide Action Plan on HDN as an issue. The most advanced in applying HDN principles are the large Finnish non-governmental organisations. In general, most interviewees admit that FD is a new concept for them or even a totally unknown approach.

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs

There is very little in the KI interviews on complementarity of Finland’s FD and HDN positions with its partners, probably because this issue was not included in the interview questions format. However, some insights can be deduced from the interviews. Finland is seen as a team player in the international fora, a donor with no pronounced hidden agenda and a reliable ‘you see what you get’ donor but not particularly innovative and slow to adopt new trends. Finland is perceived as supportive of partner organisations’ thinking and policies. Seen from Brussels, Finns are knowledgeable ‘strictly business’ people who are able to mediate between different positions and propose solutions that satisfy all parties. All KIs point out the effort of Finland to promote the position and rights of women and girls in all partner organisations.
There also is a certain degree of complementarity with Finland’s multilateral partners. At least in one case Finland has given significant added value to a multilateral partner, namely the successful initiative to integrate the rights of the disabled among refugees and IDPs in the operations of UNHCR; Finland was a precursor in the topic, and the principles were later adopted by the World Humanitarian Summit (2016). This achievement was commended at HQ level in international organisations and by MFA staff.

**JC 2.3: Influence: MFA policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective**

Concerning Finland’s influence towards partners and added value relative to the work of multilateral institutions, it is non-negligible, significant in some cases. Finland is considered as a loyal team player that brings forth issues compatible and complementary with its partners. The topics Finland promotes come from DPPs whose priority policy areas complement and are not contradictory with any international development goals.

All interviewees involved in humanitarian aid and development cooperation, both internally in Helsinki and externally in HQs of international/multilateral organisations pointed out Finland’s influence in gender equality, the position and rights of women (and girls). This applies even to policies that in appearance do not have much to do with development or humanitarian aid, such as some joint EU policies where behind the scene Finland has kept this issue in the air and negotiated its inclusion in policies and agreements. This was reported to have happened also, in some cases, against the expressed will of some other donors sitting on the board of a humanitarian organisation.

On single issues, the most consistently cited by key informants is Finland’s proactive role (joined by Australia and later at the EU level Luxembourg) in promoting Disability and Inclusion policy in humanitarian/refugee situations, later adopted by the WHS in 2016 and mainstreamed in the operations of UNHCR. This has been highlighted as the one policy area in which Finland raised its profile to a ‘champion country’ instead of its traditional ‘low key’ actor, providing a good example of how the MFA can, when there is political will, introduce a new policy with relatively small investment, combining advocacy, keeping the topic ‘in the air’ and making alliances, and funding a pilot project whose lessons learned were integrated in the policy.

While practically all KIIs found Finland a solid promotor of human rights, especially women’s and children’s rights, few pointed out any particular proactiveness in questions related to FD and HDN. However, in the case studies, Finland’s support for MENA/Syrian crisis Finland was perceived as an active donor in supporting HDN, while in Afghanistan and Somalia Finland’s approach is only implicit.

The gaps in influence reported by interviews are the same as in JC 2.1. above: IDPs and urban displacement or displacement due to climate change-related reasons have not been addressed by Finland.

**Case studies**

**Answer to EQ 2**

To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?

*Answer to EQ 2*

Finland directly addresses FD only in one case, through a project implemented by UNDP and ILO in Afghanistan (SALAM). In Somalia, and the rest of support to Afghanistan, is targeted
mainly to women, girls and children especially in the sector of health (reproductive, maternal and child health) and girls’ education (in Afghanistan) under the heading of (human) rights, and state-building in these two fragile states. All in all, Finland’s response to the situation is comprehensive, including civilian and military crisis management, peacebuilding by an NGO in Somalia and another in MENA, but the approach is not directly related to displacement. Finland aligns its support with national development plans, but none of the projects/programmes beyond SALAM operates in terms of HDN. In Afghanistan, however, Finland is involved in (forced) returns of failed asylum seekers from Finland. Syria/MENA is a different situation, and there Finland is actively promoting HDN, and the involvement of the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance in decision-making is important.

An emerging issue is worth a remark: two Finnish large NGOs (FCA and FELM) carry out peacebuilding projects in MENA (FELM) and Somalia (FCA). These initiatives could contribute to the forming of a bridge towards the thinking of a triple nexus: humanitarian-peace-development nexus. But overall, Finland’s response is not adequate nor sufficient despite some promising emerging initiatives.

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

**JC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.**

There seems to exist sufficient evidence that, in the two development partner countries of the evaluation, Afghanistan and Somalia, HDN (and FD although at lesser degree) are only now making their way slowly into programming while no major changes after 2015 (or even since 2012) have taken place in the bulk of development cooperation interventions funded by Finland (the only exception being the SALAM ‘employment against migration’ project in Afghanistan).

On the other hand, in Syria/MENA Finland is at the forefront of pushing for HDN in a context where there is no ‘weight’ (inertia) of previous development programmes. Syria/MENA is a special case, different from the two others that are official development cooperation partner countries, in that in Syria there is an active civil war where the Syrian Arab Republic and its Government are one part. There Finland’s contribution is mainly humanitarian, and contrary to what happens in Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland is not bound to any national development plan. These factors combined make, it can be hypothesised, that Finland is a strong promoter of HDN.

This finding may suggest that the ‘clash’ between traditional development cooperation (previously absent in MENA but with important budgetary expenses in Afghanistan and Somalia) and the more recent idea of using development cooperation as deterrent against migration is less acute in the case of the Syrian conflict/MENA, for which the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance participates in the drafting of justifications of project proposals (QAB memos).

Concerning organisational mainstreaming of HDN, Finland’s missions/delegations in the case study countries seem to be unaware of the HDN action plan on training and mainstreaming of HDN launched in the Autumn 2018. While in Afghanistan the FD agenda seems to orient more towards returns, in Somalia the topic of discussion among donors, Finland included, is on the Durable Solutions Initiative of the UN (and IGAD) as the way forward in HDN in the Horn of Africa, an initiative where Finland does not participate through any channel.
In the case of Somalia and MENA, two large Finnish NGOs (FELM, FCA) work in peacebuilding. This experience could be further integrated into the thinking on FD, as a bridge towards the triple nexus (humanitarian-peace-development nexus).

**JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs**

In Afghanistan and Somalia, the Finnish approach is called ‘comprehensive’, including crisis management (civilian and/or military, humanitarian aid and development) but it is not always clear if this is by choice (result of conscious choice which may be more the case in Afghanistan thanks to the White Papers approved by the Parliament) or results from separate, independent decisions (MFA, MoD, MFA-EU department, PMO, which is likely the case in Somalia). In any case, the ‘comprehensiveness’ of the approach does not exclude working in silos, one instance (e.g. MFA unit) not informing/coordinating with the others.

In Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland’s development cooperation is aligned and complementary with the respective national development plans.

Concerning internal complementarity, in Afghanistan and Somalia the crisis management (civilian and military) operations in which Finland participates are complementary and coherent with development cooperation by pursuing the strengthening of the security situation. In Afghanistan the debate circles around security while in Somalia peace-building plays a significant role in a way that could easily be developed towards a full-fledged approach under the ‘triple nexus’ between stabilisation/peace-humanitarian-development. CSO/NGO support was found to be complementary particularly in the case of Somalia where the share of funding channelled through CSOs is 37%.

In all three case study countries, Finland’s largest budgetary contributions are channelled through pooled funding or multi-partner trust funds (Afghanistan: Law and Order Trust Fund LOFTA, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF; Somalia: EU Emergency Fund for Africa EUTF, Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia MPF; or multi-bilaterally through UNDP, ILO, IOM etc.), principally due to security situations in the countries (Kabul and Mogadishu are non-family posts). While the use of pooled funding or trust funds (as in Afghanistan and Somalia or EU and UN funding for Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon) in a way guarantees complementarity (and alignment and harmonisation), there are trade-offs: the lack of staff resources reduces the possibilities of overview of use of those funds and the visibility of Finland.

**JC 2.3: Influence: MFA policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective**

Lack of staff and the consequent obligation to prioritise what to follow-up seriously limit policy influence. In the case of Somalia and partially for MENA, this is further exacerbated by the geographically complex aid architecture where the Embassy is not located in the country where activities take place. In both Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland’s policy influence is perceived by donors ‘not absent’ but low profile, ‘low key’, ‘do its part’, indicating relatively scant knowledge about what Finland does. However, Finland is not perceived non-influential for its size and the size of its field presence. In Somalia, Finland co-chairs (with Sweden) the ‘pillar working group’ of social and human development in the MDTF. Particularly in Afghanistan, Finland increases its influence by teaming with the Nordic countries and some others who have similar goals (Germany) to appear as a larger donor. In all three cases, Finland is very actively promoting women’s and girls’ rights, in Afghanistan in girls’ education and in reproductive health, which is one of the main sectors funded by Finland in Somalia. However, the field studies did not discover any special influence of Finland in FD, with the exception of the peacebuilding efforts of FCA in Somalia.
Syria/MENA is a special case, different from the two others that are official development cooperation partner countries, and in that in Syria there is an active civil war where the Syrian Arab Republic and its Government are one part. There Finland’s contribution is mainly humanitarian, and the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance participates in the drafting of project justifications, and contrary to what happens in Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland is not bound to any national development plan. Furthermore, Syria and the neighbouring countries impacted by the crisis are not Finland’s official development partners. These factors combined make, it can be hypothesised, that Finland is a strong promoter of HDN.
ANNEX 7: EVALUATION QUESTION 3 on policy coherence

Synthesis of findings and key issues for the EQ

Answer to EQ 3

EQ3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

Aggregate Response to EQ 3

Policy coherence is, and has been for some time, a major feature of Finnish external policy and efforts to promote it across ministries are an established practice. The MFA has in place a series of mechanisms to promote coherence and is widely recognised externally as a strong proponent of policy coherence. However, these mechanisms are not always effective, and they exist mostly at HQ level. Promoting policy coherence was thus found to be not as prevalent in the case study partner countries where Finland is operating. A view also emerged from interviews that the role of Finland in advocating for PCD was more noticeable in the past. At the same time, as Finland is a small country where many people in government know each other, it is apparent that the promotion of policy coherence also takes place informally at the personal level through extensive individual contacts across ministries and departments.

The major area of policy incoherence that emerged was on diverging views on migration and on the use of development policies to achieve migration-related outcomes. This divergence exists both within the MFA and across ministries and especially between the MFA and the MoI. The tensions between MFA development policies and domestic interests and policies on migration have not been fully resolved.

It was found that FD and HDN are relatively new concepts among Finnish MFA officials which have gradually evolved in Finnish policies over the period of the evaluation. They thus do not yet provide a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies. This is particularly visible in the case studies reviewed in the framework of this evaluation. Yet, it does seem that there are initial efforts to foster policy coherence around FD and HDN issues.

MFA policies are generally well aligned with those of its partners be they national NGOs and CSOs, or multi-lateral donors with whom Finland works closely such as the EU and the UN.

For quite a number of years Finland has received positive comments on PCD promotion from a variety of sources including OECD Peer Reviews. However, the role of Finland in advocating for PCD was more noticeable in the past. Some of the key mechanisms Finland has in place to promote policy coherence identified include, among others, a Task Force on Migration (MTF), the EU Coordinating Committee, the Result Based Management (RBM) and the Development Policy Results Report (DPR) processes and the external Development Policy Committee (FDPC). Yet, there is also some evidence suggesting that these mechanisms are not always as effective as one might hope. At the same time as Finland is a small country
informal contacts and links between officials in different departments and ministries provide another level of mechanism, so that some promotion of policy coherence does still take place at the personal level even when formal mechanisms falter.

Interviews conducted with Finnish Government officials, civil servants in partner countries, and representatives of Finnish bilateral and multilateral partners confirm that FD and HDN are new concepts that have not yet crystallised in the policies of the Finnish MFA. They therefore do not yet provide a solid basis for assessing policy coherence. The Finnish response to the recent so-called migration crisis has prompted some policy incoherence within the MFA and across ministries. This negatively impacted policy coherence on the MFA’s approaches to FD and HDN. The tension is particularly evident between the MFA and the MoI, but there are also some officials inside the MFA who argue that the Ministry should adopt a different approach to development cooperation that is more closely adjusted to supporting the government’s interest-driven stance on migration. This group of officials argue that development cooperation policy should be made coherent with Finland’s migration policy (‘PCM’), rather than the other way round (PCD). Others would like Finland’s development cooperation to continue focusing on long-standing country programmes and argue that the evidence supporting the root causes approach is lacking. The increasing alignment of development with migration issues and securitisation is somewhat incompatible with the objectives of development cooperation.

This is the most apparent area of incoherence uncovered, as aside from this there appears to be high levels of coherence between most areas of policy dealt with by the MFA. This is consistent with the fact that evidence shows that the Ministry has been strongly committed to promoting PCD throughout the period of the evaluation.

Yet, there appears to be ongoing efforts by the MFA to foster coherence on FD and HDN issues with the creation of one-page briefing notes, an Action Plan, new advisors for the Development Policy Steering Committee and the Humanitarian Aid unit etc.

Finland’s policies are generally viewed by external interlocutors as coherent and consistent. Evidence also shows that MFA policies are generally well aligned with those of its partners be they national NGOs and CSOs, or multilateral donors with whom Finland works closely such as the EU and the UN. This suggests a strong willingness to learn from external actors and adjust national policy to international experience and norms, though there is likely to also be a reverse effect with Finland also impacting on these norms.

**Document analysis**

**Answer to EQ 3**

**EQ3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?**

*Response to EQ 3*

The fact that the FD and HDN policies of the MFA have evolved over the period of the evaluation means that for much of these six years it would seem, from documentary evidence at least, that they cannot be said to provide a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies. Moreover, towards the end of the period and particularly after the 2015 surge in immigration rates into the EU and just as the approaches on HDN and FD were becoming more clearly articulated, Finnish migration policy has also been toughened. This coincidence has meant that the evidence does show a tension existing in these latter years between the MFA
policies and the domestic policies on migration. In other words, incoherencies between the two sets of policies have not been fully resolved.

This is the most apparent area of incoherence uncovered, as aside from this there appear to be high levels of coherence between most areas of policy dealt with by the MFA. This is consistent with the fact that evidence shows that the Ministry has been strongly committed to promoting PCD throughout the period of the evaluation, has in place a series of mechanisms to do so and is recognised externally by authoritative groups such as the OECD as a strong proponent of policy coherence. Only one example of apparent incoherence within the MFA remit emerged and that was between its humanitarian mine action policy and its fragile states guidelines.

Evidence also shows that MFA policies are generally well aligned with those of its partners be they national NGOs and CSOs, or multi-lateral donors with whom Finland works closely such as the EU and the UN. This suggests a strong willingness to learn from external actors and adjust national policy to international experience and norms, though there is likely to also be a reverse effect with Finland also impacting on these norms.

While the MFA commitment to policy coherence does emerge strongly and there is evidence to suggest that a whole of government approach is promoted by the PMO, it is less clear how committed other ministries are overall to the policy coherence per se and how willing they are to achieve synergies and make policy trade-offs. Clearly inter-ministerial coordination and information exchange mechanisms do exist and are used. But it is not clear from the documentation just how much they are really used to promote policy coherence effectively. Their very existence is an important first step towards this end but does not guarantee that policy coherence will really be promoted.

**Key findings on judgement criteria**

**JC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively**

There is strong independent evidence to show that the MFA has in place mechanisms to promote policy coherence and that these operate effectively over time.

When the analysis is taken further to other Ministries it is less clear how well the concept of policy coherence is understood and whether the coordination mechanisms that do exist in different areas have a mandate that goes beyond coordination and information exchange and extends to promoting policy coherence. Their very existence however does suggest that some efforts to promote greater policy coherence are taking place at least informally. Evidence on some of these coordination mechanisms (e.g. the MTF) does show clearly that they do operate over time.

There is also a lack of clarity on the thematic scope of these mechanisms. Migration and Rights issues are clearly well covered. But the concepts of FD and HDN largely do not appear in the documents surveyed.

**JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoL, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)**

Policy coherence is a major feature of Finnish external policy and efforts to promote it across government and between specific ministries are clearly very prevalent. Policy coherence therefore seems to be widely accepted as a desirable objective across government. The same can be said about coherence between the policies of Finland with those of its partners, be they bilateral or multilateral and official or civil society. At the same time Finland is not immune to some of the contradictions that emerge in international fora (EU and UN) between different policies, not least in this area of development policy and migration management policy.
However, while this statement holds at a general level it is harder to link it specifically to FD and HDN policies as these do not figure prominently in the documents reviewed.

**JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN**

There is evidence to suggest that the level of policy coherence in certain areas is not adequate and that the tensions between different areas of policy are not always resolved. One tension identified is between Asylum policy since 2015 and the MFA’s policy on migration and development and HDN in the context of FD. The implicit assumption in the 2015 PMO Action Plan is that there is an inverse causal relationship between development (as well as other related policies such as peace building, conflict reduction) and migration, although this thesis is not elaborated. Equally the Action Plan does not adequately cover the needs of vulnerable groups in a manner consistent with MFA policy.

Going further back to 2014 there is further evidence of incoherence between the domestic policy on migration issues and the MFA’s policy on FD. Other evidence suggests that this has become more acute in recent years, for instance with the Migration Service receiving political instructions to interpret laws in a fairly tough and restrictive manner.

**PCD Mechanisms and the use made of them**

MFA documents show that the Ministry does have a range of mechanisms to promote policy coherence across their different policy areas and a good understanding of the PC concept. The OECD Peer Reviews for 2012 and 2017 also indicate that Finland does make use of its PCD mechanisms over time in a consistent fashion. MFA documents reviewed suggest that there is a fair degree of coordination with other ministries, especially MoI.

Moving to documents from other ministries (MoI, MJ) there is a recognition of the importance of coordination and liaison with other ministries and there is evidence of mechanisms being established to promote such exchanges. However, there is little or no indication of how much this effort to exchange information and coordinate implementation actually affects policy formulation or adaptation to achieve greater coherence. Sector coverage also appears to vary with coordination and policy coherence promotion on fundamental and human rights and on overall migration policy fairly stronger whereas there is little indication of debate on FD and HDN policy.

Numerous mechanisms to promote coherence have been identified in various documents from the MFA and in OECD reports. These mechanisms include national coordination systems, ad-hoc working groups, an inter-ministerial committee and the Development Policy Committee. Since 2017 responsibility for coordination on the SDGs has been transferred to the PMO. Other documents, also from the MFA, recognise the need for policy coherence and a stated intention to promote it, but are silent on the mechanisms through which this is done.

A Migration Task Force was set up in September 2015 (task force meeting minutes), to provide a forum for discussion between different ministries and state agencies on migration policy and its implementation. Among other things it is tasked with coordinating the management and control of the flows of asylum seekers/refugees, and ultimately to try and restrict numbers. Within this the MFA was charged with emergency communication through embassies and diplomatic representations to present a negative view of chances to obtain asylum in Finland. The MTF as such can be seen as a mechanism to promote policy coherence, at the desk officer level, not higher policy level (MTF is an implementation and information sharing level mechanism).

