1.2 Methodology

The evaluation team consisted of two international and one Iranian consultant (see Annex 2). Interpretation for the international consultants was necessary in some interviews.

The evaluation field work was undertaken between 9 October and 6 November 2006 (Annex 3). After a nine day period of preliminary interviews and scoping in Tehran, Bam and Kerman, the evaluation team presented an inception report to a meeting of UNICEF and government staff in Kerman on 18 October 2006 (Annex 4).

Following discussions with UNICEF Iran staff, the original terms of reference (ToR) for the evaluation were reformulated in the inception report to make them shorter and more user friendly (Annex 1).

The evaluation methodology has been a mixture of qualitative and quantitative investigation. Time and resources did not allow for a full quantitative survey of affected persons and other key stakeholders. ‘Triangulation’ was used to verify and validate information and findings by cross-checking information against a number of different sources in order to establish its validity.

The selection of field interview sites and interviewees (e.g. affected persons; project level staff) was done on a purposive basis, targeting a selection of individuals, groups, projects etc. that could provide information needed to cover the areas under investigation. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were used.

UNICEF’s programme focuses on Bam city and Baravat, but also covers the district of Bam. The evaluation coverage reflected this with several visits to rural areas outside the city. However, 80% to 90% of the evaluation team’s field work took place in Bam city itself, reflecting the major proportion of UNICEF expenditure in that location.

In Bam and Baravat the evaluation team conducted over 100 individual and focus group interviews with government officials, UNICEF staff, recipients of UNICEF assistance, families caring for separated children, teachers, kindergarten teachers, social workers, health workers, engineers and other professionals. The team also visited villages outside Bam such as Ghossamabad and Kordesan, a nutrition clinic in Rigan and a flour factory in Jiroft.

A full list of interviewees can be found in Annex 5.

The evaluation covers all phases of UNICEF’s work in Bam:

- **Phase I**: Immediate relief (up until February 2004)
- **Phase II**: Recovery– start up and initial implementation (provision of temporary services, shelter etc) (timing varies according to project, but roughly from March 2004 to end 2005)
- **Phase III**: Transition phase to longer term work and integration into UNICEF’s country programme.

As indicated in the Inception Report, the evaluation focused less on Phase 1, given the time that had elapsed since the initial disaster. Moreover, an earlier evaluation (Dessallien 2005) took a detailed look at UNICEF’s response during 2004. Although the overall tone and some of the
findings of that evaluation were strongly disputed by the Country Office, the report, part of aegional evaluation of three earthquake responses, contains a very detailed account of the first
weeks and months of the response.¹

The evaluation team took into account a variety of UNICEF global and country specific
documents including UNICEF’s Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies, UNICEF
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRPs), UNICEF’s Country Programme Action
Plan (CPAP) and UNICEF’s global Medium Term Strategic Plans (MTSP) 2002 - 2005 and
2006 – 2009. (A list of sources is given on page 79).

The evaluation team’s draft findings were presented to a meeting of UNICEF and government
staff in Tehran on 5 November 2006. The draft evaluation report was revised after two rounds of
feedback and comment from UNICEF country staff, the Middle East and North Africa Regional

1.3 Constraints

The ToR for the evaluation were broad and represented a challenge to the evaluation team,
particularly as the working time available was reduced by approximately a week because of the
Eid-ul-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan and the fact that the international consultants’ visas
could not be extended beyond their original 30 day periods. As a result, the evaluators did not
look in any depth at communications and media issues. Interviews with UNICEF staff in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional office and New York headquarters were very
limited in number.

A notable difficulty was the lack of official government information relating to the
reconstruction of Bam. For example, the evaluation team, and apparently UNICEF Iran, could
not obtain a copy of the master plan for the reconstruction of Bam. This seems quite
extraordinary and must raise a question mark about the effectiveness of the coordination of the
reconstruction effort (see also section 12.7). Other official data, such as the number of houses
and schools rebuilt was also not available.

1.4 Outline of the Report & Terminology

Section 2 covers the various contexts of the Bam disaster, section 3 provides an overview of the
disaster and section 4 an overview of UNICEF’s response. Sections 5 to 11 cover the programme
areas of UNICEF’s work. Section 12 looks at cross-cutting issues and section 13 at operational
and programme management topics. Conclusions are given in section 14, lessons learned in
section 15 and general recommendations in section 16.

For simplicity, in much of the report, UNICEF is used where technically UNICEF Iran or the
UNICEF Country Office should be used. Again for simplicity, the report refers to UNICEF’s
programmes where properly they should be described as UNICEF – supported programmes, or,
in many cases, government programmes supported by UNICEF. UNICEF was and is not
operational in Iran in the sense of running its own projects.

Lessons and recommendations can be found at the end of each section and consolidated in
Annex 7.

¹ The Dessallien report looked at UNICEF’s earthquake responses in Algeria, Morocco and Iran.