Zimbabwe’s Urban Crises: Food Security and the Joint Initiative

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The Background
The crisis in Zimbabwe is prolonged, widespread and deeply felt. Zimbabwe faces multiple challenges: political stalemate; very poor service delivery; a stagnant and contracting economy; increasing unemployment; an HIV/AIDS pandemic and the progressively challenging task of accessing even the most basic commodities. Coupled with a hostile government and poor relations with the international community, the crisis in Zimbabwe shows no signs of abating. The combination of these factors is driving Zimbabweans into poverty. Life expectancy has plummeted from 62 years in the late 1980s to 43 years in 2010. The HIV rate among adults peaked at 27 percent in 1997 and over 1.3 million children are without either one or both parents. Historically, Zimbabwe was the ‘breadbasket’ of Southern Africa. Today, however, due to inefficient governance, low agricultural investments, a crippled private sector, cyclical weather patterns, and controversial land reform programmes, Zimbabwe has become a net food importer. Food security has declined significantly and is now a critical issue facing the population.

The Urban Context
Urban vulnerability has increased dramatically over the last few years. Rural insecurity has driven people to the cities. There has been a six to eight percent per annum urban growth rate with a resultant explosion in the informal sector. Formal unemployment stands at over 80 percent, and 70 percent of people live below the poverty line. Inflation has reached a daily rate of nearly 100 percent and the average income is less than $1 USD a day.

By 2004, the informal economy had become the mainstay of Zimbabweans, with about 4 million people earning their living through informal employment, as opposed to the 1.3 million engaged in the formal sector.

Vastly deteriorated standards of service delivery have left many urban areas without access to clean water, refuse collection, suitable sanitation or regular electricity. Government policies have exacerbated the situation, notably ‘Operation Murambatsvina’, translated as ‘Operation Drive Out Rubbish’. This operation, officially known as ‘Operation Restore Order’ (ORO) has been locally likened to a tsunami in terms of scope and devastation.

In May 2005, without warning, the Government of Zimbabwe sent bulldozers into urban areas to ‘demolish all illegal structures’. This demolition and eviction campaign led to the destruction of homes, businesses, vending sites and assets of many poor urban dwellers. ORO left 700,000 urban residents homeless, without access to basic services, and destroyed the livelihoods of an estimated 2.4 million others. For many of those affected, negative and even harmful coping strategies, became the only option. These coping mechanisms vary from measures such as withdrawal from school and reducing the household’s number of meals or quality of food to increases in borrowing, crime and prostitution. Writing in February 2008, the Washington Post described how many of those affected by ORO were forced to walk to work, sometimes as much as 18 miles a day, as a single bus trip cost a week’s wages.
Wealth Groups

In 2006, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee surveyed 4,570 households to determine the status of wealth, food security, nutrition, education, employment and access to services in urban areas.

These statistics, however, mask the growing and disparate poverty of urban dwellers. In Bulawayo, for example, the ‘total poor’ represented 91 percent of the population.

The Rationale

Increasingly concerned about the political, social and economic situation, and in the wake of the United Nations Common Response Plan, seven International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) formed the Joint Initiative (JI) consortium. Involved in the JI were: Mercy Corps, Practical Action, Oxfam GB, CARE International, Save the Children UK, Africare, and Catholic Relief Services. The JI group aimed to pool their expertise, capacities and resources to offer a wide breadth of comprehensive programmes.

The overarching goal of the JI was to ‘restore dignity and reduce suffering for the most vulnerable in urban and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe’.

The formation of the JI, and its subsequent programmes, represent a new and major collaborative approach to help vulnerable households in a comprehensive and coordinated way.

Assessments

Early in the programme’s formation, a vulnerability needs assessment was carried out in each target area to identify the top three priorities and needs of beneficiaries at the community level. These priorities then shaped the programme’s direction and focus. The assessment prioritised: Livelihood Opportunities; Food Security; Lack of Shelter; HIV/AIDS; Education and Public Health.