The MoI report on International Migration (2016–2017) does not talk about policy coherence mechanisms but does recognise the importance of coordination and suggests that there is close liaison between the MoI and the MFA.
The Ministry of Justice stresses the importance of strengthening coordination in human rights within government. To promote this, it has appointed a Government network of fundamental and human rights contact persons which has prepared a ‘National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights 2017-2019’ (2017). But there is no evidence that this network is involved on FD and HDN issues. Some ministries also have internal networks of contact persons on fundamental and human rights.

Some of the government coordination mechanisms identified, which may or may not go beyond coordination to promoting policy coherence, were established fairly late in the evaluation period. For instance, the MoJ’s Government network of fundamental and human rights was established in October 2015 with a mandate through to 31 December 2019. Evidence collected does suggest it continues to operate. Equally minutes of the Migration Task Force meetings also indicate continued operation of this coordination mechanism from its establishment in September 2015 up to 2018.

At the field level the MFA’s (2015c) Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperation the reviewers reported that “During the field visits an important disconnect was observed between MFA policies and reality on the ground. Specifically, while there is considerable emphasis on ‘results focus’ in various policy statements … it did not emerge as a theme in the field.” This does not relate specifically to FD and HDN policies but rather to the ‘results focus’ however, it may be that such a disconnect also exists between these policies and issues on the ground.

**PC with other government departments**

There is considerable evidence of different government departments recognising the need for joined up approaches and good policy coherence between ministries and of efforts being made to put this in practice. However, it is not always clear how far these go both in terms of the policy areas that are brought together, and the depth of the coherence achieved. In particular the concepts of FD or HDN are rarely mentioned as a framework for coherence promotion efforts. Equally it is difficult to read into the evidence how balanced the coherence solutions found actually are, though in some places it does look as if the MFA has had to adapt its positions quite a bit to accommodate those of other ministries.

For example, the PMO in its 2015 Action Plan on Asylum Policy adopted the view that ‘The large-scale entry into a country is related primarily to the conditions prevailing in countries or areas of origin … It is important that Finland, the EU and the international community influence these conditions’ which implies that some coordination of policy between different ministries (MoI and MFA at the very least) will be expected. The plan goes on to describe both the humanitarian and the development work that will be required to implement it. Equally it talks about the need to align trade policy. Indicators (notably the vocabulary and terminology which is MFA language) suggest that there is some resonance between PMO policy and MFA with the latter having some influence on the policy stance of PMO at least in terms of recognising the diversity of drivers of FD; this influence does not extend to HDN, based on the indicator evidence. The Action Plan however offers only simplistic assumptions on the relationship between migration and development (a causal relationship challenged by many MFA officials) in the context of FD, rather than an understanding of the complexity of the subject matter. Note also that other Ministries such as MoI have heavily influenced this Action Plan with the focus on ‘development-migration nexus’. Overall this suggests that the MFA has found it tough to influence PMO thinking in relation to the drivers of migration. Moreover, despite the hardening domestic policy to which the Action Plan is primarily addressed, and elaborates, it is careful not to particularise asylum in Finland only to RSD.

The Strategic Programme of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government published by the PMO (2015a) and entitled ‘Finland, a land of solutions’ spells out how policies in different areas will be used to tackle international crisis management and manage migration.

In other areas too, there is evidence of a high level of joined up thinking on how different policy areas need to interrelate to tackle specific issues and evidence of efforts of joint planning on particular issues.
For example, ‘Finland’s National Action Plan 2018–2021 on Women, Peace and Security’ published in 2018, was prepared jointly by several ministries (MFA, MoI MoEd & Culture, MoD, MEAE), as well as by parties engaged in crisis management (Crisis Management Centre Finland, CMC Finland, and the Finnish Defence Forces), civil society organisations and experts working in research institutions.

In the MoI (2013) Government Resolution on the Future of Migration 2020 Strategy there is extensive evidence of policy coherence between MFA and MoI policies and evidence of MFA input using some of the vocabulary of FD and HDN which, curiously, it was not using in its own documents at that time (see eg MFA 2012a MFA 2014b). Note the statement ‘so that international migration decisions are made through choice and not necessity’ almost an exact recitation of the MFA statement two years later in DPP 2016.

In the MoI’s (2017) paper on International Migration 2016-2017, there is evidence of PC although with the usual caveat, on whether this is really in the context of FD and HDN. There are indirect indicators of coherence, e.g. Trade (MoEAE), crisis management (MoD) resettlement (MoI) Climate change (MoE) 2030 Agenda, across government. But it could also be argued that return arrangements (page 56) are inconsistent.

Another MFA document (2015d) Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action) talks about the need for ‘Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assistance, plus an involvement with those NGOs like HALO and MAG that have existing weapons and ammunition disposal programmes.’

In the MFA (2015) Guidance Note on Human Rights Based Approach in Finland’s Development Cooperation and despite the references to mechanisms that may improve coherence [generally] in relation to HRBA, there is no evidence of coverage of FD and HDN given the overall lack of links to these themes in the document. Equally in the MFA. (2015d) note on Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action, although there is some reference to the policy coherence (and collaboration) with other ministries it is framed more broadly in relation to mine action (rather than specifically on FD and HDN).

In bilateral high-level consultations between Finland and international humanitarian organisations, the Finnish delegation included representatives of other ministries (MoI and MEAE). So far, the hypothesis seems valid that the MFA would like to go on with business as usual but is challenged by the government’s efforts (2015 onwards) to change its policies.

On the other hand, the very existence of the Migration Task Force is certain proof that some degree of coherence has been attempted, specifically, between MoI and MFA (and other ministries/agencies). MoI and MFA produce joint drafts on regional migration processes (2018). The task force as such is a mechanism for promoting policy coherence (at the beginning in Sept 2015, policy coherence for managing and controlling flows of asylum seekers/migrants and reducing the attractiveness of Finland as destination). But it should be noted that the MTF is a coordination body at the desk officer level, and the minutes do not indicate any discrepancies between MoI and MFA as concerns policy approaches

**Alignment with other partners**

There is strong evidence that Finland’s on migration and humanitarian and development policies are well aligned and coherent with its partners, especially with the EU and the UN. Specific references to FD and HDN are not so common and although policy thinking on these two concepts has evolved in these international fora it is not that apparent that Finland has adjusted its own policy to accommodate the new thinking. In other words, the shift does not seem to have occurred till the very end of the evaluation period in Finland though it is observable a couple of years earlier in international fora. This lagged effect would tend to confirm that, in this respect at least, the influence has been from international circles to Finland.

On human rights specifically, the MFA’s 2014 Guidance Note on HRBA clearly states that it is *inspired by the documents of other donors such as Denmark, Germany, the EU and the UN Statement of Common*

The MTF minutes also indicate a continued effort to align with EU policy and to seek to influence it.

**Good enough coherence?**

While in many ways it seems that a good level of policy coherence is achieved, a few examples of incoherence do emerge from the evidence collected.

In the area of asylum policy evidence from PMO (2015) Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy December suggest that the level of policy coherence is not adequate. There is some resonance between PMO policy language and that of the MFA – which may have had some influence on the policy stance of PMO at least in terms of recognising the diversity of drivers of FD. The PMO Action Plan, however, offers only simplistic assumptions on the relationship between migration and development and HDN in the context of FD (suggesting MoI would have had heavy input into this Action Plan), not an understanding of the complexity of the subject matter.

The implicit assumption in the PMO Action Plan is that there is an inverse causal relationship between development (as well as other related policies such as peace building, conflict reduction) and migration, although this thesis is not elaborated (as a domestic policy document this is not surprising). This suggests that some GoF stakeholders believe there is inter-ministry coherence, assuming that the domestic challenges of large-scale spontaneous asylum-seeking and irregular migration can be tackled by development. However, we know from other evidence the MFA policy agenda does not support this assumption – e.g. KI interviews – that the MFA is sceptical of this thesis. This suggests that there are potentially detrimental effects on interpreting and implementing FD and HDN across GoF.

The evidence drawn from this Action Plan thus confirm that there is some incoherence between PMO Action Plan and MFA. Equally whilst the neglect of vulnerable groups (women, girls and children) in the Action Plan does not indicate policy incoherence between ministries, it does suggest that MFA influence on PMO policy in this area has been limited.

The European Migration Network (2014) Annual Report on Migration and Asylum Policy Finland also suggests incoherence with the views of the MFA. This report deals with domestic migration issues – labour migration, family reunification, citizenship etc. One short chapter – No.7, page 50 – is on Migration and Development Policy but does not engage at all with MFA thinking or FD/HDN concepts. The chapter on Irregular Migration only deals with this from a domestic perspective not tied into causes of FD. This suggests incoherence between the EMN reading of the issues and the MFA.

In most reports reviewed there is no evidence on whether coherence levels are adequate or not. But as FD and HDN are rarely mentioned this does suggest a potential blind spot for policy coherence.

The report of the MFA’s Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action (MFA, 2015d) also provides evidence of incoherence between the MFA’s mine action strategy and its Fragile States agenda. Apart from Afghanistan and Somalia the choice of countries for the HMA do not match the guidelines on Fragile States. The HMA is treated as too much of a stand-alone sector with inadequate efforts made to define synergies with other elements of development cooperation.

**Constraints on pushing PCD**

A couple of cases of serious incoherence emerge from the evidence collected.

Thus, the evidence cited above for the PMO’s Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy December 2015 points to the existence of constraints on pushing policy coherence. The disjuncture between ministries in the understanding of relationship between development and migration in the context of FD and HDN may become increasingly problematic.
Equally evidence on contradictions between the views of different MFA desk officers while there is seeming agreement on international humanitarian and human rights principles, different views on the importance of root causes in limiting migration (the traditional Finnish position) etc., and the way the Government is acting in other areas points to incoherence reaching problematic levels. Thus, political orders are issued to the Migration Service to interpret laws and rules in a very restrictive way even in cases when laws have not changed (restrictions to family reunification, definition of Afghanistan and Iraq as safe countries), and there are increasing deportations/forced repatriations where many of the repatriated persons have been killed (or committed suicide) upon arrival. This is so much the case that French courts are refusing to return asylum seekers to Finland because Finland is not considered to respect international conventions etc. The Minister of Interior has ordered an investigation on the legality of deportations/repatriations during summer 2018.

**KIIS – GoF and Partners Combined**

**Answer to EQ 3**

**EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?**

**Response to EQ 3**

The interview evidence confirms that FD and HDN are relatively new concepts among Finnish MFA officials and therefore do not yet provide a solid basis for assessing policy coherence. Officials rather talk in terms of the coherence between policies on development cooperation and those on migration.

Consistently among all interviewees, both Finnish officials and others interviewed, see Finland as a country that is strong on PCD and policy coherence more generally. Finnish representatives are known internationally as advocates of PCD who will regularly bring up the issue if it has been neglected in official meetings. But equally Finland is known for presenting a coherent and consistent position itself in international fora, notably in the EU and in UN settings. This orientation in favour of PCD goes back a good number of years and is built on some well-established and effective mechanisms to promote PCD within the Finnish government administration and its relations with civil society in Finland.

At the same time interviewing in Finland revealed despite the existence of these traditions and well-established practices there are some limits to what they can achieve. In particular it became apparent that tensions existed between the government’s policies on development cooperation and those on migration that have not yet been resolved. This tension has emerged in the years since 2015 and the influx of refugees in that year. The tension is particularly evident between the MFA and the MoI, but there are also some officials inside the MFA who argue that the Ministry should adopt a different approach to development cooperation that is more closely adjusted to supporting the government’s stance on migration. Development cooperation policy should thus be made coherent with Finland’s migration policy (‘PCM’), rather than the other way round (PCD). Others argue that the relationship between ODA spending and migration is not direct and the adjustments proposed will not result in less migration. So far this has not been resolved and officials agree that this needs to be resolved at the political level, though some also suggest this tension may resolve itself depending on the outcome of the next elections.
Key findings on judgement criteria

JC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively

There is good agreement among interviewees that Finland is committed to promoting policy coherence. Finland has some long-standing mechanisms (e.g. Development Policy Committee) to promote policy coherence and has established new mechanisms, which appear to be functioning and frequently used (MTF, PCSD being elevated to PMO level of responsibility, elaboration of a ToC for humanitarian assistance...). Yet, there is also some evidence suggesting that these mechanisms are not always as effective as one might hope. As Finland is a small country informal links between officials in different departments and ministries provide another level of mechanism, and according to interviewees the promotion of policy coherence does still take place at the personal level through these individual contacts. The MFA has in particular experienced some difficulties in establishing a coherent response to the so-called migration crisis due to diverging views on the use of development.

JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)

While policy coherence is still an important feature of Finnish external policy, there has been in the last ten years a significant decrease in the emphasis given by the MFA to PCD. Equally while Finland has started to promote PCSD with a whole-of-government approach coordinated by the PMO there is still some way to go before this is widely followed.

Diverging views among Finnish officials both within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and and with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) on the direction of development cooperation in response to recent migration pressure have challenged the policy coherence of the Finnish approach to migration and development cooperation. In effect, the question of forced displacement has separated rather than united different ministries. Between the MFA and the Ministry of Defence there appears to be a stronger level of policy coherence. Within the MFA there are a few voices advocating a radical rethink of the Finland’s development cooperation policy to use it as a tool to reduce migration though others resist this change. Yet, despite these internal differences, on the international scene the Finns are still perceived by partners (e.g. EU, UN, other European states, OECD) as well coordinated both within the MFA and with the MoI. Finland’s policies are generally viewed by external interlocutors as coherent and consistent. Finland is generally known for raising the issue of policy coherence in different fora. However, the role of Finland in advocating for PCD was more noticeable in the past.

JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN

There is evidence to suggest that the level of policy coherence is not adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN. Evidence show that there is a certain degree of incoherence within the MFA due to diverging views on migration, and on the use of development policies to achieve migration-related outcomes. Yet, it seems that there are ongoing efforts to foster coherence on FD and HDN issues (one-page briefing notes, an Action Plan, new advisors for the Development Policy Steering Committee and the Humanitarian Aid unit).

On migration, Finland’s position is regarded by interlocutors in Geneva and at the EU as in-line with the EU and many other European countries: it tilts towards stronger migration control and correlates greater development assistance with migration deterrence. Yet, once the Finns hardened their lines on migration, they remained consistent across fora. There is evidence suggesting that the Finnish approach to migration is not always coherent with a principled humanitarian approach. Interlocutors cite scarcely any evidence of coherence in relation to FD and HDN, indicating that the MFA is not yet seriously engaging with these concepts, more particularly HDN, comprehensively or coherently.
Evidence

GoF officials interviewed view policy coherence as an important feature of Finnish external policy and noted several mechanisms which Finland uses to establish coherence. The Department of Development Policy has traditionally been in charge of PCD, but that role has been reduced with the decision to move coordination for the 2030 Agenda and responsibility for PCSD to the PMO. That said, the MFA is still involved as its Department of UN Affairs is doing much of the work on the 2030 Agenda, but they are focussing more on PCSD rather than PCD.

However, key mechanisms to promote policy coherence identified include, among others:

- The Development Policy Committee (FDPC): an important part of its mandate is to promote coherence.
- The Task Force on Migration (MTF), run by the MFA and attended by the different MFA departments, the PMO and the MoI, is seen as new forum promoting coherence by enabling exchanges and brainstorming on thorny issues related to migration. The Finnish contribution to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is, for instance, discussed in the MTF.
- The EU Coordinating Committee, which helps promote coherence between different Finnish positions in preparation for discussions at the EU level. The influence Finnish representatives can have in external fora is partly dependent on the level of coherence achieved in the EU Coordinating Committee and on the Task Force on Migration for issues touching upon migration, HDN and FD. The Result Based Management (RBM) approach is seen by a MFA official as a tool which can help facilitate the measurement and promotion of coherence.
- The civilian crisis management approach of the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland), which fall under the responsibility of both the MoI and the MFA, is perceived as yet another avenue to reinforce policy coherence. An interview with CMC suggested that stabilisation helps to underpin the sustainability of MFA investment in mainstream development projects and programmes by deploying different actors and instruments working cooperatively.
- The Development Policy Results Report (DPR) process is also an important vehicle for PCD and is being rolled out in two-stages. Networks come together to set objectives and ‘bring the silos together’ and facilitate policy development. The second phase is implementation and monitoring in which shared analysis is an important part of the learning process analysing the challenges together including virtual platforms with embassies.

Yet, there is also some evidence suggesting that these mechanisms are not always effective. According to a representative of the MoI, policy coherence does not always work optimally at an institutional level. There has been in the last ten years a significant decrease in the emphasis given by the MFA to PCD. Responsibility for the 2030 Agenda and the use of the concept PCSD has been moved to the PMO, which takes a whole-of-government approach, ensuring a certain government wide coherence, also at the EU level, but does not focus so specifically on PCD. In early November 2017 for instance the PM issued a policy statement that there would be a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to migration involving trade, development and returnee policy. One result however is that the MFA is no longer taking as strong a line on PCD specifically and it has yet to be seen what impact these shifts in the mechanisms used will have on the effective promotion of policy coherence. CSO voices suggest that the MFA still has to create mechanisms to promote PCSD. However, as Finland is a small country, informal links between officials in different departments and ministries provide another level of mechanism, and according to interviewees the promotion of policy coherence does still take place at the personal level through these individual contacts.
The MFA has in particular experienced some difficulties in establishing a coherent response to the so-called migration crisis due to diverging views on the use of development cooperation funds for migration objectives both within the MFA and across ministries, especially with the MoI. This negatively impacted policy coherence on the MFA’s approaches to FD and HDN. In effect, the question of forced displacement has separated rather than united officials and different ministries, bringing out clearly the existence of different perspectives. In broad terms, two groups are taking shape. First, there are those who think that the focus of Finnish aid should be directed towards the countries of origin or transit of migration to Finland. Within the MFA there are thus several voices advocating a radical rethink of Finland’s development cooperation policy towards new types of cooperation addressing the root causes of migration in fewer, migration-relevant, developing countries, focussed more on business, private sector cooperation, trade, and job creation. However, there is also considerable resistance to such a change as many MFA officials feel this is based on false premises. Some interviewees even talk about the space given to such arguments as going against their sense of professional integrity. Thus, a second group of staff, mainly in the MFA, share more traditional ideas about development cooperation and would like Finland to continue its long-standing programmes with established partner countries. This second group would like migration to take less space in the development cooperation rhetoric. Between the MFA and the MoD, there appears to be a stronger level of policy coherence largely because the latter take their policy line from the MFA. Officials in both the MFA and the MoI are aware and increasingly concerned that the MFA’s emphasis on promoting policy coherence is not as strong as it used to be.

The increasing alignment of development with migration issues and securitisation is not easily compatible with the long-term approach that characterises development work. In other words, the Finnish internal political agenda and the developmental aspiration collide, suggesting a certain failure of policy coherence. Equally there appears to be no easy trade-off, so it is recognised this is essentially a political decision that has to be taken at a higher level, though for now the signals officials lower down the ranks receive on this are not that clear. Some interviewees suggested that the outcome of the next elections and a possible new government coalition, may well resolve the issue and given that public attention has shifted away from migration at present there is not much need to resolve the issue before then.

Nevertheless, it seems that there are ongoing efforts to foster coherence on FD and HDN issues: an Action Plan was created, the Development Policy Steering Committee and the Humanitarian Aid unit both appointed new advisors, a draft Theory of Change (ToC) has been prepared for humanitarian assistance to promote PCD etc. Additionally, one-page briefing notes were recently drafted and widely shared internally. These texts on different topics relating to migration and Finnish development policy are meant for internal use as information packages and to provide guidance. Their purpose is to unify thinking and to encourage discussion to help formulate a more consistent philosophical approach. To achieve greater policy coherence on FD and HDN issues, some GoF interviewees see a need to bridge the two visions that emerged in post-2015 of the long-term development objectives and the fast track action. One MFA official suggested the creation of a ToC on the tenuous relationship between migration and development, and the practice of how to address the root causes of migration via development cooperation given existing research showing an inverted U curve relationship between development and migration levels. This would then feed the coherence of Finnish development practices related to migration.

Yet, despite these internal differences, on the international scene the Finns are perceived by partners (e.g. EU, UN, other European states, OECD) as well coordinated both within the MFA and with the MoI. Finland’s policies are generally viewed by external interlocutors as coherent and consistent. According to interviews with EU officials and EU MS representatives, Finland is widely known for raising the issue of policy coherence in EU fora. Finnish officials also feel that, in EU circles, Finland can still demonstrate its commitment to policy coherence with established mechanisms, which generally function well and are frequently used. This may also be due to the government’s EU Coordination Committee, which is used to work out Finland’s positions before each EU Council meeting. This tool is seen by GoF officials as func-
tional and useful, although recently coordination appears to have also taken place increasingly in writing via emails. There are also occasionally joint MFA-MoI delegations to the EU Council and other meetings.

However, interlocutors confirm that the levels of coherence achieved mainly resonate with existing policy priorities in the 2016 DPP and other ‘policy pillars’ such as crisis management, humanitarian assistance and migration policies. On the methodologies of PCD and PCSD, Finland is considered by certain partners to be exemplary and is generally known for raising the issue of policy coherence in different fora. However, the role of Finland in advocating for PCD was more noticeable in the past. Finland’s CSO partners are more aware of the changing face of Finnish development cooperation and the internal tensions and what they perceive as a worrying trend towards greater securitisation of Finnish aid.

The 2016 cuts in Finnish ODA have had probably more of an impact on Finland’s international standing, at least among UN family partners and have made it harder for Finland to make its voice heard in the humanitarian sector in particular. The MFA seeks to counter this by being a ‘good donor’ for instance by honouring its commitments, paying on time and aligning with country systems.

On migration, Finland’s position is regarded by interlocutors in Geneva as in-line with the EU and many other European countries: it tilts towards stronger migration control and correlates greater development assistance with migration deterrence. Yet, once the Finns hardened their lines on migration, they remained consistent across fora. The Finnish approach to migration is not coherent with a principled humanitarian approach, observed, for example, in Finland’s Afghan refugee return policies in relation to wider development and human rights policies. The inconsistency of ‘aid tied to politics’ was criticised by some key informants.

Interlocutors cite scarcely any evidence of coherence in relation to FD and HDN, confirming that the MFA is not yet seriously engaging with these concepts, more particularly HDN, comprehensively or coherently. Gaps, for example, in IDP policy and programming are noted, despite some reference in the 2012 policy and also to urban displacement and in the education sector where there is the need to address more systematically the education needs of displaced persons, especially in access to 2nd and 3rd level education.

On the other hand, much of the discussion on the HDN does equally appear to be relevant to policy coherence and the processes and structures that could support its promotion.

Case studies

Answer to EQ 3

EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

Response to EQ 3

In partner countries, case study evidence suggest that Finland does not have sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure coherence on FD and HDN approaches. As a result, the level of policy coherence is not yet adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN. Evidence from the MENA case study suggest that Finland’s interventions in the region were found to align and cohere with some PPAs and policy pillars, but not so much in HDN frame. In Somalia, the Finnish humanitarian approach appears to operate in silos and is further accentuated by the long-term humanitarian principles approach in place to assist Somali refugees in camps in Kenya. In the Afghan context, the gradual inclusion of FD and HDN undermined policy coherence mainly because of the strong emphasis on migration control objectives. The latter are driven by a short-
term political agenda rather than longer term and more holistic measures that would be required to address the root causes of conflict and displacement. However, the Finnish MFA's approach to FD and HDN appears to be to a certain extent coherent with its partners at the bilateral and multilateral level.

Key findings on judgement criteria

**JC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively**

In the context of Somalia and the MENA region, there seems to be an absence of clear mechanisms to promote policy coherence. In the case of Somalia, interviews uncovered some incoherence in the operationalisation of the humanitarian and development nexus due to a silo approach being taken to their implementation and the lack of consultations and coordination between the different units dealing with HDN and FD at the Embassy of Finland.

Unlike the other two case studies that have country/region strategies, development cooperation in Afghanistan is linked, since 2012, to the existence of white papers that are produced every 4 years that ensure coherence and alignment between policies and actual operations. FD and HDN were not referred to in the first two white papers, but, while the latest white paper of 2018 does engage with FD, it does so with a clear emphasis towards 'sustainable' returns (i.e. preventing new displacements). Otherwise, while the modus operandi of the comprehensive approach intends to bring together different policy pillars, in practice this does not guarantee coherence between the different policy pillars, especially as internal mechanisms- notably around funding- prevent rather than promote coherence.

**JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)**

As the MFA does not have clear or strong policies on FD or HDN, there is an inherent limitation to assess how coherent these may be in relation to the policies of other actors on the same topics. Finnish policies on Afghanistan and the MENA region have generally been perceived as being coherent and notably aligned the Finland’s PPAs. However, in the Afghan case the gradual inclusion of FD and HDN in the wider policies undermined policy coherence. The MoI’s emphasis on migration control has had a clear impact on country programme with the prioritisation given since 2016 to the return of failed asylum seekers to Afghanistan, a policy that was met with either indifference or criticism by the MFA. The MFA’s policies on FD and HDN are more easily aligned with that of multilateral partners with the caveat that these partners may have diverse opinions and priorities on how to tackle the issue.

The Finnish country strategy for Somalia is aligned with the Somali National Development Plan. EU level support (EU Emergency Trust Fund with the original mandate of preventing migration, military and civilian crisis management etc) basically aims at creating conditions for efficient development cooperation. A large part of Finland’s humanitarian aid to international organisations is non-earmarked thus increasing the chance for coherence – but reducing Finland’s visibility at the tables where decisions about the use of the funds are made. CSO funding is coherent with the DPP and with the Somalia country strategy.

**JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN**

The case studies indicate that the level of policy coherence is not yet adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN. In the Afghan context, there is a shared realisation of the importance of FD both in terms of its scale and impact in the country. Yet, there is no unified or coherent way to address it. Finland’s push towards returns of Afghans with the ensuing implications of returning to a fragile state and conflict context does not always sit comfortably with Finland’s other development cooperation priorities.
In Somalia, while EU level funding is in part directly targeted to reducing outwards migration from Somalia (EUTF), humanitarian aid continues being spent on humanitarian purposes even after 20–30 years of existence of refugee camps (no HDN approach materialised). More recent initiatives on root causes such as business partnerships (for employment creation) and the planned participation in the construction of a migration authority (to be able to receive returnees, including forcibly returned) may increase coherence if the objective is to use development cooperation as deterrent to migration.

In the MENA region, policy coherence has been tested by the scale and diversity of of the Finn’s engagement. Interventions in the MENA region were found to align and cohere with some PPAs and policy pillars, but not so much in HDN frame.

**The Somali Case Study**

The interviews provided some insights into the reasons for the low visibility of Finland among development donors. These hint at some coherence issues such as the lack of resources, and understaffing, leading to a lack of balance between the budgets for Somalia and the number of staff dedicated to monitoring and follow-up on how the funds are used. Interviews uncovered some incoherence in the operationalisation of the humanitarian and development nexus due to a silo approach and the lack of consultations and coordination between the different units dealing with HDN and FD at the Embassy of Finland. The Unit for Humanitarian Aid acts in total independence from the regional unit and Somalia strategy, and little if any coordination and complementarity was found. The same independence applies to the Civil Society Unit but in this case, the funded projects are aligned and support the overall Finnish strategy for Somalia. The peace-making projects funded by the Political Department support the rest of Finnish initiatives in Somalia.

An additional factor, worth praising on one hand, is the fact that Finland gives un-earmarked humanitarian funding (or earmarked only for a certain country), with the practical consequence that Finland does not participate in the decision-making process of the humanitarian aid it gives. This is one expression of working in silos typical in MFA, further accentuated by yet an additional factor in the case of FD/HDN and IDPs in Somalia: the strong reluctance of UNHCR to apply the Durable Solutions approach for Somali refugees in camps in Kenya, leading to strong reliance over a long-term humanitarian approach and principles, rather than evolving towards an HDN approach.

**The Afghan Case Study**

Most KIs supported the ‘comprehensive approach’ which by combining political, civilian and military interventions as a modus operandi encourages policy coherence. They confirmed its adequacy and relevance to the Afghan context where there still is an active conflict. A KI noted as especially valuable to have development cooperation specialists working alongside political experts. Yet, further efforts are needed to overcome the remaining tendency to work in silos. The HDN nexus may however not be as relevant as in post conflict contexts, which are more conducive to development.

One dimension of Finland’s policy towards Afghanistan of preventing further arrivals of migrants and reducing the current caseload has been to prioritise returns both voluntary and involuntary. The MoI took the lead role in negotiating the return agreement because the migration management portfolio is owned by the MoI. This push for returns created some frictions with the MFA’s priorities and reflected a certain lack of coherence with its development cooperation objectives since concurrently the security situation on the ground worsened and the increased numbers of both returnees and IDPs further inflated the humanitarian crisis in the country. The high human risks associated with returns of Afghans let to a temporary halt on such practice in September 2018, following the release of new UNHCR Guidelines. Yet, that suspension only lasted a week and the Finnish migration office then issued new guidelines which in principle authorised the resumption of returns. Some KIs expressed doubts regarding the coherence and efficiency of such policy in the context of fragile states, as it is likely to lead to more migration out of Afghanistan.
The MENA Case Study

Evidence from the MENA case study suggest that policy coherence has been tested by the scale and diversity of Finland’s engagement. One challenge is the spread of the programme. Funding is finite and if it is spread too thinly it is difficult to retain coherence. At the programmatic level, Finland’s interventions in the MENA region were found to align and cohere with some PPAs and policy pillars, but not so much in the HDN frame. Projects to which Finland contributes seem to lack strategy and direct connections to HDN and FD. Donors including Finland have been experiencing funding challenges, placing stress on policy coherence, while HDN requires predictable, non-earmarked, multi-year funding.

There have also been challenges in synchronising messaging between the headquarters and the field. Yet, while headquarters have the money and make the decisions, it seems to be taking messaging from the field into account. The MFA is also viewed by several KIs as very strong on gender equality and women and girls at the field level. Finland appears to have internalised the gender issues and policy making from headquarters down to the field. Its engagement is fully consistent and coherent with the women and girls PPA of 2016 DPP and also bears strongly on the peace and security PPA. Finland is coherent on most substantive issues but where it lacks coherence is around administrative procedures – namely funding procedures – to deliver its policies.

The MFA is closely aligned with advocacy on peace building and facilitating coherence and co-ordinating International NGOs they have funded in the Syrian peace process involving the Syrian government, opposition and Kurdish group. This activity is coherent with peace and civilian crisis management policy pillars although not explicitly in an HDN frame. Another example of coherence is in context of the UNHabitat/ FELM-CSI (Common Space Initiative) Syria peace building process. MFA is not funding the UN Habitat Programme, but they are important partner for CSI.
Answer to EQ 1

EQ 1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

There is no evidence that the MFA developed clear approaches to FD and HDN, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation. While forced displacement is without contest a key feature of the Afghan context and has been for years, Finland’s emerging engagement with the concept can more evidently be linked to the arrival in Finland in 2015 of large numbers of migrants and refugees, including of Afghans and its response, aligned with a domestic political shift has been to give greater emphasis on return policies. With the massive returns of Afghans, the following year from Iran and Pakistan who then added themselves to the large numbers of IDPs that count the country, Finland stared to consider with more interest some of the implications to these population movements and to support their ‘integration’, as part of a wider effort [including at EU level] to prevent migration. There are also signs of increased knowledge and engagement but limited as the broader integrated approach is the established framework in Afghanistan.

Key findings on judgement criteria

JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established

Although FD has been a key feature of the Afghan context for decades it is mainly absent from MFA’s policy formulation in relation to Afghanistan. Policy documents developed around 2013–2014 do not engage with the concept but more surprisingly not even with the related concepts of refugees and internal displacement. This gap is confirmed by KIs working in Afghanistan during this period. The 2015 ‘European refugee crisis’ and at a different level the return campaigns by Pakistan and Iran acted as a game changer with a much clearer emphasis put not so much on FD but on migration control and return. Both written policies and their programmatic translations have notably focussed on return, including through greater support for returnees.

The engagement with the HDN concept in Afghanistan takes a wider stance through the comprehensive approach that is the framework adopted by Finland in Afghanistan.

JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented

The manner in which the MFA has engaged with FD in Afghanistan has had some impact over Finland’s on-going commitment towards the 5 PPs and PPAs. For some of the KIs, the emphasis on migration control in a conflict and fragile context like Afghanistan is not always easily compatible with the emphasis on human rights.
The comprehensive approach is well developed in Afghanistan and is described by most KIs as a good model whereby development and humanitarian objectives coincide, although it does not entirely prevent the silo approach.

The policy priorities for Afghanistan are closely aligned with the PPAs as described in the 2016 DPP with a clear emphasis on the first PPA about the rights of women and girls which has been described by nearly all KIs as a key focus areas. There is also an emphasis on livelihood and support to the rule of law.

**JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)**

As noted above in Afghanistan, there has been a clear emphasis on women and girls but this approach has not been extended to considering the specific vulnerabilities triggered by displacement. Among the weaknesses and gaps noted in the case study feature internal displacement: even if some development project activities have benefitted IDP populations, their needs and vulnerability have not been acknowledged and they have not been targeted as such with the exception of a small scale exploratory project addressing livelihood needs of different displaced populations, including IDPs. Urban displacement is also a gap despite being a characteristic of the displacement for both IDPs and returnees. Climate change is seen as a key issue in the Afghan context, but one that has received insufficient consideration by Finland despite recent evidence (drought currently affecting Afghanistan) that climate related events precipitate population displacement.

**Answer to EQ 2**

**EQ 2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?**

The ‘evolving approach and interpretation of FD’ [and to lesser extend HDN] can be observed in the context of Afghanistan but the programmatic translation of this greater attention towards the phenomenon remains limited in intensity and scale in comparison to the other areas, especially around gender and women’s empowerment where Finland’s influence is most widely recognised.

**Key findings on judgement criteria**

**JC2.1 Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA**

Finland’s initial engagement in Afghanistan like much of the rest of the international community has been focused on the security and stabilisation of the country with state building and development goals gradually featuring more prominently. The engagement has mostly left out any consideration or analysis of FD until recently, less so on HDN as Afghanistan is where the comprehensive approach model emerged and was first tested [by Finland and others].

**JC2.2 Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR’) and CSOs**

Finland’s engagement with other actors has been described in positive terms as indeed either aligned or complementary to that of other actors. Finland is however acknowledged as leading on the issue of gender.
parity and women, peace and security and while there is evidence of the country’s influence in this domain, the links with FD have not been explored.

**JC2.3 Influence: MFA policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective**

Finland’s role towards FD and HDN has been quite limited on average and its interest circumscribed and fairly recent (while the phenomenon of FD itself has always been there) to identify any policy influence towards bilateral and multilateral partners. Finland’s influence has more obviously been significant and systematic on gender parity and on women peace and security but even in relation to these the country mainly failed to connect it to FD and consider the specific vulnerability of displaced women.

**Answer to EQ 3**

**EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?**

Finnish policies on Afghanistan have generally been perceived as being coherent and notably aligned the Finland’s PPAs. However, while the gradual inclusion of FD and HDN in the wider policies did not help but rather undermined policy coherence, the same is observed in the Afghan context. The main reason for which coherence may be weakened rather than strengthened relate to the strong emphasis on migration control objectives that are driven by a short-term political agenda rather than longer term and more holistic measures that would be required to address the root causes of conflict and displacement.

**Key findings on judgement criteria**

**JC3.1 Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively**

Unlike the other two case studies that have country/region strategies, development cooperation in Afghanistan is linked to the existence since 2012 of white papers that are produced every 4 years that ensure coherence and alignment between policies and actual operations. FD and HDN have been absent of the first two white papers but while the latest white paper of 2018 engages with FD, it does so with a clear emphasises towards ‘sustainable’ returns (i.e. preventing new displacements). Otherwise, while the modus operandi of the comprehensive approach intends to bring together different policy pillars, in practice this does not guarantee coherence between the different policy pillars, especially as internal mechanisms- notably around funding- prevent rather than promote coherence.

**JC3.2 There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/ Departments (e.g. MoI and PMO MoD) and the MFA’s partners bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)**

As the MFA does not have clear or strong policies on FD or HDN, there is an inherent limitation to assess how coherent these may be in relation to the policies of other actors on the same topics. What however transpires more clearly is that the MoI’s emphasis on migration control has had a clear impact on country programme with the prioritisation given since 2016 to the return of failed asylum seekers to Afghanistan, a position that was meet with either indifference or criticism by the MFA. MFA’s policies on FD and HDN are more easily aligned with that of other multi-lateral partners with the caveat that these partners may have diverse opinions and priorities on how to tackle the issue.
JC3.3 The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN

The level of policy coherence is probably insufficient or inadequate to achieve a common approach to FD and HDN. In relation to FD while there is a shared realisation of the importance of the phenomenon both in terms of its scale and impact in Afghanistan, there is no unified or coherent way to address it and Finland’s push towards returns of Afghans with the ensuing implications of returning to a fragile state and conflict context does not always sit comfortably with Finland’s other development cooperation’s priorities.

Introduction: Context and overview of Finland’s engagement in the country

While Finland’s contribution towards Afghanistan is small compared to other donors, it is significant if one look at the aid per capita and Afghanistan continues to be the biggest recipient of Finnish aid with an annual budget of approximately 30 MEUR per year, even if actual disbursements per year can be lower.