The Programme

The JI management structure consisted of the donor group, a steering committee, Area Coordination Committees (ACCs), and Programme Management Units together with the INGO’s own operational and management teams. Most of the INGOs worked through local partners. The programme, which began in May 2006, aimed to assist up to 12,000 vulnerable households (HH) in six urban and peri-urban locations. The comprehensive interventions included:

- Support for household (HH) livelihoods
- Support to food insecure households
- Shelter provision
- The waiver of school fees for two years for 50 orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) and investments in training, educational resources and infrastructure to participating schools
- HIV and AIDS interventions
- Child Protection

Oxfam GB had five activities in the Joint Initiative programme. These were: supplementary food baskets, low input gardens, home based care, youth friendly centres and cash transfers. This case study focuses on the Food Security Intervention.

Food Security Intervention

Both a lack of availability and access to food, led to a dramatic increase in the numbers of people experiencing food insecurity. This was exacerbated by a government price freeze in 2006, which effectively emptied shops and supermarkets of basic foodstuffs and commodities. As a result, food was in short supply and then, only available on the black market at vastly inflated prices. Accessing food became very difficult for urban and rural dwellers and for low or middle income groups alike.

As part of the Joint Initiative, Oxfam GB worked with CARE International in Zimbabwe to implement the food security component of the programme as a lack of availability or access to food was identified as a top priority in all three of Oxfam GB’s target areas, Mbare (Harare) and Mzilikazi and Makokoba (Bulawayo).

The project had three phases lasting approximately eighteen months each.
Thanks to incremental programmatic performance and a good harvest for 2008/9, the focus of the third phase is on recovery. A major component of this phase is the adoption of a cash transfer project to improve access to food, savings and livelihood development.

The Projects
This case study focuses on the food security interventions that were carried out in Phase 1 of the project. The Oxfam GB project aimed to improve access to food for vulnerable populations in these areas by:

- Establishing a food voucher system for 6,150 vulnerable households (4,400 in Mbare, 1,750 in Bulawayo -Mzilikazi, Mkokoba and Njube)

- Supporting 2,200 vulnerable households to establish home gardens or “low-input” gardens (LIGs) to supplement food intake and dietary diversity

The voucher system aimed to enable vulnerable households to access a supplementary monthly food basket that was designed to contribute towards meeting the household’s overall food requirements. The food basket, equivalent to a value of $20 USD, was to contribute approximately one-third of a household’s kilocalorie needs. This was in line with the rations being provided by the World Food Programme and CARE.

Oxfam GB and its implementing partners paid selected local supermarkets in advance to make ready a list of agreed upon commodities, such as beans, salt, maize, cooking oil

### Phases

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<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Number of Beneficiaries (Households)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Vouchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1: June 2006 – December 2007</td>
<td>6150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2: January 2008 – December 2009</td>
<td>3055</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 3: January 2010 – June 2011</td>
<td>1000</td>
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In addition to providing vouchers as a response to meet urgent needs, Oxfam also engaged in projects that helped to preserve the resilience of the population such as provision of agriculture inputs - fertiliser and seeds as well as promotion of community nutrition gardens. Photo: Chiramwiwa Gavi/Oxfam
and peanut butter. This process was done rapidly, to counter the effects of hyperinflation. If commodities were unavailable, suitable alternatives would be substituted.

After the verification and identification process, the targeted households received their monthly-allocated vouchers from Oxfam GB and its partner organisations. The beneficiary or a household proxy could then use the vouchers at the supermarkets within a specified period. This would usually be for a five-day period per month. The voucher programme was designed to coincide with seasonal fluctuations and needs.

In November 2007, Oxfam GB piloted an electronic voucher (e-voucher) system for this programme, replacing the original paper voucher system. The results were immediate and significant. Prior to computerisation, each distribution site required 52 staff to oversee the disbursement of the vouchers and beneficiaries would regularly have to wait for hours to be seen. Due to the introduction of the e-voucher programme, four people could manage the flow of people and 1,700 beneficiaries could be seen in one day, nearly 33 percent more than under the paper system.