Figure 5: Disbursements extended to Afghanistan by year 2012–2018

Finland’s level of engagement in Afghanistan has also remained constant over the years and it has established a long-term (over 17 years) relation that has several phases. Finland’s involvement in Afghanistan dates back to 2002 and was initially conceived as a short-term Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) project. In 2004 Finland reinforced its presence though its involvement in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the north of the country in cooperation with Norway, an intervention focused on civilian humanitarian activities and the security sector reform. In 2007, Finland’s deployed in Mazar-i-Sharif on a Sweden-lead CIMIC operation part of the ISAF mission that was terminated at the end of 2014. In 2009 development cooperation with Afghanistan increased when Finland’s presence in Kabul was upgraded to Embassy status. Since 2015 Finland maintained its presence pursuing at the military level an advisory and training role to the Afghan military.

Finland’s development cooperation support to Afghanistan is mainly channelled through multilateral actors such as the World Bank that managed the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARPF) and the UN agencies. This includes humanitarian assistance and support to civil society organisations as well as the funding of civilian crisis management that meets the OECD criteria for development cooperation. Humanitarian funding is however channelled separately and handled directly from Helsinki with more limited involvement from MFA staff deployed in Kabul.
During the interviews, Afghanistan was described as ‘a complex environment with lots of different parallel dynamics’, while others KIs highlighted how ‘in Afghanistan everything is politically motivated’. A majority of KIs gave a bleak view of the situation in Afghanistan, one KI describing a ‘sliding slope since 2003’ and expressed doubts whether the involvement of the international community has really benefited Afghans. Another KI, referring to the conference held about Afghanistan in Geneva in November 2019 mentioned the ‘disconnect between politics and reality’. In parallel other KIs confirming the importance of Finland’s presence [together with the rest of the international community]: ‘what would happen if we are not there?’ and that it is important to ‘ensure that at least things are maintain at the same level’ (that the situation doesn’t get worst). While also acknowledging the challenges, two KIs, both having been involved over a long period, offered a more optimistic vision about the country’s future and hope that the generational shift that is underway would bring positive change.

The 2014 Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation highlighted how in Afghanistan ‘productivity and growth in the labour market are inhibited by corruption, weak government capacity and poor public infrastructure’. It further noted that living standards and infant mortality rates are ranked among the lowest in the world, even despite the significant increase of functioning health facilities with qualified health workers from 2002 (MFA 2014, 107). Four years later, the security, economic and political situations remain very unsettled and wide-spread corruption is still a plague that hampers state building measure and projects. According to UNAMA, the number of civilian deaths reached a record high in 2017 after nearly a decade of rising casualties and while the highest number of civilian casualties effecting children mainly has been in the Kabul province the geographical spread indicates the country-wide character of the war (UNAMA 2017, 5) The international community also paid a high tribute with notably over 100 aid workers killed in 2017, the highest number in the world followed by a high toll as well in South Sudan and Syria.

All KIs acknowledged that the country still has huge needs. Several factors were put forward to explain the challenging environment, including the worsening of the security situation, the multiplicity of actors and the lack of coordination in a context in which ‘too much money was poured in too fast’.

**Policy Mapping/Documentation Findings**

Despite the relevance of FD both in scale and in the various forms it takes in the Afghan context (internal displacement, cross-border movement, returns) there is a surprising lack of reference to FD in earlier official policies related to Afghanistan. One explanation put forward by a KI is related to the dominance of the military and political priorities at the time while FD was relegated to the humanitarian remit.
The documents analysis clearly shows that prior to 2015, FD is very much absent from policy. The 2013 Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan is a holistic document covering political issues, aid, and security. It contains a small reference to returnees but one that is framed as a statement of intention not as an actual policy like in the 2018 White Paper (see below). The 2014 White Paper on Afghanistan gives an overview of the context but while several consequences of the conflict/ post conflict situation are mentioned (e.g. on-going instability, destruction of the country’s social and technical infrastructure and its economy) there is not a single reference to displacement of civilians whether refugees or IDPs (or about their return to Afghanistan). This gap is very surprising considering the high level of displacement in Afghanistan (at all time). Interestingly there is a small reference to the Afghan diaspora [in Finland] at the end of the document: ‘The over 3,000 people of Afghan origin who currently live in Finland can be counted as a major resource for the further development of Finno-Afghan relations in the spheres of economy and trade and also more generally’ (MFA 2014, 30). There are other gaps in the White Paper, especially no reference to climate change.

This gap is even more surprising that the 2014 Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation which predates and informed the 2014 White Paper did acknowledged the key role of FD: ‘four decades of conflict in Afghanistan have been one of the key drivers of displacement, creating substantial refugee populations requiring support’ (MFA 2014, 107)

The 2018 White Paper contrarily to the 2014 version engages with FD but almost entirely and exclusively with a focus on returns, mentioning Finland’s promotion of voluntary returns (concerned 144 Afghans in 2016) and its objectives towards non-voluntary returns too through the EU Joint Way Forward (signed in October 2016) and its bilateral agreement on returns on a similar model also developed by Germany and Sweden (some 18 Afghans were returned by the police in 2016 while the number reached 54 by November 2017). The paper also acknowledges the large-scale returns of refugees and undocumented migrants from both Pakistan and Iran and Finland’s support toward employment opportunities of returnees (i.e. the inter-agency SALAM project) and through humanitarian assistance provided through UNHCR and the Red Cross. The new White Paper also has a clear focus on migration, in alignment to the EU framework around member states cooperation in supporting the peace process, regional cooperation and controlled migration.

An internal MFA report on results of cooperation with Afghanistan from 2018 also focused extensively on returns (both from Finland and the region). Yet it also mentioned the staggering high number of IDPs in the country, of which a majority are women and it is the first FMA document that addressed the related vulnerabilities that these women face as a result of displacement and the lack of identification documents, especially the impossibility to access essential services.

HDN is not often mentioned in documents related to Afghanistan mainly because the broader comprehensive crisis management concept is the operating framework in Afghanistan. The 2014 Evaluation Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation Synthesis- Afghanistan highlights that ‘rather than being a conventional country programme evaluation, it focuses on the peace, security and development nexus’ (MFA 2014, 102). It then clarifies how in such context, ‘development cooperation includes a wide range of interventions supporting conflict prevention and mitigation indirectly, with development cooperation being implemented in parallel with diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance’ (MFA 2014, 03). The 2014 White Paper similarly refers to ‘the cross-cutting objectives of Finland’s development efforts for Afghanistan (i.e. human rights, women’s rights, equality, good governance and anti-corruption activities)’ (ibid., 16).

KII’s Findings

Most KIs in the MFA were supportive of the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ which combines political, civilian and military interventions as a modus operandi, and they confirmed its adequacy and relevance to the Afghan context where there still is an active conflict (‘it is the only possible approach’). A KI noted as
especially valuable to have development cooperation specialists working alongside political experts. It was acknowledged that the comprehensive approach had evolved over time with a more dominant military involvement at the beginning while the civilian component subsequently increased in importance. Partner KIs had more mixed views about the comprehensive approach; one KI highlighted that ‘there are certainly a number of challenges and possible contradictions in relation to the comprehensive approach’ and added that ‘it is good to be at least conscious about them’.

While one KI acknowledged that bringing in development objectives from the beginning is important, in practice a post conflict context is more conducive – and in the context of Afghanistan which is an active conflict again – the nexus is just less relevant.

All MFA KIs acknowledged that FD is part and parcel of the Afghan context but also that it was initially just not featuring in the political agenda of Finland and even if some projects would have targeted displaced population the issue was just not visible; it ‘was a side note’ (other than for humanitarian experts). Instead, Finland’s initial involvement in Afghanistan was driven by security considerations (linked to the fight against terrorism) as well as political interests (linked to the NATO partnership). Human rights considerations, especially the willingness to address the situation of women also came into the equation while the development component only came subsequently.

There are two parallel dimensions that explain the rising profile of FD in relation to Afghanistan. The first relates to the arrival of 30,000 asylum seekers to Finland (‘eyes started to open when the refugees started to come to Finland’) as among them were a large portion of Afghans (along Syrian and Iraqi nationals). The other is linked to the massive returns of Afghans from Iran especially and Pakistan triggered by a mixed pull and push factors which mobilised the efforts of partners based in the country to ‘prevent an infolding humanitarian situation’. The massive returns mainly affected the 3 cities of Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat which on top witnessed an increased number of IDPs due to the severe drought.

The other dimension of Finland’s policy towards Afghanistan to prevent further arrivals and reduce the current caseload has been to prioritise returns both voluntary and non-voluntary. One MFA KI insisted on the fact that migration management portfolio [and the push for returns] is ‘owned by the MoI, it is their responsibility’. The MoI took the lead role in negotiating the return agreement (signed in October 2016, along the ‘Joint Way Forward’ signed at the EU level). The return of some Afghans from Finland (about 10,000 from Europe) was a ‘political statement’. Another KI saw it less as a signal at domestic level but believed the motivation for that agreement was to ‘push Afghanistan to take some responsibility’.

Even if the actual numbers of returnees have been so small, several MFA personnel noted how it was a difficult position to hold as at the time when a strong focus was placed on return by Helsinki, the security situation on the ground worsened and the increased numbers of both returnees and IDPs inflated further the humanitarian crisis in the country. A KI noted how this ‘idée fixe about wanting returns’ is not easily compatible with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan (‘the push for Afghanistan to take back those not eligible for refugee status should be considered within the bigger picture of the situation in Afghanistan’). Another KI found the return policy to be problematic as there are very few places where people can actually safely return to, implying that there are high risks for the returnees, putting into question that policy: ‘not sure this policy is human’ and ‘that it is fair to put people in great danger’ (even if it is hard to trace what actually happens to these returnees, whether some have lost their lives...). This view was illustrated by the fact that in September 2018, the returns of Afghans was put on hold in Finland following the release of new UNHCR Guidelines (UNHCR 2018b) but that suspension only lasted a week and the Finnish migration office issued new guidelines which in principle authorised the resumption of returns (following the practice in other countries, notably Germany). That episode (suspension followed by the resumption of returns can be explained by Finland’s concern of creating pull factors for prospective asylum-seekers). Even more pragmatic views do not find the logic of this policy: ‘it is crazy to consider return when most people will leave again’ but also that ‘there is not much point to adopt this strategy [return] for fragile states’. 
But another KI reflected that, ‘if the return of some was the price to pay for maintaining Finland’s presence in Afghanistan, then it was probably worth paying that price’. At the same time the complexity of the question was acknowledged as well as the need to consider Finland’s concerns about the impact of having increased number of migrants / refugees. And another KI wondered ‘how much of that emphasis on preventing migration is part of a change of rhetoric rather than actual work?’

In 2017 the numbers of Afghan asylum seekers arriving to Finland went down as a result of Finnish and European policies more broadly, and the return influx to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan also slowed down mainly due to negotiations between the hosts and return countries. But, although no longer an ‘emergency situation’, beyond this ‘crisis’ Finland became aware that FD as a phenomenon is forecasted to accelerate with more people coming from fragile state contexts and from places experiencing a significant population growth and suffering from the effects of climate change/water shortage, all three characteristics of the Afghan context.

The above development and new policy environment explain why the rhetoric that links development and migration, which to an extent surpassed the one linking security and development that justified development cooperation in the earlier phase, was applied in the Afghan context; and so to prevent the continuous arrivals of Afghans to Europe, the government conceded to continue funding development in the country. As put by one KI, ‘the large arrival of Afghan asylum-seekers to Finland triggered the need to change the content of the development package’.

Support Afghanistan Livelihoods and Mobility (SALAM) project

At a programmatic level, since 2017 Finland is supporting a new project, called SALAM in Nangarhar province [across the border with Pakistan] that clearly addresses FD in all its complexity and dimensions and that also engages with the nexus. Its aim is to offer durable solutions to displaced people, including returnees and IDPs and to the host community by providing vocational and skills training, matching potential employees with private businesses, and developing policies for managed migration. The project, ran jointly by UNDP and ILO, supported by UNHCR, in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrdom and the Disabled (MOLSAMD), focuses on supporting self-reliance, poverty reduction of the different displaced groups which is at the core of what HDN is about.

The project while considered relevant, innovative, ‘concrete and tangible’, holding a great potential and being a good illustration of cooperation. But there are a number of challenges and drawbacks to the project. First, the project has a very short time frame 1 year- and even with the one-year no cost extension granted this is not seen as realistic. Most crucially, this short-term timeframe is seen contrary to the longer-term vision inherent to the project- as a result the focus has been on the delivery rather than the longer-term objectives (‘the project has become the end rather than the mean’). A second challenge relates to the management of Labour migration pillar of the project (which essentially means the exportation of labour force to Arab States). Here the focus has been on institutional capacity development of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, and this task has proved quite challenging because it is a ‘supply driven process’ about exporting low skilled workers. However, a benefit of this project has been in terms of lessons learned and referred especially to the partnership with the WB in terms of labour migration- so this ‘pilot project’ may have help the WB to establish a solid engagement with the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Thirdly, the narrow geographic focus on Nangarhar province is seen another ‘in-built’ limitation: indeed, the high number of returnees and IDPs find themselves in a situation of market saturation. It appears that the SALAM project was initially conceived as a national framework – and this much broader remit (than what it is now) would have been adequate/ more
appropriate (would have enable people to move across regions in areas where the employment market may be more dynamic). As for the challenging security situation is ‘just the price of doing any business in Afghanistan’.

In terms of drawbacks, because government premises were not available for the project implementation – the number of beneficiaries had to be reduced as the project had to rely on the private sector to provide facilities (which was costlier). Partners now see the role of the private sector is a necessity.

Few KIs at the MFA engaged with the issue related to HDN, possibly because the concept applied more explicitly [and may be promoted] in other operational contexts like the Middle East and also because the comprehensive approach is the dominant operating framework that applies in Afghanistan. One KI was doubtful about the traditional way of considering humanitarian aid because of the ‘inherent risk of rendering people passive’ but acknowledge the struggle to change the approach as it is clearly still important to address basic vital needs. Another KI nevertheless highlighted how humanitarian needs in Afghanistan are much greater now, and currently under-estimated, and mentioned population growth, food insecurity and the impact of the drought as among the key reasons and how these needs are currently under-estimated. There is a tendency, more prevalent in the manner that things work at HQ rather than in Afghanistan, to focus on narrow tasks and follow the silo approach when having a wider view is what is needed.

Most partner KIs had little clue about Finland’s position on FD and HDN with the exception of those more directly involved with the SALAM project (mentioned above) but notwithstanding of Finland’s position on these themes, for many of the bilateral partners these were issues that they had themselves integrated and prioritised. One partner KI confirmed the point of the MFA above about the fact that most projects that Finland support are not especially targeting forcibly displaced populations, adding that this does not mean that they are excluded either suspecting that a high rate of returnees were among the beneficiaries (the same KI anecdotally noted that among the national staff (educated and young – mainly under 40) possibly up to 80% didn’t grow up in Afghanistan but rather in Pakistan or Iran).

Bridging the nexus and focusing on building resilience was described as a priority for a number of organisations and as put by one KI, ‘for every penny in humanitarian work, there should be a seed for development work’, adding that humanitarian work taking place alongside development offers a better scenario in the long run. The concept of HPDN seems to get even greater traction and to resonate with a majority of partner KIs who highlighted that all activities are done under a broader ‘peace building umbrella’. One KI felt that the (triple) nexus is a sustainable way (more than HDN) of thinking, ‘it is the way to go’.

Partner KIs acknowledged how big of a challenge internal displacement which is increasing, becoming protracted and affecting urban areas mainly. Several KIs felt that the government of Afghanistan had done very little to address the question of internal displacement and one KI actually wondered whether donors ‘had given-up on the government on this’, with the exception of the EU that was seen as having a firmer position about the need for the government to take ownership and responsibility on the issue. Partner KIs were all clear that prioritising return in a country with such high level of insecurity, poverty and poor or inexistent basic services was problematic. One KI even went further saying that ‘anybody pretending that there are safe areas to the returned to in Afghanistan is not credible’. Another KI also indicated that the focus should not be about preventing people to migrate. Efforts to facilitate integration once returns had taken place were on the other hand seen as aligned with the wider peace building efforts and important as the current reality is that mainly returnees remain in situation of displacement being added to the increasing numbers of IDPs. One KI insisted on the need to give to people a sense of belonging, which to be effective implies having a greater sense of security and being able to access jobs and livelihood.
There is certainly a ‘willingness from Finland to be influential’ but because of its limited presence and resources there is also as expressed by a KI at the MFA ‘a need to think strategically about how to profile ourselves, to be in different places...’ While the influence exerted depends on the personality of individual post holders, Finland generally benefits from the ‘reputation of not being empty but an evidence-based donor’. One MFA KI also highlighted a two-pronged strategy to achieve greater impact by ‘being an active participant in discussions as well as finding ‘like-minded allies’ – most often the Nordic states and Germany who had similar objectives’. The ‘need to cooperate, to share responsibilities with others’, notably with the EU and the Nordic + group (that includes the Nordic countries, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden and 3 other like-minded donors, the UK, the Netherlands and Canada) was supported by others KIs at the MFA, while Finland’s involvement in the Nordic + group was noted as ‘strategic to be a bigger player’.

KIs from partner organisations described Finland as ‘an active donor’ and as being ‘influential’ even if they had less money than some of the other donors. One KI described Finland as being ‘very approachable’, mentioning that ‘not everything appears set’ and that ‘they are open to dialogue and are flexible’ even if obviously they have their own politically motivated priorities. Most KIs saw Finland’s policy interests as being generally aligned with that of the other Nordic countries and also with values and principles of multi-lateral organisations.

The biggest chunk of its funding has been towards the ARTF and Finland is among the 10 largest contributors of the Fund but one KI acknowledged that when projects are smaller (3 donors involved in a project support to UNESCO) or when Finland goes solo in supporting bilateral projects, it gives greater visibility to Finland even if these projects are more demanding.

Another KI explained that to meet time-management constraints Finland has had to prioritise a ‘hand-off approach’, channelling aid in such a way that it does not require active engagement as is the case for the WB Funds where the starting point is that Finland do trust these organisations.

While KIs from the MFA were able to describe the various means and channels used to influence, for partner organisations this was less obvious: one KI put forward as an explanation the fact that severe movement restrictions for members of the International community in Afghanistan limited occasions for interaction because of the limited number of coordination and consultation meetings.

Finland has been consistent in terms of its thematic focus and many highlighted the strong emphasis on gender, women, peace and security, girls’ education while the other Nordic countries had their own thematic niches (i.e. corruption for Denmark, the freedom of the press for Sweden). Two KIs found that having such a focused agenda enabled Finland to stand out against bigger donors.

Partner KIs all easily identified Finland with its policy priorities (as mentioned above), interest in long-term sustainable development, and highlighted how that support was broad with no specific emphasis on people in situation of displacement.

It is however worth highlighting as was mentioned by a KI, that the ‘money doesn’t always follow policies’ and that in financial terms, the focus on women’s equality and ending GBV is very limited.
It was noted by KIs from the FMA that while some efforts have been made to include the issue of disability and inclusion notably in the ARTF chaired by the WB, the reality is that it has been less of a priority in the Afghan context (where there are so many other priorities). Finland’s intention to bring more attention to disability and inclusion was noted from partner KIs who confirmed ‘a willingness to give space to the issue at policy level, but with little translation on the ground given the large number of priorities’. Another KI mentioned that the issue is confronted with a strong cultural barrier of exclusion and that greater engagement would require more attention and the work of all- but as put by one KI ‘culture can change’.

KIs at the MFA also identified some gaps, both at policy and operational level, namely related to WASH (with the forthcoming end to the UNICEF programme), agriculture (which is not getting enough attention despite receiving some support under the ARPF), forestry (although possibly less relevant given that Afghanistan only has 2% of forest left) and climate change which has intrinsic links with the risk of higher population movements.

**Synthesis/Meta-Analysis**

Aware of its small size (compared to other donors) Finland has tried to ensure cohesion in its work in Afghanistan and as put by one KI it has been ‘a small team but with one common denominator’.

The documents analysis and KIIIs confirmed an overall coherence ‘between what is on paper and the programme’, i.e. a general alignment between written policies, guidance provided by Helsinki and actual operations. All programmes funded in Afghanistan are broadly in line with the PPAs even if there are some gaps, notably in related to climate change.

However, in relation to FD there is a clear evolution in terms of where it features in Finland’s policy towards Afghanistan from being an ‘invisible issue’ to a significant one. What also clearly emerges is a change in terms of what specific aspects of FD are considered, from a relatively ‘low profile’ focus on Afghans (as refugees in the region and a relatively contained Afghan community in Finland) at the beginning to a much stronger emphasis on migration control and return (both returnees from Finland and those returned from
Iran and Pakistan). This has given rise to some perceived challenges/ tensions, especially between migration control concerns and on-going development support as it is now clearer that Finland’s presence in Afghanistan is partly motivated by the ‘migration agenda’. As put in the words of a KI, ‘what has been an internal debate in Finland triggered by the arrival of asylum seekers has conflated with the long-term development activities in Afghanistan’. It is worth noting that views are not unanimous and in a KI’s opinion the different approaches (MFA, MIGRI, MoI) towards FD/migration ‘rather than revealing a lack of coherence could instead by interpreted as different but complementary approaches to tackle a same issue’.

It is worth noting the strong expectation that the forthcoming evaluation will give some answers and be a guide to formulate recommendations and will generate ‘fresh thinking and fresh methods’ (although a key question remains whether this will be a ‘whole presence’ evaluation or an evaluation of development cooperation as this would produce different outcomes). Although the latter seems to be what is envisaged, the former would enable Finland to undertake a more fundamental reflection about its continuous involvement in Afghanistan (i.e. for how much longer? In what form? Towards what type of transition?)

**Recommendations**

From the case study and the intervention of KIIIs especially a number of recurrent issues deserving further attention and action emerged; they include:

- The need to increase the knowledge base or take knowledge into consideration more systematically. This would enable Finland to have programmes that are better aligned with the evolving situation in the country and the current needs of the Afghan population;
  - It was notably mentioned to better document impact of joint humanitarian and development work.
  - This also involves taking into consideration the complex causes, manifestation and effects of displacement.
  - A better understanding of the situation in Afghanistan also implies taking a ‘holistic perspective’ and to give greater consideration of the regional dynamics, notably the role of Pakistan but also of other key players in the region including the USA, China and Russia.
- Because peace and stability has not yet been achieved and progress in other areas will be compromised until it is, there is a need to focus efforts towards reducing violence. There is also a need for donors to put more pressure on the government, notably with an emphasis on four main themes and related actions to bridge the gap between short- and long-term objectives:
  - To push for long-term and sustainable solutions for IDPs.
  - Give greater emphasis to accountability.
  - Prioritise the rule of law and institutional building.
  - Greater focus towards education, notably the curriculum, seen as a vector for peace transition.
- Then the thinking should not be so much about diminishing aid per se but rather how to ensure more effective continuity, including by envisaging more co-funding with the Nordic countries (especially worth considering that ‘if peace was to be achieved more resources would be needed for Afghanistan’).
• For the comprehensive approach to be [more] successful, further efforts were needed to overcome the remaining tendency to work in silos by ‘focusing on understanding each other role while looking at achieving a common goal, the very reason for the presence in the country’.

• Also, worth noting a general support to maintain the focus on gender equality and women’s rights to pursue the progress achieved in this domain in which Finland has taken a lead role and more generally a support to keep development assistance targeted at a few chosen areas rather than it being too broad (dispersed).

• In relation to FD, there is a consensus to give greater consideration to the theme, ‘as it is not an issue likely to go away’ and there is a tangible risk of more displacement due to climate change notably. Several interviewees mentioned as the most pressing concern in relation to FD the fact that conflict displacement is being mingled with drought displacement; an adequate response will require more attention to the linkages with displacement caused by drought/ climate change. It more broadly emerged that Finland needed to think through the nature of its engagement with FD (especially over what Finland specific expertise and added value could be).

  – First it would be important to place the issue of FD at the level of a right-based intervention [within a human rights framework] putting greater emphasis on the issue of internal displacement.

  – Building on existing engagement with FD (i.e. the SALAM project), developed further means and channels to address the needs of returnees by focusing on their integration [so that they can reconnect to their country and communities] by for instance putting more emphasis on the education and employment sector (e.g. on literacy, vocational training and job creation), sectors that Finland is already supporting thought the WB and UNESCO notably and over which it has knowledge and expertise.

  – In relation to the SALAM project specifically, to really be an exemplar of what a project addressing FD within a HDN frame should be, it first needs to learn from what has prevented its rapid and efficient implementation; it then would require greater advocacy on the part of the MFA to stimulate the interest of other donors; and offer more flexibility, especially in terms of the time frame and geographical focus as well a greater (and exclusive focus) on job creation.

References


MFA (2014a) Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation, Case Study on Peace and Development in Finland’s Country Programme in Afghanistan
**Documents consulted**


Answer to EQ 1

EQ 1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

The approach to FD and HDN in the 2017 Somalia country strategy is not clear and may suffer from problems of causality in the implicit theory of change in how root causes are addressed (example: to which degree do health services for women and girls have an impact on migration?). However, the most important objective for Somalia must be state-building and strengthening of the incipient federal state structure, in order to later be able to address FD and the root causes.

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s Somalia country strategy (and other relevant documents) is clearly formulated and well-established.

The most direct practical and theoretical link to FD in the Somalia country strategy is the role of FCA in promoting peace-making and reconciliation that can have an immediate impact on forced displacements of population. For the larger health-related projects, totally justified by human rights and the PPA of gender equality and the rights of women and girls, the link is less immediate and long-term through state-building and the provision of basic safety nets. The strengthening of the state structure in Somalia is more than indispensable in the long-run.

JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.

Grosso modo, Finland does not ‘use’ FD in Somalia, and the use of HDN is incipient, if at all present. However, the Somalian diaspora in Finland (and from other countries) is actively used for development cooperation in the health sector, bringing in an aspect of migration/refugees-development nexus. But the contrary direction of causality might be true: the different fields of activity in which Finland participates in five policy pillars and development cooperation priority areas (civilian and military crisis management, peacebuilding, rights-based service provision etc) may add value to how FD could be operationalised, at least in the long run. However, this overall finding may be changing as future Finnish business funding projects and Finland’s support to the creation of a Somalian migration office, currently in the pipeline, materialise.

JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN in the case of Somalia, without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups).

The bulk of development funding by MFA for Somalia does not directly address ‘root causes’ of displacement (maternal and child health care, gender-based violence (GBV) and female genital mutilation (FGM) rarely are causes of forced displacement), but rather are (human) rights based. For climate change, only some small diaspora CSO projects work in that field/sector. Development cooperation funds are not used
for humanitarian situations (e.g. for initiatives of Durable Solutions), and humanitarian funds are not used for development efforts of internally or externally displaced persons. Urban displacement is totally absent from Finnish funding. However, some development project activities have benefitted also IDP populations (notably in sector of sexual and reproductive rights and health).

**Answer to EQ 2**

**EQ2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?**

Finland’s approach to the Somalia situation has elements of adequacy. State-building is a ‘must’ in the case of Somalia, and this is the main objective of the whole country strategy. HDN does not show on the ground except in some smaller CSO projects. Funding for EU, including military civilian crisis management, contributes to the creation of conditions for development, as well as CSO funding for peace-making. But the totality is not clearly formulated nor targeted. The approach has not evolved significantly since 2012; the same (larger) projects continue during the whole evaluation period.

**Key findings on the Judgement Criteria**

**JC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.**

The new Action Plan on HDN prepared as organisation-wide learning exercise in 2018 (MFA 2018b) does not yet show on the ground. Finland’s development cooperation for Somalia does not have the instruments to support HDN through, e.g., the Durable Solutions Initiative, launched by the UN.

**JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs.**

There is a certain complementarity between military and civilian crisis management (mainly EU), multi-bilateral funding for projects mainly on maternal and child health and peace-making initiatives carried out by CSOs. Yet, the part of humanitarian aid channelled for Somali refugees in Kenya (and Ethiopia) does not consider HDN but rather remains on the level of humanitarian aid in protracted displacement situations, thus is not complementary with the rest of Finland’s contributions in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. Each country strategy in HoA is designed in total separation from each other.

**JC 2.3: Influence: MFA Policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners has been sustained and effective.**

No evidence of policy influence on FD and HDN. On the other hand, there is evidence of Finland exercising policy influence on (human) rights-based reproductive and maternal and child health (Finland co-chairs with Sweden the social and human development pillar working group in the implementation of the National Development Plan).
Answer to EQ 3

EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?

To start with, there is practically no ‘approach’ to FD and HDN. There are elements of policy coherence between crisis management, EUTF, CSO peacebuilding and development cooperation, but this is, in the case of Somalia, possibly the result of separate and independent decisions in different MFA units working in silos, PMO and MoI (there is no White Paper for Somalia).

Key findings on the Judgement Criteria

**JC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively.**

No, there seem not to be mechanisms to promote policy coherence. The Unit for Humanitarian Aid acts in total independence from the regional unit and Somalia strategy, and little if any coordination and complementarity was found. The main missing issue is HDN in refugee/IDP camps which continue operating on pure, traditional humanitarian principles even after almost three decades. The same independence applies to the Civil Society Unit but in this case, the funded projects are aligned and support the overall Finnish strategy for Somalia. The peace-making projects funded by the Political Department support the rest of Finnish initiatives in Somalia.

**JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs).**

The Finnish country strategy for Somalia is aligned with the Somalian National Development Plan. EU level support (EU Emergency Trust Fund with the original mandate of preventing migration, military and civilian crisis management etc.) basically aims at creating conditions for efficient development cooperation, but it is not clear if this is result of political choice (the EUTF funds come from the Ministry of Finance, decided by PMO). A large part of Finland’s humanitarian aid to international organisations is given non-earmarked thus increasing coherence – but reducing Finland’s visibility at the tables where decisions about the use of the funds are made. CSO funding is coherent with the DPPs and with the Somalia country strategy.

**JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN.**

The level of policy coherence is not yet adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN. While EU level funding is in part directly targeted to reducing outwards migration from Somalia (EUTF), humanitarian aid continues being spent on humanitarian purposes even after 20–30 years of existence of refugee camps (no HDN materialised). More recent initiatives on root causes such as business partnerships (for employment creation) and the planned participation in the construction of a migration authority (to be able to receive returnees, including forcibly returned) may increase coherence in addressing FD.

**Synthesis**

Somalia is an old development cooperation partner country of Finland. The projects that started in the early years of 1980 were totally interrupted and destroyed in 1990-1991 due to a civil war and the collapse of Major-General Siad Barre’s regime – and at the same time the collapse of the Somalian state. The cooperation was renewed in 2012 when a new state structure, the Federal State of Somalia, was founded, and international donors signed a New Deal agreement to support the new state.
During the period now under evaluation, Finland has participated in Somalia’s reconstruction, peace and development on various fronts: the EU-lead crisis management operations (civilian and military) and EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, civil society organisations’ (CSO) projects and multiparty (or multi-bilateral) funding to multilateral organisations. Finland (MFA) as such does not fund and implement bilateral projects in Somalia. Thematically, the focus is on women’s and children’s rights, especially in maternal and child health, and overall, on the strengthening of the federal state structure.

When talking about Finland in Somalia, one must take into account that a CSO, FinnChurchAid (FCA), is a large actor in Somalia and has a much wider and more permanent presence in the country than MFA. By the same token, when talking about Somalia in Finland, one must note that, contrary to the other case study countries of the evaluation, there is a well-established, relatively well integrated, 20,000-strong long-term Somalian diaspora in Finland. FCA is part of ‘Finland’ in the Somalian context, and about 40% of its funding comes from MFA (three channels: humanitarian aid, development funding and political funding for peace-building).

Finland’s response to the internal and external displacement and migration situation – or in general the security situation in the country – has not been incoherent. Police training and other crisis management initiatives work (or have worked) at the background to contribute to the creation of conditions allowing for development projects to operate. State building is supported by political dialogue and healthcare services are improved by funding UN agencies and World Bank multi-partner budget support to the Federal and Regional governments. FCA specialises in peace-building and mediation, in this way offering a link in the triple nexus (humanitarian-peace/stabilisation-development nexus). Yet, the response of Finland to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) in Somalia has not been clearly targeted nor sufficient.

Several reasons lead to this conclusion: the Somalian situation affects the whole Horn of Africa (HoA) region while MFA units prepare country strategies for the region’s countries in silos, exclusively departing from each country’s internal situation (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia) – as if there were not about a million Somalians in Kenya, for instance. Second, Finland does not have a development cooperation instrument to integrate the Durable Solutions approach promoted by the UN (Special Representative of UN Secretary General for Somalia) to bridge the existing gap between humanitarian aid and development projects. In addition, the fact that there is very little – if at all – coordination between regional units/country teams in charge of development cooperation (and Embassy in Nairobi), and the humanitarian aid unit, makes that HDN is not effectively operationalised on the ground. An additional obstacle to HDN seems to be the reluctance and strong resistance of a large UN humanitarian organisation active in the HoA region to adopt the Durable Solutions principles.

On the other hand, a project (or lately, projects, MIDA FinnSom for Health in Somaliland, and MIDA FinnSom for Health and Education in Puntland and South-Central Somalia) offers an example of a higher level of nexus: that between migration and development. In the MIDA project, implemented by IOM, diaspora members with medical training are used to support the capacities of health facilities and health sector training in Somalia.

**Country Context**

Somalia is one the poorest countries in the world, so much so that it is not included in the UNDP Human Development Index and ranking (the latest dates from 2016, with statistical update from 2018), and the only information given is life expectancy of 55.7 years, and annual per capita GNI under 300 USD (about one half of the GNI of the last in the ranking list, Number 188, Central African Republic). The country has about 15 million inhabitants according to UN estimates in November 2018, although statistics as recent as from 2016 rather indicate about 10 million inhabitants. Of them, about 2.6 million are internally displaced persons (IDP) according the several high-level sources in November 2018, and about one million
live in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, mainly in Kenya but also in Ethiopia. When including the diasporas in North America and Europe, this represents about a quarter or a third of the total population (Danish Refugee Council 2013, 17). Several interviewed persons for this evaluation in Nairobi indicated that Somalia is one of the most rapidly urbanising countries in the world with the estimate that by 2030, 80% of the population will be living in cities, and the rural-to-urban migrants who elsewhere in the world would just be called migrants, are considered IDPs in Somalia. While not being the only reason for this high degree of urbanisation, climate change causing draughts on a regular basis is an important factor in the population dynamics in Somalia: the exceptional climatic phenomena have become the new normality.

Somalia became a ‘country in exile’ (Danish Refugee Council 2013, 17), or the ‘epicentre of the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis’ (MFA 2017, 6) after clan-based internal conflicts between regions in the late 1980’s and the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 at the fall of Major-General Siad Barre’s regime. Massive migration/exile waves followed the chaos created by the new situation, and it was also in this context that the original Somalian asylum seekers arrived in Finland. It was only over ten years later, in 2012, that a new serious attempt to establish a Somalian state and government was made. In this year, the Somali Federal State was founded, elections were held, and in 2013 a partnership called the New Deal process (and Somali Compact, 2012–2016; replaced in 2017 by the National Development Plan, NDP) between the Somali Federal Government and the international community and development donors was signed, Finland among them. The New Deal, and the following NDP designed in 2017 after parliamentary elections late 2016 and presidential elections in early 2017, provide the basic framework for state building in Somalia.

Despite relatively encouraging progress in some basic state functions (e.g. national revenue collection increased from about 113 MUSD to 142 MUSD between 2016 and 2017), and the successful electoral processes in 2016–2017, the situation continues being fragile. The Federation consists of states of which some (Somaliland and Puntland in the north) are relatively well-established and capable of carrying out most basic state functions while the newly created states in South-Central Somalia are only taking the first steps of statehood. Additionally, there seems not to be a clear vision about what a federal state structure means, and – particularly – Somaliland, until independence in 1960 a British protectorate, practices passive resistance against being considered an autonomous state within Somalia.

Security situation is another concern. An Islamist terrorist group called Al Shabab (AS) is active in most of the South-Central territory outside urban centres, and despite relatively unimportant numbers (estimated around 5,000 fighters), Al Shabab is capable of carrying out attacks even in the capital, Mogadishu (the latest massive one took place in October 2017, with the estimate of over 500 dead). The African Union peace enforcement force, AMISOM, has taken over some towns and cities but Al Shabab has a certain support among the population. One reason for this support is the inefficient functioning of the official justice system while Al Shabab is in the position to mediate and practice Islamic law in communities, the AS justice being considered more expedite and less corrupt than the official courts of justice. (EASO 2017, 51). Furthermore, AS is ‘clan-blind’, contrary to the rest of the Somali social structure where access to services, to remittances from diaspora and jobs is based on clan affiliation, and AS recruits massively in marginal and minority clans and the ‘clan-less’ nonethnic Somalians (locally called ‘bantus’) (Botha & Abdil 2016, 7). Additionally, (youth) unemployment is a main reason for enrolment in the violent group (EASO 2017, 52); 27% of Al-Shabab members joined for economic reasons and additional 25% for both economic and religious reasons while only 15% for religious reasons only (Botha & Abdil 2016, 5). Because of the sustained presence of Al Shabab in South-Central Somalia, most of the territory is not safe for repatriations and returns.

According to anonymous humanitarian sources reported by Danish Refugee Council (2016), clan militias and clan violence is an even higher risk for civilians than Al-Shabab. It is highly probable that a part of attacks and disputes between clans are falsely or wrongly attributed to AS (ibid., 9–10). According to two
interviews carried out for the evaluation, clan violence and problems in clan affiliation are a significant root cause of emigration and, ultimately, of ending up as asylum seeker in Europe.

An important but often neglected characteristic of the protracted Somalian phenomenon of IDPs is that they represent marginal clans and Somali-Bantu (non-ethnic Somali) minorities, discriminated against by the majority clans, and there are significantly higher numbers of single mothers and children among them than in the average population; the poorest of the poor who do not have any possibilities of migrating from the country as refugees. They have been in the internal refugee camps since early 1990’s and the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, later to be joined by ethnic Somalis fleeing Al Shabab violence and draughts (the latest in 2016–2017). This ethnic and clan-based (and clan-less) population is an obstacle from the donor point of view to universal citizenship and elections, because majority clans and political elites are reluctant to give the right to vote to non-ethnic Somali Bantus and marginal clan members. In places such as Kismayo or Baidoa with important internal refugee camps, these minorities are in fact the majority, if given the right to vote.