When markets are functioning and food is both available and accessible, cash transfers (applied here through a voucher system) allow vulnerable people to obtain food assistance in a manner that maintains their sense of independence, choice and dignity. Furthermore, they build on and can strengthen private sector distribution channels.

The Low Input Gardens enabled beneficiaries to build their capacity to produce their own food, serving both to increase the amount of food available and the variety in the household’s diet. Households received ‘LIG Starter Kits’, with tools, a variety of seeds and an information book to support the creation and maintenance of the LIG. This included seed saving, multiplication and propagation practices. Surplus crops could be sold for profit, as a boost to income or to release funds to purchase other basic commodities. Innovative and sustainable approaches, such as intercropping and the use of climbing or container based plants were applied together with techniques such as natural water and soil conservation. These are suited to urban areas, where space and agricultural inputs are limited.

Prior to the establishment of the gardens, Oxfam GB and partners facilitated the selection of 40 volunteer community LIG trainers (20 each in Harare and Bulawayo) through a community participatory process. These trainers were responsible for providing training and advice to around 50 households and school/community groups. The training was designed to cover all aspects of garden creation and management; from seed storage, disease control and soil improvement to advice on marketing produce and record keeping.

Who was targeted?

**Voucher System**

The beneficiaries selected were the poor and food insecure households displaced or affected by ORO and who remained in Mbare, Mzilikazi, Njube and Makokoba. Oxfam GB and CARE, together with local partners, agreed upon a common definition of vulnerability. Vulnerable HHs were identified by Oxfam’s local partners, using community based targeting. The following criteria for vulnerability included but were not limited to:

- economically vulnerable households with limited or no livelihood opportunities
- households headed by single mothers/widows
- orphan headed/child headed households
- households supporting the chronically ill
- households headed by the elderly
- households supporting disabled people.

**Low-input gardens**

This component was targeted at those households already benefiting from the food voucher system. Selection criteria for involvement in the LIGs included:

- Households with access to land for the establishment of a LIG
- Households with at least one member physically able to tend to the LIG
- Schools, community centres and churches were targeted alongside individuals, as a means of providing support to an additional 200 households that were without access to either land or landlord approval to participate in the scheme.

The registration and verification process enabled Oxfam GB and CARE to ensure that those most vulnerable to food insecurity were targeted and that the resulting interventions were most appropriately designed.
The project provided continuous motivational and technical support to the community LIG trainers throughout the period as their commitment and performance was central to the success of the intervention.

**Local Partners**
The food security and livelihoods project was managed by Oxfam and implemented through local partners, the Zimbabwe Project Trust (Zimpro) in Harare and Lead Trust in Bulawayo. Monitoring and evaluation were undertaken collaboratively. Working with local NGOs ensured a degree of continuity and legitimacy in community involvement. Furthermore, the use of local networks and organisations helped to circumvent the prevalent political tensions.

**Donors**
The programme was supported through a system of pooled funding by major international donors, namely: the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DFID, USAID, AusAID, and, until recently, CIDA and SIDA.

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**Accountability**
The project set up help desks, information/suggestion boxes and child friendly desks. Information was provided to beneficiaries through local partners, Oxfam staff, local food committees and during regular community meetings. The help desk, project staff and the complaint boxes were the most important and favoured feedback mechanism. However, an assessment, carried out in 2009, found that 34.5 percent of respondents did not know that these mechanisms existed. There is a clear need to boost awareness of what mechanisms are in place and how beneficiaries may best access them.

**Gender**
The vulnerability criteria for inclusion in the two projects specifically recognised that households headed by single mothers and widows are likely to be amongst the ‘most food insecure’. The voucher programme specifically encouraged the registration of women and women proxy representatives as a means of ensuring that the food basket reaches the household. This is partly because men have traditionally been more likely to “cash in” the basket. By design, the LIG component was specifically geared towards women, as home gardens have customarily been their responsibility.