An additional factor must be considered when analysing development cooperation in/for Somalia: ‘aid architecture is complex and fragmented largely due to the cross-border dimension of aid coordination’ (Transparency International 2016, 10). Until very recently and due to the security situation, most donors operating in Somalia have been located in Nairobi instead of Mogadishu, and while this continues being the case, there is a visible movement of, in the first place, multilateral donor organisations to grounding work in Somalia’s capital instead of Nairobi.

**Finland’s activities in Somalia**

Of the three case study countries of the evaluation, Somalia is the one with the longest involvement with Finland and Finnish development cooperation. In fact, Somalia was an important partner country for Finland in the early 1980s, particularly in the health sector. The origin of cooperation came from personal connections. The former director of the National Board of Health, then working for WHO, was sent to Somalia toward the end of 1970 to study possibilities of basic health projects, and the Finn met the only trained haematologist of the country, who asked about ways of support in the field of blood services (Leikola 2017, 20). This initiative was then presented to Finnish Red Cross (FRC) Blood Service in September 1980, and the Blood Service sent a representative to Somalia in November-December 1980. A three-year funding from MFA development aid was achieved. (Ibid.).

The status of Somalia as official development cooperation partner country was decided by the Parliament in 1982, at the same time as eight other new countries (Koponen 2018). The MFA started to support projects in Somalia 1983, including the blood service project and a large tuberculosis project (as a curiosity it can be mentioned that a Finnish NGO, Physicians for Social Responsibility (LSV, kind of mini ‘Finnish doctors’), still implements a small tuberculosis project in Somalia). Other sectors followed, mostly infrastructure investments (diesel-powered generators, grain silos) (Ibid.). But already in 1989, aid to Somalia started being phased out (decision officially signed in early Autumn 1990), due to increasing armed conflicts around the country, and the threatening chaos, with the consequence that all aid investment was lost and the about 70 resident Finns repatriated in extremis (Koponen, ibid.).

The current Somalia country strategy (MFA 2017), defines Finnish development cooperation and policy dialogue in Somalia as contributing to a ‘stabilisation, economic recovery and social development’ and more stable and secure Somalia (and Horn of Africa, HoA), where Finland supports the country’s ‘efforts to address the root causes of social exclusion, radicalisation, and irregular migration to countries in the region and overseas’ (MFA 2017, 11). According to the strategy, the key priority (‘a key priority’ in original) for Finland’s engagement in Somalia is to support the realisation of women’s and girls’ rights, particularly in the health sector. The overarching second key priority is state-building, supporting the building and
strengthening of the core functions of the Somali state (p. 12), including rule of law, transparent and well-functioning public sector, revenue collection and service delivery.

Finland does not fund bilateral intergovernmental projects in Somalia, but the funding is channelled either through CSOs or multilateral organisations’ pooled funds (trust funds) and in multi-bi-lateral projects (‘programmable bilateral support through multilateral channels’, MFA 2017, 9). The largest CSO active in Somalia is FCA; other significant ones are Solidarity (active in Somaliland), Save the Children, FRC (mainly in humanitarian aid) and several smaller local or diaspora-based CSOs. In total disbursements, CSO/NGO projects made up 37% of all Finnish contributions to Somalia (32 MEUR out of 87 MEUR), an exceptionally high percentage. The most important multi-bi-lateral initiatives concern UNFPA (reproductive, maternal and neonatal health), the MIDA FinnSom health expertise and training project through IOM. Finland participates in the World Bank-run Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia (MPF). At the EU level, Finland has participated in EUCAP Somalia (maritime law enforcement), EUNAVFOR Atalanta (anti-piracy), and contributes to the EU Emergency Fund for Africa (EUTF), and these expenditures do not show in MFA statistics.

The aid statistics show that the budget cuts of development cooperation greatly affected the disbursements also for Somalia, although a lowering trend was already seen in the disbursements of 2015, that is, before the radical cuts were decided. The trend is upward again but funding has not reached the levels of 2015. It should be noted that the 2018 figures comprise only disbursements made by September 2018. (Figure below.)

**Figure 8:** Disbursement for Somalia by year 2012–2018.

Source: Own elaboration based on MFA statistics

The distribution of aid between 2012 and 2018 according to OECD-DAC CRS purpose codes is the following (Figure below). Two sectors stand out: health and humanitarian aid, both over 30 MEUR (72% out of the total aid of 87 MEUR), the rest representing relatively minor extensions. The large proportion for basic healthcare (as contrasted against the smaller total for reproductive health and maternal mortality, 5.2 MEUR) is explained by about 15 MEUR extensions to the UNICEF health and nutrition programme plus almost 10 MEUR for the MIDA FinnSom medical training diaspora projects 2012–2018 (the first MIDA FinnSom started in Somaliland in 2008).
When observing the sector-specific distribution according to year, it appears that health and reproductive health projects continue all over the period; there is strong continuity in what Finland funds between pre- and post-2015. The so-called refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 does not seem to have had a significant impact on the sectors supported by Finland. The only visible novelty which, however, does not yet show in disbursements, are half a dozen small (max 65,000 EUR) ODA-eligible private sector projects to which funding has been committed but not yet disbursed (by September 2018) with the approximate total funding of 250,000 EUR. The private sector and business promotion were the new topics raised in the 2016 DPP, and Somalia is a pilot country for Finnish Business Partnership Support (FinnPartnership) with the second largest number of supported businesses after Vietnam. (FinnPartnership is a ‘match-making’ and training organisation for Finnish companies that want to carry out long-term commercial business that have a development impact in developing countries, and in these partnerships the Finnish Somali diaspora has a role to play.)

The implicit working hypothesis in this design is that public service delivery decreases or prevents ‘exclusion, radicalisation and irregular migration’. This hypothesis may not prove to be the valid logic chain if the strategy really is to address the root causes of these problems. Rather, the priorities are clearly rights-based (women’s and girls’ rights, reproductive rights, rule of law etc. as human and fundamental rights), and in conditions such as Somalia, it would be great negligence to not to direct all possible resources for state-building.

This conclusion is by no means claiming that there is no logical connection between exclusion, radicalisation, e.g. the security situation, and a well-functioning public sector. As seen above, one of the reasons of the longevity of Al Shabab in the Somalian rural areas is the failing justice system. Another one mentioned was unemployment of (mainly) young men; this aspect is only addressed in some smaller CSO projects funded by Finland and, more recently, the private sector business funding mentioned above. In the last instance, the fundamental challenge in state-building in Somalia is how to support (and achieve) the tran-
sition from clan-based authority (FCA 2017, 24) and clan-facilitated access to services to universal (and federal, that is, multi-layered) authority based on citizenship. But there is no immediate or clear logic between the means and the objectives that would guarantee an impact on radicalisations and emigration/refugees in the Somalia country strategy 2017, with the exception of business and employment creation that seems to be a growing although still modest sector of Finnish ODA extensions. Additionally, there are plans that Finland help funding the Somalian migration agency building to improve population movements’ management, and be able to receive returnees, including forcibly returned nationals from Europe.

As such, Finland’s intergovernmental cooperation with Somalia is making a difference within its own system of logic. When an objective is that the rights of women and girls are increasingly realised, a significant increase of elected women in the Parliament through Finnish policy dialogue and advocacy, or the 30% increase in the use of reproductive health services in areas covered by the projects between 2016 and 2017, is synonymous of great success. Finnish support has also contributed to the increase in internal revenue collection. An additional advantage of operating in the sector of maternal and child healthcare is also that Al Shabab seems to be more lenient towards external cooperation in this sector than towards other sectors (Transparency International 2016, 25), more clearly identified as anti-Islamic interference of infidels.

Somalia is the case study country of this evaluation where the CSO/NGO sector must be addressed with special interest. As mentioned above, 37% of all Finnish ODA disbursement to Somalia are channelled through CSOs/NGOs, with almost 280 different extensions (disbursements) total in the years 2012–2018. The budgets range from just over 20,000 EUR to a couple of millions of Euros for humanitarian aid in the case of FRC; these figures include all purposes (according to OECD-DAC CRS purpose codes).

In addition to the numbers (4th largest linguistic group of immigrants in Finland, 20,000 persons) of the Somalian diaspora, its particularity is the high degree of organisation. In the Finnish NGO register, there are over 100 NGOs/CSOs run by Somalis, although a part of them are inactive. About twenty active development-oriented diaspora NGOs are organised in the Somalia Network, a coalition of and support organisation for CSOs/NGOs implementing projects in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The membership includes also purely Finnish non-governmental organisations such as Solidarity and FCA, but the Somalian diaspora associations are the majority. In the latest round of applications of project support in 2017, about 20 diaspora projects got funding from the Civil Society Unit of MFA. Although FD and HDN are absent from both the guidance of CSO funding (MFA 2017a) and in most approval justifications of funding, the fact that the Finnish Somali diaspora is active in development projects (and not only in the government-funded health project MIDA FinnSom as health professionals of Somalian origin), adds a dimension of migration-development nexus to Finland’s policies towards Somalia.

While Solidarity with its anti-FGM and livelihoods plus climate change resilience projects is well known and ‘embedded’ regionally in Somaliland, one Finnish non-governmental actor stands out in Somalia: FCA that has a wider and deeper presence in Somalia than the Finnish government. FCA has five field offices in Somalia, with staff of 31 persons (of which 26 Finns). Roughly 60% of FCA’s funding for Somalia is from external, that is, non-Finnish sources (ECHO, EU, Somalia Stabilisation Fund, USAID etc.) which can be taken as a proof of confidence, and indeed, of effectiveness. Finland supports FCA through three channels: humanitarian aid, programme-based support for development, and support from the Political department for peace-making/peacebuilding.

The main activity of FCA in Somalia is peacebuilding. FCA is one of the hubs of the international Network of Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and works locally in facilitating local peace agreements and reconciliation initiatives by training and advocacy and maintains excellent working relations with the Somalian Federal Government – despite the word ‘church’ in its name. At the federal and state levels, FCA assists UNDP in developing and strengthening local and provincial administration structures and mechanisms. – As violence and the poor security situation are one of the reasons of internal displacement and possibly of migration, too, the peace-making activities of FCA have a direct connection to FD.
Field Evidence

Although interviewees in Nairobi agreed that Finland ‘is not absent’ and ‘keeps low profile’, none of the non-Finnish informants had a clear idea about Finland’s policy influence or evolving approach to FD/HDN in Somalia. The interviews therefore did not help to answer the questions in the Evaluation Matrix. On the other hand, this empirical finding offers a fertile opening for analysing the reasons of this relatively low visibility of Finland among development donors, exacerbated no doubt by the geographically ‘complex aid architecture’ of Somalia between Nairobi and Mogadishu.

First, there is a lack of resources, and understaffing. This phenomenon does not only affect Finland but several bilateral donors, too, brought up the issue in the interviews. There starts to be a ‘disbalance’ between the budgets for Somalia and the number of staffs dedicated to monitoring and to following-up how the funds are used. Particularly Finland, ‘seen as Nordic donor but with resources rather those of a Baltic state’. Only a couple of projects/initiatives can be actively monitored by the staff based in the Somalia Section of the Nairobi Embassy, who do not assist meetings of UN agencies in Nairobi because Finland does not fund the UN in Kenya (except humanitarian aid to UNHCR for Somali refugee camps but as this is non-earmarked support from the Unit for Humanitarian Aid, Finland does not participate in making decisions about its use).

Second, the Embassy under the Regional Unit is officially not in charge of monitoring humanitarian aid which falls under the mandate of the Department for Development Policy, Unit for Humanitarian Aid and Policy (KEO-70), nor of CSO/NGO projects, under the responsibility of Civil Society Unit (KEO-30) that do not usually coordinate with or consult the regional unit and the Embassy. An additional factor already mentioned above, worth praising on one hand, is the fact that Finland gives humanitarian funding non-earmarked (or earmarked only for a certain country), with the practical consequence that Finland does not participate in the decision-making process of the humanitarian aid it gives. This is one expression of working in silos typical in MFA, further accentuated by yet another additional factor in the case of FD/HDN and Somali refugees and IDPs.

This factor is the strong reluctance, even hostility, of UNHCR to apply the Durable Solutions approach for Somali refugees in camps in Kenya. The Durable Solutions Initiative is promoted by the Special Representative for Somalia of the UN Secretary General and was officialised in the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions (March 2017) by Heads of States of IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, IGAD 2017). There was unanimity among the interviewees that 1) humanitarian funding is too long – almost 30 years in the case of the refugee camps for Somalians in Kenya – and development solutions, not humanitarian aid, should be offered immediately after stabilisation of a refugee/IDP situation, 2) the Somali refugees will not, according to experience, return to where they came from, and 3) that humanitarian funds should be used to build permanent infrastructures (wells, schools) instead of temporary ones, and 4) governments (local, national) should be the ones who run schools and hospitals, and not the humanitarian organisations. Finland is not funding the Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) due to lack of suitable instruments: it does not fall under humanitarian aid nor under programmable bilateral aid as these are currently understood and managed, although there no fundamental reasons why the DSI could not be included in CSO funding or as bilateral aid – although in this case the funding should probably be channelled as aid to Kenya because the camps are on Kenyan territory.

As a side-line to this observation about UNHCR’s strongly negative attitude towards the DSI commented by all Kenya-based interviewees, some also launched hypothesis for explaining why UNHCR has adopted this attitude. The first concerns the political situation in Kenya where political candidates tend to wave the closure of the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps as campaign slogans before elections. The second, related explanation was that the section of UNHCR running those camps may be taking very seriously the absolute neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid from any government or political arrangements. (This does not prevent Switzerland from implementing an HDN-compatible vocational training
and employment project for both refugees and local people in the Kakuma refugee camp.) And the third explanation was that UNHCR is defending its ‘turf’ and wants to continue providing humanitarian aid even in very protracted refugee situations.

Third, Finland channels funding through Finnish non-governmental organisations (FCA and FRC) instead of, e.g., pooled humanitarian funds apt for small donors. This means that the representatives of the Government of Finland are not present in meetings where humanitarian funding is decided, as NGOs cannot represent the Government.

On the other hand, the topic of the ‘double nexus’ – used locally among Nairobi donors for HDN – was present in each interview. HDN is taken seriously and some bilateral donors are currently recruiting (or have recruited) special staff members with experience in both development and humanitarian aid, to incarnate and promote HDN. A new topic is entering the debate: the ‘triple nexus’ in the meaning of stabilisation/humanitarian phase → peace/reconciliation → development nexus. This could be a niche where Finland would be well positioned to be a champion basing on the experience in all aspects of the triple nexus.

**Recommendations**

1. **FD:** For MFA regional units and country teams: The Horn of Africa country teams and Head of Unit for HoA and Eastern Africa, particularly those in charge of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are strongly recommended to discuss a joint regional strategy for HoA that would take into consideration FD (internal displacement and refugee camps), and the situation of Somalian refugees should be considered in the three country strategies, which now is not the case. The timing is right, as new country strategies will soon be designed, and the Somalian strategy forms part of a pilot self-evaluation of the current country strategy.

2. **HDN:** The country teams of the region (HoA) should include pilot projects on livelihoods and vocational training targeted for refugee camps and local people in their country plans. The Swiss project in Kakuma could be taken as an example.

3. **FD and HDN/HPDN:** The Somalia Team should discuss with the Unit for Civil Society, Political Department, FCA, FRC and other larger Finnish CSOs, and FinnPartnership on how to ‘package’ Finland’s bilateral interventions in Somalia into a totally coherent programme targeted towards the triple nexus: humanitarian-peace-making/stabilisation-development. All the elements are there now, but the totality is not coherently targeted and coordinated but rather resulting from separate decisions. In a second phase, other ministries and MFA departments should be taken onboard by MFA leadership to coordinate how Finland’s EU funding and crisis management initiatives could be aligned in a national strategy for Somalia. This ‘packaging’ could give great added value to the other Finnish contributions in Somalia and the priority policy areas.

4. **Climate change** is much too little considered in overall in funding decisions of Finland, destined for Somalia. Climate resilience and fight against desertification should be guiding principles of all aid to Somalia, also because climate change has direct impact on forced displacement.

There are also some additional but less urgent, or less important, recommendations.

5. There have been fluctuations, during the latest years, in the position about to which degree the Embassy of Finland in Nairobi is supposed to monitor CSO projects, basically under the responsibility of the Unit for Civil Society, and humanitarian aid to refugee camps in Kenya, under the responsibility of the Unit for Humanitarian Aid. It is absolutely necessary to gather those three together and define how the responsibility between them will best be divided, to optimise the use of meagre staff (and financial) resources. At the same time, information sharing between those three should greatly be increased and strengthened.
6. The MIDA FinnSom diaspora project is a model to follow, and ground-breaking in Finnish development cooperation. The MFA regional departments should reflect whether there are other diasporas in Finland (with possible inputs from diasporas from other countries) that could be used in favour of the development of their countries of origin.

7. The Unit for Humanitarian Aid and Policy should discuss with UNHCR the strong reluctance – reported in all interviews in Nairobi – of the organisation to apply the UN and IGAD initiative on Durable Solutions and try and find the reasons and solutions for the situation. The situation in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps is not satisfactory, with people staying idle for decades in them.

8. The Somalia Team is recommended to study the World Bank initiated projects on urban displacement in Somalia, and see if, and possibly how, Finland could support them.

References


Documents consulted


ANNEX 10: CASE STUDY MENA

Answer to EQ 1

EQ 1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) over the Evaluation period?

The MENA case study (defined in this evaluation as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) is new territory for the MFA both geographically and in relation to the modalities of its engagement. As such in addressing this EQ, Finland’s response presents something of a paradox and a ‘disconnect’. At a policy level Finland now has a well-developed strategy, broadly in line with the HDN thinking, and its role in supporting the strategic, regional level international response has been very consistent with the HDN approach through the Sub regional response facility – note that the international modalities of the HDN response have been pioneered in the Syria refugee crisis. Finland’s support for the host communities and the involvement of the private sector are also consistent with HDN precepts.

On the other hand, at the programme level, the MFA partnerships reveal more a case as ‘business as usual’. The MFA has certainly pursued its 4PPAs, and to some extent the policy pillars, and has tried to adapt its programmes and projects to the requirements of longer-term sustainable development but has yet to adequately adopt the flexibility needed.

There are signals that the MFA has recognised the emerging HPDN triple nexus.

On FD there is little evidence that the MFA has developed clear approaches, although there has been some small involvement with displaced populations in Syria.

Key findings on judgement criteria

JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in the MENA case study is clearly formulated and well-established.

There is little, although nonetheless convincing documentary evidence, and some compelling KII evidence (from the region but not partners at HQs) to concur that the overall manner in which HDN is addressed is clearly formulated and is increasingly well established at a policy level and at a strategic operational level. In many ways this has been exemplary. There is also evidence that the MFA has identified the emerging triple nexus of the HPDN and the potential contribution it can make. Less clear is how well the formulation has translated into practice in the field at programme level - noted in subsequent JCs and EQs.

Dominated by the scale of the crisis and its commitment to the HDN approach, the overall manner of the MFA’s (and indeed most donors’) response to FD is less convincing.

Evidence

Until 2017 – i.e. for the first six years of the Syrian crisis – there was no explicit policy/strategy/ programme management apparatus in place. The approach was framed by relevant overarching policy documents – 2016 DPP (MFA 2016), the policy guidance for Fragile States (MFA 2014b) and the Humani-
tarian Assistance and Policy (MFA 2015a). Nonetheless, the evidence shows that, although its policy for the region was not ‘clearly formulated’, the MFA coped satisfactorily in a ‘policy vacuum’ but within the frame of extent generic policies, and quickly engaged the main parameters of the emerging international response in which it came to play an active role.

The MFA now has a clearly formulated policy strategy for its involvement in the MENA region, (Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts Syria and Iraq 2017–2020, MFA 2017). This manifestly builds on the MFA’s experience accumulated up to this time and presents a clearly formulated policy apparatus in what could, in some respects, be construed as an exemplary HDN formula. It frames the MFA’s response in terms of Finland’s global commitments and values complemented at a programme level with policy objectives and priorities consistent with Finland’s 4PPAs – e.g. significant profile for Women and Girls – and its Policy Pillars – e.g. significant profile for peace and stability. Significantly, it states (page 10) that ‘the challenge cannot be viewed through a traditional development lens due to the highly political nature of both the conflicts and the response...’ and (page 11) ‘...takes the view that the traditional ‘relief first and development later’ approach is not tenable in the kind of protracted humanitarian and refugee crises.’ (emphases added).

At a strategic level in the region itself, the MFA has been an early (since 2015) and consistent advocate of the ‘resilience’ and ‘nexus’ response embodied in the Syrian Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), although these terms are not explicitly stated in the 2017–2020 Strategy. KII evidence strongly confirms the MFA’s comprehension of (and commitment to) the HDN approach (see EQ2 below).

Other evidence of the scope of MFA’s formulation of the HDN is present. For example, supporting the social and economic needs of both displaced and host communities is an important pillar of the HDN approach (noted in chapter 3.3.2 of the main evaluation report). Finland has been heavily committed to advocacy for and assistance and development cooperation with host communities. One KII stated that the MFA’s split of funding was between 60:40 and 50:50 hosts and refugees. In this context in Lebanon it has supported community dialogue for social cohesion which was a major gap as host/refugee cohesion and solidarity was under great stress in that country. In Jordan, similarly, the MFA in partnership with other donors, was first in the field to support public infrastructure projects – solid waste management and grey water recycling – which had the twin objectives of improving environmental health conditions and building community cohesion between refugees and hosts, in this case with a strong gender component as well. Support for the World Bank 2015 Syrian Crisis Trust Fund was for underpinning public sector capacity in Jordan, critical at that time as it was under enormous pressure.

Thus, in addition to fulfilling HDN approaches, these projects are also consistent with MFA policy pillars and the 4DPPs illustrating, very significantly, that these longstanding policy commitments can be adapted to new operational contexts.

On private sector engagement, another emerging pillar of the HDN approach, the 2017 strategy notes that ‘the promotion of Finnish know-how and opportunities for Finnish companies to offer solutions to projects is noted as will be strengthened during implementation of the strategy.’ On these lines the MFA has been active but pragmatically so. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development partnered the UNDP in 2018 in a Regional Resilience and Private Sector Innovation Workshop for Improved Crisis Response. An earlier visit by Finnish business people to refugee camos in the region was brokered by the embassy in Beirut. However, there is no evidence as yet that this activity has been strengthened in line with the proposals of the 2017 Strategy.

There is some evidence of the potential of the triple nexus, observed as ‘Finland if anybody could do this’ in the context of peace and stabilisation policies. For example, the MFA has supported FELM Peacebuilding and Advocacy programme in Syria – 2.5 MEUR multi-year programme – in line with the Geneva Track 1 and Track 2 peace process. FELM and Common Space Initiative work across all the parties in the conflict.
and is focused on peace through development activity, not the usual peace building actors/mediators in communities.

By contrast the programmes and projects themselves display much weaker alignment with the HDN precepts. The local level provides the granular evidence of the ‘disconnect’ between development and humanitarian policies despite the persuasive framing of the overall policy and the commitment to strategic level HDN. This is discussed in JC 2 below.

**JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.**

The 4PPAs and the five pillars are amply present in Finland’s programmes in the region and are very consistent with the MFA’s priorities – e.g. women and girls, peace building and security, community cohesion, resilience building. KIIs recognised these attributes per se, and commended MFA for some of the risks it took for funding ‘outside the conventional’. Some of these projects serve multiple PPA objectives. But, whilst many of the projects could be construed as having an HDN ‘orientation’, with one exception, there is only limited evidence that the HDN adds value to or strengthens the way these policies are implemented, or vice versa.

**Evidence**

Examples of MFA programmes that align with the 4PPAs, the five ‘pillars’ and have elements of the HDN are numerous, viz

- **HDN development strategy:** resilience-building support for UNDP sub-regional facility 3RP – see EQ 2 below.

- **HPDN triple nexus:** – Peace Building with the CSI (Common Space Initiative)/FELM/European Institute for Peace which is the biggest peace building project of MFA.

- **HDN humanitarian assistance:** – mostly now in Syria UNHCR-ICRC/IFRC-FCA c. 6 MEUR p.a., plus Syria Recovery Trust Fund in areas controlled by opposition, but now diminishing as only one area left – Ibil. MFA is also working with UNDP inside Syria on livelihoods including for disabled and a UNICEF knowledge generation c. 2.5 MEUR in 2017.

- **HDN: – humanitarian and development:** – A UNICEF supported project in Jordan, Makani (“My Space” in Arabic) is a very good example of an integrated programme that fulfils many of the MFA’s DPP priorities and, exceptionally, seems to tilt strongly towards a more integrated HDN methodology and objectives. This is a comprehensive/integrated approach to service provision linking interventions in education – learning support services; child protection – community-based child protection services; early childhood development, adolescent and youth participation – life skills and innovation labs; as well as integration of health and nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services. The programme aims to promote and contribute to children’s, youth and parents’ full development and well-being – physical, cognitive, social and emotional. It buttresses the mainstream education programme for refugees and hosts. The project focuses on informal settlements (47 interventions from total of 147) where the most vulnerable children are found, plus urban areas (78 projects) and 22 in the two camps. KIIIs observed that this project ‘speaks well of MFA’s commitment to innovation (a very non-standard education programme) and nexus principles whether intentionally or unintentionally’.

However, at this programme level underlying constraints indicate that the HDN did not fully strengthen the implementation of the DPPs and pillars, or at least did so not do so in a systematic way that could maximise the impacts and outcomes. Amongst the identified constraints, the following are the most significant.
The so-called humanitarian and development ‘silos’ in the MFA’s approach were noted by most interlocutors, with the caveat that these silos were endemic to the sector, not a specific MFA issue. They described how the silos are reflected in different precepts and concepts, in different programming and funding arrangements and in different reporting protocols. Exemplifying the difficulties this creates for implementing partners was a particular coup noted by one partner that had managed ‘levering [MFA] humanitarian funds for ‘development’, so the two-year grant was seen as a bit of a success.’

This begged the question, for example is ‘education in emergencies or child protection, or social cohesion humanitarian or is it developmental? ‘It is not a zero-sum game... they have to overlap’. In other words, despite the commitment of MFA, there are fundamental issues of operating precepts and protocols in the MFA (and indeed in all donors working across the HDN) that have not been resolved.

Another challenge identified in this case study in relation to the HDN, concerns the basis for principled needs-based humanitarian assistance. But it was pointed out that the MENA context makes dramatically clear that ‘humanitarian assistance is not non-political’ for example in providing assistance inside Syria itself. The view was expressed that whilst this was understood by the MFA (and other donors) in the field, closer dialogue with donor countries’ HQs, such as for Finland, was needed so that ‘they can understand that humanitarian assistance is a political project in a country like Syria’. It was stated ‘they need to know this, but they believe it is non-political’.

**JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN in the case of MENA, without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups).**

The development policies contain ‘useful’ elements, for example urban projects, crisis management, and the HRBA; but it is not clear if this is the result of deliberate ‘policy steer’ or by default in that the MFA’s partners implement projects in these locations/sectors. Although there has been one project (now terminated) in Syria that did support IDPs, this remains a significant gap. Climate change does not feature but then it is also very low on the priorities of all international agencies and the 3RP.

**Evidence**

There was evidence that MFA projects did contain relevant elements useful to HDN, but not so much FD. For example, the UNICEF supported Makani project in Jordan, discussed above, is focused on informal urban settlements; note this as one of the ‘new ‘patterns of FD movement identified in the main report in chapter 3.3.2). A FELM project has also been supporting IDPs as part of its peace building work in Syria. However, the impression given by KIs was that these locations/sectors were inevitably part of the project design in the region, given the characteristics of the displacement, and not a deliberate policy steer.

**Answer to EQ 2**

**EQ 2. To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development and humanitarian actor?**

Overall, Finland’s approach to HDN in the MENA case has been very adequate as an official development and humanitarian actor. Finland has been very actively engaged in advocating and promoting the HDN approach through the Sub regional response facility – note that the international modalities of the HDN response have been pioneered in the Syria refugee crisis. In this way it has aligned with the norms set by international agencies, notably UNDP, UNHCR (the joint conveners of the sub-regional facility and the 3RP) and UNICEF, but also the World Bank (Syrian Crisis Trust Fund). Equally it can be considered an influential, norm-setter, or at least a
very strong advocate of the HDN. As noted in JC 1.2 this alignment is less clear at programme level.

There is some evidence of reflexivity in the field but given the extent of its engagement and innovation at both strategic and programme levels, it has not taken full stock of the learning experience to date.

On the other hand, capacity limitations to cover the range and the geographic spread of its programmes may have undermined some of the potential influence that it might have achieved and has limited programme monitoring and coherence at the field level.

There are signals that the MFA has recognised the emerging HPDN triple nexus.

Key findings on judgement criteria

**JC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.**

There is some evidence of reflexivity and learning, for example the 2017–2020 strategy document demonstrates the accumulation and aggregation of the preceding five years’ experience. However, it is not clear that this valuable experience has been more widely embedded in policy development for HDN and FD within the MFA for example in the 2018 roll out of the internal Action Plan on HDN

Some KIs also gave the impression that that MFA compliance with HDP in the field happened by accident rather than design

**Evidence**

The most obvious example of reflexivity lies in the adoption of the *Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts Syria and Iraq 2017–2020* (MFA 2017). As noted in JC1.1 this is exemplary in many respects and constitutes a clearly formulated policy strategy for its involvement in the MENA region. The MFA’s speedy engagement with the roll out of HDN in the 3RP in the region shows that the ‘MFA was quickly into nexus thinking and language’ as cited by one KI.

Yet, at a programme and project level as noted in JC 1.3, MFA seems to have adopted HDN approaches somewhat by default and thus may not have thought through the implications.

However, a very significant observation by some KIs is the reflection that there has been limited space dedicated to taking sock and institutional learning from the last seven- or eight-years’ experience of innovative policy making and programming. As an evaluator also reflecting on this, this evaluation and the processes underway in the MFA – the Internal Action Plan roll-out, the Departmental Policy Reform process, inter alia, provide the opportunity and some space for this learning.

**JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilateralers and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR’) and CSOs**

Finland’s disposition in the MENA region is fully complementary with the other actors. It has played a significant and very supportive role given the constraints that it is a relatively small donor within a complex and large scale – volume and geographic spread – programme.
**Evidence**

KII evidence strongly acknowledges Finland’s significant role both in advocating ‘nexus thinking’ and its practical embodiment through donor support for the joint UNHCR-UNDP Sub-regional response facility secretariat. KII evidence describes Finland as a ‘trail blazer for HDN,’ and ‘has helped UNDP and UNHCR to spearhead the recovery-reliance-development strategy’. The MFA has worked within the 3RP machinery (i.e one of the donors funding the secretariat and also scaling-up research focusing on developing livelihoods and social cohesion toolkits (NB consistency with consistent 4PPAs and policy pillars)), and externally with strong advocacy with other donors to maintain the momentum for the 3RP. The MFA was also noted for its ‘very strong support for the host community component’, a key component of the HDN approach noted in chapter 3.3.2 of this Evaluation.

One very salient indicator of Finland’s complementarity is that a KI noted how it was very effective in background dialogue, ‘it watches, then campaigns’. For example, it is not in the top regional donors’ group (100 MUSD club) but it attends and has been a very strong advocate ‘promoting resilience when other donors were less interested’. The MFA was also deemed to be very helpful in background advocacy – seeking common ground to bring together UNDP and UNHCR – ironically bridging different operating precepts and principles that exist with the MFA as well – to support the regional resilience programme by commending workable approaches.

Finland has aligned with other international actors, for example allocating 3 MUSD to the World Bank: 2015 Syrian Crisis Trust Fund, ensuring that unused funds were cycled forward: support public sector capacity in Jordan which was critical at that time as under enormous pressure. This was the main channel which MFA found to fund public sector.

Of particular note was Finland’s support for the 2017 Donor Conference bringing together the 3RP 2017/18 and Humanitarian Response Priorities January 2017 (the Humanitarian Resilience Plan). One KI noted that the donor conference was ‘rescued and successfully hosted by MFA in Helsinki with support also from other Nordics.

Linked to this, MFA (plus the government of Canada) partnered UNDP in 2017 for report *Never too early to Plan: lessons learned for post agreement reconstruction in Syria*. Finland was commended by one KI for its forward-looking attitude and willingness to take political risks in thinking ahead on Syria, and the challenges for social cohesion and development and IDPs (a rare mention) when other donors were saying why invest in solidarity building in Syria?

At the same time the MFA has recognised that different operating conditions require different operating modalities. For example, it was noted that Finland tries to support all the countries with a range of protection interventions – child protection, education, social cohesion vulnerability, especially in Lebanon where the protection atmosphere is ‘very sour’. Also noted was the need to adapt the ‘nexus’ to different country circumstances. The nexus was described as ‘tricky in countries like Lebanon where [until recently] there [has been] no coherent national level co-ordination or national programme/strategy and no sector working groups and so many stakeholders’. Accordingly, the MFA has had to operate more pragmatically. By contrast in Jordan donors, such as the MFA, can align with the government’s programme – the National Jordanian Response Plan.

**JC 2.3: Influence: MFA Policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners has been sustained and effective.**

There is strong evidence of sustained MFA policy influence in the MENA region through advocacy and funding for the regional strategic response in the HDN. There is no evidence of parallel influence on FD.
Capacity limitations to cover the range and the geographic spread of its programmes may have undermined some of the potential influence that the MFA might have achieved and has limited programme monitoring and coherence at the field level.

**Evidence**

The main dimensions and successes of MFA influence have been discussed in JC 2.2 above. In many ways this is a remarkable achievement given that MFA coverage on the ground is so thin to cover three countries – an ambassador, a deputy head of mission, and one local staff working mainly on CSO programmes.

KII indicators suggest that whilst the main dimensions of the strategy have been well covered by the MFA, what is lacking is detailed oversight and influence on implementation and programme coherence – see EQ 3. Whereas it was noted that humanitarian assistance, being more needs and principles based, development cooperation requires sustained dialogue with partners, and this is not taking place sufficiently. Strategic dialogue with partners is important. This mixed portfolio of projects across the countries described above lead KIs to perceive that aligning the 4 PPAs to the HDN was becoming more difficult for the MFA. Not being able to attend donor co-ordination meetings, because of staff shortages has implications for coherence, influence and monitoring. KIs compared the Finnish MFA unfavourably in this respect compared with other Nordics.

On the other hand, KIs noted that the MFA was quite hands off but equally valued what they saw was trust by the MFA in their capacity and principles and a willingness not to ‘micro manage’ and use un- or soft- earmarked funding. The MFA was welcomed in its openness of approach caricatured as ‘what are you doing, how can we assist?’ and ‘we respect what you do’ approach.

One KI summed up Finland’s predicament, ‘with small missions like the MFA, they don’t have the staff and this low presence is not doing justice to their commitments’.

**Answer to EQ 3**

**EQ 3. To what extent and how do the approaches to FD and HDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies?**

Policies rooted in the DPPs have strongly influenced the establishment of policy coherence, at least in the recent past of the evaluation time frame. This is reflected in the 2017–2020 Strategy. The programme in the region aligns well with the DPPs. They provide a good ‘back stop’ given that coherence on the ground is constrained by the wide spread of the programme and the shortfall of staff to monitor and provide oversight.

Poor coherence between MFA HQ and the field was noted.

**Key findings on judgement criteria**

**JC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively.**

No operational mechanisms were identified as being in place to promote policy coherence at HQ or in the region. The 2017–2020 Strategy provides a good back stop for coherence on development policies and programmes. However, the Unit for Humanitarian Aid acts somewhat independently, given the different operating precepts and principles, and thus little coordination and complementarity was found. This is somewhat of a paradox given the strong advocacy and support for the concept of the HDP which the MFA has promoted.
Evidence

The lack of direct mechanisms, except for the 2017–2020 strategy, is surprising. The ‘One-pagers on migration’ seem tangential and the Theories of Change for the four PPAs do not really provide a mechanism to support coherence for HDN in the region.

Symptomatic of the lack of mechanisms is the indication by a small number of KIs that they perceived a disconnect between HQ and the Embassy in Beirut. This was noted as a challenge in synchronising messages and ensuring consistency and what was perceived to be the more dominant role of the MFA at HQ compared with Norway, for example, which was said to delegate more to the embassy level. Finland was perceived to be more centralised, the corollary, perhaps, of having so few staff in the field. The question was also raised that this might be because ODA projects are more politically sensitive and thus the MFA keeps tighter control.

JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs).

There is evidence of strong coherence with external partners – close alignment with multilaterals and CSOs for example – but less coherence across the government

Evidence

Earlier JCs have underscored the generally good levels of coherence with external partners, albeit that contact in the field is limited. The impression from KIs is that coherence is undertaken at HQ level in the MFA and HQ level of its multilateral partners; but this could also be taken again as symptomatic of the weak field presence. Nevertheless, KIs spoke of very good relationships with MFA across several desks and levels of staff, valued annual programme meetings. It was noted that connecting a spectrum of MFA stakeholders also involved close follow-up by the MFA staff: ‘dialogue was good, tight, strong, sharing of political assessments and knowledge’. In this context it was also noted by KIs that they appreciated the high degree of trust and transparency with which MFA engaged its partners. However, in this context KIs also noted their appreciation for the high degree of trust and transparency with which MFA engaged its partners, indicating the value of informal mechanisms in promoting policy coherence.

Externally, a significant gap in coherence is engagement with the private sector

JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN.