At every stage, the projects ensured that women were fully represented in all planning, decision-making, monitoring and evaluation processes. A report from 2008 found that women represented 80 percent of the community groups, newly formed to participate and engage with the projects11. The projects also used disaggregated data to allow for: the recognition of gender specific needs; a gender based intervention impact analysis and to ensure that the project responded appropriately.

**Cost efficiency**
The final evaluation of the JI programme found that the programme had been cost effective. This was due to single contact points for contractual arrangements, harmonised financial and procurement rules, and unified reporting12. Joint delivery also meant that INGOs could focus on their existing skills, within part of a broader programme, instead of each INGO trying to operate beyond their areas of expertise.

**Exit strategy**
The final evaluation of the JI Phase 1 programme found that the “conditions that JI sought to address are, in most instances, worse today than when the programme started in 2006”13. Despite the continued deterioration of the social and economic conditions in Zimbabwe, it is essential to plan for a long term exit strategy and programme sustainability. Oxfam and the JI have been building on the following:

- The continuance of the synergistic programme approach – with multiple interventions by multiple partners
- Maintaining and enhancing links with other Oxfam projects, with other JI projects and with agencies not working in the JI, but in the same sectors
- Ensuring programme length is sufficient enough to advocate for change
- The engagement of local authorities to reach agreed Memorandums of Understanding regarding programme objectives and handovers
- The enhancement of community structures to address needs collaboratively

The JI has built on lessons learnt from the first and second phases and is moving towards recovery programmes. The Cash Transfer project is an example of this.
Ida Chazuka (87) carries her grandson on her back and several bags of maize on her head as she collects food from an Oxfam supported project. Many grandmothers have been left to care for young children due to massive economic migration and the HIV and Aids pandemic. Photo: Nicole Johnston/Oxfam
Challenges to the Programme

• Working in the dense, highly mobile, regulated and heterogeneous urban environment is a challenge that Oxfam is facing globally.

• In Zimbabwe, ORO radically swelled the number of internally displaced people. This presented a challenge in targeting beneficiaries, both because increased mobility exacerbated possible risks of exclusion and because the government would assist only those people living in approved housing in designated areas.

• Beyond this, the government of Zimbabwe had been unresponsive and, at times, hostile to INGO activities.

• Hyperinflation meant that it was very difficult to predict prices. This significantly affected the affordability of food.

• As a new mode of operating, the JI also experienced some managerial and operational challenges. The JI consortium had to begin with a process of harmonisation, from how to create contractual arrangements to how different projects and agencies would communicate. As the JI implemented multiple programmes, in many locations with many partners, this inevitably took time to set up. The results, however, have been impressive.

IMPACT

Key Successes

Food Vouchers

• 8,780 beneficiary households received monthly food vouchers. 4,400 households in Mbare, 1,750 in Bulawayo, 1,837 in Gweru and 793 in Masvingo. This exceeded the original target by 25 percent.

• All 48 registered child-headed households received food vouchers.

• The food voucher project reached the targeted populations: 64% of female headed households; 30% elderly headed households; 15% headed by or supporting a chronically ill member

• 82% of households reported an improvement in the availability of food

• 44% of beneficiaries stated that the number of meals they consumed had increased. In Bulawayo, 63% reported having at least two meals per day and 26% reported to be having at least three meals. 71% of households experienced an improved variety of food consumption

• An Impact assessment of the Food Voucher Project in Bulawayo in 2009 found that all households received their...
entitlement in the reporting period, with 97.1 percent of respondents reporting that the timeliness of the responses was good.\textsuperscript{15}

- 91% of respondents in Bulawayo stated that the vouchers enabled them to channel the money originally needed for the purchase of food to buy other basic commodities.
- Food Committees, made up of trained project beneficiaries, helped to facilitate the distribution of the vouchers. These Committees also formed an effective and meaningful point of contact for complaints and queries.
- The Feedback mechanisms helped to improve service response. For example, poor packaging of beans and mealie meals resulted in goods being damaged. Effective feedback meant that this information was fed to the contracted companies, who then changed their suppliers and accounted for certain losses in their planning.

**Low Impact Gardens**
- 2,149 LIGs were established during the project
- In Mbare, 1,100 LIGs were established (100%)
- In Bulawayo, water shortages meant that the number of targeted beneficiaries was scaled down from 1,100 to 300
- Revived water supplies meant that by February 2008, Bulawayo managed to establish a total of 1,049 LIGs
- 20% of the food voucher recipients were participants of the LIG project. This meant that the beneficiaries most vulnerable to food insecurity were further supported and given longer term assistance
- 52% of beneficiaries reported an improvement in the availability of food as a result of LIGs
- 47% of beneficiaries had a supplemented and diversified diet as a result of this initiative, with 25% of beneficiaries reporting an increase in the number of meals the household consumed in a day.
- As a response to the demand for more land, group gardens have been established
- Training of lead farmers/facilitators was conducted prior to distribution of inputs. This ensured that seeds were optimally used
- New and appropriate technologies were adopted. This will have long term and sustainable consequences for the future.
- Households not in the project could and did participate in the training. Although these households did not receive the same physical inputs, the training enabled them to construct and maintain LIGs. This has a cascading effect on food security for non-beneficiary households.
- Field days further promoted the adoption of LIGs and appropriate technologies to a wider group of households.
- Establishing ‘contact farmers’ helped to share information; lessons learnt and provided a point of contact for questions.

**The JI**
- The scope and approach of the JI was contextually relevant and the comprehensive programmes were appropriate for the beneficiaries. Field visits and reports from beneficiaries clearly show that the programmes have directly addressed their needs.\textsuperscript{16}
- The JI programme aimed to provide a holistic and comprehensive set of programmes to the most vulnerable populations, across a number of criteria. This worked well. By the beginning of 2008, most of the targets originally set out by the project had been successfully met.
- The JI proved that urban programming can be executed successfully with substantial impact on beneficiaries.
- The programme was effective in terms of management, cost effectiveness and programming.
- The JI provided opportunities to: share experiences and information; bring together new and complementary perspectives (such as issues around child protection); create simplified reporting procedures; establish an improved enabling environment through Area Coordination Committees (ACCs); adopt harmonised monitoring, verification and information sharing processes; share information with agencies operating outside of the JI (to avoid duplication) and focus on INGOs individual areas of expertise within a holistic approach.
- This consortium approach has built good relations with partners and can be used for further work.

**A proud grandmother with her grandson, Anesu**

The cash transfer system is providing life-saving opportunities to many households, like Anesu’s family. The $20 USD that Anesu’s mother receives not only allows her to purchase necessary goods, it also represents health, hope and a future for Anesu.
Lessons Learnt

Food Vouchers
• Because of deteriorating economic conditions and difficulties in accessing food, vouchers became the main source of food for many of the beneficiaries, as opposed to the supplementary basket that they were originally designed to be. This meant that the ration was inadequate. Monitoring and evaluation should have raised this earlier to maximise the impact for beneficiary households.
• Delays in updating beneficiary databases and printing of registration cards resulted in delays at distribution points. Staff were forced to revert to manual registers.
• Different forms of targeting and registration of beneficiaries across different organisations (such as SOS targeting children and Oxfam targeting household heads), meant that households were sometimes included twice. Registration and targeting procedures should be streamlined and consistent.
• Initial problems with verification meant that there was some confusion with distribution early on in the programme.
• The computerisation of the e-voucher project meant that the system was vulnerable to power shortages. This occurred in December 2007, which led to a huge influx of beneficiaries arriving the following day. Despite this setback, 60% of beneficiaries reported shorter waiting times than previously. The system requires the development of effective contingency plans.
• Initially, there was little shared public information about the voucher programme. For example, there was no public address system in place. Raising public awareness is essential to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the project.

Low Input Gardens
• The Final Evaluation report found that 71% of the original target group were able to participate in the LIG project. This was partly due to difficulties in accessing land, so that some of the intended beneficiaries were unable to establish LIGs.
• Water shortages were a major constraint and partly accounted for the shortfall of beneficiaries compared to the target.
• Establishment of community gardens for those without access to land (i.e. tenants) has been delayed by the need to drill boreholes to supply water. The use of treated municipal water was not permitted.
• The procurement of inputs (seeds and tools) was challenging. This was both a question of timing and of slow JI procurement procedures. Furthermore, despite LIGs targeting child headed households, child-friendly tools were not purchased.
• While future projects can still support the creation of household LIGs, logistical problems and costs can be overcome by establishing group gardens, with secure fencing and safe perennial water supplies.
• Projects should include a lobbying component to address issues of access to land and water.

The JI
Oxfam's Final Evaluation Report found two main areas for improvement.
• Improvements in Programme Management. The suggested measures are to: standardise and improve the functioning of the ACCs; to ensure that progress reports and feedback are shared with international and local partners to improve information sharing; and to create functional contingency plans.
• Improvements in Programming Methodologies. These measures include the need to: agree and adopt best practice approaches; work towards attaining 100 percent verification across all interventions; work towards greater collaboration with those outside of the partnership, but within the same sector; allocate more funds to research and share best practices to improve lesson learning and monitoring.

Potential for Replication

The Food Voucher Project used local supermarkets to distribute much needed food which can help to stimulate the local economy. The methodology used is well designed and appropriate to contexts where food is available, shops or supermarkets have the capacity to participate, and there is a desire to support local economic growth.

The LIGs project is designed for urban spaces, with sustainable and appropriate technologies. A project of this type can be used in most urban areas, where space is limited, although questions of access to land and water must be considered. Community gardens and providing shared spaces, such as at schools and churches, is an option.

The JI was a successful and innovative way to approach crises. Multiple and integrated programming to comprehensively address the needs of the vulnerable meant that the impact of each initiative was supported by the impact of other projects. Duplication was reduced and INGOs were able to focus on their areas of expertise within a coordinated programme. The consortium approach is appropriate to humanitarian contexts, where there are multiple needs and multiple agencies. The learning that was taken from the JI Phase One has fed into the planning and programming in phases two and three. Likewise, the overall learning from the Zimbabwe experience could help with the creation of a new ‘Joint Initiative’ elsewhere. This will be ongoing research in practice.

Right: Dorothy Shilling (68) and the bounty from her backyard food garden.
Photo: Nicole Johnston/Oxfam
Acronyms

ACC  Area Coordination Committee
Aus AID  Australian Agency for International Development
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
DFID  Department for International Development
HH  Households
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation
JI  Joint Initiative
LIG  Low Input Garden
ORO  Operation Restore Order
OVC  Orphans and Vulnerable Children
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
USD  United States Dollar
USAID  US Agency for International Development

Endnotes

2 According to government figures, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS has been declining since the mid-1990s and was 14.3% of the population in 2010. However, sources suggest that these figures must be taken with caution. The likelihood that the high numbers of homeless and displaced people in Zimbabwe were not surveyed means that the given figures cannot be wholly representative of the current situation. http://www.avert.org/aids-zimbabwe.htm, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIV/AIDS_in_Zimbabwe
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Murambatsvina
7 UN Special Envoy in Zimbabwe, Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibajuka, ‘Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina’, UN, 2005
9 The food poverty datum line (FPL) represents the minimum consumption expenditure necessary to ensure that each household member can, (if all expenditures were devoted to food) consume a minimum food basket representing 2,100 kilocalories per day.

The total consumption poverty line (TCPL) is the level of minimum expenditure required by a household to cover the FPL and the basic non-food household requirements. In this assessment, the poor were defined as households whose income or expenditure was below the TCPL but greater than the FPL. Households with income or expenditure above the TCPL were considered non poor. The Total Poor is the combination of the above groups.

10 This is based on a household of five people, each consuming 2100 kilocalories per day.
11 Oxfam GB, “JI End of Project Narrative Reports”, June 1, 2006 – February 29, 2008, Oxfam
13 ibid