There are good levels of policy coherence around existing policies. Less clear is the adequacy of these approach in the context of HDN and FD.

Evidence

Earlier JCs have highlighted the main limitations to policy coherence. These are:

- A degree of disconnect between the MFA’s thinking and operational engagement at the HDN strategy level compared with programme level
- A degree of disconnect between HQ and the field.
Recommendations

Since the Syrian crisis response is the main (only?) HDN type programme globally, there is a significant body of strategic, policy and implementation experience, after eight years, for all donors not just Finland which prompts the following recommendations.

- First, and most important, the MFA is recommended to commission an evaluation of its engagement in the region, lessons learned, strengths and weaknesses and, most important, guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN engagement recognising that this will always be context specific. The evaluation should be comprehensive covering i) all levels – HQ, regional level (the 3RP), implementation (programmes and partnerships); ii) management processes – e.g. strategy development, application of policy instruments (e.g. the 4PPAs), staffing, funding, PCD etc; iii) focus on the triple nexus which is evident, in some respects in the MFAs response.

- More immediate recommendations are:
  - Review the need to scale up staffing requirements for a multi-country, multi-partner programme;
  - Review communication and distribution of responsibilities between HQ-Embassy with more delegation to the region to improve programme flexibility.
  - Review strengths and weaknesses (e.g. policy influence, monitoring, and especially PCD) of current programme spread and country spread with a view it considering streamlining and sharper focus.
  - Review PCD

References


The Inception Report presented a ‘reconstructed’ ToC (Figure below) was based largely on the DPP2016 and committed the team to presenting a new ToC in this Final Report. This would seeks to capture the logic of how all the MFA interventions, based on a shared understanding of key concepts of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus, can expect to achieve their expected outputs, outcomes and impacts in relation to the 2016 DPP. In this way the ToC will help to strengthen the MFA’s policy coherence in respect of forcibly displaced populations in both countries of origin and impacted/host countries. It will also act as a learning tool by helping to clarify how the different modalities, implementation channels of delivery, and target groups adopted by the MFA may or may not fit with the general overall direction of change captured in the generic ToC. As part of this reflection the evaluation team also examined the MFA’s four individual ToCs for its four Policy Priority Areas (PPAs).

**The Reconstructed ToC**

In the Inception Report the reconstructed ToC proposed that Humanitarian Assistance and Development Co-operation should sit alongside each other as the twin axes of MFA policies and that PCD/PCSD cover all the inputs made by the MFA in both these policy areas and those of other ministries that impact on them. Funding and Policy Influencing are inputs applying to both.

**Figure 10:** Draft Reconstructed ToC from Inception Report

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**ANNEX 11: THEORY OF CHANGE**

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In addition, the reconstructed ToC identified the inputs and the means, key activities and their operationalisation providing a guide to check these during our analysis of the desk study, KIIs and country case studies.

It also identified the four policy priority areas as the main areas in which to find outputs that would lead to six generic outcomes that were gleaned from the text of the DPP.

**Ministry ToCs for the Policy Priority Areas**

The Ministry’s own ToCs for the four Priority Areas were studied. Three overall comments can be made. First, it was noted that these detailed ToCs, though a good deal more specific, fitted well with the overall ToC produced by the evaluation team. Second, it was found that only one of the four PPA ToCs (No 4 on Food Security) had specific references to migration and then only in the list of ‘Assumptions and Implications’ at the end. The other three made no reference to migration or refugees at all. Finally, perhaps not surprisingly considering they were drafted before 2015, these ToCs make no use of the concepts of forced displacement or the humanitarian-development nexus, nor even less, the latest concept of the humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

At the individual PPA level the main findings emerging from this analysis were:

**PPA 1: Gender**

While the Outcomes and Outputs are written at a generic level that does not focus on women in particular circumstances such as migration, the Activities are much more specific referring to partner countries and even programmes. For instance, mention is made of working with women and girls in fragile contexts and even to the countries covered in the case studies for this evaluation (Afghanistan, Somalia and MENA). However, no mention is made of catering to the special needs of women or girls who are refugees or migrants more generally even though this is an important aspect of Finland’s work in these settings.

**PPA 2: Livelihoods**

As with the PPA1 Theory of Change this second one does not mention migration or refugees at all, and the Outcomes and Outputs text is written at a generic level that would not easily accommodate language on such specific concerns unless it was a primary concern. Equally, the text on Activities does not refer to migration and refugees, even though there would be scope to do so here, if so wished. Of course, the question then arises as to how much livelihoods is a specific concern within Finland’s work on migration and refugees, though adopting an HDN approach would suggest it might well be important in these programmes.

**PPA 3: Ending Poverty**

Similarly, this third ToC does not refer to migration or refugees even at the level of Activities where it might be appropriate. There is mention of one of the case study countries, Afghanistan, however, which suggests it might be appropriate to refer to programmes for migrants and refugees in this ToC at the level of Activities.

**PPA 4: Food Security**

Migration is mentioned in the Assumptions and Implications related to Food Security and Nutrition and among those for Forests and Natural Resources of this Theory of Change. On the other hand, migration and refugees are not mentioned in the assumptions for the Water section of the diagram. So, while migration is recognised in places, this lack of consistent treatment suggests that no specific attention was paid to these issues when the diagram was drafted.

As with the other PPA ToCs, neither migration nor refugees are recognised in the main parts of the diagram. While it is understood that the generic pitch of the text for the Outcomes and Outputs does not
really allow for a mention of specific circumstances, there is scope for this at the level of Activities in the diagram.

**Revised ToC**

The revised ToC drafted after the evaluation was completed is presented in Figure below. The basic logic and structural elements remain largely the same. The main changes are at the bottom of the diagram, which deals with the main stakeholders. Moving from the bottom upwards they are:

- Another key governmental actor has been included: notably the PMO. Trade policy, although it is under the MFA, has also been highlighted separately as another important area for policy coherence.
- The five main policy ‘pillars’ of the MFA identified in the study are now more clearly listed in the box at the bottom centre of the diagram.

**Figure 11: Revised ToC using an HPD Nexus approach to Migration & Forced Displacement**

- The number of main inputs has also been expanded to include the funding going into Peace-building efforts. This is also portrayed on the same line as Humanitarian Assistance and Development Cooperation to denote the three main elements of the HPD Nexus that provides the most useful conceptual framework for the MFA to adopt. The main evaluation report makes the case for this and includes a recommendation.
• The partners identified now also include FELM (Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission) in the green ‘Other Partners’ box in the centre of the diagram.

• In the UN box, the words migration and refugees have been added.

• The coverage expected for policy coherence, represented by the large dotted area inside a dashed line at the bottom of the diagram, has not been changed. Evidence collected during the evaluation does show that this coverage is in practice not as good as expected in all areas but given that the diagram represents the ‘theory’ of change rather than the ‘practice’, the diagram does not show any such existing gaps.

• Near the top of the diagram, at the level of Outcomes some regrouping has been done so as to bring out more clearly the peace and security Outcomes. Otherwise the Outcomes, Outputs and the ‘destinations’ for the Outputs are left unchanged.

• The overall objective at the top of the diagram has been slightly reworded using the word ‘Ensuring’ instead of ‘Securing’

Otherwise, the evaluation suggested that the reconstructed ToC diagram designed by the team at the start of the evaluation covered the Ministry’s existing theory of change well.

Conclusions

The overall ToC prepared by the evaluation team at the start of the study did not require much updating as a result of the findings of the evaluation though it was considered useful to do some fine-tuning in order to better represent the finding from the study. Equally, an attempt was made to fit in the HPD Nexus to show how this can further bring together the MFA’s work on forced displacement.

The MFA’s individual ToCs for the four Policy Priority Areas fit well with the overall ToC on forced displacement proposed by the evaluation team except for the fact that there is a virtual total lack of references in them to migration and refugees. This is perhaps not surprising for the period in which they were drafted, but as a result rewriting these ToCs to incorporate the Ministry’s objectives on forced displacement and HPD Nexus approach, would be a good opportunity to draw greater attention to this work.
ANNEX 12: METHODOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF QAB DATABASE ANALYSIS

Methodological explanation: First phase

The Evaluation Team considered that the material produced by and for the Quality Assurance Board (QAB) of development cooperation was a potential source to test the impact of the ‘threshold moment’ in funding decisions in the MFA and see up to which degree FD is used as argument in decision-making inside the organisation. This is the methodological explanation on how the material was assembled and analysed.

The Evaluation Team asked to have the complete set of QAB agendas and meeting minutes in two periods of time: from June 2012 to December 2013, and from June 2016 to December 2017, as a sample submitted to closer analysis. The purpose was to detect possible changes in the corpus of development cooperation projects/programmes between the two DPPs. The approval of each DPP in Finland always takes place in February the following year of parliamentary elections when the new government defines its priorities for development cooperation, and it was considered that some months were needed so as to be able to see possible changes in orientation of priorities after the approval of a DPP.

Based on the agendas and minutes, a full list of all funding initiatives relating to the three case study countries, Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA were picked out from the agendas and meeting minutes, and full documentation of those projects/programmes was asked for, to be analysed in a second phase. Each funding initiative consists of a proposal, normally drafted by the desk officer and submitted to the QAB, and an opinion, here called statement, written by the thematic/sector advisor. In some cases, the ‘package’ of each funding proposal also included a statement written by the diplomatic representation/embassy of the country or region where the project would be implemented.

To analyse the changes in funding initiatives between the 2012 and 2016 DPPs, a table was drawn by clustering the policy priority areas and cross-cutting objectives of both in larger thematic areas. The thematic priorities, independently whether cross-cutting or specific priority area, found in both DPPs were seven, in some cases phrased slightly differently in the DPP 2012 from the 2016 DPP, and an eight in DPP 2016. Yet, both DPPs have a high degree of thematic continuity. The categories found were:

1. Democracy and rule of law;
2. Economy and employment;
3. Human rights;
4. Gender equality;
5. Human development, including health and education;
6. Humanitarian purposes, and
7. Refugees and migration-related initiatives.
8. The ‘larger’ environment; climate change, sustainable use of natural resources

The categories were then inserted in the horizontal axis of an Excel table, and the funding initiatives approved by QAB on the vertical axis, indicating each approved funding initiative and its budget in the corresponding cell. Table 1 below indicates the distribution of Finnish funds according to thematic priorities as approved by the QAB between June 2012 and December 2013.
It has to be underlined that the approved funding initiatives and their budgets (that after the approval by the QAB are sent to the Minister of Development Cooperation for signature, after which they become funding decisions, legally binding commitments) should be taken with extreme care and as indicative only to illustrate changing policy priorities, not as actual disbursements. The evaluation has not checked whether the Minister effectively signed them, and in any case the financial flows going through the scrutiny of the QAB are only a part of funds going to a certain country (namely, funds to the EU and humanitarian aid are excluded from them). In addition, as the 2017 approvals show, the sums approved for certain projects/initiatives can change, with posterior increases or cuts in relation to what was originally approved. In a few words, the figures below only indicate projects/programmes deemed by the QAB of being of sufficiently good quality and aligned with Finnish development policies that they would merit being funded.

**Table 5:** Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June 2012–Dec 2013</th>
<th>Democracy rule of law</th>
<th>Economy employment</th>
<th>Human rights</th>
<th>Gender equality</th>
<th>Human dev. Health educ.</th>
<th>Other / multisector</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Total June 2012–Dec 2013</td>
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</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on MFA-QAB meeting minutes 2012–2013.

For instance, what Table 5 tells us is that over 50% of approved funding proposals concerns topics related to democracy and rule of law, and roughly 57% if human rights are added to the same category. Migration and/or refugees are totally absent from the body of proposed projects. The total represents 4.7% of all QAB-approved funding proposals during the same period. In a pie chart format, the table gives the following figure below:

**Figure 12:** Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.
The following table (Table 6) gives the figures for funding proposals judged eligible for Finnish funding by the QAB between June 2016 and December 2017. The total represents roughly 12% of all QAB-approved funding proposals during the same period; that is, about two and a half times higher in proportion than between June 2012 and December 2013.

**Table 6: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Total June 2016–Dec 2017</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,920,197</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,500,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,520,000</strong></td>
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<td><strong>9,676,968</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,680,165</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,680,165</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

There are approved budgets in each thematic category, and the overall amount is more than double (64.68 MEUR) compared with the previous sample; and indeed, the share (percentage) of Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA in all funding proposals approved by the QAB is more than double (12%) than in the previous period. Figure below gives the same distribution of approved funding proposals for the period between June 2016 and December 2017.
Figure 13: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

Methodological explanation: Second phase

The second phase in the analytical use of the QAB material database was to carry out a qualitative analysis on the core issue of the evaluation: connection between development policy and forced displacement, in other words, how coherent has Finland (MFA) been in addressing forced displacement, and the root causes thereof, through development cooperation and policy. This phase was based, not on the agendas and minutes of QAB meetings, but on the proposals drafted by desk officers, and the statements written by thematic/sector advisors, and by embassies in some cases.

The proposals as well as the statements have a certain standard format, including following elements of the proposed project: abstract, results monitoring mechanism and indicators, ODA eligibility, lessons learned from earlier phases, country context, compliance and complementarity with Finnish development policy, risk management and other aspects, e.g. administrative structure of the proposed intervention etc. Some proposals have only a couple of pages of text, but some others are up to 15 pages long. The thematic advisor’s opinion gives a justification for approving the proposal, or in the contrary case, demands further clarification about certain aspects (management structure, indicators, fund management structure etc.). Several proposals are sent back to the desk officer for clarifications, corrections and further information which can be seen in the proposals mentioning “corrected after QAB’s recommendations from X date”).

All proposals and statements were then submitted to a search with key words, or rather, their equivalents in Finnish: migr* (‘muutt*”), refug* (‘pakol*”), camp (‘leir*”), and a key word, perhaps slightly outdated but still used in the documents, corresponding to what in English would be ‘immigrant worker’ which in Finnish does not come from the same root as migrant (‘siirtol*”).

The sample of documents from the earlier period (June 2012–December 2013) was relatively small. Only four proposals (out of 16) were found in the MFA electronic archives of which only three turned out to be fully relevant for the Syrian crisis/MENA, and only one advisor statement. One of the reasons for this scant ‘harvest’ can be the fact that at that time, the proposals and statements were produced manually, on paper, and signed in person, then photocopied but not necessarily scanned and sent to the archives in electronic format. In none of the documents was migration, refugees, work-related population movements or similar mentioned/addressed. In the eyes of Finnish development cooperation, the topic did not exist.

The second sample period proved to be more abundant, probably a reflection of better and fully electronic archival methods. Twenty-four project proposals had been handled by the QAB between June 2016 and December 2017; in addition, there were three extra projects of humanitarian mine clearance that had been tendered, without desk officer proposals and therefore left out from the qualitative second phase analysis. With the exception of one project, all proposals were found (23), and 21 advisor or embassy statements.
In general terms it can be said that about one half of the projects concern refugees or mention migration in the documentation. All funding initiatives for the MENA region with Syria are eminently refugee or IDP-related. This is logical considering the humanitarian situation in the region but also when taking into account that Syria and the MENA region is not a partner country for the Finnish development cooperation, contrary to Afghanistan and Somalia, for which clearly non-migration or refugee related projects are funded (water and sanitation, reproductive health etc.).

In general, the focus under which the projects related to Afghanistan and Somalia are proposed is eminently human rights oriented, and, to a lesser extent, concerned about state-building. As examples for Afghanistan can be presented the UNICEF WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) project and Marie Stopes International reproductive health project. For Somalia, the approved projects manage argumentation on provision of services in the health sector, particularly for women and girls (maternal, child and reproductive health). Migration is present only marginally in most of the proposals and/or statements; one example could be that an international non-governmental organisation complains about their professional staff migrating out of the country among risk management arrangements or that some health services provided will benefit also IDPs. In cases like this, the proposal was considered not FD related in the sense of the evaluation. None of the proposals for Afghanistan or Somalia used the terms or logics of FD or the HDN, with one exception on Afghanistan.

For MENA/Syria, the finding is totally different. The humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) is well developed in the argumentation of a resilience building project for local communities in Syria and neighbouring countries (UNDP), in a project for economic empowerment of women in Jordanian refugee camps and in the argumentation concerning the No Lost Generation initiative of UNICEF in Syria and Jordan. It is easy to see that the topic has been elaborated within the MFA and the officials understand the complexities of the nexus, and indeed, the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance has participated in drafting the statements of proposals for Syria/MENA.

Only one proposal related to MENA migration and transit countries (ILO women’s health in transit countries) does not operate with the HDN concept (nexus or continuum). The rest of the QAB-approved projects for Syria/MENA fall under the first Policy Priority Area (PPA), democratic and well-functioning societies, closely related to peace and political dialogue to resolve the Syrian armed conflict.

Only one project, the UNDP-run employment and vocational training project SALAM in Afghanistan in cooperation with ILO and UNHCR, addresses directly the prevention of FD through job creation, indicating understanding of the development-migration nexus. In the case of this project, both the proposal and the advisor's statement indicate a clear orientation to FD, probably due to the fact that the problem tree (and the ToC) of the project itself addresses lack of employment and of employability skills as one of the root causes of FD (here phrased 'irregular migration' internally and externally).

To illustrate the argumentation, fragments of the proposal and statement are translated here (p. 2, desk officer’s proposal 14 November 2016): The ToC’s logic is that when there are legal and regular channels for (e)migration, there is an offer of vocational training and job opportunities exits and Afghan women and men are aware about options open for them, wellbeing is enhanced, and irregular migration reduced. And the advisors confirm in their statement that the project is compliant with Finnish polices because it addresses root causes of FD by providing services to refugees, IDPs, migrants and returnees but express doubts about the ToC (that increased job opportunities would automatically reduce irregular migration). Although dating from 2016, the argumentation reveals clear understanding of the connection of economic development and migration (inversed U-curve) that has later been elaborated in internal memos at MFA in 2018.

In one project proposal the advisor’s statement referred to the project’s (UNICEF WASH in Afghanistan) complementarity with Agenda 2030, in addition to human rights concerns.
Conclusions

There has been a break in the approach towards FD and migration between the period preceding the DPP of 2016 and posterior. The break (or threshold moment of 2015–2016) is manifest in the selection of thematic sectors funded, for instance the move from democracy and rule of law oriented projects towards more funding for refugee and migration related projects, and in the quantity of funds towards the three case study countries Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, the total budget over double between June 2016 and December 2017 compared with the period between June 2012 and December 2013, and this in spite of an overall reduction of about 43% of available funds in the MFA-controlled and managed Finnish development cooperation.

Whereas the humanitarian-development nexus is largely understood by MFA officials, according to the QAB documents database, especially in the case of project proposals for the Syrian crisis, the same does not apply to the development-migration nexus in the case of FD. Many of the handled projects in the database could have merited an argumentation about FD and the role of development policy in its prevention, but the focus given by MFA officials to the projects in development cooperation partner countries is eminently humanitarian and human rights based. However, the IOM MIDA FinnSom programme of diaspora health professional’s support for Somalia’s health sector elevates the discussion towards the migration-development nexus.
EVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY